Civil Law Review (Family Code)

San Beda College of Law CIVIL LAW REVIEW FAMILY CODE
DIVORCE (Art. 26)

ENGRACE NIAL v. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000
FACTS:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born four children, the petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was
void for lack of a marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Was the subsequent marriage void for lack of a marriage license despite
cohabiting as husband and wife for at least five years?
2. May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?
RULING:
1. YES. At the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said
that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living
with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It
is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage
even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between
the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife".
The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
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distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing
their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their
privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
2. YES. The law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either
party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
GRACE J. GARCIA v. REDERICK A. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife
in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree
of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was
solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since
October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998,
claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with
Editha Samson.
ISSUE:
Is the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio admissible as evidence
to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy?
RULING:
NO. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not
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take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence. Thus, the Supreme Court remands
the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial
evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743, 6 February 2007
FACTS:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six children. Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin. However, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimos estate. She also filed a petition for letters of
administration. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo
by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.
Respondent presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void
ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos
marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
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ISSUE:
Is the decree of divorce obtained in the US by deceaseds second wife,
automatically recognized in the Philippines?
RULING:
NO. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law
and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and
the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show
that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in
Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and prove.
VAN DORN v. ROMILLO, JR.
No. L-68470, 8 October 1985
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in
1972. After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines
and begot two children. The parties were subsequently divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982. Alice Reyes Van Dorn has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Upton filed suit against petitioner stating that Van Dorns business in Ermita,
Manila is a conjugal property of the parties, and asked that Van Dorn be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Upton be declared
with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein private respondent
had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case
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on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that
the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject
of this certiorari proceeding.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community
of property. For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by
the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Is the divorce decree obtained by Upton in Nevada valid and binding in the
Philippines?
RULING:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has
to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
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PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA
G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Geiling, a German
national, got married in Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough,
and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella was born. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual
recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany,
which later promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to
said respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia as and
with yet another man named Jesus Chua.
ISSUE:
Can private respondent Erich Geiling file the criminal case for adultery against
petitioner?
Ruling:
NO. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as
well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon
a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. In other words, only
the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action
therefor. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the matter of status of persons. Under the same considerations and
rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
EDGAR SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 134029, 6 February 2007
FACTS:
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo) was the former governor of the Province of
Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968,
Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen,
filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
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Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On
June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she
filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner
Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismisson the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.
ISSUE:
Can a Filipino, who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad validly remarry
under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988?
RULING:
YES. The Court noted that it need not retroactively apply the provisions of the
Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative. The Court cited the
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., which involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved
through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce
was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in
the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse
had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.
Moreover, the Court noted that the same doctrine was applied in the case of
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. Also, citing the
case of Republic v. Orcebido, the Court maintained that the legislative intent
behind Art 26(2) of the Family Code may be traced to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.
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Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRASUS L. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005
Facts:
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997.
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial
Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children. Barely a
year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from
her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the
said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the
letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with
whom she eventually had a child.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She
asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and
was now married to Stephen Micklus. After securing a divorce from
respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired
American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband
was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC
declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void.
On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. Petitioner
Republic, believing that the Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
applicable to the case at bar.
Ruling:
NO. According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
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alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein
one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner
at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation,
the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his
wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself
admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after
which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was
still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition,
and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws,
then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005
FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and
her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
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In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and
her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating
him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?
RULING:
YES. Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter
of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
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In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 124371, 23 November 2000
FACTS:
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married before a
parish priest in Nabua, Camarines Sur.
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship
and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the
United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,
Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and
he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and
was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino
Llorente.
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her . He then returned to the
United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior
Court of the State of California. On November 27, 1951, the court issued an
interlocutory judgment of divorce.
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.
Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and on January 16, 1958 married Alicia
F. Llorente in Manila.
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and
wife.Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children.
Lorenzo filed for probate and allowance of his last will and testament but
before the proceedings could be terminated , Lorenzo died.
Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over
Lorenzos estate in her favor contending that she was Lorenzos surviving
spouse, that such properties were acquired during their marriage and that
Lorenzos will would encroach her legitime.
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On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial
court gave due course to Paulas petition.
ISSUE:
Is the divorce decree obtained by Lorenzo, a filipino who obtained foreign
citizenship, valid and cognizable under Philippine laws?
RULING:
YES. Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the
time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his
will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed
by foreign law.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
But the hasty disregard of both the RTC and CA of Lorenzos Will by calling to
the fore the RENVOI doctrine, claiming that American law follows domiciliary
rule is unjustified. There is no such thing as American law for the whole nation
of the US, for the country comprises of a group of States, each State having
its own applicable law, enforceable only within that state.
As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence reiterates that once it is
proven that an individual is no longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he
obtains a divorce abroad, its effects shall be recognized in the Philippines.
The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity.
Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are
issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is reversed. Court
REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
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validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial
court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the
deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689, 19 October 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
He alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent
sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived
as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely" and
his sex from "male" to "female." The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which in turn, rendered a decision
in favor of the Republic. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
May a person's sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment?
Ruling:
NO. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
There is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the
entries in his birth certificate. The changes sought by petitioner will have
serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even
the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner's first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of
the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant
the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man
with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and
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the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner's petition
were to be granted.
VOID MARRIAGE
CHI MING TSOI v. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997
FACTS:
Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the
Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Ginas expectations that the
newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each
other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned
his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first
night, second, third and fourth night.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same
room and on the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of
sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the
annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina
alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
him his penis (clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect).
Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made and according to
him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts she always removed
his hands.
ISSUE:
Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner
a psychological incapacity?
RULING:
YES. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign
of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of
the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one
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of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the
sanction therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act
of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the
mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
REPUBLIC v. MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997
FACTS:
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which
union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Are irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute
psychological incapacity?
RULING:
NO. Laid down hereinbelow are specific guidelines in interpreting and
applying Art. 36, to wit:
(a) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the existence of the
marriage and against its nullity.
(b) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (1) medically or
clinically identified; (2) alleged in the com-plaint; (3) sufficiently proven by
experts; and (4) clearly explained in the decision.
(c) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage,'' although the manifestation need not be perceivable at such
time.
(d) The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable, although the incurability may be relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
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Furthermore, the incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not to those not related to marriage like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job.
(e) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(f) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts. 68-71 of
the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Arts. 220-225, same
Code, in regard to parents and their children. Such non-compliance must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the text of the
decision.
(g) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling, should be given great
respect by our courts.
(h) The trial court must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as
counsel for the State. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. The
Solicitor General and the fiscal shall submit such certification to the court
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is submitted for resolution.
In the case at bar, finding that there was no psychological incapacity on the
part of the respondent-husband but more a difficulty'' if not outright refusal''
or neglect'' in the performance of some marital duties, and that the evidence
merely showed that the parties could not get along with each other, the
Supreme Court denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
petitioner-wife.
MARCOS v. MARCOS
G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000
FACTS:
The spouses first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at
the Malacaang Palace, through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts and then were married. The
wife alleged that after the downfall of President Marcos, her husband left the
military service and then engaged in different business ventures that did not
however prosper. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they
would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He
would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would
also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their
cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to
stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house,
she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting
physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The
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following day, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her
sister's house.
The appellee submitted herself to psychologist for psychological evaluation
while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children,
x x x. The ruling of the trial court was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE:
1. Was the CA correct in reversing the trial court as to its findings of the
psychology incapacity of the respondent in the action for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the basis that the respondent did not subject himself to
psychological evaluation.
2. Was the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including
the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the
social worker -- enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
RULING:
1. NO. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is
no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require
that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
2. NO. The alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and
not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
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pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void. Because Article 36 has been abused as a
convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for
its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
NOEL BUENAVENTURA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127358, 31 March 2005
FACTS:
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by petitioner Noel
Buenaventura on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. Petitioner, with leave of
court, amended the petition stating that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Respondent denied the allegation that she was psychologically
incapacitated. The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio and ordered,
among others:
1.
Plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million
pesos, exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date
of decision plus attorneys fees of 100,000.
2.
Liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property,
particularly plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits from the Far East Bank
and Trust Company and shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies, and ceding (50%) of the net amount of
retirement benefits and outstanding shares, respectively.
The damages were awarded on the basis of Article 21, 2217 and 2229 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Petitioner assails the trials court decision on the ground that damages arising
as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. Petitioner also assailed
the decision the trial court ordering him to cede of his retirement benefits
and outstanding shares of stock.
ISSUES:
1. Is the award of damages and attorneys fees proper in case of declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity?
2. What property relations govern the parties to a void marriage who do not
have legal impediment to contract marriage?
RULING:
1. NO. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By
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declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of
moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this
case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and
discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent.
Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
The award for attorneys fees is likewise not proper.
2. The property relation is CO-OWNERSHIP under Article 147 of the Family
Code. Under this regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household. Unlike in conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the
couples separate property are not included in the co-ownership. Thus, the
order giving respondent the share of retirement benefits and outstanding
shares of stock is sustained but on the basis of liquidation, partition and
distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership
of gains.
BOBIS v. BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000
FACTS:
Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, Isagani
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. An information
for bigamy was filed against respondent Isagani. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first
marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second
marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension
of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the
Family Code.
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ISSUE:
Is the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy?
RULING:
NO. Parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their
marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent
courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an
element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is
why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the
courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity.
Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question.
MORIGO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Berrete were married on August 30, 1990 in
Bohol. Sometime in 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada and left
Lucio behind. On August 19,1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition
for divorce against Lucio which was granted on January 17, 1992 and took
effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, Lucio married Maria Lumbago. Lucio then filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lucia on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucio was, however,
charged with bigamy. The trial court discounted his claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. It further held that want of a
valid ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy.
Froilan filed an appeal with the CA. While the same was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision on the civil case declaring
the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio. The appellate court,
however, affirmed the judgment of conviction ratiocinating that what the RPC
seeks to punish is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first
marriage has been dissolved. It held that the fact the first marriage was void
from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
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Both the trial court and CA ruled that the divorce obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity as it was contrary to public
policy.
ISSUE:
Is Morigo guilty of bigamy?
RULING:
NO. First, in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy
thus:
a.
the offender has been legally married;
b.
the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
c.
he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
d.
the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been
for the existence of the first.
Second, the mere private act of singing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired
was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence
of a solemnizing officer. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that
the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Berrete. Thus, there is no
first marriage to speak of.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v.
Tan where it was held that a judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. It
bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just one, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage
certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
OFELIA GOMEZ v. LIPANA
G.R. No. L-23214, 30 June 1970
Facts:
The defendant-appelant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the
first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y
Aquino in 1935. At the time of the seocond marriage, the first was still
subsisting, whcih fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife.
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On December 17, 1943, the spouse of the second marriage acquired by
purchase a piece of land in Cubai, Quezon city, for the price of P3,000.00.
The Torrens Title for the property was issued in the name of Joaquin Lipana
married to Isidra Gomez. Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, survived
only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. Ofelia Gomez, judicial
administrator of her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the
forfeiture of the husbands share in the Cubao property in favor of the sid
estate. Reliance was placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil code, the Spanish
text of which provides:
La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al
ser declarado nulo.
El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de la nulidad, no
tendra parte en los bienes gananciales.
The society of joint property concludes after the marriage dissolves or
on having been declared void, The conjuge that for his bad faith will have
been a cause of the nullity, will not have part in the community properties.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and
that the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the
aforecited provision and declared his interest in the disputed property
forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
ISSUES:
1. Can the validity of a marriage be attacked collaterally?
2. Is Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code applicable in this case?
Ruling:
1. YES. There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to
Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra
Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the conditions
envisioned in sub-section (b). The burden is on the party invoking the
exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has not
discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced
by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven
years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was then
generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so.
2. YES. The conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was
dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has been no judicial
declaration of nullity except possibly in this very action, filed after the
dissolution by death had taken place and when Article 1417 of the Spanish
Civil Code was no longer in force.
Even though the said provision was no longer in force, it is still presumed with
respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither the marriage nor the
conjugal partnership never existed, and hence such spouse has no right to
share in the conjugal properties; but this legal effect of such presumption
derives from the premise that Article 1417 is still in force, and in any event is
of doubtful application if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice of the
right of the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal partnership
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formed thereby, which includes properties acquired by the husband during its
existence.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the
right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
NIAL v. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000
FACTS:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of
their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or
on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing
a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After
their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack
of a marriage license.
ISSUE:
Is the cohabitation contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code which
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license refer to one
which both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire fiveyear continuous period?
RULING:
YES. The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said
that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living
with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
23 4S 2014-2015


their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It
is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage
even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between
the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void
ab initio because of the absence of such element.
VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 132955, 27 October 2006
Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva
got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17,
1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage
alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who
was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage;
that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned
that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. ilia
prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a
month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned
to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that
petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son
being born prematurely. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals dismiss the
petition.
ISSUE:
Should the marriage be annulled based on vitiated consent, fraud, and lack of
cohabitation?
Ruling:
NO. To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite
the alleged coerced consent which supposedly characterized his marriage
with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span
of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took
serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged
inaction evidently finds basis in Lilias allegation that this annulment suit was
filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would
bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal
case for bigamy which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately,
however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided
ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very
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outcome of the present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with
his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must
be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this
Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in
this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
As to the issue of vitiated consent - he cited several incidents that created
on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the
appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the
premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the
threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New
Peoples Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and
who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his
person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a
contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being
harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his
employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself
out of harms way. Based on the records, he never sought the assistance of
the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of
those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about
his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
As to whether there is fraud in this case which he also invoked as a basis
for annulment of his marriage, he argued that he was made to believe by
appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married.
Appellants excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because
he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright
lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate
with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his
client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x
that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where
"the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
As to the lack of cohabitation - appellant cannot claim that his marriage
should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his
wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage.
Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses
who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to
cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any
of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent,
insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant
failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds,
the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
25 4S 2014-2015


SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995
FACTS:
Leouel and Julia got married on 1986 and lived with the latter's parents. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel"
over a number of other things. On 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates
of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her.
Seven months after her departure Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit
the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices
of the AFP, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with,
Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code". Leouel argues that
the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words,
Leouel asserts:
"(T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated."
The complaint was eventually dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Should the failure on the part of Julia to communicate with her husband for
several years be considered a psychological incapacity thereby warranting the
nullity of marriage?
RULING:
NO. In accordance with the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee, the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
26 4S 2014-2015


Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.
This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual problem.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS & MOLINA
268 SCRA 198, 13 February 1997
FACTS:
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which
union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was later affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Are irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitutive of
RULING:
YES. The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of
the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and
the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified; (b) alleged in the complaint; (c) sufficiently proven by
experts; and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
27 4S 2014-2015


(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
LUCITA HERNANDEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126010, 8 December 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C.
Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang,
Cavite on January 1, 1981. They had three (3) children.
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed a petition seeking the annulment of her
marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of
the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the
filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support
the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most
of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed
that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with
different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent
endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease
(STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and
unprepared for the duties of a married life.
ISSUE:
Should the marriage be annulled on the ground of private respondent's
RULING:
NO. Other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the
fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from
a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court
of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private
respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not
sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely
physical.
28 4S 2014-2015


Furthermore, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
grounds for finding that he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state,
and not merely due to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of
being handsome, as the appellate court held.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the
precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order
to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 151867, 29 January 2004
Facts:
Petitioner David B. Dedel and Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel were married and the
union produced four children. Petitioner avers that during the marriage,
Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She
had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a
Jordanian national. Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for
treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that
despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with
whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country,
Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim.
Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children
as his own. Thereafter, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan
with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on
special occasions. Giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon,
petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE:
Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall
within the term "psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
NO. "Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and
29 4S 2014-2015


persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the
obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior
to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records
is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and
which produced four children. Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within
the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which
make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual
promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds
for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. Article 36 is not to be
equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner
refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
LAM v. CHUA
G.R. No. 131286, 18 March 2004
FACTS:
The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the
petition that: she and Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said
marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological
incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage
when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and
irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of
gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was
forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains and the separation of present and future properties; said agreement
was approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a
Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long been separated in bed and
board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject
to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and
Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support
of their child, John Paul.
30 4S 2014-2015


The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana
herself. She testified that her marriage with Jose was arranged by her
parents in the traditional Chinese way; that her married life was abnormal
because Jose very seldom came home, never worked for a living and instead
kept asking for money from her to buy his sports cars; that she was also the
one spending for all the expenses of their only child, John Paul.[3] After her
testimony, counsel for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence.
On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open[4] on the
ground that she was able to secure additional new evidence which were
significant, material and indispensable. On
July 6, 1994, the trial court granted the motion to re-open the case and held a
hearing for the reception of additional evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted
into evidence the Marriage Contract dated May 25, 1977 between Jose and
one Celia Santiago, and another Marriage Contract dated
May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock,[5] showing that Jose had
been married twice before he married Adriana in 1984.
On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered a decision declaring the nullity
of marriage between Adriana Chua and Jose Lam.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court correctly ruled on the declaration of nullity of marriage
between the parties?
RULING:
NO. A judgment of a court upon a subject within its general jurisdiction, but
which is not brought before it by any statement or claim of the parties, and is
foreign to the issues submitted for its determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis
supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial court to
have rendered judgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it was
beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The amendment of the petition to reflect the
new issues and claims against Jose was, therefore, indispensable so as to
authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage of Jose and
Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should have
been awarded for the support of John Paul. When the trial court rendered
judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served
upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived
petitioner Lam of due process.
Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana and Jose
for being bigamous is concerned, the decision rendered by the Pasay RTC
could be declared as invalid for having been issued beyond its
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering that Jose, did not assail the declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Adriana in his motion for reconsideration which
he filed with the Pasay RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court of Appeals
and with us, he likewise did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay
31 4S 2014-2015


RTC to receive evidence and render judgment on his previous marriages with
other woman which were not alleged in the petition filed by
Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo the
judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose null
and void for being bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional
question may be raised at any time, this, however, admits of an exception
where estoppel has supervened.[20]
OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 141528, 31 October 2006
FACTS:
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the RTC of San Pablo City seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging psychological incapacity. The petition
was denied. Subsequently, Oscar filed another petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage alleging that the marriage was null and void because it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license. The RTC dismissed the petition
on the ground of Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits.
ISSUE:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
RULING:
YES. Petitioner is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of
action. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which
the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner
essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to
the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and
respondents marriage. Moreover, in the first petition, the petitioner impliedly
conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in
accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged
absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been
presented and heard in the earlier case.
CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. SIAYNGCO
G.R. NO. 158896, 27 October 2004
FACTS:
After twenty-four (24) years of married life together, Manuel filed for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
of his wife Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife
exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him; that she
incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with
him and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables,
32 4S 2014-2015


chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she
showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his
office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at
him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors;
that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not
even give him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological
incapacity arose before marriage.
The trial court denied Manuels petition. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr.
Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on
the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
1. Did the CA properly apply the ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA?
2. Is Juanita Psychologically incapacitated?
RULING:
1. NO. Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts
of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its
own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. The CA
perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in
its factual milieu with the case at bar.
2. NO. we have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by
his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with
cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by
her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In
our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led
respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR. v. CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO
G.R. No. 162049, 13 April 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he didn't have
time for her; and that she constantly quarreled with him even before marriage
when he could not give her the things she wanted. He added that she was not
supportive of his medical career. Even marriage counseling did not work.
Petitioner stated that when they quarreled, she refused to have sex with him
and even told him to look for other women. He filed the petition for nullification
of their marriage when he found out their eldest daughter had been made
pregnant by a man whom respondent hired to follow him. The trial court held
that petitioner and respondent were both psychologically incapacitated to
perform their marital obligations. Respondent appealed the case to the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and
declared that the marriage still subsists.
33 4S 2014-2015


ISSUE:
Is the marriage void on the ground of the parties' psychological incapacity?
RULING:
NO. Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. The
intention of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
In the present case, the spouses' frequent squabbles and respondent's
refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute
psychological incapacity. Petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable
incapacity, on the part of both spouses, existed at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. Their bickerings and arguments even before their marriage
and respondent's scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show their
immaturity, and immaturity does not constitute psychological incapacity.
LEONILO ANTONIO v. IVONNE REYES
G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years
old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first
meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City
Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding at the Sta. Rosa de Lima
Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila. Out of their union, a child was born,
who sadly died five (5) months later. Petitioner filed a petition to have his
marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for
nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, to
wit: (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her
family; (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred; (3) She
misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither; (4) She claimed to be a singer or a freelance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold);
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under
those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold
34 4S 2014-2015


and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million ; and (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to
the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he
could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August
1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not
change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
Petitioner presented Dr. Acebede a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez a clinical
psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner
was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person.
On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant
lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological.
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that
there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and
invented personalities.
ISSUE:
Will the acts of Ivonne, which constitute persistence in lying and making up
stories, be considered as a psychological incapacity as a ground of
declaration of nullity of marriage?
RULING:
YES. Following the case of Republic v. Molina, the Court explained that the
evidence to establish psychological incapacity must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto. Jurisprudence
since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. However, It
might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity
deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading
"psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage." At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this
Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as
to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that
would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge
to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding onthe civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law.
While the Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological
incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable
specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed
35 4S 2014-2015


by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case,
current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It
is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court
has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework
that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the
clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation,
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.
There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of
this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Nevertheless, the Court applied the guidelines as provided in the Molina case
so as to determine whether or not Ivonne is psychologically incapacitated:
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior,
and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel
Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing
career. As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a
preponderance of evidence.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and
abnormal behavior of perennially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational
attainment, and family background, among others.
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She
fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before
she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found
out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is
immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of
cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in
36 4S 2014-2015


particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it
is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit
to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the
Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed
decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention. Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However,
respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie,
fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he
draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable.
Thus, the Court declared that the marriage between Antonio and Reyes is
void.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO
G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004
Facts:
Petitioner sought to annul her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national. Petitioner alleged that her husband left her and their daughter a
month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the
promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens.
But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated
with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines
but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all
efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail. Petitioner asserted that such
abandonment constitutes psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Is Toshio psychologically incapacitated?
Ruling:
NO. The Court finds that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving
that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
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illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no
other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could
have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
It must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.
There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of
abandonment in the context of legal separation. The Court cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing
so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person
from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do
not apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the
husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological
incapacity, the Court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a
Filipino spouse. The Court cannot be lenient in the application of the rules
merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological
incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
ROLANDO LANDICHO v. HON. LORENZO RELOVA
G.R. No. L-22579, 23 February 1968
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch
I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense of bigamy. It was
alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira
Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe
Lourdes Pasia."
On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, likewise presided by respondent Judge Relova where Fe Lourdes
Pasia seeks to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio
because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On
June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party
complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first
spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be
declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and
38 4S 2014-2015


intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her
before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
Petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the
decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the
pending civil suit. Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the
motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside
the above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
Is the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of
the second wife against petitioner and a third party complaint against the first
spouse for the annulment of the first marriage by the petitioner constitutes a
prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him?
RULING:
NO. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963,
the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to
such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question.
A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
DONATO v. LUNA
G.R. No. 53642, 15 April 1988
FACTS:
An information for bigamy against petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato. Before the
petitioner's arraignment, private respondent Paz Abaya filed a civil action for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings of the criminal case contending that the civil case
seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent
raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before
the criminal case can proceed. He also contended that the second marriage
should have been declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent.
ISSUE:
Does the annulment case constitute a prejudicial question which would
warrant the suspension of the criminal action for bigamy?
RULING:
NO. The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into
by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions"
are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the
case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown
39 4S 2014-2015


that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was
obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the
second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy. The preceding elements do not exist in the
case at bar. Petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private
respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in
entering a subsequent marriage is belied by the fact that both petitioner and
private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived
together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one
month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second
marriage. Also, it was petitioner's second wife, private respondent Paz B.
Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the
ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
WIEGEL v. SEMPIO-DIY
G.R. No. L-53703, 19 August 1986
FACTS:
In an action filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked
for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 in
Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short,
and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilias previous existing marriage to
one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25,
1972 in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior
subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the
first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said
marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both
parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force
exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely
voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the
respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence (1) that the first
marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband;
and (2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already
married to someone else. Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of
evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first
marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES:
1. Is the second marriage contracted by a spouse (in this case, the wife)
during the existence of her first marriage considered as valid on the ground
that her first marriage was vitiated by force?
2. Is the second marriage contracted by a spouse during the existence of her
first marriage be considered as valid on the ground that her first husband had
a prior existing marriage at the time of their marriage, and thus the said first
marriage is void?
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RULING:
1. NO.The fact that the first marriage of the wife was vitiated by force
committed against both parties will not render the said marriage void but
merely voidable, and therefore valid until annulled. Without having been
annulled, the first marriage is still valid and any subsequent marriage of said
spouse is VOID.
2. NO. The fact that the wifes first husband had an existing prior marriage at
the time of their marriage will not render the subsequent marriage contracted
by the said wife valid, for then such first marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
second marriage. Accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law.
DOMINGO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993
FACTS:
Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo and petitioner Roberto
Domingo were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center
Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with
Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite.
Petitioner had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25,
1969 which marriage is valid and subsisting, which became known only to
private respondent in 1983 when dela Paz sued them for bigamy.
Since 1983 up to present, petitioner had been unemployed and completely
dependent upon private respondent for support and subsistence. Sometime
in June 1989, private respondent discovered that petitioner was cohabiting
with another woman; and discovered further that petitioner had been
disposing some of private respondents property without her knowledge and
consent. Petitioner failed and refused to return the possession and
administration of said property to her brother/attorney-in-fact.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage and Separation of Property against petitioner.
ISSUES:
1. Is a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage?
2. Is the petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage filed only for
purposes of remarriage?
3. Is there a need for filing an action for separation of property separate from
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?
41 4S 2014-2015


RULING:
1. YES. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. In fact, the requirement
for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position
that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage
is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage.
As a matter of policy, the nullification of a marriage for the purposes of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is defective with respect to
the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure
and with no legal effect. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky ground.
2. NO. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground of defense. Article 40 of the
Family Code, (The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.) as finally formulated, included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need
not obtained only for purposes of remarriage.The position of the word solely
in Article 40 of the Family Code shows that it is meant to qualify final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
One can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of marriage for purposes other that remarriage, such as in
case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters presumptive
legitimes.
3. NO. Declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the
liquidation of property, custody and support of children, etc. There is no need
for filing a separate civil action for such purposes. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them.
42 4S 2014-2015


BELTRAN v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 137567, 20 June 2000
FACTS:
After 24 years of marriage between the petitioner and his wife Charmaine E.
Felix, the petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
In her Answer, the petitioner's wife alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage.
The petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest,
filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of
Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil
case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to
the determination of the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Will the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
based on psychological incapacity pose a prejudicial question that should
merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage?
RULING:
NO. The import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of
remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the
criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge
of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to
state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with
a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
43 4S 2014-2015


MERCADO v. TAN
GR No. 137110, 1 August, 2000
FACTS:
Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got
married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J.
Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and
signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused
was single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of
the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having
been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony
solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV,
Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant
through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually
resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said
accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was
lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and
in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado
and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage, which is in inception
void, necessary before entering into a subsequent marriage?
RULING:
YES. Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void.
Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Committee
has observed:
[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that
the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial
declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143
SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision
changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its
performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033).
44 4S 2014-2015


It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning
is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the
second marriage.
REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO
G.R. No. 94053, 17 March 1993
Facts:
Respondent Gregorio Nolasco married Janet Monica Parker, a British national
she met while his ship was on a port call in England. They were married in
Catholic rites in Antique but shortly after giving birth to their first child, Parker
left Antique. In the present petition, respondent avers that he took efforts to
look for her himself. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his
missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the
address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to
him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no
news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later
married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family
background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such
information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not
report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine
government authorities.
ISSUE:
Was there a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead?
Ruling:
NO. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search
for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded
belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, is instructive as to degree of diligence required in
searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was
charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief
that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not
exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting
that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the
whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such
inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived
in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information
concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only
that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his
suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. .
45 4S 2014-2015


In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after
learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract
and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her
there.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give
any information as to her personal background even after she had married
respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The
same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his
wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he
had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
ARMAS v. CALISTERIO
G.R. No. 136467, 6 April 2000
FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died
intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of
P604,750.00. He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously
married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without
a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds,
Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a
court declaration of Bounds presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition
claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between
Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and
void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator,
without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to
her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositorappellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the
former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of her first spouse?
RULING:
YES. Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur :
(a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four
consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of
disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
46 4S 2014-2015


declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the
spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in
Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first
husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for
more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958
with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
James Bounds.
MANUEL v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 165842, 29 November 2005
Facts:
Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa on July 28, 1975. He contracted a
second marriage now with Tina Gandalera on April 22. It appeared in their
marriage contract that Eduardo was single. However, starting 1999, Eduardo
started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a
year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he
would slap her. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left,
and did not return and he even stopped giving financial support. Tina became
curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila
where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married.
In a response to a complaint for bigamy, Eduardo testified that he declared he
was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good
faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
ISSUE:
Is Eduardo Manuel criminally liable for bigamy?
DOCTRINE:
YES. In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was
married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a
nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The prosecution also
proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after
the effectivity of the Family Code.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married
the private complainant in 1996, he had a well-grounded belief that his first
wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years
since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family
47 4S 2014-2015


Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted
in good faith and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the
private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of
bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden
and having failed to do so, he is liable for bigamy.
LUCIO MORIGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrette were boardmates for a period of four (4)
years (1974-1978). After school year 1977-1978, Morigo and Barrete lost
contact with each other. In 1984, Morigo was surprised to receive a card from
Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters,
they became sweethearts. In 1986, Barrete returned to the Philippines but left
for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. Lucia subsequently came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition Morigo to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married,
thus they were married married on August 30, 1990 at Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Barrette reported back to her work in Canada leaving
Morgio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court.
Morigo subsequently married Maria Jecacha Lumbago. Morigo then filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. Seeking, among
others, the declaration of nullity of Morigos marriage with Barratte, on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
Appellant was thereafter charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the
City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City with the RTC of Bohol. Morigo moved for
suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial
nullification of his marriage with Barratte posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion
for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case,
herein Morigo pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in
a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again. Meanwhile, while the bigamy case was pending
before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually
took place. On appeal, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia could not acquit Lucio. The
reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first
48 4S 2014-2015


marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first
marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
ISSUE:
Is a judicial declaration of nullity required to contract a second marriage in a
case where there was no marriage ceremony that was conducted during the
first marriage?
Ruling:
NO. As a rule, a judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who
enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes void.
However, in the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a
duly authorized solemnizing officer. Morigo and Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constiture an ostensibly vaild marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequient marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a
penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of
the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Morigo is not
guilty of bigamy.
TENEBRO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed in Lapu-Lapu City. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling
which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted another marriage, this
one with a certain Nilda Villegas in Cebu City. When Ancajas learned of this
third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed
married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that Tenebro
was indeed her husband. Thereafter, Ancajas filed a complaint for bigamy
against Tenebro. The RTC find the accused guilty of bigamy.
ISSUES:
1. Was there sufficient evidence to prove the first marriage?
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2. Is petitioner liable of bigamy despite the judicial declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage?
RULING:
1. YES. The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying
merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering
that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does
not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity,
apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced
against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner
informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own
conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the
requisites for validity.
2. YES. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned. As a second or
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void
ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or
incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se
an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO v. SUSAN YEE CARIO
G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001
FACTS:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2
children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with
Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already
bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after
his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits
of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able
to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of
sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee
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admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the
subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage
between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid
marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that
she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUES:
1. Is the first marriage valid?
2. Is the nullity of the previous marriage validates the second marriage?
RULING:
1. NO. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar,
there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage
license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. It is
beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
However, Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even
if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to
marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void
due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations
is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned
during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by
each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each party
notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.
2. NO. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there
must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the
instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized
without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a
policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to
properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall
belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC).
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TY v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony
on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August
27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of
a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also declared null and void
ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria,
private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979.
Private respondent filed a civil case praying that his marriage to petitioner be
declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when
they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he
was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married
petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been
issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only
on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4,
1979. Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent alleged that
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages.
ISSUE:
Is a decree of nullity of the first marriage required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly?
RULING:
NO. Where the second marriage of a person was entered into in 1979, before
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986), during which time the prevailing
rule was found in Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977), People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954) and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957),
there was no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of
license and consent, before such person may contract a second marriage.
The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he
could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, the Court conclude
that private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
SARAO v. GUEVARA
40 O.G. 263, 31 May 1940
FACTS:
(DISCLAIMER: I was not able to find the full text for this case. Rest assured, due diligence was
exercised in searching for available digests online).
Sarao and Guevarra got married on June 3, 1936. When Sarao tried to have
carnal knowledge with Guevarra, she refused. When nighttime came, she
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eventually gave in. Guevarra complained that her private part was in pain and
even noticed some matter oozing therefrom which had a foul smell. Upon
advice of a physician and with consent of Sarao, Guevarra had her uterus and
ovaries removed. After the operation, Sarao claimed to have lost any desire to
have intercourse with his wife after her operation and filed a case for
annulment on the ground of impotency.
ISSUE:
Can Saraos claim prosper?
RULING:
NO. Marriage may be annulled if the party was, at the time of celebration of
the marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state and that
such incapacity remains incurable. Sarao wants to construe the phrase
physically incapable of entering into the married state into incapacity to
procreate. Impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate.
It must not be confused with sterility. Impotency must exist at the time of the
marriage and must also be permanent and incurable. Temporary and
occasional incapacity for copulation is not a ground. Guevarra is not impotent
the removal of organs rendered her sterile, but it did not render her unfit for
sexual intercourse. It was due to plaintiffs own voluntary desistance that
made him give up the idea of having sexual intercourse with her again even
after she had been rid of her disease.
Added ruling: With respect to Saraos contention of fraud that Guevrra did not inform him of
her illness, such contention was not given merit because fraud was not alleged in the
complaint and was not proved at the trial.
GODOFREDO BUCCAT v. LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT

G.R. No. 47101, 25 April 1941
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938,
became engaged in September, and got married in November 26. On
February 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was nine (9)
months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida
and never returned to married life with her. On March 23, 1939, he filed for an
annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married
Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in
favor of Luida.
ISSUE:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be granted on the
ground that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?
Ruling:
NO. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a
sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society rests. In
this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of
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pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that
Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luidas
condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly
developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got
married.
Note: The case is written in Spanish.
FERNANDO AQUINO v. CONCHITA DELIZO
G.R. No. L-15853, 27 July 1960
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent
Conchita Delizo based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other
things, that Conchita Delizo at the date of her marriage to petitioner Fernando
Aquino concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another
man, and about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her
answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock
between her and the plaintiff.
The trial court noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that
the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties,
and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not
constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners claim unbelievable that
he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he
married her.
ISSUE:
Can a woman, who is four months pregnant, be considered as to have
committed fraud, when she concealed such pregnancy from her husband?
RULING:
YES. In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19), plaintiff's claim that he
did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be
unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced
stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That
pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the
defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the
time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that
her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally
plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on
the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still
below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part
of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be
attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on
the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen
reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen
54 4S 2014-2015


more general and apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally
plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or
not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must
have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even physicians and
surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and gives her
subjective and objective symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of
pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months.
EMILIO R. TUASON v. COURT OF APPEALS and TUASON
G.R. No. 116607, 10 April 1996
Facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or
declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason.
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. During presentation
of private respondent's evidence, petitioner, on April 18, 1990, filed his
Opposition to private respondent's petition for appointment as administratrix of
the conjugal partnership of gains.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing, a counsel for
petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel
was out of the country and due to return on the first week of June. The court
granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990. On June 8, 1990,
petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court
declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed
the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of
private respondent's marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the
children to private respondent.
Petitioners contention: Petitioner insists that he has a valid and meritorious
defense. He cites the Family Code which provides that in actions for
annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should
intervene for the state because the law "looks with disfavor upon the
haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default." He contends
that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should
have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as
to the reason for his non-appearance.
ISSUE:
Whether the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.
Ruling:
NO. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught
with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of
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nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for
legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if
in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Our Constitution is
committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The
state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared
in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to
the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private
respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several
pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is
crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds
barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and
legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated.
Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation
by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the
parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the nonintervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the
contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.
MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS v. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861, 30 July 2004
FACTS:
A verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed against
Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias ("Mr. Macias"), her husband and
incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte.
Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication of Summons
during the first week of April 2001. Without delay, on April 10, 2001 or within
the 30-day period to file an answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss, which she
set for hearing on April 20, 2001 However, instead of first acting upon the
motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject case
on April 19, 2001, or one day before.
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In the interim, from April 10, 2001 up to April 30, 2001, various motions and
manifestations, one after the other but interrelated, were filed by the counsel
of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the merits of the case before the
respondent judge. One was denied while the rest were ignored. As previously
stated, the respondent proceeded with the hearing on April 30, 2001 without
resolving the other motions and manifestations.
ISSUE:
Is the respondent judge justified in disregarding the motions and deciding the
case ex-parte?
RULING:
NO. It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court,
even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the period
therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a
hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default
proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.
In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she
indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public Prosecutor of
his investigation.
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: "If the
defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists,
and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that
the evidence submitted is not fabricated." Thus, the report of the Public
Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the
case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule.
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had filed
a Certification dated May 04, 2001 with the respondent judge's court, stating,
among others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General during the
ex-parte presentation of plaintiff's evidence, even cross-examining the plaintiff
and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he had no
objection to the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage,
such Certification does not suffice to comply with the mandatory requirement
that the court should order the investigating public prosecutor whether a
collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be made by the
court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the case
had already been had. Notably, said Certification was filed after the
respondent judge had ordered the termination of the case.
Cervantes v. Fajardo - RAMPAS
57 4S 2014-2015


REPUBLIC v. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005
FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy was married to Fely Iyoy in 1961 and this marriage gave birth to
five children. Fely Iyoy eventually left for the States to provide for their family
in 1984 and in less than a year sent Crasus documents to sign with regard to
a divorce that she applied for. Crasus eventually found out that Fely married
Stephen Micklus in 1985 and their relationship has conceived of a child.
Crasus eventually questioned the validity of Felys subsequent marriage. The
CA in deciding the case sided with Fley.
ISSUE:
Is a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino in the US valid and recognized in
the Philippines?
RULING:
NO. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to
a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By
its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date
was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC
that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left
for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband
in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino
citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was
already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow
and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
ESPIRITU v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115640, 15 March 1995
Facts:
Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband and wife in the USA. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese,
was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo
and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their
second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born
on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by
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Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his
company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma
Layug and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over
the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The
trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's
parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed
upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
ISSUE:
Is the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be
granted?
Ruling:
NO.The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to
another does not fall under compelling reasons'' is neither meritorious nor
applicable in this case.
The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values,
not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records
appears to have become final.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent
with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications,
Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate
shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth
by her behavior.
MANGONON v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125041, 30 June 2006
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City
Court Judge in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years
old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was
solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code,
it was subsequently annulled. Within seven months after the annulment of
their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to
petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon,
raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them.
At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter
college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with
her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica
and Rina were then admitted to different universities in USA however they are
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financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education. Petitioner likewise
averred that demands were made upon Federico and the latters father,
Francisco, for general support but it was left unheeded.
ISSUE:
Was the grandfather, in case of the inability of the father and the mother,
liable to support pendete lite?
Ruling:
YES. Under the Rules of Court, a court may temporarily grant support
pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the
case before it can settle an application for this relief. It is enough that the facts
be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record. After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence
presented, we find that petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof,
the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins
entitlement to support pendente lite. In the words of the trial court By and
large, the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot be denied. They
had maintained constant communication with their grandfather Francisco. As
a matter of fact, respondent Francisco admitted having wrote several letters to
Rica and Rina. Indeed, respondents, by their actuations, have shown beyond
doubt that the twins are the children of Federico.
Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial courts grant of support
pendente lite in favor of Rica and Rina, the next question is who should be
made liable for said award. There being prima facie evidence showing that
petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina,
petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their
childrens college education. In view however of their incapacities, the
obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco.
Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next
immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents.
Anent respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option
under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica
and Rina as stated in Art 204 of the Family Code, however in this case, this
court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second
option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this
action, the relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and
petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant.
Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the
Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from
the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate
to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the
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amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente
lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial
resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors. The
issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on petitioner and her
twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco is best left for the resolution of
the trial court. After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina are not
entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall then order the return of the
amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment.
(NOTE: The issue of the case is mainly on support pendete lite.
With regard to the issue on annulment

of marriage, it was just stated in the facts that the spouses were once married (at the age of 19
(male)and 21) (female) but without CONSENT under art. 85 of the New Civil Code. The latter was the
ground for the annulment.
Not mentioned in the case but here is Art 85 of NCC:
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was between the ages of
sixteen and twenty years, if male, or between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years, if female, and
the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parent, guardian or person having authority
over the party, unless after attaining the ages of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be, such
party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; XXX)
ANAYA v. PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930, 26 November 1970
FACTS:
Defendant Fernando Palaroan (Fernando) filed and action for annulment of
the marriage on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. Judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint of Fernando,
upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora Anayas (Aurora)
counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando had divulged to Aurora that prior to their marriage he had premarital relationship with a close relative of his. Aurora claimed that the nondivulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of
Fernando definitely wrecked their marriage. Consequently, Aurora argued
that the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted fraud, in
obtaining her consent within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the
Civil Code. Aurora prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral
damages.
ISSUE:
Is the non-disclosure of the husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman a ground for annulment of the marriage?
RULING:
NO. Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another
woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a
ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the
article, providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity
shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may
detest such non-disclosure of pre-marital lewdness or feel having been
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thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law
does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon
marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself
alone, is interested.
Article 86 of the Civil Code provides:
Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:
1. Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
2.
Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
3.
Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune, or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
LEGAL SEPARATION
FRANCISCO v. TAYAO
G.R. No. L-26435, 4 March 1927
FACTS:
Juanaria Francisco, plaintiff, and Lope Tayao, defendant, contracted marriage
in 1912. They separated in 1917. The husband then moved to Zamboanga.
There he was later prosecuted for having committed adultery with a married
woman named Bernardina Medrano, wife of Ambrosio Torres, at whose
instance the criminal complaint was instituted. As a result of that proceeding,
Lope Tayao, together with his co-accused Bernardina Medrano, was
sentenced to suffer three years, six months, and twenty-one days
imprisonment prision correccional, and to pay the costs.
On these facts Francisco sought to have the bonds of matrimony between her
and Lope Tayao dissolved. The trial judge denied the action, stating that the
plaintiff was not an innocent spouse within the meaning of sections 1 and 3 of
the Divorce Law.
ISSUE:
Under Act No. 2710, the Philippine Divorce Law, may the wife of a husband
held guilty of adultery by another action be granted divorce?
RULING:
NO. The causes for divorce are prescribed by statute. The Divorce Law is
emphatically clear in this respect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A petition for
divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on
the part of the husband . . . ." Note well the adverb "only" and the conjunctive
"or." Later on comes section 8 providing that "A divorce shall not be granted
without the guilt of the defendant being established by final sentence in a
criminal action"that is, in relation with section 1 of the same law, by final
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sentence in a criminal action for adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband.
Facts Peculiar to the Case:
(1) This case was decided under Act No. 2710, or the Philippine Divorce Law of 1917, now
long repealed; and
(2) Act No. 2710 as affirmed by this case then required final judgment in a criminal action of
adultery or concubinage before divorce - then possible by law - is allowed. The rule was
modified as discussed in Gaudionco v. Penaranda.
GANDIONCO v. PENARANDA
G.R. No. 79284, 27 November 1987
FACTS:
Private respondent Teresita Gadionco (Teresita), the legal wife of petitioner
Froilan Gadionco (Froilan), with the RTC presided by Judge Penaranda, a
complaint against Froilan for legal separation on the ground of concubinage,
with a petition for support and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a
complaint against Froilan for concubinage.
Froilan contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents
thereto, such as, application for support, should be suspended in view of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him.
Froilan cites Sec. 3, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides:
SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. Whenever the
offended party shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense. as contemplated in the first Section 1
hereof, the following rules shall be observed:
(a)
After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil
action arising from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding
has been rendered. . . .
ISSUE:
Should a civil action for legal separation be suspended upon the filing a
criminal action for concubinage to await conviction or acquittal?
RULING:
NO. First, the Sec 3, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
refers to civil actions to enforce civil liability arising from the offense. As
earlier noted, an action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the
main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to
each other.
In other words, a civil action for legal separation based on concubinage, may
proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage,
because said civil action is no one to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to
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the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support and
disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.
Second, a decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof of preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILIAM ONG v. LUCITA G. ONG
G.R. No. 153206, 23 October 2006
Facts:
Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the
Family Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch
41 alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. Lucita claimed that: soon after three
years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical
violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like
putang ina mo, gago, tanga, and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair,
bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could
reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty things regarding
their children or their business; William would also scold and beat the children
at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she
tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and
box her. William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing
the case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging to the
conjugal partnership; these properties, which include real properties in Hong
Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were acquired during the marriage
through his (Williams) sole efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a
decree of legal separation are Lucitas parents and siblings while such decree
would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child
abuser, and will taint his reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese
community.
ISSUE:
Is there a valid ground for the issuance of a decree of legal separation?
Ruling:
YES. As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that
there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life
miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for
not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned
the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art.
56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be
denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The
abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
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justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left
William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.
REPUBLIC v. IYOY
G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005
FACTS:
Respondent Crasus Iyoy married Fely Ada Rosal on December 16, 1961. As
a result of their union, they had five children. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a
nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America, leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent
Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus
received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers;
he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus
learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married
to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely continued to live
with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. and she had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the
U.S.A. Fely returned to the Philippines several times including one when she
attended the wedding of her eldest child, Crasus, Jr., where she had
invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus.
At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and
abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of
reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his
Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and
clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Do abandonment and sexual fidelity per se constitute psychological
incapacity?
RULING:
NO. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article. It should not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
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permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
In the instant case, at most, the wifes abandonment, sexual infidelity, and
bigamy, give the husband grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates
with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situation where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.
BUGAYONG v. GINEZ
100 Phil 616, 28 December 1956
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to
defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while
on furlough leave. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their
sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July,
1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her
husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a
local college there.
As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from
Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-in-law) and some from anonymous
writers(which were not produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged acts
of infidelity of his wife which he did not even care to mention. On crossexamination, plaintiff admitted that his wife also informed him by letter, which
she claims to have destroyed, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. This
prompted him to ask for advice from the legal department of the Navy.
Plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in
the house of one Mrs. Malalang, defendant's godmother. She came along
with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the
plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as
husband and wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and again
passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin
Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received
that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query,
merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of
infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted
efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte,
"to soothe his wounded feelings".
Benjamin Bugayong filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a
complaint for legal separation against his wife, Leonila Ginez, who timely filed
an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and setting up
affirmative defenses. After the issues were joined and convinced that a
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reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on June 9,
1953. Plaintiff's counsel announced that he was to present 6 witnesses but
after plaintiff-husband finished testifying in his favor, counsel for the defendant
orally moved for the dismissal of the complaint, but the Court ordered him to
file a written motion to that effect and gave plaintiff 10 days to answer the
same.
The motion to dismiss is based on the alleged condonation by the husband.
ISSUE:
Should the complaint for Legal Separation be dismissed on the ground that
there is condonation?
Ruling:
YES. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. In this case, there was a condonation on the part of the
husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery"
committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the
infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a
reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter
in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him
and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and
together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and
the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house
likewise as husband and wife all these facts have no other meaning in the
opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and
that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation
occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery.Although no acts of infidelity might have been
committed by the wife, We agree with the trial judge that the conduct of the
plaintiff-husband above narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful,
deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal
separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes within
the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.
The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with
the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge
or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to
conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted by
evidence (60 L. J. Prob. 73).
If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to constitute
condonation? Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties
ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in
the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial
cohabitation (27 C. J. S., section 6-d).
Additional Info from the case: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital
offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in I Bouver's
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Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or
remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has
committed". It is to be noted, however, that in defendant's answer she
vehemently and vigorously denies having committed any act of infidelity
against her husband, and even if We were to give full weight to the testimony
of the plaintiff, who was the only one that had the chance of testifying in
Courtand link such evidence with the averments of the complaint, We would
have to conclude that the facts appearing on the record are far from sufficient
to establish the charge of adultery, or, as the complaint states, of "acts of rank
infidelity amounting to adultery" preferred against the defendant. Certainly, the
letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-in-law Valeriana
Polangco, which must have been too vague and indefinite as to defendant's
infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor the anonymous letters
which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according to
plaintiff, his wife addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed by one
Eliong, whose identity was not established and which admission defendant
had no opportunity to deny because the motion to dismiss was filed soon after
plaintiff finished his testimony in Court, do not amount to anything that can be
relied upon.
LAPUZ SY v. EUFEMIO
G.R. No. L-30977, 31 January 1972
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio, alleging that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
But before the trial could be completed, petitioner Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular
accident. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio,
thereafter, moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" mainly on the
ground that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
Counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by
her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
ISSUE:
1. Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action?
2. If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
RULING:
1. YES. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the
bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in
this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines (now
governed by the Family Code) recognizes this by allowing only the innocent
spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article
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108 (now Article 66 of FC) by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of
legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that
the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
actio personalis moritur cum persona.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to
such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the
question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of
jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the
subject-matter of the action itself.
2. YES. An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved because these rights are mere effects of
decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree
such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a
more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights
and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
CERVANTES v. FAJARDO
G.R. No 79955, January 27, 1989
Facts:
This case is a petition for writ of Habeat Corpus over the minor Angelie
Cervantes, daughter of common-law spouse Conrado Fernando and Gina
Carreon. It appears that Angelie was offered for adoption to petitioners
Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes (sister of Gina Carreon) and Nelson Cervantes.
Petitioners took custody of the child when the latter was two weeks old. Gina
Carreon executed an affidavit of consent to the said adoption and the court
later approved the petition for adoption.
Years later, the biological parents of Angelie demanded from the adoptive
parents the payment of P 150,000 otherwise they would get back their child.
Petitioners refused and as a result, Gina took the child from the petitioners
residence and would only return the child upon the payment of the said
amount.
According to Gina, the consent of adoption was not fully explained to her.
However, this is in contrast with her utterances during the interview with the
social worker who conducted the case study of the said adotion.
ISSUE:
Considering the circumstances surrounding the life of the natural parents as
compared to that of the adoptive parents, the latter being in a better position,
are the adoptive parents entitled to the custody of the child?
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Ruling:
YES. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall
be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the
Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost
consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned,
taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the
contending parents.
Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-law
husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord
the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an
upright and moral-minded person. Gina Carreon previously gave birth to
another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3)
years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a
sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook
and values of said minor. On the other hand, petitioners who are legally
married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of
supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural
mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a
married man, can most likely give her.
Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and the
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting
parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and to
exercise parental authority and responsibility over her.
ESPIRITU v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115640, 15 March 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met
sometime in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel
Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. They
both went abroad to work and there maintained a common law relationship.
They finally got married while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines.
They had two (2) children, Rosalind and Reginald.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his
company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, copetitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because
Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of
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being arrested. Meanwhile, she decided to return to the Philippines and filed
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain
custody over the children.
ISSUE:
Should the custody of the children be given to Teresita?
RULING:
NO. In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations.
If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the
best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be
overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is
paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion,
the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other
parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
Both Rosalind and Reginald are over 7 years of age. They understand the
difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality.
Their best interests would be better served in an environment characterized
by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is
nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article
213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the
children the kind of attention and care which the mother is not in a position to
extend.
Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the
record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two
requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code.
The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies
as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should
have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of
seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and
relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother.
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

GOITIA v. CAMPOS RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263, 2 November 1916
Facts:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the
conjugal domicile. The defendant Jose Campos Rueda, one month after he
had contracted marriage with the plaintiff Eloisa Goitia de la Camara,
demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs. The plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and
refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. The
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defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made
similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always
spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant
and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her
lips, her face and different parts of her body. As the plaintiff was unable by
any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and
take refuge in the home of her parents.
Articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the
whole extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
ART. 149. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it,
either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining
in his own home the person having the right to the same.
ISSUE:
Can the defendant be compelled to support the plaintiff outside of the conjugal
dwelling only if it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or
separation from the defendant?
Ruling:
NO. Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to
give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not
one of them. The provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix
the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to,
assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his
wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he
changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign
country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option,
do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his
own home.
It is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to
granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the
question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate
from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a
divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must
also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the
power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to
grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent
from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of
marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife.
This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the
contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself
that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in
driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for
72 4S 2014-2015


separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a
penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a
judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate
of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the
public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base
demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro
tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred
and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker
one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of
preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any
respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the
wife in the situation of a feme sole.
ARROYO v. VASQUEZ
G.R. No. L-17014, 11 August 1921
FACTS:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the
bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a
few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife in
the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their
common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her
husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce
her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her
to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The
defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her
husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way of defense and
cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on
the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to
consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal
partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate
maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor
of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her
alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff should
pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to
defendant in the trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case
with the usual formalities by appeal to this court.
ISSUE:
Can one of the spouses be compelled by a court order to cohabit with the
other spouse?
RULING:
Upon examination of the authorities the Court is convinced that it is not within
its province to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one
of the pair are invalid, an action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution
73 4S 2014-2015


of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be
effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the
same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the
policy of the practice is extremely questionable.
The Court is therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is
entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the
marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though
he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.

74 4S 2014-2015

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