JUDICIAL TENURE COMPLAINT

The judicial conduct of Judge Brown; a) was not impartial in his rulings on the
law, b) was not faithful to the law and did not maintain professional competence in it,
c) has shown either an appearance of bias or in fact a palpable personal bias and was not
patient, dignified, and courteous to Complainant, d) had not respected and observed the
law of the case as stated by the Texas Court of Appeals, e) ignored the relevant law on
issues of Due Process in the United States and Texas Constitutions, f) unlawfully
dismissed Complainants Counter-Complaint, g) unlawfully denied Complainant the
right to prove that the alleged claim had been paid in full, h) defaulted Complainant for
being late, instead of financial sanctions, ignoring seminal case law, i) denied
Complainant his rights to a Jury trial as to the question of damages j) refused to credit
Complainant the prior executions based upon the same causes of actions toward the
default Judgment, k) discriminated against Complainant on the basis of Complainants
medical conditions and l) violated TCR 2.003 (C)(1)(b), Cannon 2(B) and Cannon 3(A)
(1)(3) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Motion to Disqualify Judge Brown was originally filed on September 23,
2014, to be heard on October 1, 2014. Complainant also supplemented the Motion to
Disqualify, which included Judge Browns threat to sanction him. Judge Brown
adjourned the motion to November 19, 2014. Complainant submits that Judge Brown
should have heard Complainants Motion to disqualify forthwith. Because Complainants
legal redress was not forthcoming in a timely fashion, it amounts to nothing more than
Justice delayed is justice denied.

11

Complainant was informed that Judge Brown did not want to hear the Motion for
Disqualification and if the Motion to Disqualify Judge Brown was not withdrawn, Judge
Brown would sanction Complainant. These threats by Judge Brown violate
Complainants rights to Due Process and the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct Cannon
3(A).1
I. BACKGROUND FACTS PRIOR TO BEING
REMANDED TO WASHTENAW COUNTY
1.

Mr. Fred Woodworth and the Woodworth Law Firm (Woodworth) sued

Complainant in three different courts for the same false claim for legal fees. Complainant
had retained Woodworth to represent him in a bankruptcy proceeding in the Eastern
District Court of Texas, Complainant fired Woodworth due to their incompetence,
negligence, breach of contract and failure to act in Complainants best interest.
2.

After being fired, Woodworth committed fraud by filing an exaggerated false claim

for legal fees in Complainant's bankruptcy case, without any admissible evidence.
Woodworths Bankruptcy claim was in violation of the Federal Bankruptcy Code and
contrary to the retainer agreement. Woodworth illegally received $45,000 from
Complainant's estate over Complainants objection.
3. Complainant appealed. The Federal District Court reversed the Bankruptcy Court and
ordered Woodworth to disgorge the $45,000 he received back to Complainants estate.
Woodworth ignored the Federal District Court order and refused to disgorge the funds he
illegally received.

The Motion to Disqualify Judge Brown was denied on November 19, 2014. Complainant was not sanctioned.
Complainant had reminded the Court that the other motions couldnt be heard until the State Court
Administrators Office assigns the Disqualification Motion to anther Judge. The other motions scheduled for
November 19, 2014 were not heard.

22

4.

Woodworth then commenced a breach of contract action against Complainant for

the same alleged claims in the Wilson County Circuit Court (Case No. 07-728565-CK)
knowing that venue was improper. Woodworth neither served Complainant with the
Complaint nor did Woodworth serve Complainant with their Motion for Summary
Judgment.
5.

The Wilson County Circuit Court granted Woodworth 's Motion for Summary

Judgment and awarded $46,240.91, the total amount of Woodworth's claim based on
Fred Woodworths Affidavit. Woodworth then executed on two vehicles owned by
Complainant valued at $40,000 plus $3,000 in cash, totaling $43,000. This amount was
on top of the $45,000 Woodworth already collected. Therefore, Woodworth had collected
$88,000 on an improperly grating of a Motion for Summary Judgment of $46,240.91.
6. Complainant then appealed the Wilson County judgment to the Texas Court of
Appeals (Woodworth v. Complainant, No. 283397).
7.

The Texas Court of Appeals:

a. Ruled that Woodworth did not offer admissible evidence to prove the alleged

claim of attorney fees.

b. Inferred that Woodworth illegally seized $45,000 from Complainants
bankruptcy estate and that there was an Order to disgorge these funds back to
Complainants estate. However, the Court of Appeals never found that Woodworth had, in
fact, returned this money to Complainants estate.
c. Found that the amount of attorney fees that Woodworth was claiming continued
to change several times.

33

d. Found that Woodworth based their claim for attorney fees upon Opinions,
conclusionary denials, unsworn averments, and inadmissible hearsay. (Supra at page 6)
e. The Court was highly critical of the Wilson County Trial Court and this also
reflected on Fred Woodworth s credibility and trustworthiness.
f. Vacated the Trial courts Order granting Woodworths Motion for Summary
Judgment and established the law of the case.
g. Assessed costs against Woodworth for $1,075.80, which Woodworth refused to
pay.
h. Ordered the case be remanded to the proper venue, Washtenaw County.
8. After the Wilson County judgment was vacated, by the Court of Appeals, Woodworth
refused to pay the costs awarded to Complainant that the Court of Appeals, the $43.000
Woodworth had executed on nor the $45,000 that Woodworth did not disgorge
II. AFTER REMAND TO WASHTENAW COUNTY
1. After the case was remanded to Washtenaw County and assigned to Judge Brown,
Woodworth filed a Motion to Dismiss and to strike Complainant's counter-claim alleging
that only Complainant's GAL could file pleadings and therefore Complainant was
precluded from bringing a counter-claim in this matter. If what Woodworth said was true
regarding the GAL, then Judge Brown should have also dismissed Woodworths
Complaint not having served Complainants GAL.
2. Woodworth's motion also claimed that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the
claims set forth by Complainant in the counter-complaint. In the Order Striking
Defendant Counter-Complaint, the Order stated, That this court does not have

44

jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims set forth in Defendant J. Edwards
Complainants counter-complaint.
Judge Brown further ordered That defendant J. Edward Complainants countercomplaint is
stricken from the record. If Judge Brown had jurisdiction to hear the Complaint, he
had jurisdiction to hear the counter-complaint.
3. Throughout these entire proceedings Judge Browns conduct towards Complainant
was strikingly not impartial. For example, Judge Browns rulings were inconsistent when
he dismissed Complainants Counter-Complaint finding:
that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims set
forth in J. Edward Complainant's Counter-Complaint and rulled that J. Edward
Complainant's Counter-Complaint is stricken from the record. based upon Woodworths
Motion to Strike.
4. Judge Brown did not disclose which of Woodworths claims that were the basis of the
Order to Strike. Judge Brown simply ignored Complainants Motion for Clarification
requesting that that Judge Brown clarify upon which legal basis he relied upon to strike
Complainant's Counter-Complaint for the lack of jurisdiction
5. Woodworth argued in his Motion to Strike that since Complainant was appointed a
Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) that Complainant could not defend himself or file a counterclaim against Woodworth without being represented by the GAL. However, the record is
clear that Woodworth did not serve his Complaint on the GAL. Judge Brown again
ignoring this fact failed to dismiss Woodworths Complaint for improper service.

55

6. Judge Browns ruling is clearly inconsistent. This in another example of a basic

unfairness and denial of Due Process, which permits Woodworth to serve and sue
Complainant without serving Complainants Guardian Ad Litem (GAL), while allowing
Woodworths Complaint to go forward even though Woodworth did not serve the GAL.
There are basic constitutional protections against this denial of Due Process.

7. Judge Brown unlawfully dismissed Complainants counter-complaint without any

legal justification, since Woodworths cause of action was the same cause of action that
Woodworth had already collected $88,000. By dismissing Complainant's counter- claim,
Judge Brown unlawfully refused to give Complainant any credit for the prior executions
by Woodworth towards any Judgment.
8. In Complainant's counter-claim, Complainant had asked for the costs that the Texas
Court of Appeals awarded to him, that Woodworth had refused to pay, the return of all of
Complainants property Woodworth that had executed on ($43,000) prior to the Wilson
County Judgement being vacated and the $45,000 that Woodworth never disgorged to
Complainants Bankruptcy Estate. In violation of both the Federal District Court Order
and the Texas Appeals Court Decision, Woodworth refused to return the assets that
belonged to Complainant and Judge Brown refused to enforce the return of
Complainants assets subsequent to both of the Appeals Court decisions.
9. Woodworth did not properly answer the Request for Admissions and other discovery
requests, including the production of documents. Judge Brown refused to have the
admissions admitted or to compel Woodworth to answer the entire discovery requests in
accordance with the Texas Court Rules. If Judge Brown enforced the discovery rules,

66

Woodworth would have to admit that he had been paid in full and that Woodworth did not
have any admissible evidence to prove their alleged claim.
10. Judge Brown granted Woodworth's Motion in Limine claiming res judicata, which
would not allow Complainant to produce evidence that Woodworth had been paid in full.
Judge Browns action allowed Woodworth to collect a third time for the same cause of
action.
11 Due to medical reasons Complainant was 46 minutes late for the trial. When
Complainant arrived at the courtroom all of the parties were still there, Judge Brown
should have gone back on the record and continued the proceedings. Instead, Judge
Brown defaulted Complainant for being late, again displaying his ill will.
12. Judge Brown refused to hear any reasons that caused Complainant to be delayed.
The Court did not make any attempts to contact Complainant to inquire whether he was
going to appear for the trial or if Complainant had been hospitalized.
13. The trial transcript does not reflect that Judge Brown showed that Complainant
flagrantly and wantonly refused to timely appear at trial. The transcript does not
reflect that Judge Brown gave careful consideration, or any consideration, as to which
factors he based the default upon or what other sanctions existed that were just and
proper in this case, other than default, as required by the Appeals court decisions in Bass
v Combs, 238 Mich App 16, 26; 604 NW2d 727, 733 (1999); Dean v Tucker, 182 Mich
App 27, 32, 451 NW2d 571 (1990).
14. Judge Browns imposition of a default was a drastic sanction. Instead of defaulting
Complainant, Judge Brown should have considered financial sanctions against

77

Complainant for being late. See, Richardson v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 213 Mich App
447, 451, 540 NW2d 696 (1995)
Judge Brown stated on page 3 of the trial transcript,
Let me say that as a preliminary matter Complainant was back-- was in
Court in my office last Tuesday, had conversations with my judicial
Attorney, brought with him what he claimed to be an emergency motion
to adjourn trial. That motion was never filed. It was attempted to be filed
apparently by Complainant. Thealso Complainant had basically re-praeciped
an earlier motion to amend a counter-claim, which was, I believe, original filed
back in July of 2010.
The Court well first of all, Ms. Barron, my judicial attorney, after speaking
with me told Complainant that I was not going to grant his motion to amend the
counter-claim nor was I going to grant his emergency motion to adjourn trial.
(See attached Transcript)
15. Contrary to Judge Brown's statement, without first conferring with Judge Brown,
Ms. Barron decided the issue herself and informed Complainant that Judge Brown would
not grant the Emergency Motion to Adjourn Trial. Since Ms. Barron told Complainant
that Judge Brown would not grant the Emergency Motion to Adjourn Trial, it was
irrelevant whether the motion was filed because it was denied by Ms Barren prior to
Complainant filing the motion or having a hearing.
Judge Brown stated on pages 4-5 of the transcript,
With respect to his emergency motion to adjourn trial. Again it was not actually
filed nor docketed, but essentially I believe I would characterized it as ahe
made almost an oral motion or plea to Ms. Barron, my judicial attorney on
Tuesday of last week. Saying Im much too sick, I have health reasons. I cant
the stress of the trial would be too much for me, I cant do it. However, at the
same time he appeared to be totally healthy while he was here on Tuesday despite
his having -- smoking cigarettes which were protruding from his pocket.
16. Judge Brown inaccurately paraphrased Ms. Barrons comments, which were hearsey.
Complainant reiterated to Ms. Barron what was contained in the doctors letters, that his
blood pressure was extremely elevated and that he was at risk of having a stroke,

88

heart attack or kidney failure. Also, Complainants medical doctor had advised him
that when his anxiety level is very high he should have a cigarette to calm down.
Judge Brown also stated on page 5 of the transcript,
But again, the Court was not provided with any legitimate physicians statement
That he could not be here.
17. In fact, Complainant had provided two legitimate letters from his physicians, Dr.
Donald J. Proux and Dr Yeong Kwock with his Emergency Motion to Adjourn Trial.
18. But Judge Brown ignored the medical doctors' letters, which described Complainant
as suffering from extremely elevated blood pressure and that he was clinically depressed.
They also advised the court to adjourn the trial to avoid Complainant having a
stroke, heart attack, or kidney failure.
19. The doctors' letters were in fact admissible legitimate evidence as physician reports
pursuant to MRE 803(6), which states A memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, in any form, of acts, transactions, occurrences, events, conditions, opinions,
or diagnoses.
20. Judge Brown essentially provided his own ad hoc unqualified medical analysis of
Complainants medical conditions. Judge Browns attitude and lack of concern if
Complainant had a heart attack, stroke, or kidney failure can only be characterized as
evidence of his overwhelming lack of impartially towards Complainant.
22. After defaulting Complainant, on page 6 of the transcript Judge Brown asked Wilson,
Woodworths attorney,
What are you seeking in terms of damages, counselor?
23. Wilson responded:

99

the damages including costs and statuary attorneys fee was $68,764.22 plus
$9,824.29 in statuary interest.
24. Judge Brown just asked Wilson to give him a number that represented the amount of
attorney fees allegedly owed by Complainant. Judge Brown merely accepted the amount
given by Wilson, without having an evidentiary hearing to require Woodworth to prove
the amount of attorneys fees allegedly owed by Complainant. Judge Brown then entered
a Judgment for the amount Wilson alleged was due, ignoring the law of the case Wilson
could have said any amount and Judge Brown would have granted it. .
25. Judge Brown refused to follow the law of the case, in which the Court of Appeals,
in Woodworth v Complainant provided to the subsequent judge a detailed analysis of
Woodworths claims and commented:
..the record lacks admissible evidence to support plaintiffs specific claim at
the hearing of December 20, 2007, that they were owed a total of $46,240.91.
We note that this amount is inconsistent with both the allegation in plaintiffs
motion that the amount due was $68,478.47, and with an earlier conclusory
affidavit filed with the complaint, which indicated that the amount owed was
$45,647.22. The trial court accepted plaintiffs claim for the lesser sum of
$46,240.91 without requiring any supporting evidence. (Id. p. 6).
Judge Brown refused to require Woodworth to provide admissible evidence to support
their claim.
26. Had Judge Brown required Woodworth to offer admissible evidence to prove his
alleged claims, a jury trial would have established facts to determine if any fees should
have been awarded to Woodworth. Judge Brown did not respect and observe the law and
violated MCJC Cannon 2(B) and TCR 2.003 (C)(1)(b).
27. After the trial, Woodworth executed over $20,000 in cash from Complainants bank
account and illegally seized two vehicles belonging to The J. Edward Complainant
Foundation.

10

28. Judge Brown a) violated federal law by allowing executions on The J. Edward
Complainant Foundations (Foundation) assets because there was no judgment against the
Foundation, then he refused to have the Foundation's illegally seized assets returned. b)
then falsely rulled that the Foundation was Complainants alter ego in violation of the
United States Supremacy Clause. Instead of having Woodworth prove his false allegation,
Judge Brown required Complainant to prove that the Foundation was not his alter
ego. Judge Brown incorrectly ruled that the Foundation was Complainant's alter ego
without any proof. Judge Brown then wrongfully refused to give Complainant any credit
towards the Judgement for the Foundations vehicles, after ordering the Foundation assets
were Complainants and c) wrongfully ruled that Complainant turnover stock of the
Foundation to, showing his lack of understanding of the law, for there is no stock issued
in a 501(C)(3) Foundation.
29. Complainant was 46 minutes late for the trial due to medical reasons. When
Complainant arrived at the courtroom all of the parties were still there, Judge Brown
should have gone back on the record and continued the proceedings. Instead Judge
Brown defaulted Complainant for being late, again displaying his ill will.
30. The transcript is silent as to whether or not a jury pool was available or whether
Judge Brown had dismissed the jury.
31. Mr. Woodworth previously had filed an Affidavit stating that the total amount of
Woodworths attorneys fees was $45,647.22. Judge Brown never inquired how
Woodworth s claim of attorney fees increased by over $20,000, that he previously swore
was due, to $68,764.22.

11

32. If Woodworth were required to testify in an evidentiary hearing as to the issue of

damages, Judge Brown would have been forced to rule on the inconsistent statements
made by Mr. Woodworth in his Affidavits filed in both the Wilson County and the
Washtenaw County Trial Courts. These Affidavits, which contained these inconsistent
statements of Mr. Woodworth are not considered hearsey under the Texas Rules of
Evidence. Thus, Judge Brown by ignoring the law of the case, and by not having a
jury trial on the issues of damages, ignored Woodworths inconsistent statements,
denying Complainants right to Due Process of Law.
33. Following the entry of the Default Judgment, Judge Brown intentionally denied
Complainant the right to a jury trial as required in accordance with the Texas Constitution
of 1963, Art. I, 14. Also, the Court of Appeals, in Mink v Masters, 204 Mich App 242,
246, 247 (1994), found that even though the defendant was defaulted on liability, he was
still entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages. The Texas Supreme Court has not
reversed Mink.
34. The record reflects Complainant had timely demanded a right to a jury trial, which
was not waived and the law is clear that a default does not constitute a waiver of a jury
trial in a civil action.. See, Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573,583-584; 321 NW2d 653
(1982) 35. Therefore, Complainant, despite the default, had a right to a jury trial on the
question of damages and never stipulated with Woodworth to waive this right. See,
Lasser v George, 252 Mich. App. 104;651 N.W.2d 158, 160 (2002) and TCR 2.508(D)(3)
and TCR 2.509(A)(1).
36. Judge Brown showed further evidence of a lack of impartiality, bias and prejudice by
intentionally ignoring Texass established case law as to a clear right to a jury trial, to

12

determine the measure of damages, even if defaulted and, as such violated Complainants
right to Due Process of Law.
37. Judge Brown refused to acknowledge an offset to the Judgment from the prior
executions made by Woodworth of approximately $160,000. Allowing Woodworth to
collect more than three times the judgment amount Attached is a copy of the Order not
allowing Complainant any credit towards the Judgement for previous executions by
Woodworth prior to case being remanded. .
38. Judge Browns conduct towards Complainant was not impartial; he displayed a
personal animus towards Complainant and discriminated against him on the basis of his
medical conditions.
39. The United States Supreme Court in Liteky v. United States 510 US 540, 550(1994)
would conclude that Judge Browns opinion of Complainants expression of his medical
conditions amounted to a personal bias defined as a favorable or unfavorable
disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate,
either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge
that the subject ought not to possess or because it is excessive in
degree . . . . Judge Browns opinion concerning Complainants health is
unwarranted, wrongful and inappropriate.
40. The mere fact that Judge Brown saw a pack of cigarettes in Complainants clothing
and his judicial clerk saw Complainant smoking caused Judge Brown to irrationally
dismiss Complainants serious medical condition. Judge Brown also stated that
Complainants letters from his physicians were not legitimate. Such a judicial opinion

13

is without merit, prejudicial and is further evidence that Judge Brown ridiculed
Complainants medical condition, showing his contempt of Complainant.
41. Complainant has been adamant in these proceedings that his medical conditions
existed. Judge Brown observation of Complainants medical conditions has shown a
deep, antagonism towards Complainant, which make a fair judgment impossible.
See, Armstrong v Ypsilanti Twp, 248 Mich App 573, 597 (2001)
42. Complainant did not bring his Motion to Disqualify Judge Brown just because he
disagreed with Judge Browns rulings. He is bringing on this motion because another
jurist would not be so contemptuous and degrading towards Complainants medical
conditions. With an impartial jurist, the trial would have been adjourned due to
Complainants medical conditions or Complainant would have been financially
sanctioned rather than defaulted. Complainant would also have had an opportunity to be
granted a jury trial on the issue of damages, which was required in this instance.
43. An impartial jurist would not have ignored the seminal aforementioned Court of
Appeals case of Findly v. Complainant, which was the law of the case.
44. An impartial jurist, after reading the Court of Appeals decision, would have either
dismissed Woodworths action or require an evidentiary hearing for Woodworth to
provide admissible evidence of the alleged amount of attorney fees owed by
Complainant.
45. The impartial jurist also would determine the amount of the prior executions by
Woodworth, for the same cause of action that would have offset any fees claimed.

14

46. Complainant simply was not provided a fair hearing by an impartial judge. Judge
Brown s judicial conducted not only violated the concept of fundamental fairness but
it was a clear violation of his constitutional rights to Due Process of Law.
47. Throughout these proceedings Judge Swart did not perform his duties of office
impartially, diligently, was not faithful to the law, did not maintain his professional
competence and was not patient, dignified and courteous to Complainant. See, MCJC
Cannon 3(A)(1)(3).
48. Complainant incorporates by reference the plain words of Judge Brown, as
memorialized in the transcript of the trial, where Judge Brown essentially implied that
Complainant had misrepresented that he had serious medical conditions. Judge Brown
stated that Complainant looked healthy and implied that Complainant did not have
serious medical conditions because Complainant had not offered legitimate physician
letters as evidence of his medical conditions. Judge Brown had knowledge at the start of
these proceedings when Mr. Woodworth filed his Motion to Strike Complainants
Counter-Complaint that a Federal Judge appointed a Guardian Ad Litem on behalf of
Complainant.
49. Further, the derogatory comments about Complainant smoking and carrying
cigarettes was evidence that Complainant was healthy fly in the face of reality that
Complainant has serious medical conditions. Such comments from a sitting Circuit Court
Judge are clear evidence of Judge Browns lack of impartially he has shown
Complainant.
50. The most striking inconstancy of Judge Browns rulings, as stated above, the Judge
Brown ignored the reasoning of the Texas Court of Appeals case, supra, in Woodworth v

15

Complainant. The Court of Appeals rulled squarely against Woodworth in vacating and
remanded a Wilson County Judgment which awarded Woodworth $46,240.91, when
Woodworth. presented no admissible evidence to prove his attorney fee claims. While
Judge Brown awarded Findlay, based upon the same cause of action as filed in Wilson
County, as remanded, increased from $45,647.23 to $68,764.22 with no evidentiary
hearing or jury trail on the issue of damages.
51. The Court of Appeals expected Judge Brown to actually perform an evidentiary
hearing to determine the amount of the alleged fees Complainant owed, but Judge
Brown failed to do so. Judge Brown did not order an evidentiary hearing because
he is not impartial towards Complainant. Again, this is one example of many that
Complainant has discussed in the pages above.

16