Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2015
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145368. April 12, 2002]
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 constituting a Committee for the preparation of the
National Centennial Celebration in 1998. The Committee was mandated to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National
Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.[1]
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998. It renamed the Committee as the National Centennial Commission. Appointed to chair the reconstituted
Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary
Chairpersons.[2]
Characterized as an ad-hoc body, the existence of the Commission shall terminate upon the completion of all activities related to the
Centennial Celebrations.[3] Like its predecessor Committee, the Commission was tasked to take charge of the nationwide preparations for
the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos
Congress.
Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the responsibility to prepare, for approval of the President, a
Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Executive Order.
E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support by a Secretariat to be composed of, among others,
detailed personnel from the Presidential Management Staff, the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and the National Historical
Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by a full time Executive Director who shall be designated by the President.
Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the Department of Tourism and the presidents Contingent
Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the Commission, and approved by the President. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be
incorporated in the budget of the Office of the President.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created.[4] Petitioner was among the
nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the
construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin
Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue
Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.
On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent citizens
committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial projects, including its component activities.
Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee.
On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report No. 30 dated
February 26, 1999. Among the Committees recommendations was the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of
NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction &
Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring)
even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit
by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law.[5]
Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended the further investigation by the Ombudsman,
and indictment, in proper cases of, among others, NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a)
in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently referred to the Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of
the Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:
1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
(EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. Pea
and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules
and Regulations;
2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal complainant.[6]
In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, directed
petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses.
On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office.
In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion to dismiss.
On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the motion was denied in an Order dated October 5,
2000.
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"DMCI ito. They are a mining company. If they can make Semirara Island disappear, they can make that building disappear. DMCI is very
good in demolishing things. They are into mining... To tear down is not a technological impossibility. Kayang kaya nila iyon," he claimed in
an interview with GMA News TV's "News To Go" on Wednesday.
DMCI Holdings Inc., the parent of DMCI homes, also holds the exclusive rights to explore, mine and develop the coal resources in the 5,500hectare Semirara Island in Caluya, Antique. Other minerals on the island are limestone and silica.
Celdran issued his statement after the Supreme Court imposed a temporary restraining order suspending the construction of Torre de
Manila.
The high-rise condominium is already 30.7 percent complete, with ongoing structural activities at the 32nd floor, according to DMCI's
construction update as of December 19, 2014.
According to the "Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and other Personages" of the National Historical
Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), vista points and visual corridors to monuments should be clear for "unobstructed viewing
appreciation and photographic opportunities."
But DMCI also broke the zoning laws, Celdran pointed out.
"The real problem here is that they broke the zoning laws. Iyong floor-to-height ratio diyan, kailangan seven stories high lang... May permit
sila, but we need to investigate how they got those papers," he said.
Also a tour guide of Manila, Celdran said that most of the tourists he encountered so far frowned upon Torre de Manila.
"Some people say that this would never happen in their country. If they have a national hero and a national monument, they would never
allow a large corporation or the whims of a rich man do something like this," he said.
Celdran lauded the SC ruling since it showed that the Filipino people can go after large corporations and their mistakes.
"The thing I like about this TRO is that it showed the Filipino people that oligarchs or large corporations like this can be questioned, can be
stopped, and can be taken to task for things that they do and abuses that they do," he added. Trisha Macas/VS, GMA News
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ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO,
RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of
2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau
of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system
of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the
Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the
BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic
Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy
Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their
recognized organization.6
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and
procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate
personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other
functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and
regulations of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They
contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and
incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system
should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient
standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if
their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead,
the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to
fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of
the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being premature as there is no actual
case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this Courts jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They
assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law.
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Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through
which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately
related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.
Undue Delegation
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is
complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot.27 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in
carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing"29 the delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be
sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the
Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:
Excess of Collection of the Excess the Revenue Targets
Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to Accrue to the Fund
30% or below
15%
More than 30%
15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the revenue collection target was
exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in
the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to
the DBCC the distribution of the agencies revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection
districts in the case of the BOC.
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Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year
as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets
does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Boards authority and identifies the conditions under which officials and employees
whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:
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(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target
by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the
rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, as has no historical record of
collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under consideration unless the
transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when
the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought
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Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of
tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due
process is accorded the employee.31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection
falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is
analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws.32
The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and
welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare."33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
Separation Of Powers
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven
Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by
the Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus
officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law
may be considered moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on
Elections34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over
the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to
monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate
executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent
in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the perceived "exponential accumulation of
power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority
to the executive branch and the administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative
agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated to them. x x x x x x x x x
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny,
investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to
determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request
information and report from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the
agency involved.
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b. Congressional investigation
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Footnotes
* Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers.
1 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2 An Act to Improve Revenue Collection Performance of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) Through
the Creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and of a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board and for Other Purposes.
3 Section 2, RA 9335.
4 Section 3, id.
5 Section 4, id.
6 Section 6, id.
7 Section 7, id.
8 Section 11, id.
9 Section 12, id.
10 Cruz, Isagani, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1995 edition, p. 23.
11 Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 edition, pp. 848-849.
12 Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904 (2000). (Vitug, J., separate opinion)
13 See La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 01 December 2004, 445 SCRA 1.
14 Taada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997).
15 Section 2, id.
16 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, 15 December 2004, 446 SCRA 299.
17 173 U.S. 381 (1899).
18 74 U.S. 166 (1868).
19 Blacks Law Dictionary, Special De Luxe 5th Edition, West, p. 481.
20 158 Phil. 60 (1974).
21 Id. Citations omitted.
22 Ambros v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 159700, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 572.
23 Section 2, RA 9335.
24 Section 18, Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987.
25 Section 23, id.
26 Pelaez v. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965 (1965).
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Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-sixth day of July, two thousand four.
Republic Act No. 9335
AN ACT TO IMPROVE THE REVENUE COLLECTION PERFORMANCE OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR) AND THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS (BOC) THROUGH THE CREATION OF A REWARDS AND INCENTIVES FUND AND OF A REVENUE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
BOARD AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "Attrition Act of 2005".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 3. Coverage. The system of rewards, incentives and sanctions provided in this Act shall cover all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC, regardless of employment status, with at least six months of service.
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Promulgated:
August 9, 2006
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DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1] dated October 11, 2002
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17235, affirming in toto an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City,
Branch 17, which found herein petitioners guilty of the crime of libel.
The antecedent facts:
On March 24, 1992, in the RTC of Davao City, the city prosecutor of Davao, at the instance of one Aproniano Rivera, filed an Information[2]
for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code against the herein petitioners, Tony N. Figueroa and Rogelio J.
Flaviano. Docketed in the same court as Criminal Case No. 25,957-92 and raffled to Branch 17 thereof, the Information alleges as follows:
That on or about April 9, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, Tony VN. Figueroa, writer under the column entitled Footprints of the People's Daily Forum, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another with his co-accused Rogelio J. Flaviano, Publisher-Editor of the same magazine, with malicious intent of impeaching the
honesty, integrity, character as well as the reputation and the social standing of one Aproniano Rivera and with intent to cast dishonor,
discredit and contempt upon said Aproniano Rivera, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously published in the People's Daily Forum, a news
publication as follows:
Bangkerohan public market these days is no different from the US Times Square. Bullies, thugs, hooligans and gyppers roam with impunity,
some using organizational clout as a ploy to keep themselves from obvious exposure. Some leeches, like a certain Aproniano Rey Rivera,
our sources say, are lording it over like the city's sprawling vegetable and meat complex has become an apportioned bailiwick.
Rivera, apparently a non-Visayan pseudobully flaunting with his tag as president of a vendor's federation, has intimated a good number of
lowly hawkers. This is a confirmed fact, our sources believe. And our independent eveasdroppers [sic] have come with a similar perception
of a man who continues to lead a federation when, in the first place, he has no business being in Davao or in Bankerohan.
Often, Mr. Re (King?) Rivera strolls the stretches which criss-cross the Bankerohan confines with the arrogance of a tribal chieftain; the only
differences, however, are that: he uses no G-strings, speaks in some strange Luzon lingo and twang, and has no solid leadership. Our
reports have finely outlined the mechanics of Rivera's tactics despite assertions the man is nothing but a paper tiger conveniently propped
up by federation members loyal to his sometime indecent role as a sachem.
This man, the sources add, is backed by powerful city government hooligans who, it was reported, have direct hand in the planned
manipulation in the distribution of stalls to privileged applicants. Even if he has reportedly sold his interest in the public market, which
should be reason enough for him to resign from his position, Rivera still carries the false aura of intimidating poor vendors and imposing his
insensible remarks about what must be done about the governance of Bangkerohan.
Sometimes its hard to compel a man with Rivera's mind about the nuances of honorable resignation. May iba d'yan na pakapalan na lang ng
mukha!
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Rivera, however, must be consoled in knowing he's not alone with his dirty antics. Romy Miclat, a president of a meat vendors group in
Bankerohan, and his board member, Erning Garcia, have tacitly followed the way of the thugs, floating little fibs to gullible victims. Our
moles have gathered the due are seeling [sic] the new public market stalls for P9,000 with the assurances that the buyer gets a display area
ordinarily occupied by two applicants. A lot more have fallen prey to the scheme, and more the blindly swallowing all the books the two are
peddling.
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Having been exposed to embarrassment and ridicule occasioned by the publication of the subject article, Rivera is entitled to moral
damages and attorney's fees.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision dated October 11, 2002 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador concurring, Rollo,
pp. 39-62.
[2] Rollo, pp. 68-70.
[3] Rollo, pp. 71-88.
[4] Supra note 1.
[5] 27 Phil 52 (1914).
[6] MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 210, 218-219.
[7] Sazon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120715, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 692, 698.
[8] Laurel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002, 381 SCRA 48, 61-62.
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Footnotes
1 Angara v. The Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
2 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. xxxiv, citing Miller, Lectures on the
Constitution of the United States 64 (1893); 1 Schwartz, The Powers of Government 1 (1963).
3 Cruz, Philippine Political law, 2002 ed. p. 12.
4 Id.
5 Resolution dated August 24, 2010 consolidating G.R. No. 192935 with G.R. No. 193036, rollo, pp. 87-88.
6 Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
7 Biraogo Petition, p. 5, rollo, p. 7.
8 Salvador Laurel v. Hon. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002, citing F.R. Mechem, A Treatise On The Law of Public Offices and
Officers.
9 International Center for Transitional Justice, <http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/138.html> visited November 20, 2010.
10Freeman, The Truth Commission and Procedural Fairness, 2006 Ed., p. 12, citing Hayner, UnspeakableTruths: Facing the Challenge of
Truth Commissions.
11International Center for Transitional Justice, supra note 9.
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also
96 McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 367.
97 Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wash. 2d 211 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), pp. 367-368 .
98 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 US 425 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 371.
99 Hunter v. Flowers, 43 So 2d 435 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 370.
100 Clements v. Fashing, 457 US 957.
101 See Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), pp. 370-371, as footnote (A state legislature may, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, address a
problem one step at a time, or even select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. [Jeffeson v. Hackney,
406 US 535].
102 McDonald v. Board of Election Comrs of Chicago, 394 US 802 cited in Am Jur 2d, Footnote No. 9.
103 Ricketts v. City of Hardford, 74 F. 3d 1397 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 303.
104 OSG Consolidated Comment, p. 66, rollo, p.186.
105 Lagman Memorandum, p. 30; rollo, p. 118.
106 G.R. No. 86926, October 15, 1991; 202 SCRA 680.
107 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
108 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 ed., pp. 12-13.
109 Id.
110 Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 156951, September 22, 2006.
47
48
49
50
51
52
Footnotes
1 Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (Study on the Right to the Truth): Report of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Economic and Social Council (E/CN.4/2006/91), 8 February 2006.
2 See Yasmin Naqvi, The Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?, International Review of the Red Cross (2006), 88:862:254268.
3 Ibid., 268.
4 Ibid., 245.
5 But see Eric Brahm, What is a Truth Commission and Why Does it Matter?, Peace and Conflict Review (Spring 2009), 3:2:1-14, which
proposes that "Mark Freemans (2006) typology of human rights investigations as the definition offering the most analytical clarity and the
strongest potential to move the field forward." Freeman [Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (2006), New York: Cambridge
University Press; E.H.R.L.R., 2008, 2, 294-297] defines a truth commission as an "ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of
inquiry set up in and authorized by a state for the primary purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on the principal causes and
consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of severe violence or repression that occurred in the state during determinate
periods of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making recommendations for their redress and future prevention."
6 Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, Human Rights Quarterly (Nov. 1994), 16:4:600.
7 Ibid., 604.
8 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/009/2007/en/7988f852-d38a-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/ pol300092007en.html, viewed
on 9 November 2010.
9 Ruben Carranza, Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic Crimes?, The International Journal of
Transitional Justice, Vol. 2, 2008, 322.
10 Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 75885, May 27, 1987, 150 SCRA 181,
202.
11 Promulgated on February 28, 1986, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government.
12 Promulgated on March 25, 1986, promulgating the Provisional Constitution (also known as the Freedom Constitution). Article II, Section
1 thereof stated that the President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new
constitution x x x.
13 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 68 Phil. 139, 156 (1936).
14 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 17 October 2000.
15 Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052, 29 August 2007.
16 Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, 312 Phil. 1145, 1152 (1995) citing AM JUR 2d on Public Officers and Employees.
17 Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
18 Ibid.
19 Buklod ng Kawaniang EIIB v. Sec. Zamora, 413 Phil. 281, 295.
20 Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, G.R. No. 175573, 11 September 2008.
21 Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. v. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo (G.R. No. 160756, 2010)
22 Quinto v. Comelec (G.R. No. 189698, 2009)
23 Abakada Guro v. Hon. Cesar V. Purisima (G.R. No. 166715, 2008)
24 59 SCRA 54, 1974.
25 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 176951; G.R. No. 177499; 2008; G.R. No. 178056, 2008)
26 Par. 69, Lagman, et als Petition
53
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56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
Footnotes
1 Constitution, Article III, Section 1 and 14, which states:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
2 Executive Order No. 1, "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010," Section 1.
3 TSN, September 28, 2010, pp. 23, 39-40, 52, 60, 73-75, 123-126.
4 Id. at 182.
5 Id. at 58-60.
6 EO 1, Section 1, par. 2.
7 Id., Section 2, paragraphs. H and I; Sections 3, 4 and 5.
8 Id., Sections 12, 13.
9 Id., Section 11.
10 Id., Section 2 (b).
11 Id., Sections 2 (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i) and 6.
12 Id., Section 6.
13 Id., Section 2.
14 Id., Section 15.
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71
72
73
74
75
76
77
Footnotes
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 105965-70, 354 SCRA 651, 661.
2 Id. at 664-665.
3 Id. at 660-661.
4 Records of the Constitutional Commission Vol. II, 26 July 1986, p. 267.
5 Sec. 9, Sec. 10, Sec. 14 and Sec. 2 of Article XI, 1987 Constitution.
6 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, 26 July 1986, p. 296.
7 Section 2(a) and (b), respectively, E.O. No. 1, dated 30 July 2010.
8 Article XI, Section 13(1), 1987 Constitution.
9 Section 2(b), E.O. No. 1, supra note 7.
10 Article XI, Section 13(4), 1987 Constitution.
11 Section 2(c) and (d), E.O. No. 1, supra.
12 Article XI, Section 13(5), 1987 Constitution.
13 Section 2(e), E.O. No. 1, supra.
14 Id., Section 9.
15 The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Section 15(8) and (9) and Section 26(4).
16 G.R. Nos. L-79660-707, 27 April 1988, 160 SCRA 843, 846-847.
17 G.R. No. 159747, 13 April 2004, 427 SCRA 46.
18 Id. at 74.
19 Id. at 77-78.
20 Id. at 86.
21 Id. at 92.
22 Memorandum for Respondent, p. 79.
23 G.R. No. 120422, 248 SCRA 566, 579.
24 Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 73-74.
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91
92
93
94
95
96
Footnotes
1 Also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. One of EO 1s WHEREAS clauses reads: "WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing
authority to reorganize the Office of the President."
2 Domingo v. Zamora, 445 Phil. 7, 13 (2003).
3 Emphasis supplied.
4 Emphasis supplied. President Aquino took his oath in Filipino.
5 Rodriguez, et al. v. Santos Diaz, et al., 119 Phil. 723, 727-728 (1964).
6 TSN, 7 September 2010, pp. 56-57.
7 No. L-29274, 27 November 1975, 68 SCRA 99, 104.
8 Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of EO 292, quoted on page 2.
9 Section 22, Chapter 8, Title II, Book III of EO 292 reads:
Section 22. Office of the President Proper. (1) The Office of the President Proper shall consist of the Private Office, the Executive Office, the
Common Staff Support System, and the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System;
(2) The Executive Office refers to the Offices of the Executive Secretary, Deputy Executive Secretaries and Assistant Executive Secretaries;
(3) The Common Staff Support System embraces the offices or units under the general categories of development and management,
general government administration and internal administration; and
(4) The Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System includes such special assistants or advisers as may be needed by the President."
(Emphasis supplied)
10 Section 22(4), Id.
11 Section 47(2), Chapter 6, Book V of EO 292 provides:
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. xxx
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
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102
103
104
Footnotes
1 Executive Order No. 292 (July 25, 1987), Book I, Chapter 9, Sec. 37.
2 Constitution, Art. VII, Secs. 1 & 7 (2nd sentence), respectively.
3 Id., Sec. 7 (1st sentence).
4 Executive Order No. 292 (July 25, 1987), Book III, Title III, Chapter 10, Sec. 31.
5 Presidential Decree No. 1416 (June 9, 1975), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772 (January 15, 1982).
6 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1.
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118
119
Footnotes
1 Decision, at p. 43.
2 This is discussed in the part of this Opinion on "The Majority Decisions Turn-Around."
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123
Policy
Debate
(2000)
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Footnotes
1 SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureau and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
2 G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
3 Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, 312 Phil. 235, 247 (1995).
4 50 Phil. 259 (1927).
5 Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
6 Cruz, Philippine Political Law (2005 ed.), p. 182.
7 G.R. No. 143481, February 15, 2002.
8 Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
137
138
139
140
141
Footnotes
1 From the website of the International Center for Transitional Justice, http://ictj.org/en/tj/138.html, accessed on December 6, 2010.
2 Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Truth Commissions, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United
Nations, New York and Geneva (2006) at p. 6.
3 Section 1, EO No. 1.
4 TSN, September 28, 2010, pp. 209-215, cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Brion.
5 To cite a few examples: The South African "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" was established under the Promotion of National Unity
and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 passed by that countrys parliament. The "National Unity and Reconciliation Commission" in Rwanda was
officially set up in 1999 by an act of the Transitional National Assembly.
6 Section 11 of EO No. 1.
7 Section 15 of EO No. 1.
8 Section 2, EO No. 1 with phrase in brackets supplied from Section 1.
9 104 Phil. 483 (1958).
10 345 Phil. 962 (1997).
11 Id. at 974.
12 352 Phil. 888 (1998).
142
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145
146
147
148
149
150
151
Footnotes
1 Dated July 30, 2010.
2 Rene B. Gorospe, I Constitutional Law (2004 Edition) 210.
3 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.
4 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939), citing leading American cases.
5 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Article 11, Section 15.
6 Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227.
7 Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 411, 416.
152
xxx
xxx
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints against all
presidential appointees in the government and any of its agencies or instrumentalities xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. After completing its investigation or hearing, the Commission en banc shall
submit its report and recommendations to the President. The report and recommendations shall state, among others, the factual findings
and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty recommend (sic) to be imposed or such other action that may be taken."
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring
its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). The full text of the assailed executive order reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13
ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION AND TRANSFERRING ITS INVESTIGATIVE, ADJUDICATORY AND
RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WHEREAS, this administration has a continuing mandate and advocacy to fight and eradicate corruption in the different departments,
bureaus, offices and other government agencies and instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, the government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote economy and efficiency in
government;
WHEREAS, Section VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices;
WHEREAS, Section 31 Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) provides for the continuing
authority of the President to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416 (Granting Continuing Authority to the President of the Philippines to Reorganize the National
Government), as amended by PD 1722, provides that the President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the National Government and may, at his discretion, create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or integrate
entities, agencies, instrumentalities and units of the National Government, as well as, expand, amend, change or otherwise modify their
powers, functions and authorities;
WHEREAS, Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 9970 (General Appropriations Act of 2010) authorizes the President of
the Philippines to direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or agency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order the
following:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the government to fight and eradicate graft and corruption in the different departments,
bureaus, offices and other government agencies and instrumentalities.
The government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote economy and efficiency in the government.
SECTION 2. Abolition of Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). To enable the Office of the President (OP) to directly investigate graft
and corrupt cases of Presidential appointees in the Executive Department including heads of government-owned and controlled
corporations, the
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Footnotes
* On official leave.
** On leave.
*** On official business.
**** On leave.
1 Rollo, pp. 51-53.
2 Docketed as OP-DC Case No. 11-D-008.
3 Rollo, p. 54
4 Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III of E.O. No. 292.
5 G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718, 729.
6 G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003, 397 SCRA 56.
7 Paragraphs (2) and (3) of Section 31.
8 G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003, 397 SCRA 56.
9 Section 2, E.O. 12.
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March 4, 1925
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BIDIN, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks the annulment of the orders dated September 21, 1992 and October 18, 1993 issued by
respondent Judge Federico Taada which decreed, among others, the revision of some 36 precincts contained in the counter-protest filed
by respondent Radovan. The said orders were issued by respondent judge in resolving petitioner/protestant's "Motion to Determine Votes,
to Proclaim Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office" dated August 27, 1993.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Evelyn Abeja and private respondent Rosauro Radovan (deceased) were contenders for the office of municipal mayor of
Pagbilao, Quezon, in the May 11, 1992, national elections.
Based on the official returns of the Municipal Board of Canvassers for the said municipality, private respondent was credited with 6,215
votes as against petitioner's 5,951 votes.
Soon after the proclamation of private respondent, petitioner filed an election contest, docketed as Election Case No. 92-1, entitled "Evelyn
Abeja vs. Rosauro Radovan" with the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. The protest covered twenty-two (22) precincts.
On June 5, 1992, private respondent filed an Answer with a Counter-Protest of the results in thirty-six (36) precincts.
During the pre-trial, private respondent's counsel filed a motion praying that the 36 counter-protested precincts be revised only if it is
shown after completion of the revision of the 22 protested precincts that petitioner leads by a margin of at least one (1) vote. The trial
court declared discussion on the matter to be premature (TSN, July 6, 1992, pp. 8-12; Rollo, p. 148). The revision of the ballots covering 22
protested precincts was completed in September 1992. Thereafter, petitioner urged private respondent to commence the revision of the
36 counter-protested precincts by praying the necessary fees for the purpose. Private respondent refused.
In view thereof, petitioner moved that the counter-protest of private respondent be considered withdrawn. Private respondent opposed
the motion and reiterated that the ballots of the 36 counter-protested precincts should only be revised and recounted if it is shown after
the revision of the contested ballots of the 22 precincts that petitioner leads by at least one (1) vote.
Petitioner filed another manifestation and motion on September 29, 1992, praying that the counter-protest be considered withdrawn from
the time the final report of the Board of Revisors is submitted to the court for approval.
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164
(b)
The protestant-in-intervention, if any, shall then offer evidence in support of his defense or counter-protest, if any;
(c)
The respondent or protestee shall then offer evidence in support of his defense or counter-protest, if any;
It thus appears from the foregoing rule that the petitioner/protestant and the respondent/protestee shall present their evidence upon their
original case in succession in accordance with the order or sequence provided therein.
On the other hand, Section 11, Rule 35 provides:
Sec.
11.
Presentation and reception of evidence. The presentation and reception of evidence in election contests shall be
made in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 17 of these Rules, but the same shall be completed within thirty (30) days from the date of the
commencement thereof.
The record shows that the revision of ballots in the 22 protested precincts was completed sometime in September 1992. Judge Lopez
issued a ruling on the said revision almost a year later, or on August 18, 1993.
In the interim, private respondent failed to commence the revision of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts, stubbornly maintaining
the position that said precincts should be revised only if it is shown after the revision that petitioner leads private respondent by at least
one (1) vote. No law or rule authorizes such a procedure. Consequently, private respondent must be deemed to have waived or abandoned
his counter-protest.
The applicable Comelec rules provide for the presentation of evidence by the parties in succession in the order or sequence provided under
Sec. 2, rule 17 (Comelec Rules) which must be submitted within a reasonable time, if not immediately after the revision of the precincts
covered by the protest proper.
By insisting that the counter-protested precincts should be revised only if it is shown after the revision of the protested precincts that
petitioner, his opponent, leads by at least one (1) vote, private respondent is adopting a self-serving rule without legal sanction calculated
to unduly prolong the litigation.
Furthermore, it is readily apparent from the provisions of the applicable Comelec Rules that the court shall render its decision after both
parties shall have presented their respective evidence. Nowhere in the said provisions is it indicated that presentation of evidence by the
protestee may continue after the court has ruled on the evidence of the protestant and determine the number of votes obtained by the
latter. Otherwise, it would be possible for the protestee to prolong the protest and render it moot by expiration of the term of office
contested.
There is likewise merit to petitioner's claim that private respondent is guilty of laches, which, in a general sense, is a failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that a party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Republic v. Caballero, 79 SCRA 177 [1977]).
In the case at bar, private respondent unreasonably failed to cause the revision of the counter-protested precincts despite being afforded
ample time to do so and must be deemed to have abandoned it. However, it is not clear from the record of the case whether Judge Lopez
issued an order requiring private respondent to pay the required cash deposit for the revision of the ballots in the counter-protested
precincts in accordance with Section 10, (b), Rule 35 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, otherwise, the counter-protest shall be
automatically dismissed as provided in Sec. 10[c] thereof:
Sec. 10. Cash Deposit.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b)
In case revision of ballots is required, there shall be deposited, within ten days after being required by the Court, the sum of three
hundred pesos (P300.00) for every ballot box for the compensation of revisors at the rate of P100.00 each.
(c)
Failure to make the cash deposits herein provided within the prescribed time limit shall result in the automatic dismissal of the
protest, counter-protest or protest-in-intervention, as the case may be.
165
#Footnotes
*
Died on June 13, 1992 and is substituted by Vice-Mayor Conrado de Rama and Ediltrudes Radovan, widow of Rosauro Radovan.
These provisions were subsequently repealed and superseded by COMELEC Resolution No. 2493, promulgated on July 14, 1992.
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DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari assails the April 25, 2005 and August 10, 2005 Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 2568125684, which respectively reversed the May 27, 2004 Resolution2 of the court a quo and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.3
On October 7, 1999,4 four separate Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 were filed against petitioners
Julian A. Alzaga, Meinrado Enrique A. Bello and Manuel S. Satuito relative to alleged irregularities which attended the purchase of four lots
in Tanauan, Batangas, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). Alzaga was the Head
of the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS when one of the lots was purchased. Bello was a Police Superintendent and he succeeded Alzaga as
Head of the Legal Department. It was during his tenure when the other three lots were purchased. Both were Vice Presidents of AFP-RSBS.
On the other hand, Satuito was the Chief of the Documentation and Assistant Vice President of the AFP-RSBS.5
Petitioners filed their respective Motions to Quash and/or Dismiss the informations alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
them and their alleged offenses because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity created for the benefit of its members and that their positions and
salary grade levels do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606
(1978),6 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 (1997).7
On May 27, 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
However, in a Resolution dated April 25, 2005, the Sandiganbayan reversed its earlier resolution. It held that the AFP-RSBS is a governmentowned or controlled corporation thus subject to its jurisdiction. It also found that the positions held by Alzaga and Bello, who were Vice
Presidents, and Satuito who was an Assistant Vice President, are covered and embraced by, and in fact higher than the position of
managers mentioned under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, thus under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration8 was denied, hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE PETITIONERS
II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE THAT THE ARMED FORCES RETIREMENT AND
SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM (AFP-RSBS) IS A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION
III
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE THAT PETITIONERS ALZAGA AND BELLO[,] WHO
WERE BOTH VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE AFP-RSBS[,] AND PETITIONER SATUITO[,] WHO WAS ASSISTANT VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE AFP-RSBS[,]
ARE COVERED AND EMBRACED BY THE POSITION "MANAGERS" MENTIONED UNDER SECTION 4 a (1) (g) OF PD NO. 1606, AS AMENDED.9
The petition is without merit.
The AFP-RSBS was established by virtue of P.D. No. 361 (1973)10 in December 1973 to guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP
military retirement system, as provided for in R.A. No. 340 (1948).11 It is similar to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and
the Social Security System (SSS) since it serves as the system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military
service.12
The AFP-RSBS is administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through a Board of Trustees and Management Group,13 and funded from
congressional appropriations and compulsory contributions from members of the AFP; donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the
system; and all earnings of the system which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever.14
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 8249, grants jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan over:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
180
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 8-18 and 20-23; penned by Associate Justice Efren N. De La Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval
and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr.
2 Id. at 86-98.
3 Id. at 174-181.
4 Id. at 88.
5 Id. at 94.
6 REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS "SANDIGANBAYAN" AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
7AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606,
AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
8 Rollo, pp. 174-181.
9 Id. at 34-35.
10 PROVIDING FOR AN ARMED FORCES RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM.
11 AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A UNIFORM RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, TO PROVIDE FOR SEPARATION
THEREFROM, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
12 People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 456 Phil. 136, 142 (2003).
13 P.D. No. 361 (1973), sec. 6 and Circular No. 6 dated March 10, 1976 issued by the Department of National Defense.
14 P.D. No. 361, Sec. 2.
15 456 Phil. 136, 144 (2003).
16 G.R. No. 169727-28, August 18, 2006, SC E-Library and G.R. Nos. 140576-99, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 166, 169.
17 G.R. No. 158187, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 187, 192-193.
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OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PORTAL EDITED AT THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 638
Republic Act No. 10660
April 16, 2015
S. No. 2138
H. No. 5283
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Sixteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two thousand fourteen.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10660]
AN ACT STRENGTHENING FURTHER THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FURTHER AMENDING
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 3. Constitution of the Divisions; Quorum. The Sandiganbayan shall sit in seven (7) divisions of three (3) members each.
Two (2) members shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That when the required quorum for the particular division
cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary incapacity of a member or a vacancy therein, the Presiding Justice may
designate a member of another division to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a
special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a
case or cases assigned thereto.
SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads:
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent and higher;
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