INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES UNION (IBAA-EU),

petitioner, vs.HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, and IBAA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-52415
October 23, 1984
FACTS:
The Department of Labor promulgated the rules and regulations for the
implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads: Sec.
2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by
the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not
less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid
for all days in the month whether worked or not. For this purpose, the monthly
minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by
365 days divided by twelve
Later, Policy Instruction No. 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor interpreting
the above-quoted rule, pertinent portions .The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to
start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the case of monthly,
only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid
legal holidays are entitled to the benefit.
Respondent IBAA by reason of the ruling laid down by the aforecited rule
implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction No. 9, stopped
the payment of holiday pay to all its employees.
Writ of execution of the previously decided case for them to be paid their holiday
pay was filed by the petitioner. Labor arbiter and NLRC ruled in their favor. IBAA
filed an MR to the Office of the Minister of Labor which set aside the decision of
NLRC. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON holiday pay does not apply to monthly- paid employees.
HELD:
No. Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9
issued by the then Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the guise of
clarifying the Labor Codes provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended them
by enlarging the scope of their exclusion.
The provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay
are clear and explicit it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the
benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to
categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees,
when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay.

UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF

PANGASINAN And NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
Respondents.
G.R. No. L-63122
February 20, 1984
FACTS:
University of Pangasinan did not entitle its faculty to ECOLA during the semestral
break and when it increased its tuition fee, it refused its faculty the salary increase
60% of the incremental proceeds of increased tuition fees.
ISSUES:
WON faculty members of a university are entitled to ECOLA during semestral
breaks.
HELD:
Yes.
Per various PDs on ECOLA, ECOLA pay includes LOA withoutpay.The contention that
the fact of receiving a salary should not be the basis of receiving ECOLA is without
merit as per IRR of Wage Order No. 1: Allowance for Unworked days: a) All covered
employees whether paid on a monthly or daily basis shall be entitled to their daily
living allowance when they are paid their basic wage.
The intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages. Hence
the principle, No pay, no ECOLA.Also applied by analogy is the principle
enunciated in the ORI-LCP: Sec. 4. Principles in Determining Hours Worked d) The
time during which an employee is inactive by reason of interruptions in his work
beyond his control shall be considered time either if the imminence of the
resumption of work requires the employees presence at the place of work or if the
interval is too brief to be utilized effectively and gainfully in the employees own
interest.
No work no pay principle does not apply in the case because the petitioners
certainly do not ad voluntatem absent themselves during semestral breaks. Rather,
they are constrained to take mandatory leave from work.
Intention of the law to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages. No pay, no
ECOLA. But petitioners were paid their wages in full for the months of Nov and Dec
notwithstanding the intervening semestral break.
Sec. 4 of the Omni:
Principles in Determining Hours Woked: (d) The time during which an
employee is inactive by reason of interruptions in his work beyond his control
shall be considered time either if the imminence of the resumption of work

requires the employees presence at the place of work or if the interval is too
brief to be utilized effectively and gainfully in the employees own interest.
Semestral break may also be considered as hours worked.
- Sec. 3 of PD 451 on increase on tuition or other school fees conditions.
- In University of the East vs UE Faculty Assoc: In effect, the problem posed
before Us is whether or not the reference in Sec 3(a) to increase in salaries
or wages of the faculty and all other employees of the schools concerned as
the first purpose to which the incremental proceeds from authorized
increases to tuition fees may be devoted, may be construed to include
allowances and benefits. In the negative, which is the position of resp, it
would follow that such allowances must be taken from resources of the school
not derived from tuition fees. Xxx We note that among the items of the
second purpose stated in provision in question is return in investment. And
the law provides only for the maximum, not a minimum. In other words, the
schools may get a return to investment of not more than 12% but if
circumstances warrant, there is no minimum fixed by law which they should
get.
- If the schools happen to have no other resources to grant allowances and
benefits, either mandated by law or secured by collective bargaining, such
allowances and benefits should be charged against the return to investments
referred to in the second purpose stated Sec 3(a).
- The law provides that 60% should go to wage increases and 40% to
institutional developments, student assistance, extension services and return
on investments (ROI). Under the law, the last item ROI has flexibility sufficient
to accommodate other purposes of the law and the needs of the university.
ROI is not set aside for any one purpose of the university such as profits or
returns on investments.
- Besides, ROI is a return or profit over and above the operating expenditures
of the university, and still, over and above the profits it may have had prior to
the tuition increase.

SHELL OIL CO. OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD. V. NATIONAL LABOR UNION, 81

PHIL. 315 (1948)
FACTS
Acting on a request from the working entity called "National Labor Union," the Court
of Industrial Relations has issued a decision in which, among other things, the oil
company "The Shell Company of Philippine Islands, Limited" is obligated to pay their
workers who work at night (since the sun sets until it rises the next day) an
additional compensation of 50% of their regular wages if they worked by day.

Court of Industrial Relations

held that The Shell Company
pay its workers
working at night an additional compensation of 50% over their regular salaries by
working during daytime.

Meanwhile, the working junction respondent argues that the power is discussed as
part of the broad and effective powers to the Commonwealth Act No. 103 - the
charter of the Industrial Relations Court - the court grants; and that
the Commonwealth Act No. 444 cited has no application to this case, as the same is
necessarily limited scope, and especially referring exclusively to the maximum time
allowable work in industrial establishments - day 8 hours.

Shell argues that there is no legal provision empowering CIR to order payment of
additional compensation to workers who work at night, and that Act No. 444
relieved the employer of such obligation as it is provided in the Act where it made
compulsory the "overtime" (additional compensation) pay for work rendered beyond
8 hours, and such cases do not include the work at night.
NLU argues decision of the CIR is part of its broad and effective powers as granted
by Commonwealth Act No. 103 - the charter of the Industrial Relations Court, and
that Act No. 444 has no Application to this case because it is referring only to
particular and the maximum working day permitted in industrial establishments-

the8-hourday.
ISSUE
1. WON CIR has the authority to order payment of additional compensation to
workers who work at night?
2. WON those who work at night are entitled to 50% additional compensation?
HELD
1.YES Articles 1, 4 and 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 103:
It is evident from the Com Act. No. 103 : SECTION 1. (a) that when a dispute arises
between the principal and the employee or worker on the question of wages, CIR
has jurisdiction throughout the Philippines to consider, investigate and resolve the
dispute, setting the wages they deem fair and reasonable,
SEC. 4. (b) that for the purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
arrangement, CIR also has jurisdiction over any dispute - industry and agriculture resulting from any differences in wages, compensation or participation, working
hours, conditions of employment or tenancy between the employers and employees
or between workers and owners and the landowners or farm workers subject to the
fulfillment of certain requirements and conditions when it sees that the dispute
could cause results or a strike,
SEC. 13. (c) that in exercising its powers specified above, the Court Industrial
Relations is not limited, to decide the dispute, to grant the remedy or remedies
requested by the parties to the dispute, but may include in any order or decision or
determination relating to the purpose of settling the dispute or to prevent further
agricultural or industrial disputes.
2. (YES) about the pernicious effect of working at night justifying the award of
additional 50% to the compensation of affected workers, affirming the decision of
CIR. The case against nightwork, then, may be said to rest upon several grounds. In
the first place, there are the remotely injurious effects of permanent nightwork
manifested in the later years of the worker's life. Of more immediate importance to
the average worker is the disarrangement of his social life, including the
recreational activities of his leisure hours and the ordinary associations of normal
family relations. From an economic point of view, nightwork is to be discouraged
because of its adverse effect upon efficiency and output. A moral argument against
nightwork in the case of women is that the night shift forces the workers to go to
and from the factory in darkness. Recent experiences of industrial nations have
added much to the evidence against the continuation of nightwork, except in
extraordinary circumstances and unavoidable emergencies. The immediate
prohibition of nightwork for all laborers is hardly practicable; its discontinuance in
the case of women employees is unquestionably desirable. 'The night was made for
rest and sleep and not for work' is a common saying among wage-earning people,
and many of them dream of an industrial order in which there will be no night shift.

PNB V PNB EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

115 SCRA 507
July 30, 1982
NATURE
FACTS
PNB and PNB Employees Association (PEMA) had a dispute regarding the proper
computation of overtime pay. PEMA wanted the cost of living allowance (granted in
1958) and longevity pay (granted in 1961) to be included in the computation.
PNB disagreed and the 2 parties later went before the CIR to resolve the dispute.
CIR decided in favor of PEMA and held that PNB should compute the overtime pay of
its employees on the basis of the sum total of the employees basic salary or wage
plus cost of living allowance and longevity pay.
The CIR relied on the ruling in NAWASA v NAWASA Consolidated Unions, which held
that for purposes of computing overtime compensation, regular wage includes all
payments which the parties have agreed shall be received during the work week,
including differentiated payments for working at undesirable times, such as at night
and the board and lodging customarily furnished the employee.

ISSUE
WON the allowance and longevity pay should be included in the computation of
overtime pay as held by the CIR.
HELD
Longevity pay cannot be included in the computation of overtime pay for the
very simple reason that the contrary is expressly stipulated in the CBA, which
constitutes the law between the parties. As regards cost of living allowance, there is
nothing in Commonwealth Act 444 [or the 8-hour Labor Law, now Art. 87 Labor
Code] that could justify PEMAs posture that it should be added to the regular wage
in computing overtime pay. C.A. 444 prescribes that overtime work shall be paid at
the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least 25% additional. The
law did not define what is a regular wage or salary. What the law emphasized is that
in addition to regular wage, there must be paid an additional 25% of that regular
wage to constitute overtime rate of pay. Parties were thus allowed to agree on
what shall be mutually considered regular pay from or upon which a 25% premium
shall be based and added to makeup overtime compensation.

IMELDA B. DAMASCO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,

FACTS
Damasco was employed by respondents [Manila Glass Supply and Bonifacio K. Sia]
as Sales Clerk on January 30, 1992, receiving lately a daily wage of P140.00; that as
sales clerk, she was ordered to do almost all the works related to the glass business
of respondents including the cutting, sales and delivery of glass as well as
balancing, accounting and checking of capital and profits every end of the month
she was made to work from 8:30 in the morning up to 9:30 in the evening
continuously from Monday to Sunday without having been paid overtime pay, rest
day pay and holiday pay; that during the period of her employment, she was not
paid any 13th month pay as well as five (5) days service incentive leave pay; that
on August 28, 1992 at around 7:00 oclock in the evening
That respondent asked complainant why she was not teaching her two (2) other coworkers on what to do, and she answered she would not do it anymore because if
the other co-workers should commit mistakes in accounting, she was the first one to

be lambasted by respondent after which, he threw some notebooks at complainant

who began to tremble in fear and her whole body shook;
Respondent ordered her to go out of the room, lambasted her again Alma, brought
her home and since then, she did not report for work anymore because she
developed a phobia of respondent
On December 7, 1992, Damasco filed before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch
in San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint against Bonifacio Sia and Manila Glass
Supply Damasco indicated that she is suing her employer for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of overtime pay Damasco additionally charged her employer with nonpayment of 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay and night shift
differential.[3]
On September 2, 1993, the labor arbiter rendered judgment in favor of Ms.
Damasco. The labor official declared that Sia has not shown any just or authorized
cause in terminating the services of Damasco, except for wild, generalized and selfserving statements that Damasco committed serious misconduct or willful
disobedience of the lawful orders in connection with her work. The labor arbiter also
ruled that Damasco is entitled to 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay,
holiday pay, overtime pay
ISSUE
whether or not public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in affirming, albeit with modifications,
the labor arbiters patently null and void decision
HELD
NO the labor arbiter set the case several times for preliminary conference but the
parties failed to reached an amicable settlement. The labor arbiter then ordered the
parties to submit their position papers. In compliance therewith, the parties
submitted position papers where they set out and argued the factual as well as the
legal bases of their position. Damasco filed her position paper, computation of
money claims and affidavit. For his part, Sia filed his position paper and affidavit.
Damasco, in turn, filed her affidavit in reply to the affidavit of Sia. After both parties
had filed their replies, the case was deemed submitted for resolution as the labor
arbiter did not find it necessary to conduct a trial-type hearing. Note that the filing
of position papers and supporting documents fulfills the requirements of due
process. Further, it is within the discretion of the labor arbiter to determine if there
is a need for a hearing. Thus, we cannot subscribe to Sias posturing that the labor
arbiter gravely abused its discretion when he dispensed with the hearing to receive
further evidence.