G.R. No.

L-34915 June 24, 1983

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch
XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
City Fiscal for petitioners.
Manuel Villaruel, Jr. and Feliciano Tumale for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII
declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of
approval of the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the
enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer,
Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where
the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9
of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to
annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the
Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both petitioners and respondent agreed to the
rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that
the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City

Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and
resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious
because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the
property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use
of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's
police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to
promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the
spread of a conflagration.
We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote
with approval the lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance:
The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that
would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9
cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such
other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City.' (Subsections 'C',
Sec. 12, R.A. 537).
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs.
Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to
regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also
prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance,
'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction
thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The
confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery.
Neither can the ordinance in question be justified under sub- section "t", Section 12 of Republic Act 537
which authorizes the City Council to'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and provide for
their burial in such proper place and in such manner as the council may determine,
subject to the provisions of the general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries and
governing funerals and disposal of the dead.' (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537).
There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically termed by the
respondents, 'donation'
We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of
police power. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 which
reads as follows:
(00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act
and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,

promote, the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience
of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and
enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may
prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the forefront in the bill
of rights is the provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the
property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist
independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50).
It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is
deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the
general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in
consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most essential of government
powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government
(Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power
embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court
has said that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its
sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the state itself, it does not need to be
expressed or defined in its scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is the
most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential insistent and illimitable
Especially it is so under the modern democratic framework where the demands of society and nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of police power have become
almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all
embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands
of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by
which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs.
Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the
broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and the due
process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does
not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and
order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed
article, such as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due
process of law, nay, even without compensation.
In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the heavy burden shouldered by whoever
challenges the validity of duly enacted legislation whether national or local As early as 1913, this Court ruled in Case v.
Board of Health (24 PhiL 250) that the courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity and, more so, where the ma
corporation asserts that the ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and general welfare.

In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849)
the Court speaking through the then Associate Justice and now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any evidence to offset the presumption of
validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm 'The
presumption is all in favor of validity. ... The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be
lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular ... municipality and with all the facts and lances which surround the subject and necessitate
action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations
are essential to the well-being of the people. ... The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. (U.S.
v. Salaveria (1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of
municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil.
369.)
We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v. Board of Health supra :
... Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by
virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and
highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the nature of wellordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under
the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. An property in
the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general
welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police
power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and
safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and
providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to
prevent positive wrong and oppression.
but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act
537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the
center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law
regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in
Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner
as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to
the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from
laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with

salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision
developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal
corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always
received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned
ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and
commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been
impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987
FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA, RICARDO PUNO,
FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MARIANO CASTAEDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III,
VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor, San Fernando, Pampanga, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring
12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as a
talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct
business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents
deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property. At the petitioners' behest, we
have issued a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo between the parties pending our decision. 1 Now we
shall rule on the merits.
This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218
authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stags
and sell in the above-mentioned place. 2 The action was protested on November 10, 1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants
from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. 3 On January 18, 1964, while this case was
pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the
parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, 4 thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961.
Four years later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land
occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the
subject of private occupancy. 5 The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent. 6
The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from the place; in fact, according to then
they and the 128 other persons were in 1971 assigned specific areas or space allotments therein for which they paid daily
fees to the municipal government. 7 The problem appears to have festered for some more years under a presumably uneasy
truce among the protagonists, none of whom made any move, for some reason that does not appear in the record. Then, on
January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the
immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a
public plaza. 8

Acting thereon after an investigation conducted by the municipal attorney, 9 respondent Vicente A. Macalino, as officer-incharge of the office of the mayor of San Fernando, issued on June 14, 1982, a resolution requiring the municipal treasurer
and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls in the subject place beginning July 1, 1982. 10 The reaction of the
petitioners was to file a petition for prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No.
6470, on June 26, 1982. The respondent judge denied the petition on July 19, 1982, 11 and the motion for reconsideration
on August 5, 1982, 12 prompting the petitioners to come to this Court on certiorari to challenge his decision. 13
As required, respondent Macalino filed his comment 14 on the petition, and the petitioners countered with their reply. 15
In compliance with our resolution of February 2, 1983, the petitioners submitted their memorandum 16 and respondent
Macalino, for his part, asked that his comment be considered his memorandum. 17 On July 28, 1986, the new officer-incharge of the office of the mayor of San Fernando, Paterno S. Guevarra, was impleaded in lieu of Virgilio Sanchez, who
had himself earlier replaced the original respondent Macalino. 18
After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties in their respective pleadings, we rule for the
respondents. The petition must be dismissed.
There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted is a public
plaza, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. 2040. This finding was made after consideration of the antecedent facts
as especially established by the testimony of former San Fernando Mayor Rodolfo Hizon, who later became governor of
Pampanga, that the National Planning Commission had reserved the area for a public plaza as early as 1951. This
intention was reiterated in 1964 through the adoption of Resolution No. 29. 19
It does not appear that the decision in this case was appealed or has been reversed. In Civil Case G.R. No. 6740, which is
the subject of this petition, the respondent judge saw no reason to disturb the finding in Civil Case No. 2040 and indeed
used it as a basis for his own decision sustaining the questioned order. 20
The basic contention of the petitioners is that the disputed area is under lease to them by virtue of contracts they had
entered into with the municipal government, first in 1961 insofar as the original occupants were concerned, and later with
them and the other petitioners by virtue of the space allocations made in their favor in 1971 for which they saw they are
paying daily fees. 21 The municipal government has denied making such agreements. In any case, they argue, since the
fees were collected daily, the leases, assuming their validity, could be terminated at will, or any day, as the claimed rentals
indicated that the period of the leases was from day to day. 22
The parties belabor this argument needlessly.
A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking.
This is elementary. Indeed, this point was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 23 decided in 1915, where
the Court declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private person.
Justice Torres said in that case:
According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises
the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and
public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces.
The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not in
1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the
defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said plaza or public place to the defendant for private use
the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over
a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.

The Civil Code, article 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of man may
be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce, as was decided by the
supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 1895, which says: "communal things that cannot be
sold because they are by their very nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the
plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."
Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C, whereby the municipality of Cavite leased to
Hilaria Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or effect, because it is
contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a was held that the City of contract.
In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, 24 it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza
Sta. Cruz, being likewise beyond the commerce of man.
Echoing Rojas, the decision said:
Appellants claim that they had obtained permit from the present of the City of Manila, to connect booths
Nos. 1 and 2, along the premises in question, and for the use of spaces where the booths were constructed,
they had paid and continued paying the corresponding rentals. Granting this claim to be true, one should
not entertain any doubt that such permit was not legal, because the City of Manila does not have any
power or authority at all to lease a portion of a public sidewalk. The sidewalk in question, forming part of
the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, could not be a proper subject matter of the contract, as it was not within the
commerce of man (Article 1347, new Civil Code, and article 1271, old Civil Code). Any contract entered
into by the City of Manila in connection with the sidewalk, is ipso facto null and ultra vires.
(Municipality of Cavite vs. Roxas, et a1, 30 Phil. 603.) The sidewalk in question was intended for and
was used by the public, in going from one place to another. "The streets and public places of the city shall
be kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and
the same shall only be used or occupied for other purpose as provided by ordinance or regulation; ..."
(Sec. 1119, Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.) The booths in question served as fruit stands for
their owners and often, if not always, blocked the fire passage of pedestrians who had to take the plaza
itself which used to be clogged with vehicular traffic.
Exactly in point is Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 25 where the Supreme Court declared:
There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls,
specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to
law. Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available
to the public in general They are outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by
the municipality to private parties.
Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed
premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. They should have
realized and accepted this earlier, considering that even before Civil Case No. 2040 was decided, the municipalcouncil of
San Fernando had already adopted Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, declaring the area as the parking place and public
plaza of the municipality.
It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said resolution of the municipal council of San Fernando that respondent
Macalino was seeking to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the stags constructed in the disputed area. As officerin-charge of the office of the mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place
and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando, conformably to the aforementioned orders from the court and the
council. It is, therefore, not correct to say that he had acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in issuing his
order.

Neither can it be said that he acted whimsically in exercising his authority for it has been established that he directed the
demolition of the stalls only after, upon his instructions, the municipal attorney had conducted an investigation, to look
into the complaint filed by the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando. 26 There is evidence
that the petitioners were notified of this hearing, 27which they chose to disregard. Photographs of the disputed area, 28
which does look congested and ugly, show that the complaint was valid and that the area really needed to be cleared, as
recommended by the municipal attorney.
The Court observes that even without such investigation and recommendation, the respondent mayor was justified in
ordering the area cleared on the strength alone of its status as a public plaza as declared by the judicial and legislative
authorities. In calling first for the investigation (which the petitioner saw fit to boycott), he was just scrupulously paying
deference to the requirements of due process, to remove an taint of arbitrariness in the action he was caged upon to take.
Since the occupation of the place in question in 1961 by the original 24 stallholders (whose number later ballooned to
almost 200), it has deteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the community in general. The proliferation of stags
therein, most of them makeshift and of flammable materials, has converted it into a veritable fire trap, which, added to the
fact that it obstructs access to and from the public market itself, has seriously endangered public safety. The filthy
condition of the talipapa, where fish and other wet items are sold, has aggravated health and sanitation problems, besides
pervading the place with a foul odor that has spread into the surrounding areas. The entire place is unsightly, to the dismay
and embarrassment of the inhabitants, who want it converted into a showcase of the town of which they can all be proud.
The vendors in the talipapa have also spilled into the street and obstruct the flow of traffic, thereby impairing the
convenience of motorists and pedestrians alike. The regular stallholders in the public market, who pay substantial rentals
to the municipality, are deprived of a sizable volume of business from prospective customers who are intercepted by the
talipapa vendors before they can reach the market proper. On top of all these, the people are denied the proper use of the
place as a public plaza, where they may spend their leisure in a relaxed and even beautiful environment and civic and
other communal activities of the town can be held.
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated to the
municipality under the general welfare clause. 29 This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and
make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein." This authority was validly exercised in this casethrough the adoption
of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the municipal council of San Fernando.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for
it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. 30 In fact,
every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the
police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. 31 This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions
of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. 32
We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for prohibition. On the
contrary, he acted correctly in sustaining the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from the disputed
area and clear it of an the structures illegally constructed therein.
The Court feels that it would have been far more amiable if the petitioners themselves, recognizing their own civic duty,
had at the outset desisted from their original stance and withdrawn in good grace from the disputed area to permit its
peaceful restoration as a public plaza and parking place for the benefit of the whole municipality. They owned this little
sacrifice to the community in general which has suffered all these many years because of their intransigence. Regrettably,
they have refused to recognize that in the truly democratic society, the interests of the few should yield to those of the
greater number in deference to the principles that the welfare of the people is the supreme law and overriding purpose. We
do not see any altruism here. The traditional ties of sharing are absent here. What we find, sad to say, is a cynical

disdaining of the spirit of "bayanihan," a selfish rejection of the cordial virtues of "pakikisama " and "pagbibigayan"
which are the hallmarks of our people.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision dated July 19, 1982, and the order-dated August 5, 1982, are
AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order dated August 9, 1982, is LIFTED. This decision is immediately executory.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104786 January 27, 1994
ALFREDO PATALINGHUG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO CRIBILLO, MARTIN ARAPOL, CORAZON ALCASID, PRIMITIVA
SEDO, respondents.
Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for petitioner.
Garcilaso F. Vega for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
In the case before us, we are called upon to decide whether or not petitioner's operation of a funeral home constitutes
permissible use within a particular district or zone in Davao City.
On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 otherwise
known as the "Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City," Section 8 of which states:
Sec. 8. USE REGULATIONS IN C-2 DISTRICTS (Shaded light red in the Expanded Zoning Map) AC2 District shall be dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses as provided hereunder:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
3.1 Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street parking space (see parking standards of
P.D. 1096) and provided that they shall be established not less than 50 meters from any residential
structures, churches and other institutional buildings. (Emphasis provided)
Upon prior approval and certification of zoning compliance by Zoning Administrator issued on February 10, 1987
Building Permit No. 870254 in favor of petitioner for the construction of a funeral parlor in the name and style of
Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor.
Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay Agdao, Davao City that the construction of petitioner's funeral
parlor violated Ordinance
No. 363, since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and several residential
structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation and found that "the nearest residential structure,
owned by Wilfred G. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south. . . . ." 1

Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, petitioner continued to construct his funeral parlor which
was finished on November 3, 1987.
Consequently, private respondents filed on September 6, 1988 a case for the declaration of nullity of a building permit
with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the trial court. 2
After conducting its own ocular inspection on March 30, 1989, the lower court, in its order dated July 6, 1989, dismissed
the complaint based on the following findings: 3
1. that the residential building owned by Cribillo and Iglesia ni Kristo chapel are 63.25 meters and 55.95
meters away, respectively from the funeral parlor.
2. Although the residential building owned by certain
Mr. Tepoot is adjacent to the funeral parlor, and is only separated therefrom by a concrete fence, said
residential building is being rented by a certain Mr. Asiaten who actually devotes it to his laundry
business with machinery thereon.
3. Private respondent's suit is premature as they failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by
Ordinance No. 363.
Hence, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. (CA G.R. No. 23243).
In its decision dated November 29, 1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court by annulling building permit No.
870254 issued in favor of petitioner. 4 It ruled that although the buildings owned by Cribillo and Iglesia ni Kristo were
beyond the 50-meter residential radius prohibited by Ordinance 363, the construction of the funeral parlor was within the
50-meter radius measured from the Tepoot's building. The Appellate Court disagreed with the lower court's determination
that Tepoot's building was commercial and ruled that although it was used by Mr. Tepoot's lessee for laundry business, it
was a residential lot as reflected in the tax declaration, thus paving the way for the application of Ordinance No. 363.
Hence, this appeal based on the following grounds:
The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Tepoot building adjacent to petitioner's
funeral parlor is residential simply because it was allegedly declared as such for taxation purposes, in
complete disregard of Ordinance No. 363 (The Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City) declaring the
subject area as dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses.
We reverse the Appellate Court and reinstate the ruling of the lower court that petitioner did not violate Section 8 of
Davao City Ordinance No. 363. It must be emphasized that the question of whether Mr. Tepoot's building is residential or
not is a factual determination which we should not disturb. As we have repeatedly enunciated, the resolution of factual
issues is the function of the lower courts where findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding
on this court, except only where the case is shown as coming under the accepted exceptions. 5
Although the general rule is that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on us, 6 this admits of exceptions
as when the findings or conclusions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other. 7 While the trial
court ruled that Tepoot's building was commercial, the Appellate Court ruled otherwise. Thus we see the necessity of
reading and examining the pleadings and transcripts submitted before the trial court.
In the case at bar, the testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's building was used for a dual purpose
both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundry business was conducted. 8 But while its commercial aspect has been
established by the presence of machineries and laundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than being declared for
taxation purposes as such, was not fully substantiated.

The reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's decision was based on Tepoot's building being declared for
taxation purposes as residential. It is our considered view, however, that a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of
the property for zoning purposes. A property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation
purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of
property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes.
Needless to say, even if we are to examine the evidentiary value of a tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Code, a
tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration does not bind
a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code, 9 appraisal and assessment are based on the
actual use irrespective of "any previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation thereon," which is based on a taxpayer's
declaration. In fact, a piece of land declared by a taxpayer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor
as commercial because its actual use is commercial.
The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is
strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial or
C-2. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local government
has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While the commercial
character of the questioned vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance, private respondents have failed to present
convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was constructed, was still
a residential zone. Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial purpose," as gleaned from
Ordinance No. 363.
The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to
promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote
the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. 10 Thus, persons
may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this
fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the
location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area
covered thereunder.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the order dated
July 6, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-45338-39 July 31, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
POLICARPIO GONZALES and AUGUSTO JOSUE, respondents-appellants.

Jose Z. Galsim for respondent-appellant P. Gonzales.

Jaime G. Manzano for appellant A. Josue.

FELICIANO, J.:p
The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of two (2) parcels of land situated in Taong Malabon, Metro Manila and
designated as Lots 1 and 2 of Plan MR-1018-D. Lot I which adjoins F. Sevilla Boulevard has an area of 605 square
meters; Lot 2, an interior lot abutting F. Sevilla Boulevard only on its northern portion, is 664 square meters in area. This
piece of property was formerly a deep swamp until the occupants thereof, among them appellants Policarpio Gonzales and
Augusta Josue, started filling it. Each of appellants who are brothers-in-law, constructed a mixed residential and
commercial building on the interior part of Lot 2.
On 14 April 1955, then President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 144, entitled "Reserving for Street
Widening and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipality of Malabon,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon." 1 Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for
the purposes mentioned in the Proclamation.
The Municipal Council of Malabon then passed Resolutions 2 authorizing the filing of ejectment cases against appellants
so that Proclamation No, 144 could be implemented. On 23 June 1955, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pasig, Rizal filed
separate complaints against appellants for the recovery of the portions of Lot 2 they were occupying.
Appellants disputed the light of the Government to recover the land occupied by them. In his answer, Policarpio Gonzales
claimed (1) that Lot 2 was covered by a lease application, and later a miscellaneous sales application, filed before the
Bureau of Lands; (2) that he had a municipal permit to construct a building as well as a business license duly issued by the
Office of the Mayor of Malabon; and (3) that the lot occupied by him was not needed by the Municipality of Malabon in
the widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard. The defenses interposed by Augusto Josue were substantially similar to those raised
by Policarpio Gonzales.
Upon agreement of the parties, the separate cases were tried jointly. On 28 January 1967, the trial court, presided over by
then Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma, rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding the complaints to be justified and meritorious, this Court orders defendants
Policarpio Gonzales and Augusto Josue and/or their agents, representatives, successors-in-interest to
vacate Lots 1 and 2 of Plan MR1018-D as described in the complaint, and to remove at their expense their
respective buildings and/or improvements erected and existing on said lots, and restore the possession
thereof to the Republic of the Philippines, and to pay the corresponding costs in the respective cases.
SO ORDERED. 3
Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution dated 1 December 1976, the Court of Appeals, speaking
through Mr. Justice Luis B. Reyes, certified the consolidated cases to this Court since the appeals raised only a question of
law, that is, whether Presidential Proclamation No. 144 was valid or not. 4
Although appellants filed separate briefs before the Court of Appeals, their common defense was presented and discussed
in very similar language:
Stripped of surplusage, it is respectfully submitted that Proclamation No. 144 dated April 14, 1955 of the
President of the Philippines, more particularly that portion which withdrew from sale and settlement the
land in question and reserving [the] same for parking space purposes, is not in accordance with Section 83

of the Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act No. 141, and therefore, invalid. Under said law "parking
space" is not one of those reservations for public benefit which the President of the Philippines may
designate by proclamation from any tracts of land of the public domain. The reservation for "parking lots"
under the presidential proclamation in question is not required by public interest, nor it is for the benefit
of the public, because only those who have cars can use the parking lot. Public use or public benefit must
be for the general public and not a use by or for particular persons. The essential feature of public use is
that it should not be confined to privileged individuals, but open to the general public. This is not so of the
parking space as contemplated by the presidential proclamation in question. (Citations omitted.)
Section 83 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Law provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce [now Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources], the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the
public domain as reservation for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines [now Republic of the
Philippines] or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations
prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it,
including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems,
communal pastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen's
village and other improvements for the public benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Appellants urge this Court to declare Proclamation No. 144 invalid. They contend that the setting aside of the lots
occupied by them for parking space purposes does not redound to the public benefit as required under Section 83 of the
Public Land Act. They claim that only certain privileged individuals, i.e., those who have cars, can avail of the parking
facility without any advantage accruing to the general public.
As observed by the trial court, Proclamation No. 144 was issued by then President Ramon Magsaysay in response to
several resolutions passed by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal, which had become particularly aware of the
increasing vehicular traffic and congestion along F. Sevilla Boulevard. 5 The Municipal Council had proposed to widen F.
Sevilla Boulevard and at the same time, to reserve an area for parking space to ease up traffic problems, in anticipation of
the completion of the then proposed market and slaughterhouse located to the west of F. Sevilla Boulevard. In this day and
age, it is hardly open to debate that the public has much to gain from the proposed widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard and
from establishment of a municipal parking area. Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla Boulevard and other main
thoroughfares was prevalent; this, of course, caused the build up of traffic in the surrounding area to the great discomfort
and inconvenience of the public who use the streets. Traffic congestion constitutes a threat to the health, welfare, safety
and convenience of the people and it can only be substantially relieved by widening streets and providing adequate
parking areas.
Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated areas along public streets or highways is allowed
which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a useful purpose. In other jurisdictions where traffic is at
least as voluminous as here, the provision by municipal governments of parking space is not limited to parking along
public streets or highways. There has been a marked trend to build off-street parking facilities with the view to removing
parked cars from the streets. While the provision of off-street parking facilities or carparks has been commonly
undertaken by private enterprise, municipal governments have been constrained to put up carparks in response to public
necessity where private enterprise had failed to keep up with the growing public demand. American courts have upheld
the right of municipal governments to construct off-street parking facilities as clearly redounding to the public benefit. 7

Appellants, however, allege that the benefits, if any, that may be derived from the proposed street-widening and parking
space will be confined to people who have cars, hence there would be lacking the essential feature of property reserved for
public use or benefit. Appellants would restrict property reserved for public use or benefit to include only property
susceptible of being utilized by a generally unlimited number of people. The conception urged by appellants is both
flawed and obsolete since the number of users is not the yardstick in determining whether property is properly reserved
for public use or public benefit. In the first place, Section 83 above speaks not only of use by a local government but also
of "quasi-public uses or purposes." To constitute public use, the public in general should have equal or common rights to

use the land or facility involved on the same terms, however limited in number the people who can actually avail
themselves of it at a given time. 8 There is nothing in Proclamation No. 144 which excludes non-car-owners from using a
widened street or a parking area should they in fact happen to be driving cars; the opportunity to avail of the use thereof
remains open for the public in general.
Besides, the benefits directly obtained by car-owners do not determine either the validity or invalidity of Proclamation No.
144. What is important are the long-term benefits which the proposed street widening and parking areas make available to
the public in the form of enhanced, safe and orderly transportation on land. This is the kind of public benefit envisioned
by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal and which was sought to be promoted by the President in issuing
Proclamation No. 144.
We believe and so hold that Proclamation No. 144 was lawful and valid.
Proclamation No. 144 specifically provided that the withdrawal of Lots No. 1 and 2 shall be subject to existing private
rights, if any there be. Prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 144, appellants had applied for miscellaneous sales
applications over the lots respectively occupied by them. Insofar as appellant Policarpio Gonzales is concerned, it is not
disputed that he had acknowledged the ownership of the National Government of the land applied for by him. 9 Although
not expressly stated, Augusto Josue must be deemed to have similarly admitted that ownership by the National
Government since he filed a miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands, an agency of the Government, an
application which can only be filed in respect of tracts of public land, not private land.
The miscellaneous sales application, however, of appellant Policarpio Gonzales had not been approved by the Bureau of
Lands at the time Proclamation No. 144 was issued; the land therefore retained its character as land of the public domain.
Upon the other hand, the miscellaneous sales application of appellant Augusto Josue had already been rejected in an Order
of the Director of Lands dated 8 January 1954. 10 Accordingly, no private rights had accrued and become vested in
appellants. In both cases, the lots remained public lands and were in fact subject to the free disposition and control of the
Government.
Appellants allege having built mixed residential and commercial buildings on Lot 2. The evidence of record discloses that
appellants had secured the appropriate municipal permits or licenses therefor, that is, for the construction of said buildings
as well as the carrying on of business therein. However, since the lease, sale or any other form of concession or
disposition and management of lands of the public domain was directly under the executive control of the Director of
Lands, 11 and not of local government officials, the Malabon Municipal Mayor must be held to have exceeded his
authority in allowing the use of lands of the public domain to appellants by constructing thereon commercial and
residential use buildings, or any other kind of building for that matter.
Sometime after Proclamation No. 144 was issued by the President, appellants brought their predicament to the attention of
the President. The then Presidential Complaints and Action Committee ("PCAC") conducted an investigation on the basis
of which it eventually recommended the exclusion from the reservation of the lots affected, in line with the "Land for the
Landless" policy of President Magsaysay's administration. 12 The then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
similarly recommended the exclusion of the portion of Lot 2 occupied by appellants and forwarded to the Office of the
President a draft of a proposed amendment of Proclamation No. 144 specifically excluding Lot 2 from the scope of
application thereof .The amendment, however, remained merely a proposal for failure on the part of the President of the
Philippines to act favorably thereon.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 28 January 1967 of then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92299

April 19, 1991

REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CECILIA
ALMAJOSE, respondents.
Legal Services Division for petitioner.
Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law Offices for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 7, Article IX (A) of the present Constitution, the petitioner Governor of
the Province of Rizal, prays for the nullification of Resolution No. 89-868 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated
November 21, 1989 and its Resolution No. 90-150 dated February 9, 1990.
The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to dismiss, as it hereby dismisses the
appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan of Rizal. Accordingly, the approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose
as Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is upheld. (Rollo, p. 32)
The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150 reiterates CSC's position upholding the private respondent's appointment by
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal was left vacant by its
former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario.
In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to
a Memorandum issued by the petitioner who further requested Director Abella to endorse the appointment of the said Ms.
Dalisay Santos to the contested position of PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of
Taytay, Rizal before she discharged the functions of acting PBO.
In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, then Director Abella of Region IV recommended
the appointment of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget
Officers of the said province which included three nominees of the petitioner. According to Abella, the private respondent
was the most qualified since she was the only Certified Public Accountant among the contenders.
On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment papers of the private
respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella.
In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner reiterated his request for the appointment of
Dalisay Santos to the contested position unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.
On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his other
recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a local
budget officer. Director Galvez whether or not through oversight further required the petitioner to submit at least three
other qualified nominees who are qualified for the position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.
On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the private respondent's appointment wrote Secretary
Carague protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally
authorized to appoint the PBO; that the private respondent lacks the required three years work experience as provided in

Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional
Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio
A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that public
respondent DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner's
nominees met the prescribed requirements.
On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling.
On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against the appointment of the private
respondent and reiterating his position regarding the matter.
Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the questioned resolutions which prompted the petitioner to submit before us
the following assignment of errors:
A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT BY DBM ASSISTANT SECRETARY
CABUQUIT OF CECILIA ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF RIZAL.
B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CECILIA ALMA JOSE POSSESSES ALL THE REQUIRED
QUALIFICATIONS.
C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO THE
SUBJECT POSITION.
D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING
PETITIONER TO SUBMIT NEW NOMINEES WHO COULD MEET THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATION
(Petition, pp. 7-8, Rollo, pp. 15-16)
All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the
functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the
recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV.
The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the
position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 112 which provides that:
Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of
Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service
law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrative control and technical supervision of
the Ministry of Budget and Management.
The petitioner maintains that the appointment of the private respondent to the contested position was made in derogation
of the provision so that both the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Almajose's
appointment.
There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to
the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the appointing authority, the Minister (now
Secretary) of public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same.
In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he
fancies ? This is the issue before us.

Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December 24, 1986, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code vested upon the Governor, subject to civil service rules and regulations, the power to
appoint the PBO (Sec. 216, subparagraph (1), BP 337). The Code further enumerated the qualifications for the position of
PBO. Thus, Section 216, subparagraph (2) of the same code states that:
(2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, of good moral
character, a holder of a degree preferably in law, commerce, public administration or any related course from a
recognized college or university, a first grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and has acquired at least
five years experience in budgeting or in any related field.
The petitioner contends that since the appointing authority with respect to the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal was
vested in him before, then, the real intent behind Executive Order No. 112 in empowering him to recommend nominees to
the position of Provincial Budget Officer is to make his recommendation part and parcel of the appointment process. He
states that the phrase "upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application
in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and
Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative
issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's
nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No.
31 dated February 9, 1988.
The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent CSC as follows:
As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among the recommendees of the
Provincial Governor who are thus qualified and eligible for appointment to the position of the PBO of Rizal.
Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the local chief executive is merely directory and not a condition sine
qua non to the exercise by the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative. To rule otherwise would in effect
give the law or E.O. No. 112 a different interpretation or construction not intended therein, taking into
consideration that said officer has been nationalized and is directly under the control and supervision of the DBM
Secretary or through his duly authorized representative. It cannot be gainsaid that said national officer has a
similar role in the local government unit, only on another area or concern, to that of a Commission on Audit
resident auditor. Hence, to preserve and maintain the independence of said officer from the local government unit,
he must be primarily the choice of the national appointing official, and the exercise thereof must not be unduly
hampered or interfered with, provided the appointee finally selected meets the requirements for the position in
accordance with prescribed Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. In other words, the appointing official is
not restricted or circumscribed to the list submitted or recommended by the local chief executive in the final
selection of an appointee for the position. He may consider other nominees for the position vis a vis the nominees
of the local chief executive. (CSC Resolution No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31)
The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of
war between the Secretary of Budget and Management and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a
seemingly innocuous position involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local
autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in
favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor
of autonomy.
The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal since the turn of the century. And yet,
inspite of constitutional provisions and, as in this case, legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials, national
officers cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. They deny or water down what little grants of autonomy have so far
been given to municipal corporations.
President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to the Second Philippine Commission ordered the new Government
"to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which natives of the
Islands, both in the cities and rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local officers to
the fullest extent of which they are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study
of their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law,
order and loyalty.

In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the Commission which combined both executive and legislative powers was
directed to give top priority to making local autonomy effective.
The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between presidential control
and supervision as follows:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11,
Article VII, 1935 Constitution)
the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be
provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He
has only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.
In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated:
. . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175 [1958]) with the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion as the ponente,
clarified matters. As was pointed out, the presidential competence is not even supervision in general, but general
supervision as may be provided by law. He could not thus go beyond the applicable statutory provisions, which
bind and fetter his discretion on the matter. Moreover, as had been earlier ruled in an opinion penned by Justice
Padilla in Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143 [1955]) referred to by the present Chief Justice in his opinion in the
Hebron case, supervision goes no further than "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties." (Ibid, pp. 147-148) Control, on the other hand,
"means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the
performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It would follow
then, according to the present Chief Justice, to go back to the Hebron opinion, that the President had to abide by
the then provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on suspension and removal of municipal officials, there
being no power of control that he could rightfully exercise, the law clearly specifying the procedure by which
such disciplinary action would be taken.
Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation implementing local autonomy was enacted. In 1959,
Republic Act No. 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing Local Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy and
Reorganizing Local Governments" was passed. It was followed in 1967 when Republic Act No. 5185, the
Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further autonomous powers to local governments governments."
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country further, at least insofar as legal provisions are concerned,
towards greater autonomy. It provided under Article II as a basic principle of government:
Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barangay
to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a local government code
defining more responsive and accountable local government structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial
boundary alteration cannot be done except in accordance with the local government code and upon approval by a
plebiscite. The power to create sources of revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon local governments.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments
The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the
provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory,
it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously
hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and
resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:
Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local
chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.
is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no
one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the proper administration of fiscal
affairs at the local level. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are
forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the
constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally
imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason that there
should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the local and
national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between
the two levels of government.
It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and Judges.1wphi1
Under Article VIII of the Constitution, nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. The
President makes the appointments from the list of nominees submitted to her by the Council. She cannot apply the DBM
procedure, reject all the Council nominees, and appoint another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be no
reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing power's personal choice.
The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez required the Provincial
Governor to submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. It was a
meaningless exercise. The appointment of the private respondent was formalized before the Governor was extended the
courtesy of being informed that his nominee had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government's
prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are manifest.
In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of local governments as
institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "local
assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people may establish a system of free government but
without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh
Edition, pp. 705-706).
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also
appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are SET
ASIDE. The appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and Management is

ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial
Governor.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,
vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY
TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT,
and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the
Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents Acmad
Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their
respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao
del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as
members of the Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI,
Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter
which reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues with local
government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on the recent
and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the
autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to
constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the
Commission.
You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your respective
assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the Philippines.
Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.

5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of
the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the
house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang
pampook ... ."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the
members of the Assembly the following telegram:
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM
RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY
MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS
REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE
PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL
ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR
PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE
PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF
MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the following
assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
3. Dagalangit, Rakil
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the
session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the
affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the
session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present:
1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer
2. Ali Salic
3. Ali Salindatu

4. Aratuc, Malik
5. Cajelo, Rene
6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
7. Dagalangit, Rakil
8. Dela Fuente, Antonio
9. Ortiz, Jesus
10 Palomares, Diego
11. Quijano, Jesus
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis, Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our
colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to call the names of the new comers in
order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But
before doing so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer and
Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in
today's session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me chair hears none
and the said motions are approved. ...
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one
abstained and none voted against. 1
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents
from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on
November 2, 1987 as null and void;

(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook,
Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable.

Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook,
"EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK
AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and
signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his
Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and
nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and
that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . .
constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much
amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic],"
6
and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should
have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had
become "moot and academic". 8
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot
and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution so
issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the
Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and
effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the
petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to
do so. On the other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that
"since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the
private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but
that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled." 11 Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh
out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and
that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin
with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said
therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled
amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the
petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks
of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their
integrity and character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial
remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be
punished for seeking redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal,
the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most
elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish

their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such
discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully
intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called
autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In
other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618 15
promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions
"[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its
Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities 18 specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective
regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government,"
"which include, but are not limited to, the following:

20

(1) National defense and security;

(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing. 21
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden
the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25
over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in
the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency. 28
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly,
an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved
herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not
resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in
the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting
of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone
to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other
hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government
acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII),
then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the
former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating
the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." 33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative
powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in
the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;

(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;

(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs and
facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the
Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as may be
necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the
Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree,
national legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more
reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on
November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the
Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster
was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31
of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the
Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short
intervals." 36 Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the
petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is
while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their
Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally
and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules
speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess
since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can
be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents'
own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a
settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a
valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears
is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the
Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the
invitation was what precipitated it.

In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a
recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are
not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful
meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful
prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the
Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 39
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED
to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker
thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.