BERNSTEIN'S DISTORTING MIRRORS: A Rejoinder

BERNSTEIN'S DISTORTING MIRRORS: A Rejoinder
Author(s): ALASDAIR MACINTYRE

Source: Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 30-41
Published by: Penn State University Press
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BERNSTEIN'S DISTORTING MIRRORS:

A Rejoinder
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE
is a large' compliment
to haveone's viewsexpoundedand
criticizedby RichardJ. Bernstein.Bernstein'sthreebooks,
Praxisand Action(Philadelphia, 1971),The Restructuring

ofSocial
and PoliticalTheory(New York, 1976) and BeyondObjectivism
and
Relativism
(Philadelphia,1983) constitute
jointlya remarkable
a trilogy
whichis no lessthana narrative
achievement,
interpretationofthehistory
ofrecentphilosophy
and socialtheoryfrom
the nineteenth
centuryto the present.The epigraphto Bernstein'sthis-worldly
commedia
"Only
mightwellbe E. M. Forster's
connect."For one of Bernstein'ssingulartalentsis forseeing
hithertounnoticedor underemphasizedconnectionsbetween
thinkers
who,untilhe tookthemin hand,had appearedto have
littlein common.Bernsteinuses thistalentto extraordinary
and reconciling
effect.So withina singleoverallunifysynthetic
in
Praxis
and
Action
suchheterogeneous
ingargument
figuresas
and
Strawson
all
Marx, Kierkegaard,Dewey,Carnap,
play a
and RelativismWinch, Kuhn,
part; and in BeyondObjectivism
and Arendtare almostas improbaGadamer,Habermas,Rorty,

as
recruited
bly
cooperativedramatispersonaein Bernstein's
theatre.
philosophical
The recurrent
patternin thesedramasisone whichBernstein
himselfcharacterised
aptlyin the finalparagraphsof TheRe-
structuring
ofSocial and PoliticalTheoryas a movementtowardsa
climaxoftheoretical
reconciliation.
Two or moreof Bernstein's
Alasdair Maclntyreis W. AltonJones Professorof Philosophyat Vanderbilt

Universityand President-Electof the Eastern Divisionof the AmericanPhilosophical Association.AfterVirtue,the subject of his present exchange with
Richard Bernstein,is his eighthbook. In the Summer 1982 issue of Soundings,
Maclntyrehad the shoe on the other foot- therehe was the energeticcriticof
Richard Rorty'sPhilosophy
and theMirrorofNature.
30

Bernstein'sdistorting mirrors
31
charactersare firstbroughton stageand theapphilosophical

characterof theirviewsis thenexhibited
parently
incompatible
withgreatclarity,so thatwe seem to be confrontedwithan
But thensomehowor othera
unavoidablechoice,an either/or.
a
reconciliation
is afterall effectedand
transformation
occurs,
a new
of conflictwe have a both/and,
insteadof the either/or
a
Is
there
reconciliations
effected?
How
are
these
harmony.
all
of
what
was
after
onlyapparentopposigenuineovercoming
thatis illusory?"In the final
tion?Or is it the reconciliation
withexcluanalysis"claimedBernstein"we are notconfronted
a
final
How
is
such
sivechoices"(Restructuring
223).
analysisto
p.
be arrivedat and defended?
conclusionsare alwaysreachedthough
Bernstein's
synthetic
narrationof particulartheorists
thedetailof hisinterpretative
and theories.Two examples which illuminatethat mode of
are his accounts firstof Kuhn and later of
interpretation
Habermas. For much in Bernsteinone way or anotheris a
responseto Kuhn'sthesisthatin certainkeyepisodes in the
of thenaturalsciencesthereoccurnotonlymomentsof
history
exclusivechoice,but momentsin whichsuchchoiceis between
in theirconceptual
alternativebodies of theoryso different
in theircharacterisations
of the relevantempirical
structures,
of whatproblemsare central
data, and in theiridentifications
standardscan be foundbywhichone can
thatno theory-neutral
be shownto be superiorto itsrivalor rivals.Indeed partof the
betweenthecontendingpartiesin suchcasescondisagreement
cernshowthedisagreement
betweenthemistobe resolved.And
as well
occurin philosophy
ofcoursesuchradicaldisagreements
as in thesciences.
of
It does notfollowthat,wheneversuchincommensurability
is necessarily
rivalbodies of theoryis encountered,rationality
devoidofresources.Each of thetwo(or more)bodiesof theory
will bringto such encounterssome historyof progressand
in solvingwhateach takesto be the keyproblems
achievement
thathave been identifiedfromitsown pointof view,but also
in the face of its own problems
some historyof bafflement
that
one
And
it
be
of
failure.
somegreateror lesserdegree
may
of thecontendingbodiesof theorywillturnout to affordposand the limboththe achievements
of understanding
sibilities
- achievementsand limitations,
that is,
itationsof its rival(s)
rival
which
that
that
rival
of
the
standards
bodyof
judged by

SOUNDINGS
32
theorycannotprovideeitherconcerningitselfor concerningits
of
theoretical
opponents.So itwas thattherationalsuperiority
Galileanand thenof Newtonianmechanicsover medievalimand to
petustheorywas vindicatedby theirabilityto identify
of
as
as
the
achievements
limitations
well
the
explain necessary
of
it
that
rational
so
was
the
superiority quanimpetustheory;
tummechanicsoverNewtonianmechanicswasvindicatedbyits
as well
and toexplainthenecessarylimitations
abilitytoidentify
as theseemergedin
of Newtonianphysics,
as theachievements
The markof a rationally
thelaternineteenth
century.
superior
a more
that
it
the
for
resources
then,
is,
writing
theory
supplies
rivals
of
itself
than
those
both
its
rivals
and
of
adequate history
from
can supply.And philosophy
is in thisrespectno different
thesciences.
Noticehoweverthatwheretheoutcomeof a conflict
between
twoor moreincommensurable
bodies of theorydoes resultin
the vindicationof the rationalsuperiority
of one of the two
of conflicthas not been recontendingparties,the either/or
the conflicthas been replaced by the both/andof synthesis;
solvedin theexclusivefavorof thevictor.But thisis something
thatBernstein'sperspective
neverallowshimto recognize.Indeed he makestheclaim,aftera longdiscussionof incommenwhosestarting-point
is Kuhn'swork,that"different
surability
but can
traditionsor formsof lifemaybe incommensurable,
nevertheless
andRebe rationally
compared"(Beyond
Objectivism
which
lativism,
p. 107).Yettheconceptionofrationalcomparison
he employsis inadequatein at leasttwoways.
It is firstof all a conceptionwhichis neverprovidedwitha
And the examplesof rasufficiently
precisecharacterisation.
tionalcomparisonthatBernsteinprovides,forinstanceincomparingHabermaswithGadamer,are notpersuasive.Moreover,
eventheworkof rationalcomparison,specifiedas meagrelyas
Bernsteinspecifiesit,can onlybe undertakenfromsome particularpointof view,fromthe standinggroundaffordedby
some particulartradition.For wherewe have tworadicallyinbodiesoftheory,
commensurable
therewillbe twoincompatible
standardsofjudgmentnotonlyas towhatitisineach thatisboth
capableof and meritscomparison,butalso as totheoutcomeof
suchcomparison.Hencetheactivity
ofrationalcomparisonwill
of
no
reconciliation
for
theotherwiseirreconcilaprovide point
of incommensurability
resistsdisble. The either/or
stubbornly

33
solutionintoBernstein'ssynthetic
both/and.Indeed, as I shall
in
at
a
later
this
argue
point
paper,evenin cases of important
whichare lessfundamental
thanare thosecharacdisagreement
terised by radical incommensurability
the relationshipof
to both/andis a good deal morecomplexthanBerneither/or
stein'ssynthesizing
enterpriseeverallowsfor.
is missingfromhis interpretations
of the
Whatconsequently
is
of
of
the
history thought anyrecognition
importanceof the
distinction
betweentwoquitedifferent
kindsofextendedargumentand debate,thatwhichcan takeplaceonlywithin,
and may
indeed be partiallyconstitutive
of, a singletraditionand that
whichgivesexpressionto some fundamental
conflictbetween
rivaltraditions,
conflictof a kindthatmayon occasionprove
incapableof rationalresolution.And perhapsthisomissionhas
someconnection
withanother.Bernstein's
ofmovements
history
of thoughtin whichmomentsof apparentirreconcilability
dissolveintosomefurther
is a narrative
at
almostentirely
synthesis
the levelof thought.
This is not in itselfa matterforreproach.
Standardhistoriesof philosophyare usuallydeeplysparingin
theirreferences
to the socialmilieuof the philosopherswhose
and whilethereare some
writings
providetheirsubject-matter,
as Social
splendidexceptions,such as A. W. Levi'sPhilosophy
Expressionand the first volume of A Historyof Philosophyin
Arnerica
by ElizabethFlowerand MurrayG. Murphey,most
venturesintothisgenreare intellectual
disasterareas. Lukcs's
derVernunft
is a case in point.But in moral,social,
Die Zerstrung
and politicalphilosophy
towritethehistory
ofphilosespecially,
in
or
ophy theory anythingapproachingcompleteindependisalwaystoriskdistortion.
enceofsocialhistory
Fortheconcepts
in
articulated
theorists
those
areas
characterisbyphilosophical
in
stand
some
close
to
the
tically
relationship
conceptsactually
embodiedin humanactivity
and socialrelationships.
And systematicmoralphilosophies
alwaysdo articulatesomemoraland
culturalstandpoint.
Bernstein'snarrativesare of course deeply informedby a
generalawarenessof thistruth.How could theyfailto be when
writeswithconsciousawarenessthatweare living
he,likemyself,
in the aftermath
of Marxism?Nonetheless,one of the central
featuresof Bernstein'sown specificpositionsis thattheyare
at thelevelof conceptsand theories,oftenenough
formulated
withoutmorethan
indeedat theleveloftheoriesabouttheories,

SOUNDINGS
34
occasionalglancesat thosesocialrealitiesaboutwhichtheoryis
and withinwhichit findsits pointand purpose.
constructed
This emergesclearlyin some of his criticisms
of AfterVirtue,
criticismswhich also depend for their force upon the inaccountsofintellectual
conflict
and of
adequaciesof Bernstein's
tradition.
The conceptualanalysescentraltotheargument
o After
Virtue
bothpresupposeand are presupposedbyitsthesesconcerning
theactualconflict
oftraditions.
Aboutthatactualconflict
and its
socialhistory
Virtue
After
saysa good deal lessthanI wouldhave
in Chapter5; butperhapswithinthe
wished,as I acknowledged
afforded
the
scope
by argumentofthatbookitwasnotpossible
to saymore.And itmaywellbe thecase thatwhatI perceiveas
- for the disthe misdirected
characterof Bernstein'scriticism
agreementbetweenus extends,at leaston myside,to disagreementoverwhatour disagreements
are and at whatlevelthey
arise- is myownfaultjustbecauseofthatinadequacy.Wherein
does thatmisdirection
lie?
Bernsteintreatsmyaccountoftherelationship
of thevirtues
tothepracticesinwhichtheyare rootedas thoughitis merelya
pieceofconceptualanalysis.But myclaimwas notjust thatthe
tobe explicatedwithreference
to
conceptofa virtueis partially
theconceptofa practice;itwasthattheexerciseofthevirtuesis
and alwayshasbeenactuallyrootedin practices.The conceptual
is onlyone aspectof a socialrelationship.
And the
relationship
of theemergenceand growthin complexity
of theconhistory
of thatconceptis
ceptof the virtuesand of the understanding
one aspectofthesocialhistory
oftheexerciseofthevirtues.It is
failureto appreciatethisand hisinsistence
perhapsBernstein's
on movingnot merelyat the levelof theory,
but at thatof the
of
that
him
leads
to
misunderstand
somecrucial
theory theory,
of
the
different
of
the
that
I describe.
virtues
aspects
catalogues
The incompatibilities
in these cataloguesare of two distinct
kinds,thosethatexistwithinand are subordinatedto thecon- theHomeric,thePerictinuities
ofan ongoingsocialtradition
lean, the Sophoclean, the Aristotelian,and some medieval
cataloguesbelong in thisclass- and thosethatarise between
rivaland fundamentally
incompatiblestancesor traditions
thatbetweenJaneAustin'sand BenjaminFranklin's
catalogues
wouldbe an example.
WhatBernsteinemphasizesis thatit is trueof thecatalogues

35
in the firstclass thattheypresupposerivaland incompatible

truthclaims,justas italso is ofthecataloguesin thesecondclass
(p. 9 above). But it is at thispointthatthe inadequacyof his
iscrucialtohiscritiqueof
ofincommensurability
owntreatment
For
what
that
Virtue.
inadequacyobscuresfromvieware
After
kindsof radicaldisagreement
involvedin
thetwoverydifferent
setsof incompatibleaccountsof the virtues.
the twodifferent
blindtotheexistenceofa classof
AndBernsteinisconsequently
in which,althoughone of theconconflicts
and disagreements
itcan do so
tendingpartiescan vindicateitsrationalsuperiority,
a
within
its
own
perspective good deal of the
onlybyincluding
substanceof its opponents'claim; in thistype of case often
enough it is preciselyin the abilityof one of the contending
partiesto do this,in a wayand to a degreethatitsopponentis
unable to match,thatthe vindicationof its claim to rational
in whichone
lies. Here indeedthereis an either/or
superiority
butnottheother,is a both/and.
of thealternatives,
This is the thesispresupposedinAfter
Virtueconcerningthe
between
the
Aristotelian
asymmetrical
conception
relationship
of the virtuesand its Homericand Sophoclean predecessors.
FromtheHomericor Sophocleanstandpointitisnotpossibleto
confrontthe Aristotelian
conceptionsexcept antagonistically;
but fromthe Aristotelian
standpointit is possibleto assimilate
large parts of what Homer and Sophocles have to teach, a
in the courseof whichthe Aristotelian
processof assimilation
Butthiswasnotofcourseonlyor
modified.
was
itself
standpoint
a matterofone theoryassimilating
evenprimarily
others;itwas
withinits
which
a
mode
of
life
was
to
a matterof
able incorporate
in theexerciseof
thiskindof complexity
communalstructures
withinwhichthis
thevirtues.The actualsetofsocialinstitutions
if
was of
first
was
even
achieved,
veryimperfectly,
possibility
understood
coursethatoftheAthenian
but
byits
polis; xhatpolis,
undercitizensat leastto somedegreein thewaythatAristotle
affordsa voiceintheEthics
stoodit- the"we"towhomAristotle
- was able to
and Politicsare the bestof the Atheniancitizens
achievethisbecause it could integratewithinitselfa varietyof
practices;thoseof poetry,of dramaticart,of athleticand gymnasticexercises,of oratory,and, of course,of- in Aristotle's
sense- politics.Whatisitaboutpracticesthatmakesofthemthe
primarycontextforlearningand exhibitingthe virtues?Here
on Bernstein'spart:the types
againthereis misunderstanding

SOUNDINGS
36
thathe claimsfallundermyaccount- spying,smugof activity

are examples
gling,the art of the executioner,and torturing
involvesysit
to
do
so
seems
13
me,
not,
above)
clearly
(p.
just
oftheendsand goalswhich
ofourconceptions
tematicextension
of practices,
excellencemay serve- one centralcharacteristic
understoodas I understandthem.I suspectthatwhatmayalso
theextent
havemisleadBernsteinis thathe hasunderestimated
to whichmythesisis articulatedin termsof a specifichistorical
Forwhentheconceptionofa practiceisintroducedin
tradition.
theconceptofa virtuehasalreadybeenpresented.It
Virtue,
After
- from
- bysomesortof induction?
constructed
is notoriginally
sharedfeaturesofthesetofall possiblepractices.It isoriginally
- the"our"hereis notthatof the
learntfromour predecessors
ofpost-Enlightenment
butthatoftheheirs
culture,
protagonists
- and theproblemis,as
ofancientand medievalAristotelianism
I havealreadynoticed,thattheypresentus withjust too many
different
accountsof whata virtueis. Whatwe thencome to
bebothconceptualand historical,
recognizeis theconnection,
tweenthesharedvirtuesof thattraditionand thesharedpracon the natureof practices
ticesof itsadherentsand reflection
enablesus to specifymoreaccuratelythe natureof thevirtues,
on thevirtuesenablesus to understandmore
just as reflection
the
nature
of practicesand more particularly
the
adequately
citedby
betweenpracticesand the typesof activity
differences
- definablein terms
whichare all- unlikepractices
Bernstein,
of the use of a range of skillsto reach a giventypeof end.
Practicesare notdefinablein termsof anygivenend. For they
comprisepreciselythose ongoing modes of human activity
withinwhichnewendsemerge,are revised,are lostfromsight,
and so on; whilenewsetsof meanshaveto be
are rediscovered,
And thegoodsthatare purdevisedand redevisedaccordingly.
sued withinpracticesare not related to the exerciseof the
exercise
virtuesin thewayin whichtheendsthatthesuccessful
ofsomeskillprocuresare relatedtotheexerciseofthatskill.For
thegoodsinternaltopracticeswhichcannotbe achievedwithout
theexerciseofthevirtuesare nottheendspursuedbyparticular
individuals
on particular
occasions,buttheexcellencespecificto
thoseparticulartypesof practicewhichindividualsachieveor
move towardsin the course of pursuingparticulargoals on
particularoccasions, excellences our conception of which

37
changesovertimeas thegoalspursuedwithina particularpracticechange.

Someonemayofcourseuse thetypeofbehaviorenjoinedbya
- or
to procurecertainends; honesty
particularvirtueskillfully
ratherthebehaviorwhichhonestywouldrequire- mayon occafailureto
sionbe thebestpolicy.It isperhapsin partBernstein's
betweenthe genuineexerciseof a virtueand the
distinguish
skillful
use of thebehaviorrequiredbya virtueto achieveparticularsuccesses(as well as his failureto graspthe distinction
betweenpracticesand typesof activitydefined in termsof
specificends)thatleadshimtoaccusemeofa "leapoffaith"or "a
nonsequitur"(p. 14above)whenI saythatjustice,courage,and
honestyare necessarycomponentsof practices.But he has also
- and I certainly
notunderstood
beara gooddeal ofresponsibilfor
not
this
clearer
theextentto whichthisclaim,
ity
making
is
an
historical
a
claim
about the conditionsunder
too,
one,
whichthe virtueshaveactuallyflourished.
It is worthemphasizingat thispointthatit is no partof my
positiontodenythatan individuallackingthevirtuescannotby
thedevelopment
ofa highdegreeofskillbe immensely
successfulin achievingwithina givenpractice.Butjust becausesucha
personlacksthevirtues,the goodsthuspursuedbyhimor her
willnotbe the goodsof thosetypesof excellence-to-be-valuedwhichare internalto specifictypesof practice,
for-its-own-sake
butratherthoseexternalgoodsofprestige,
fame,money,status,
and power whichare only incidentally
relatedto excellence.
Bernsteinis rightofcourseto imputeto me theviewthatin the
longrun practicescannotbe sustainedwithoutthe exerciseof
thevirtues.The activity
oftheskillful,
butunvirtuous
achieveris
the
of
those
who
the
of
exercise
alwayparasiticupon
activity
by
thevirtuessustainthepracticein whichhe or she participates.
A different
kindof responseto Bernstein'scriticisms
of my
accountofvirtuesin termsofpracticeswasgivenbyPaulSantilli
in what I judge to have been a highlyeffectiveresponseto
Bernstein's
on
paperwhenitwasfirstdelivered(at a conference
at
in
Santilli
practicalphilosophy Duquesne University 1983).
pointedout thattheaccountof thevirtuesin termsof practices
isonlya firststagein myaccountofthevirtues;and thatrestrictionsupon whatcancountas a virtueare imposedbythesecond
are emstageof thataccountin termsof the wayrelationships

38
SOUNDINGS
bodied in thenarrativeformof a singlehumanlife,and bythe

in thosetradition-informed
thirdstagein termsofparticipation
whosehistoryprovidesindividualliveswiththeir
communities
context.So thateven if qualitieswhichare not in factvirtues
satisfytheconditionsof thefirststage,theywillbe excludedby
the laterstagesof the account.And since I do not denythat
undercertainconditionsit maybe possiblefortheretobe such
forme to acceptSantilli'srejoindergratecases,itis important
as
a
fully supplementto myown response.
Santillihasalsoputmeinhisdebton anotherpoint,statingmy
positionin some waysmore clearlythan I had succeeded in
doing. On the view of the humantelostakenin AfterVirtue,
althoughthereisnotone kindoflifethelivingoutofwhichisthe
telosforall humanbeingsinall timesand places,nonethelessfor
each individualand community
ineach timeand placewhatthe
humantelosconsistsin forthemis a matterof discovery,
notof
choice.The objectivity
of themoralorderisa necessarypresupof the virtuesand of our
positionbothof our understanding
of
the
human
telos.
But
thisobjectivity
is not in
understanding
the leastincompatible
withthe need to makechoicesbetween
theclaimsofincommensurable
goodswhichat particularpoints
in historyare contingently
forthe authority
of
incompatible,
theseclaimsdoesnotderivefrommychoices.Rather,itprovides
thecontextwithinwhichevenin makingsuchchoicesI am, in
Santilli'swords,"requiredto submitmywillto a visionof the
good" in a way quite incompatiblewithany Nietzscheanaccount.
Bernsteinseemsto believethatancientand medievalbeliefs,
of the moral
beliefs,in the objectivity
includingAristotelian
orderrequiredas a "foundation"(p. 23 above) or were"based
upon" theoriesabout human nature and the nature of the
universe.This is an important,
althougha commonmisreading
ofthestructures
ofancientand medievalthought
whichprojects
backon tothatthoughtan essentially
modernviewoftheordering of philosophicaland scientific
enquiries.On thismodern
view,ethicsand politicsare peripheralmodes of enquiry,deestablishedby
pendentin keypart on whatis independently
and
the
naturalsciences(semanticshas nowto
epistemology by
somedegreeusurpedtheplaceofepistemology).
Butin ancient
and medievalthought,ethicsand politicsaffordlightto the

39
other disciplines as much as vice versa. Hence from that

I mustdecide
whichI share,itisnotthecase thatfirst
standpoint,
whethersometheoryofhumannatureor cosmologyis trueand
onlysecondly
pass a verdictupon an accountofthevirtueswhich
is "based" upon it. Rather,if we findcompellingreasonsfor
acceptinga particularviewof thevirtuesand thehumantelos,
thatin itselfwillplace constraints
on what kindof theoryof
humannatureand whatkindof cosmologyare rationallyacitisin keypartinsofaras a particulartheory
ceptable.Moreover,
of humannatureand a particularcosmologygivean adequate
of moraland politicallifeare
explanationofwhythestructures
whattheyare thatwe havegood reasonat leasttotakeseriously,
and perhapsto accept,the claimsto rationalwarrantof those
particulartheories.It is preciselyin thisrespectthatcertain
versionsat leastof medievaltheisticAristotelianism
are rationto
Aristotle's
Aristotelianism.
allysuperior
It is well-recognized
thatat thecore of Aristotle's
moraland
is
a
tension
between
what
is
local and
there
politicalphilosophy
what
is
and
universal.
ethicsis
and
Aristotle's
particular
general
concernedwiththegood for human beings as such, but the
in
necessarymilieuforthepursuitofthatgood is characterised
ofthepolis.WhatmedievaltheisticAristermsof thestructures
totelians
achievedwithvarying
degreesofsuccesswasan integraof thesetwopoles of Aristotle's
tionand reconciliation
thought
withina schemewhichbothrescuedAristotlefromthe defects
and enablesus tounderstandAristotle's
ofhisownparochialism
in
of
context
the
thought
conceptionsof historyand tradition
whichare alientoall ancientGreekthought.Conceptionsofthe
place of slaves,of women,and of barbariansall in consequence
undergoradicaltransformation,
althoughnotalwaysof course
so.
sufficiently
The explanatorypowerof medievaltheisticAristotelianism
wasnotonlyretrospective,
pointingus towardsthatwhichcould
notbe accountedforin Aristotle's
terms,evenwhenithad to be
It
A centralthesis
was
also
obliquelyacknowledged.
prospective.
of AfterVirtueis that such Aristotelianism
providesthe only
standpointfromwhichin the end a trueand adequate moral
historyof modernitycan be written.I am well aware of how
muchmoreneeds to be done bothto spellout and to warrant
thatclaimthanis actuallyachievedinAfter
Butthatis the
Virtue.

SOUNDINGS
40
claim. And ifit is correctthe inadequacies of Enlightenmentand

thoughtmake a mockeryof any hopes of
post-Enlightenment
human emancipation through that thought,a hope which adherentsof post-Enlightenment
thought,such as Bernstein,still
seem to cling to, albeit more and more vestigially.
Bernsteinexhortsme to "appreciate the extentto which [the
Enlightenment]was a legitimateprotestagainst hypocrisyand
injustice" and how it indicted "moral and political ideologies
that systematicallyexcluded whole groups of human beings
fromparticipatingin 'the good life' ..." (p. 24 above). He goes
on to inviteme to recognize my own indebtedness to Kant (p.
24-25 above) and, he mightwell have added, to Diderot and to
Mill and to Hegel and to a significantnumberof others.But the
thesis of AfterVirtueis not at all that the thinkersof the Enlightenmenthave nothingto teach us. It is thatin order to learn
fromthem what theygenuinelyhave to teach us theirinsights
have to be integratedinto a quite differentkind of intellectual
frameworkand understood in termsof a quite differentkindof
intellectualperspectivefromthose offeredby what I called the
Enlightenmentproject.
One of the crucial failures of Enlightenmentideology has
been in respectof the kind of ground for protestand rebellion
and the kind of hope that it offers to those systematically
whichmake the
excluded fromthe practicesand the institutions
good life possible. For it has fatallyinfectedmuch of modern
And
protestand rebellionwiththe idiom of abstractuniversality.
so it has not focused upon the tasks of creating practices and
institutionswhich will actually enable the children of the
hithertodeprived and the hithertoarbitrarilyexcluded to learn
how to read Greek and to playbaseball or cricketand to listento
and to play stringquartets and to value excellence in all these
areas. It has insteadencouraged themto pursue fictionsofrights
and of equalityso thateverybodyin the end willhave equal right
to an education thatit is worthnobody'swhile to have. Marx of
course had a good deal to teach us about the source of thiskind
of failure,which has proved to be something we have been
unable to learn. And a contemporaryMarxist,C. L. R. James,
has had even more to teach. But I do not thinkthattheirlessons
can be assimilatedin any fruitfulway by the Neo-Marxismsof
the presentwhich have failed so signallyto transcendthe limitationsof post-Enlightenment
thought.

Bernstein's distorting mirrors
41
I have argued in thisrejoinderthatBernsteinhas misinterbutit

Virtue;
pretedsomeofthecentralclaimsadvancedinAfter
has notof coursebeen mycontentionthathad he understood
he wouldhave been able to accept them.The
themcorrectly,
Virtueis, as Bernsteinclearly
fundamental
standpointof After
recognizes,deeply incompatiblewiththat of his own overall
projectand especiallywithits culminationto date in Beyond
the
andRelativism.
FromthestandpointofAfter
Virtue
Objectivism
and reconciliations
of Bernstein's
histories
can appear
syntheses
as
in
blurred
mirrors.
reflected
a
set
of
only
images
distorting


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Author(s): ALASDAIR MACINTYRE

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