G.R. No.

L-39248 May 7, 1976

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE, defendant-appellant, LAND REGISTRATION
COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, defendants.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Atty.
Baltazar Llamas plaintiff-appellee.
Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration Commissioner.

ESGUERRA, J.:
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final consideration and resolution of the
pure question of law involved.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the Republic of the
Philippines (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch
1, alleging, among others, the following:
3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant Register of
Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at Espaa Extension, Quezon City and
Davao City, respectively. "(are included in this complaint, the first being the public
Official charged under the law with the approval )." subdivision surveys of private
lands while the second is the Official vested with the authority to issue certificates of
titles, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Law;
4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the
owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED
TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY TWO SQUARE METERS
(525.652), more or less, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry
of Deeds of Davao City, issued in her name;
5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the
aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which was approved by the Land
Registration Commissioner on March 17,1967;
6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379- B-2-B-1 contains an
area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2B-2 contains an area of 577,679

Square Meters or a total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square
Meters more than the original area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439
in the name of said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;
7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land Registration
Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order from the Court of
First Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No. 9969, directing the Register of
Deeds for the City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate
of Title No. T-1439 and thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT
Nos. T-18886 and T-18887;
8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered Lot 379-B-2B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and on the
same date registered Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No. 18887 in the name of
Luisa Villa Abrille;
9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the aforementioned
excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the
required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Law;
10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of the
approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a portion of the
Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said Davao
River; hence a land belonging to the public domain; and
11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18887 which
covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-69322, wherein the
excess area of land belong to the public domain (not private land) is null and void ab
initio.
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao- City filed her answer averring that she,
"in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith effected the registration of
Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379B-2-B-2 and the issuance of corresponding TCT
No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887 therefor, respectively, in view of the approval of the Land Registration
Commissioner of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao to correct the area in Certificate of Title No. T-1439, to cancel the same and to
issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887".
On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the complaint; that they admit the increase in area of the land of their
predecessor but that the increase in area of the land was acceded to and concurred in by the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, and the same was duly noted and approved by the
Court of First Instance of Davao; that they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887 out
of Certificate of Title No. T- 1439 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but
that TCT No. T-18886 had been cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor
of Gaudencio Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been cancelled and several Transfer
Certificates of Title were issued thereunder; that the subject increase of area was made in
accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa Abrille, predecessor-in-interest

of herein defendant-appellant, as riparian owner was entitled under the law to claim, as she did, the
increase or excess in area of her original land as her own.
On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a judgment on the
pleadings and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of the subject matter of the complaint
since the subdivision plan involved therein was approved by the then Commissioner of Land
Registration, Antonio Noblejas; and that on February 19, 1968, the then Commissioner of Land
Registration, Antonio Noblejas, issued LRC Circular No. 167 directing the Register of Deeds
throughout the Philippines to, among others, deny the registration of subdivision plans with
increased or expanded areas and to withhold the issuance of the corresponding titles, or if the plans
have already been registered and the titles issued, to recall the titles and to take appropriate steps
for their cancellation.
Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in the case as
movant-intervenors but they were denied standing in court by the trial court in its order of August
16,1969.
On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" and
pray that judgment be rendered by the trial court on their case based on their stipulation of facts. The
"Agreed Stipulation of Facts" of the parties reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto the
Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts and
allege:
1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the Registry
Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A27, Page 40 under Original
Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 317, in the name of
Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa Abrille;
2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was inherited by Luisa
Villa Abrille and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 was issued in the name of
said Luisa Villa Abrille;
3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-69322 by the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T18886 and 18887 were issued by the defendant, Register of Deeds of Davao, copy
of which subdivision plan is hereto attached as Annex "A", and made integral part
hereof;
4. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18886 was subsequently cancelled by virtue
of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19077 was issued in the name
of Gaudencio Consunji a purchaser in good faith and for value;
5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated March 27, 1967, copy of
which order is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof;

6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the defendant, Land Registration
Commissioner, copy of which report is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made
integral part hereof;
7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was by virtue of an
Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch 1, in Special Proceedings No. 1357,
entitled: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a project
of partition cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the following Transfer Certificates of Title
were issued to the following named persons, to wit:
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;
(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;
(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;
(f) T-20732 Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;
(i) T-23015 - Miguel Huang;
(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;
(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;
which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision plan LRC Psd71236 duly approved by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of
which subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made
integral part hereof;
8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot 379-B-2-B, but
the same was with the knowledge of the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner
and the court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV;
9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or prejudiced in
the increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the registered owner holds property
adjacent to the parcel of land in question;
10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-B and abuts
the Davao River;

11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with coconuts,
bananas and other seasonal crops by the defendants, through their predecessor-ininterest;
12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago as the
coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;
13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any portion of the
increase in area;
14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd71236, only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T- 20725; T-20701; T-20713; and T20690 contain the increase in area; while all the other certificates of title issued under
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 do not contain any increase in area;
15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was without
notice to the Director of Lands.
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970, which reads
as follows:
This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted by the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, against the Estate
of Luisa Abrille, represented by Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land Registration
Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao. Because the residue
of the intestate estate of Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among Huang Siu Sin,
Josefino Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were
directed to appear and to substitute for the intestate estate and they did.
The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
The increase in area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5609 of
the Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and
subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T. 1439 in the name of Luisa Villa
Abrille and finally, based on subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros Huang, T20701 in the
name of Josefino Huang, T-20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the
name of Huang Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to 607,779 square meters, or
82,127 square meters.
The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to include the
increase in area was a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-79322
recommended by the Commissioner of Land Registration in his Report, and for
issuance of new title under Section 44, Act 496, as amended, filed with this court,
which was assigned to Branch IV.

Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy was
sought, notice before the hearing is required. The parties admit that there was no
notice to the persons interested, including the Director of Lands, before the petition
was heard.
Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 even assuming arguendo that the
same belonged to the owner of the land to which it is adjacent by the simple
expediency of a petition for approval of subdivision plan and issuance of new titles,
because a subdivision of a registered land under Section 44 of Act 496 does not
authorize the inclusion of land or area not embraced in the titled or in excess of what
is stated in the title. And the approval by the Court of such subdivision plan does not
lend validity to it. The subdivision must be limited to the area stated in the title.
Neither amendment of the title under Section 112 of Act 496 would be a valid remedy
1.
The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille.. owners of the adjacent estate, might have acquired a
registrable title to the land in question but to bring it under the operation of the Land
Registration Act, a petition for registration under Act 496 should have been filed.
More so when the title acquired is by continuous possession for at least 30 years
under a claim of ownership And even assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact
that the riparian estate is registered does not bring ipso facto effect its accretion
thereto under the operation of the Land Registration Act. No decree of registration of
the land based upon final judgment promulgated by a court of competent jurisdiction
after due publication, notice and hearing, has been issued by the Commissioner of
Land Registration and transcribed by the Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry,
for the reason that no initial or original registration proceedings have been instituted
by the owner. And the only way by which a title to the land in question can be issued
for the first time is for the Land Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of
registration based upon final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
after trial.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and directing the Register of Deeds of
Davao to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the portions consisting of
82,127 square meters, the land involved, shall have been segregated therefrom in
accordance with law.
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille brought the
case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, in its Resolution dated July
22, 1974, certified the case (CA-G.R. No. 47438-R) to this Court for consideration and final
disposition.
Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval of Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice to interested persons, and in
ordering the cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690. It is
the contention of the defendant-appellant that since the government agencies having to do with
lands know all the time the increase in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the government
agencies concerned tolerated if not abetted the ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in area,

defendant-appellant should not be made to suffer the effect of the allegedly wrong procedure or step
taken in the approval of the aforementioned subdivision plan. Besides, defendant-appellant claims
that it is their honest belief that the legal remedy taken by them in seeking the approval of their
subdivision plan concerned was well within the law, particularly the provision of Section 44 of Act
496, as amended.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision plan, with the
increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration Commission does not lend validity to
the said subdivision plan; and that the issuance of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725,
T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690) over the increased area in question is improper and invalid
notwithstanding the conformity of the Land Registration Commissioner and the subsequent order of
the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan concerned, as the
required giving of notice to all parties interested in defendant-appellant's petition for approval of
subdivision plan was not at all followed,
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at a judicious
disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which cover the
increased area in question totalling 82,127 square meters.
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of the opinion and so
hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which admittedly covered the increased area of
82,127 square meters under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for
the City of Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval of their
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include the questioned increased area of
82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and irregular. This is so, for the increased
area in question, which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give
allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the defendantappellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa
Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a
former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law,
Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed Instead of an ordinary
approval of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the predecessor-ininterest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is good only insofar as it covers
previously registered lands. In the instant case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of
82,127 square meters, has not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse
still, the approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all
parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect or
incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following requisites
should all be satisfied:
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;

3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all the
documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land
Registration Commission;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the
hearing in the Official Gazette;
6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have
interests in the property by the sheriff;
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or
not;
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing
the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and registration;
11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of
Deeds, and
13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the
issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the
Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.
Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court committed no
error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-17652

June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance
of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo
and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied
by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of
land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly
Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who
inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears
registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property
is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration
sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in
the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side
took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof
had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964
square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion,
alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-ininterest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when
respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages
corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their
answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they
have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year
1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises
and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and
costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual
deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We
are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in
1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed

by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact
that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman,
defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in
1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his
witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion
since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but
could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more
or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for
taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered
upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257
(Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under
this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for
taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by
mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of
land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question
being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to
the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that
the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment,
because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the
riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil.
408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the
reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the
law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have
been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by
prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that
the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the
land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription
(Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel
of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the
meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960,
the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which
started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties.
By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the
riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of
the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership
through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Courta quo, has
resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in
question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is
registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496,
which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall

be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of

the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period
required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An
accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong
to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to
the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act.
Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To
hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the
technical description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the
identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a
negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream
(Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him
to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion
is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the
Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition
area by another person through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case
of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the
length of time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that
he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the
plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he
declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in
1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was
changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two
witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was
Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his
own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful
possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he
said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he
said, was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence
than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first
stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the
latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that
they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only
then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan;
and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes
thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April,
1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his
co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title.
This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession
to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.
1wph1.t

The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933
to 1958 is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is
they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the
additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were
deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The
excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the
certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor
Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the
surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it
was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the
land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been
illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence,
that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion
started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of
the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the
defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property
in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old,
petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the
land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land
just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial
property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered
land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso
facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens
system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land
adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give
title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner,
making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be
placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been
provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property
(which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of
First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and
hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property
under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription?
This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration
of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondentsappellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and
adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the

existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence
presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of
the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old
Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. 73465 September 7, 1989
LEONIDA CUREG, ROMEO, PEPITO, HERNANDO, MANUEL, ANTONIO AND ELPIDIO (ALL
SURNAMED CARNIYAN) petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (4TH CIVIL CASES DIVISION), DOMINGO APOSTOL,
SOLEDAD GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES GERARDO, FLORDELIZA GERARDO, AND
LILIA MAQUINAD,respondent.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for petitioners.
Silvestre Br. Bello for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated October 15,1985 in AC-G.R. CV No.
03852 entitled "Domingo Apostol, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Leonida Cureg, et al., DefendantsAppellants", which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Branch XXII declaring
private respondent Domingo Apostol the absolute owner of a parcel of land, situated in Barangay
Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly described as follows:
... containing an area of 5.5000 hectares, and bounded, on the north, by Cagayan
River; on the east, by Domingo Guingab; on the south, by Antonio Carniyan; and on
the west, by Sabina Mola, with an assessed value of P3,520. (par. 9 of complaint, p.
4, Record; Emphasis supplied)
On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo,
Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad, filed a complaint for quieting of title and
damages with preliminary injunction against herein petitioners Leonida, Romeo, Pepito, Hernando,
Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan with the Regional Trial Court of Isabela and

docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 111-373. A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court
on November 12, 1982.
The complaint alleged that private respondents, except Domingo Apostol, are the legal and/or the
forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February 1944, the latter being the only issue
of the late Francisco Gerardo, who died before the outbreak of the second world war; that since time
immemorial and/or before July 26, 1894, the late Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessorsin-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim
of ownership and adverse to all other claimants, of a parcel of land (referred to as their
"motherland"), situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly described as follows:
... containing an area of 2.5000 hectares, more or less, and bounded on
the North, by Cagayan River; on the East, by Domingo Guingab (formerly Rosa
Cureg); on the south by Antonio Carniyan;and on the West by Sabina Mola, ... (p. 2,
Record)
that said land was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-3023 in the name of
Francisco Gerardo, which cancels Tax Declaration No. C-9669, also in the name of Francisco
Gerardo; that upon the death of Francisco Gerardo, the ownership and possession of the
"motherland" was succeeded by his only issue, Domingo Gerardo who, together with three (3) legal
or forced heirs, namely Soledad Gerardo, one of private respondents herein, Primo Gerardo and
Salud Gerardo, both deceased, have also been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession
of the same; that Primo Gerardo is survived by herein respondents, Rosa, Nieves and Flordeliza, all
surnamed Gerardo and Salud Gerardo is survived by respondent Lilia Maquinad; that in 1979,
respondents Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia
Maquinad verbally sold the "motherland" to co-respondent Domingo Apostol; that on September 10,
1982, the verbal sale and conveyance was reduced into writing by the vendors who executed an
"Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance (Exhibit "Q", p. 206, Rollo); that about the time
of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition, their "motherland" already showed/manifested signs
of accretion of about three (3) hectares on the north caused by the northward movement of the
Cagayan River; that Domingo Apostol declared the motherland and its accretion for tax purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 08-13281 on September 15, 1982.
The complaint also stated that sometime about the last week of September and/or the first week of
October 1982, when private respondents were about to cultivate their "motherland" together with its
accretion, they were prevented and threatened by defendants (petitioners herein) from continuing to
do so. Named defendants in said case are herein petitioners Leonida Cureg and Romeo, Pepito,
Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan, surviving spouse and children,
respectively, of Antonio Carniyan. Further, the complaint stated that Antonio Carniyan was the owner
of a piece of land situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela and more particularly described as
follows:
... containing an area of 2,790 sq. m., more or less bounded on
the north by Domingo Gerardo; on the East, by Domingo Guingab; on the south, by
Pelagio Camayo; and on the west by Marcos Cureg, declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 13131, with an assessed value of P70.00. (P. 5, Record)
that deceased Antonio Carniyan revised on November 28, 1968 his Tax Declaration No. 13131 dated
July 24, 1961 to conform with the correct area and boundaries of his Original Certificate of Title No.

P-19093 issued on November 25, 1968; that the area under the new Tax Declaration No.15663 was
increased from 2,790 square meters to 4,584 square meters and the boundary on the north became
Cagayan River, purposely eliminating completely the original boundary on the north which is
Domingo Gerardo.
Petitioners' answer alleged that the "motherland" claimed by private respondents is non-existent;
that Antonio Carniyan, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a piece of land bounded
on the north by Cagayan River and not by the land of Francisco Gerardo as claimed by private
respondents; that the "subject land" is an accretion to their registered land and that petitioners have
been in possession and cultivation of the "accretion" for many years now.
The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied on July 28,1983 (pp.
244-250,Rollo) on the ground that the defendants were in actual possession of the land in litigation
prior to September 1982. In a decision rendered on July 6, 1984, the trial court held that respondent
Domingo Apostol, thru his predecessors-in-interest had already acquired an imperfect title to the
subject land and accordingly, rendered judgment: 1. declaring Domingo Apostol its absolute owner;
2. ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against herein petitioners; 3. ordering that
the writ be made permanent; and 4. ordering herein petitioners to pay private respondents a
reasonable attorney's fee of P5,000.00, litigation expenses of P1,500.00 and costs (pp. 143145, Rollo).
On July 17, 1984, petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the
decision of the trial court on October 15, 1985. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied
on January 8, 1986. Hence, this petition for review on the following assigned errors:
A. It erred in ruling that the subject land or "accretion" (which is bounded on the north
by the Cagayan River) belongs to the private respondents and not to the petitioners
when the petitioners "Original Certificate of " Title No. 19093 states clearly that the
petitioners' land is bounded on its north by the Cagayan River.
B. It erred in construing the tax declarations against the interest of the herein
petitioners who are only the heirs of the late Antonio Carniyan since the late
Francisco (supposed predecessor of the respondents) could not have executed the
recently acquired tax declarations (Exhibits "A" to "A-2") as he died long before World
War II and since the late Antonio Carniyan could no longer stand up to explain his
side.
C. Contrary to the evidence and the finding of the Regional Trial Court, it wrongly
ruled that petitioners have never been in possession of the land (p. 7 of Annex
"A", ibid.).
D. It erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to the private respondents who
incredibly claimed that the accretion occurred only in 1982 and is a "gift from the
Lord. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)
This petition is impressed with merit.

The object of the controversy in this case is the alleged "motherland" of private respondents together
with the accretion of about 3.5 hectares, the totality of which is referred to in this decision as the
"subject land."
In this case, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the "subject land" which is
an accretion to the registered land while private respondents claimed to be entitled to the 3.5
hectares accretion attached to their "motherland."
It should be noted that the herein private respondents' claim of ownership of their alleged two and a
half (2 & ) hectare "motherland" is anchored mainly on four (4) tax declarations (Exhibits "A", "A-1",
"A-2" and "B", pp. 191, 192, 193, 194, Rollo). This Court has repeatedly held that the declaration of
ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence to prove
ownership. (Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384; cited in
Camo v. Riosa Bayco, 29 Phil. 437, 444). For their part, petitioners relied on the indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of their Original Certificate of Title No. P-19093, dated November 25, 1968 (Exhibit
"3", p. 189, Rollo) issued in the name of Antonio Carniyan (petitioners' predecessor-in-interest)
pursuant to Free Patent No. 399431 dated May 21, 1968, clearly showing that the boundary of
petitioners' land on the north is Cagayan River and not the "motherland" claimed by respondents.
The said registered land was bought by the late Antonio Carniyan from his father-in-law, Marcos
Cureg, on October 5, 1956, as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale (Exhibit "8", p. 195, Rollo)
which states that the land is bounded on the north by Cagayan River.
In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393,401402, We ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts
which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original
certificate of title indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed
premises. Petitioners' OCT No.P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as against the tax
declarations (Exhibit "A', dated 1979; Exhibit "A-1 " undated and Exhibit "A2" dated 1967, pp. 191,
192, 193, Rollo) offered by private respondents in support of their claim, which declarations are all in
the name of private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo, and appear to have
been subscribed by him after the last war, when it was established during the trial that Francisco
Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war.
Anent Tax Declaration No. 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan (Exhibit "C", p. 203, Rollo), which
the appellate court considered as an admission by him that his land is bounded on the north by the
land of Domingo Gerardo and that he (Carniyan) is now estopped from claiming otherwise, We hold
that said tax declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title which is
of a later date. Since petitioner's original certificate of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded
on the north by the Cagayan River, private respondents" claim over their "motherland," allegedly
existing between petitioners" land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified with the
issuance of the original certificate of title.
It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may
have existed prior to the decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, supra., p. 404). By the issuance
of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to exceptions stated in Section
39, Act 496 (now Sec. 44 of PD No. 1529). Moreover, the tax declarations of the late Antonio
Camiyan subsequent to the issuance of OCT P-19093 (Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already states that
its northern boundary is Cagayan River. In effect, he has repudiated any previous acknowledgment

by him, granting that he caused the accomplishment of the tax declarations in his name before the
issuance of OCT No. P- 19093, of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's land.
Finally, the trial court concluded that petitioners have never been in possession of the "subject land"
but the evidence on record proves otherwise. First, the trial court on page 11 of its Decision (p.
121, Rollo), stated the reason for denying private respondents' petition for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, that is, "... the defendants (petitioners herein) were in actual possession of the
land in litigation prior to September, 1982" (p. 121, Rollo). Second, witness for private respondents,
Esteban Guingab, boundary owner on the east of the land in question and whose own land is
bounded on the north of Cagayan River, on cross-examination, revealed that when his property was
only more than one (1) hectare in 1958, (now more than 4 hectares) his boundary on the west is the
land of Antonio Carniyan (T.S.N., 5 May 1983, pp. 19-20). Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a
geodetic engineer, on direct examination stated that in 1974, the late Antonio Carniyan requested
him to survey the land covered by his title and the accretion attached to it, but he did not pursue the
same because he learned from the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Lands that the same
accretion is the subject of an application for homestead patent of one Democrata Aguila, (T.S.N.,
May 18, 1984, pp. 12-13) contrary to the statement of the trial court and the appellate court that
Albano "made three attempts to survey the land but he did not continue to survey because persons
other than defendants were in possession of the land," which statement appears only to be a
conclusion (p. 7, Rollo). Fourth, We note Exhibit "20" (p. 273, Rollo) for petitioners which is an order
by the Director of Lands dated August 14,1980 in connection with the Homestead Application of
Democrata Aguila of an accretion situated in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela. Aguila's application
was disapproved because in an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands of the area applied
for which is an accretion, the same was found to be occupied and cultivated by, among others,
Antonio Carniyan, who claimed it as an accretion to his land. It is worthy to note that none of the
private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest appeared as one of those found occupying
and cultivating said accretion.
On the other hand, the allegation of private respondents that they were in possession of the
"motherland" through their predecessors- in-interest had not been proved by substantial evidence.
The assailed decision of the respondent court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, stated
that since the "motherland" exists, it is alsopresumed that private respondents were in possession of
the "subject land" through their predecessors- in-interest since prior to July 26, 1894. The trial court
relied on the testimony of Soledad Gerardo, one of the private respondents in this case, an
interested and biased witness, regarding their possession of the "motherland." From her testimony
on pedigree, the trial court presumed that the source of the property, the late Francisco Gerardo,
was in possession of the same since prior to July 26, 1894 (pp. 137-140, Rollo).
The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged "motherland" claimed by private
respondents is nonexistent. The "subject land" is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement
of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code:
To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only four thousand five
hundred eighty four (4,584) square meters. The accretion attached to said land is approximately five
and a half (5.5) hectares. The increase in the area of petitioners'land, being an accretion left by the
change of course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become

registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See
Grande v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the
operation of the Torrens System. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision
appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil
Case No. Br. III-373 for quieting of title and damages.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31673 June 30, 1971

QUIRINO FERNANDEZ, VICTORIO FABRICA, ILUMINADO FABRICA, ARSENIO LABRICA,
MARCELINO ABELLA, RODULFO SY and RUFINO CAUMERAN, petitioners,
vs.
SANTIAGO O. TAADA as presiding Judge of Branch V, Court of First Instance of Cebu, and
JUAN BORROMEO, respondents.
Melquiades S. Caumeran for petitioners.
Filiberto Leonardo for private respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
The antecedent facts follow:
In an application for registration dated 21 December 1967 filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch V (L. R. C. No. N 767, L.R.C. Rec. No. 34192), respondent Juan Borromeo prayed
that he be declared as the real and absolute owner of the parcel of land situated in Barrio Pook,
Talisay, Cebu, consisting of 5,897 square meters more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (described in Original Plan Psu-234595) situated in Barrio Pook, Municipality of
Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, having an area of 5,897 square meters, more or less,
assessed at P70.00 as per Tax Declaration No. 026448 and bounded as follows:
N Lot No. 191 owned by Juan Borromeo (applicant);
E by a lot belonging to Claudio Baller;
S Bohol Strait or Seashore; and
W lot No. 2586 owned by Juan Borromeo (applicant).
Respondent bases his claim of ownership on Article 457 of the New Civil
Code, 1 alleging that the land sought to be registered was formed by accretion having
been deposited therein gradually by currents of a Register bordering lot Nos. 7191 and
2586 owned by him. Respondent further prayed that the Register of Deeds be ordered to
issue an original certificate of title in his name.
On 8 March 1968, petitioners herein opposed the abovesaid application on the grounds, among
others, that (a) Article 457 of the New Civil Code could not be invoked, the disputed area having
been fanned by action of the sea and not by river currents, there being no river in the vicinity; (b) that
it was the oppositors who occupied the said land openly and public and not respondent; and (c)
respondent Juan Borromeo is an alien, not qualified to own real properties in the Philippines.

In an order dated 28 July 1969, the Land Registration Court (LRC for short) ruled that the
petitioners-oppositors have no interest over the subject land, thereby dismissing the opposition filed
by them for lack of legal basis. However, the said order was set aside after a Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by said petitioners-oppositors. 2 In an order dated 3 December 1969, the
aforesaid order of 28 July 1969 was revived, directing further there the demolition of the 11 huts in the
premises built by the herein petitioners-oppositors.
Petitioners-oppositors tried to appeal the aforesaid order of 3 December 1969 but the LRC denied
the appeal bond and record on appeal in its order of 14 January 1970, on the ground that the order
was merely interlocutory and, therefore, unappealable. Petitioners moved to reconsider the order of
14 January 1970 but the motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
The jurisdictional issue raised by applicants herein is without merit. If it be true that the lot sought to
be registered.
was formed by accretion which it gradually received from the effects of the current of
the waters flowing on the river bordering the said Lots No. 7191 and 2586 of the
herein applicant (now private respondent Juan Borromeo) (Application, Annex "A" of
Petition, paragraph 3)
then title to the lot vested in said applicant under Article 457 of the Civil Code of the
Philippine from the time the alluvial deposit was formed. Borromeo's petition to the
Registration Court "to declare him the owner" of the lot is in effect a request
for confirmation of the title already vested in him by the law, and the court plainly had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application.
It is true that the oppositors averred below that the deposit was not aluvial but a result of the action
of the sea. This issue, however, is dependent on the result of the evidence to be produced at the trial
on the merits that was still to be held. The same thing can be said of the allegation that the applicant
for registration was disqualified to acquire agricultural land. Neither of these claim can now be
inquired into at this stage of the proceedings.
The respondent court ordered the option of herein petitioners to be dismissed as improper, for lack
of personality to oppose the registration independently of that of the national government, after
receiving evidence that oppositors were mere sales applicants to the Bureau of Land and that they
had been warned that they should not enter nor improve the land object of their sales applications,
prior to the approval thereof by the land authorities; and in fact paragraph 6 of their sales
applications explicitly provided that the same conveyed no right to occupy the land prior to approval
(Order of 3 December 1969, Annex "E", of Petition). Under the circumstances, We can not say that
the action of the court below was in abuse of discretion, considering the rule in Leyva vs.
Jandoc, 4where this Court fully agreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that:
Although the provisions of law just cited apparently authorizes any person claiming
any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, it is our view
nevertheless that the opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other
real right independent of and not at all subordinate to, the rights of the Government.
We have examined Soriano vs. Cortes, 8 Phil. 459;Roxas vs. Cuevas, 8 Phil. 469;
and Archbishop of Manila vs. Barrio of Santo Cristo, et al., 39 Phil. 1, all of which
cases are discussed in the petition and answer, and we find that in all these cases

the interest of the oppositors were each private in nature; otherwise stated, their
interests were not in any manner subordinate to those of the Government. While the
right claimed by the petitioners herein seemed at first blush to be directly opposed to
the adjudication of ownership to the applicant, it developed in the proceedings that
their right, that of being foreshore lessees of public land, is completely subordinate to
the interests of the Government, and must necessarily be predicated upon the
property in question being part of the public domain. In such case, it is incumbent
upon the duly authorized representatives of the Government to represent its interests
as well as private claim intrinsically dependent upon it. It is well-settled that the
interest of the government cannot be represented by private persons. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the recent case of Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, 5 it was declared by this Court that "persons who
claim to be in possession of a tract of public land and have applied with the Bureau of Lands for its
purchase have the necessary personality to oppose registration". An examination of the facts of the said
case, however, not only reveals that the subject land was already determined to be public, but that the
application was opposed by the Directors of Lands and of Forestry as well as by the Private Oppositor,
who likewise alleged session that "is open, continuous, notorious and under the claim of owner for at least
60 years. Moreover, it was not shown that the sale application of private oppositor therein was subject to
the restrictions on entry and improvement found in the sales applications of the petitioners in the case at
bar. Manifestly, the proper step for petitioners herein would have been to urge the Director of Lands to
oppose the application for registration of the applicant Juan Borromeo.
But the dismissal of the oppositions to the registration application did not warrant the respondent
court's order to demolish the houses and improvements of herein petitioners in the controversed
land. The reason is obvious: there is as yet no decision, much less a decree of registration, in favor
of applicant Borromeo; neither is there any showing that the land authorities had complained of
petitioners' occupancy. Even if their land sales applications forbade entry before approval, the
Director of Lands could waive that condition. Only after the land is duly registered, and a writ of
possession issued after due hearing (or alternatively, a final court order of ejectment) can oppositors
below, now petitioners in this court, be dispossessed. In ordering the demolition of petitioners'
houses at this stage of the proceedings, the respondent court acted in grave abuse of discretion,
equivalent to excess of jurisdiction, and certiorari lies to correct it.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of 3 December 1969 is declared null and void in so
far as it directed the demolition of the 11 huts of petition oppositors on the disputed premises; and
the preliminary writ of injunction heretofore issued is made permanent. Let the records be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against private respondent Juan Borromeo.

G.R. No. L-25914 March 21, 1972

PALAWAN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL CO., INC., applicant-appellant,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellee.
Jose G. Flores for applicant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo
and Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for oppositor-appellee.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:p
Direct appeal taken, by Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Co., Inc., from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Palawan dismissing the former's application for registration and confirmation of title
over a parcel of land of 414.5144 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Panacan,
municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan, and more particularly described in amended plan SC4782-AMD.
Said application, filed on February 14, 1961, relies upon section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 2061, upon the ground that, through its predecessor in
interest, appellant had been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and lawful possession of the
land since 1912, under a bonafide claim of acquisition and ownership.
The Director of Lands opposed the application, alleging that it involves a public land covered by
appellants sales application No. 4782 dated April 9, 1920; that the land was not awarded to
appellant, it having refused to pay the value thereof as determined by an appraisal committee in
July, 1950; and that appellant has no valid title to be confirmed, its possession being, not that of an
owner, but, merely, that of a (sales) applicant of a position of the public domain.
In due course, the Court of First Instance of Palawan rendered judgment sustaining the opposition of
the Director of Lands and, accordingly, dismissing the application. Hence, this appeal, upon the
ground that the lower court had erred in holding that:
1. ... the possession and occupation by the applicant-appellant of the land subject of
the application is not the possession and occupation contemplated by the law
(subsection [b] Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic
Act No. 1942).
2. ... the applicant-appellant's possession and occupation of the land subject of the
application did not exclude the Bureau of Lands.
3. ... if the possession and occupation by the applicant-appellant of the land subject
of the application were to be considered as falling under sub-section (b) of section 48
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942 there will be
many instances where the government will be defrauded.

4. ... the only remedy of applicant-appellant is to continue with its sales application
and that it cannot choose the remedy of confirmation of title because it would be
defrauding the government.
Appellant invokes section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942,
which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. 1
More particularly, appellant maintains that it is entitled to the registration applied for pursuant to the
above-quoted provision, which authorizes the confirmation of claims of "those who ... have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application ..."
In this connection, the lower court had made the following findings of fact:
Sometime on April 19, 1920, the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company,
Inc. filed Sales Application No. 4782 over a parcel of public land consisting of 1,024
hectares located at Panacan, Aborlan, Palawan (see Exhs. "1" and "13-A"-status
Report). The application was given due course by the Bureau of Lands. Sometime in
December, 1930, the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company, Inc. requested
the Director of Lands that it be permitted to reduce the area applied for to 680
hectares because the portion it originally applied for were squatted and claimed by
other, (Exhs. "2" and "2-A"). On November 13, 1933, the Director of Lands wrote a
letter to the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company, Inc. advising the latter that
it had recommended to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce an appraisal of
P18.00 per hectare for the land it had applied for sale (Exh. "3"). On November 27,
1934, the Director of Lands issued Notice of Auction Sale over the land applied for
consisting of 764.0683 hectares setting the date of bidding for February 27, 1935
at Puerto Princesa, Palawan (Exh. "4"). According to the records, this auction sale
set for February 27, 1935 did not take place because of the request of the applicant
for postponement. On June 5, 1936, the applicant wrote to the Director of
Lands praying that its Sales Application No. 4782 be not cancelled, in view of the
demand of the Director of Lands that the sales application be cancelled for lack of

interest and that the company may be given time to comply with the condition
required by the Bureau of Lands, (Exh. "5").
According to Exhs. "G", "G-1", "G-2" and "G-4", Tax Declarations Nos. 342, 1414,
1425 and 1750, respectively, the applicant had declared the land applied for, for
taxation purposes. On the face of these exhibits, the following appears: On Tax
Declaration No. 342 "Purchase Application"; on Tax Declaration Nos. 1414, 1425
and 1720, appear the words "S.A. No. 4782". In February 1936, the
company protested to the Provincial Treasurer that the land applied for by it be not
subject to real estate taxes, (Exh. "6").
It also appears from the records that applicant had paid for the necessary expenses
for the survey and had cooperated with the Bureau of Lands surveyor for the survey
of the land, (Exhs. "7", "11" and "20"). On June 13, 1939, a resurvey was ordered by
the Director of Lands, preparatory to the requirements of public bidding, (Exhibit
"19").
The land applied for was again set to be sold at a public bidding on May 19, 1941,
but the bidding was again postponed because the applicant company requested its
suspension because it asked for the reconsideration of the appraised value set by
the Director of Lands, (Exh. "8"). On March 24, 1950, the applicant, thru its Attorney
Almario, wrote a petition to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources asking that the appraised value be reduced.
On July 24, 1950, pursuant to the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, a committee of appraisal reappraised the property and fixed the price of
P100.00 per hectare, (Exhs. "10", "16", "17" and "18").
On October 9, 1950, the applicant, thru its counsel, Atty. Clemente C. Fontanilla
asked for the reconsideration of the appraisal, (Exh. "18"). The Bureau of Lands
stood pat.
Since the time the applicant had applied for the land, it took possession thereof
partially and improved portion thereof planting coconuts and other crops. The value
of improvements are reflected in the various tax declarations. The total area, as
finally surveyed is 415.5144 hectares under Amd Plan No. Sc-4782, SWO-34910.
This plan as well as the survey was undertaken and prepared by a public land
surveyor instructed to make the survey. The land covered by this plan is the same
land applied for by the applicant under SA-4782, and it is the same plan that was
submitted by the applicant in these registration proceedings.
On November 24, 1961, in reply to a subpoena issued by the District Land Office of
Palawan, the applicant thru its president, advised the latter for the first time that he
will not submit to the investigation, set because they want to wait for the result of
their application involving the present case which was filed sometime in March,
1961. 2
It is obvious from the foregoing facts which are not and can not be disputed in this direct appeal,
which, as such, is limited to questions of law that appellant's posession of the land in question

was merely that of a salesapplicant thereof, to whom it had not been awarded because of
its refusal to pay the price fixed therefor by the Bureau of Lands. As such sales applicant, appellant
manifestly acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the same is a public land under the
administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the application was submitted. The trial court was,
therefore, fully justified in concluding that applicant's possession was not that of anowner, as
required by law.
This conclusion is assailed upon the ground that said section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141
original provided that:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.
and that Republic Act No. 1942, which became effective on June 22, 1957, amended said paragraph
(b), not on by dispensing with the requirement that the possession begin not later than July 26, 1894,
but, also, by eliminating the phrase "except as against the Government," qualifying the possession
"under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership" therein called for.
We find no merit in this pretense, for, under both the original and the amended provision, it is
essential that the applicant hold the land "under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership," and
appellant herein had never made such claim, except in its present application for registration, filed
on February 14, 1961. All of its acts prior thereto, including its real estate tax declarations,
characterized its possession of the land as that of a "sales applicant," and, consequently, as one
who expects to buy it, but has not as yet done so, and is not, therefore, its owner. Moreover, the
elimination of the qualifying expression "except as against the Government," found in said section
48(b) as originally enacted, bolsters up the view taken by the lower court. Indeed, it suggests that
the "bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership," under the amendment by Republic Act No. 1942,
must be adverse to the whole world, including the Government.
Again, as the trial court had aptly observed:
In the mind of the Court, the possession and occupation by the applicant company of
the land sought to be registered, is not the possession and occupation contemplated
by the present law on this matter (Subsection [b], Section 48 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942). If this were the case, there will be
many instances where the government will be defrauded. If confirmation or
registration of title can be done, as it is being done now by the applicant company, a
possessor and occupant of a public agricultural land under the administration of the
Bureau of Lands who has applied for the purchase of the same will just sit on his
right, making the application pending for more than 30 years while he possesses and
occupies the land, declare the same for taxation purposes, pay the corresponding

taxes religiously and consistently, and then after a lapse of 30 years, will abandon his
sales application and convert it to an application for judicial confirmation or
registration of title. Such situation is not the one contemplated by our legislators
when they passed Republic Act No. 1942, for had it been their intention, our
legislators would have been a party to an act of defrauding our government ... .
Appellant brands this process of reasoning as "illogical" and "contrary to law," because, pursuant to
section 47 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic No. 2061, the benefits of section
48 (b) of the former are available not later than December 31, 1968, so that those whose possession
had not as yet lasted 30 years could not seek a confirmation of their title. We do not see the violation
of the rules of logic or of law alluded to by appellant. The fact is that, were we to accept its own
process of reasoning which we cannot, it being contrary to the clear and natural import of said
section 48 (b), as amended appellant could have sought confirmation of its alleged title early as
1942 or 1950, or long before December 31, 1968.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 94525 January 27, 1992

DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH DIVISION) and POMPEYO MALIWAT and AMELIA G.
MALIWAT,respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition filed by the Director of Land Management to review the decision dated March 29,
1990 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court's decision which ordered the registration of the
title of a 16-hectare parcel of land in the names of the private respondents.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found the facts of this case to be as follows:
The Land Investigator/Inspector of the Bureau of Lands verified that Feliciano Juco, his
grandparents or predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, exclusive, adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession of the land in question in the concept of owners, for a period of twenty (20)
years. Juco built a house on Lot 3 where his family lived. He had carabaos grazing in his pasture.
His brother-in-law, Gelacio de la Cruz, owned and lived on the adjacent Lot 4.
On March 10-11, 1957, Nieves Naval de Roldan caused the whole tract of land in Cuyambay, Tanay,
Rizal, to be resurveyed as PSU-l64381, by Private Land Surveyor Francisco Agustin. Her children
filed an application to purchase the property through the Bureau of Lands. Lot 4 was placed in the
name of Desiderio Roldan. A sales application was filed by Mariano Roldan for Lot 3.
Feliciano Juco was informed of the posting in the Municipality of Tanay, Rizal, of Mariano Roldan's
sales application for Lot 3. But having no money, he failed to participate in the bidding. Lot 3 was
purchased by Bernardina Manalaysay.
In 1963, with Quirino D. Villena's help, Feliciano Juco was able to obtain financial assistance from
the spouses Leon and Loreta R. Lina to protest against Mariano Roldan's acquisition of Lot 3. He
promised to sell the lot to Lina later. On July 23, 1963, a "Conditional Sale and Transfer of Right to
Land" was executed by Juco in favor of the Lina spouses.
The Lina spouses fenced Lots 3 and 4 and planted fruit trees thereon. Two (2) years later, a Bilihang
Tuluyanwas executed by Juco, with his wife's consent, in favor of Lina. The document was notarized
by Teodulo Q. Bernardos (Exh. C) and registered under Act No. 3344 on September 5, 1972.
Juco lost his protest in the Bureau of Lands, but upon appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, he was, on December 18, 1969, adjudged to have the preferential right to buy
the property (Exh. O). He was given sixty (60) days from the finality of the decision to file his own
application to purchase it, which he did on August 29, 1971 (Exh. I-Director of Lands). Shortly
thereafter, Feliciano Juco died.
Juco's wife, Pacita Ressureccion, and their children, Jimmy, Nicanor, Beatriz and Adalia, offered to
sell the property to Pompeyo Maliwat who was told about the proceedings in the Bureau of Lands

but not about the earlier sale of the land to the Lina spouses. He verified from the records that
Feliciano Juco did have a preferential right to the property, so he bought it (Exh. D). He had the deed
of sale registered (Exh. E) and he declared the land for tax purposes in his name. He placed men on
the land to take care of it (pp. 610-613, Rollo.)
Claiming to be the owners in fee simple of Lot 3, PSU-164381, with an area of 169.301 square
meters, situated at Barrio Cayambay, Tanay, Rizal, the Maliwats filed on March 20, 1977 in the
Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila, an application for registration of the land in their names
under the Torrens system. It was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-7753.
The Director of Lands (now Director of the Land Management Bureau) opposed the application on
the ground that the land is public land.
The Minister of Agrarian Reform also opposed it on the ground that the land is reserved for agrarian
reform.
On November 8, 1972, the Lina spouses filed a motion to dismiss Maliwat's application for
registration of title on the ground that the land is covered by a homestead application of Loreto R.
Lina duly filed and recorded on January 9, 1970 in the District Land Office No. 3 of the Bureau of
Lands, and that it is public land under the administration and disposition of the Director of Lands, not
the court. On April 5, 1973, they amended their opposition. They claimed that they had purchased
the land from Feliciano Juco, and that hence, the title should be registered in their names.
Another opposition was filed by one Cesar N. Roldan, claiming to be the actual occupant of the land,
that the possession was given to him by the heirs of Feliciano Juco who died while awaiting the
action of the Director of Lands on his application for a free patent; and that he (Roldan) filed an
application (for free patent) in substitution of the deceased, Feliciano Juco.
On December 26,1985, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders and decrees the registration of the
parcel of land subject matter of the present proceeding and the registration of title
thereto in favor of the applicants, Pompeyo Maliwat and Amelia G. Maliwat, spouses,
of age, Filipinos with residence and postal address at Sta. Mesa, Metro Manila, who
are hereby declared the true and lawful owners in fee simple thereof.
Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration and
certificate of title be issued in the name of the applicants. (pp. 123-124, Rollo.)
The Director of Lands appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 12601). On
March 29, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. A motion for
reconsideration, filed by the petitioner, was denied, hence, this petition for review.
The Director of Lands avers that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in holding that Lot 3, Plan Psu-164381 is private land, despite overwhelming
evidence including the admissions of private respondents' predecessors-in-interest,
that it is a public land.

2. In applying the Bengzon (152 SCRA 369) and Acme (146 SCRA 509) rulings on
the conversion of alienable public land to private property, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that the possession of Lot 3, Psu-164381 by Feliciano Juco and
respondents spouses, Pompeyo Maliwat and Amelia Maliwat, was not in the concept
of owners; and
3. in confirming the alleged registrable right of the private respondents to the land in
question.
After deliberating on the petition, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Lot 3, had
become private land by virtue of the late Feliciano Juco's open, continuous, and exclusive
occupation and cultivation thereof since 1939, which when tacked to Maliwat's possession after
February 12, 1972 (when he purchased it) far exceeds the statutory thirty-year period for the
conversion of alienable public agricultural land into private property. The decision of the Court of
Appeals accords with the following rulings in this court:
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or thru his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
The above [doctrine] is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases
of Cario vs.Insular Government, 42 Phil. 935; Suzi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424;
and Herico vs. DAR, 95 SCRA 437; that open, exclusive and undisputed possession
of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. (Director of Lands vs. Bengzon, 152 SCRA 369, 376, citing the doctrine laid
down in the Director of Lands vs. IAC and Acme Plywood and Veneer Co., Inc., 146
SCRA 509, 522).
. . . The mandate of the law itself is that the possessors "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and by legal fiction, the land ceases to be
public and thus becomes private land. In the language of Herico vs. DAR, supra title
over the land has vested on the possessor so as to segregate the land from the
mass of the public domain. And as stressed in Suzi vs. Razon, supra, it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sustained by the courts, an application thereunder being sufficient. (Republic vs. De
Porkan, 151 SCRA 107-108.)
As an applicant possessor who has complied with all the necessary requirements for
the grant by the government under the Public Land Act through actual possession,
openly, continuously, and publicly, private respondent through his predecessor-ininterest is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a
grant but the grant itself of the government for it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by courts an application
therefore being sufficient under the law. (Santos vs. CA, 189 SCRA 550).

Juco's admission in his free patent application that the land he was applying for is public land did not
divest the title which had already vested in him before he filed said application on August 9, 1971.
Having become private property, the land, as correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, was "beyond
the control or jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Consequently, the order of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources . . . giving him (Juco) sixty (60) days within which to file the
corresponding land application was null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever on the already
acquired title of Juco under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended. Nevertheless, the decision
established the fact that Juco was the actual occupant of the land with improvements thereat" (pp.
136-137, Rollo).
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 12601 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19940

August 14, 1965

FERNANDEZ KIDPALOS, applicant-appellant,

vs.
BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-19941

August 14, 1965

WALDO KIDPALOS, applicant-appellant,

vs.
BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-19942

August 14, 1965

NABOS VALENCIANO, applicant-appellant,

vs.
BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-19943

August 14, 1965

MAGLIA CAYAPA, applicant-appellant,

vs.
BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-19944

August 14, 1965

SANDO LAMPACAN, BASATEN LAMPACAN, CONSING LAMPACAN and TOPAYNA

LAMPACAN, applicants-appellants,
vs.
BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, oppositor-appellee.
Bienvenido L. Garcia for applicants-appellants.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for oppositor-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal from orders of dismissal of five applications for registration of land on the ground
of res judicata, by order of June 17, 1960, issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, in its
cases Nos. N-40, N-41, N-42, N-43 and N-44.

The fact is uncontroverted that on August 31, 1954, Maglia Cayapa, Nabos Valenciano, Waldo
Kidpalos, Fernandez Kidpalos, and Ipang Lebos Vda. de Lampacan sued the Baguio Gold Mining
Company and the Director of Mines in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City (Civil Cases Nos.
457, 458, 460, 463 and 549), seeking judgment declaring said plaintiffs to be the owners of certain
parcels of land situated in sitio Binanga Barrio of Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Benguet, Mountain
Province; to annul the declarations of location of certain mineral claims of the Baguio Gold Mining
Company, overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs; and to recover damages from the Company.
The complaint also sought to enjoin the Director of Mines from proceeding with the lode patent
applications of The Mining Company, and to have the mine buildings erected on the land in question
demolished at the latter's expense. The defendant Baguio Gold Mining Company, claiming title by
virtue of valid locations of the claims since 1925 to 1930, asked for dismissal of the action and
damages.
After due trial, the Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs Cayapa, et al., had failed to
substantiate their claims of ownership and dismissed the suits. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. No. 19628-R to 19632-R), the latter rendered judgment, on July 31, 1958, finding that the
land lay within the Cordillera Forest Reservation proclaimed by Governor General Stimson, and that
it formed part of the Public domain; that from 1927 to 1933, one George Icard and his son, Joseph,
had entered and located therein certain mining claims, subsequently sold and transferred to the
Baguio Gold Mining Company; that the latter had occupied the land, worked the claims, and
performed the acts required by the mining laws to entitle it to mineral patents therefor until the recent
World War II; that after the war the claims were validated by Act No. 4268 of the Philippine
Legislature; that the Mining Company had acquired beneficial title to the claims by its locations,
although the corresponding patents were still in process at the Bureau of Mines; that "the appellee
mining company has acquired a superior title to that of the plaintiffs-appellants over the mineral
claims under litigation" (Rec. App., pp. 186-220). Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of the actions by the Court of First Instance.
In view of the affirmance of the decision of the trial court by the Court of Appeals, the plaintiffsappellants therein resorted to the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. L-16649 to
L-16653). The latter, however, declined review in a resolution reading as follows:
In G.R. Nos. L-16649-53 (Maglia Cayapa vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), acting on the petition
for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals rendered on July 31, 1958, THE COURT
RESOLVED to dismiss the same on the ground that the issues raised are factual and have
no merit, but without prejudice to the registration proceedings filed by petitioner before the
same court regarding the properties herein involved, it appearing that the Court of Appeals,
in touching incidentally on the question of ownership, did so without interfering with the
merits of said registration proceedings. (Emphasis Supplied.)
While the cases were still pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs had filed in Court the
present registration cases. Baguio Gold opposed the registration, and moved to dismiss the
applications. Proceedings were originally held in abeyance until the appeals in the preceeding,
cases were decided.
The 1960 Supreme Court resolution in L-16649-53 having become final, the oppositor Baguio Gold
Mining Company reiterated its motions to dismiss the registration cases in the Court of First
Instance. The latter dismissed the applications, and the applicants then directly appealed to this
Supreme Court.

They assail the order of dismissal of the court below claiming that there could not be res
judicata because (1) the 1960 resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing their petition for review of
the Court of Appeals decision in favor of Baguio Gold Mining Company contained the reservation
"without prejudice to the registration proceedings filed by petitioner" (which are the cases now at
bar); and (2) that the former judgment's dispositive portion provided only for dismissal of the
appellant's previous complaint against Baguio Gold Mining Company, and it is only this dispositive
portion that is binding on the parties to the former litigation.
It thus appears that appellants do not dispute that the subject matter in the present registration
proceedings is the same land involved in the previous litigation, or that the parties are the same (the
applicants-appellants Lampacan in Registration Case No. N-44, L.R.C. Record No. N-11914, now
G.R. No. L-19944, being the heirs and successors of the former plaintiff Ipang Lebos Vda. de
Lampacan in the preceding law suit). It is now denied either that the former judgment of the Court of
Appeals was rendered on the merits of the case.
Neither is it disputable that the causes of action in both cases are identical, since in both the
appellants asserted that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the land in dispute, allegedly
invaded by appellee Baguio Gold Mining Company. While the former cases were reivindicatory in
character and the ones presently before us are land registration proceedings, such difference in
forms of action are irrelevant for the purposes of res judicata. It is a firmly established rule that a
different remedy sought or a diverse form of action does not prevent the estoppel of the former
adjudication (Pealosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 322; Juan vs. Go Cotoy, 26 Phil. 328; Chua Tan vs.
Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Francisco vs. Blas, 93 Phil. 1; Sarabia vs. Sec. of Agriculture, L-16002,
May 23, 1961, and cases cited therein). Since there can be no registration of land without applicant
being its owner, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in the previous litigation declaring that the
mining company's title is superior to that of appellant's should be conclusive on the question in the
present case.
Much reliance is placed by appellants on the statements made in this Court's 1960 resolution
declining review of the former judgment of the Court of Appeals,
without prejudice to the registration proceedings filed by petitioner before the same court
regarding the properties herein involved, it appearing that the Court of Appeals in touching
incidentally on the question of ownership, did so without interfering with the merits of the
registration proceedings.
The words quoted merely establish that the decision in the reivindicatory action decided by the Court
should not be considered as having decided the pending registration proceedings, since the nature
of both proceedings were different, one being a personal action and the registration being one in
rem. The Court of First Instance could not, in other words, automatically apply the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the registration proceedings. And the reason is plain; the pronouncement, of the
judgment in the former case would not necessarily preclude relitigation of the issues if res judicata is
not invoked, since res judicata is a matter of defense and does not deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction to act on a second suit between the parties on the same subject matter (cf. Rule 16, Sec.
1 [f], Revised Rules of Court). But the defense having been set up in the present proceedings, the
trial court acted properly in considering and resolving the same.
Appellants likewise argue that only the dispositive portion of a judgment concludes the parties and
the previous adjudication was merely that appellants' reivindicatory suit should be dismissed. We

find this view unduly restrictive of the salutary rule that issues once previously threshed out and
finally adjudicated should no longer be relitigated between the same parties on the same subject
matter and cause of action. This is the substance of res judicata, without which multiplicity of actions
will be unavoidable. Hence the doctrine is that
Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been
rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that
matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily
presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. (30 Am. Jur.
930)
Or, as stated in Redden vs. Metzger, 26 Am. St. Rep. 97, 99-100:
... . The rule of res adjudicata applies as well to facts settled and adjudicated as to causes of
action:Whitaker v. Hawley, 30 Kan. 326. The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is
compulsive on the parties as to all points directly involved in it and necessarily
determined: Shirland v. Union Nat Bank, 65 Iowa 96; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 249.
When a fact has been once determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final
judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between
the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which,
from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done The estoppel is not
confined to the judgment, but extend to all facts involved in it as necessary steps, or the
groundwork upon which it must have been founded. It is allowable to reason back from a
judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion
is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the premises are
equally indisputable with the conclusion: Burlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200; 96 Am. Dec.
733: Board, etc. v. Mineral Point R.R. Co., 24 Vis. 124; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 257;
Wells on Res Adjudicata, sec. 226: 1 Herman on Estoppel, sec. 111.
In consonance with the foregoing principles, we hold that the findings in the former judgment (that
the mining claims were validly located and that the title of the mining company is superior to that of
appellants), being the basis of the sentence of dismissal, conclude the applicants in the present
case, the previous adjudication being final and rendered on the merits, and there being identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action in all the cases. Hence, the dismissal of these land
registration proceeding, by the Court of First Instance of Baguio was in order and conformable to
law.
That at present the law permits registration applicants to proceed on the basis of 30 years' open,
adverse, and uninterrupted possession as owner, instead of requiring, as of yore continuous adverse
possession as owner since 1894, does not help appellants at all. The vesting of title to the lands in
question in the appellee Baguio Gold Mining Company has effectively interrupted and rendered
discontinuous the possession claimed by applicants.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal of these proceedings on the
ground of res judicata is affirmed. Appellants shall pay the costs.