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JONES v. HALLAHAN
501 S.W.2d 588 (1973)
Marjorie JONES et al., Appellants, v. James HALLAHAN, Clerk of the
Jefferson County Court, Appellee.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
November 9, 1973.
David Kaplan, Stuart L. Lyon, Louisville, for appellants.
J. Bruce Miller, Louisville, for appellee.
VANCE, Commissioner.
The appellants, each of whom is a female person, seek review of a judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court which held that they were not entitled to have issued to them a
license to marry each other.
Appellants contend that the failure of the clerk to issue the license deprived them of
three basic constitutional rights, namely, the right to marry; the right of association;
and the right to free exercise of religion. They also contend that the refusal subjects
them to cruel and unusual punishment.
The sections of Kentucky statutes relating to marriage do not include a definition of
that term. It must therefore be defined according to common usage.
Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, defines marriage as follows:
"A state of being married, or being united to a person or persons of the opposite sex as
husband or wife; also, the mutual relation of husband and wife; wedlock; abstractly,
the institution whereby men and women are joined in a special kind of social and legal
dependence, for the purpose of founding and maintaining a family."
The Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia defines marriage as:
"The legal union of a man with a woman for life; the state or condition of being
married; the legal relation of spouses to each other; wedlock; the formal declaration
or contract by which a man and a woman join in wedlock."
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, defines marriage as:

Marriage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue licenses for that
purpose. For a time the records of marriage were kept by the church. Some states even
now recognize a common-law marriage which has neither the benefit of license nor
clergy. In all cases, however, marriage has always been considered as the union of a
man and a woman and we have been presented with no authority to the contrary.
It appears to us that appellants are prevented from marrying, not by the statutes of
Kentucky or the refusal of the County Court Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a
license, but rather by their own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is
defined.
A license to enter into a status or a relationship which the parties are incapable of
achieving is a nullity. If the appellants had concealed from the clerk the fact that they
were of the same sex and he had issued a license to them and a ceremony had been
performed, the resulting relationship would not constitute a marriage.
This is a case of first impression in Kentucky. To our knowledge, only two other states
have considered the question and both of them have reached the same result that we
reach in this opinion. Baker
[501 S.W.2d 590]
v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 810, 93 S.Ct. 37, 34 L.Ed.2d 65; Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 67 Misc.2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499.
Baker v. Nelson considered many of the constitutional issues raised by the appellants
here and decided them adversely to appellants. In our view, however, no
constitutional issue is involved. We find no constitutional sanction or protection of
the right of marriage between persons of the same sex.
The claim of religious freedom cannot be extended to make the professed doctrines
superior to the law of the land and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145. We do not consider the refusal
to issue the license a punishment.
In substance, the relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize the
issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is not a marriage.
The judgment is affirmed.
All concur.

"The civil status, condition or relation of one man and one woman united in law for
life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent
upon those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex."
Kentucky statutes do not specifically prohibit marriage between persons of the same
sex1nor do they authorize the issuance of a marriage license to such persons.

US v. Windsor

PFR2
Location: United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York
Facts of the Case
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted in 1996, states that, for the purposes of
federal law, the words marriage and spouse refer to legal unions between one man
and one woman. Since that time, some states have authorized same-sex marriage. In
other cases regarding the DOMA, federal courts have ruled it unconstitutional under
the Fifth Amendment, but the courts have disagreed on the rationale.
Edith Windsor is the widow and sole executor of the estate of her late spouse, Thea
Clara Spyer, who died in 2009. The two were married in Toronto, Canada, in 2007,
and their marriage was recognized by New York state law. Thea Spyer left her estate to
her spouse, and because their marriage was not recognized by federal law, the
government imposed $363,000 in taxes. Had their marriage been recognized, the
estate would have qualified for a marital exemption, and no taxes would have been
imposed.
On November 9, 2010 Windsor filed suit in district court seeking a declaration that
the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the
governments position was that DOMA must be defended. On February 23, 2011, the
President and the Attorney General announced that they would not defend DOMA.
On April 18, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of
Representatives filed a petition to intervene in defense of DOMA and motioned to
dismiss the case. The district court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA was
unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the executive branchs agreement with the lower court that the act is
unconstitutional deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide the case?
Does the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives have
standing in the case?
Does the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines the term marriage under federal
law as a legal union between one man and one woman deprive same-sex couples
who are legally married under state laws of their Fifth Amendment rights to equal
protection under federal law?

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male
transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex
reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru
the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision
in favor of the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth
certificate.
Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 Clerical Error
Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer
as a result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides
that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no
correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment
and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of
the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error is immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for
his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by
the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

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Republic v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan case brief summary

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981,
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up developed
secondary male characteristics and eventually diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH). On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Correction
of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
Respondent alleges that she had clitoral hypertrophy in her early years, at age six,
after an ultrasound, it was discovered that she had small ovaries but at 13 years old,
tests revealed that her ovarian structures had diminished, stopped growing and had
no breast or menses. For al intents and purposes, as well as in disposition, considered
herself male. To prove her claim, respondent presented Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH, who issued a medical certificate stating that
respondent is genetically female but her body secretes male hormones, has two sex
organs of which the female part is undeveloped.

All people are not heterosexual. Heterosexuality is not superior and is

not the norm by which all other sexual orientation and gender identities
are measured." --Burnaby, B.C. Schools Draft Policy #5.45
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
Littleton v. Prange
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (1999) (Texas Court of Appeals).

Summary: Littleton was born male, but had a sex change operation as a young adult.
Littleton got married to a male. The marriage lasted six years. The male died. Littleton
brought a lawsuit against the doctor who treated her husband, as she was permitted to
do as the surviving spouse, under Texas' wrongful death statute. Doctor moved for
summary judgment, arguing that as a matter of law, because Littleton was actually
"male", there had never been a valid marriage, and Littleton was therefore ineligible
to bring the suit as the surviving spouse. The trial court granted the motion for
summary judgment.

RTC granted respondents petition.

ISSUE: Can a genetically female but predominantly male person request for change
of name and sex?

RULING: The Court ruled that the governing law with respect to change of name and
sex is RA 9048. Respondent, indisputably, has CAH, as such, is characterized by
inappropriate manifestations of male characteristics, although are genetically female.
CAH people also have ambiguous genitalia, appearing more male than female but
have internal female reproductive organs which may become undeveloped. These
individuals are commonly referred to as intersex, and respondent, having reached the
age of majority, and having decided to be male, considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones is a preponderant biological support for considering
him male.
Republics petition is denied. RTC Branch 33 decision is affirmed.

Holding: Trial court affirmed. Summary judgment is granted when there are no facts
to be determined by the trial court, and the issues present a pure question of law.
Appellant is male. Although appellant has believed herself to be female all her life,
and although she has had extensive surgery to alter her body to resemble a female
body, all her feminine physical characteristics are entirely man-made by physicians.
Legislature has not granted post-operative transsexuals the right to marry as females,
and it is not appropriate for the courts to grant them that right, in the absence of
legislative action.

Concurring Opinion: Agree with majority decision, but this result may cause
difficulties for intersex people.

Dissent: Disagree with majority decision. Whether appellant is a male or a female is

an issue of fact, that should be decided by the trial court, not an issue of law that can
decided on a motion for summary judgment. Court says there's no law on the issue
but then says issue can be decided as a matter of law. Furthermore, majority decision
relies on appellant's original birth certificate. Appellant amended her birth certificate
to reflect her new gender during proceedings in the trial court, and the trial court
accepted the amended birth certificate. An amended birth certificate is an official
Texas state document, and is like an amended pleading. Therefore it is inappropriate
for the majority to rely on the original birth certificate.

PFR4

G.R. NO. 27972, PEOPLE V. SANTIAGO, 51 PHIL. 68

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

refused to give her consent, and he finally notwithstanding her resistance,

accomplished his purpose by force and against her will.
After the deed had been done the appellant conducted the girl to the house of his
uncle, Agaton Santiago, who lived not far away. They arrived here about 11 a. m., and
remained for several hours. In the course of the afternoon Agaton Santiago brought in
a protestant minister who went through the ceremony of marrying the couple. After
this was over the appellant gave the girl a few pesos and sent her home. Her father
happened to be away that night, but upon his return the next day, she told him what
had happened, a this prosecution for rape was started.

October 31, 1927

G.R. No. 27972
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
Fausto C. Cuizon for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Nueva Ecija, finding the appellant, Felipe Santiago, guilty of the
offense of rape and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for fourteen years, eight
months and one day, reclusion temporal, with the accessories prescribed by law,
requiring him to endow the offended party, Felicita Masilang, in the amount of P500,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, requiring him also to
recognize and maintain, at P15 per month, the offspring, if there should be any, as
consequence of the rape, and requiring him further to pay the costs.
The deceased wife of the appellant was the aunt of Felicita Masilang, aged 18, who was
the injured girl in this case. She is therefore appellant's niece by marriage, and she
calls him uncle. Both are residents of the municipality of Gapan, in the Province of
Nueva Ecija. On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked Felicita, who was them
about 18 years of age, to accompany him across the river on some errand. The girl
agreed and they went over the river together into the municipality of San Leonardo.
After crossing the river, the appellant conducted the girl to a place about twenty paces
from the highway where tall grass and other growth hid them public view. In this spot
the appellant manifested a desire to have sexual intercourse with the girl, but she

The trial court found that the offense of rape had been committed, as above stated,
and the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape
from the criminal consequences of his act. We concur in this view of the case. The
manner in which the appellant death with the girl after the marriage, as well as before,
shows that he had no bona fide intention of making her his wife, and the ceremony
cannot be considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore
void for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of
the wrongdoer.
The Attorney-General suggest that, in fixing the penalty, it would be proper to take
into account the aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed in an
uninhabited place. But the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
crime was committed en despoblado. The incident occurred only a few paces from the
Manila North Road, and it appears that there was an unoccupied house nearby to
which the girl was taken and where food was procured from Florentina Cuizon who
lived not far away. It is the constant doctrine of the court that an aggravating
circumstance must be as clearly proved as any other element of the crime (U. S. vs.
Binayoh, 35 Phil., 23, 31; Albert, Law on Crimes, pp. 88-89); and we cannot feel
certain, upon the proof before us, that the place of the commission of this offense was
remote enough from habitation or possible aid to make appropriate the estimation of
the aggravating circumstance referred to.
The judgment appealed from is in accordance with law, and will be affirmed. So
ordered, with costs against the appellant.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur.