SPOUSES BENATIRO vs HEIRS OF CUYOS

FACTS:
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos had nine
children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria,
Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died
leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu.
Before the CFI, after filing a petition to have herself appointed
administrator, and after filing an opposition thereto, Gloria & Fransisco,
assisted by their corresponding counsels, agreed to have Gloria
appointed as administratrix of the estate & letters of administration of
the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria
Cuyos Talian after posting a nominal bond of P1,000.00. The Clerk of
Court, Atty. Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the
agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition. In his
Commissioners report dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he
issued subpoena supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause
their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon,
Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a
conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine
heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to
attend. He reported that those who were present agreed not to
partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it
for the sum of P40,000.00 & divide the proceeds equally. Columba
bought the properties.
The CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of the
estate based on Glorias absence & change of residence. The Court
ordered the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale after the
payment of the sum ofP36,000 which shall remain in custodia legis,
then divided among the heirs after payment of necessary taxes.
Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of land in
favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum of P36,000.00. Original
Certificates of Titles were issued in favor of the latter.
In Feb 1998, Gloria, Patrocenia , Numeriano, Enrique & Salud filed with
the CA a petition for annulment of the order of the CFI of Cebu, alleging
that the CFIs order was null and void and of no effect, the same being
based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and
irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in

claiming their share of their father's estate, clearly showing that

extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.
The CA granted the petition and declared the CFI order & the
Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro null
& void, hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON extrinsic fraud existed in the case at bar serving as a
sufficient ground to annul the CFIs order.
HELD: The Court held that the CFI;s order should be annulled not on
the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold
Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that
the assailed order is void for lack of due process.
Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that: Grounds for
annulment of judgment. The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
However, jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional
ground therefor.
The veracity of Atty. Taneos report was doubtful. There was no
evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of
arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they
were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of
the alleged meeting. The Commissioner's Report, which embodied the
alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the
alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto.It was
imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be
heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests. The CFI
adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the
signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI's order
based on a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of
due process.
The CFI's order being null and void may be assailed anytime, the
respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration in
annulling the assailed order. An action to declare the nullity of a void
judgment does not prescribe. Since the CFI judgment is void, it has no
legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the
Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void

judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the
subsequent transfers are void ab initio.
The petition was denied

AVELINO VS. CA
FACTS:
In 1989, Antonio Avelino, Sr. died intestate. In 1991, his daughter,
Maria Socorro Avelino filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of his deceased father. All the other heirs
however opposed the petition and they moved that the petition be
converted into an action for judicial partition of the said estate. The
trial court granted the oppositions motion and so Socorros petition
was converted accordingly. Socorros motion for reconsideration was
denied. Socorro then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in granting the other
heirs motion. The Court of Appeals found no reversible error. Socorro
elevated the petition to the Supreme Court. She insists that a partition
cannot be had because the extent of the estate is not yet determined
hence an administration proceeding is still needed. She also insists
that the Rules of Court does not provide for a conversion of a petition
for administration to an action for partition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Socorros petition for the issuance of letters of
administration may be converted into an action for judicial partition.
HELD: Yes. This can be based on Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court. Where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to
the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled
to submit to administration proceedings. In this case, all the heirs, with
the exception of Socorro, agreed to judicial partition as they see it to
be the more convenient method. There is no merit to the contention of
Socorro that a partition cannot be had because the extent of the estate
is not yet determined. The extent of the estate can actually be
determined during the partition proceedings. Therefore, the trial court
made no error in converting Socorros petition to an action for judicial
partition.

PACIOLES vs. CHUATOCO-CHING

FACTS:
Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated
value of P10.5 million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank
deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain
businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner, and their
two minor children. Milio Pacioles husband of deceased Miguelita filed
with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelitas estate.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds that
petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an
administrator; and the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed of
paraphernal properties.
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that
the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate. Respondent
countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on
condition that both of them would undertake whatever business
endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners. She
then nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special
administrator.
The intestate court then issued an order appointing petitioner and
Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate and then
declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory
heirs of Miguelita. Petitioner then submitted to the intestate court an
inventory of Miguelitas estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.

Petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion that an

Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition
and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3)
payment of attorneys fees. Respondent opposed on the ground that
the partition and distribution of the estate is premature and
precipitate, considering that there is yet no determination whether
the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or
owned in a joint venture. Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk
of Miguelitas estate as an heir and co-owner. She prayed that a
hearing be scheduled.
The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and
attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for partition and
distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed premature. It also
ordered that a hearing on oppositors claim as indicated in her
opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine whether
the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are
entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a
co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their
partnership venture.
Petitioner questioned this order but the MR was denied. The Petition for
Certiorari with the CA. This is a Petition for Certiorari to the CA.
ISSUE: Did the lower court acted with GADALEJ in ordering that a
hearing be set to determine the ownership of the properties in an
intestate proceeding?
HELD: YES May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and
pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be
part of the decedents estate?
The general rule is that the intestate court cannot hear and pass upon
questions of ownership. However the intestate court may hear and
pass upon questions of ownership provisionally and when merely
incidental if the purpose is to determine whether or not a property
should be included in the inventory of he estate of the deceased. But
this case does not fall under the above mentioned deviation from the
general rule, thus the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
ordering that a hearing be set for determining the ownership of the
properties in question.

The facts of this case show that the inventory is not disputed. In fact,
in respondents Manifestation and Opposition, respondent expressly
adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner. Respondent could have
opposed petitioners inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific
properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of
doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to
the low valuation placed on the real estate properties. Also, Emmanuel,
respondents son and representative, did not submit his own inventory
Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the
intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be
included in the inventory. She wanted to secure from the intestate
court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties
comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of
general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum
for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties
ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate given that she had Torrens
title over such properties. (Miguela cannot even determine in particular
the properties she is claiming.

MESUGAS vs. REYES

FACTS:
Petitioner Anita Reyes-Mesugas and respondent Alejandro A. Reyes are
the children of Lourdes Aquino Reyes and Pedro N. Reyes. Lourdes died
intestate, leaving to her heirs, among others, three parcels of land.
Sometime on February 2000, respondent filed a petition for settlement
of the estate of Lourdes, praying for his appointment as administrator
due to alleged irregularities and fraudulent transactions by the other
heirs. Petitioner, her father Pedro and Arturo, a sibling of the petitioner,
opposed the petition. On August 30, 2000, a compromise
agreement was entered into by the parties whereby the estate of
Lourdes was partitioned, to which the RTC of Makati rendered a
judgment in accordance of it.
Sometime in December 2004 petitioner filed a motion to
cancel lis pendens annotation in the TCT No. 24475 in the RTC in view

of the finality of judgment in the settlement of the estate. Petitioner

argued that the settlement of the estate proceeding had terminated;
hence, the annotation of lis pendens could already be cancelled since it
had served its purpose.
Respondent opposed the motion and claimed that the parties, in
addition to the compromise agreement, executed side agreements
which had yet to be fulfilled. One such agreement was executed
between petitioner and respondent granting respondent a one-meter
right of way on the lot covered by TCT No. 24475. However, petitioner
refused to give the right of way and threatened to build a concrete
structure to prevent access. He argued that, unless petitioner
permitted the inscription of the right of way on the certificate of title
pursuant to their agreement, the notice of lis pendens in TCT No.
24475 must remain.
In its order, the RTC of Makati denied the motion to cancel the notice
of lis pendens annotation for lack of sufficient merit. It found that the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was unnecessary as there
were reasons for maintaining it in view of petitioner's non-compliance
with the alleged right of way agreement between the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the probate court (RTC of Makati) can could
touch upon the issue of cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotation.
HELD: No. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. Once submitted to the court and stamped with judicial
approval, it becomes more than a mere private contract binding upon
the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its
determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any
judgment.
Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise
agreement is immediately executory as there is no appeal from such
judgment. When both parties enter into an agreement to end a
pending litigation and request that a decision be rendered approving
said agreement, such action constitutes an implied waiver of the right
to appeal against the said decision.
In this instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of Lourdes. The RTC therefore took
cognizance of the case as a probate court.

Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited

jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to the estate but never on the
rights to property arising from the contract It approves contracts
entered into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is
by fiat of the Rules of Court. It is apparent therefore that when the RTC
approved the compromise agreement on September 13, 2000, the
settlement of the estate proceeding came to an end.
Moreover, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled when the
annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused
it to be recorded. The compromise agreement did not mention the
grant of a right of way to respondent.
Any agreement other than the judicially approved compromise
agreement between the parties was outside the limited jurisdiction of
the probate court. Thus, any other agreement entered into by the
petitioner and respondent with regard to a grant of a right of way was
not within the jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a probate court.
Therefore, there was no reason for the RTC not to cancel the notice
of lis pendens on TCT No. 24475 as respondent had no right which
needed to be protected. Any alleged right arising from the side
agreement on the right of way can be fully protected by filing an
ordinary action for specific performance in a court of general
jurisdiction.