RULINGS OF CASES FOR MIRANDA

DOCTRINE
Sec. 12, Article III
1. Source
Miranda vs Arizona
Was a confession an admissible document in a court of law if it was obtained without warnings
against self-incrimination and without legal counselrights guaranteed to all persons by the 5th
and 6th amendments? With whom does the burden of proof rest for determining whether a
defendant has legally waived his or her rights? What is the standard for judging whether
voluntary confessions should be deemed admissible? When should an attorney be appointed for a
person if he or she cannot afford one?
Miranda Warnings
You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of
law.
You have the right to an attorney.
If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.
By a 5-4 margin, the Court voted to overturn Miranda's conviction. Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Warren declared that the burden is upon the State to demonstrate that procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination are followed. The current
practice of 'incommunicado' [unable to communicate with the world] interrogation is at odds with
one of our Nation's most cherished principlesthat the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself.
Warren then summarized the case, measuring it against the fundamental fairness standards the
Court had established. [I]t is clear, he wrote, that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his
right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right
not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner. Without these
warnings [his] statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which
contained a typed-in clause stating that he had 'full knowledge' of his 'legal rights' does not
approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.
Turning to the standard for a valid waiver of rights, Warren wrote: [A] valid waiver will not be
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact
that a confession was in fact eventually obtained. Moreover, any evidence that the accused was
threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not
voluntarily waive his privilege.
Warren then spelled out the rights of the accused and the responsibilities of the police. Police must
warn a suspect prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires.
The creation of the Miranda Warning put on the shoulders of the police the burden of informing
citizens subject to questioning in a criminal investigation of their rights to due process. Ernesto
Miranda, retracting his confession, was tried again by the State of Arizona, found guilty, and sent to
prison. His retrial, based on a prisoner's successful appeal, did not constitute double jeopardy.
PP vs Mojello
The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he was fully apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to counsel, as contained in such confession.28
Appellant was properly assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial confession of appellant
was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal Judge of MedellinDaanbantayan and acting Judge of MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan and Madredijos. Judge Jaca declared that
he explained to the appellant the contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if he
understood it. He subsequently acknowledged that when appellant subscribed to his statement,
Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and his Clerk of Court were present as well as other people.

The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid requirements of the
Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is admissible as evidence. The lower court was correct in giving
credence to the extrajudicial confession of the appellant.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to
execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who
threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not understand the
contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the
Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress, compulsion or
coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving
claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. Bare assertions will
certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption. The test for determining whether a confession is
voluntary is whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed. In cases where
the Miranda warnings have been given, the test of voluntariness should be subsequently applied in
order to determine the probative weight of the confession.
Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession remains unrebutted by his
failure to present independent evidence that the same was coerced.
It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement officers is to ensure that a
suspect has been properly apprised of his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel. It is in the
paramount public interest that the foundation of an effective administration of criminal justice relies
on the faithful adherence to the Miranda doctrine.
Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional requirements under Art. III,
Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It follows that the admission of
culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore not "fruit of the poisonous tree" since the tree
itself is not poisonous.
Aquino vs Paiste
It is evident that when petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR on March 27, 1991
to be investigated, she was already under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee
for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was
provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed.
However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that the
custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either aborted or did not
push through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the
amicable settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with both parties
affixing their signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.
It is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the person of Atty. Uy. The presumption that
Atty. Uy is a competent and independent counsel whose interests are not adverse to petitioner has
not been overturned. Petitioner has merely posed before the CA and now this Court that Atty. Uy
may not be an independent and competent counsel. Without any shred of evidence to bolster such
claim, it cannot be entertained.
Petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uys appointment during the time she
was in the NBI and thereafter, when she signed the amicable settlement. Verily, in the instant case,
petitioner is deemed to have engaged Atty. Uy when she conferred with him and thereafter signed
the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel in his presence. We do not see how the
answer of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon cross-examination about the petitioners counsel in the
NBI, could be evasive when the NBI agent merely stated the fact that an independent counsel, Atty.
Uy, was provided petitioner.
When petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly executed the amicable
settlement. Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel and such "right to counsel is
intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.
The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling
the truth." An amicable settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an
extrajudicial confession or admission but is a contract between the parties within the
parameters of their mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the
presence of Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioners rights even if the custodial investigation did not push
through and precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or intimidation.
In fine, we agree with the courts a quo that even assuming arguendo that the amicable settlement
is not admissible, still the conviction of petitioner would be affirmed as conspiracy was duly proven
by other pieces of evidence.
PP vs Concepcion

Appellants contention that they were not apprised of their constitutional rights upon their arrest
cannot lead to their acquittal. The arresting officers alleged failure to inform them of their Miranda
rights or the nature of their arrest should have been raised before arraignment. It is too late in the
day for appellants to raise these alleged illegalities after a valid information has been filed, the
accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellants were involved in the buy-bust
operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, appellants Alfredo and Henrys participation
cannot be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants plain
denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must
simply fail. Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to
contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in
prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. For this claim to prosper, the defense must
adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have
performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.
We uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. The presumption
remains because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police
officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive. The
presumption was not overcome as there was no evidence showing that PO2 Sistemio and PO2
Arojado were impelled by improper motive.
The testimony of defense witness Julieta dela Rosa does not convince us. As the wife of appellant
Alfredo and sister-in-law of appellant Henry, we find her not to be credible. Her testimony is suspect
and unsubstantiated. In her direct testimony, she said her husband, appellant Alfredo, was outside
their house with his friends. However, such statement was belied by Alfredo himself who said he
was inside his house when he was allegedly arrested by members of the PDEA. Such inconsistency
as to where appellant Alfredo was when the alleged unlawful arrest was made, further diminishes
the credibility of the defense witnesses.
Undeniably, appellants are guilty of sale and delivery of shabu, a dangerous drug. It was duly
established that there was a conspiracy between them to sell and deliver dangerous drugs.
PP vs Reyes
Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as
evidence, as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel
of his own choice during custodial investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose
his counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the custodial investigation
whether he had a lawyer of his own choice, and whether he could afford to hire a lawyer; and that
the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga to him.
An extra-judicial confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or
inducement by a person under custodial investigation, stating or acknowledging that he had
committed or participated in the commission of a crime. In order that an extra-judicial confession
may be admitted in evidence, Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the
following safeguards be observed.
Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the
following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and
(4) it must be in writing.
The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision covers the period
from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the
offense although not yet in custody. The right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain
silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. Such right
contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is
conveyed.
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of
the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information
and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. The lawyer called to be present during such
investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer is
one furnished in behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he must be
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. A competent and independent
counsel is logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time the
latter answers the first question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession.
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that the
person under investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extra-judicial
confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights.

However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he
voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced
to admit although untrue. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions
being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from
saying anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly apprised
appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel of their own choice during their respective custodial investigations.
Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent
and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations.
PP vs Tuniaco
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the requirements of a valid extrajudicial confession and
the establishment of the existence of corpus delicti in murder cases.
Before anything else, officer Tabucon informed accused Aleman in Cebuano of his constitutional
right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel of his own choice and asked him if he was
willing to give a statement. Aleman answered in the affirmative. When asked if he had any
complaint to make, Aleman said that he had none. When Aleman said that he had no lawyer,
Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that he was assisting all the suspects in the case.
Tabucon warned Aleman that anything he would say may be used against him later in court.
Afterwards, the police officer started taking down Alemans statement.
Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing. These requirements
were met here. A lawyer, not working with or was not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted
accused Aleman during the custodial investigation. Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused
Aleman, before the taking of his statement, conversing with counsel at the police station. Atty.
Besinga did not dispute this claim.
Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the confession. The appellate court is
correct in ruling that such allegation is baseless. It is a settled rule that where the defendant
did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of
violence was presented, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. Here,
although Aleman claimed that he bore torture marks on his head, he never brought this to the
attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath.
Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in education and so he did not fully realize the
consequences of a confession. But as the CA said, no law or jurisprudence requires the police
officer to ascertain the educational attainment of the accused. All that is needed is an
effective communication between the interrogator and the suspect to the end that the
latter is able to understand his rights. This appears to have been done in this case.
Moreover, as the lower court noted, it is improbable that the police fabricated Alemans confession
and just forced him to sign it. The confession has details that only the person who committed the
crime could have possibly known. What is more, accused Datulaytas confession corroborate that of
Aleman in important details. Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions, such
corroboration is circumstantial evidence against the person implicated in it.

2. Rights are available only during custodial investigation

Any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way (or in custody interrogation of
accused persons).
2.1 Under RA 7438
Custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed without prejudice to
the liability of the inviting officers for any violation for any law.
PP vs Tan
ROMERO, J.:

May the confession of an accused, given before a police investigator upon

invitation and without the benefit of counsel, be admissible in evidence
against him?
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and
whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against
the confessant. Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution provides:
x x x
xxx
xxx
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible against him.
Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438), approved on May 15, 1992, reenforced the constitutional
mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of
which reads:
As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases
to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect
is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating
officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be
a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory
reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance
of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be voluntary,
knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the
police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to
convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the
right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if
the same be initiated by mere invitation. This Court values liberty and will always
insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non
against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government.
What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is inadequate to warrant a conviction.
Considering the circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellants investigation which fell short
of compliance with constitutional safeguards, we are constrained to acquit the appellant.
PP vs Ordono
PER CURIAM:
COURTS are confronted, repeatedly, with the difficult task of scrutinizing the sufficiency of
extrajudicial confessions as basis for convicting the accused. The drive to apprehend the
culprits at any cost, particularly in crimes characterized by brutality and savagery, not too
infrequently tempts law enforcement agencies to take unwarranted shortcuts and disregard
constitutional and legal constraints that are intended to ensure that only the guilty are
punished. In the delicate process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, courts play a
crucial role in assuring that the evidence gathered by government agents scrupulously meets
the exacting constitutional standards which if not met impose a strict exclusionary rule, i.e.,
"any confession or admission obtained in violation of Art. II, Sec. 12 (1), shall be inadmissible in
evidence."

Review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's testimony reveals that the
interview was conducted free from any influence or intimidation from police officers and was done

willingly by the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority ordered or forced
the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be expected that police officers were
around since the interview was held in the police station, there was no showing that they were
within hearing distance nor within the vicinity where the interview was being conducted. At most,
the participation of the police authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct an interview.
The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and
even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by herein
accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the
nature of an investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked
by the radio reporter, not by the police or any other investigating officer. When the accused talked
to the radio announcer, they did not talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not,
hence their uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights.
Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of the
two (2) accused to the radio announcer. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something
false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual
and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.
The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that
certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be
taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. Governmental power is
not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against
aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
The admissions of the accused before the radio announcer and duly tape-recorded are further
bolstered and substantiated by the findings of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the
Autopsy Report/Post Mortem Findings.

PP vs Lugod
Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel,
and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one.
Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if
he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the
assistance of counsel. Consequently, the accused-appellants act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo
that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for
having transgressed accused-appellants rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our
Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed
may be. In the same vein, the accused-appellants act in pointing out the location of the body of
Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused-appellants right to remain silent. The same
was an integral part of the uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree.
As can be seen from the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, accused-appellant merely responded to the
ambiguous questions that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him. He did not state in certain and
categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice-Mayor admitted that the
accused-appellant did not tell him that he raped and killed Nairube. In addition, we note the
contradiction between the testimony of the Vice-Mayor who stated that he was alone when he
spoke to the accused-appellant and that of SPO2 Gallardo who claimed that he was present when
accused-appellant confessed to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
PP vs Pasudag
After the interrogation, SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report, which was part of the
investigation. Accused-Appellant signed the confiscation report. In both the interrogation and the
signing of the confiscation receipt, no counsel assisted accused-appellant. He was the only civilian
present in the Office of the Chief of Police.
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant was not under custodial
investigation when he signed the confiscation receipt. It has been held repeatedly that custodial
investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. Obviously, accused-appellant
was a suspect from the moment the police team went to his house and ordered the uprooting of the
marijuana plants in his backyard garden.

"The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more that mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee." Even if the confession or
admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without
a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence.
PP vs Reyes, supra
Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence,
because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his
own choice during custodial investigation. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession was
elicited through force, torture and without the assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was not
assisted by any lawyer from the time he was arrested until he was coerced to sign the purported
confession; that he was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the beatings he
suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who,
according to the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation.
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of
the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information
and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. The lawyer called to be present during such
investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer is
one furnished in behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he must be
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. A competent and independent
counsel is logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time the
latter answers the first question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession.
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that the
person under investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extra-judicial
confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights.
However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he
voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced
to admit although untrue. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions
being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from
saying anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly apprised
appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel of their own choice during their respective custodial investigations.
Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent
and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations.
PP vs Lauga
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a Bantay Bayan

Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan, the
confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no
valid waiver of such requirement.
This Court needs to ascertain whether or not a bantay bayan may be deemed a law enforcement
officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
It may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11
November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized
to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay
level. The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as
Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing BarangayBased Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative
well-known in his community.
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to
perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope
of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a
state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his

constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution,
otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not
deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but from the confluence of evidence
showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2.2 Police Line-Up (not yet shifted from the investigatory to accusatory stage)
PP vs Amestuzo
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may
be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts
when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of
the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he was presented
for identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the investigation
process. Moreover, there was no showing that during his identification by the complainants, the
police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from accused-appellant. In fact,
records show that the police did not at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented before
the complainants. The alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under
custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extra-judicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In the present case,
there is no such confession or extra-judicial admission.
Accused-appellant also makes much ado about the manner in which he was presented to the
complainants for identification. It is alleged that the identification was irregular as he was not
placed in a police line-up and instead, made to stand before the complainants alone.
Again, the contention has no merit. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is no law
requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. The fact that he was brought out of
the detention cell alone and was made to stand before the accused by himself and unaccompanied
by any other suspects or persons does not detract from the validity of the identification process.
PP vs Piedad
The claim by the defense that Niels pre-trial identification was suggestive due to the absence of a
police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that even before the incident, Luz
Lactawan knew the accused. Fidel, on the other hand, knew Niel because they played basketball
together. Hence, the witnesses were not identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar with, where
arguably, improper suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused were presented
before the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones responsible
for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply because they were
the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were certain they recognized the
perpetrators of the crime.
Besides, there is no law which requires a police lineup before a suspect can be identified as the
culprit of a crime. What is important is that the prosecution witnesses positively identify the
persons charged as the malefactors. Neither is the lack of counsel during the pre-trial identification
process of the accused-appellants fatal.
The right to counsel accrues only after an investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and commences an interrogation aimed at a particular suspect who has been taken
into custody and to whom the police would then propound questions which tend to elicit
incriminating statements. The presence of counsel during such investigation is intended to prevent
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. What is thus sought to
be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for
the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict
him. In the case at bar, however, accused-appellants did not make any extrajudicial confession or
admission with regard to the crime charged. While Niel and Lito may have been suspects, they were
certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less forced to confess to the crime
imputed against them. Accused-appellants were not under custodial investigation. In fact, Niel
averred during cross-examination that the police never allowed them to say anything at the police
station on the day they voluntarily presented themselves to the authorities.
Likewise, Lito testified that he did not talk to any of the police officers nor sign any written
statement at the police station when he was invited. Moreover, the rights accorded an accused

under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution applies only against testimonial compulsion and not
when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined, as was done in this case - presented to
the witnesses to be identified. Accused-appellants were not thus denied their right to counsel.
PP vs Escordial
Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ny person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He contends that he was
subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have
independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in not
excluding evidence obtained from him during such interrogation for violation of accused-appellant's
rights under this provision.
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as
a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him whether
inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that
he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact,
accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to physical torture, did he ever
admit committing the crime with which he was charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement
was obtained from accused-appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him.
Of greater significance is the fact that accused-appellant was never assisted by counsel, whether of
his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the Bacolod police station. Although accusedappellant made no statement during this time, this fact remains important insofar as it affects the
admissibility of the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant by the prosecution witnesses,
namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega.
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the cases at
bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the
police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the
crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications
were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect
is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial
investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is
because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce
the trial itself to a mere formality." We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial
investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him.
Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and by
Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various
dates after his arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of
counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently,
the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held
inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the
primary] illegality.'"
Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court
identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the "fruits of the poisonous tree." This incourt identification was what formed the basis of the trial court's conviction of accused-appellant.
As it was not derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence
thereof, it is admissible as evidence against him. However, whether or not such prosecution
evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.

PP vs Casimiro
With respect to the receipt of property seized from accused-appellant, the lower court declared:
The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was signed by the
accused does not affect the liability of the accused. The receipt of property seized was issued by
the police in accordance with their standard operating procedure in a buy bust operation to show
what property was seized. The receipt should not be treated as an admission or confession.

Indeed, the receipt could not be considered evidence against accused-appellant because it was
signed by him without the assistance of counsel.24 Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution.
The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the suspect to a poseur
buyer and signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as "suspect/ owner." In effect, accusedappellant admitted that he delivered a prohibited drug to another, which is an offense under the
law. Having been made without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that
marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in evidence.
The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if accused-appellant could not
afford counsel, one would be assigned to him. The warning was perfunctory, made without any
effort to find out if he understood it. It was merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting
meaningful information to the suspect. We cannot say that, in signing the receipt without a lawyer,
accused-appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely. What is more, the police investigators did
not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say whether he was willing to answer their
questions even without the assistance of counsel or whether he was waiving his right to remain
silent at all.
PP vs Sayaboc
Beginning with the admissibility of Sayabocs extrajudicial confession, we hold that such cannot be
used in evidence in this case.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition
for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional
requirements safeguarding an accuseds rights during custodial investigation have been strictly
complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for
this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion
while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial investigations.
Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant
did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform
a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and
inadmissible.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow the
suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights.
More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was
a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers for two
days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.
We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel. We
understand the difficulty and frustration of police investigators in obtaining evidence to bring
criminals to justice. But even the hardest of criminals have rights that cannot be interfered with.
Those tasked with the enforcement of the law and who accuse those who violate it carry the burden
of ensuring that all evidence obtained by them in the course of the performance of their duties are
untainted with constitutional infirmity. The purpose of the stringent requirements of the law is to
protect all persons, especially the innocent and the weak, against possible indiscriminate use of the
powers of the government. Any deviation cannot be tolerated, and any fruit of such deviation shall
be excluded from evidence.
For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be used in evidence against him.
We hold, however, that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving his guilt for the crime
of homicide.
PP vs Bagnate
The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty of the crimes he was
to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellants extrajudicial confession. There is
nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty
for the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption arise that the counsel is incompetent or
not independent just because he failed to apprise the accused that the imposable penalty for the
crime he was about to admit is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the
resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the commission of a crime.
As previously stated, Atty. Brotamonte ably assisted appellant during the entire procedure from
the time appellant signified his intention to give his extrajudicial confession up to the time he
signed the same. Besides, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant was not aware of the consequences
of his admissions as Judge Base explained it to appellant when he appeared before the latter to
swear to the veracity of his confession.
Appellant failed to substantiate his bare claim that when he was brought to the Tabaco police
station, the police officers boxed and kicked him, telling him to confess to the crimes. As the
records show, like Atty. Brotamonte, Judge Base also asked him if he was forced to confess but
Bagnate said that he was not. If it were true that he was forced to confess to the crime, then

appellant should have complained of such abuse to Atty. Brotamonte or Judge Base as he had the
opportunity to do so when the two conferred with him on separate occasions.
Where the appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their
persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did
not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did
not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be
considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.
To consider appellants allegation of maltreatment as true is to facilitate the retraction of solemnly
made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever.
The taking of appellants confession has conformed to the safeguards of the Constitution. It
constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person
of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by
truth and conscience.
PP vs Ganih
The Court entertains no doubt that Ganih and the others with him kidnapped Mrs. Lee to trade her
freedom for a price. Ganih initially demanded P15 million for her but he reduced his demand when
Mr. Lee could raise only P1.2 million. The kidnappers actually received this ransom as evidenced by
the fact that they immediately released Mrs. Lee after the last negotiation.
Significantly, Ganih offered nothing but his bare denial and unsubstantiated alibi to counter the
overwhelming evidence that the prosecution adduced against him. His other contention is that the
police made Mrs. Lee identify him, not in a proper police line-up but in a mere show-up after giving
her some improper suggestions.
But the manner in which Mrs. Lee identified Ganih was substantially the same as in any proper
police line-up except that this one took place outside the police station on account of Mrs. Lees
desire not to be seen while making the identification. The police did not show Ganih alone to Mrs.
Lee, which would suggest that he was their suspect. They made three other men stand with Ganih
in front of the police station while Mrs. Lee gazed on them behind the tinted windows of her vehicle.
What the Court condemns are prior or contemporaneous improper suggestions that
point out the suspect to the witness as the perpetrator to be identified. Besides, granting
that the out-of-court identification was irregular, Mrs. Lees court testimony clearly shows that she
positively identified Ganih independently of the previous identification she made in front of the
police station. Mrs. Lee could not have made a mistake in identifying him since she had ample
opportunities to study the faces and peculiar body movements of her kidnappers in her almost four
months of ordeal with them. Indeed, she was candid and direct in her recollection, narrating events
as she saw them take place. Her testimony, including her identification of the appellant, was
positive, straightforward, and categorical.

3. The guarantee does not apply to spontaneous statement/res gestae

PP vs Baloloy
We shall first address the issue of admissibility of JUANITOs extrajudicial confession to Barangay
Captain Ceniza.
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the
crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a
crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was asked by Ceniza to tell
her everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and thereafter threw
her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in
an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation
in connection with the commission of the offense.
Moreover, JUANITO did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza,
which could have compelled her to testify falsely against him. Where there is no evidence to show a
doubtful reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify against the accused or
falsely implicate him in a crime, the said testimony is trustworthy.
However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his constitutional rights during custodial
investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating
questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the

accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is
deemed to have started.
At any rate, while it is true that JUANITOs extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon was made
without the advice and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, it could however
be treated as a verbal admission of the accused, which could be established through the
testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused.
PP vs Arondain
The statement of accused-appellant immediately after his arrest that he shot the victim because
the latter refused his demand for money, which statement is allegedly admissible as part of the res
gestae.
Based on applicable jurisprudence, we find that the trial court erred in finding accused-appelant
guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. The confession made by the accusedappellant admitting the crime of frustrated robbery cannot be admitted as part of res gastae.
It must be stressed that said statement, if it was at all made by accused-appellant, was obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights. Said confession was given after he was arrested and without
the assistance of counsel. He was not informed of his right to remain silent or right to counsel.
From time he was arrested and deprived of his freedom, all the questions propounded
on him by the police authorities for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or
any information came within the ambit of a custodial investigation. As such, he was
entitled to the rights enshrined under Article III, Section 12, of the Constitution. Failing to observe
this constitutional mandate, the alleged confession of accused-appellant cannot be admitted as
evidence against him.

4. The guarantee does not apply to statements given in administrative

investigations
Navallo vs Sandiganbayan
Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable
only when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody
investigation," which we have since defined as any "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way."
A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An
audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer
contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to
sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own testimony.
Office of the Court Administrator vs Sumilang
ROMERO, J.: With reluctance, the Court once again has to wield its power of imposing
disciplinary measures on members of the Bench and employees of the judiciary for
failure to live up to the obligations incident to their status as officers of the Court.
Malla claims that her constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution were
violated when she was "pressured" to sign an affidavit dated September 14, 1994 before the Office
of the Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed. Thus, she concludes that the affidavit
is inadmissible in evidence.
During the investigation, Malla repeated what she basically stated in her affidavit i.e., that she used
a substantial amount of the P240,00.00 for her personal needs. This effectively refutes whatever
pressure and coercion she claims was employed against her. By repeating her confession in open
court, Malla thereby converted it into a judicial confession.
In People v. Loveria, however, we ruled that the aforementioned constitutional provision may be
invoked only during "custodial investigation" or as in "custody investigation" which has been
defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The investigation is
defined as an "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigation
conducted by the Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and the NBI and such other police agencies in our
government." Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the
law enforcement authority contemplated in the constitutional provision. At any rate, Malla
admitted during her testimony that she received the said check from Villarica covering the amount
of P240,000.00 payable to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it with the Municipal
Treasurer, the latter refused because there was no order from Judge Sumilang. Consequently,
Villarica entrusted said check to her. It was at this juncture that she used the money for personal
purposes.

Remolona vs Civil Service Commission

The main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the
government service for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the
performance of his official duty. He claims that the extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him
is inadmissible because he was merely made to sign a blank form.
The submission of Remolona that his alleged extra-judicial confession is inadmissible because he
was not assisted by counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12 paragraphs 1 and
3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution deserves scant consideration.
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal
case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such
investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of
engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of
Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule
XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always
imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing
conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.
In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the investigation conducted by the
CSC field office. The investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and
whether there is a prima facie evidence sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable by the
CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probably guilty thereof and should be
administratively charged. Perforce, the admissions made by Remolona during such investigation
may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.
PP vs Ting Lan Uy
Appellant claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was based on his sworn
statement, transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn statement was taken and the NBI
Report, which are incompetent evidence. He contends that his sworn statement was taken without
the benefit of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
The investigation under the above-quoted provision refers to a custodial investigation where a
suspect has already been taken into police custody and the investigating officers begin to ask
questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. Succinctly stated,
custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accusedappellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture. The protective
mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or confessions made to a
private individual, or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the
investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official
capacity
Thus, the flaw in appellants argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent vis--vis the
foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement was taken during the administrative
investigation of NPCs audit team and before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was
still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no specific
suspect.
Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was confined at the time at
the Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police authorities.
Appellant can hardly claim that, under the prevailing circumstances at the time, whatever degree of
compulsion may have existed went beyond the borders of the unobjectionable where impermissible
levels of duress would force him into making false and incriminating declarations against his

interest. While he may have been persuaded into doing so, he cannot feign that he was intimidated
in such a way as to bring his statements within the ambit of the exclusionary constitutional
provision.
The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at the time the sworn
statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his predicament. The essence of the
constitutional safeguard is protection from coercion. The interview where the sworn statement is
based was conducted by NPC personnel for the NPCs administrative investigation. Any
investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct and independent from the
NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.
PP vs Salonga
We reject accused-appellants argument that his "so-called extra-judicial confession/admission"
taken on January 27, 1987 marked as Exhibit "B" is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that the
waiver of his right to counsel was made without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which mandates that "x x x (a)ny person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. x x x Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence."
Clearly, the constitutional right to counsel as may be invoked only by a person under custodial
investigation for an offense. Accused-appellants extra-judicial confession was properly admitted
and considered by the trial court considering that when accused-appellant gave his statement he
was not under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is "the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to elicit incriminating statements." Indeed, custodial investigation refers to "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
In this case, when Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group discovered that there
was a discrepancy in the proof sheet brought about by the issuance of a cashiers check
numbered 013702 made payable to Firebrake Sales and Services in the amount of Thirty Six
Thousand, Four Hundred Eighty pesos and Thirty centavos (P36,480.30), accused-appellant was
summoned to appear before Valentino Elevado, Assistant Accountant, Department of
Internal Affairs of Metrobank for questioning. It bears stressing that Elevado is not a
police officer or law enforcer but a private person who was a bank officer. In the course of
the interview, accused-appellant admitted having issued the subject cashiers check without any
legitimate transaction, to his co-accused Amiel Garcia who was then encountering financial
difficulties. He also admitted that out of the amount of the check, P8,500.00 went to his personal
benefit. His admissions were reduced into writing and offered as Exhibit "B" by the prosecution. It is
well-settled that the legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to
those extra-judicial confessions obtained during custodial investigation.
BPI vs Casa Montessori
The voluntary admission of Yabut did not violate his constitutional rights (1) on custodial
investigation, and (2) against self-incrimination.
In the first place, he was not under custodial investigation. His Affidavit was executed in private and
before private individuals. The mantle of protection under Section 12 of Article III of the
1987 Constitution covers only the period "from the time a person is taken into custody
for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the
time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not yet in
custody."
Therefore, to fall within the ambit of Section 12, quoted above, there must be an arrest or a
deprivation of freedom, with "questions propounded on him by the police authorities for the
purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information." The said constitutional provision
does "not apply to spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner" whereby an individual
orally admits to authorship of a crime. "What the Constitution proscribes is the compulsory or
coercive disclosure of incriminating facts."
If in these government proceedings waiver is allowed, all the more is it so in private investigations.
It is of no moment that no criminal case has yet been filed against Yabut. The filing thereof is
entirely up to the appropriate authorities or to the private individuals upon whom damage has been
caused. As we shall also explain later, it is not mandatory for CASA -- the plaintiff below -- to
implead Yabut in the civil case before the lower court.
Under these two constitutional provisions, "[t]he Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between
the individual and the State." Moreover, the Bill of Rights "is a charter of liberties for the individual
and a limitation upon the power of the [S]tate." These rights are guaranteed to preclude the

slightest coercion by the State that may lead the accused "to admit something false, not prevent
him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth."
Yabut is not an accused here. Besides, his mere invocation of the aforesaid rights "does not
automatically entitle him to the constitutional protection." When he freely and voluntarily executed
his Affidavit, the State was not even involved. Such Affidavit may therefore be admitted without
violating his constitutional rights while under custodial investigation and against self-incrimination.
Astudillo vs People
The Court of Appeals did not thus err in pronouncing that petitioners were not under custodial
investigation to call for the presence of counsel of their own choice, hence, their written
incriminatory statements are admissible in evidence.
The extra-judicial confession before the police of Flormarie (who, as earlier stated, has remained at
large) in which she incriminated petitioners bears a different complexion, however, as it was made
under custodial investigation. When she gave the statement, the investigation was no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particular suspect. The
records show that Camilo had priorly reported the thievery to the same police authorities and
identified Flormarie and Benitez as initial suspects.
It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to in-custody
questioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of regularity
of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence, in the
absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with these constitutional safeguards,
extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial investigation
are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of a case. In other words, confessions
and admissions in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution are inadmissible in
evidence against the declarant and more so against third persons. This is so even if such
statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given.
Petitioners at all events argue that their written statements were obtained through deceit, promise,
trickery and scheme, they claiming that Lily dictated to them their contents. There is nothing on
record, however, buttressing petitioners claim other than their self-serving assertion. The
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime
unless prompted by truth and conscience such that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary
is proved thus stands.
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the written admissions likewise militate against
petitioners bare claim. Petitioners admittedly wrote their respective letters during office hours in
Lilys office which was located in the same open booth or counter occupied by the cashier and
credit card in-charge. And this Court takes note of the observation of the trial court that petitioners
written notes were "neatly written in Tagalog, and not in broken Tagalog as spoken by Lily Ong".

5. The right guaranteed

compulsion

by

this

provision

refer

to

testimonial

PP vs Paynor
He argues that there was a violation of the Miranda rights of an accused when he was identified by
the witness while he was seated on a bench of the investigation room. The manner employed by
the investigators in obtaining his T-shirt, pants, towel, slippers, and hat, according to appellant, was
a further violation of his rights as these items were taken from him in the absence of his counsel.
Appellant then asseverates that there was a violation of his rights while under custodial
investigation, in light of the Miranda doctrine, when allegedly the police investigators
unceremoniously stripped him of his clothing and personal items, and the same were later
introduced as evidence during the trial. The Court is not persuaded. The protection of the accused
under custodial investigation, which is invoked by appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution provides that such accused shall the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the right to waive the right to counsel in the
presence of counsel, and that any confession or admission obtained in violation of his rights shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him. As held in People vs. Gamboa, this constitutional right
applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to
be examined. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable
the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against
testimonial compulsion.
The desperate ploy of appellant that the evidence against him was purely circumstantial does not
even warrant refutation. It was definitely established by the prosecution that appellant was actually
the one who treacherously attacked the victim. Eyewitness Magaway unequivocally stated and
lucidly described how she saw appellant actually stabbing Mrs. Aguinaldo, and even demonstrated
during the ocular inspection the specific part of the room where the crime was committed and
where she herself was when she witnessed the dastardly deed. As already explained, the defense

failed to show that the witness had ill motives in testifying against appellant and there is no doubt
in the mind of this Court that the witness really had personal ill feelings against him. The conclusion
that irresistibly emerges, therefore, is that the witness was just honestly relating what she really
saw on September 18, 1991, and that she so testified because of her desire for justice and redress
for the terrible wrong against her teacher.

6. The rights under the Miranda Doctrine which a person under

custodial investigation is entitled:
6.1 To remain silent
6.2 To competent and independent counsel
PP vs Suela
An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically [requires] that the lawyer be present
and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question
asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the
lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under
investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in
relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent."
True, counsel does not necessarily have to dissuade the person under investigation from
confessing. But his bounden duty is to properly and fully advise his clients on the nature
and consequences of an extrajudicial confession.
The modifier competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric . It
stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable
lawyer.
With respect Edgardo Batocan, we hold that his extrajudicial confession was obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights. This appellant did not finish first year high school. Yet Atty. Rous, who is
touted by the prosecution as a competent and independent counsel, interviewed Batocan -- before
the latter gave his confession -- for only around "five minutes." After this initial interview, Atty. Rous
just listened nonchalantly to the questions propounded by the police and to the answers given by
Batocan. Counsel was not even sure that he had explained to appellant the consequences of his
extrajudicial confession. Furthermore, Atty. Rous' attention was divided while attending the
custodial investigation as he was also looking over another paper work on his desk.
Evidently, Atty. Sansano, the counsel of Suela, did not understand the exact nature of appellants'
rights to counsel and to remain silent during their custodial investigations. He viewed a refusal to
answer as an obstruction in the investigation. This shows that he was incapable or unwilling to
advise appellants that remaining silent was a right they could freely exercise without fear of any
untoward consequence. As counsel, he could have stopped his clients from answering the
propounded questions and advised them of their right to remain silent, if they preferred to do so.
That the process of investigation could have been "obstructed" should not have concerned him
because his duty was to his clients and not to the prosecution or to the police investigators.
The extrajudicial confessions of all three appellants are thus inadmissible in evidence.
PP vs Morial
The Court finds Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively deprived
of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation.
Atty. Tobias Aguilar arrived at about 8:00 that morning of January 9, 1996. After being introduced to
Leonardo Morial, Atty. Aguilar had a short conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was willing
to answer the questions that may be propounded by the police investigator. Atty. Aguilar warned
him that the statements that he may give might be used in evidence against him. Leonardo said he
was willing to answer the questions voluntarily.
Midway into the investigation, after the police investigator had asked "all the material points," Atty.
Aguilar asked the investigator that he be given leave as he had a very important engagement. The
investigator agreed to the lawyer's request. Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was
willing to answer the questions in his absence. He also instructed the police that, after the written
confession had been prepared, the accused and the document containing the confession should be
brought to his office for "further examination." Atty. Aguilar was in the police station for less than
thirty minutes from the start of the interrogation.
If it were true that Atty. Tobias had to attend to matters so pressing that he had to abandon a client
undergoing custodial investigation, he could have terminated the same to be continued only until
as soon as his schedule permitted, advising the suspect in the meantime to remain silent. This he
failed to do. Appallingly, he even asked his client whether he was willing to answer questions during

the lawyer's absence. The records also disclose that Atty. Tobias never informed appellant of his
right to remain silent, not even before the custodial investigation started.
Atty. Tobias Aguilar, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain
silent, by his "coming and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt
departure before the termination of the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution contemplated when it added the modifier "competent"
to the word "counsel." Neither can he be described as the "vigilant and effective" counsel that
jurisprudence requires. Precisely, it is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the custodial
investigation that the Constitution abhors and which this Court condemns.
Even granting that appellant consented to Atty. Aguilar's departure during the investigation and to
answer questions during the lawyer's absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right to
counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12 (3), Article III of the Constitution, these
rights cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of counsel. No such
written and counseled waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.
As appellant Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during custodial
investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him.
PP vs Bandula
From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao
were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel
came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two
weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused
was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that
violence was used against the accused.
The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a
special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal
attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna
assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective extrajudicial
confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does
not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides
legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the
delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It
is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without
running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent
the accused during custodial investigations.
What is most upsetting however is the allegation of the four (4) accused that they were mauled into
owning the crime. Based on the records, we are strongly drawn to the belief that violence indeed
attended the extraction of statements from the accused.
For, why did the investigators not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before attempting to
elicit statements that would incriminate them? Why did the investigators not advise the accused
that if they could not afford the services of counsel they could be provided with counsel free of
charge before conducting any investigation? Why did the investigators continuously disregard the
repeated requests of the accused for medical assistance? How did accused Sedigo get his "black
eye" which evenat. Baldejera admitted? How and why did accused-appellant Bandula suffer a
fractured rib?
We cannot close our eyes to these unanswered questions. This Court is greatly disturbed with the
way the accused were treated or maltreated. In fine, we cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions
of the accused and use the same against them or any of them. Where there is doubt as to their
voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.

PP vs Velarde
PANGANIBAN, J.: A municipal mayor cannot be considered a competent and
independent counsel qualified to assist a person under custodial
investigation. Hence, the extrajudicial confession taken from the accused with His
Honor as counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Without this confession, the remaining
evidence, which is circumstantial, fails the test of moral certainty. Hence, acquittal is
inevitable.
Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as an independent counsel. He was
the mayor of Malolos at the time. As such, he exercised "operational supervision and control" over
the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers included the utilization of the elements thereof for the

maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the
bringing of offenders to justice.
As mayor of Malolos, his duties were inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to appellant, who
was already incarcerated and tagged as the main suspect in the rape-slay case. Serving as
counsel of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of "operational
supervision and control" over the police. "What the Constitution requires in Article III Section
12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake
his client's defense without any intervening conflict of interest." Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the
mayor of the place where the investigation was taken, could not act as counsel, independent or
otherwise, of appellant.
Furthermore, the right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not just the mere
presence of a lawyer beside the accused. The competent and independent lawyer so engaged
should be present "at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every
turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. The
desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the
lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the
person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is
impaired."
During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to act as the independent and competent counsel
envisioned by the Constitution. He failed to give any meaningful advice to protect the rights of
appellant. The former did not even bother to inform the latter of the consequences of an
extrajudicial confession.
It is significant to point out that, during the cross-examination and perhaps in total confusion, the
investigator even went so far as to state that Atty. Domingo had not acted as appellant's lawyer. If
this were so, then appellant had absolutely no counsel when his extra-judicial confession was taken.
In whatever way we may look at the situation, it is clear that, in palpable violation of the
Constitution, appellant was not assisted by a competent and independent counsel during the
custodial investigation and the taking of his extra-judicial confession.
PP vs Alberto
Appellant asks this Court to disregard the extrajudicial confession which he had allegedly executed
before and with the assistance of Atty. Cimafranca, but which confession he denies. If disregarded,
he claims that the prosecutions evidence would not be sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
A counsel-assisted and voluntary confession is sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused especially when it is corroborated on material points by the prosecution
witnesses. However, it is essential that the person making the confession must be
assisted by a "competent" counsel.
On this score, we are constrained to hold that the standards of "competent counsel" elucidated in
Deniega were not met in this case. In the first place, it is clear that the appellant was not given the
option to choose his own lawyer.
In our view, the assistance rendered by Atty. Cimafranca during the custodial investigation failed to
meet the exacting tests laid down in People vs. Deniega, supra. Thus, we must conclude that the
so-called extrajudicial confession of appellant is inadmissible as evidence for the prosecution.
Moreover, we find that the prosecution did not even take any effort to establish that the person who
executed the said confession was the appellant. Atty. Cimafranca was not made to identify
appellant in court. Nor were the signatures or initials therein identified as appellants own.
Without said confession, the prosecutions evidence is weak. It is insufficient to sustain the
conviction of appellant.
PP vs Tomaquin
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:Once again, the Court is confronted with the issue of the
admissibility of an extrajudicial confession. This appeal particularly involves the
question of whether a barangay captain who is a lawyer can be considered an
independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively safeguarded appellants rights
as an accused during the investigation when he himself entertained the suspicion that appellant is
guilty of the crime charged, and naturally, he would want appellant to admit having committed it.
It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty. Parawans qualification as a competent and
independent counsel because he was his choice.

As provided in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, "(A)ny person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during such investigations
should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning, but
the word "preferably" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling his defense. What is imperative is that the counsel should be competent and independent.
That appellant chose Atty. Parawan does not estop appellant from complaining about the latters
failure to safeguard his rights.
It appears that appellant chose Atty. Parawan because he was the barangay captain of Brgy. Lorega
where appellant resides, and apparently, appellant trusts Atty. Parawan to protect his rights. The
latter, however, fell short in tending to the trust reposed on him. Appellant did not finish
Grade 1 and does not know how to read and write. As between him and Atty. Parawan
who presumably knows the intricacies of the law and appellants predicament, Atty.
Parawan should have known better and exercised his sound judgment before conceding
to appellants choice. But it did not occur to him to inhibit himself from acting as appellants
counsel and instead, he even let appellant go through the investigation and execute the
extrajudicial confession knowing fully well that he was biased as regards appellants innocence.
Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent and competent
counsel as required by the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant,
even if gospel truth, is deemed an uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
In this regard, it may not be amiss to repeat the declaration of the Court in People vs. Deniega,
stressing the role of the courts in ascertaining that extrajudicial confessions meet the exacting
standards of the Constitution:
Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a hard look into the sufficiency
of extra-judicial confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the sole basis for
convicting accused individuals. In cases of crimes notable for their brutality and ruthlessness, the
impulse to find the culprits at any cost occasionally tempts these agencies to take shortcuts and
disregard constitutional and legal safeguards intended to bring about a reasonable assurance that
only the guilty are punished. Our courts, in the process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, play a central role in bringing about this assurance by determining whether or not the
evidence gathered by law enforcement agencies scrupulously meets exacting standards fixed by
the Constitution. If the standards are not met, the Constitution provides the corresponding remedy
by providing a strict exclusionary rule, i.e., that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation
of (Article III, Section 12(1) . . . hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence."
Without appellants extrajudicial confession, the prosecutions case now teeters precariously on
circumstantial evidence.
PP vs Lucero
Among the evidence considered by the RTC during the trial were a blood-stained white t-shirt and
knife found in the room of accused-appellant. However, these items were the result of a search
conducted after accused-appellant had been questioned without the presence of counsel, nor had
accused-appellant been apprised of his rights.
Accused-appellant was not informed of his rights, nor was there a waiver of said rights. Thus, the
information elicited is inadmissible, and the evidence garnered as the result of that interrogation is
also inadmissible. This parallels Aballe v. People, wherein the accused in that case was questioned
without the presence of counsel, and later produced the weapon used in killing the victim, also
making an extrajudicial confession admitting his guilt. In that particular case, it was held,
"Together with the extrajudicial confession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a
constitutionally infirmed interrogation and must consequently be disallowed."
It is clear that the questioning of accused-appellant was made in violation of Section 12(1), Article
III of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, the trial court erred in considering the knife and bloodied t-shirt when they are inadmissible,
which is what the CA correctly concluded. But even if the confession and evidence gathered as a
result of it are disregarded, the evidence that remains still supports the result of the conviction of
accused-appellant.
6.3 To be informed of such rights (contemplates the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.)
PP vs Nicandro
According to Pat. Joves, he informed appellant of her constitutional rights when she was under
custodial investigation. What specific rights he mentioned to appellant, he did not say. Neither did
he state the manner in which the appellant was advised of her constitutional rights so as to make
her understand them. This is particularly significant in the instant case because appellant is

illiterate and cannot be expected to be able to grasp the significance of her right to silence and to
counsel upon merely hearing an abstract statement thereof.
As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation
of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively
establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative
showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be
admitted in evidence.
PP vs Canela
There is no showing that accused-appellant was properly informed of his constitutional rights. While
Sgt. Atienza claimed that he informed the accused-appellant of his constitutional rights when he
prepared the booking sheet and arrest report, a perusal of said document failed to show that
accused-appellant was informed of said rights.
And this was eventually admitted by Sgt. Atienza on cross-examination. Not only did he not inform
accused-appellant of his rights, he also failed to explain said rights to him. He simply made the
accused read the same. Even when accused-appellant was made to sign on the ten peso bills
allegedly confiscated from him in the buy-bust operation: it was only made to read his
constitutional rights.
Making accused-appellant read his constitutional rights is simply not enough. The
prosecution must show that accused-appellant understood what he read, and that he
understood the consequence of his waiver.
PP vs Sayaboc
The right to be informed requires the transmission of meaningful information rather
than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he
might make of these rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational
attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of
the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.
We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel.
While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the
police, still, the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4
Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial investigation.
The trial court attributed the silence of Atty. Cornejo to the garrulous nature and intelligence of
Sayaboc, thus:
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy himself,
during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and consequences
of answering the questions propounded.
This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a confession.
Indeed, as an officer of the court, it is an attorneys duty to, first and foremost, seek the truth.
However, counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the
questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The duty
of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right
of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time.
We understand the difficulty and frustration of police investigators in obtaining evidence to bring
criminals to justice. But even the hardest of criminals have rights that cannot be interfered with.
Those tasked with the enforcement of the law and who accuse those who violate it carry the burden
of ensuring that all evidence obtained by them in the course of the performance of their duties are
untainted with constitutional infirmity. The purpose of the stringent requirements of the law
is to protect all persons, especially the innocent and the weak, against possible
indiscriminate use of the powers of the government. Any deviation cannot be tolerated, and
any fruit of such deviation shall be excluded from evidence.
For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be used in evidence against him.
PP vs Casimiro
The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was signed by the
accused does not affect the liability of the accused. The receipt of property seized was issued by
the police in accordance with their standard operating procedure in a buy bust operation to show
what property was seized. The receipt should not be treated as an admission or confession.
Indeed, the receipt could not be considered evidence against accused-appellant because it was
signed by him without the assistance of counsel.
The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the suspect to a poseur
buyer and signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as suspect/ owner. In effect, accused-

appellant admitted that he delivered a prohibited drug to another, which is an offense under the
law. Having been made without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that
marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in evidence.
The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if accused-appellant could not
afford counsel, one would be assigned to him. The warning was perfunctory, made without
any effort to find out if he understood it. It was merely ceremonial and inadequate in
transmitting meaningful information to the suspect. We cannot say that, in signing the
receipt without a lawyer, accused-appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely. What is more,
the police investigators did not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say whether
he was willing to answer their questions even without the assistance of counsel or whether he was
waiving his right to remain silent at all.
PP vs Bagnate
Appellant claims that Atty. Brotamonte was not a competent and independent counsel as he failed
to advise him of the penalty to be imposed on the crimes he was accused of committing; hence, he
was not aware of the consequences of his admissions.
To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his
client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything
which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel,
however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
In the present case, the assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than perfunctory. Before
the onset of the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte privately conferred with appellant to ascertain the
voluntariness of his confession and to make sure that no force or duress was employed by the
police authorities on the latter to make him admit the crimes charged. He informed appellant of his
constitutional rights and was clear in explaining to him the questions propounded by SPO2 Ambion.
The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty of the crimes he was
to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellants extrajudicial confession.
Thus, what the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by an accused
without having been informed of his right to remain silent, or, without having been given competent
and independent counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of counsel,
he was not provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in writing and not in the presence
of counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by violence or any other
means that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to
inform an accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption
arise that the counsel is incompetent or not independent just because he failed to apprise the
accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit is death. After all, the
imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the
commission of a crime.
As previously stated, Atty. Brotamonte ably assisted appellant during the entire procedure from
the time appellant signified his intention to give his extrajudicial confession up to the time he
signed the same. Besides, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant was not aware of the consequences
of his admissions as Judge Base explained it to appellant when he appeared before the latter to
swear to the veracity of his confession.
6.4 Rights cannot be waived except in writing and signed by the person in the presence
of the counsel

7. Waiver
7.1 must be in writing and made in the presence of the counsel
Sec. 2(d) RA 7438
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public
Officers.
-XXXXXX(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the
latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be
inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
-XXXXXXXPP vs Ordoo

The admissions of the accused before the radio announcer and duly tape-recorded are further
bolstered and substantiated by the findings of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the
Autopsy Report/Post MortemFindings.
A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's testimony reveals that the
interview was conducted free from any influence or intimidation from police officers and was done
willingly by the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority ordered or forced
the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be expected that police officers were
around since the interview was held in the police station, there was no showing that they were
within hearing distance nor within the vicinity where the interview was being conducted. At most,
the participation of the police authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct
an interview.
The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and
even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by herein
accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the
nature of an investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked
by the radio reporter, not by the police or any other investigating officer. When the accused talked
to the radio announcer, they did not talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not,
hence their uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights.
Sec. 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of the two
(2) accused to the radio announcer. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something
false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
PP vs Mendoza
Accused-appellant argues that the confession he made to PO3 Daniel Tan at the St. Paul's Hospital
that he and Marco Aguirre had robbed Abatay is inadmissible in evidence because it was given
without the assistance of counsel while he (accused-appellant) was in custody.
Indeed, the confession is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of
Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was made without
assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its presentation during
trial with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to
admissibility. No error was, therefore, incurred by the trial court in admitting evidence of
confession.

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PP vs Gonzalez
As explained by Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant Joel Gonzales voluntarily surrendered the
stolen goods to him. When he went to the house of accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, the watches,
cassette recorder, chainsaw, and spare parts were given to him. What thus happened was a
consented search, which constitutes a waiver of the constitutional requirement for a search
warrant. It has been held that the right to be secure from an unreasonable search may be
waived either expressly or impliedly. And when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable search and seizure, as in this case, the exclusionary rule (Art. III,
3(2)) in the Constitution does not apply.
7.2what may be waived: The right to remain silent and the right to counsel, but not
the right to be informed of these rights.
7.3No retroactive effect: Requirements and restrictions in Sec 12(1) have no
retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to April 26, 1983
Filoteo vs Sandiganbayan
PANGANIBAN, J.: A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is constitutionally
guaranteed certain rights. One of the most cherished of these is the right to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his choice. The 1987 Constitution, unlike its predecessors,
expressly covenants that such guarantee cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. In the present case, petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled
waiver of the right to counsel is applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial
investigation took place in 1983 -- long before the effectivity of the new Constitution. He also
alleges that his arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession was extracted through torture,
and that the prosecutions evidence was insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not raised by
petitioner, the question of what crime -- brigandage or robbery -- was committed is likewise motu
propio addressed by the Court in this Decision.
On the merits of the petition, we find that the pivotal issue here is the admissibility of petitioners
extrajudicial confession which lays out in detail his complicity in the crime. Petitioner therefore
questions the respondent Courts admission in evidence of his extrajudicial confession on the

strength of cases upholding the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding the

absence of counsel especially where the statements are replete with details and circumstances
which are indicative of voluntariness. We shall first tackle the issue of his uncounselled waiver of
his right to counsel.
By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an
accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of
counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made
prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during
custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible.
The admissibility of petitioners uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel notwithstanding, the
Court has still to determine whether such waiver was made voluntarily and intelligently. The
waiver must also be categorical and definitive, and must rest on clear evidence.
Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he apprised petitioner of his right to counsel
even in waiving the same right but petitioner did not even inform him that his father-in-law was a
lawyer. Although allowed to talk for thirty minutes with Jimmy Victorino, who was his comrade at
the WPD General Assignment Section, still, petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel.
It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights as an
accused. He was a fourth year criminology student and a topnotch student in the police
basic course. Having been in the police force since 1978, with stints at the investigation division
or the detective bureau, he knew the tactics used by investigators to incriminate criminal
suspects. In other words, he was knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial
confessions.
7.4 Burden of Proof: The burden of proving that there was a valid waiver rests on the
prosecution.

8. Exclusionary Rule
8.1 Confession or admission obtained in violation of Sec. 12, and Sec. 17, Art.III, shall be
inadmissible in evidence
A confession is a declaration made voluntary and without compulsion or inducement by
a person acknowledging that he has committed or participated in the commission of a
crime.

PP vs Fabro
PANGANIBAN, J.: The 1987 Constitution guarantees persons undergoing custodial investigation the
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The Constitution impels strict compliance
with these requirements because a confession of guilt given during such investigation constitutes
formidable evidence against the accused on the principle that no one will knowingly, freely and
deliberately admit authorship of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience, particularly
where the facts given could have been known only by appellant. On the other hand, any allegation
of force, duress, undue influence or other forms of involuntariness in exacting such confession must
be proven by clear, convincing and competent evidence by the defense. Otherwise, the
confession's full probative value may be used to demonstrate the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
A confession is defined in jurisprudence as a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion
or inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that he has committed or participated in the
commission of a crime. But before it can be admitted in evidence, several requirements have to be
satisfied.
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which came into effect on February 2, 1987, requires that:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
Moreover, Article III, Section 17 of the Constitution, guaranteeing the right of the accused against self-incrimination,
provides:
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is given:

1. Freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or trickery;

2. Knowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under custodial
investigation of his constitutional rights; and
3. Intelligently with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its
consequences.
Once admitted, the confession must inspire credibility or be one which the normal
experience of mankind can accept as being within the realm of probability.
A confession meeting all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high order since it is
supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will knowingly, freely and
deliberately confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.
When all these requirements are met and the confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of
proof that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the accused.
After the prosecution has shown that the confession was obtained in accordance with the aforesaid
constitutional guarantee, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to obtain it
rests on the accused.
Appellant has miserably failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the use of force or
intimidation on his person to secure his confession. The records show that appellant's confession
was sworn and subscribed to before Fiscal Jesus Dorante, to whom he could have and should have
voiced his objection, if any. Quite the contrary, Fiscal Dorante certified that he personally examined
appellant and was convinced that the latter gave his statement freely and voluntarily and that he
understood the contents of his confession. Appellant's failure to voice out his complaints is
tantamount to a manifestation that indeed he waived his right to counsel in the presence of Atty.
Jungco in accordance with the Constitution. His assertion on appeal that he was intimidated into
giving said confession rings hollow and too late.
We hold that appellant's confession was properly admitted by the trial court as part of the
prosecution evidence.
PP vs Gomez
While the sworn statement taken from appellant by an NBI agent at the Stanley Prison in Hongkong
during his incarceration was not made the basis for Immaculata's conviction by the court a quo, a
word could be said about the manner in which it was procured. It would seem that appellant was
merely apprised in general terms of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. He
then was asked if he would be willing to give a statement. Having answered in the affirmative, the
NBI investigating agent asked him whether he needed a lawyer.
"S. Sa ngayon po ay hindi na at totoo lang naman ang aking sasabihin. Kung mayroon po kayong
tanong na hindi ko masasagot ay sasabihin ko na lang po sa inyo."
After that response, the investigation forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly was in compliance
with Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel to a
person under custody even when he waives the right to counsel. It is immaterial that the sworn
statement was executed in a foreign land. Appellant, a Filipino citizen, should enjoy
these constitutional rights, like anyone else, even when abroad.

Under our laws, the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of an accused for a criminal offense lies
with the prosecution. The burden must be discharged by it on the strength of its own evidence and
not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense or the lack of it. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and
satisfy the conscience of those who are to act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Here, it is not unlikely for one to suspect that appellant has had an inkling on the existence of the
conspiracy but the essential connecting link showing a definite community of design between him
and the others just has not been adequately shown. When the circumstances obtaining in a case
are capable of two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of
innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and
the court must acquit.
8.2Fruit of the poisonous tree: (libertarian exclusionary rule known as the fruit of the
poisonous tree, a phrase minted by Justice Frankfurter in the celebrated case
Nardone vs U.S. Once the primary source (the tree) is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from
it is also inadmissible.
8.3 Receipt of seized property inadmissible

PP vs Salazar
PANGANIBAN, J.: As her defense in this appeal, appellant alleges violation of her constitutional
rights against warrantless search and seizure, and to counsel during custodial investigations.
However, the search, being merely an incident of a legitimate buy-bust operation against illegal
drugs, needed no warrant. And while her right to counsel during the custodial investigation was
indeed violated, there were other evidence sufficient to warrant her conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
We find appellant's claim that she was not informed of her right to counsel during custodial
investigation to be correct. Moreover, the NARCOM agent's admission that they made her
sign and thumbmark the bond paper which they used to wrap the marijuana found in
her possession was violative of her constitutional right to counsel. While the bond paper
does not appear to have been considered as a pivotal piece of evidence against appellant, such act
of the NARCOM agents is worth noting if only to provide guidance to law enforcement operatives.

PP vs Andan
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the
news reporters because they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel.
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e.,
when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in
connection with an alleged offense.
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the
death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him
at his parents' house.
It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and
may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3)
of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No
police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously,
freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that
appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate
his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed
the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant's
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made
in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We
have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence.
Marcelo vs Sandiganbayan
The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in admitting in evidence the letters signed
by him because he was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel. The following provisions of the Constitution are invoked by petitioner Article III, 12(1)(3) &
17.
Petitioners counsel says that the signing of petitioners and his co-accuseds names was not a
mere mechanical act but one which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes selfincrimination. Petitioners counsel presumably has in mind the ruling in Beltran v. Samson to the
effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against himself extends to any
attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of
comparing it with the handwriting in a document in a prosecution for falsification. Writing is
something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and attention, so it was held.
The letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly seized from
petitioner and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioners admission
that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion on February 17, 1989 is
inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves.

The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a
lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner and his
companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed,
petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found on the
letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution
witnesses.
PP vs Janson
The invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson cannot be used against Ricky Pinantao. An
extrajudicial confession by an accused implicating another may not be utilized unless
repeated in open court or when there is an opportunity for the co-accused to crossexamine the confessant on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered hearsay as against
said co-accused under the res inter alios acta rule, which ordains that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
For all the foregoing considerations, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court finding Janson and
Pinantao guilty of the crime of robbery with rape fails to persuade us that appellants have been
adequately identified as the perpetrators of the heinous offense. In our view, to affirm that
judgment of conviction on the basis of contradictory testimony of prosecution witnesses and the
flawed extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel Janson is to sanction a possible miscarriage of
justice.