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3 AUTHORS:
Saud Althunibat
Marco Di Renzo
27 PUBLICATIONS 59 CITATIONS
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Fabrizio Granelli
Universit degli Studi di Trento
230 PUBLICATIONS 817 CITATIONS
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio systems allow cognitive users (CUs) to
opportunistically exploit the portions of spectrum that are not
very efficiently used by the licensed users [1]. CUs should
sense the spectrum to identify the unused portions. However,
single-user spectrum sensing may suffer from shadowing and
multipath fading. Therefore, cognitive radio networks (CRNs)
are created in order to perform what is called cooperative
spectrum sensing (CSS) [2]. In CSS, several CUs report their
sensing results to a central entity, called fusion center (FC),
which is in charge of issuing a final decision about the
spectrum occupancy based on a specific fusion rule (FR).
In a CRN, one of the CUs could be an attacker that sends
false sensing results to the FC, aiming at degrading the overall
performance of the CRN. This attacker is usually referred as
spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack. Such attack
affects the detection accuracy and energy efficiency of the
CRN, and its influence depends mainly on the adopted strategy
in reporting the false data [3].
Detection and combating SSDF attackers have received an
increasing attention recently. In [4], an algorithm for detecting
the attacker is presented. The idea is to count the number
of mismatches between the final decision and the reported
local decisions for each CU. Once the number of mismatches
exceeds a predefined threshold, the corresponding CU will be
identified as an attacker and its reported data will be neglected.
This work is funded by the Research Project GREENET (PITN-GA-2010264759).
The research activities of Marco Di Renzo are supported in part by
the European Commission under the auspices of the FP7-PEOPLE MITNCROSSFIRE project (grant 317126).
Fig. 1. The representation of the (a) Sensing channel, (b) Reporting channel
and (c) Cascaded channel (sensing and reporting)
(3)
PF = P r.{U = +1/H0 }
(4)
PH 0 (1 PF )R Tt
N Ecss + (1 PH 0 PF PH 1 PD )Et
(5)
bk,l
l l
(9)
fk,l
l
(10)
k =
kh (1 kh )
kh (1 kh )
(14)
0.9
EGC, 2 H, PF=0.1
0.8
Proposed, 2 H, PF=0.1
0.7
0.6
PD
Pd
pf
Pe
0.1
0.05
0.1
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
EGC, PF=0.05
ARA, P =0.05
0.9
0.9
Proposed, P =0.05
F
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.5
PD
PD
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
2 H + 1 Att.
4 H + 1 Att.
6 H + 1 Att.
8 H + 1 Att.
Fig. 3.
The average detection probability PD for a CRN consisting
one malicious attacker and different number of honest CUs for the three
algorithms. (In ARA is set to the optimal value) (q = 1).
4
x 10
Proposed, P =0.05
F
ARA, PF=0.05
EGC, PF=0.05
2 H + 1 Att.
4 H + 1 Att.
6 H + 1 Att.
8 H + 1 Att.
0.5
0.4
0.3
2 H + 1 Att.
4 H + 1 Att.
6 H + 1 Att.
8 H + 1 Att.
Fig. 4. The average energy efficiency for a CRN consisting one malicious
attacker and different number of honest CUs for the three algorithms. (In ARA
is set to the optimal value).