TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS.

BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011

GR # L-59234, September 30, 1982 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Equal
Protection)

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation

phasing out taxicabs more than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the
constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and
directed solely towards the taxi industry.

Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety
and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated
taxis.

ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than
six years old is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the safety and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no
infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common knowledge that
taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use,
creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.

Lozano vs Martinez Digest

G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986.\

Facts:

Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check
Law). They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts
charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions
were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court
declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely
affected thus appealed.

Issue:

1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment

due to debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment
of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a
debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of
its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order.
- See more at: http://legalvault.blogspot.com/2014/12/lozano-vs-martinezdigest.html#sthash.hC8xksdF.dpuf

LIM vs. PACQUING

G.R. 115044, January 27, 1995
Facts:
On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC)
fileda petition for prohibition seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the
provisional authoritythat had been granted them to operate jai-alai. ADC's franchise
was invalidated by PD No.771, which expressly revoked
all
existing franchises to operate all forms of gambling facilitiesissued by local
governments.Respondent contends that Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Mayor
to allow ADC to operate Jai-Alai in the City of Manila. ADC also assails the
constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violativeof the equal protection and nonimpairment clauses of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether ADC has a valid franchise to operate the Jai-Alai de Manila.
Held:
PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the
inherent
police power of the State. Gambling isessentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It
breeds indolence and erodes the value of good,honest and hard work. It is, as very
aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill whichgovernment must minimize
(if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development. Jai-alai is not a
mere economic activity which the law seeks to regulate. It is essentiallygambling
and whether it should be permitted and, if so, under what conditions are
questionsprimarily for the lawmaking authority to determine, talking into account
national and localinterests. Here, it is the police power of the State that is
paramount. On the alleged violationof the non-impairment and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution, it should beremembered that a franchise is not in the
strict sense a simple contract but rather it is moreimportantly, a mere privilege
specially in matters which are within the government's powerto regulate and even
prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gamblingfranchise is
always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare.ADC has no
franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai therefore, it may not operateeven if
it has a license from the Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.

Miners Association vs Factoran Jr.

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

Facts: The petition seeks a ruling from this court on the validity of two
AdministrativeOrders 57 and 82 issued by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and NaturalResources to carry out the provisions of Executive Orders
279 and 211. This petitionarose from the fact that the 1987 Constitution provided
for a different system of exploration, development and utilization of the countrys
natural resources. Unlike the1935 and 1973 Constitutions that allow the utilization
of inalienable lands of publicdomain through license, concession or lease, the
1987 Constitution provides for the fullcontrol and supervision by the state of the
exploration, development and utilization of thecountrys natural resources. Pres.
Cory Aquino promulgated EO 211, which prescribesthe interim procedures in the
processing and approval of applications for the exploration,development and
utilization of minerals in accordance to the 1987 Constitution. Inaddition, Pres.
Aquino also promulgated EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary tonegotiate and
conclude joint venture, co-production or production-sharing agreements for the
exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources and prescribing
theguidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or
financialassistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development, andutilization of minerals. In line with EO 279, the DENR Secretary
issued AO 57Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under EO 279
and AO 82Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA)through negotiation. Petitioner, Miners Association of the
Philippines, mainly contendthat the DENR Secretary issued both AOs 57 and 82 in
excess of his rule-making power because these are inconsistent with the provisions
of EO 279.
Issue: whether AO Nos. 57 and 82, which are promulgated by the DENR, are valid
andconstitutional
Held: AO Nos. 57 and 82 are both constitutional and valid. This is due to the fact
that EO279, in effect, gave the Secretary of Natural Resources the authority to
conclude jointventure, co-production, or production sharing agreements for the
exploration,development and utilization of mineral resources. Furthermore, the
constitutionality of these administrative orders goes to show that the utilization of
inalienable lands of publicdomain is not merely done through license, concession
or lease since the options arenow also open to the State through direct
undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing
agreements.\
\

Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) vs. CA

[G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991]
Facts: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching,
rinsing and dyeing textiles with untreated wastewater which were being discharged
directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. On September
22, 1988, petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order based on
2 findings made on Solar Textile Finishing Corportions plant, directing Solar
immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source
installations as they were clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
984 (Pollution Control Law) and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations. Solar then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was granted by the Pollution Adjudication Board for a
temporary operation. However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and preliminary
injunction against the Board but the same was dismissed. On appeal, the CA
reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has
legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an
establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is
discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the
maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Solar, on the
other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte
order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" and argued that there
were no findings that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue
the Order and Writ of Execution against Solar Textile Finishing Corporation. YES.
RULING:
The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution issued by petitioner Board
were entirely within its lawful authority Ex parte cease and desist orders are
permitted by law and regulations in situations like in this case. The relevant
pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err
when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy
was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact

appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board
and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated,
without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the
Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.\
\
\