Republic vs Dayot

FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed
a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993
an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand,
Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the
marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore,
the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers
to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose
and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right
to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.
Ninal vs Bayadog
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and
Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under
the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the
marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they
instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his
marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the
death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Manzano vs Sanchez
Manzano vs. Sanchez
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he
officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven
years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their
spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can
contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both
parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment

that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another
person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez
demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Void and voidable
Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524 December 29, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina A.
Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels
father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as null and void. Federico anchors his oppostion
on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an
illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federicos Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends
that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabels parents null and void be
upheld.
ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should prevail? Related thereto,
was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?
HELD:
Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its
judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be declared null and void, the body had
shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes
for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may
be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void
marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the
spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children
by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of
whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is
considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called
natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89
of the Civil Code which provides that children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate.
Mallion v. Alcantara
Facts:
Oscar Mallion fi led a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking adeclarationof nullity of his marriage
with EdithaAlcantara due topsychological incapacity.The RTC denied the petition for failure to adduce
preponderance of evidence. As the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a declarationof nullity of
marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and voiddue to the fact that it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license. It was laterdismissed by the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of res judicataand forum
shopping. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Does a previous fi nal judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity ontheground of psychological
incapacity bar a subsequent petition fordeclaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
Held:
Yes. Petition is denied.
Ratio:
Res judicataapplies.Declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by earlier
decision on psychological capacity. Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action, whichis
the nullity of marriage. When the second case was fi led based onanother ground, there is a splitting of a cause of
action, which is prohibited. Heisestopped from asserting that the marriage had no marriage licensebecause
heimpliedly admitted the same when he did notquestion the absence of a marriagelicense in the fi rst case
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI
FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced by their marriage
contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There
they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
Ginas version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love that night of

their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and then
turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and
wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her
husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long
walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989
(ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did not
even see her husbands private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results were that Gina is
healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings examination was kept confidential up to this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said she had observed
him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband only married her
to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man
Chings version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with
Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on his
part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any
differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according
to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage
entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.
The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children basedon the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love, respect and fidelity,
the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate
or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness
and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope
of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

Abbas vs Abbas

Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas
on the ground of absence of marriage license, as provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code.
Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the Philippines on December 1992, a
ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary
Ann Ceriola. Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document.
Syed claim that he did not know the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.
In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite was
proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.

Ruling:
No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on January 9, 1993, the Family Code is the applicable
law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the absence of the essential and formal
requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that those marriages which are solemnized without a license are void from
the beginning in exception to those covered by the preceding chapter.
Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the marriage contract and testimonies to prove the existence
of the said license.
Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

De castro vs De Castro G.R. No. 160172

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a
marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation
sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license,
they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to
their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.
HELD:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the
evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage.
Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit
cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They
were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their
marriage void ab initio.
NICDAO CARIO VS YEE CARIO
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two children. He then married Susan
Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000
while Yee received a total of P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively denominated as "death benefits."
Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity, the marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the
previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships.

Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy.
She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the
said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to absence of a valid marriage
license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a coownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the
first marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by
intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before
he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other
than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
Psychological incapacity
REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425
FACTS:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina
Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the
wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few
months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends
and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict
physical injuries to her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC
of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since
Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general
circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and
presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not
he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion
between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the investigating
prosecutors manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The
investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since
he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor
General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the
evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the
CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only
because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.
ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the
husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a
fugitive from justice?
HELD:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more
than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.
In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary
requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently
proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given
an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

DANILO A. AURELIO, PETITIONER, VS. VIDA MA.CORAZON P. AURELIO, RESPONDENT

Facts :Danilo and Vida Ma. Corazon married on March 23, 1988. Four years after, the wife filed for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage alleging that both
she and her husband were suffering psychologicallyincapacity. The root cause of such psychological incapacity being present prior and
even during thetime of the marriage
ceremony was stated and alleged in the complaint by discussing their family backgrounds which was clinically identified by a
competent and expert psychologist
who found thatthe psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is grave,incorrigible
and incurable. Such PI of the husband manifested by lack of financial support; lack of driveand incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife ;
by consistent jealousy and distrust; by alternatedmoods between hostile defiance and contrition; his refusal to assist in the maintenance of the
family,refusal to foot the household bills and provide for his family's needs; by being insensitive to the feelingsof his wife; by
humiliating and embarrassing his wife even in the presence of their children. He alsoexhibited arrogance.The wife, on the other hand, is effusive and
displays her feelings openly and freely which changevery quickly - from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day
experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She
cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what shewants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely.Their hostility
towards each other distorted their relationship which led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological aversion to
cohabit with her husband or to takecare of him. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that itfailed to
meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of theFamily Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations contained in respondent's petition are insufficient to support adeclaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity?
HELD; No. The petition observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198),otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine.
There was allegation of the root cause of the psychologicalincapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent. The manifestation of juridical
antecedence wasalleged. The allegations constituting the gravity of psychological incapacity were also alleged in the petition. The incurability was
likewise alleged. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quotedin the petition. There is a cause of action presented in the
petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Perez Ferraris vs ferraris

Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couples relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for
well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her
life in the company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when
Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to
withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armidas
lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger,
temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent
and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brixs
leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity,
the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family.

ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant in the case at bar.

HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-the-house
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and
lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and
these do not constitute PI. Further, the expert was not able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of
respondents alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that
such disorder can be part of his family upbringing She stated that there was a history of Brixs parents having difficulties in
their relationship- this is of course inconclusive for such has no direct bearing to the case at bar.
What is psychological incapacity?
The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality

disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Courts rely heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained in court.

Tongol vs Tongol
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245, and its Resolution of March 19, 2003, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. The CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 149, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August 27, 1967. Out of their union, they begot
four children, namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born in 1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.
On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, which was
granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over the objection of the latter's family; their marriage
was not a happy one because of her parents' continued interference and attempt to break up their union; greatly influenced
by her parents, Filipinas, even at the early stages of their marriage, already treated Orlando with contempt and without the
love and respect due him as her husband; when Orlando started a junk shop business, Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving
him encouragement; later on, his business became successful and he was able to embark upon another business venture; he
put up a pharmaceutical company which also became profitable; Filipinas then became interested and began to interfere in
the operation of the business; however, because of her bad attitude, the employees were aloof; she also resented the fact
that her husband got along well with the employees; as a result, she quarreled with her husband causing the latter
embarrassment; she even suspected that the income of the business was being given to her husband's relatives; their
continued fighting persisted and affected their children; efforts atreconciliation proved futile because their differences
had become irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas; in 1994,
the spouses filed a petition for dissolution of their property relationship; and the petition was granted in 1995.
In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage
is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando who is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
his obligations as a married man.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza Guevara, an
employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a
psychiatrist who conducted a psychological examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing their
marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision granting the petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the spouses' psychological examination. On the other hand, record
shows that evidence for Filipinas only consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.
On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
1.

2.
3.

WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA. CECILIA VILLEGAS FAILED TO STATE WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT'S INADEQUATE PERSONALITY DISORDER WAS GRAVE, PERMANENT AND INCURABLE
(par. 12, p. 3, Annex A, hereof).
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL (p. 7, ibid.).
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (Annex B, hereof). [2]

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the present case
is enough to sustain a finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[3] the term psychological incapacity was defined as:
[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologiccondition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x[4]
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.[5]
While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[6] wherein
the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 [7] of the Family Code was laid down, this Court finds it
significant to reproduce the same quoted portion, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of
the
court.
The
Solicitor
General
shall
discharge
the
equivalent
function
of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[8]
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[9] which took effect
on March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines have been modified. Section 2(d) of the said Rule provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.xxxx
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor General, stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition to the petition. Attachment of expert opinions to the petition is also dispensed with.
In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas, that
respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder. However, both courts ruled that the behavior exhibited by
respondent does not amount to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC and the CA for the following reasons:
First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who made the following written evaluation regarding respondent's
psychological makeup:
xxxx
On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a matriarchal family where the mother
assumed a more active and dominant role. She was left to the care of her aunt and developed a basic feeling
a (sic) rejection.
The only college graduate among 7 children her operating intellectual ability is low-average. Sudden change
overwhelmed her. When seized by an impulse, she is likely to give way, even minor pressures upset her and
when this happens, emotional control could not be relied upon.
In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their employees, especially with females, she
became (sic) suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and this is related to her basic feelings of rejection in early
life. She coped (sic) up with her uncomfortable feelings by exhibiting temper tantrums, irritability and
dominance, a replica of her mother's attitude, but to the distaste of her husband.
At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the expectation of further rejection.
Additionally, she is threatened by a neurological illness (tremor of the hands) for which she is consulting a
neurologist.
Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr. Orlando Tongol is suffering from
some depressive features, which seems to be a recent development as a result of marital problems. On the
other hand, Mrs. Tongol is suffering from an Inadequate Personality Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which
renders her psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. She is
unable to cope with the sudden work and environmental shifts, that overwhelmed her, due to insufficient
psychological inner resources.[10]

The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of Dr. Villegas that as a child, Filipinas had always felt rejected,
especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those feelings of rejection even when she became an adult and got
married; that her fits of jealousy and temper tantrums, every time she sees her husband having a good interaction with their

employees, are ways of coping up with her feelings of rejection. However, Dr. Villegas failed to link respondent's personality
disorder to her conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her obligations as wife and mother. The
Court cannot see how respondent's personality disorder which, according to Dr. Villegas, is inextricably linked to her feelings
of rejection, would render her unaware of the essential marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos, to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. What has been established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of inadequacy and rejection,
respondent not only encounters a lot of difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her obligations towards her husband,
such as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court hasruled that psychological incapacity must be more than just
a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. [13] As held in Santos:
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated.[14]
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of respondent is grave enough to
bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner contends that respondent's exaggerated
reactions to normal situations, her unreasonable feelings of rejection brought about by her dysfunctional upbringing, are all
indications of the gravity of her psychological condition. Even granting that respondent's psychological disorder is serious, the
fact remains that there is no evidence to prove that such condition is of such nature as to render respondent incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation nor in her testimony did Dr.
Villegas categorically and conclusively characterize respondent's inadequate personality disorder as permanent or
incurable. Dr. Villegas wasnot sure of the permanence or incurability of respondent's illness as shown by her following
statement:
I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from (sic) both of
them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also
suffering from some depression, Sir.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses.[16] The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the psychological incapacity as understood under Article 36
of the Family Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In the present case, the testimonies of both petitioner and
respondent as well as the other witnesses regarding the spouses' differences and misunderstanding basically revolve around
and are limited to their disagreement regarding the management of their business. In fact, respondent herself, in her
Memorandum submitted to the trial court, claimed that their quarrels arose solely from their disagreement on how to run their
business.[17] This is confirmed by the testimony of petitioner's sister who lived with the spouses for a considerable period of
time.[18] However, a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.[19]
In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under the Family Code include the mutual
responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and provide support for the family, which means that compliance with
this obligation necessarily entails the management of the income and expenses of the household. While disagreements on
money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one's marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not
a sufficient ground to declare a marriage null and void. In the present case, respondent's disagreement with her husband's
handling of the family's business and finances and her propensity to start a fight with petitioner spouse regarding these
matters can hardly be considered as a manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of
the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common,
and even normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.
Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also one's obligation toward their
children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that respondent had been remiss in performing her
obligations toward their children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. [20]
It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefor manifest themselves.[21] It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage.[22] It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. [23] In the instant case, the Court finds no error in the findings
of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the aversive behavior of petitioner and respondent towards each other is a mere
indication of incompatibility brought about by their different family backgrounds as well as their attitudes, which developed
after their marriage.
In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder. However, the totality of the evidence
presented in the present case does not show that her personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by Article 36 of the
Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of
married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. [24] Hence, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. [25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision and March 19, 2003 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.

SANTOS VS. CA AND BEDIA-SANTOS

FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a
municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia
Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel
over a number of things aside from the interference of Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called
her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a
chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch
with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of
Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law
nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
__________
Notes:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

ANTONIO VS REYES G.R. NO. 155800

FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on December 8, 1990. A child was born in
April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no longer take her constant lying, insecurities and jealousies over him so he
separated from her in August 1991. He attempted reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for
good in November 1991. Only after their marriage that he learned about her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented was insufficient to establish
Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not been satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and,
generally, under the Molina guidelines.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that
constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife's
behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.

The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the
primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to
her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a
world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her psychological incapacity was
have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to
the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by the
Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical courts, that are
accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remains
unchanged.
Toring vs. Toring & Republic Digest
Ricardo P. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring and Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010
Justice Brion
Facts: Ricardo and Teresita were married and had 3 children. Ricardo then filed a petition for annulment based on Teresita
psychological incapacity. He alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. The doctor who performed the
psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo and their son, Richardson, testified that the major factor that contributed to
the demise of the marriage is Teresita Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her incapable to fulfill her essential
marital obligations.
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient basis to declare Ricardo and Teresita marriage void due to psychological incapacity.
Held: No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to "no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."
It is not acceptable that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the
psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that
Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
SILVINO A. LIGERALDE vs. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG, ET. AL.G.R. NO. 168796, April 15, 2010
Private acts of living an adulterous life does not rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that the lawrequires
.There must be a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completelyunable to discharge theessential
obligations of the marital state, not just character flaws that warrant a conclusion of psychological malady.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This petition seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed theDecision of the RegionalTrial
Court of Dagupan City (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner Silvino A. Ligeralde (Silvino) and privaterespondent
May Ascension A.Patalinghug (May) null and void.The couple wed on October 3, 1984, and begot four children. Silvino, who
described May asimmature, irresponsibleand carefree, claimed that even before marriage he already noticed somesigns of
negative marital behavior. Duringtheir marriage, he caught her in moments of infidelity,as she would cover up her trysts with
her Palestinian boyfriendby saying that she watched avideo program in a neighboring town. They would also have alterations
despite his pleasof her changing her ways. Despite May's attempt of reformation for the sake of their marriage andchildren,
she stillbounced back to her old ways of infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, thus leading Silvino to filing acomplaint
of psychological incapacity on the part of his wife.
ISSUE
Whether May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
RULING
No, the Courts considered view that petitioners evidence failed to establish respondent Mays psychological
incapacity characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. The facts of petitioner were not sufficient to
prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of private respondents condition. Even with the testimony of the
psychologist, Dr. Nicdao-Basilio, the root cause of psychological incapacity was not identified, as the illness shouldbe
fullyexplained in the totality of evidence of the incapacitating nature. In addition, the private acts of living anadulterous life
does not rise to the l
evel of the psychological incapacity that the lawrequires. There must be a

manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completelyunable to discharge the essential obligations ofthe
marital state, not just character flaws thatwarrant a conclusion of psychological malady. Petition is denied
republic vs galang
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), challenging the
decision[2] dated November 25, 2004 and the resolution[3] dated May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
70004. The challenged decision affirmed the decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Angeles City, declaring
the marriage of Nestor Galang (respondent) and Juvy Salazar null and void on the ground of the latters psychological
incapacity. The assailed resolution denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. They resided in the house of the respondents
father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The respondent worked as an artist-illustrator at the Clark Development
Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at home as a housewife. They have one child,
Christopher.
On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler.
Heclaimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often asked money from their friends and relatives on the
pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from mental deficiency, innate
immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their] child. He posited that
Juvys incapacity was extremely serious and appears to be incurable. [5]
The RTC ordered the city prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties. Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama
formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case
for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his
allegations.
In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not want to wake
up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors care; and Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought
him there.[6]
The respondent further stated that Juvy squandered the P15,000.00 he entrusted to her. He added that Juvy stole his ATM
card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing his (the respondents) fathers pension. He, likewise, stated
that he caught Juvy playing mahjong and kuwaho three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their
relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a hospital. [7]
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she
conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but
the latter did not respond.[8] In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured individual.
He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations but manifest[s] a very
low frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests
suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of selfesteem and gained emotional tensions caused by his wifes behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being
very irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in
gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and
personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her
immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to
perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few
reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be
incorrigible.
xxx
The following incidents are the reasons why the couple separated:
1.

After the marriage took place, the incapacity of the defendant was manifested on such
occasions wherein the plaintiff was the one who prepared his breakfast, because the defendant
doesnt want to wake up early; this became the daily routine of the plaintiff before reporting to
work;

2.

After reporting from work, the defendant was often out gambling, as usual, the plaintiff was the
one cooking for supper while the defendant was very busy with her gambling activities and
never attended to her husbands needs;

3.

There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the public market because of the
irresponsible attitude of the defendant;

4.

That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders, there was an occasion
wherein the defendant [would] steal money from the plaintiff and use them for gambling;

5.

Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after their marriage took place, wherein
the defendant would come with stories so that people [would] feel pity on her and give her
money. Through false pretenses she [would] be able to deceive and take money from neighbors,
relatives and other people.

6.

That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her unhealthy lifestyle (gambling), but the
defendant never listened to his advices;

7.

That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their son, when the plaintiff will leave
for work, the defendant [would] entrust their son to their neighbor and go [to] some place. This
act reflects the incapacity of the defendant by being an irresponsible mother;

8.

That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal home that resulted into the couples
separation.

Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral
disorders. These disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing money.
She doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.
The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents and start a new life again and hoping
she would change. Tried to get attention back by showing her with special care, treating her to places for a
weekend vacation, cook[ing] her favorite food, but the defendant didnt care to change, she did not prepare
meals, wash clothes nor clean up. She neglected her duties and failed to perform the basic obligations as a
wife.
So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it is my humble opinion that there is
sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties as a wife and mother to their only son. [9]
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies
of the respondent and the psychologist, and concluded that:
After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting
evidence, this Court is convinced that as held in Santos case, the psychological incapacity of respondent to
comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which Dr. Gerardo Veloso said
can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of
marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and
work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject
before marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if
treatments required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of
the subject are all obtaining in this case.
xxxx
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
instant
petition
is
granted
and the marriage between petitioner and defendant is herebydeclared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.[10]
The CA Decision
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision
datedNovember 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
The CA held that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It explained that
Juvys indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with her acts of gambling and swindling, undermined her capacity
to comply with her marital obligations. In addition, the psychologist characterized Juvys condition to be permanent, incurable
and existing at the time of the celebration of her marriage with the respondent. [11]
The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated May 9, 2005.[12]
The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was insufficient to
establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations. The petitioner additionally argues that

the respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys condition. [13] The respondent took
the exact opposite view.
The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her
essential marital obligations.
The Courts Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to grant the
petition,
and
hold
that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage on the groundof psychological incapacity under the terms of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [16] We
laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, whose salient points are footnoted below.[17] These guidelines
incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos.[18]
In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos,[19] we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion
in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. Thereafter, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) [20] which provided that the
complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of
the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te [21] placed some cloud in the continued
applicability of the time-tested Molina[22] guidelines. We stated in this case that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molinaunintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and
be bound by it. This is contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be considered as
completely on "all fours" with another.
Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting[23] and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo,[24] however, laid to rest any
question regarding the continued applicability of Molina.[25] In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te[26] did not abandon Molina.
[27]
Far from abandoning Molina,[28] Ngo Te[29] simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained
that Suazo[30] that Ngo Te[31] merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity. [32]
The Present Case
In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondents evidence the testimonies
of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological report and evaluation insufficient to prove Juvys
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
a.

The respondents testimony

The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their
child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the
respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his
account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order to borrow money
from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.
These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. We stress
that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations.In Republic
of
the
Philippines
v.
Norma
Cuison-Melgar,
et
al.,
[33]
we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing sobecause of some psychological, not physical,
illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage had to be shown.[34] A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the
psychological incapacity.
The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted in
some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her essential marital
obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility,
resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. In Ricardo B.
Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,[35] we emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as these may
only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some
psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.

In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to encash a check, of stealing the respondents ATM,
and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible,
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these were
mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for playing mahjong and kuwaho for money, nor
her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child was sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a
mental malady at the time of the celebration of marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and
obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers
to as swindling) only two (2) years after their marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances.
The evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to augment the familys income during the early stages of their marriage by
putting up a sari-sari store and by working as a manicurist.
b.

The Psychologists Report

The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that Juvy
was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time required by Article 36 of the
Family Code.
To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from the
information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description of Juvy would contain a considerable
degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description alone can hardly be considered as
credible or sufficient. We are of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos[36] that the person sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as a condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If
the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to
support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologists examination and report. In this case,
however, no such independent evidence has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent
sources who intimately knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference and
could have added weight to the psychologists report.
Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply stressed Juvys negative traits
which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; her
involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to change), and declared that psychological
findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders x x x she doesnt manifest any
sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be incorrigible. [37] In the end, the
psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for herconclusion that there is sufficient reason to believe that the
defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son. [38]
We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did not even
identify
the
types
of
psychological
tests which she administered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys psychological condition. We alsostress that the
acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the marriage; there was no showing that any mentaldisorder
existed at the inception of the marriage. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition,
specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties.
Significantly, the report did not even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder found. Finally, the report
failed to establish the incurability of Juvys condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy lacks the initiative to change and
that her mental incapacity appears incorrigible [39] are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
c. The Psychologists Testimony
The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or incurability of Juvys
alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report i.e., that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible;
played mahjongand kuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her
child without linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again, these allegations, even if true, all occurred during the
marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvys early life and associations, how she acted
before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the
psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of
the celebration of the marriage.
She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. In these respects, she merely
stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this premise, she
jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure. These unfounded
conclusions cannotbe equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. To be declared clinically
or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed,
psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [40]
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at
the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage lies with the plaintiff. [41]Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them,

could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it
was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie. [42]
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25, 2004 and May 9, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004.
Accordingly, weDISMISS respondent Nestor Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs against respondent Nestor Galang.
Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their
college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided
to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering
that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month;
he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home.
Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house
unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed
with his parents. Edwards parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a
separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the
latters psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician,
if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show
a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly
shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential
marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she
had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
Halili v. Halili G.R. No. 165424 June 6, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona Santos-Halili null and void on the
basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in
civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife. However, they
started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other
women. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."
ISSUE:
Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological
incapacity.
RULINGS:

In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court reiterated that courts should interpret
the provision on psychological incapacity on a case-to-case basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive
behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily
hurt
by
others'
comments.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make
everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions
(such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or
doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and
had a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological
incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage and thus the Court declared
the marriage null and void.
Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-41132, 160 SCRA 821 , April 27, 1988
VICTORINO HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SUBSTITUTED HEIRS OF REV. FR. LUCIO V. GARCIA
(DECEASED). respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
To those prevented by fraud from proving their title to land subject of registration proceedings in another's name, the law
affords the remedy of review of the decree of registration by petition in the land registration court within one year from its
issuance of the order. 1 This was the remedy availed of by Victorino Hernandez, but as he could convince neither the Court of
First Instance of Rizal nor the Court of Appellants 2 of the merits of his petition, he failed in his bid to reopen and correct the
decree in Land Registration Case No. N-2488 Fr. Lucio V. Garcia the absolute owner of three parcels of land in
Paraaque. 3 This Court however finds that upon the recorded facts, the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought.
Fr. Garcia 4 applied in 1959 for the registration in his name of Lots 1-A, 1-B, and 2 of Plan Psu-172410-B in Bo. San Dionisio,
Paraaque. His property adjoined that of Hernandez, and since both estates were once owned by one Andres San
Buenaventura, 5 no dividing boundaries existed thereon until cadastral surveyors from the Bureau of Lands laid down official
monuments to mark the separation of the lots. These monuments were set along a line which the landowners had previously
agreed upon as representing the correct boundary between their estates. This was in 1956. 6
Unknown to Hernandez, the Advance Plan Psu-172410-B submitted in Fr. Garcia's behalf to the land registration court in 1959
included 220 square meters of land now disputed Lots ABC and 4057-A of Lot 1-B. This area fell beyond the stipulated
boundaries of Fr. Garcia's land and encroached pro tanto on the land of Hernandez (on which, it should be mentioned, his
tenants had been living for many years [decades, in fact] before the date of Fr. Garcia's application). 7 Allegedly lulled into
complacency by the recentness of their agreement as to the limits of their respective properties, and confident that the
visible landmarks installed by the government surveyors precluded any overstepping of those limits, Hernandez proffered no
opposition to Fr. Garcia's application, leaving the heirs of Andres San Buenaventura as the only oppositors thereto.
It was not until the court had already ordered the registration of the lots in Fr. Garcia's name that Hernandez discovered the
anomaly in the application. He at once filed a petition for review of the decree, but in view of the new trial ordered by the
court upon motion of the heirs-oppositors, the petition was dismissed on the ground of prematurity. 8 The court thereafter
adjudged Fr. Garcia as the owner of Lots 1-A and 2 and the heirs-oppositors as owners of Lot 1-B.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals declared Fr. Garcia absolute owner, by acquisitive prescription, of an the lots. This
judgment became final on December 9, 1970; Decree No. 132620 was issued by the CFI of Rizal, and the Register of Deeds
issued OCT No. 8664 in Fr. Garcia's name. 9
Hernandez promptly refiled his petition for the reopening of the decree. He argued that the decree covered a substantial
portion of his land to which Fr. Garcia could claim no title. He averred anew that the Advance Plan supporting the application
was "irregular, because it disregarded the existing Bureau of Lands monuments designating the actual possessions of the
petitioner and the applicant" and "falsely designates (other) ... boundaries ... not actually marked by any ... monuments, thus
fraudulently giving the false impression to petitioner that no alteration has actually been made in originally agreed-upon
boundaries in the course of the preparation of (the) Plan." Thus having been "misled to believe that no encroachment has
been made by applicant," and "conscious of the previous agreement and the fact that the Bureau of Lands monuments have
not been altered." Hernandez had put up no objection to the application. 10
As stated at the outset, the trial court dismissed Hernandez's petition, 11 and the appellate court gave his appeal short
shrift. 12 Both courts were of the view essentially that the evidence did not bear out the claim of fraud; that under the Statute
of Frauds, the parties' covenant as to their properties' metes and bounds was unenforceable since it was not reduced to
writing; and that Hernandez's parents and predecessors-in-interest, 13Victorino and Tranquilino, acquired title by purchase
from San Buenaventura to only 516 square meters of land, which could not have included the disputed property. 14
Ordinarily, the Appellate Court's factual conclusions are not reviewable by this Court, 15and since here those conclusions are
decidedly adverse to Hernandez, the application of the rule should result in a verdict against him. The rule admits of
exceptions, however, as when facts of substance were overlooked by the appellate court which, if correctly considered, might
have changed the outcome of the case. 16
In this case there are several pivotal facts about which there is no controversy whatever, it may be added which clearly
should have been weighed by the court a quoin Hernandez's favor, but inexplicably were not. It is of record, to begin with,
that concrete monuments or "majones" were laid out by government surveyors in 1956 between the properties of Hernandez
and Fr. Garcia. Hernandez avows that these structures were purposely installed to mark the limits of their estates; his
opponents could only let this statement pass with telling silence. Neither did they seriously dispute that these "mojones" were
installed along the line agreed upon by the parties as marking their properties' boundaries. All they averred in their defense is

that the agreement did not bind them. Lastly, they freely conceded the presence of a fence along this line, but were quick to
point out that they had merely "permitted" Hernandez to put up this "temporary" structure "to stop the public (from) using ...
this place as a common madden shed." The excuse is lamentably feeble.
Hernandez argues that if indeed the Advance Plan, basis of Fr. Garcia's application, was prepared without regard to the
boundary indicated by the fence and the surveyors markers, and worse, "falsely designate(d) as boundaries the lines marked
by ... corners not actually marked by any Bureau of Lands monuments" which purposely left the mistaken impression that the
exact limits of the adjoining estates had been faithfully drawn, then he was truly a victim of fraud, deftly cheated of the
chance to vindicate his claim to the land. The respondents again did not care to refute the premises on which the argument is
predicated. In any event, the argument is entirely in accord with the evidence and the norms of logic.
Lastly, the Appellate Court may have been convinced of the impossibility of the inclusion of the disputes lot in the 516 square
meters stated as sold to Hernandez's parents in the deed of sale in their favor, 17 but only because the Court missed sight of
the fact that the adjoining lots sold to the spouses and to Fr. Garcia were unregistered and unsurveyed at the time of the
transfer. This explains the discrepancy between the area of the land purportedly conveyed to the Hernandezes in the
instrument (516 square meters) and the actual area falling within the boundaries described in the same document, which,
after the survey, was found to be 716 square meters. The respondents cannot hold Hernandez to the approximate area fixed
in the deed and claim ownership over the excess. All the land embraced within the stated boundaries was sold. 18 If the
respondent insist on the figures named in the deeds of sale, then they themselves stand to lose 736 square meters of land.
San Buenaventura had only sold 1,545 square meters to Fr. Garcia, 19 but the estate was later found to be actually 2,328
square meters in area. 20
Given the weight they deserve, the recorded facts prove Hernandez's entitlement to the relief sought. The respondents'
reliance on the Statute of Frauds to secure a contrary judgment is misplaced. The Statute of Frauds finds no application to this
case. Not every agreement "affecting land" must be put in writing to attain enforceability. Under the Statute of Frauds, Article
1403(2) (e) of the Civil Code, such formality is only required of contracts involving leases for longer than one year, or for the
sale of real property or of an interest therein. Hernandez's testimony is thus admissible to establish his agreement with Fr.
Garcia as to the boundary of their estates. It is also to be noted that the presence of Hernandez's tenants on the land within
his side of the border, were this to be reckoned from the "mojones," further buttresses his claim.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate more than adequately that the inclusion of the 220-square-meter area in the
Original Certificate of Title No. 8664 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal is null and void.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another one entered,
ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to register the 220 square meters in question in favor of petitioner Victorino
Hernandez; and to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 8664 and issue a new one in favor of the private respondents
excluding said 220-square-meter area belonging to the petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found
petitioner Digna A. Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but not annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts are as follows:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains.[1]
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in
the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar, Jr. at the Saint
Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan. [2] They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage as
shown by the following facts:
(a)
At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services Division of the
Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough effort to find a job and was
dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able
to land a job as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
(b)
While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and she had
to rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.

(c)
As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In May 1989, when he
came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of having an affair with

another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it. When she refused, he insulted her and
uttered unprintable words against her.He would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk.
(d)
When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been happening every year, he
quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, while
he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a
bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body. She
was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police Station.
(e)
Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his mother at
Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole administrator of their
conjugalproperties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1) declaring their marriage void ab initio in
accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and respondent
pursuant to Title II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of petitioner and
respondent and the forfeiture in
favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code; and
(4) granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by publication as
provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer [3] wherein he denied the material allegations in the petition and
averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of infidelity. He
claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. As counterclaim, respondent prayed
for the award of P200,000.00 as moral damages, P45,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P1,000.00 as appearance fee for every
scheduled hearing.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order [4] terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal
Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally
their conjugal properties.
On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting that after conducting
an investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the parties. [5] The initial hearing of the case was held on
November 23, 1998.
Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist
Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
Bugallon, Pangasinan.
Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a government
agency in Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by their marriage contract. [6] At the time of
their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the
Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of P5,000.00. It was petitioners brother who helped respondent
find a job as a seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was employed as a seaman,
and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of P1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went home in 1989 and then returned
to work after three months. Every time respondent was home, he quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an
affair with another man. Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the house
and returned home, he was drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that respondent was involved in drugs. [7]
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they constructed a
house on the lot.[8]
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioners sister. Respondent,
however, did not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home at around midnight, petitioner asked him
about the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with, but he did not answer her. Instead, respondent
went to the kitchen. She asked him again about what happened at the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she
was the one having an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to be bloodied. When she opened her
eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, and he attempted to kill her. However, she was able to parry his attack with her left
arm, causing her to sustain injuries on different parts of her body. When respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got
nervous and went out. After 10 minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she had gone
out and was hiding from him. When she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place and proceeded to
Gomez Street toward the highway. At the highway, she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a clinic or
hospital. She alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her
wounds. After a few hours, she went home.[9]

When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were residing about 300 meters
away.She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in order to open the door. She found that their
personal belongings were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card and jewelry.[10]
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan. [11]
Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner
learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment from him. [12]
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while respondents parents were separated. Respondents
brothers were also separated from their respective wives.[13]
Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent.[14]
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was abroad. She
confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:
It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are rooted in
the kind of family background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and separated from Respondents
father. This turn of events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from his alcoholic and
marijuana habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a double bind where he both deeply loved and
resented his mother.
His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an offshoot of
deep-seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to resolve his childhood
conflicts and anger, he turned to his wife as the scapegoat for all his troubles.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline Personality
Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and
self-destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses.Eduardo Najeras psychological impairment as traced
to his parents separation, aggravated by the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his
marriage to Petitioner Digna Aldana.
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause irreparable
damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior across time render his
impairment grave and irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is recommended that parties marriage be
annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part of Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume
his marital duties and responsibilities to Digna Aldana-Najera. [15]
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondents psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the
composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with
borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses. [16]
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he
received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and mauled
petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police
blotter.[17]
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner and
respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.

Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and respondent/defendant

Eduardo Najera;

2.

Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff and

respondent/defendant, and to divide the same equally between themselves pursuant to their
Joint Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998. [18]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution [19] dated May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment of the Trial Court is
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs[20]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5, 2004.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1.

The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.

2.

The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent
Eduardo Najera.

3.

The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is practically the same
set of facts established by petitioners evidence submitted before the trial court and therefore the same
conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.
Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert in
Psychology.[21]

4.

The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.[22]
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent which
is his dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
The Court is not persuaded.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." [24] The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. [25] In
fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."[26] What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. [27]
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed
to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical
violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondents abandonment of petitioner without
justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation [30] only and not for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February 11, 2004, twelve days before the
decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7
in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
Petitioners argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered
the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioners motion for
reconsideration. In the saidResolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this
Court and correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded
to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which
include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999,
he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in
absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty
required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting
marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby
rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a
child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have
broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he]
identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends,
already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he
could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he
also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married
and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until
one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that
wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked
the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the
Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the
sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the
ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitionerappellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitionerappellants mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates
(psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the
respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before
the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never
presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latters testimonies, this Court is without
any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that
the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the
Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid
should be decreed civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the
Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of
evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented
before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find
no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court. [31]
Santos v. Santos[32] cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted
the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1.
2.

those who lack sufficient use of reason;

those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3.

those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the
second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in
effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate
Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon
contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering
nugatory his marital contractx x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name
and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby
proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of
the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of
Canon Law. x x x
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological
incapacity of respondent.Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the
psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated February
23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Brenda Marcos vs Wilson Marcos (G.R. No. 136490)
FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to
provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the
nullity of the marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and
void under Article 36 which was however reversed by the Court of Appeals
ISSUES: 1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a
declaration
of
psychological
incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.
HELD: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidencepresented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditionsince qua non for such declaration.Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may haveresorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his
acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on hispart. There is absolutely no showing that his defects
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they areincurable.Verily, the behavior of respondent can be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for aperiod of more than six years. It was during
this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,and even left the
family home.Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage.
Equallyimportant, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as
a taxi driver.In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychologicalincapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined inMolina.

republic v. Molina (Case Digest)

268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997
1.

Panganiban

Facts : On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of
marriage, Reynaldo show signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to spend more time
with his friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances
resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which
was affirmed by CA.
Issue : Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personality constitute psychological incapacity?
Ruling : There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more of a
difficulty if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence merely adduced that Roridel and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing
of the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:

The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically of clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes.
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220,221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven be evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from the 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
Judgment reversed and set aside.