PEOPLE V.

JANSSEN
Marriages exempt from license requirementa.
1. In articulo mortis (Art. 27, 29, 30, 31, 32)
2. Remote locations (Art.28, 29, 30)
3. Among ethnic groups (Art.33)
4. Cohabitation for 5 years (Art.34)
FACTS:
On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdea and Juana S. del Rosario
appeared before Reverend Father H. Janssen, a Catholic parish priest of the
municipality of San Jose, Antique, to have their names inscribed in the
marriage registry, which was done. On
December 30, 1928, the banns were published in his parish in San Jose,
Antique.
As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked
the defendant-appellant to marry them before that date. Upon petition of
the defendant-appellant, the Bishop of Jaro issued the following
dispensation on December 29, 1928 authorizing the solemnization of the
marriage as long as there are no legal impediments to the marriage. On
January 4, 1929, the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, gave the
authority to solemnize marriage. By virtue of the above-quoted
dispensation, and in view of said authority of the municipal secretary of
San Jose, Antique, the defendant-appellant on January 6, 1929, solemnized
the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdea to Juana S. del Rosario
ISSUE
Whether or not appellant violated violated section 2 of Act No. 3412,
HELD
The law does not impose upon priests or ministers of religion the duty In
holding that it is the duty of the accused to inquiring into and determining
the residence of the contracting parties before solemnizing marriage. It is
sufficient to know that the license has been issued by a competent official,
and it may be presumed from the issuance of said license that said official
has complied with his duty of ascertaining whether the woman who desires
to get married resides habitually in his municipality.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is
solemnized by a church, sect, or religion whose rules and practices require
proclamation or publicity, it is not necessary that said proclamation be
made during ten days, unless said rules or practices so require.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 166859, G.R. No. 169203, G.R. No. 180702, April 12, 2011
FACTS:

The Republic commenced Civil Case No. 0033 in the

Sandiganbayan by complaint, impleading as defendants
respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) and 59
individual defendants.

Cojuangco allegedly purchased a block of 33,000,000 shares of

SMC stock through the 14 holding companies owned by the CIIF Oil
Mills. For this reason, the block of 33,133,266 shares of SMC stock
shall be referred to as the CIIF block of shares.

Contention of the Republic of the Philippines:

That Cojuangco is the undisputed "coconut king" with unlimited
powers to deal with the coconut levy funds, who took undue
advantage of his association, influence and connection, acting in
unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, misused
coconut levy funds to buy out majority of the outstanding shares of
stock of San Miguel Corporation.
Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and ACCRA law offices plotted,
devised, schemed, conspired and confederated with each other in
setting up, through the use of coconut levy funds, the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment
of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK. CIC, and more than
twenty other coconut levy-funded corporations, including the
acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan:

Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033-F was dismissed for
failure of plaintiff to prove by preponderance of evidence its causes
of action against defendants with respect to the twenty percent
(20%) outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation
registered in defendants names

Republic of the Philippines appealed the case to the Supreme Court

invoking that coconut levy funds are public funds. The SMC shares,
which were acquired by respondents Cojuangco, Jr. and the
Cojuangco companies with the use of coconut levy funds in
violation of respondent Cojuangco, Jr.s fiduciary obligation are,
necessarily, public in character and should be reconveyed to the
government.

ISSUE:

Whether Respondent Cojuangco Jr. used the coconut levy funds to

acquire SMC shares in violation of the his fiduciary obligation as a
public officer.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
Cojuangco violated no fiduciary duties
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a
government official or employee during the administration of former Pres.
Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation
with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
Republics burden to establish by preponderance of evidence that
respondents SMC shares had been illegally acquired with coconut-levy
funds was not discharged.
The conditions for the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the
Civil Code (like the trustee using trust funds to purchase, or a person
acquiring property through mistake or fraud), and Section 31 of the
Corporation Code (like a director or trustee willfully and knowingly voting
for or assenting to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, among others)
require factual foundations to be first laid out in appropriate judicial
proceedings. Hence, concluding that Cojuangco breached fiduciary duties
as an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB without
competent evidence thereon would be unwarranted and unreasonable.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan could not fairly find that Cojuangco had
committed breach of any fiduciary duties as an officer and member of the
Board of Directors of the UCPB. For one, the Amended Complaint contained
no clear factual allegation on which to predicate the application of Articles
1455 and 1456 of the Civil Code, and Section 31 of the Corporation Code.
Although the trust relationship supposedly arose from Cojuangcos being
an officer and member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB, the link
between this alleged fact and the borrowings or advances was not
established. Nor was there evidence on the loans or borrowings, their
amounts, the approving authority, etc. As trial court, the Sandiganbayan
could not presume his breach of fiduciary duties without evidence showing
so, for fraud or breach of trust is never presumed, but must be alleged and
proved.
The thrust of the Republic that the funds were borrowed or lent
might even preclude any consequent trust implication but is more inclined
to be a contract of loan. To say that a relationship is fiduciary when existing
laws do not provide for such requires evidence that confidence is reposed
by one party in another who exercises dominion and influence. Absent any
special facts and circumstances proving a higher degree of responsibility,
any dealings between a lender and borrower are not fiduciary in nature.

DISPOSITION:
The Court DISMISSES the petitions for certiorari and, AFFIRMS
the decision promulgated by the Sandiganbayan on November 28, 2007 in
Civil Case No. 0033-F.
The Court declares that the block of shares in San Miguel
Corporation in the names of respondents Cojuangco, et al. subject of Civil
Case No. 0033-F is the exclusive property of Cojuangco, et al. as registered
owners.

Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)

FACTS:
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza
gave written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property,
documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos.
A sequestration order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa,
Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was
void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The
Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG Commissioners.
The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning
the sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking permission from the
PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to
the validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda
failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as
provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet
exist when the Olot Resthouse was sequestered; and that she intended to
delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash.
Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the
sequestration order was void because it was signed not by the 2
commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.
HELD:
No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a

sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a prima facie case

that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order,
the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG.
In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence
of the prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence to the
Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG
representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and
consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's
evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what
makes it ill-gotten wealth,and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its
acquisition.
As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and
cannot be validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot
accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the
sequestration order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike
it down on sight.
*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis
pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the claim of the
Republic in another civil case.
Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)
FACTS
A complaint was filed against the defendants Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the
ACCRA lawyers, Danilo Ursua and 71 corporations by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) referred here as Republic of the
Philippines with regard to a block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) stock
which were allegedly bought through the CIIF Holding Companies and
funded by the coconut levy fund passing through the Unicom Oil Mills and
directly from UCPB. The coconut levy funds were considered as
government funds since this came from contributions from the coconut
farmers with the purpose of improving and stabilizing the coconut farming
industry, however these were said to be privatized under presidential
directives of then Pres. Marcos. Defendant Cojuangco Jr., being close with
the Marcoses is said to have taken undue advantage of his association,
influence and connection, embarked upon different devices and schemes
including the use of the ACCRA Lawyers as nominee shareholders and
the defendant corporations as fronts to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of the Filipino people when he misused the coconut levy fund,
amounting to $150 million, to purchase 33 million shares of the SMC
through the holding companies. Hence with the allegations mentioned and
with different cases and issues which remain unresolved, the block of

shares representing 20% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC remained

sequestered by the government.
During the pre-trial brief, the Sandiganbayan sought clarification from the
parties, particularly the Republic, on their respective positions, but at the
end it found the clarifications "inadequately" enlightening. To resolve
various pending motions and pleadings, Sandiganbayan lifted and declared
the Writs of Sequestration null and void.
Despite the lifting of the writs of sequestration, since the Republic
continues to hold a claim on the shares which is yet to be resolved, it is
hereby ordered that the following shall be annotated in the relevant
corporate books of San Miguel Corporation:
(1) any sale, pledge, mortgage or other disposition of any of the shares of
the Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, et al. shall be subject to the outcome
of this case;
(2) the Republic through the PCGG shall be given twenty (20) days written
notice by Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, et al. prior to any sale, pledge,
mortgage or other disposition of the shares;
(3) in the event of sale, mortgage or other disposition of the shares, by the
Defendants Cojuangco, et al., the consideration therefore, whether in cash
or in kind, shall be placed in escrow with Land Bank of the Philippines,
subject to disposition only upon further orders of this Court; and
(4) any cash dividends that are declared on the shares shall be placed in
escrow with the Land Bank of the Philippines, subject to disposition only
upon further orders of this Court. If in case stock dividends are declared,
the conditions on the sale, pledge, mortgage and other disposition of any
of the shares as above-mentioned in conditions 1, 2 and 3, shall likewise
apply.
Sandiganbayan denied both Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Modification but eventually reduced its resolution deleting the last 2
provisions. Cojuangco, et al. filed a Motion for Authority to Sell San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) shares, praying for leave to allow the sale of SMC shares
and Sandiganbayan granted the motion. Cojuangco, et al. later rendered a
complete accounting of the proceeds from the sale of the Cojuangco block
of shares of SMC stock, informing that a total amount of P
4,786,107,428.34 had been paid to the UCPB as loan repayment.
ISSUE
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of dicretion in:
(a) in lifting the Writ of Sequestrations on the sequestered SMC shares.
(c) in deleting the last two conditions the Sandiganbayan had earlier
imposed on the subject shares of stock.

their parents, the grandparents of Ramonito and Generoso.

RULING
Among the WOS issued, only one writ WOS 87-0218 complied with PCGG
Rules and Regulations requirement that the issuance be made by at least
two Commissioners. However, even if Writ of Sequestration No. 87-0218
complied with the requirement that the same be issued by at least two
Commissioners, the records fail to show that it was issued with factual
basis or with factual foundation. It is the absence of a prima facie basis for
the issuance of a writ of sequestration and not the lack of authority of two
(2) Commissioners which renders the said writ void ab initio. Thus, being
the case, Writ of Sequestration No. 87-0218 must be automatically lifted.
Consequently, the writs of sequestration nos. 86-0062, 86-0069, 86-0085,
86-0095, 86-0096, 86-0097 and 86-0098 must be lifted for not having
complied with the pertinent provisions of the PCGG Rules and Regulations,
all of which were issued by only one Commissioner.
Nor did the Sandiganbayan gravely abuse its discretion in reducing from
four to only two the conditions imposed for the lifting of the WOS. The
Sandiganbayan thereby acted with the best of intentions, being all too
aware that the claim of the Republic to the sequestered assets and
properties might be prejudiced or harmed pendente lite unless the
protective conditions were annotated in the corporate books of SMC.
Moreover, the issue became academic following theSandiganbayans
promulgation of its decision dismissing the Republic's Amended Complaint,
which thereby removed the stated reason - "the Republic continues to hold
a claim on the shares which is yet to be resolved" - underlying the need for
the annotation of the conditions (whether four or two).

Leoncia Balogbog vs. CA

G.R. No. 83598, March 7, 1997

Presumption of marriage

Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of

marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took
place.
FACTS:
This is an action for partition brought by Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog
against Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog. Ramonito and Generoso claimed
that they were the legitimate children of Catalina and Gavino, the
elder brother of Leoncia and Gaudioso. Gavino died in 1935, predeceasing

Ramonito and Generoso presented witnesses: one, the mayor of Asturias

from 1928 to 1934, another, who was a family friend, and Catalina herself.
For its part, defendants denied knowing Ramonito and Generoso and
claimed that Gavino died single and without issue. As proof of this, they
presented certificates showing that there was no record in the Register of
both the marriage between Gavino and Catalina and the birth of Ramonito.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of Ramonito and Generoso. CA
affirmed, holding that private respondents failed to overcome the
legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be
legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the presumption of marriage applies

Whether or not Ramonito and Generoso were legitimate

children of Gavino
HELD:
The SC found no reversible error committed by the CA.
Petitioner contends that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should be
proven in accordance of Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 (only by
a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry) since
the marriage was celebrated when such law was in effect.
But the SC noted that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did
not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of
the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this country.
Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was
brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be
determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the
provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights,
and the rules on evidence.
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This
presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.

Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to

prove the marriage. Indeed, although amarriage contract is considered
primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that
no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove marriage.
Rationale for the presumption
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in
the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of
constitutional concern.
Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee: The basis of human society throughout the
civilized world is that ofmarriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always
presume marriage.
Legitimacy of Children
The SC held that the fact that there was no record of birth in the Civil
Registry does not mean that Ramonito andGeneroso were not legitimate
children. Their legitimacy was proved by testimony of witnesses, including
Catalina, the mother herself. Moreover, there was submitted an official
transcript of an investigation before the Police Investigation Committee of
Balamban, Cebu, wherein Gaudioso himself admitted that Ramonito is his
nephew.

Leoncia Balogbog vs. CA

FACTS:

Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and

accounting against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and
accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of
Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed
to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961
respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino,
their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was
claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas
and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of
their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not
aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started
to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and
Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police
investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter
is the son of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their
parents marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor
of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he
knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have
three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt
presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned
during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at
the family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local
Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record
of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant
Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina
should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil
Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged
marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889
should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil
Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or
unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof,
such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of
husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the
birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in
evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.

HELD: Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of
Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus
entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of
Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General
of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this country.
Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was
brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be
determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the
provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights,
and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is
that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are
legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place.
Other evidence may be presented where in this case evidence consisting
of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage
of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of
whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are recognized by
Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996
Complainant: Rodolfo G. Navarro
Respondent: Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy, MCTC
Ponente: J. Romero
Facts:
The complainant submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by the respondent with the following facts:
(a) On September 27, 1994, respondent solemnized wedding between
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first wife;
(b) On October 27, 1994, the respondent allegedly performed a marriage
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. Del Rosario
outside of the respondents courts jurisdiction. Such wedding was
solemnized at the respondents residence in municipality of Dapa, which
does not fall within the respondents jurisdictional area of Sta. Monica
Burgos.
Respondent, in his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA):
(a) Seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage
between Tagadan and Borga by stating that he merely relied on the
Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming that
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven (7)
years.
(b) Maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del
Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph one (1) of the Family Code,
which states that Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction.; and that Article 8
thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the
pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the
case. In the foregoing the other facts are present in relation to the first
marriage solemnized by the respondent as stated herein:
(a) The affidavit was not issued by the judge of Basey, Samar. It was,
however, merely acknowledged before him;

(b) The affiants stated in their affidavit that they knew Tagadan who was
left by his wife, Ida Penaranda and she has not returned nor been heard for
almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is
already dead.
Issues:
The issues are:
(1) Whether or not the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of
Ida Penarandas presumptive death and ample reason for the respondent
to proceed with the marriage ceremony of Tagadan and Borga;
(2) Whether or not the solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del
Rosario was within the respondents courts jurisdiction.
Held:
(1) No. The joint affidavit is not a sufficient proof of Penarandas
presumptive death. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides as
quoted, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death or the
absentee Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage.
(2) No. The solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was
not within the respondents courts jurisdiction. He was not clothed to
solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. As
such, there are only three instances, which the law provides, wherein a
judge may solemnize a marriage as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code:
(2.1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
(2.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented
addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma
del Rosario.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
(Re: Sumaylo and Del Rosario - Under the Family Code, even if the
solemnizing officer is not authorized, the marriage would be valid if either
or both parties believe in good faith in his authority to solemnize the
marriage.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a
complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct,
ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and
Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom
has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely
separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has
not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge
likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del
Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge
holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding
at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
HELD:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and
bigamous there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and
Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only
made the written request where it should have been both parties as stated
in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate
their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Facts: Respondent Judge was alleged to have committed two specific acts
exhibiting gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance
of the law:
a) Respondent Judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the lack of a summary
proceeding for the declaration of Mr. Tagadans first wifes (Ida Pearanda)
presumptive death. Respondent states that the joint affidavit presented by
the groom confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not
seen each other for almost seven years is sufficient proof of Ida
Pearandas presumptive death, and therefore, an ample reason for him
to proceed with themarriage ceremony.

b) Respondent Judge performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano

Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction
on October 27, 1994. Respondent maintains that this is not a violation of
Article 7 (1) of the Family Code which states that: Marriage may be
solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
courts jurisdiction; and that Article 8 which states, a marriage can be held
outside of the judges chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect thereof applies to the case in question.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the marriages solemnized by the respondent judge are
valid under the Family Code; and
(2) Whether or not respondent is subject to administrative liability
Held: First marriage is not valid. Article 41 of the Family Code requires that
even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage. Since Gaspar Tagadan failed to present such
judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Respondent
judge erred in accepting the joint affidavitsubmitted by the groom.
The marriage solemnized has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
void, marriage as provided under Article 35 of the Family Code, The

following marriage shall be void from the beginning; (4) Those bigamous x
x x marriages not falling under Article 41.
Second marriage is valid. Under Article 3 of the Family Code, one of the
formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizingofficer.
Under Article 7(1), marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any
incumbent member of the Judiciary within the Courts jurisdiction.
Respondent Judge holds jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta. Maria-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario was solemnized at the respondent
Judges residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to
the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision.
Article 8 requires both parties to present a written request. The written
request presented addressed to respondent judge was made by only one
party, Gemma del Rosario. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his courts jurisdiction, while there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, the validity of the marriage is not affected.
It is the officiating official, respondent Judge, who shall be subject to
administrative liability.