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Battle of the Dnieper

The Battle of the Dnieper was a military campaign that

took place in 1943 on the Eastern Front of the World War
II. It was one of the largest operations in the World War
II, involving almost 4,000,000 troops on both sides and
stretching on a 1,400 kilometres (870 mi) long front.[1]
During its four-month duration, the eastern bank of the
Dnieper was recovered from German forces by ve of the
Red Army's fronts, which conducted several assault river
crossings to establish several lodgements on the western
bank. Subsequently, Kiev was liberated in the Battle of

Sumy-Priluki Oensive 26 August 30

September 1943
Poltava-Kremenchug Oensive 26 August 30
September 1943
Donbass Strategic Oensive 13 August 22
September 1943 (Southwestern and Southern
Dnieper airborne assault 24 September - 24 November 1943

One of the costliest operations of the war,[1] the casualties are estimated at being from 1,700,000 to 2,700,000 The second phase of the operation includes :
on both sides.[1] One of the most tragic events took place
Lower Dnieper Oensive 26 September 20 Deduring the establishment of so-called Bukryn lodgement
cember 1943
near the village of Malyi Bukryn (Myronivka Raion).
The Soviet writer and war veteran Viktor Astafyev in
his memoirs was recalling that 25,000 soldiers who enMelitopol Oensive 26 September 5 Novemtered the Dnieper from one side, would exit the river
ber 1943
on the other side in amounts of 5-6,000.[1] Due to great
Zaporizhia Oensive 1014 October 1943
losses, the Dnieper Airborne Assault became the last
Kremenchug-Pyatikhatki Oensive 15 Octomass airborne operation utilized by the Soviet Union dur[1]
ber 3 November 1943
ing the World War II.
Dnepropetrovsk Oensive 23 October 23
Some 2,438 soldiers were awarded the Hero of the Soviet
December 1943
Union which was more than had been awarded previously
Krivoi Rog Oensive 1421 November 1943

since the awards establishment and never again was there

such a big number of laureates.

Apostolovo Oensive 14 November 23 December 1943

During the battle in the Soviet Union a new term Black

Coats appeared.[1][4] It referred to newly mobilized
population from territory newly liberated from Nazi
Germany.[1][4] The Black Coats were used as a human
shield during the campaign.[1][4] Later there appeared a
myth about Zhukov who supposedly wanted to drown all
Ukrainians in the Dnieper.[1]

Nikopol Oensive 14 November 31 December 1943

Aleksandriia-Znamenka Oensive 22 November 9 December 1943
Krivoi Rog Oensive 1019 December 1943
Kiev Strategic Oensive Operation (October) (124
October 1943)


Chernobyl-Radomysl Oensive Operation (1

4 October 1943)

The operation consisted of several phases. The rst phase

of the battle :

Chernobyl-Gornostaipol Defensive Operation

(38 October 1943)

Chernigov-Poltava Strategic Oensive 26 August

1943 30 September 1943 (Central, Voronezh and
Steppe fronts)

Lyutezh Oensive Operation (1124 October

Bukrin Oensive Operation (1215 October

Chernigov-Pripyet Oensive 26 August 30

September 1943

Bukrin Oensive Operation (2124 October


Kiev Strategic Oensive 313 November 1943


beginning of the year. The Ukrainian industrial region

was the rst priority, since it was a densely populated area,
and its coal mines and other ores would provide precious
Rauss November 1943 counterattack
resources for the Soviet state. The main thrust of the
Kiev Strategic Defensive 13 November 22 Decem- oensive was in a southwesterly direction; the northern
ank being largely stabilised, the southern ank rested
ber 1943
on the Sea of Azov.

Strategic situation

3 Planning

Map of the battle of the Dnieper and linked operations

Central Front Konstantin Rokossovsky

Following the Battle of Kursk, the German High Command was no longer in a position to mount large-scale
oensives against the Red Army in the East. During
the long retreat after Kursk, the Wehrmacht 's Heer
and supporting Luftwae forces had managed to cross
the Dnieper river to the West and reestablished the defences along the Wotan fortied line. The crossing of Voronezh Front Nikolai Vatutin
the Dnieper was accomplished by thousands of German
soldiers in small rafts and boats while under continuous
air and ground attack by pursuing Soviet forces. German
losses in men and materil had been considerable, many
of the experienced units were weakened. This meant that
the Wehrmacht forces had to adopt an operational sustained defence against the Soviet Fronts. On occasions
Wehrmacht tactical counter-attacks did meet with considerable success, but this could not be translated into a
return of the strategic initiative lost at Kursk. While the
strength in personnel, materil and logistical support of
the Wehrmacht forces declined, that of the Red Army Steppe Front Ivan Konev
steadily increased, allowing the latter to create an ever
larger numerical superiority for further conducting oensives.
By mid-August, Adolf Hitler understood that the Soviet oensive could not be contained and he ordered
construction of a series of fortications to slow down
the Red Army's oensive capability, demanding that
the Wehrmacht defend the Wotan Line positions on the
Dnieper at all costs.
On the Soviet side, Joseph Stalin was determined to pursue the recovery of the occupied territories, started at the Southwestern Front Rodion Malinovsky


Soviet planning

6th Guards Army, led by Ivan Chistiakov
38th Army, led by Nikandr Chibisov / Kyrylo
Moskalenko (since October)
47th Army, led by Pavel Korzun / Pylyp
Zhmachenko (September - October) / Vitaliy
Polenov (since October)
27th Army, led by Sergei Tromenko
52nd Army, led by Konstantin Koroteev

Southern Front Fyodor Tolbukhin

2nd Air Army, led by Stepan Krasovsky

Steppe Front (known as the 2nd Ukrainian Front after 20 October 1943), commanded by Ivan Konev


Soviet planning

The operation begun on 26 August 1943 soon after the

liberation of Kharkiv[1] (see Belgorod-Khar'kov Oensive Operation). Divisions started to move on a 1,400kilometer front that stretched between Smolensk and the
Sea of Azov.

Southwestern Front (known as the 3rd Ukrainian

Front after 20 October 1943), commanded by
Rodion Malinovsky
Southern Front (known as the 4th Ukrainian Front
after 20 October 1943), commanded by Fyodor Tolbukhin

The operation involved ve fronts:

Overall, the operation would be executed by 36 Com Central Front (known as the Belorussian Front af- bined Arms, four Tank and ve Air Armies. 2,650,000
ter 20 October 1943), commanded by Konstantin personnel were brought into the ranks for this massive
Rokossovsky and accounted for 579,600 soldiers
operation. The operation would use 51,000 guns, 2,400
tanks and 2,850 planes.
2nd Tank Army, led by Aleksei Rodin /
The Dnieper is the third largest river in Europe, second
Semyon Bogdanov (since September)
only to the Volga and the Danube. In its lower part,
9th Tank Corps, led by Hryhoriy Rudchenko its width can easily reach three kilometres, and being
(KIA), Boris Bakharov
dammed in several places made it even larger. More 60th Army, led by Ivan Chernyakhovsky
over, its western shore the one still to be retaken
was much higher and steeper than the eastern, complicat 13th Army, led by Nikolay Pukhov
ing the oensive even further. In addition, the opposite
65th Army, led by Pavel Batov
shore was transformed into a vast complex of defenses
and fortications held by the Wehrmacht.
61st Army, led by Pavel Belov
48th Army, led by Prokoy Romanenko
70th Army, led by Ivan Galanin / Vladimir
Sharapov (September - October) / Aleksei
Grechkin (since October)
16th Air Army, led by Serhiy Rudenko
Voronezh Front (known as the 1st Ukrainian Front
after 20 October 1943), commanded by Nikolai
Vatutin and accounted for 665,500 soldiers
3rd Guards Tank Army, led by Pavlo Rybalko

Faced with such a situation, the Soviet commanders had

two options. The rst would be to give themselves time
to regroup their forces, nd a weak point or two to exploit (not necessarily in the lower part of the Dnieper),
stage a breakthrough and encircle the German defenders,
rendering the defence line next to useless (very much like
the German Panzers bypassed the Maginot line in 1940).
This, however, would give them time to get more reserves
and furthermore, would expose the Soviet troops to outanking mechanized attacks - every Soviet commanders
nightmare since 1941.

1st Tank Army, led by Mikhail Katukov

The second option would be to stage a massive assault

4th Guard Tank Corps, led by Pavel Polubo- without waiting, and force the Dnieper on a broad front.
This option left no additional time for the German deyarov
fenders, but would lead to much larger casualties. For
1st Guard Cavalry Corps, led by Viktor Bara- political reasons (Stalin wanted Kiev to be retaken on 7
November), the second option was chosen.
5th Guards Army, led by Aleksei Zhadov
The assault was staged on a 300-kilometer front almost
4th Guards Army, led by Hryhoriy Kulyk / simultaneously. All available means of transport were to
Aleksei Zygin (KIA) / Ivan Galanin
be used to transport the attackers to the opposite shore,


including small shing boats and improvised rafts of bar- 3.2.1 German organisation
rels and trees (like the one in the photograph). The preparation of the crossing equipment was further complicated
2nd Army - Walter Wei
by the German scorched earth strategy with the total destruction of all boats and raft building material in the area.
Luftotte 2 (selected units) - Wolfram Freiherr von
The crucial issue would obviously be heavy equipment.
Without it, the bridgeheads would not stand for long.
(in Ukraine) Army Group South - Erich von


German planning

Main article: Panther-Wotan line

The order to construct the Dnieper defence complex,

4th Panzer Army - Gotthard Heinrici

1st Panzer Army - Eberhard von Mackensen
8th Army - Otto Wohler
6th Army - Karl-Adolf Hollidt
Luftotte 4 - Wolfram Freiherr von
Richthofen / Otto Deloch (since September)

(in Crimea) Army Group A - Ewald von Kleist

17. Armee - Jaenecke

4 Description of the strategic operation

4.1 Initial attack
Despite a great superiority in numbers, the oensive was
by no means easy. German opposition was ferocious
and the ghting raged for every town and city. The
Wehrmacht made extensive use of rear guards, leaving
some troops in each city and on each hill, slowing down
the Soviet oensive.
Army Group South Erich von Manstein

4.2 Progress of the oensive

known as Eastern Wall, was issued on 11 August 1943 Three weeks after the start of the oensive, and despite
and began to be immediately executed.
heavy losses on the Soviet side, it became clear that the
Fortications were erected along the length of the Germans could not hope to contain the Soviet oensive in
Dnieper. However, there was no hope of completing such the at, open terrain of the steppes, where the Red Armys
an extensive defensive line in the short time available. numerical strength would prevail. Manstein asked for as
Therefore, the completion of the Eastern Wall was not many as 12 new divisions in the hope of containing the
uniform in its density and depth of fortications. Instead, Soviet oensive but German reserves were perilously
they were concentrated in areas where a Soviet assault- thin. Years later, Manstein wrote in his memoirs:
crossing were most likely to be attempted, such as near
Kremenchuk, Zaporizhia and Nikopol.
After analysing this situation, I concluded
Additionally, on 7 September 1943, the SS forces and
the Wehrmacht received orders to strip the areas they had
to abandon from anything that could be used by the Red
Army to slow it down, and to try to create supply shortages
for the Soviet forces by implementing a scorched earth

that we can't keep the Donbass with the forces

that we already possess, and that even a greater
danger for the whole Eastern Front is being created on the north ank of the group. The 8th
and 4th Armies won't be able to contain the Soviet oensive for very long.



Dnieper airborne operation

Decisive action

As a result, on 15 September 1943, Hitler ordered Army

Group South to retreat to the Dnieper defence line.
The battle for Poltava was especially bitter. The city was
heavily fortied and its garrison well prepared. After a
few inconclusive days that greatly slowed down the Soviet
oensive, Marshal Konev decided to bypass the city and
rush towards the Dnieper. After two days of violent urban
warfare, the Poltava garrison was overcome.
Towards the end of September 1943, Soviet forces
reached the lower part of the Dnieper. The hardest part
was still to come, though.


Dnieper airborne operation

(The following is, largely, a synopsis of an account by

Glantz[6] with support from an account by Staskov.[7] )
STAVKA (the Soviet high command), detached the
Central Front's 3rd Tank Army to the Voronezh Front
to race the weakening Germans to the Dnieper, to save
the wheat crop from the German scorched earth policy,
and to achieve strategic or operational river bridgeheads
before a German defence could stabilize there. The
3rd Tank Army, plunging headlong, reached the river
on the night of 2122 September and, on the 23rd, Soviet infantry forces crossed by swimming and by using
makeshift rafts to secure small, fragile bridgeheads, opposed only by 120 German Cherkassy ak academy NCO
candidates and the hard-pressed 19th Panzer Division
Reconnaissance Battalion. Those forces were the only
Germans within 60 km of the Dnieper loop. Only a heavy
German air attack and a lack of bridging equipment kept
Soviet heavy weaponry from crossing and expanding the
STAVKA, sensing a critical juncture, ordered a hasty airborne corps assault to increase the size of the bridgehead
before the Germans could counterattack. On the 21st,
the Voronezh Fronts 1st, 3rd and 5th Guards Airborne
Brigades got the urgent call to secure, on the 23rd, a
bridgehead perimeter 15 to 20 km wide and 30 km deep
on the Dnieper loop between Kaniv and Rzhishchev,
while Front elements forced the river.

expected capacities), the master loading plan, ruined,
was abandoned. Many radios and supplies got left behind. In the best case, it would take three lifts to deliver
the two brigades. Units (still arriving by the over-taxed
rail system), were loaded piecemeal onto returned aircraft, which were slow to refuel owing to the less-thanexpected capacities of fuel trucks. Meanwhile, alreadyarrived troops changed planes, seeking earlier ights. Urgency and the fuel shortage prevented aerial assembly
aloft. Most aircraft, as soon as they were loaded and fueled, ew in single le, instead of line abreast, to the dropping points. Assault waves became as intermingled as the
units they carried.
As corps elements made their 170 to 220 km ights from
four of ve elds (one of which received no fuel), troops
(half of whom had never jumped, except from training
towers) got briefed on drop zones, assembly areas and
objectives only poorly understood by platoon commanders still studying new orders. Meanwhile, Soviet aerial
photography, suspended several days by bad weather,
had missed the strong reinforcement of the area, early
that afternoon. Non-combat cargo pilots ferrying 3rd
Brigade through drizzle expected no resistance beyond
river pickets but, instead, were met by anti-aircraft re
and starshells from the 19th Panzer Division (only coincidentally transiting the drop zone, and just one of six
divisions and other formations ordered, on the 21st, to
ll the gap in front of the 3rd Tank Army). Lead aircraft,
disgorging paratroopers over Dubari at 1930, came under
small arms, machine gun, and quad-20 anti-aircraft re
from the armored personnel carrier battalion (Pioneers)
of the 73rd Panzer Grenadier Regiment and elements of
the division sta of 19th Panzer Division. Some paratroops began returning re and throwing grenades even
before landing; trailing aircraft accelerated, climbed and
evaded, dropping wide. Through the night, some pilots
avoided starshell-lit drop points entirely, and 13 aircraft
returned to airelds without having dropped at all. Intending a 10 by 14 km drop over largely undefended terrain, the Soviets instead achieved a 30 by 90 km drop over
the fastest mobile elements of two German corps.

On the ground, the Germans used white parachutes as

beacons to hunt down and kill disorganized groups and
to gather and destroy airdropped supplies. Supply bonres, glowing embers, and multi-color starshells illuminated the bizarre and macabre battleeld. Captured docThe arrival of personnel at the airelds was slow, neces- uments gave the Germans enough knowledge of Soviet
sitating, on the 23rd, a one-day delay and omission of objectives to arrive at most of them before the disorga1st Brigade from the plan; consequent mission changes nized paratroops.
caused near chaos in command channels. Mission change
orders nally got down to company commanders, on the Back at the Soviet airelds, the fuel shortage allowed only
24th, just 15 minutes before their units, not yet provi- 298 of 500 planned sorties, leaving corps 45mm anti-tank
sioned with spades, anti-tank mines, or ponchos for the guns and 2,017 paratroops undelivered. Of 4,575 men
autumn night frosts, assembled on airelds to load for an dropped (seventy percent of the planned number, and just
1830 take-o. Owing to the weather, not all assigned air- 1,525 from 5th Brigade), some 2,300 eventually assemcraft had arrived at airelds on time (if at all). Further, bled into 43 ad-hoc groups, with missions abandoned as
most ight safety ocers disallowed maximum loading hopeless, and spent most of their time seeking supplies
of their aircraft. Given fewer aircraft (and lower than not yet destroyed by the Germans. Others joined with


the nine partisan groups operating in the area. About 230

made it over (or out of) the Dnieper to Front units (or
were originally dropped there). Most of the rest were almost casually captured that rst night or killed the next
day (although, on that rst night, the 3rd Co, 73rd Panzer
Grenadier Regiment, suered heavy losses while annihilating about 150 paratroopers near Grushevo, some 3 km
west of Dubari).

4.6 The assault-crossings

The rst bridgehead on the Dniepers western shore was

established on 22 September 1943 at the conuence of
the Dnieper and Pripyat rivers, in the northern part of the
front. On 24 September, another bridgehead was created
near Dniprodzerzhynsk, another on 25 September near
Dnipropetrovsk and yet another on 28 September near
The Germans underestimated that 1,500 to 2,000 had Kremenchuk. By the end of the month, 23 bridgeheads
dropped; they recorded 901 paratroops captured and were created on the western side, some of them 10 kilokilled in the rst 24 hours. Thereafter, they largely ig- meters wide and 1-2 kilometres deep.
nored the Soviet paratroopers, to counterattack and trun- The crossing of the Dnieper was extremely dicult. Solcate the Dnieper bridgeheads. The Germans deemed diers used every available oating device to cross the
their anti-paratrooper operations completed by 2100 on river, under heavy German re and taking heavy losses.
the 26th, although a modicum of opportunistic actions Once across, Soviet troops had to dig themselves into the
against garrisons, rail lines, and columns were conducted clay ravines composing the Dniepers western bank.
by remnants up to early November. For a lack of manpower to clear all areas, forests of the region would re4.7 Securing the lodgements
main a minor threat.
The Germans called the operation a fundamentally sound
idea ruined by the dilettantism of planners lacking expert
knowledge (but praised individual paratroops for their
tenacity, bayonet skills and deft use of broken ground in
the sparsely wooded northern region). STAVKA deemed
this second (and, ultimately, last) corps drop a complete
failure; lessons they knew they had already learned from
their winter oensive corps drop at Viazma had not stuck.
They would never trust themselves to try it again.
Soviet 5th Guards Airborne Brigade commander
Sidorchuk, withdrawing to the forests south, eventually
amassed a brigade-size command, half paratroops,
half partisans; he obtained air supply, and assisted the
2nd Ukrainian Front over the Dnieper near Cherkassy
to nally link up with Front forces on 15 November.
After 13 more days combat, the airborne element was
evacuated, ending a harrowing two months. More than
sixty percent never returned.


Assault-crossing the Dnieper

Soviet soldiers attacking on a lodgement in October 1943

German troops soon launched heavy counterattacks on almost every bridgehead, hoping to annihilate them before
heavy equipment could be transported across the river.
For instance, the Borodaevsk lodgement, mentioned by
Marshal Konev in his memoirs, came under heavy armored attack and air assault. Bombers attacked both
the lodgement and the reinforcements crossing the river.
Konev complained at once about a lack of organization of
Soviet air support, set up air patrols to prevent bombers
from approaching the lodgements and ordered forward
more artillery to counter tank attacks from the opposite
shore. When Soviet aviation became more organized and
hundreds of guns and Katyusha rocket launchers began
ring, the situation started to improve and the bridgehead
was eventually preserved.
Such battles were commonplace on every lodgement. Although all the lodgements were held, losses were terrible
at the beginning of October, most divisions were at only
25 to 50% of their nominal strength.

4.8 Lower Dnieper Oensive

Soviet soldiers preparing rafts to cross the Dnieper (the sign reads
Onwards to Kiev!")

By mid-October, the forces accumulated on the lower

Dnieper bridgeheads were strong enough to stage a
rst massive attack to denitely secure the rivers west-

Incidentally, between 28 November and 1 December
1943 the Teheran conference was held between Winston
Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Stalin. The Battle
of the Dnieper, along with other major oensives staged
in 1943, certainly gave Stalin a dominant position for negotiating with his Allies.

7 Casualties debate
The Wehrmacht delivers re across the Dnieper

ern shore in the southern part of the front. Therefore, a vigorous attack was staged on the KremenchukDnipropetrovsk line. Simultaneously, a major diversion
was conducted in the south to draw German forces away
both from the Lower Dnieper and from Kiev.
At the end of the oensive, Soviet forces controlled a
bridgehead 300 kilometers wide and up to 80 kilometers
deep in some places. In the south, the Crimea was now
cut o from the rest of the German forces. Any hope of
stopping the Red Army on the Dniepers east bank was


Stalins determination to recover Kiev before 7 November has raised quite a few criticisms among historians.
It is commonly accepted now that the bridgeheads on
the Lower Dnieper were deliberately left alone to draw
German forces from Kiev, resulting in heavy losses.
While this hypothesis could be true to some extent, one
must not forget that the action of establishing a bridgehead alone is dangerous enough and can (and usually
does) lead to heavy casualties.


The Battle of the Dnieper was another defeat for the

Wehrmacht that required it to restabilize the front further
West. The Red Army, which Hitler hoped to contain at
the Dnieper, forced the Wehrmacht 's defences. Kiev was
recaptured and German troops lacked the forces to annihilate Soviet troops on the Lower Dnieper bridgeheads.
The west bank was still in German hands for the most
part, but both sides knew that it would not last for long.

Casualties during the Battle of the Dnieper are still a subject of heavy debate. Some sources give very low gures (200,000 to 300,000 total casualties), which is much
lower than for instance, the Battle of Kursk. However,
given the duration of the campaign and the huge area
involved, more than one historian argues that the losses
involved were huge, easily reaching or even surpassing
those at the Stalingrad, but going unnoticed because of
the large operational area (and of the aura of fame enveloping the latter). The death toll also depends on the
time frame considered. It also depends on whether the
toll of the Battle of Smolensk, which was fought to draw
German forces away from the area in which the Dnieper
battle would be held, is included in the total.
On the subject of Soviet casualties, Nikola Shefov in his
Russian ghts puts the gure of 373,000 killed in action
(KIA) and more than 1,500,000 total Soviet casualties.
British historian John Erickson, in his Barbarossa: The
Axis and the Allies, puts a gure of 173,201 Soviets KIA,
during a time frame from 26 September to 20 December
1943, therefore not taking into account the period from
24 August to 26 September. Glantz/House 'When Titans Clashed' put a gure of 428,000 total losses (103,000
KIA) during 26 August to 30 September (ChernigovPoltava Operation) and 754,000 total losses (173,000
KIA) during 26 September and 20 December.
Given the heavy German resistance even before the
Dnieper forced-crossing, this gure seems a low estimate (Soviet sources estimate casualties from the postKursk oensive alone at 250,000 killed, wounded and
captured), the gure of over 300,000 KIA could seem
correct, with the wounded in action number following the
3:1 empiric ratio.

German losses, however, are more dicult to evaluate.

The simple rule of 3:1 losses during an oensive operation against a heavily defended enemy would lead to a
500,000 toll, matching the one at Kursk. Shefov and
Additionally, the Battle of the Dnieper demonstrated the other Soviet/Russian historians quote casualties as high
strength of the Soviet partisan movement. The "rail war" as 1,500,000.
operation staged during September and October 1943 The Battle of the Dnieper is listed among the most lethal
struck German logistics very hard, creating heavy supply battles in world history.


[1] Liberation of Kiev and battle of the Dnieper. How it was.

PHOTO. Ukrayinska Pravda. 6 November 2013
[3] Nikolai Shefov, Russian ghts, Lib. Military History,
Moscow, 2002
[4] Parkhomenko, V. Didn't burn in re, didn't drown in
Dnieper. Ukrayinska Pravda. 3 May 2011
[5] Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, oscow, 1957.
[6] The History of Soviet Airborne Forces, Chapter 8, Across
The Dnieper (September 1943), by David M. Glantz,
Cass, 1994. (portions online)
[7] 1943 Dnepr airborne operation: lessons and conclusions
Military Thought, July 2003, by Nikolai Viktorovich
Staskov. (online) See ref at Army (Soviet Army) under
40th Army entry.

David M. Glantz, Jonathan M. House, When Titans
Clashed:how the Red Army stopped Hitler, University Press of Kansas, 1995
Nikolai Shefov, Russian ghts, Lib. Military History, Moscow, 2002
History of Great Patriotic War, 1941 1945.
oscow, 1963
John Erickson, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies,
Edinburgh University Press, 1994
Marshal Konev, Notes of a front commander', Science, Moscow, 1972.
Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, oscow, 1957.



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