1668

OPERATIONS,
STRATEGICAL
ILT-ATATED BY
Great_ Campaigns in Europe and America.
PR.FPARED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART

U. S. INFANTRY AND CAVALRY SCHOOL.
Major ARTHUR L. WAGNER, Assistant Adjutant General, Instructor.
Captain EBEN SWIFT, 5th Cavalry, Assistant Instructor.
First Lieut. J. T. DICKMAN, 3rd Cavalry, Assistant Instructor.
First Lieut. A. L. MILLS, 1st Cavalry, Assistant Instructor.
_
4
JAUL19
1897.
PREFACE.
THis book is not presented to the public as a treatise on strategy,

but is intended solely for the use of the student officers at the U. S.
Infantry and Cavalry School in connection with a course of lectures.
Many features that would be required in an ordinary text-book are
accordingly omitted.
THE basis of this work is that portion of Hamley's "Operations
of War" relating to the subject of Strategy.
Some of the descriptions
of campaigns are taken verbatim from Hamley; others are revised and
rewritten either wholly or in part ; and others again are entirely new.
U. S. INFANTRY AND CAVALRY SCHOOL.
February 1, 1897.
CONTENTS
PAGE.
Campaign of Novara,
Campaign of Salamanca,
Campaign of Jena,
13
17
Campaign of Moreau, 1800.
31
46
Campaign of Marengo,
Campaign of Ulm, 1805.
Combat of Saarbrficken,
Campaign of 1796, in Italy,
Campaign of Eckmiihl, 1809.

Campaign of Vicksburg,
67
86
-
96
106
108
121
1864.
Campaign of Waterloo,
53
75
Campaign in Virginia, 1862.
Bull Run Campaign, 1861.
Atlanta Campaign,
141
Passage of the Danube, 1809.
156
Passage of the Danube, 1877.
160
Passage of Gave de Pau, 1814.

-
Passage of the Ticino, 1859.
Passage of Bull Run,
Metz and Sedan,
Campaign in Champagne,
-
171
173
-
165
Passage of the Rapidan and Rappahannock,

Massena's Retreat, 1811.
163
180
185
206
Campaign of Novara, 1849.

When hostilities (suspended after the campaign of 1848) recommenced, the opposing armies faced each other on the Ticino, a deep
swift stream about 70 yards wide. On the 12th March the Sardinians
gave notice that the armistice then existing was to terminate on the
20th of the same month.
Their army in the space which was the theatre of operations
formed six divisions, with two brigades detached. The King was the
nominal leader, but the real command was vested in a Pole named
Chzarnowsky. He had served on the Russian staff against the Turks
in 1829, and had taken part in the Polish insurrection of 1831, rising
from the rank of lieutenant-colonel to the command of a division in
a few months. There was nothing apparent in his career to justify
the slight thus cast on the claims and abilities of the Sardinian
generals, who now commanded the divisions under his orders as
follows :
Vespolate and Vigevano.
1st division, . Durando,
2d,
"
Bes,
Cerano and Casalnuovo.
Romentino and Galliate.

Perrone,
"
3d,
.
Duke of Genoa, Trecate and Buffalora.
4th, "
La Cava.
IRamorino,
"
5th,
Reserve,
.
Duke of Savoy, Near Novara on the Mortara road.
Of the two detached brigades, one under Colonel Belvedere was
near Piacenza, guarding the right bank of the Po from an advance
in that direction.
The other under General Solaroli was at
Oleggio, on the left of the Sardinian line. As the operations were all
on the left bank of the Po, Belvedere's brigade may be left out of the
reckoning. In all, the Sardinians on the Ticino numbered about
65,000 men and 140 guns.
See Map
No. 12.
Dispositions
of the Sar-
dinians.
Buflalora to
Pavia, 28.
STRATEGICAL OPE RATIONS.

Sardinian
base and
lines of communication.
The point to which all the operations of the Sardinians must

specially refer was their capital, Turin. It no doubt formed their
real base of supply, though they might also depend in a secondary
degree on Alessandria. The roads from their front to Turin wereVigevano-Mortara-Casale..
Trecate-Novara-Vercelli.
Vercelli to
Novara, 14.*
The fifth division could communicate either with Mortara through

Garlasco, or with Alessandria by Casitisma across the Po.
We may conclude that their immediate depots of supply were in
Mortara and Novara; and that these were in part filled from the
produce of the surrounding district; that there were more permanent

depots with reserves of ammunition in Vercelli and Casale, which
were at once at a convenient distance, and protected by the Sesia;
and that the great magazines were at Alessandria and Turin.
The Austrian army, commanded by Marshal Radetzky, who had
Austrian
been a colonel on the staff at the battle of Marengo forty-nine years
front, base,
before, extended along the other bank of the Ticino from Turbigo on
and commns,- the right to Pavia on the left. Its base was the space
between the
nications.
The
Quadrilateral.
the
of
fortresses
Mincio and Adige guarded by the
(See map
No. 5.)
roads between the front and base were
to
asara,
Pavia-Lodi
Lonato-Peschiera.
Pavia-Pizzighitone-Cremona-Mantua.
Nature of the
theatre.
A great road leads from Milan to Peschiera by Brescia, but the populations of the towns there were very disaffected; and ten years afterwards the Austrians did not use it in retreating from Magenta. It is
therefore probable that Radetzky did not rely on it.
For the immediate supply of his right he would depend on Milan;
for that of his left on Pavia; and Crema, Pizzighitone, and Cremona
would form an intermediate line of magazines.
The country between the Sesia and Ticino is much cut up with
canals of irrigation; and the mulberry plantations, where vines are
trained in festoons from the trees, and the deep, soft rice-fields, are
serious obstacles to the movements of troops, especially of cavalry,
who can rarely find there ground on which to act in a body; hence
the columns marching there must chiefly keep the roads, which
are bordered with wet ditches, and often pass along causeways raised
above the swampy fields.
" All distances are given in English miles.
THE NOVARA CAMPAIGN.

By the Sardinian leaders it was considered an object of the first
importance to advance on Milan and raise an insurrection there. It
was expected that as soon as the advance on the capital should be
begun, Radetzky, as in the previous year, would fall back at once
towards his base. Should he halt on the Adda, he was to be attacked
at Lodi. But it was considered more probable that he would retire
beyond the Mincio.
On the Piedmontese left, Solaroli's brigade was to operate against
the extreme Austrian right in the hilly country abott Como and
Varese; much as Garibaldi's corps acted in 1859. Five divisions
were to move on Milan; the remaining one (the 5th) at La Cava, was
to seize if possible the island of the Ticino opposite Pavia; if all went
well, it was to push. on and attack Pavia itself.
It was expected that these operations would be executed against
an enemy who would either retreat or stand on the defensive. There
was a third alternative-namely, that he would assume the offensive.
This, though not expected, was provided for in the Piedmontese plan.
Should the enemy advance by the line Milan-Novara, he would be
met by the mass of the Piedmontese army; should he cross from Pavia,
the fifth division was to fall back either on San Nazzaro or on Mortara, according to the direction of the attack, retarding the Austrian
march till Chzarnowsky, directing his other divisions down the right
bank of the Ticino, should attack the Austrians in the difficult intersected country in the angle of the two rivers, while some of their
forces might still be on the other bank.
Radetzky, confident in the superiority of his troops, had resolved,
on his part, on an offensive campaign of the most decisive kind. To
this end he had begun before the termination of the armistice to
assemble his army (5 corps in all, numbering 70,000 men and 180
guns) about San Angiolo, on the road between Pavia and Lodi, 4000
men being left to garrison Milan and prevent an insurrection in the
city. No care was taken to conceal the intention of an advance on
Turin, for it. was announced in the proclamations of the Marshal; and
no provision was made for converting the offensive into a defensive
campaign (as in the case of the enemy), for, except the garrison of
Milan, and some detachments left to watch the passages of the Ticino,
the whole army was directed to concentrate on San Angiolo,-the
Plans o
campai
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS.
Passages of
the Ticino.
"Right" (or
"left") bank
-always
looking down
the stream.
Austrian
movements.
Pavia to
point of passage, however, being kept secret. There are passages over
the river at Sesto Calende, Oleggio, Turbigo, San Martino, Vigevano,
Beregardo, and Pavia. Radetzky meant the main body to pass at
Pavia. The detachments along the Ticino moving down the bank
were to cross at Beregardo. The march was to be directed on Mortara; on arriving there, the many roads of which the town is the
center would enable Radetzky to adapt his movements to circumstances, whether against the Sardinian capital or the Sardinian army.
Both armies, then, were about, simultaneously, to assume the
offensive, and to that end each was massed on its left on one of the
two great roads to Turin.
20th March.-At noon the Austrians, who had thrown two bridges
of boats over the Ticino below the permanent bridge of Pavia, began
to pass to the right bank. It was to provide for such a movement
that Ramorino had received his instructions. But that general was
no longer opposite Pavia. Intelligence had reached him the day
before that the Austrians were passing to the right bank of the Po to
attack Alessaudria, and that any attempt made by the enemy at the
bridge of Pavia would be only a feint. Leaving three battalions on
the Ticino, he had carried the remainder across the Po to Casatisma
to oppose the movement of the enemy. Such was his defence of his
breach of orders; but it did not avail- the court-martial which judged
his offence condemned him to be shot.
At the approach of the Austrians, two of the battalions left by
Ramorino followed him across the Po; the third retired on Mortara.
The Austrians posted a brigade of the 4th corps at the bridge of the
Po to prevent Ramorino from recrossing. Their other movements
were as follows:The rest of the 4th corps marched on La Cava.
The 2nd corps marched on
. . Gropello.
Zerbolo and
" 3rd
"
"
Gropello, 8.
" 1st
"
"
. .
Gropello.
Zerbolo.
Reserve opposite Pavia, with a brigade at Pavia on the left bank in

case of an attack on the Austrian communications on that side of the
Ticino.
The detachments which had guarded the length of the river assembled for passage (two brigades) at Beregardo.

The same day and hour the Duke of Genoa's division, led by the
King, crossed the Ticino at San Martino and the canal at Buffalora,
and halted at Magenta. Had Chzarnowsky found an Austrian rearguard on the Milan road he would doubtless have briskly attacked it.
But he found no enemy on that road;.and as was natural in a general
new to command and doubtfull of his own plan, he grew nervous and
halted for information.
The intelligence which had probably reached him of the concentration of the Austrians on San Angiolo was calculated to confirm him
in the belief, which that operation was designed to inspire,; that the
enemy was retreating beyond the Adda. Fearing to advance, yet
unwilling to retrace his steps without positive reason, he suspended his
forward movement till at ten that night he heard of the events that
had occurred on his right. He immediately ordered1st division
through Mortara on Trumello.
2d divisionerve
3d
"
4th
"
Novara to
Vigevano,18.
on Vigevano.
The 2d division from Cerano, which was nearest to Vigevano,

Sardinian
would arrive first, and was to push an advanced-guard to San Siro. movements
Thus the right wing would bar Radetzky's path on Mortara, while the as ordered,
left wing would be ready to fall on his flank. Should this cause the
Austrians to halt for concentration during the 21st, Chzarnowsky
proposed to extend his wings inward till they touched, and so form
line of battle from Trumello on the right to Ticino on the left, and
then to attack the enemy, whose columns were, moving in a close
country where they would be unable to deploy.
but imperfect
21st .March.-The first division, for some unexplained reason,
ly executed.
Mortara.
beyond
halted just
The reserve was deployed on the Casale road on the western side
of Mortara, apparently to guard the line Mortara-Casale from an
attack by the San Giorgio road.
On the left, the advance-guard of the 2d division met at San
Siro, at two in the afternoon, the advance-guard of the 1st corps marching on Gambolo, and was pushed back on Sforzesca. The brigades
from Beregardo reinforced the Austrian advanced guard. A Sardinian brigade came up on the other side, and an action ensued in
Austrian
movements
as ordered.
G4ropello 1
Mortara, 14.
LaCava to
S. Giorgio, 21
Austrian
movements
as executed.
which both claimed the advantage. The 3d and 4th Sardinian divisions did not arrive at Vigevano till evening.
Radetzky's orders for the 21st were these:2(1 corps from Gropello by Trumnello, through Mortarn.
1st "
Zerbolo by Ganibolo, on Mortara.
Gropello by Trunmello, to occupy Mortara.
3d "
4th
"
La Cava by San Nazzaro and San Giorgio, on the
left of Mortara.
Reserve by Garlasco on the rear of Mortara.
In executing these movements, the head of the Austrian 2d corps,

leading, came upon Durando outside Mortara. The Sardinian division
was badly posted, and the reserve was forced to file through the
narrow streets in order to reinforce it. Before that tortuous movement could be accomplished, Durando was defeated, and the Austrian
corps pushing on, drove both divisions out of Mortara on the roads of
Robbio and Novara.
The real positions of the Austrian corps on the night of the 21st
were these:Two brigades from Beregardo near Sforzesca.
2d corps in Mortara.
ist
"
in Gambolo.
3d " in Trumello.
4th " in San Giorgio:
Reserve, Gropello.
That night Chzarnowsky, hearing of the disaster to his right wing,
resolved to concentrate on Novara,
22d.--Sardinians concentrating on Novara.

A ustrian 2d corps towards Vespolate
The rest closed on Mortara.
23rd.-The Sardinian wings had met and taken position outside

Mortara to
Novara, 16.
Mortara to
Borgo
Novara in the angle between the Trecate and Vercelli roads.

Austrian 2nd corps, followed at intervals by tie 3d and reserve,
0on Novara.
1st corps by Robbio on Borgo Vercelli.
4th " remained at Mortara.
Vercelli, 18.
The Austrian 2d corps attacked on arriving near the enemy.
It
fought singly with loss till supported successively by the 3d, the
reserve, and tie 4th corps-the 1st being too far off to take part in the
action. The Sardinians were defeated at all points, and pushed off the
Vercelli road; masses deserted during the night; and next morning the

Austrians, advancing through Novara, pursued along the roads of
Momo and Oleggio. The same night the King abdicated, and Victor
Emmanuel, the new sovereign, concluded an armistice with the victor
as the preliminary of peace.
Results of the
Austrian
operations.
operations.
COM ME NTS.
At the outset the two armies, by the positions of their fronts on
the Ticino, covered the two lines which they respectively possessed to
their bases. What, then, were the circumstances which so completely
changed the relations of their fronts and lines in favor of the
Austrian s?
Each army concentrated on its own left, the Austrians on the
Pavia-Mortara line, the Sardinians on that of Novara-Milan. The aim
of Radetzky was Mortara, the object of Chzarnowsky was Milan, and
from their points of concentration they would have about the same
distance to traverse to their objects.
But let us suppose that each had executed his design; that the
Austrians had concentrated at Mortara at the same time as the Sardinians concentrated at Milan. The Austrians would have actually
been on one of the two Sardinian lines of communication, namely, that
of Mortara-Casale-Turin. And they would be within a single march
of the second and last line, that of Novara-Vercelli-Turin.
On the other hand, the Sardinians would still be a long march
from the first Austrian line at Lodi, and a considerable distance from
the second Austrian line of Pizzighitone.
Thus the circumstances were not reciprocal. If Chzarnowskv
were to continue to advance, his own communications would be absolutely lost, while he was still only aiming at the enemy's. In fact, in
the first movement, by which each uncovered to a certain extent one
line to concentrate on the other, the Sardinan communications were
compromised in far greater degree than those of the Austrians, and this
was owing to the direction of the lines of communication through the
theatre of war. To render this more easily intelligible, an abstract of
the essential features of the situation is given in the accompanying
sketch; and students will find it useful to make such in other cases,
whenever they have ascertained what the essential features are.
Pavia to
Mortara, 23.
The Ticino
to Milan, 20.
Milan to Lodi
orS. Augiolo,
20.
The following points are to be specially noted with reference to

the movement of each army against the communications of the other:1st, Its comparative directness. The Austrians had the shortest
possible line from Pavia to Mortara. The Sardinians, on the contrary,
must perform a long circuit through Milan to Lodi or S. Angiolo.
2d, Its comparative security. To secure their flank the Austrians
needed only to guard the small angle between the river and the PaviaMortara road, in which there was only one avenue whereby they could
be attacked, namely, that of Vigevano. On the other hand, in order
to secure the Sardinian flank from an attack from Pavia, it would have
been necessary to guard the wide angle, of which Milan is the apex,
and the roads from thence to Lodi and Buffalora are the sides.
The Polish general did what generals will always be found to do
under such circumstances-he abandoned his designs upon his enemy's
communications in order to secure his own. To this end the new front
on which he wished to place his army was that of Vigevano-Trumello.
By so doing he would cover both his lines so long as he could maintain
his front. And if his right wing could maintain itself between Trumello and Mortara, while his. left defeated the right wing of the enemy,
he would actually sever the Austrian communications. If his right
held its ground while his left was defeated, still the disaster would not
be fatal, since the beaten wing could make good its. retreat to the
Sesia, while the right held Mortara, and they might reunite behind
But the most disastrous circumstance would be that the
the river.
right wing should be defeated, whether the left did or did not hold its
ground; for, by gaining Mortara the enemy would be nearer to the
last line of retreat at Vercelli than the left wing was. In fact,, the left
wing would increase its peril by maintaining its position.
The great object of each general must then be that his right should
not be defeated while his left should be successful.

Let us see what steps Radetzky took to secure this result.
It was essential to carry his army as soon as possible to the other
bank of the river, lest a part should be attacked while isolated. To
this end he threw two additional bridges. Between 50,000 and 60,000
men occupied about fourteen hours in crossing. Had they passed by
one bridge the operation would have occupied nearly two days. The
detachments crossed at Beregardo: 1st, because that was a point
which they would reach sooner than Pavia; 2d, because it gave an
additional point of passage; 3d, because they would there be within
easy reach of aid from the main army, and they to a certain extent
covered the army by menacing the flank of an enemy attacking from
Vigevano.
To hasten the advance it was necessary co use all the roads available, but it was also necessary to keep the columns that moved on them
ready to concentrate for battle. One corps, therefore, moved by the line
Zerbolo-Gambolo, and two, followed by the reserve, by Pavia-Mortara.
Had all moved by the latter they would have been too scattered to
form an effective line of battle, and should the enemy pierce any point
of it, say Garlasco, all the troops beyond would be cut off. As it was,
it might be expected that the corps and the two brigades on the right
would be able to oppose the enemy on the side of Vigevano till the
others from the great central road could come up, supposing the enemy
were to throw his whole weight on that side; and, if defeated in a battle there, the Austrians could retreat on Pavia by Gropello and Zerbolo. There was little risk while the four corps were within supporting distance on the two roads.
But the march on Mortara was further hastened by moving one
corps by the line San Nazzaro-San Giorgio. That mo'vement, however, entailed a certain risk, for the corps would be too distant to take
part in an action between Garlasco and Vigevano; and should the
main army, thus weakened by a fifth, be defeated, the corps would be
cut off. On the other hand, its advance threatened the line MortaraCasale; and should the Sardinians advance to Trumello it would be in
a position to cut them from Mortara. This movement, then, probably
caused both Durando's halt, and the bad disposition of the reserve,
on the 21st.
The arrangements, then, so far, were very well suited to the object.
Radetzky's
movements
explained.
Beregardo to
Pavia, 9.
Garlasco to
Sforzesca, 5.
Lomello to
Sforzesca, 14.
The advance on Mortara could be rapidly continued, and the right flank
was strong against attack. And on the 21st, after the 2d corps had
reached Mortara and was engaged there, and the 1st corps had reached
Gambolo, still the Sardinian left wing would have found it difficult to
penetrate to the Pavia-Mortara road. For in first line it would have
encountered the 1st corps at Gambolo, and the brigades at San Siro; in
second line the 3d corps and reserve; in all, 40,000 men. If it had
advanced on Trumello, its way would have been barred by the first line,
supported, during the engagement, by the second; if it had advanced on
Garlasco it would have been opposed at first by the brigades, which
would have been supported by the second line, whilst the 1st corps
would fall on its flank. Chzarnowsky could scarcely have hoped to
break through these 40,000 men, with the 30,000 which he might have
assembled at Vigevano on the afternoon of the 21st.
Nevertheless, as will presently be shown, Radetzky's dispositions
for the security of his advance were not perfect; because he might, in
his orders for the 21st, have given a direction to some of the troops on
his right which would have been equally good in the actual, and far
better in the possible circumstances.
We have seen that the line which the Sardinians really occupied
was that of Vigevano-Mortara. This lineis parallel to the line NovaraVercelli. And when the Austrians had driven the right wing from
Mortara, their left was nearer to the Vercelli road than the Sardinian
left. Using reasonable speed, the Austrians would reach it first. Thus
the fact that the front of the Sardinians was considerably in advance
of their last line of retreat did not prevent, but only postponed, the
catastrophe.
It was impossible for Chzarnowsky, after he knew of the loss of
Mortara, to continue the offensive movement of his left wing. For not
only must he contend with the Austrians in his front, but the corps at
Mortara might turn back and hem him in against the Ticino. But a
manoeuvre that really was open to a general of unusual readiness and
promptitude was to move the left wing from Vigevano direct on Mortara, and break through the Austrian corps there, thus balancing the
amount of disaster, and recovering the communications with Casale.
And this design, though scarcely to be expected from an inexperienced
leader, was said to have been actually entertained by Chzarnowsky.

At all events the attempt was practicable, and though the boldest, it
was also the most prudent course; and as such it should have been
foreseen and provided for in the plans of Radetzky. Now his right
wing at San Siro, or Sforzesca, did not guard his left from such an
attempt. But supposing his right wing in Vigevano, it is at once seen
His
how much additional security is conferred upon his position.
wings would thus have been in connection by a straight and good road
-he would have precluded the enemy from attempting any but front
attacks; and he would have been equally ready to concentrate on Mortara. His 1st corps, therefore, instead of continuing to move on
Gambolo during the 21st, leaving it to the advanced-guard and the
two brigades to oppose the Sardinians, should have been pushed on
Vigev'ano supported by the 3d corps, and, if necessary, by the reserve.
No definitions nor explanations would have availed to prove the
superior importance which certain points in a theatre derive from their
position, so clearly as the examples of the two towns Mortara and
Vigevano; the former giving access to all the lines which the enemy
could use-the latter giving, while occupied, absolute security to the
Austrian advance.
In a greater degree this is also true of the points Pavia and Milan.
When the Austrians were concentrated at Pavia, they occupied a center
from whence to move by short radii to all possible points on the lines
of operation, whether for offence or defence. And had the Sardinians
held Milan at the outset, it would have afforded them reciprocal
advantages.
On the 23d, Radetzky knew that the enemy must be either at
Novara, or making for Vercelli, but probably at Novara. Therefore he
directed three corps thither, and sent one corps by Robbio to close the
road. Supposing the enemy to be making for Vercelli, that single
corps would be sufficient to arrest their progress till the reserve from
Mortara could move to its support, while the other corps, crossing the
intervening space, would come on the flank and rear. When the leading corps found the enemy at Novara, all were directed thither; but
that which had been detached on Robbio did not arrive to share in the
action. Whatever risk there might be in the absence of a fifth of his
army from the battle-field was thus incurred by Radetzky.
It may be asked, Why did he not direct his whole army on Ver-
Mortara to
Vigevano, 8.
General deductions.
celli, since he would thus effectually cut the enemy from the base without incurring the risk of dispersing his corps? But had he done so, he
would have opened the Novara-Mortara road to the Sardinians, who,
crossing his rear, might have passed the Po and gained Alessandria.
The risk of this was prevented by moving his several corps along the
road to Novara.
Finally, the Sardinians, to meet the attack, formed on a front
parallel to the Vercelli road, with their flank on the road. Beaten in
the battle, they naturally and inevitably retired to their rear; they
thuslost the only road that led to Turin, and their defeat was absolute
and decisive.
On the other hind, had the Austrians been defeated in the battle,
they, retiring to their rear, would have followed the road by Mortara
to Pavia, and could either have defended the Ticino, or continued
their retreat to the Mlincio.
With reference, then, to the subject of this chapter, it may be
assumed, as a step towards future investigations1st, That when one of two opposing armies is operating on a front
parallel to the line communicating with its base, and the other on a
front perpendicular to the line communicating with its base, the latter
has acquired a great advantage over its adversary.
2d, The advantage is of the same kind whether the armies are
concentrated or operating on extended fronts.
3d, The distance of the front of the army from its parallel line of
communication, when the front is extended; and when the space between
is devoid of defensible positions, does not prevent, but only postpones
the catastrophe.
4th, That it must be a great error to place an army in such a
position, without reasonable prospect of a counterbalancing advantage.
But the disadvantage is of a kind that will be annulled by a tactical success, and it does not necessarily render a tactical success less
probable.
In order to avoid the circumlocutory phrase, "an army operating
on a front parallel to the line communicating with its base," let us in
fiuture say, "forming front to a flank." The term "flank position"
would not answer the purpose, since it properly belongs to an army
concentrated in one space, and not extended on a wide front.
SAEOf a
t
Y
95
O'ILIS
CAMPAIGN OF .1849 AND 1859
BISaeSardirduwtLo'mfUuwziwR
/y
(til
I.t ,
.,
N: _ _.
Campaign of Salamanca.
As an instance of success achieved in the position which has been
described as so unfortunate, let us take the case of Wellington at
Salamanca.
The hostile armies in July 1812 faced each other on the Douro.
Marmont's line, in case of retreat, lay through Valladolid and Burgos.
Wellington could regain his base in Portugal only by the road from
Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo. The French front extended from Toro
on the right to the Pisuerga on the left, and was there thrown back
along the course of the river. Wellington's right was at Rueda, his
left on the Guarena. Thus each army, in the existing position, covered
its communications with its base.
Marmont, on the 15th and 16th, suddenly moved his army upon
Toro, and began to cross there. Wellington knew of this movement
on the 16th, and prepared to meet it by uniting his center and left at
Canizal during the night.
Marmont, then, had turned Wellington's left, and' by persisting in
an advance from Toro upon Salamanca he would reach that place as
soon as his adversary. Wellington must therefore break through or
be lost. He would attack the French on the march; they would form
in order of battle to meet him, and the fronts of both armies would be
parallel to the road from Toro to Salamanca. Both armies would be
in a flank position-either would be ruined by defeat. A French
victory would cut Wellington from Portugal, and throw him back on
the Castilian mountains and the army of King Joseph. An English
victory would cut Marmont from Toro, and drive him back on the
Douro, and the difficult hostile country of the Tras-os-Montes.
See Map
No. 1.
Rueda to the
Guarena, 23.
T9 ro to Tordesillas, 23.
Tordesillas
to Nava del
Rey, 13.
The Trabancos to the

Guarena, 10.
It was not Marmont's design to bring matters to such a desperate

issue. His movement on Toro had been a feint to induce Wellington
to make a corresponding movement, and so leave the bank of the river
at Pollos and Tordesillas open. He countermarched on the 17th behind
the river, crossed it at those two places, and occupied Nava del Rey,
where his whole army was concentrated that night.
Wellington, doubting his antagonist's object, had left his right on
the Trabancos, to guard against such an operation as that which Marmont had effected. At midnight the English general, then at Toro,
heard that his right wing on the Trabancos was in presence of the
French army. As he could neither keep it there till the center and
left could march to its support, nor hope to withdraw it safely to any
considerable distance, he adopted the obvious measure of concentrating
his army on an intermediate line of defence. At daybreak his right
retreated towards the Guarena, closely followed by the heads of Marmont's columns: it reached and crossed the river-met there the rest of
the army; an attempt of the French to cross was defeated, and they
remained facing each other throughout the 19th.
Both now covered their lines of retreat. But, on Wellington's
right, roads led to the fords of Huerta and Alba on the Tormes, and
thence to his line of communication below Salamanca. Wellington
did not expect Marmont to attenmpt to turn his right by that line,
because he believed the fort which guarded the ford at Alba to be
held by a Spanish garrison, and he therefore remained covering Salamanca, a point which was very essential to his campaign; for should
the French regain it with its forts and bridges, Wellington's first step
towards resuming the offensive must be to attack Marmont, thus strongly
posted on the river, in order to open the road for a further advance.
The English leader therefore held his position, covering Salamanca. But Marmont-knowing, what Wellington did not know,
that the Spanish garrison had been withdrawn from Alba-concentrated his army on its left. on the 20th, moved in several columns up
the Guarena, and crossed it, moving to the Tormes. The stroke was
aimed directly at Wellington's communications, and he was constrained
to follow the movement, marching parallel to his adversary on an
opposite range of heights within musket-shot. All the country between
the Douro and Tormes appears to be so open that the columns were
THE SALAMANCA CAMPAIGN.

not restricted to the roads, but moved freely as they do at Aldershot.
The march was conducted by both generals with such regularity, that
though on each side vigilant eyes watched for an opening to attack to
advantage, neither found it. Such movements can be made only by
practised and self-reliant leaders.
At Cantalpino the British found themselves outmarched and outflanked. Finding it impossible to be first on the river, Wellington fell
off towards some heights on his right, while Marmont's left reached
Huerta.
Napier tells us that on the evening of this day Wellington was
deeply disquieted. He might well be: for the French had proved
their superiority in marching power; and if the parallel march of that
day were repeated, they would strike a lower point than Wellington
on the Ciudad Rodrigo road, and sever his communications. On the
other hand, if he retreated precipitately he would have the mortification
of seeing his adversary regain Salamanca.
With these menacing
alternatives before him, he took position on the hills covering Salamanca on the 21st.
On that day Marmont began to cross at Huerta and Alba, and
placed a garrison in Alba, his leading divisions encamping at Calvariza-Arriba. Wellington met this movement by crossing also, at Santa
Marta and Aldea Lengua. On that night Wellington's right was at
the village of Arapiles, his left at Santa Marta, where a division
remained on the right bank covering Salamanca from a possible advance
on that bank by Marmont. The French left had been extended,
threatening the Ciudad Rodrigo road.
It may appear that Marmont in thus manceuvring to his left was
to a certain extent uncovering his own communications. But in reality
he ran no risk. For though the great road, the only one, back to
France lay through Valladolid, yet French armies occupied both Madrid and Andalucia, and the King was then moving through the
mountains towards Blasco to co-operate with him. Thus supported he
might feel confident of regaining the Douro.
In the series of manoeuvres just described, one skilful general
had sought to assail and the other to defend a line of communication.
And the strategical advantage remained entirely with the French
leader, who had pressed his antagonist back from the Douro to the
Huerta from
the Guarena,
13.
Tormes, and now compelled him to form front parallel to his line of
retreat. But to gather the fruits of his success he must still defeat his
enemy in battle. Next day, however, saw Wellington win the battle
of Salamanca, and with the victory he not only regained all the ground
of which the previous operations had deprived him, but by the mere
impetus of success, and without another engagement, his left wing
pushed the beaten army back on Burgos, while his right chased the
French Court from the Spanish capital. Nevertheless, the disparity
of loss between the victors and vanquished at Salamanca was not considerable. Marmont's army, far from being ruined, presently made
head again and turned on its pursuers, following them once more to
the Tormes.
These examples will probably be sufficient to illustrate the case of
a flank position in an open country. The general who by manceuvres
or otherwise places his enemy in such a position, is within one vigorous
stride of decisive success; and if his confidence in himself and his
troops be such as to render him eager to fight for an adequate object,
he must esteem himself fortunate indeed to be able, at no more than
ordinary risk to himself, to force on his antagonist the alternative of
victory or ruin.
On the other hand, an army which is inferior in fighting power to
its adversary, will not gain much by forcing that adversary to form
front to a flank, for its chance of victory will be as slight as ever.
And a great superiority in fighting power, such as larger force,
or a strong position, may justify a leader in forming front to a flank
in order to give battle.
Campaign of Jena.
CASE OF BOTH ARMIES FORMING ON A FRONT PARALLEL TO THE
LINE OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE BASE.-CAMPAIGN OF JENA.
It sometimes happens that both opposing armies form front to

their natural flanks; for instance, the lines to their bases running east
and west, the armies front north and south. This may happen from
many causes: because both are confident in the issue of a battle, and
are more careful of assailing the enemy's communications than of
guarding their own; or because one army has established such a superiority as to risk little by the movement, to which the adversary is
compelled to conform; or because of geographical circumstances which
will be discussed hereafter; or because political reasons are paramount
in the plan of campaign.
During the campaign of Austerlitz, in 1805, causes of dispute
and hostility existed between Napoleon and the Prussian Government.
If Prussia had then joined the coalition against the Emperor, her
position on the flank of his line of march down the Danube to Vienna
would have enabled her seriously to embarrass, perhaps to destroy, the
plan of his campaign. He could hardly have persisted in advancing
while a powerful army was descending through Franconia upon his
rear. By joining Austria and Russia at that time, Prussia might have
checked at their outset the victories of the Empire.
Reasons for
operating
thus.
But the result of that campaign was to force Austria to concludea
peace on Napoleon's terms. And it was not till the Emperor was leading his victorious troops back to France that Prussia declared war.
Nor was this the only error she committed in choosing a time for
hostilities. For Russia had made a treaty of alliance with her, and a
few weeks would have brought the forces of this powerful auxiliary on
the theatre of war. As it was, with untried troops, antiquated generals
and equipments, divided counsels, and a meagre exchequer, she was
ee Map
No. 2.
about to enter the lists, single-handed, with the experienced leaders,

the tried soldiers, and the boundless resources of Napoleon.
It had been the Emperor's policy to cause the several corps of the
army returning from Austerlitz to halt along the course of the river
Mayne. For at this time he was engaged in forming the Confederation of the Rhine, by which the territories of his German allies were to
be increased at the expense of his German enemies, and the eastern
bank of the great river, thus in his hands, would give him free admission to the rest of Germany. To spare France as much as possible,
he had stationed his army in the territories about to be thus transferred,
feeding it by forced contributions. The different corps were posted
on the 3d October 1806 as follows:-
Positions of
the French
corps.
1st,
3d,
4th,
5th,
STATION.
COMMANDER.
CORPS.
6th,
7th,
Cavalry,
Imperial Guard,
Bernadotte,
Davout,
Soult,
Lannes,
.
.
.
.
Ney,
.
Augereau, .
between
Murat,
Bessires and Lefebvre, .
FORCE.
20,000
.
Lichtenfels,
27,000
.
Bamberg,
Amberg and Bamberg, 32,000
22,000
Schweinfurt,
Nuremberg,
Wurtzburg,
Wurtzburg & Kronach,
Wurtzburg,
20,000
17,000
32,000
20,000
190,000
Stationed thus along the Mayne, the French corps, looking northwards, saw before them the hills of the Thuringian Forest, part of the
range of central Germany, which extends from the Rhine to the
frontier mountains of Bohemia. Beyond that range is the great plain
of northern Germany, the vast levels of Prussia, Hanover, and West-
Possible
French lines
of operation.
phalia, merging on the one side into the flats of Poland and Russia,
on the other into the gentle slopes of the Netherlands and France.
Three roads lead from the Rhine into northern Germany.
The first, from Wesel across Westphalia and Hanover, by which
the mountains would be avoided.
THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

The second, the main post-road of Germany from Frankfort along
the valley of the Mayne to Hanau, thence northward by Fulda,
Eisenach, Gotha, Weimar, to Leipsic.
The third, from Mayence along the valley of the Mayne to Bamberg and Baireuth, thence by three defiles to the valley of the Saalnamely, Baireuth to Hof, Kronach to Schleitz, Coburg to Saalfeld.
Napoleon's newly-acquired fortress of Wesel gave him admission
to the first road; but, although by traversing it he would turn the
obstacle of the mountains, his path would be crossed by great rivers,
which, by the volume of their waters in the lower portions of their
courses, would render the passage in the face of an enemy a formidable
problem. Moreover, during the long circuit which his troops must
perform from the Mayne to Wesel, his design would become apparent,
and the enemy would be prepared to meet him on that line.
The choice of a line of operation seemed therefore to lie between
the roads which passed the Thuringian Forest, the one on its western,
the other on its eastern extremity. That of Fulda-Eisenach would
bring the French and Prussian armies into opposition on the Saal and
Elbe, each covering its communications with its base. That of Bamberg would bring the French on the upper portion of the Saal, where
it is an inconsiderable obstacle, and on the Prussian communications.
A glance at the map shows that the Elbe forms the great natural
defence of Prussia against an attack from the west. The passages of
the river are guarded by the fortresses of Magdeburg, Torgau, Wittenberg, and Dresden, closing the principal roads to Berlin and to East
Prussia.
Here, then, Prussia might await the onset till joined by her Russian
auxiliaries; but such was the influence of the traditions of Frederick's
exploits on the spirit of the people, that nothing was thought of but
an offensive campaign. It was said in Prussia that the success of the
Napoleonic system of war was due to the supineness of his adversaries,
who had chosen to wait in a defensive attitude the development of
his plan, and that by anticipating his attack the most effective weapon
in his armory would be wrested from him. Another and more substantial, if not more potent, reason for taking a position in advance of
the Elbe, was that Saxony and Hesse-Cassel would send strong contingents to the Prussian army if their territories were covered, but not
ARM'~
20
otherwise.
Indeed, if Saxony were left defenceless it was possible that
she might save herself by submitting to conditions, one of which

would he a free passage over the Elbe for the French at Dresden.
Owing to these considerations the hostile armies now faced each
other on opposite sides of the Thuringian Forest.
The Duke of
Brunswick, a veteran of the Seven Years' War, was commander-inchief of the Prussian army; but it was divided into two main portions,
and the lesser was placed under Prince Hohenlohe, one of the sovereigns
who had just been deprived of his territories by the Confederation of
the Rhine. He had acquired some reputation in 1792, and exercised
a certain independence of command.
Position of
the Prussian
forces.
The main Prussian army was at Erfurt; on its right about Gotha
was the Westphalian contingent under General Richel; the advanceguard was under the Duke of Weimar, whose business was to reconnoitre the defiles toward the enemy.
Hohenlohe's main body was
near Jena on the Saal, and his advance-guard under General Tauenzein watched the defiles leading to the Upper Saal from Hof to Saalfeld.
The numbers were, according to the German authorities, as follows:11,000
Duke of Weimar's force,
51,000
Main' body,
22,000
General Riichel's Westphalians,
44,000
Hohenlohe's corps, including Saxons,
15,000
Reserve under the Prince of Wirtemberg,
Total in the field,
Prussian base
and front.
143,000 t
The base of the Prussian portion of the army was the Elbe from
Magdeburg to rorgau-that of the Saxon contingent was Dresden; and
the general front of the army was parallel to the roads from Dresden
to the Saa.l.
Wirtemberg's reserve was behind the Elbe.
t Thiers' estimate of the Prussian force is as follows:-10,000
Duke of Weimar's force, ..
Main body,.66,000
17,000
Rdchel's Westphalians,
50,000
Hohenlohe's corps, including Saxons,
15,000
Reserve under Prince of Wirtembcrg,
Total in the field,
158,000
In addition to these forces were the garrisons on the Oder and the Vistula,
amounting to 25,000.
THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

Napoleon had collected his supplies at Mayence, making Wurtzburg his immediate depot; and the general front of the French was
parallel to the road Mayence-Wurtzburg.
In October both sides meditated immediate offensive operations,
and up to the 7th the Duke of Brunswick believed that Napoleon
intended to concentrate his army behind the Forest and await the
attack. The Prussian generals differed in their plans of action. Hohenlohe wished to throw his own corps against the French right through
the defiles of the Upper Saal. He calculated on surprising and throwing back the corps successively, and forcing the grand army to the
Lower Mayne, while Brunswick's corps advanced through the passes
in its front to second him.
The Duke of Brunswick's plan was to move Hohenlohe's army by
Saalfeld and his own by Gotha, so as to bring them into communication
in the Forest, the first at Hildburghausen, the other at Meiningen, on
the 12th October. Tauenzein's corps, of Hohenlohe's army, towards
Baireuth was to cover the left, while Riichel on the right was to move
on Eisenach, and, by threatening Fulda, direct the attention of the
French to a false point. The main armies were then to fall on the
center of the line of, the Mayne, and cut off from Mayence all the
French who were in Franconia.
This movement was to commence on the 10th, and, as a preliminary, the Duke of Weimar's corps was sent into the Forest to reconnoitre and form the advanced-guard.
On the 9th, he reported that
the French were concentrating about Coburg, and the Prussian general
abandoning his offensive intentions, began to concentrate his army
about Weimar.
Napoleon had made his dispositions to advance thus:The Right Column-Soult's and Ney's corps in advance of Baireuth towards Hof.
The Center-Bernadotte and Davout, with the cavalry reserve,
and the Foot Guard at Kronach, to move by Lobenstein on Saalburg
and Schleitz.
The left-Lannes and Augereau, after feigning to move towards
Hildburghausen, were to countermarch from left, to right through
Coburg towards Saalfeld by Grafenthal.
French base
'and front.
Prussian
plans.
Napoleon's
views of, the
situation.
The army was ordered to cross the frontier of Saxony on the 8th
October. Murat's cavalry in the center advanced to Lobenstein. The
Prussian detachment, observing the defiles, made a slight demonstration of resistance and fell back to Schleitz, without disputing the
passage of the Saal, which at this part of its course is an insignificant
obstacle. Emerging from the defile, the cavalry spread right and left.
Towards Hof they saw no enemy to stop Soult's march; but on theleft
towards Saalfeld they saw two bodies of Prussian troops which were,
in fact, Hohenlohe's advanced guard under General Tauenzein.
9th October.-The Center crossed the Saal at Saalburg, moving
upon.Schleitz. Tauenzein's corps made a stand here, and were driven
in by Murat. *
Napoleon's headquarters were at Schleitz.
Lannes was approaching Saalfeld.
Soult was at Plauen.
On the 10th the Emperor wrote a letter to Soult, frori which we
learn "his view of the situation. He believed that on the 5th the Duke
of Brunswick's army had moved towards Fulda to attack, and that
Hohenlohe, in executing his share of the plan, would attempt to
advance through the defiles which Napoleon had just traversed. He
inferred that Brunswick's army had committed itself so deeply to the
forward movement that many days must elapse before it could countermarch to rejoin the Prussian left wing on the Saal. He believed,
therefore, that he should have only Hohenlohe to deal with, and he
imagined, from the direction in which the Prussians retired (especially
after hearing from Soult that the Saxon horse driven out of Plauen
had retreated towards Gera), that Gera would be their point of concentration. Whether they should make or await the attack, he was
equally confident of victory; and he intended, if they should retreat by
Magdeburg (a contingency which he expected, probably, as the result
both of his own manoeuvres to shoulder them off the Leipsic road, and
of the necessity they would naturally feel of keeping in communication
with Brunswick), to push Soult on Dresden, the road from whence to
Plauen he presumed to be clear of the enemy.
Such were his anticipations, and to realize them he pivoted his
" Jomini says Tauenzein was driven in by Bernadotte.
Murat and Bernadotte.
Thiers says, by
THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

left on the Saal, and swung round his right in order to cast his weight
on Hohenlohe, and to sever both him and Brunswick from the Elbe
except by the long circuit of Magdeburg.
10th October.-Lannes attacked Prince Louis (commanding part
of the advanced-guard) at Saalfeld, and drove him back upon Jena.
Bernadotte passed beyond Auma on the Gera road. Davout to Auma.
11th October.-Lannes from Saalfeld moved on Neustadt. Augereau filled the space between Lannes and the Saal. Soult upon Gera.
Ney towards Auma. Davout from Auma to the right of Lannes, upon
the Saalfeld-Gera road. The army was thus concentrated between the
Elster and Saal, covering the defiles it had issued from, and cutting the
Saxons from Dresden. Immense quantities of their baggage were
taken by Soult's cavalry.
12th.-Napoleon heard that Brunswick, countermarching from
Erfurt to Weimar, was approaching the Saal. The two principal roads
to the Elbe from Weimar cross the Saal at Jena and Kosen.
Lannes and Augereau were ordered to Jena.
Davout moved north, direct on Naumburg.
Bernadotte to
Naumburg, going round by Gera, in order to support Murat, who was
reconnoitering towards Leipsic. Thus the center became the right.
Murat on Naumburg, his cavalry patrolling the river between
and beyond Jena and Naumburg. Napoleon's headquarters at Gera.
Soult was at Gera.
Ney at Auma ready to reinforce either point at need.
Lannes seized Jena.
Murat's light cavalry pushed on to the gates of Leipsic..
At this time the Prussians were concentrating towards the Saal.
The Duke of Brunswick's army, not so deeply committed to the Forest
as Napoleon had supposed, assembled about Weimar on the 12th,
except the Duke of Weimar's advanced-guard of 10,000 men, which
had not yet rejoined it. Hohenlohe's army, assembled between Weimar and Jena, was to stand fast and cover the general movement. The
main body was to march through Weimar to the defile of Kosen, on
the left bank of the Saal, but not for the purpose of crossing, for to
pass by that road to Leipsic would be to lend an uncovered flank to
the attack of whatever force Napoleon might have assembled on the
right bank. He intended to hold the issue of the defile from the bridge of
Kosen to
Jena, 18.
Naunn burg to
Leipsic, 25.
Weimar to
Jena, 12.
Weimar to
defile of
Kosen, 18.
Prussian
movements of
concentration
and retreat.
Kosen on the left bank, and to push two divisions on to secure the
passage of the Unstrutt, a tributary of the Saal. He would then feel
secure of his retreat on Madgeburg, his march to the Elbe being covered
by the Saal, and the two main passages blocked by himself and Hohenlohe. General Riichel was to remain at Weimar to rally to him the
Duke of Weimar, and was then to rejoin the main army. These
movements accomplished, Hohenlohe was to follow, and the army was
then to move entir3 behind the Saal on Magdeburg. And it would
appear that the Prussian generals conceived the French army to be
advancing not as it really was, entirely on the right bank, but partly
on both banks; for Hohenlohe's front, instead of being towards the
river; was parallel to the Weimar-Jena road, as if he expected an
attack along the left bank from Saalfeld; only Tauenzein's corps was
thrown back at an angle along the heights above the Jena to observe
the passage there.
On the 12th Lannes had not only seized Jena, which is on the left
bank, but had pushed his light troops through the ravines on to the
heights which overlook the left bank, where they were almost in
presence of Tauenzein.
13th.-Napoleon, hearing that the Prussians were definitely
advancing to the Saal to fight a great battle, moved on Jena, followed
by all his corps except those of Davout and Bernadotte, which reached
Naumburg, seizing the bridge of the Saal with large magazines. Ney
to Roda.
The valley, hitherto enclosed by the Thuringian range, widens at
Jena. The right bank is flat, but behind Jena, on the left, are steep
hills ascended by winding ravines. Between Jena and Kosen were
two other passages. of less importance, because not on main roads.namely, at Lobstedt, three miles from Jena, and at Dornberg. Lannes's skirmishers, pressing on supported by a division, reached the
plateau by the ravines. Napoleon followed, and from the highest hill,
called the Landgrafenberg then, and since the Napoleonsberg, he saw
the undulating plain as far as Weimar, and the Saal running in a
deep gorge to Kosen, twenty miles distant. Hohenlohe's army was
visible on the road to Weimar; but Riichel's troops at Weimar were
hidden from view, and the valley of the Ilm concealed the march of
THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

Brunswick's army towards the defile of Kosen, whither it was moving
in five divisions, separated by intervals of three miles.
Napoleon, seeing only the troops of Hohenlohe, and unable from
the inequalities of ground to estimate their numbers, believed that the
whole Prussian army was before him, and resolved to fight it next
day. Before ascending the hill, he had sent orders to Davout to guard
the bridge of Kosen, and to Bernadotte to move on Dornberg, thus
closing the passage there. In the night of the 13th, expecting to fight
the whole Prussian army next day, and considering that the French
force at Naumburg would rejoin him as speedily and much more
effectually by the left than by the right bank, he had sent fresh orders
to Davout, not merely to bar the way at Kosen, but to cross the Saal
there and come down by Apolda on the Prussian rear. The despatch
added, "If the Prince of Pontecorvo (Bernadotte) is with you, you
may march together; but the Emperor hopes that he will be already in
the position assigned him at Dornberg." Bernadotte had joined Davout
at Naumburg, but on seeing the new despatch towards morning on
the 14th, he construed it to express the Emperor's desire that he should
be at Dornberg rather than with Davout, and to Dornberg he marched.
Murat, ordered on the 13th to assemble the cavalry at Dornberg,
received a further order in the night to move on Jena.
Soult, arriving from Gera in the night, was to cross at Lobstedt,
debouching on Closewitz, and on the rear of Tauenzein.
Ney and Murat were to ascend the Landgrafenberg by the route
which Lannes had followed.
Augereau was to move his corps partly on the Weimar road,
partly on the Landgrafenberg. The reason for this concentration on
the hill instead of on the road was, that the road winded steeply up a
hill to the plateau, and being strongly guarded, was very difficult of
access.
Hohenlohe, still imagining on the night of the 13th that he was

menaced only by Lannes and A-ugereau, and that Napoleon's main
army was moving on Leipsic and Dresden, did not think it necessary
* By this movement Augereau also placed himself in a position to threaten
Tauenzein's right and rear. This movement was also necessary to prevent the
inconvenience and danger of debouching on the Landgrafenberg by a single
outlet. During the night of the 13th Napoleon had the road widened and
graded by his engineers, and brought his artillery upon the Landgrafenberg.
Napoleon's
anticipations
and orders.
Naumburg to
Dornberg, 13.
Auerstedt to
Jena, 12.
to drive from the Landgrafenberg theFrench troops that had established themselves there, but had contented himself with reinforcing the
corps on the left which faced the river. t His main body remained
as before parallel to the Weimar road, facing the point from which he
still expected the attack of the two marshals.
Owing to his incorrect estimate of the position of the Prussian
army, which he imagined to be assembled before him, Napoleon had
massed at Jena a force double the number of the enemy. On the other
hand, Davout, advancing in compliance with Napoleon's order with
his corps 27,000 strong, met Brunswick's army, numbering 51,000, at
Auerstedt. Hohenlohe's army was routed. Brunswick's, notwithstanding its superiority of force, was defeated in a battle more glorious
to the victor than any other ever fought independently by a marshal
of the Empire. The beaten army of Auerstedt was retreating to Weimar to join Hohenlohe, ignorant of his fate, when the appearance of
Bernadotte's corps at Apolda, where it had arrived towards evening,
completed its discomfiture. Finding their retreat on Weimar thus intercepted, the Prussians in the greatest disorder turned to the right;
the two streams of fugitives crossed and intermingled, and the country
was covered with scattered bands heading towards Magdeburg.
As a result of this victory, the Prussians lost their proper line of
retreat, and the French gained the shortest lines to Berlin and theOder. Napoleon seized Berlin, headed Hohenlohe at Prentzlow, and
compelled his surrender. The remnant of the Prussian forces, under
Bliicher, unable to join Hohenlohe, and cut off from the Oder, was
thrown back upon the neutral city of Liibeck and captured. One
month had sufficed for the annihilation of tke military power of
Prussia.
COMMENTS.
Napoleon's three columns marched with great rapidity to the Saal.

They were very little encumbered with supplies, taking only the bread
and brandy necessary for the first marches; and after the defeat of the
Prussian armies there was no difficulty in subsisting on the country.
The radiation of the several corps of the pursuing army from the
neighbourhood of Weimar insured the supplies. As soon as the victories had opened the direct road to Frankfort by Erfurt, that was
t Hohenlohe's inaction was also doubtless largely due to his having been
ordered by Brunswick not to compromise himself in a general engagement.
THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

adopted as the line of communication with France; points on it were
fortified and provisioned; and as soon as the passage of the Elbe was
secured, a bakery and arsenal were established at Wittenberg for
present needs, and another at Erfurt incase of retreat.
In the march to the Saal the principle of concentration is very
evident.
The columns moved as near each other as possible; they communicated by means of the cavalry at the first opportunity; and the
army was collected in a space suited to its numbers with the least
possible delay. The Prussian plans for offence were, on the other hand,
faulty in this respect: the project of Hohenlohe, and that of Brunswick,
alike entailed the separation of the two Prussian armies during the
movement, by the formidable obstacle of the Thuringian Forest.
When the movement was begun, the French army at Schleitz left
their communications along the Mayne uncovered. It may be asked,
then, Why did the Prussian army abandon its own movement against
the'French left to meet the threatened attack? Why did it not persist
in that attempt, and thus reciprocally sever the communications of the
French on the Mayne?
It has been said that the Prussian advance was to begin on the
10th. But on that day the Prussian left was already turned, and the
French were on the Dresden road. To persist in the advance would
be to abandon the Prussian communications and magazines while
engaging in an enterprise against a line which was still distant, and
which might never be pierced. It would be an attempt to balance a
certainty by an uncertainty. Any general in the situation of the
Prussian leader, feeling the whole weight of his enemy either on his
flank or his communications, will naturally seek rather to meet the
danger than to engage in dubious reprisals. It may be assumed, then
(and other instances will hereafter be cited in confirmation), that when
two armies are maneuvring against each other's flanks or communications,
that army whose flank or communications are most immediately threatened
will abandon the initiative and conform to the movement of its adversary.
The importance of this fact is immense, for the commander who finds
himself on his enemy's flank or rear, while his own is still beyond his
adversary's reach, may cast aside all anxiety for his own communications, and call up every detachment to the decisive point, certain that
Similar case
of Chzarnowskv and Radetzky, Chap.
I.
Important
deduction.
Why Jena
was a more
critical point
than Naumburg for
Napoleon.
the enemy will abandon his own designs, in order, if possible, to

retrieve his, position.
The fact also relates immediately to the subject of this chapter, as
exhibiting a modification of the disadvantage of a flank position. The
French communications were by their direction even more exposed
than the Prussian-certainly more than the Leipsic line; yet Napoleon,
once on the Saal, felt so secure that his adversaries would presently
retrace their steps, that he actively continued his own advance though
he believed the counter-attack to be more forward than it really was.
Nothing could prove more clearly how false strategically was the
Prussian position in advance of the Elbe at the outset of the campaign
than the fact, that before any considerable action had been fought, and
though nothing had occurred but what had been foreseen as possible,
yet the army was now, by a difficult, complicated, and doubtful movement and a long circuit, attempting to regain the line of that river at
its most distant extremity.
Napoleon's dispositions, up to the battles, were all of the same
general character, being in the form of two wings and a central reserve.
On the 10th the center was at Schleitz, the left wing at Saalfeld, the
right at Plauen. He then expected to find the enemy assembled at
Gera; therefore the left is brought into the space between Auma and
the Saal, the center is still in the vicinity of Schleitz, the right is
moved from Plauen upon Gera. Finding he had miscalculated, and
that the enemy was on the other bank, he resolved to bar both the
direct roads to the Elbe. The center, having rested two days, pushes
on to Naumburg, and becomes the right; the left concentrates upon
Jena; the center (Ney at Auma, Soult at Gera) was ready to reinforce
either wing; but the left at Jena could be far more easily reinforced by
the center than the right at Naumburg. This was because the left
was the wing which it was most important to render secure, for the
Prussian armies were concentrating in order to recover their lost
communications, and this must be done either by attempting to reach the
Elbe by Magdeburg faster than the French could by Leipsic, or by a
desperate effort to break through the opposing ranks. That effort
might be made on either of the two roads-that of Jena or that of
Naumburg. If it were made successfully at Naumburg, the French
right would be defeated; but, supported by Bernadotte and connected
THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

with the main line by the cavalry, it would probably succeed in rejoining the main body; while the retreat of the rest of the army would,
if"
necessary, be secure. But if it were made successfully at Jena, the
defeat of the French left wing would not end the mischief, for the
retreat of a great part of the army would be cut off; therefore Napoleon
so disposed his corps as to concentrate most readily at Jena.
If he could have known exactly the position and direction of the
Prussian armies on the 13th October, he would no doubt have directed
Soult and part of the cavalry to join Davout and Bernadotte; for, as
matters really happened, he exposed Davout to encounter single-handed
nearly double his force, while Napoleon himself had a preponderance
over Hohenlohe much greater than was necessary, and Bernadotte was
lost to both fields. But in the absence of such certainty he followed
the safest course when he directed the whole of his center on the side
of Jena.
Historians are fond of ascribing to successful generals such endowments as "prescience" and "intuitive divination of their enemy's
designs." There will be evidence in subsequent pages that these gifts,
in the preternatural extent implied, exist only in the imaginations of
the chroniclers, and in this campaign Napoleon had in three days made
three erroneous calculations of the Prussian doings. On the 10th he
thought Hohenlohe was about to attack him; on the 10th also he judged
that the Prussians were concentrating on Gera; and on the 13th he
took Hohenlohe's army for the entire Prussian force. Still his plan
made on these suppositions was in the main quite suitable to the actual
circumstances. And this, as is mostly the case, was owing to the right
direction given to his movements at the outset. The preliminary conditions
of a campaign seldom offer more than three or four alternatives: an
attack by the center or either flank, and some combination of these.
If the enemy has made such false dispositions as to render one of these
alternatives decidedly the best, the general who has the faculty of
choosing it thereby provides in the best possible way for all subsequent
contingencies. A right impulse once given to the army, it is in a
position to turn events not calculated on, or miscalculated, to advantage; and this is probably the true secret of the "divination" of generals.
The Prussians, in contemplating an attack on the French left,
were behindhand, compared with the French, not only in time but in
Napoleon's
miscalculations.
Why Hohenlohe occupied

the heights
above Jena.
Special reference of the

campaign to
the subject of
this chapter,
space. Napoleon had massed his troops in his preliminary dispositions

so close to the Saxon frontier that a single march carried them to the
Saal; but, judging from the time when the Prussian advanced guard,
which had preceded the main body into the Forest, reached Erfurt on
its return, the Prussians would have required several days to arrive in
force oil their enemy's communications. Hence it may be seen how
great are the chances in favor of that army which is nearest its enemy's
communications. The least instructed reader will discern in Brunswick's purblind and disjointed movements the anticipation of defeat,
and in Napoleon's swift and concentrated march the confidence of
assured success.
Had the Prussian army been all assembled on the Saal on the 9th
or 10th, it would clearly have been in a much better position by taking
post, as Napoleon thought it would, about Gera, for it would thus have
had the option of retiring through Leipsic to the Elbe. But Hohenlohe alone could not take post there, or he would have lost his communications with Brunswick by a forward movement of the French
left. He was therefore obliged to await Brunswick's arrival on the
left bank, and it was inevitable that he should occupy the heights of
Jena, for nowhere else could he cover the march of Brunswick through
Weimar.
Such are the matters chiefly to be noted in this campaign; but the
reason for which it is specially quoted in this place is to show that the
position of an army parallel to its communications with its base is not
to be presumed invariably to be disadvantageous, since the relations of
the two armies may considerably modify the effect of that circumstance. The successful assumption of the initiative by one of the
combatants relieves him from all anxiety for his communications; but
the campaign also puts in the strongest light the fact, that when an
army in such a position suffers a decisive defeat, and surrenders to the
adversary the shortest line to the object of the enterprise, it will probably be ruined by the blow.
Campaign of Moreau, 18oo.

HOW THE CONFORMATION OF A BASE MAY ENABLE THE ARMY
POSSESSING IT TO FORCE ITS ADVERSARY TO FORM
FRONT TO A FLANK.
In former years the base of the Republican armies operating in

Germany had been some part of the straight course of the Rhine, from
its corner at Basle to Dusseldorf. The strong line of the Rhine, and
the lines of French fortresses behind it, could be assailed by the
Austrians only in circumstances unusually favorable. All that could
be done was to approach and choose a position where the plans of the
enemy might be defeated, his advance stopped, and the country behind
covered.
The armies on the Rhine had hitherto been on parallel fronts; the
Austrians generally on the defensive, since the exceptionally favorable
circumstances which could alone enable them to assume the offensive
by passing the Rhine had not existed. The French, breaking out at
one or other of the bridge-heads which they possessed on the river,
would try to press forward into Germany; the Austrians, drawing
together on the threatened points, would oppose them: and the result
was that, in 1800, the river still formed the frontier line between them.
But in 1800 a new condition had entered into the problem of a
campaign on the Rhine. The French had occupied Switzerland-an
act in itself unscrupulous and oppressive, but which entailed military
results such as few generals of that time had the foresight to appreciate.
One was to carry the French base onward from Basle, round the angle
to Schaffhausen. Thus that base, originally straight, was now rectangular, and enclosed within it a part of the theatre of war.
See Maps
Nos. 7 and 3.
Bridge-head:
a fortification
securing the
passage of a
Positions of
the French.
Schaffhausen
to Basle by
the Swiss
bank, 55.
France held all the places on the Rhine, and three bridge-heads at
Basle, Kehl, and Cassel. The differlnt parts of Moreau's force were
thus stationed:The right wing, General Lecourbe, 29,000 strong, was posted
along the Swiss portion of the Rhine, from Lauffenberg to beyond
Lake Constance.
Basle to
Brisach, 35.
Next on the left was the reserve, 26,000, occupying the intrenched
camp at Basle, and extending from thence to Seckingen on the right,
and on the left to Upper Alsace.
The center, under General St. Cyr, 30,000, stretched from Brisach
to near Strasbourg.
Brisach to
Strasbourg,
40.
The left wing, General Ste Suzanne, 19,000, occupied Strasbourg

and the bridge-head of Kehl on the opposite shore.
Besides Moreau's army, a force of 30,000 French occupied
Renchen to
Donaueschingen, 55.
Switzerland.
The opposing forces were thus posted: The Austrian right wing,
General Starray, 16,000, from the Mayne (where it observed the
bridge-head of Cassel) to Renchen, and General Kienmayer, 15,000,
Positions of
the Austrians
Donaueschingen to
Stokach, 28.
Austrian
communications.
the defiles from Renchen to the HSllenthal.

Main body, under the Austrian commander Kray, 40,000, at
Villingen and Donaueschingen.
Reserve, 18,000, at Stokach.
On Lake Constance was an Austrian flotilla, and beyond the lake,
in the Grisons and Reinthal was what the Austrians termed their
left
wing, 33,000, under the Prince de Reuss, communicating by a brigade
in the Italian Alps with the Austrian army in Italy. But as this
left wing acted almost altogether independently, and the campaign was
fought out by the armies on both sides then between Lake Constance
and the Mayne, it is not necessary to perplex the subject by further advertingto these forces, or to the French troops occupying Switzerland.
The Austrians were of course far from their natural base, which
was the Bohemian mountains and the Enns river. From thence roads
led through Ratisbon along the Danube, while a more southern
line
lay by Steyer, Munich, Landsberg, Memmingen, Stokach, Engen, to
Brisach.
The initiative lay with the French, who held all the passages over
the river. It was for Kray to watch and defeat their attempts. He
THE MOREAU CAMPAIGN.

might have found a much safer position farther in rear; but experience
had proved to the Austrians, that to uncover the territories of the
small German powers, such as Baden and Wirtemberg, was not merely
to lose the contingents they lent to Austria, but to transfer their
resources .to the enemy. Kray therefore kept as forward a line as
possible, but held his masses together about Stokach and Donaueschingen, that he might be ready to meet an attack on that side.
His troops were spread along the region known as the Black
Forest. The valley of the Rhine, narrow at Basle, begins a little
below to widen, till it reaches a breadth of about fifteen miles. Good
roads lie along its course on both banks, but the great tumbled barrier
of hills on the right seems to forbid all passage to Germany that way;
yet there are fissures in the mountain-ranges in which lie roads passable
for troops though difficult, and which lead through the Forest into the
valley of the Danube. From Heidelberg, Bruchsal, Karlsruhe, Rastadt, roads to Ulm pass round or pierce the Black Forest. Opposite
Strasbourg the Kinzig valley, opposite Brisach the valley of Waldkirch and the Hallenthal, give admission to the region in which lie
the sources of the Danube. These passes it was Kray's business to
guard. He had spread his right wing so far, because the French,
collecting in overwhelming numbers behind the screen of the Rhine at
Mayence, might from thence pass round his right, if there were nothing
to observe or stop them. All along the valley of the Rhine he doubtless had his cordon of cavalry posts observing the river--bodies of
infantry at the entrance of the different passes-and other bodies in
support at points where those passes intersected in the Forest, such as
Haslach. Then his main body at Villingen and Donaueschingen
covered the two roads by Rothweil and Mosskirch upon Ulm; while
his reserve at Stokach might either support the main body in opposing
an attack from the side of Alsace, or, in conjunction with the main
body at Donaueschingen, form front to the south to meet an advance
from Schaffhausen.
Bonaparte, who depended on Moreau's success for the execution
of his own campaign in Italy, wished the attack upon Kray to be made
in the most decisive manner. He desired to take the fullest advantage
army
of the conformation of the French base by concentrating the
between Schaffhausen and Lake Constance, and directing the march
Roads of the
Black Forest.
Different
plans of
Moreau and
Bonaparte.
Moreau's
plan detailed.
straight on the neck of the Austrian communications at Ulm. To

this Moreau objected, on the ground that the left and center of his
army must make a long circuit to join the right; that a movement so
extensive would become known to the enemy, who would prepare to
concentrate and crush the columns as they passed the Rhine, and who,
being on the base of the triangle round the sides of which the French
must march, would be ready to intercept them.
Bonaparte responded that the broad stream of the Rhine afforded
exactly the kind of curtain that was desired to screen the operation,
while the results offered by success would probably be decisive, as the
whole French army would be brought against Kray's left, and the
forcing of that wing would cut him from his base, and from the secondary point of Ulm.
Moreau, however, considered the risk too great. Like most
generals, he desired at almost any cost to avoid the risk of having to
force a considerable river in face of a concentrated enemy. His own
plan was this:With his left wing (Ste Suzanne) he meant to cross the Rhine at
Kehl; with his center (St Cyr) at Brisach; with his reserve at Basle.
Ste Suzanne and St Cyr were to attack the defiles of the Kinzig and
Elz on the same day. This would induce Kray to believe that the
French were massing opposite his right; and he might be confirmed in
that false impression by the extension of one of the brigades of the
Center down the valley of the Rhine towards the French left wing, as
if to connect the two corps.
As soon as Kienmayer should be driven into the defiles, and so
excluded from knowing what was going on in front or on each side of
him, the left wing was to recross at Kehl, march up the left bank, and
cross again to the German side at Brisach.
During this movement, St Cyr was to move the infantry of the
center across the hills to St Blazien, sending his artillery and trains
along the highroad on the right bank of the Rhine towards Schaffhausen. The reserve, crossing the river by the bridge of Basle, was
to push detachments up the valley of the Weiss from Basle to maintain connection with St Cyr, and was then to march along the Rhine
to Schaffhausen, where the right, under Lecourbe, was to be assembled
on the left bank of the river. Bridges were then to be thrown, and

Lecourbe's corps was to pass, protected by the reserve.
Thus two corps-namely, the reserve and right-would be in mass
between the Lake of Constance and the Austrian main body; while the
long march of the reserve in the defile between the mountains and
river was to be covered and screened by St Cyr's infantry. Lastly, as
soon as these three corps should be reunited on the Upper Danube,
Ste Suzanne was to pass through the HSllenthal and join them.
In the meantime, Starray with the Austrian right would be
altogether excluded for the present from the sphere of operations.
Kray having just been induced by the false attacks of Ste Suzanne and
St Cyr to strengthen Kienmayer, would be in no condition to oppose
the real advance on his left. The Prince de Reuss would be cut off
and left in Switzerland.
It must always be a doubtful policy to oblige a general charged
with the conduct of a campaign to adopt a plan other than that which
he has himself originated and matured, even though it be manifestly
better than his own. Recognizing this fact, Napoleon, who might as
First Consul have exercised considerable control over all the military
movements, and who was quite convinced of the superiority of his
project, nevertheless left Moreau to the undisturbed execution of his
own conceptions; and operations commenced on the 25th April 1800.
25th April.-Ste Suzanne's corps from Kehl pushed Kienmayer's
posts into the Kinzig valley, and occupied the Rhine valley in front of
that avenue.
St Cyr simultaneously passed at Brisach. One division pushed
down the Rhine valley towards Kehl, as if to connect the two attacks.
His other divisions advanced on Friburg, drove in the Austrian brigade there, and occupied the entrance of the Hollenthal.
26th April.-Kray at Donaueschingen heard of this. Kienmayer
reported that he had been attacked by 40,000 men (as he was). Kray
believed that the design was to force the Hollenthal and the Kinzig
valley, and thus to gain the sources of the Danube.
Kienmayer's left brigade, under Giulay, occupied Waldkirch and
the Hollenthal. The rest of his force was in the Kinzig valley. Kray
reinforced him with 9 battalions and 24 squadrons from Villingen. To
replace these he drew 9 battalions from Stokach. He drew in his
extreme right under Starray by ordering it to move into the valley of
French
operations.
Austrian
movements.
Friburg to St.
Blazien, 25.
Basle to Lauf
fenberg, 24.
the Murg, but it was still at a great distance.

The two French corps remained in their positions.
27th April.-Ste Suzanne repassed at Kehl and marched for
Brisach.
St Cyr from Friburg, ascending the mountain barrier on his right
with his infantry, followed the paths leading on St Blazien, excepting
one division which remained to block the entrance of the Hallenthal.
The reserve, directed by Moreau, debouching from Basle by the
bridge-head there, one division was pushed up the Weiss to give a
hand to St Cyr, and the other two divisions were directed on
Lauffenberg. *
28th April.-St Cyr came into communication on the mountains
with the division of the reserve, which had moved through the valley
of the Weiss, and St Blazien was occupied.
The other two divisions of the reserve forced and turned the passage of the Alle against an Austrian brigade intrenched there, which
fell back towards Donaueschingen, halting at Bonndorf. The other
Austrian posts along the Rhine, threatened by the French advance,
withdrew to-a position about Stuhlingen.
Kray ordered Giulay to withdraw his brigade through the Hollenthal, but to guard its inner gorge. Thus the present Austrian front
Neustadt to
Stuhlingen,
15.
towards the French was on the line Neustadt-Bonndorf-Stuhlingen,

and to support this advanced line, reserves were moved from Villingen
and Geisingen to Loffingen and Zollhaus. But Kienmayer was left in
the Kinzig valley.
29th, 30th April.-The advanced guard of the reserve was at
Thiengen-main body about Waldshut-left towards St Blazien, which
ivas occupied by St Cyr, whose left prolonged the line in the mountains.
On the 30th Ste Suzanne entered the Hollenthal. On the night of
the 30th Lecourbe had concentrated his corps on the road which runs
along the left bank of the Rhine, a few miles above Schaffhausen.
1st May.-To cover the passage of the right wing, the reserve
advanced towards Schaffhausen. The advanced guard forced the passage of the Wutach on the Schaffhausen road, while St Cyr, moving
east from St Blazien, rested his right on Stuhlingen.
The reserve finally halted near Schaffhausen.
: Lauffenberg is on both sides of the river.

The first battalions of the right wing passed the Rhine in boats,
at two points, and moved up the river to Stein, where they covered
the construction of a bridge, by which Vandamme's division passed,
and pushed up the valley of the Aach to the Schaffhausen-Stokach
road. The, next division that crossed made for an intermediate point
of that road, where the Engen road joins it. The third division moved
on Schaffhausen.
Thus Moreau's army, minus Ste Suzanne's corps, was united on
the desired routes between the lake and the Danube, opposite the left
of Krayv. Ste Suzanne's leading division, having passed the Hollenthal, was at Neustadt.
2d May.-Moreau, apprehensive that the Austrians in Switzerland
might cross Lake Constance and fall on Lecourbe, brought his reserve
closer to his right by placing it in the space Thayngen-Schaffhausen,
while the right wing occupied the space between the small bay of Constance and the Engen road, and St Cyr's corps extended from Schaffhausen to Stuhlingen.
On the other side, the Austrian outposts had quitted the banks of
the Rhine when Lecourbe crossed, drawing towards the advanced line
which stretched from a point north of Thayngen to Steisslingen (near
Stokach on the Schaffhausen road); Giulay's brigade, pushed from
Neustadt by Ste Suzanne's advance, moved to Bonndorf-the troops
at Bonndorf to Zollhaus-the troops at Zollhaus to Geisingen-main
body and reserves at Geisingen. Kray meant to unite next day at
Stokach.
3d May.-The French right wing moved on Stokach in two
columns, with two brigades on its left in the Aach valley, connecting
it with the reserve which moved on Engen. St Cyr to the left of
Engen extending towards Zollhaus.
Lecourbe, with about 20,000, attacked and enveloped the division
on the left of the Austrian line, about 9000 strong, driving it through
Stokach, with great loss, on the roads of Mosskirch and Memmingen.
Immense magazines were taken in Stokach.
While this passed on his left, Kray arrived with his main body at
Engen. The right of the Austrian advanced line near Thayngen was
Stokach to
Engen, 12.
The armies
concentrating
driven in on Engen by the superior weight of the reserve and the

brigades in the Aach valley. Kray had now about 45,000 men in
threatened
point.
towards the
position from Engen to Zollhaus. The French attacked the position
before Engen, while St Cyr engaged the troops at Zollhaus. The
Austrians
lose one
line of communication
by Stokach.
battle was severe and well contested, and was not decided at nightfall.
But the news from Stokach alarmed Kray for his communications,
which the capture of Mosskirch by Lecourbe would sever, and he
retreated.
4th May.-Covered by his rear guard, Kray withdrew his troops
on Tuttlingen, Liptingen, Mosskirch. A strong position existed in
front of the road Tittlingen-Mosskirch, behind which the army withdrew to Mosskirch.
Starray was on the march for Hechingen.
Kienmayer was moving to join Kray by the left bank of the
Danube.
This day Moreau reinforced his right.
Reserve on the Engen-Stokach road.
St Cyr at Geisingen.
Ste Suzanne at Donaueschingen.
5th May.--Kray with about 40,000 men took position at Mosskirch. The remains of his left, beaten at Stokach, had joined him,
but his right at Tuttlingen was still distant, and Kienmayer and
Starray were still beyond the Danube.
The French reserve and right (50,000) attacked Kray, who,
driven from Mosskirch, retired towards Sigmaringen. Anxious for the
safety of his right, which had been left at Tuttlingen, he halted, and
throwing forward the right of his line, drove the French from the
road Tuttlingen-Mosskirch, thus reopening communications with his
right and with Giulav's brigade, which latter joined him. With his
right thus reinforced by these new troops, he attacked the left flank of
Moreau and attempted to seize the Stokach road, but he was himself
outflanked by one of the rear divisions, and withdrew to another
position behind Mosskirch.
This battle was indecisive and the losses equal; but St Cyr (who
had been called towards Liptingen, to be near Moreau, and to hinder
the junction of Kienmayer) was now approaching the main army; and
Ste Suzanne, who entered Donaueschingen on the 4th, came into line
on St Cyr's left towards Geisingen; therefore Kray resumed his retreat.
He passed the Danube on a line of which Sigmaringen was the center.

6th May.--Kienmayer joined Kray at Sigmaringen, and the
Austrian army moved towards Rietlingen.
7th May.- Austrians to Biberach.
This movement, deviating
from their object, Ulm, was probably made in order to evacuate the
magazines at Biberach and Memmingen.
Moreau continued to manoeuvre by his right-not to cut the
enemy from Ulm, which he could not now prevent them from reaching, but to divide them from Munich and from Reuss's army in Switzerland.
Here the campaign ceases to exemplify the particular condition
which it was selected to illustrate. For the French front, which up to
the battle of Mosskirch had been perpendicular to the roads leading
back to Schaffhausen, was now, as it faced the Danube, parallel to the
road Biberach-Stokach-Schaffhausen.
Hence, not being covered by a
river (as the Austrian line to its base was by the Danube, as soon as
the army reached Ulm), Moreau's communications were even more
exposed than Kray's.
COMMENTS.
The effect of the angular base of the French is visible on the dispositions of the Austrians even before the campaign commenced. Had
the French only possessed the straight Rhine frontier up to Basle, as
formerly, Kray, under no particular apprehensions for his left flank,
might have posted his main body and reserves at points whence they
could with equal facility have reinforced any of the detached bodies
guarding the defiles on whom an attack might have been made; but,
as the case really stood, he was obliged to dispose his main body and
reserves far away to his left rear on the line Villingen-DonaueschingenStokach, in order to be ready to meet an attack on that side, which,
if unopposed, would sever his communications.
The plans of campaign of Napoleon and of Moreau had this in
common, that both aimed at the communications of the Austrians by
an advance from the extreme point of the angular base; but in the
mode of effecting the common object they differed materially, and the
difference was the result of the individual characters of the projectors.
When Napoleon's glance was once fixed on the point where decisive
success lay, the obstacles in his way lost, in his mind, much of their
importance, and were viewed merely as difficult steps to his object.
Hence, though he neglected no provision nor precaution which prudence and experience could suggest for overcoming them, yet he never
allowed them to assume an importance sufficient, to deprive his plan of
campaign of its fullest significance. Disregarding, therefore, the fact
that he must throw his army entire at one point across a great .river
which was observed by the enemy, he looked only to the great results
that must flow from the advance of that army, concentrated, upon the
vital point of an enemy whose forces would still be in greater or less
degree dispersed.
Moreau, cautious and forecasting by nature, saw in his mind's eye
the Austrian army assembled opposite Schaffhausen to oppose his passage-baffling the whole plan. All his precautions, therefore, were
framed to obviate the danger of crossing in face of the enemy. Only
one corps was to cross at Schaffhausen-another the reserve, was to
cross at Basle to cover the passage; this entailed the movement of a
third through the mountains to cover the long flank march of the
reserve along the river; and a fourth was to make a false attack in
order to detain the Austrian troops in the defiles as long as possible,
and prevent them from reinforcing the left.
The great objection urged against this combination is the long
flank march of the reserve between the mountains and the river; but
this appears to diminish on an inspection of the map, for no road traverses the Black Forest leading into the space between Basle and
Waldshut, by which a large Austrian force could move with artillery
so as seriously to menace the French. Any attempt against them
which the country admitted of would probably be checked by St Cyr,
who would also flank, at St Blazien, any attempted movement on
Waldshut. It was sufficiently certain, therefore, that the reserve
would make good its march on Schaffhausen, would cover the passage
there, and would be ready to move forward in conjunction with the
right.
The advantages to be expected were by no means so decisive as would
follow the successful execution of Napoleon's plan. For only two corps
would be ready at once to operate on the decisive point, and their subsequent movements must be hampered by the necessity of waiting for
the center and left. Whereas Napoleon would have assembled the
whole army ready to fight with a superiority, and a victory would at

once open the way into the valley of the Danube. And, granting that
the Rhine were safely passed, no French general could desire better
than that Kray without Starray should be forced to give battle in a
flank position to the whole French army.
It is probable that Napoleon's plan would have miscarried in the
hands of Moreau; but looking at other achievements of Bonaparte,his descent on the Austrian rear in Italy a few weeks later-his decisive
march to the Danube in 1805 on the other side of the present theatre
-and his march to the Saal, already described,-it is not to be denied
that, executed by himself, the design might have fulfilled all his
expectations.
The false attacks of Ste Suzanne and St Cyr had the effect not
only of detaining Kienmayer's 16,000 men in the defiles, but of causing
Kray to move thither 6000 or 7000 additional troops. But they had
no influence in detaining Starray, who was already so distant on the
right that it would be impossible for him in any case to join Kray in
time for the first operations. We find, then, that at first 49,000
French were employed in detaining less than half their number; and
when- St Cyr had joined the reserve, still Ste Suzanne did not probably
neutralize a greater number of the enemy than his own corps. The
detached operations of Ste Suzanne appear, therefore, dangerous and
fruitless.
On the 28th April, Kray might have divined the real design of
Moreau. He must have known that Ste Suzanne had repassed the
river; that St Cyr was in the mountains; that the reserve had driven
in his outposts on the Upper Rhine; and he should have learnt from
Reuss that Lecourbe was moving on Schaffhausen. Putting these
pieces of information together, the design against his left was apparent.
He might have met it in two ways: he might have fallen on St Cyr
with his reinforced right, thus utilizing the troops which he had falsely
moved in that direction; or he might have concentrated his army
between Engen and Stokach before the French left wing could have
joined the other corps,-ready to give battle with his whole force,
and closing the space between the lake and the Danube by which
Moreau desired totpenetrate. That he made no counter-attack on St
Cyr might be owing to the difficulties of the country; or it may be a
confirmation of what has been already asserted in a former chapter-
that a general, threatened in his communications, thinks of protecting
them rather than of making a counter-attack on his adversary. But
the second plan-the concentration on the left-was quite practicable;
and had it been executed, Moreau, minus Ste Suzanne, advancing on
And as Starray's
Engen, would have met Kray, minus Starray.
absence was owing to distance, and not to Moreau's precautions,
the French general's combination was a failure, inasmuch as it deprived him of the support of his left without any corresponding
advantage.
As matters actually happened, Kray, not interpreting events
rightly, neglected to call in Kienmayer, and was outnumbered on the
3d May, not on his center or right, where he fought a drawn battle,
but on the vital point-namely, his left, where Lecourbe easily defeated
the inferior force opposed to him. In order to turn the situation to
the fullest account on this day, Moreau should have borne in mind
that the important business was to reinforce and push forward his own
right, for the object of the campaign was to cut Kray from Ulm.
Instead, therefore, of drawing troops, as he did, from right to left,
the reverse of that process would have been more consonant with the
general design. St Cyr should have been weakened to send troops to
the reserve, the reserve should have despatched troops to the right,
and St Cyr, instead of being seriously engaged on a point where nothing decisive could be effected, should have been kept back, and
restricted to the task of covering the communications with Schaffhausen
against a counter-attack. Kray, dislodged by the advance of Lecourbe,
would have been forced to retreat without a battle, and ought to have
been anticipated at Mosskirch, when he would have been in great
danger of being cut off from Ulm. As it was, he made good his
retreat; and having gained Mosskirch, while the French center and
left were still westward in the Forest, he was secure of reaching Ulm. *
' The following is the criticism of Napoleon on the plan of Moreau :-"Ste Suzanne passed the Rhine at Kehl, St Cyr at New Brisach; they were
to join in the Brisgau. Moreau appreciated the danger of this move. He
recalled Ste Suzanne to the left bank in order to have him recross at the bridge
of New Brisach : this was a false movement and not a ruse de guerre. The march
of thirty leagues from Old Brisach to Basle and Schaffhausen, by the right bank
of the Rhine was faulty: the army presented its right flank to the Rhine

In 'this campaign, then, is exemplified the use of an angular base
in causing the enemy to form front to a flank. Kray was obliged at
Moreau's approach to front southwards parallel to his communications.
The French front meanwhile completely covered the line to Schaffhausen and advanced securely and confidently, while the Austrians
were hastening, with doubtful purpose and in straggling array, towards
the menaced quarter. Though the battle of Engen was indecisive,
yet the direction of the French attack compelled Kray to retreat, and
the whole of the Black Forest was lost to the Austrians, though they
had not sustained a defeat. If such results followed from the imperfect combination of Moreau, it may be imagined how complete would
have been the success of Napoleon's plan. And by supposing that the
French had possessed a fortified bridge at Schaffhausen, by which they
could have passed at once to the other bank with certainty and
security, it may be perceived how important an influence may be
exercised by the possesssion of an angular base.
So far, then, as may be, without reference to Obstacles, the various
cases have been enumerated in which an advantage of a certain kind is
obtained over an enemy by forcing him to form front to a flank. This
may be the result of manceuvres between armies which were originally
on parallel fronts, as was the case in the campaigns of Novara and
Salamanca, when the direction of the roads in the theatre enabled one
general to assail his adversary's communications without exposing his
own. It may be the result of a prompt assumption of the initiative, as
at Jena, where the communications of the offensive army were secured
by menacing the adversary's; and in this last example of 1800, the configuration of the frontier line was made subservient to the same end.
and its left flank to the enemy: it was in a cul de sac, in the midst of
ravines, forests and defiles. Field Marshal Kray was thus forewarned as
to the destination of his enemy. He had eight days in which to concentrate.
He was thus ready for battle at Engen and Stokach, and in position to cover
his magazines at Ulm before the French general, who, meanwhile, had the
initiative. If Moreau had debouched by Lake Constance with his whole army,
he would have surprised, defeated, and captured half of the Austrian army: the
debris would have been able to rally only on the Neckar: he would have arrived
at Ulm before it. With what grand results! The campaign would have been
decided in the first fortnight."-Derrecagaix.
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS,
THE CASE OF AN ARMY PROLONGING ITS MOVEMENT AGAINST
THE ENEMY'S COMMUNICATIONS BY PLACING
ITSELF ACROSS THEM.
In discussing the operations of Radetzky in 1849, it was said to

be more judicious in that general to advance as he did upon the road
Mortara-Novara, than to throw himself across the road Novara-Vercelli; because, in the second case, the Sardinian army, being totally
intercepted, might take the resolution of marching to the Po across
the Austrian communications with Pavia, and would thus not only
extricate itself, but inflict some passing injury upon its adversary. But
there are cases where a general, having succeeded in turning the flank
of the opposing line, has not been content with compelling the enemy's
forces to form front to that flank, but has thrown his army across their
line of retreat. In two notable instances this was done by Napoleonnamely, at Marengo and Ulm-and once by Moreau in 1800 on the
Danube, subsequent to the operations described in the last chapter.
Were these, then, exceptional cases? Or were the French generals,
in operating thus, giving the enemy that chance of escape which Radetzky would, in the case supposed, have offered to the Sardinians?
As it is impossible that hostile armies can be operating from the
same base, it follows that an army which throws itself across the communications of its adversary cannot directly cover its own. If the two
bases are parallel, then the army operating thus must make a complete
countermarch, and must ultimately front its own base, with which it
can retain communication only by a.circuitous route; while the adversary, by a flank or oblique movement, can render the interception
reciprocal--and taking the most favorable case, namely, that the army
thus operating starts from a base parallel to its adversary's line of
retreat (as the French base from Basle to Lake Constance in 1800), it
must, in throwing itself across its enemy's communications, form front
to a flank, and so far endanger its own. In that case a great opportunity of improving his position is offered to the adversary, since, by
traversing, in a retreat towards his own base, the line by which the
enemy's army advanced, he will probably reestablish his own communications by his flank, while he severs the enemy's, and will thus
reverse the position.

It may happen that the connection of an army with its base is by
ta single road. If the base be a point only, not a line-as, for instance,
a harbor where a landing has been effected-this will, most likely, be
the case. And even when a great army is operating from an extensive
base, the nature of the intermediate country may be such as to force
the principal routes to meet in some defile which forms the only practicable thoroughfare. Had the Allies in 1813 succeeded in their design
of throwing their army across Napoleon's rear, west of Leipsic, he
would have had no alternative but to break through or be ruined.
For the Harz Mountains on the one side, and the Thuringian Forest
on the other, had narrowed the channel by which he communicated
with France to the single road Leipsic-Erfurth-Hanau.
In general, however, an army thus cut from its base will have
two or three alternatives. 1st, It may march directly on the opposing
force, and try to drive it off the line or rout it; 2d, It may march to
one flank across the communications of the enemy; 3d, It may attempt
by a march to the other flank to avoid a collision. And it must be
remembered that these flank marches entail none of the usual risk,
which is, that they uncover the communications; for an army that has
lost its communications is at any rate free to move in all directions,
and cannot well change its position for a worse.
It will generally be very difficult for a commander who aims at
his adversary's rear, to know how soon the enemy may be informed of
his design, and how promptly steps may be taken to frustrate it. He
will, therefore, when practicable, direct his movement so far to the
rear as to insure the interception of the enemy. It is to be presumed
that he will, on reaching the point aimed at, be ignorant of the movements of the intercepted army, and must either await its approach, or
advance to close with it. The only certainty he can feel will be that
the enemy cannot pause or delay, but must act at once as soon as they
can concentrate their forces.
On the other hand, the intercepted commander must directly
experience all the doubt, confusion, and discouragement which follow
the loss of communications. If he evades the assailing force by marching round its outward flank, he must undergo the humiliation of
abandoning territory without a blow. If he marches straight upon it,
a victory may retrieve all, but a repulse will be ruin. If he marches
See Map
No. 2.
See Map
No. 5.
Austrian
positions.
upon its communications and succeeds in anticipating it there, he may

reverse the position.
CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.
In May 1800, the Austrian army in Italy, numbering 100,000,
under General Melas, was engaged in three different operations: 1st,
A corps of 25,000 men under Ott was besieging Genoa; 2d, Between
the Alps and the sea another corps under Elsnitz (18,000) was covering the siege from the efforts which a French corps, 12,000, under
Suchet, was expected to make for the relief of the place, and an
Austrian success there might be expected to transfer the war into
French territory; 3d, The remainder of the army was spread along
the foot of the Alps watching the issues from the Apennines to the St
Gothard. The Austrian lines of communication with the base on the
Mincio were:Milan-Brescia-Peschiera.
Pavia-Lodi. Lonato-Peschiera.
Pavia-Pizzighitone-Cremon a-Mantua.
Napoleon's object was to descend into Italy by the Pass of St.

Bernard * with 35,000 men, drive back the portion of the Austrian
line north of the Po (about 10,000 strong), and enter Milan. General Chabran with a division of 4,000 men was directed to cross by
way of the little St. Bernard and join Napoleon at Ivrea. General
Moncey with 15,000 men was detached from Moreau's army and directed via the St. Gothard on Belinzona; and, finally, in order to
deceive the enemy General Thurreau was ordered to debouch on Susa
by Mont Cenis. If Napoleon's plan could be concealed until he had
thrown a force across the Po at Piacenza, the Austrian army would be
cut from the Mincio; and the concentration of their forces which must
precede their subsequent "movements would relieve Genoa and leave
Suchet free to form a junction with its garrison. On the 16th of May
Napoleon, having assembled his army at Villeneuve on the Lake of
"Every pass across the mountains had been carefully considered by
Napoleon. The route by way of the St. Gothard was rejected as altogether too
circuitous; that by way of the Simplon would have necessitated a long and
difficult march through the Canton of Valais, and would have required too
much time; the route by way of Mt. Cenis was too near the line of Austrian
operations Napoleon accordingly decided in favor of the St. Bernard, though
his chief of engineers considered the passage extremely difficult. "Difficult,
granted; but isit possible?" replied Napoleon. "I think so" was the rejoinder,
"but with extraordinary efforts." "Very well then," said the First Consul,
"we will go."
THE MARENGO CAMPAIGN.

Geneva, at the foot of the mountains, began his march, Lannes' division in advance.
On the 19th of May the French found their progress checked at
Bard by an Austrian fort which completely commanded the village
through which they must pass. Lannes, however, discovered a goat
path, out of range of the fort, by means of which he succeeded in passing his infantry and cavalry to Ivrea, which he reached on the 22nd,
and carried by assault. On the same day the head of Thurreau's
column emerged from the Mont Cenis on the Susa road. The Austrian general mistook this column for the advanced guard of the French
army, and considered Lannes' division merely as a detachment
employed to make a diversion. He accordingly placed the greater
part of the force of his center, assembled round Turin, on the Susa
road, and sent only a division, under Haddick, to oppose Lannes.
23rd May.-An unsuccessful attempt was made by Napoleon to
carry the fort at Bard by escalade.
25th May.-Napoleon decided to take advantage of the darkness
of night to slip past the fort with his artillery. The wheels of the
gun-carriages were accordingly wrapped with straw, the pieces were
covered with tow so as to prevent the slightest rattling, and the street
of the village was spread with straw and dung. The artillery thus
succeeded in-stealing safely past the fort.
26th May.-Lannes defeated Haddick and drove him towards
Chivasso.
27th May.- The main army concentrated at Ivrea. The infantry
comprised three corps under Lannes, Duhesme and Victor; the cavalry
was commanded by Murat.

28th May.-Lannes advanced to Chivasso where he seized boats
as if for the passage of the Po. The Austrians alarmed by his advance
prepared hastily to evacuate Turin. Moncey was now crossing the
St. Gothard. *
* "Thirteen days had elapsed, and the stupendous enterprise of the First
Consul had completely succeeded. An army of 40,000 men, infantry, cavalry,
artillery, had crossed, without beaten roads, the highest mountains in Europe
dragging by main strength its artillery over the snow, or pushing it under the
murderous fire of a fort, and almost close to the muzzles of its guns. A division
of 5000 men had descended the little St. Bernard; another of 4000 had debouched by Mont Cenis; a detachment occupied the Simplon; lastly, a corps of 15,000
French, under General Moncey, was on the top of the St. Gothard. There were
29th May.-Napoleon began his march upon Milan.
Murat's
cavalry constituted the advanced guard. Lannes' corps formerly the
advanced guard now became the rear guard, and marched from ChiMelas learned of the advance on Milan but
vasso upon Pavia.
believed that the Austrians on the Ticino, under Wukassowitch, would
check it.
31st May.-Murat defeated Wukassowitch and drove him across
the Ticino. Wukassowitch fearful of being caught between Napoleon
and Moncey retreated behind the Adda.
1st June.-Lannes entered Pavia. Fort Bard surrendered to
General Chabran who had been charged with its investment. Chabran
placed a garrison in the fort and in Ivrea; and held the course of the
Po from the Dora Baltea to the Sesia. Lannes held the river from
the Sesia to Pavia. Melas had prepared to advance with the troops
of the center (about 20,000), crossing the Po at Casale, and cutting
the French communications at Vercelli, while the same movement
would isolate Lannes from Napoleon. But receiving information of
the reverses of Kray on the Danube, the retreat of Wukassowitch
beyond the Adda, and the arrival of the head of Moncey's column on
the Ticino, he felt the necessity of assembling his forces before attempting to break through the formidable array opposed to him on the
Ticino. He accordingly suspended the advance and gave orders for a
concentration round Alessandria. Elsnitz was to quit the Var and
march on Asti, leaving rear guards to close the Apennines against
Suchet. The forces covering Turin were to wait there until Elsnitz's
column should have reached its destination, in order to protect its
march from the French on the Mont Cenis, and were then to move on
Asti also. Ott was to raise the siege of Genoa, and hasten with his
corps to seize the important point Piacenza and defend the line of the
Po. But Ott awaited the capitulation then pending.
2nd June.-Napoleon entered Milan, and there awaited the arrival
of Moncey's forces, which, delayed by the difficulties of the route, did
not all assemble on the Ticino till the 6th.
thus in all sixty and odd thousand soldiers about to enter Italy, still separated,
it is true, from one another by considerable distances, but certain of soon rallying around the principal mass of 40,000 men who were debouching by Ivrea, at
the center of the semi-circle of the Alps."-Thiers.
THE MARENG O CAMPAIGN.

6th June. -Lannes and Victor crossed the P) at Belgiojoso. Miirat
crossed near Piacenza. Moncey now guarded the line of the Ticino
from any attempt Melas might make to break through.
7th June.-=-Lannes and Victor, turning westward, passed Stradella.
Murat took Piacenza.
Duhesme passed at Cremona with one division.
Meanwhile the movements of the Austrian corps under Elsnitz
and Ott were these:3rd June.-Elsnitz, executing Melas' orders of the 31st, was retreating on Ormea.
5th June.-Two of his brigades were cut off by Suchet in the
Apennines.
7th June.-He reached Ceva with only 8000 of his late force of
18,00 0 men.
On the 4th June Genoa capitulated.
5th and 6th.-Ott, placing a garrison ia Genoa, sent a brigade of
infantry towards Piacenza by Bobbio, and marched with the rest of
his corps on Tortona for Piacenza.
7th and 8th.-He reached Tortona.
9th. -Continuing his march on Piacenza, he encountered Lannes
and. Victor at Montebello, was defeated, and driven back on. Alessandria.
10th, 11th, and 12th.-Napoleon awaited the movements of the
enemy in the following attitude:The four divisions of Lannes, Victor, Murat, and Desaix, *
28,000, were assembled about Casteggio.
The rest of the French army was distributed as follows:One of Moncey's divisions was at Pavia; one, at Milan; and the
third, at Crema and Brescia, to hold in check the Austrians on the
Mincio.
Loison's division blockaded Pizzighittone.
Chabran's division held the line of the Dora Baltea and the Po,
from Bard to the Sesia. The lines of communications via the St. Bernard and St. Gothard were thus guarded.
12th.-Melas' army was assembled round Alessandria.
13th.-Napoleon, impatient to learn the movements of the enemy,
crossed the Scrivia, pushed his advanced guard to the Bormida, and
* Desaix arrived on the 11th June, having come almost directly from
Egypt. Napoleon at once formed a new corps for him of the divisions of
Boudet and Monnier, which had been with Murat.
detached Desaix with a division to seek intelligence towards Rivalta.
This movement would also check any attempt of Melas to move via
Novi upon Genoa, and might open communication with Suchet, who
was moving down the valley of the Bormida on Acqui.
14th.--The Austrians issued from their bridge-head on the Bormida, and fought the battle of Marengo. The French were at the
end of the first period of the battle driven back to St. Giuliano, but
the return of Desaix from Rivalta changed the fortune of the day,
and the Austrians were driven in rout over the Bormida.
15th.-Melas capitulated, abandoning the country and its fortresses as far as the Mincio, but saving his troops. For Napoleon,
considering that Melas' army was yet formidable, and might in another
effobrt succeed in breaking through his cordon, permitted them to pass.
COMMENTS.
Ivrea is an example of the importance of particular points without regard to their capability of defence. The fact that from thence
there was a road to Milan, whither Napoleon wished to go, and another
to Turin, whither he desired Melas to believe that he wished to go, was
of great moment. For, so.long as Lannes threatened Turin, so long
was the march on Milan screened.
Thurreau's force, being entirely separated from the main army
throughout the operations, was useful only as leading the enemy to a
false conclusion. But its value in that respect was incalculable. There
were sufficient Austrian troops round Turin to check Thurreau and
crush Lannes, thus laying bare the rear of the French army. But
the road of the Mont Cenis was both more practicable and more direct
than that of the St. Bernard; moreover, Thurreau had artillery, and
Lannes, at first, had not, for his guns had been delayed by the diffi.
culty of passing the Austrian fort of Bard. It was but a natural error,
therefore, for Melas to believe that Thurreau was backed by the whole
French army.
The critical part of Napoleon's movement lay between Ivrea and
the Ticino. For, during that march, his communications were by the
St. Bernard, and an advance, such as that which Melas intended on
the 31st May, would have cut off his retreat. But on passing the
Ticino, he not only gained the addition of Moncey's force, but a new
line of retreat, in case of need, by the St Gothard.
THE MARENGO CAMPAIGN.

Next what we had most to fear was a speedy concentration of the
Austrians. Against this he might confidently count on the reluctance
which Melas would naturally feel to withdraw his forces from Genoa
and the Var, whereby the fruits of the whole campaign would be
abandoned. Moreover, the time which must elapse between the transmission of orders from Turin or Alessandria, and the assemblement of
the Austrian corps on the Po, could not be less than five or six days.
Melas actually ordered the concentration on the night of the 31st
May. Ott probably received the order on the 2d June. Had he
obeyed at once he would have reached Montebello on the 7th instead
of the 9th. On that day Lannes was across the Po and moving by
Stradella. It was therefore a question of a few hours, whether the
Austrians should or should not close the line of the Po between Casale
and Piacenza against the French, and so secure their own retreat.
This crisis passed, we find Napoleon dividing his army. One half
only is on the south of the Po; most of the remainder is employed in
guarding the communications. And here is seen the danger of this
kind of operation. For Melas's army of 32,000, with superior cavalry
and artillery, was assembled at Alessandria on the 12th; on the 14th it
might have broken through Moncey's feeble cordon and have reached
Milan while Napoleon was seeking it on the Bormida.
There was a special circumstance in this campaign which should
have induced Napoleon to bring his whole army to the south bank.
For if Melas moved through Milan he would leave the country south
of the Po clear for Napoleon to establish another and better communication with France by the south of the Apennines, and, moreover, a
junction with Suchet would be effected, and the territory which was to
be the prize of the campaign would be lost to the Austrians. But
Napoleon could not be satisfied to let the enemy escape even at such
a sacrifice of territory, and therefore it was that. he left the Ticino
guarded. But there was another alternative open to Melas. He
might not only retreat by the north of the Po, but by the road from
Alessandria to Genoa; and he actually contemplated the movement,
expecting to maintain himself there with the aid of the fortress, of the
strong position in the Apennines, and of the English fleet.
The
prisoners captured by Lannes at Montebello would inform Napoleon
that Genoa was now Austrian, and that a retreat thither was offered
Turin to
Genoa, 90.
Turin to the
Var, 100.
52
to the foe. Therefore it was that his eager and grasping ambition led
him to seek a superior enemy in the great plain of Marengo, a field
altogether favorable to that enemy, who was stronger in cavalry and
artillery; and therefore it was also that the victory was further jeopardized by the detachment of Desaix towards Rivalta.
Looking at the position of the French army throughout this short
campaign, it is evident that Napoleon might have been obliged to fight
an equal enemy in a situation where, in case of defeat, he would have
been cut off from the St Bernard (which, bad as it was, was the best
line of retreat he possessed), and must have retired by the St Gothard
at the sacrifice of his artillery. Such must have been the result had
Melas sought and defeated him north of the Po, or had he been beaten
at Marengo. His confidence was justified, not by the excellence of
his precautions in case of defeat, but by the calculations which assured him that his most critical movements would be unmolested.
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Campaign of 1805.
When Austria joined with England, Russia, Sweden and Naples,
in the Third Coalition against France, Napoleon's "Grand Army,"
which had been destined for the invasion of England, was stationed as
follows :
Davout's corps at Ambleteuse,
Soult's corps and the Guard at Boulogne,
Ney's corps at Montreuil,
Augereau's corps at Brest,
Marmont's corps in Holland,
Bernadotte's corps in Hanover.
The Allies decided to make four separate attacks upon France.
The first, in the North, was to be made by an army composed of
English, Russians, and Swedes, and was directed against Hanover and
Stations of
Napoleon's
Army.
The plans of
the Allies.
Holland. The second, by the Valley of the Danube, ivas to be made

by an army composed of Austrians and Russians. The third, in
Lombardy, was to be made by an army composed of Austrians alone;
and the fourth, by an army composed of English, Russians and
Neapolitans, was to be made later in the south of Italy.
In furtherance of this plan, Austria sent an army of 100,000 men,
under the Archduke Charles, into Italy, and an army of 80,000 men,
nominally commanded by the Archduke Ferdinand, but really directed
by General Mack, against Bavaria. A force of 25,000 men in Tyrol
was to maintain communication between the two.
The Austrian
Armies.
Napoleon recognized that the neutrality of Prussia would fatally
hamper the attack from the north, and that the theater, as well as the
probable size and composition of the invading force, was such that
the attack in the south of Italy would not be serious. He accordingly
left the defense in that quarter to a force of 25,000 men under
General St. Cyr. The defense of Lombardy was left to Massena, who
with 50,000 choice troops was expected to contain the Archduke,
while Napoleon, with the main army, would fall upon the allied
Austrians and Russians in the central theater.
First movements of the

Austrians.
Two plans
open to
Napoleon.
The Emperor concluded that the Austrians, eager to secure at

once the strong strategic point of Ulm, and gain the political
advantage of the occupation of Bavaria, probably coercing the Elector
into an alliance, would not wait for the arrival of the Russians, but
would advance at once. He determined to overthrow them before
they could obtain assistance from their allies.
In August Mack's army assembled on the Inn. Magazines had
been prepared between the Lake of Constance and the UpperDanube,
notably at Memmingen, where immense stores of provisions were
collected and intrenchiments thrown up.
Promptly abandoning his contemplated invasion, Napoleon decided to break up his camps on the shore of the ocean, and transport
his army rapidly to the Rhine. Two plans were then open to him.
He might move by his right, ascend the Rhine like Moreau in
1800, cross at Strasburg and Schaffhausen, debouch by the defiles
of the Black Forest between the Suabian Alps and Lake Constance, and make a front attack upon the Austrians posted behind
the Iller. A victory in this case would, however, merely result in
driving the Austrians back on their natural line of retreat, and force
them into that junction with the Russians which it was his object to
prevent.
The other plan was, to move by his left down the Valley of the
Danube, so as to interpose between Mack, and, while covering his
own communications, completely cut him off from the approaching
Russians. This was the plan decided upon.
On August 27, Napoleon at Boulogne issued the following orders:
Bernadotte to concentrate at Gottingen on Sept. 6, and march
upon Wiirzburg.
CAMPAIGN OF 1805.
Marmont, at Utrecht, to concentrate his troops on Sept. 1, and
march upon Wiirzburg.
Davout to march, starting on the 29th from Ambleteuse, via
Lille, Namur and Luxemburg, to Mannheim.
Soult and the Guardto march, starting on the 29th, from Boulogne,
via Douay, Chambrai, MezierBs, Verdun and Metz, to Spire.
Ney to march, starting on the same day, from Montreuil, via
Arras, Rheims, Nancy and Saverne, to Strasburg.
The army thus marched in parallel columns, the divisions of each
corps following one another at a distance of one day's march. The
columns were preceded by the cavalry, which Napoleon ordered to
move four days before the infantry.
Sept. 8. The Austrians crossed the Inn and entered Bavaria.
The Elector, now in alliance with Napoleon, abandoned Munich and
retired to Wiirzburg, where his army, 25,000 strong, was concentrated
on Sept. 12. Mack immediately pushed forward to Ulm, where he
established himself behind the Iller, in a position almost impregnable
to front attack, his right at Ulm, resting on the Danube, and his left
This position he inat Memmingen supported by the mountains.
tended to hold until he should be reinforced by the Russians. The
Austrian base extended from Egra on the north to Steyer on south,
and Mack's main lines of retreat were by way of Nuremburg, north of
the Danube; by way of Ratisbon, along the same river; or by way of
Augsburg and Munich on the south.
Austrian
position, base
and communications.
Sept. 24.
Davout, Soult and Ney arrived on the Rhine.
Suchet's division, from Soult's corps, was united with Oudinot's
grenadiers into a new corps, of which Lannes was placed in command.
Augereau, from Brest, having a greater distance to march, arrived
on the Rhine some days later, and constituted the general reserve.
He was charged with the duty of guarding the country between the
Rhine and the Upper Danube, and covering the French right on the
side of the Tyrol.
Sept. 25.
Murat and Lannes crossed the Rhine at Strasburg
Murat's dragoons were pushed into the defiles of the Black Forest at
Freudenstadt, Rothweil and Neustadt, and agents were sent ahead to
engage provisions as for a march in that direction. Murat's cavalry
was supported by Lannes with a few battalions of infantry, but the
March of the
French
columns.
bulk of his corps was placed in advance of Strasburg, on the Stuttgart

road, to cover the march of the other corps, which crossed the Rhine
lower down, from a possible attack by the Austrians. ' Ney crossed at
Carlsruhe; Soult at Spire; and Davout at Mannheim.
Bernadotte arrived at Wiirzburg on Sept. 27, and Marmont two
days later.
They here united with the Bavarians.
Oct. 4. The entire army was directed upon the Danube between
Donauwerth and Ingolstadt, marching as follows:
French form
front' to the
Danubei
(Murat
Lannes
Ney
DThe Guard
(Soult
Center
l
Davout
ton
via Pforzheim, Stuttgart, Heidenheim,
on Donauwerth. Murat's cavalry screening and reconnoitering the front and on

l the right flank.
{
{
via Spire, Heilbronn,

Donauwerth.
Ellwangen,
on
via Heidelberg, Neckar-Els, Oettingen,

Neuberg.
(.Marmon tr
via Anspach and Eichstadt on Ingolstadt.
Beraadotte
lBavarians l
Left
Ulm to Ingolstadt-77.
Napoleon accompanied the right wing. . Mack, deceived by the

demonstrations of Murat, remained in position.
Mack sent Kienmayer with 20,000 men to Ingolstadt to
observe the Bavarians and connect with the Russians, who were
He did not yet detect the
expected by the high road from Munich.
Oct. 6.
nature of Napoleon's operations.
On this day Ney was at Heidenheim ;
Lannes at Neresheim; Soult at Miinster, 3 miles above Donauwerth,

where he captured the bridge; Davout at Oettingen; the Left Wing
approaching Ingolstadt.
Oct. 7.
Soult captured the bridge at Donauwerth and crossed to

Keinmayer fell back on Aicha. Murat, preceding
the right bank.

French cross
the Austrian
communication,
the right wing, crossed at Minster, and seized the bridge over the
Lannes crossed at Miinster, and the Guard at
Leck at Rain.
Donauwerth.
Ney remained to guard the left bank. Napoleon
issued the following orders:
Muratand Lannes to place themselves between Ulm and Augsburg.
Soult to Augsburg.
Davout to hasten to cross at Neuberg and clear Ingolstadt, which
Then to push Keinmayer before
the left wing was approaching.
him, occupying Aicha, and constitute the rear guard of the forces
CAMPAIGN OF 1805.
now moving westward upon Ulm.

Napoleon with the Guard remained at Donauwerth.
The army was thus prepared to oppose a front to Mack or to the
Russians, with a central reserve ready to reinforce either side.
Soult entered Augsburg.
Oct. 8.
Murat and Lannes moved
upon Burgau, to occupy the space between the Iller and the Lech.
They encountered a force of Austrians at Wertingen, which they
and close
upon the
routed and drove back upon Ulm.

Davout crossed at Neuberg and proceeded to Aicha.
The left wing reached Ingolstadt.
enemy.
Burgau, half
way between
Zrnmarshan-
received reinforcements from the right

to 40,000, was ordered up the left
his
strength
ban]k which raised
sen
Oct. 9.
Ney,
having
and
Gunzbnrb
bank to close the avenues of escape on that side, and guard the French
communications from any inovement of the Austrians from ULm.
He
was to maintain
his
communication
with
occupying the bridges as he ascended the river.
the
Emperor
by
He captured the
three bridges at Gdinzlerg aunl immediate vicinity, and drove the

defenders with loss upon Ulm.
Napoleon, thinking that it might be
necessary for him to move in person against the Russians with the
rest of his army, placed the corps of Lannes, Ney and Murat under
the command of the latter.
This step was an unfortunate one, for
Lannes and Ney were jealous and insubordinate; and Murat, not
clearly understanding the strategic situation, ordered Ney to cross to
the right bank.
Acting under the advice of his chief-of-staff, Jomini,

Ney merely sent one division to Murat.
Mack changed front to rear; right at Memmingen, left at Uln.
In a council of war it was decided that the Archduke Ferdinand with
25,000 men should endeavor to escape via Heide nheim-Nordlingen.
Mack was to hold Ulm long enough to cover the movement, and then
endeavor to effect his escape with the rest of his army via Memmingen
and Kempten into the Tyrol.
The Russian army had passed Linz, on the Danube, but was still
ten or twelve marches distant from Munich.
Napoleon set out for Augsburg, whither the Guard had already
been directed.
The left wing crossed at Ingolstadt.
Austrians
claned
front to rear.
Haslach 21
miles S. W.
of Albeck.
Oct. 10. Napoleon arrived- at Augsburg, and directed Soult to

ascend the Lech to Landsberg, and then; move upon Memmingen
thus barring the escape of Mack into the Tyrol. Marmont was
ordered to Augsburg to replace Soult. Bernadotte, with his own
corps and the Bavarians was ordered to Munich, to follow Keinmayer
and check the Russians.
Oct. 11. Under imperative orders, Ney had sent from Giinzburg
another division to Murat, Dupont's division (6,000 strong), moving
from Albeck toward Ulhn, encountered the Archduke Ferdinand
See Map
No. 4.
(25,000) at Haslach. After a stubborn battle, Dupont checked the.

Austrians, but was obliged to fall back upon Albeck. Ney, in
obedience to Murat's orders, had recalled Dupont to Giinzburg. In
compliance with these orders, Dupont fell back, followed as far as
D)achan.
Weissenhorn
10 m. S..E.
of Ulm.
Langenau by Werneck's Austrian division.

Bernadotte, pushing the rear guard of Keinmayer
Oct. 12.
before him, entered Munich. Soult drove from Landsberg a small
force of Austrian cuirassiers, which fled towards Ulm.
Napoleon concluded that Mack was not trying to break out by
way of the Tyrol, but was concentrating on the Iller between
Memmingen and Ulm.
Davout was ordered from Aicha to Dachau, where he was in a
position to unite with Bernadotte at Munich to oppose the Russians,
or move back to Augsburg to assist in the operations against Mack, as
circumstances might demand.
The Guard was ordered from Augsburg to Weissenhorn.
Napoleon was now prepared to assemble, between Memmingen an:i
Ulm, the corps of Ney, Lannes, Murat, Marn:ont, Soult, and the
Guard, for a decisive battle.
Mack sent a division to reinforce the garrison of Memmingen,
and another to occupy the heights of Elchingen, on the left bank.
The latter destroyed the bridge at Elchingen, thus cutting off Dupont
from the rest of the army, except by the circuitous way of Giinzburg.
The road to Bohemia, via Heidenheim and Nordlingen, was now open
to the Austrians, and the French communications were exposed; but
Mack was not aware of his opportunity, and the dissemination of his
forces by reinforcing bc.th flanks at a time when he should have
concentrated, deprived him of the power of prompt and effective
action.
CAMPAIGN OF 1i805.
Napoleon arrived before Ulm, and became aware of

Oct. 13.
Murat's error.
To establish prompt communication with the left bank,
the immediate establishment of a bridge at Elchingen was necessary.
The following movements were ordered:
Marmont to the Iller on the left of Lannes.
Lantnes, Ney and Miurat up the right bank, to lend a hand to

Dupont and restore the passage at Elchingen.
Dupont to advance again toward Ulm.

Soult invested Memmingen.
Oct. 14.
Ney repaired the bridge at Elchingen under fire, and
effected a passage.
Werneck, hearing the cannonade in his rear,

retraced his steps, hut Dupont, interposing between him and Ulm,
Werneck retreated
cut off his retreat and separated him from Mack.
to Heidenheim.
Soult captured Memmingen, with its garrison of 7,000 men, and
was ordered to proceed to Achstetten.
Archduke Ferdinand, on the
night of October 14, escaped from Ulm with 7,000 cavalry and a
small body of infantry, and retreating rapidly via Geislingen, effected
a junction with Werneck.
Oct. 15.
Lannes and
Elchingen.
Marmont on the Iller.
Murat
crossed to the left bank
at
Soult approaching Ulm on the Biberach road.

The investment was now complete.
Murat,. with the reserve
cavalry, Dupont's division and Oudinot's grenadiers, pursued Ferdinand and Werneck.
Oct. 16.
Napoleon summoned Mack to surrender.
Murat,
following Ferdinand, brought him to bay on the 18th near Nordlingen.
Werneck surrendered the Austrian force,
hut Ferdinand,
with a
handful of cavalry, made his escape.

Oct. 19. Mack surrendered Ulm with 30,000 men.
Napoleon's plan had been completely successful; and never was
there a greater triumph of strategy.
In less than a month from the
time that the Emperor arrived on the Rhine, he had destroyed an

Austrian army of 80,000 men, without a pitched battle, and with a
loss on his part of not more than 2,000 men hors de combat. *
- The prisoners taken were as follows: -At Wertigen, 2,000; at Gunzhurg,
2,000; at Haslach, 4,000; at Munich, 1,000; at Elchingen, 3,000; at Memiingen,
7,000; near Nordlingen, 12,000; at Ulm, 30,000. The rest of the Austrian army
was killed, wounded, or dispersed in flight.
Geislingen 16
m. N. N. W.
from Ulm.
COMMENTS.
The first great error on the part of the Austrians was the precipitancv with which they rushed forward, without waiting for the
Russians to occupy Ulm. Even if this place had retained all the
importance that it possessed in former campaigns, it may well be
doubted that its inherent strength could have compensated for the
loss of nearly 60,000 men who were advancing from Russia to un ite
with the army of Mack. Still, if the circumstances had been the
same as in former campaigns, the Austrian commander, holding the
strong position at Ulm, might have reasonably hoped to be able to
check the French until the arrival of the Russians.
New conditions had, however, entered into the strategical problem.
It was no longer necessary for the French to advance through the
Black Forest, for the line of the Mayne now gave Napoleoni a rectangular base from which he could move upon the Austrian right and
rear, while covering his own communications. The left wing covered
its communications with Wiirzburg, and the other corps, though
marching to a flank could if threatened from Ulm form front in that
direction, and cover their communications via Mayence and Wiirzburg.
Mack failed completely to grasp the, strategical situation, which
was altogether favorable to the French. Napoleon might, in fact,
have made the entire movement from Mayence and Wiirzburg, and
though in that case it could not have been concealed .he could have
compelled Mack to form front to the right, and give battle in that
unfavorable situation, as the only alternative to abandoning the
theater altogether in order to effect a junction with the Russians.
Napoleon aimed, however, at still more decisive results, and the
success of his plan demanded that the Austrians should be hleld at
Ulm until he could interpose between them and the Russians. The
skillful demonstrations of Murat and Lannes in the defiles of the
Black Forest seemed to indicate the front attack which Mack
expected and for which he was prepared. The march of the center
and right was skillfully veiled by Murat's cavalry, and even so late as
October 6, Mack seems to have been completely in the dark in regard
to Napoleon's movements, for he sent Keinmayer to Ingolstadt to
watch the Bavarians, who, as he knew, had withdrawn to Wiirzburg
and were now reported to be advancing The position of the Bavarians
was, in fact, such as to give Mack considerable uneasiness; for even if
CAMPAIGN OF 1805.
they had not been reinforced by the French they would have been a
constiant menace to his communications.
The misfortunes of the
Austrian commander were largely due to his neglect to use his cavalry
vigorously in reconnaissance. Vigorous reconnaissance and the capture of a few French prisoners should have opened his eyes to the
actual conditions, before he was inextricably in the toils of a Napoleon.
In this campaign we observe Napoleon's habitual method of
moving with two wings and a central reserve. When he had crossed
the Danube, he sent Murat with three corps to operate directly against
Ulm, while the center (Davout at Aicha and Soult at Augsburg)
was ready to form front against the Russians. When the left wing
crossed the river, Soult was free to swing into line with Murat (towards Ulm via Memmingen), Bernadotte and the Bavarians constituted the left wing facing the Russians, while Marmont and the Guard
at Augsburg and Davout at Aicha constituted the center reserve.
Circumstances rendering it evident that the left wing would unaided
be sufficient to contain the Russians, the center was united with
the left. Had the Russians been close at hand, Napoleon, leaving
Murat to contain Mack, might have united the center with the right
for a battle with the Russians in the direction of Munich.
Every consideration of prudence demanded that Mack, when he
found his communication intercepted, should concentrate his forces at
once. Whether he intended to stand for a decisive battle or to
attempt to cut his way out, concentration was alike necessary. But
instead of concentrating, he sent a part of his force to each extremity
of his line, at Elchingen andMemmingen, and thus, though inferior
to his opponent when united, incurred defeat in detail. Had he concentrated his forces promptly, two courses of action would have been
open to him; he might have retired by way of Kempten, or he might
have moved by way of Neresheim-Nordlingen, traversing the French
communications. The latter move was rendered peculiarly practicable by Murat's misconception of the strategical situation, which
caused him at a critical juncture to leave the door open for Mack's
escape. Of the two lines of retreat, that by way of Kempten would
probably have been preferable, as a junction could have been effected
with the Archduke Charles. The movement via Neresheim-Nordlingen would have wrought considerable havoc with the French trains
and would have rendered the situation somewhat reciprocal for a time;
but the Austrians could not have maintained their position on the
French communications, and the direction of their retreat would have
been such that, while separating them completely from the Archduke
Charles, they could have effected a junction with the Russians only by
a circuitous route, and Napoleon might still have interposed between
them.
The failure of Murat to appreciate the strategic situation, and the
opportunity which he accordingly offered for the escape of Mack,
shows how the most perfect plans of the greatest commanders may
miscarry through the blunders of a subordinate.
The form of the base and the nature of the operations cause a
marked similarity between this campaign and the campaign of
Marengo. "The situation", says Hamley, "is almost the same as
that on the Po, when Napoleon advanced towards Marengo, except
that he now possessed a great superiority of force over his adversary.
Now, as then, the wings of the army were separated by a great river.
By a rapid advance he was trying to close with his adversary, who, as
at Alessandria, was resting on a fortress. Soult's corps, like Desaix's,
was seeking to cut off his retreat on one flank; Ney's corps, like
Moncey's, was covering the communications on the other. And in
the earlier course of the two campaigns a similarity is evident.
The
line of the Mayne corresponds to the frontier of Switzerland, affording,
with the Rhine, a rectangular base; the advance from Wiirzburg to
the march of Moncey; the approach of the right wing towards the
Austrian front, to the feint of Thurreau, but with the difference that
Lannes and Murat were not prevented, as Thurreau was, from joining the main body. This circumstance, joined to the excellence of
the communications, and the complete security of the flank march
which had been in the former campaign so critical, gave to the
later operations a much greater degree of certainty, security, and
completeness."
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOREGOING EXAMPLES.
The operations which have been described supply certain grounds

for judging the merits of any enterprise against an enemy's communications.
First, we learn that it is not sufficient to seize any point in the
enemy's rear. The choice of this point is very important.
When armies are manceuvring near each other, and the operations
are restricted to a narrow space, as in Radetzky's campaign, the assail-
Direction to
be pursued
by an army
ant can determine with certainty the small area within which he will that aims at
come in contact with the enemy, and he can so direct his march as, its adverat the same time, to intercept and to close with him. When the Sar- sary's rear.
dinians retreated from Vigevano, the Austrian general might feel
assured that he would find them between Novara and Vercelli.
But when the turning movement is begun at a distance of several
marches from the enemy, no such exact calculation can be made; and
if the movement were directed straight on the position of the hostile
army, the latter might, by a single march to the rear, evade the blow.
On the other hand, if the movement be directed against a point
of the communications far to the rear, the assailant, on reaching it
must not only spread his forces over a space great in proportion to his
distance from the hostile army, in order to close the lines which radiate
from that army to its base, but must, by the obliquity of his march,
leave a long line of communication open to a counter-stroke.
The
necessity of secrecy will generally prevent the assailant from making
reconnaissances until the desired point is reached, and being therefore
almost in the dark as to the adversary's movements, he cannot concentrate his army on any particular line with the certainty of meeting
the shock there. Meanwhile the pressure on the communictitions will
have informed the enemy of the general direction of the movement
which he may take steps to frustrate by moving in mass in a direction,
where there is no adequate force to oppose him.
To give the greatest effect to such an operation, the movement
should be directed not more than a march or two in the rear of the rearmost point which it is calculated the enemy can reach by the time it is
completed, giving him credit for obtaining early intelligence and of
retreating with promptitude when his resolution is formed, but also
taking into account the motives which may induce him to delay to
form that resolution.
Necessity of
closing on the
intercepted
army.
Donauwerth
to Nordeingen, 18.
Having reached the point aimed at, it is essential not to await the
enemy, but to close upon him with all possible celerity. This will not
only relieve the assailant from uncertainty, and give him the power of
operating to the best advantage in any case that may occur, but will,
by narrowing the are on which his front is extended, increase his
means of concentration, and also enable him to secure his own communications against an effort of the intercepted army to break through.
Thus, when Napoleon had drawn his forces close around Ulm, his
right under Ney covered the roads to Wiirzburg from Mack; whereas
when he first crossed the Danube at Donauwerth, his right wing, in
order to protect to an equal degree the communications with Wiirzburg and bar Mack's retreat, must have extended from Donauwrth
to Nordlingen-an extension which would have so weakened it that
the Austrian army could not have been effectually opposed there.
The difficulties of the French were in proportion to the extent of the
space they must occupy between the river and the Ulm-Nuremberg
road.
When part only of the enemy's army
better to close on the intercepted portion
We shall see an example of this hereafter
when Napoleon turned from Champaubert
The intercepting force

must not be
inferiortothe
enemy unless
immediately
supported.
is intercepted, it will be
than to follow the other.
in the campaign of 1814,
on Montmirail.
Since to assail an adversary's communications is to challenge him

to immediate battle, the force which performs the movement must be
proportioned to the audacity of the step. An inferior force may menace its enemy's rear, as Sir John Moore's army menaced Napoleon's
line from Madrid to France; or a corps may inflict for a time great
damage on an adversary's army by interrupting convoys and destroying roads and supplies; but unless it have a retreat open, it will
probably suffer heavily for its presumption. Thus, when the Allies in
1813 were defeated before Dresden, Napoleon sent Vandamme's corps
up the .Elbe to intercept the retreat of their columns in rear of the
Saxon mountains; but the French force, throwing itself across the
path of the retiring army, was enveloped and destroyed. In the same
campaign, Wrede's corps, trying to cut Napoleon off from France
after the defeat of Leipsic, was swept aside at Hanau without effecting
any part of its purpose. An inferior force so engal,ed must therefore
compensate for its weakness by extraordinary advantages of position,
or must be certain of immediate and powerful support, such as a close
pursuit, by a co-operating fotrce, on the rear of the coming foe, or an
advance upon his flank by the main army. In any other case it is
imperative that the intercepting force should be strong enough to
engage on good terms wherever it may encounter the enemy.
The commander of an army that feels the grasp of a formidable
enemy on its communications is not in a position which admits of
pause or deliberation. His first step must be to concentrate his forces;
till that is effected he can only attempt to retreat under penalty of
sacrificing all the troops that have not joined him, and the more
extended his front the greater will be his danger. But if the concentration be accomplished while the enemy is yet at a distance, his hope
of safety must lie in the promptitude of his movements. Whatever
course he resolves on, whether to break through the cordon or to evade
it, it is indispensable that he should operate with his army entire. To
divide his forces for any purpose will be to play the adversary's game.
And the best course will generally be to strike boldly at the communications of the enemy, for a success there may retrieve the campaign.
Had Melas moved promptly to the Ticino he might have been in
Milan on the 14th June, while Napoleon was seeking him on the
Bormida. And Mack might have recovered his base without loss of
credit had he struck with his whole army towards Nuremberg. Still,.
meet it as he will, a sustained movement against his communications
must cause a general to lose ground in the theatre, and to abandon
his enterprises, though he save his army.
Best course
for the general of the
intercepted
antercepted
army.
Concentration indispensable.
OPERATIONS ILLUSTRATING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
FRONTS OF OPPOSING AIRMIES, WITHOUT SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE COMMUNICATIONS
WITH THE BASES.
THE MANNER IN WHICH PART OF AN ARMY MAY HOLD IN CHECK OR
RETARD A SUPERIOR FORCE OF THE ENEMY DURING
ATION:
THIS MATTER BEING
NECESSARY TO THE
AN OPERDISCUSSION
OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT STATED ABOVE.
The march of
a column
may be re-
tarded by a
very inferior
force.
'The retarding force

must engage
only partially,
It has been already said that in very few countries can a large
It
body of troops move in order of battle, even for a short march.
must of necessity, even when moving in the expectation of an immedWhen in
iate engagement,form lengthened columns on the roads.
this formation, only the heads of the columns can be deployed for
immediate action ; and to bring the army from the order of march to
the order of battle is a work of time. Therefore it may, in most
countries, be checked for a short time by a force, deployed in order of
battle, only a little superior to the heads of the advancing columns.
And the uses to be made of this circumstance are manifold ; it is not
too much to say that, rightly employed, it is the most effective weapon
in the military armory; but only one or two modes of applying it
need be adverted to, for the better understanding of this part of the
subject.
If a body of troops were to remain drawn up to oppose the advance of a superior force, on a plain, where the whole formation was
The enemy
visible, the attempt would be futile and disastrous.
would at once attack with superior force, and compel a costly retreat
under penalty of rout or destruction. But skillfully disposed, in a
good position, across the path of an adversary advancing in an
ordinarily broken and difficult country, the risk is greatly reduced.
If the armies have been manvoeuvring near each other, with numbers
and positions constantly changing, and plans and combinations only
to be guessed at, the leader who comes on such an obstacle in his path
cannot, at first, know the amount of force which bars his way
sufficiently well to begin an immediate battle. He will generally
pause, reconnoitre, and feel his way; and will defer a general attack
till he shall be ready to deploy a force sufficient to render him confident of success.
In the meanwhile .the commander of the smaller fiorce must watch
carefully the dispositions of his adversary, and combine, in an unusual
degree, resolution with prudence. For if he were to engage the
whole of his troops throughout the extent of their front, it would be
out of his power to withdraw when the adversary had deployed a
superior force, and he would be outflanked and heavily defeated. On
the other hand, if he were to give way before the enemy had made a
considerable deployment, the advance which it was his business to
He must occupy his ground to the
check would not be retarded.
last moment possible without committing himself to a general action,
and must then effect an orderly retreat. At the first opportunity
offered by the ground he must repeat the manoeuvre. Meanwhile the
adversary will have again formed order of march, and, on approaching
him, must once more form for battle,-with more or less promptitude
in proportion to the confidence he may feel that the obstructing force
is still inferior to him. In this way the day's march, which, if
unopposed, might have stretched to twenty miles, may be reduced to
six or three; and time may thus be gained for employing to decisive
advantage the rest of that army which uses the retarding force.
THE COMBAT OF SAARBRUCKEN.
The engagement at Saarbrficken on August 2, 1870, affords an
instructive example of a rear guard action, and of a well-conducted
retreat before superior numbers.
The mobilization of French troops took place near the frontier;
that of the Germans some distance in rear. A small detachment of
Germans, without their reserves, had at once been thrown into Saarbrficken upon the declaration of war, and had maintained themselves
there, making a great show of strength by an efficient outpost and
patrol system, while confronted by two army corps of the French.
On the 2nd of August the Germans had been reinforced to 6 guns,
450 sabers, and 3,250 bayonets. On the other side Marshal Bazaine
was placed in command of seven infantry divisions, to seize Saarbrficken,
and make demonstrations to the right and left: the Marshal attacked
the town with 25,000 men and 60 guns, of Frossard's 2nd Army
Corps.
The German dispositions were as follows: On the right a picket
of the 69th regiment held the viaduct with the remainder of the
withdrawing
when outnumbered.
The 2nd Battalion 40th (Hohencompany as support in Malstatt.
zollern) Fusiliers were posted in and about Saarbrficken as follows:
The 7th Company of the 40th occupied the Custom House above the
Lower Bridge, sending a subaltern and 35 men to the drill ground.
Two double sentinels, posted at intervals on the high-road, formed the
connecting links by night between picket and support. On the right
shoulder of the hill, overlooking the approach from Stiring Wendel
and also the sentry on the viaduct, a non-commissioned officer and 6
men (9 by night) were placed as a detached post, 800 yards distant
from the picket. A non-commissioned officer and 6 men were also
stationed midway between the Custom House and the viaduct, in
order to furnish immediate information of an attack on this important
point. Constant patrols were sent out from picket and support in the
direction of Drathzug.
In the center the 6th Company maintained a picket on the
Nussberg: 2 non-commissioned officers and 20 men, with a double
sentinel on the Winterberg. This party was reinforced at night by :a
subaltern and 20 men, thus forming a strong guard across the Saarbrficken-Spicheren road. The remainder of the company occupied
a house near the Upper Bridge; 4 non-commissioned officers and 24
men being constantly employed on patrol, and a double sentinel posted
on the St. Arnaul Road.
The left, beyond the river, was committed to the 8th Company:
120 men in Brebach Village and 120 at the foot of the Hallberg, ready
to man either the strongly-fortified church-yard of the village, a breastwork which had been thrown across the railway, or a shelter-trench
which had been constructed on the river bank.
The 5th Company lay in reserve between the Upper Bridge and
the eastern entrance to St. Johann, with half a section (40 men) near
the Lower Bridge.
Three squadrons of the 7th Uhlans were posted as follows: 1
troop at St. Arnaul; 1 troop at Brebach, patrolling the river roads on
the left flank; 1 squadron in support north of St. Johann, a mile in
rear; 1 squadron three miles further in rear maintaining communication
with the east, west, and rear. One troop of the 9th Hussars was at
Raschpfuhl and furnished patrols for the Forbach valley.
The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 40th, with 4 guns, were at
Raschpfuhl, a clump of houses on the hill-side, above St. Johann,
covering the line of retreat.
Two guns of the light battery were posted on the lower slopes of
the Hallberg, on the extreme left. Fear of jeopardizing their retreat
over the narrow and barricaded bridges was evidently the reason that
none were placed on the ridge.
It did not escape the observation of the sentinels that the reveill6
was not sounded as usual in the French encampments on the morning
of the 2nd of August, and towards 9 o'clock the cavalry scouts reported
that a, general and his staff were riding from the direction of Forbach
as if for reconnaissance.
Nothing further, however, was discovered. The enemy's move-,
ments were completely screened by the woods, and the patrols of the
9th Hussars had been withdrawn, when suddenly, about 10 o'clock,
the sentinels gave the alarm.
As the Prussian outposts stood to arms, and watched the enemy's
masses streaming down the Rotherberg, up the Forbach valley and
But the order had
the river road, they saw that the ridge was lost.
been passed round that retreat was to be deferred until the flanks were
turned, Every hour that the French advance might be delayed gave
longer warning to the armies pressing forward from the Rhine.
The first division of the 2nd French Corps formed the first line.
On the right of the Forbach road the second brigade descending the
Spicheren heights moved against the Reppertsberg, the Winterberg
and St. Arnaul; on the left of the road the first brigade moved against
the Drill Ground, pushing a battalion along the line of railway. Three
squadrons of cavalry scoured the ground in front.. In rear of the
right wing, at 700 to 800 paces, followed the second brigade of the
third division; in rear of the left the first brigade of the first division.
The remainder of the Corps followed in reserve.
The Uhlan videttes before St. Arnaul were the first to fall back,
and as they trotted through the village, a message from the Nussberg
informed the 6th Company that hostile infantry were issuing from the
woods beyond the valley, and making for the Winterberg. St. Arnaul
was the first point threatened.
The picket on the Nussberg extended along the crest of the
Winterberg. Forty rifles were detached from the support to occupy
the gully on the right, whilst the remainder doubled forward to St.
Arnaul. As this party took post among the scattered trees that clothe
the lower slopes of the Winterberg, the head of a heavy column,
debouching by the river road, broke into a long line of skirmishers
across the stubble. The scouts were already out in front, and although
the range was fully 1,200 yards, the Chassep6t bullets whistled shrilly
past.
The two guns upon the Hallberg now opened, and from the
shelter-trench upon the river bank the fire of eighty rifles, although
the distance was too great for effective practice, checked for the moment
the advance of the enemy's right. But his battalions further to the
left pressed rapidly forward against the Winterberg. Behind that
hill lay the line of retreat to the Upper Bridge, and, fearing to be cut
off, the captain of the 6th Company gave the order to withdraw by the
Saarbrficken Road, A French field-battery came into action against
the little force across the river, and the skirmishers, covered by its fire,
swarmed into St. Arnaul and began to scale the Winterberg.
As its flank was now uncovered, the picket on the height, after
exchanging a brisk fire at long range with the French skirmishers, in
its turn descended to the bridge, followed by the detachment occupying
the ravine.
The 5th Company had taken post on the Reppertsberg. By this
time not only had the hill across the gully on their flank been carried,
but the valley in front was filled with French. The brilliant sunshine
glanced from ten thousand bayonets, and the blue and scarlet uniforms
lent vivid color to the animated scene. Deployed behind a waving
line of skirmishers, which covered the advance with a rolling fire, a
long array of battalions in close order stretched far to right and left.
The tirailleurs pushed onward at a run. The foot of the ridge was
gained and the red kepis of the foremost soon rose above the crest-line.
The ardor of the leaders had, however, led them too far forward, and
the marksman's section, which had been drawn up behind the reverse
slope of the ridge, dashed across the stubble and drove them down the
hill. The supports followed quickly, and the whole company, extending along a hedge-row, brought a heavy fire to bear upon the enemy
immediately below, whilst the left section engaged the force upon the
Winterberg, across the gully.
The 7th Company, upon the Drill Ground Hill was meanwhile
confronted by an entire brigade of six battalions, with a second brigade in close support. Troops were also observed ascending the
Rotherberg, from which a battery had already opened fire. The
picket had extended along the crest to the left of the road at the first
alarm, and under the lofty poplars that fringed the hill in rear many
of the inhabitants of Saarbrucken watched the brilliant spectacle of the
French attack. So rapid was the advance that, when the support
reached the heights, it came at once under fire. Forty men reinforced
the picket, and extended on the drill-ground; but the enemy had still
1,200 yards to traverse ere he reached the ridge, and the Fusiliers
The
made no attempt to reply to his brisk but useless musketry.
remainder of the company was posted (under cover of the reverse
slope) on the high road.
The hostile skirmishers had crossed the hollow at the foot of the
hill, and their leading files were already climbing the terraced slopes,
A
when a sudden burst of musketry was heard to the right rear.
force was endeavoring to turn the ridge from the Saarbriicken forest,
and had attacked the picket on the viaduct. Almost at the same
moment the Reppertsberg was abandoned.
The 5th Company,
enfiladed from the Winterberg, had been compelled to withdraw.
Although his left was now exposed, his right menaced, and overwhelming numbers were pressing heavily against his front, the leader
of the 7th Company was determined to secure an unmolested retreat.
His men were instructed to reserve their fire until the enemy
approached within 300 yards, Notwithstanding the storm of musketry
to which they were exposed, the order was carried out with precision
and effect.
The French advance was roughly checked, Their sharp-shooters

halted and sought cover on the hillside.
The 5th Company had now reached the road below the ridge, the
skirmishing section, on the crest above, holding back the pursuers with
a steady fire, and even menacing by forward rushes the foremost groups.
In front of the 7th Company, the crowd of hostile riflemen
rapidly increased, gathering strength for an onward rush; the musketry
Comparative
strength of
pursuing
force.
swelled to a heavier roar, but not until the whole of the 5th Company
had reached the bridge was the order given to retire.
0
Covered by the heavy independent fire of the picket, the support
dashed down the further slope in two separate columns, and was
followed in a few minutes by the last defenders of the ridge.
As the dark blue uniforms and spiked helmets vanished in clouds
of smoke, the French infantry advanced on all sides, but with cautious
movements, and when their loud vivas announced that the heights
were won, the Fusilliers had almost gained the bridge. As the circle
of fire closed round them and annihilation seemed inevitable, they had
adroitly slipped away, guaging the moment to a nicety, and leaving
but seven severely wounded men in the enemy's hands.
The barricades across the bridges were held by the 3rd Battalion
of the 40th, which had been called up from Raschpfuhl at 11 o'clock.
Saarbrficken was now evacuated, but the French made no attempt
to follow up their success, or to seize the town.
Only a few scouts
approached the bridges.
Two field batteries and one of mitrailleuses were then brought up
to the ridge, and engaged the four pieces posted above Malstatt at a
range of 2,200 yards. The duel was unequal, but by frequent changes
of position the Prussian battery escaped destruction, and not until
guns of a heavier caliber opened fire from the Reppertsberg, was it
driven to seek shelter in the Kollerthaler Forest.
The French remained inactive during the afternoon and the
The Germans
entire 2nd Corps encamped in the St. Arnaul valley,
leisurely withdrew towards the north.
In the engagement the French lost 86 and the Prussians lost 83.
The Prussian battery expended 127 rounds, and the battalion on outpost
fired 12,000 cartridges. *
As a rear-guard is seldom more than a fifth or sixth of the total
force, especially if it be formed entirely of the troops of the reserve, it
follows that the pursuing force, in order to press confidently on the
rear-guard, attacking boldly, and argumenting the disorder, need not
be more than a third of the beaten army. Thus two-thirds of the
victorious force (supposing it to have been equal to its adversary at
first) will be disposable elsewhere.
* This description of the Combat of Saarbrucken is taken mainly from
"The Battle of Spicheren", by Major Henderson, and the German Official
Account of the Franco-German War.
73
The chance of the defeated general resuming the offensive will

then depend partly on the nature of the defeat he sustained in the field,
partly on the conduct of his rear-guard. But it may depend still more
on what the main body of the enemy, operating elsewhere, may be
able in the meantime to effect.
If the defeated general fought the
action with only part of an army, and is driven by his retreat more
apart from the rest, his endeavor will be to effect a reunion; and if he
finds that the other portion of the army has also been defeated, he
will feel that the first object of the leaders of both parts must be to
recombine the broken host, by anticipating the victor in arriving at
some possible point of junction.
Let us assume, then, that part of an army may occupy a superior
force of the enemy, while the remainder strikes a blow elsewhere; that
a beaten army may be pursued for a time by an inferior force; and
that the course taken by party of an army which have been separately
defeated will be to retreat in order to recombine.
Course of the
defeated
bodies.
Grounds
established
for pursuing
the subject.
THE EFFECT OF INTERPOSING AN ARMY BETWEEN THE PARTS

OF AN ENEMY'S EXTENDED FRONT.
It has been shown in former examples that operations against the

communications of an enemy with his base, however decisive, are only
practicable, except with corresponding risk, under certain geographical
conditions. If these do not exist, such enterprises can only be undertaken under penalty of a reciprocal exposure of the communications
of the assailant. Regard for these will generally induce commanders,
unless unusually confident in themselves and their army, to seek safer
methods of obtaining an advantage; and opportunities, must be sought
in the relations which the fronts of the hostile armies bear to each
other at different junctures of the campaign.
There are various reasons, as has been already explained, why an
army should, and generally does, operate on a front more extended than
its line of battle. Thus in the Jena campaign, Napoleon's front from
Saalfeld to Plauen extended 50 miles; the Prussians from Jena to
Gotha, and thence towards Hildburghausen, were still more dispersed;
and.when the armies were assembled in presence of each other, the
parts at Naumburg and Jena were separated by an interval of 20 miles.
When, in 1805, Napoleon marched round Ulm, there were wide gaps
between his columns; and, in fact, the case where great armies move
for any distance on a front as contracted as their line of battle is comparatively rare. Under such circumstances opportunities must occur,
amid the shiftings of the hostile bodies, for pushing into the intervals
of an enemy's front and separating its parts; the front of a great army
in motion being marked by a line passing through the heads of
advancing columns.
CAMPAIGN OF 1796, IN ITALY.
THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.
The general front of the French forces in Northwestern Italy was

marked, in the early part of 1796, by the line of the Graian, Cottian,
Maritime, and Ligurian Alps, and a small portion of the Apennines
west of Genoa.
The Army of the Alps (20,000) under Kellermann protected
Savoy; the Army of Italy (40,000) under Sch6rer occupied Liguria
to Savona and held the passes leading into Piedmont.
Numerous detachments of Piedmontese, amounting to about
25,000 men under the Prince of Carignano, were scattered in the
mountains from Mont Blanc to l'Argentitre; an army of Piedmontese
(22,000) under Colli formed the outposts on the northern spurs of the
mountains separating Piedmont from Liguria; and an Austrian army
(30,000) under Argenteau and Sebottendorf was in cantonments along
the Po and the Adda until March. Beaulieu was appointed commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies.
An
The republic of Genoa was considered neutral territory.
English fleet on the coast controlled the harbor of Genoa and restricted
the French to the land.
There are four important gaps in the mountain ranges separating
the Riviera from Piedmont; namely, the passes of Tenda, Ormea,
Cadibona, and Bocchetta. The principal roads are:
1. Nice-Saorgio-Tenda-Coni-Turin.
2. Nice-Porto Maurizio-Savona-Genoa (known as La Corniche) ;thence Bocchetta-Novi-Alessandria.
3. Parto Maurizio-Garessio--Ceva.
4. Savona-Cadibona-Dego.
5. Savona-Montenotte--Sassello.
6. Voltri-Voltaggio.
The first two were main roads, and the third could be used for
artillery; but the others were narrower and more difficult.
Napoleon was appointed to the command of the Army of Italy
February 23d; he arrived at headquarters at Nice March 27th. The
Allies left their winter quarters in the latter part of March. Early in
April the fractions of the Army of Italy were posted as follows:
Garnier, 3,300, guarding the Col de Fenestre;
Macquart, 3,700, at the Col di Tenda;
Serrurier, 7,000, on the upper Tanaro, in and beyond Ormea;
Augereau, 8,000, at San Giacomo;
Massena, 9,000, at Cadibona;
La Harpe, 8,000, at Savona;
Cervoni, 4,000, at Voltri and Pegli, (detachment from La Harpe).
Total, 43,000 men with 60 guns.
The Cavalry belonging to the army (about 4,000) was scattered
along the coast from Menton to La Pietra.
The passes opposite Savona had been fortified by Scherer, the
more important works being at Montenotte, Monte Legino, Cadibona,
and the heights of Altare. The camp of San Giacomo (capable of
holding 10 battalions) also was protected by works covering the
approaches.
Garnier and Macquart were to maintain communication with the
Army of the Alps. Connection with France was by the road SavonaNice.
At the end of March the Allied Armies under Beaulieu began
to move.
The advanced Piedmontese closed in towards the west, and the
Austrians advanced to the northern slopes of the Apennines, so that
just before the outbreak of hostilities they occupied the following
positions:
Co Hi, 17,000, extended from Coni to Millesimo;
Pr'overa, 5,000, near Dego;
Argenteau, 12,000, at Sassello, in touch with Provera;
Sehottendorf, 14,000, from Ovada to Voltaggio.
rIotal, 48,000 men with 84 guns.
The base of the Piedmontese was at Turin and they communicated therewith by Alba, Cherasco, and Fossano.
The ultimate bnse of the Austrians in Italy was east of the
Mincio; their lines of communication were Acqui-Casale-Milan,
Acqui-Alessandria-Pavia, and Novi-Tortona-Piacenza.
The fortifications of Coni, Mondovi, and Ceva closed the principal
valleys t.o the north, and the Bocchetta pass was controlled by the
Austrians.
The French Army occupied a narrow strip of country enclosed
between the Alps and Apennines and the sea. The distance from their
base west of the Var to the advance brigade at Voltri was 100 miles.
The line of communication was on a single road (La Corniche), which
skirted the seash,'re and was exposed to the attacks of a fleet at many
places. The necessity of occupying the passes on their left flank and
rear caused an undue dissemination of the French forces.
The army
was destitute and the Government at the end of its resources.
All
the supplies for the troops camped on the arid rocks of Liguria had to
be brought from Nice or Genoa. It thus became imperative to assume
the offensive, and advance into other regions, or to withdraw from the
country.
The distance between the extremes of the French front, San
Martino to Voltri, was about 90 miles, measured on straight lines.
However, leaving out Garnier and Macquart who were in observation,
and Serrurier at Ormea who took no serious part until the second
stage of the campaign, we find, after Cervoni had rejoined La Harpe,
three divisions of nearly 30,000 men in easy supporting distance of
each other and available for united action.
The line of observation of the Allies, from Coni to Bocchetta was
over 100 miles in length. Their forces were divided into three principal groups under Colli, Argenteau, and Sebottendorf, separated by
considerable intervals of difficult country.
Their endeavor to hold all the valleys radiating from the mountains caused a great sub-division and scattering of their troops. Lateral
communication could be effected only over difficult mountain roads
and trails; whereas the French, in descending from their passes, could
concentrate in any particular valley with much less difficulty.
PLANS.
General Colli, who had been fighting in this part of Italy for
several years, proposed a plan of operations to Beaulieu. The Allied
Armies were to concentrate and then debouch against the flank of the
French in two columns. The right (Piedmontese) was to march from
Ceva on Loano, ascending the western Bormida; the left (Austrians)
was to advance from Acqui on Finale Borgo, following the eastern
Bormida. The idea was to cut the French army in two and destroy
its right wing. The main objection was the difficulty of crossing the
mountains at the passes protected by intrenchments. Colli also proposed a defensive plan. Beaulieu was to concentrate the bulk of his
army at Acqui, sending detachments into the valleys of the two
Bormidas and the Erro. In case the French attacked the Austrians,
Colli was to take them in flank and rear from Ceva; or, in case the
French turned against the Piedmontese, Beaulieu was to operate in a
similar manner against their right. Both these plans had meritorious
features, but the second was inferior to the first because it surrendered
the initiative to the adversary, and becauseit depended upon the combined action of distant fractions of the available force.
Beaulieu put off accepting either one of these plans, apparently
But
because he thought he had ample time to devise one himself.
when he heard that Genoa was menaced he became uneasy and insisted
upon protecting that city at all hazards. The desire, also, to get in
touch with the English fleet, and reluctance to adopt so bold a course
without instructions from the Aulic Council at Vienna, outweighed
the correct views of his lieutenant. He therefore decided to adopt the
worst plan, to advance rapidly with his left wing and push back the
French towards the west. His right wing was to enter the valleys in
force, and, in conjunction with Colli, was to debouch oil the Riviera.
The plans of the French Directory and of Napoleon agreed in so
far that they both contemplated the assumption of the offensive and
separation of the Austrian and Piedmontese armies. Napoleon's plan
was to hold the passes of Tenda and Ormea, but to draw together the
divisions of Augereau, Massena, and La Harpe for an attack upon the
Allied center, to push in between Colli and Beaulieu, and after that
to deal with them separately.
THE OPERATIONS.
April 5th. Napoleon transferred his headquarters from Nice to

Albenga and commenced to assemble his forces opposite the Cols of
San Giacomo and Cadibona. He hoped to be the first to assume the
offensive, but the movements of Cervoni's brigade towards Genoa, a
few days before, caused his opponents to anticipate him. Soon after
his arrival at Albenga, Napoleon became aware of a general movement of the Austrians towards Bocchetta. He saw in this no reason
for changing his plans-quite the contrary. The further extension of
the Austrian army towards Genoa only rendered his operation against
the Allied center more certain of success.
April 9th.
Napoleon with his headquarters reached Savona. He

determined to assume the offensive at once and to strike the point of
contact of the Allies with a force of 25,000 men.
April 10th. Beaulieu crossed the Apennines in two columnns with
the 10 battalions and 4 squadrons forming the left of his army. Tfhe
eastern column under Pittoni followed the chaussee BochettaCarnigliano--Voltri ; the western column under Sebottendorf advanced
by Campofreddo againt Cervoni's left. The French held their ground
during the day ; in the night they withdrew to Varazze, and the next
day joined La Harpe's main body, having suffered a loss of 10 officers
and 170 men.
Beaulieu communicated with the English fleet at Voltri.
Argenteau, who late on the 9th received the order to attack thle
French at daybreak, spent the whole of the 10th in assembling his
scattered forces.
April lilA. Argenteau, who had succeeded in getting together a
little more than 3,000 men, advanced to the attack of the heights of
Montenotte at 3 a. m.
The two French battalions (1,500 men)
stationed there, under Colonel Rampon, were pushed back into their
intrenchirnets on Monte Legino, where they repulsed repeated assaults
with great bravery, and maintained themselves until reinforced in the
night.
Beaulieu spent the day in conference with Captain Nelson, the
British naval commander.
During the night, April 11th-12th, La Harpe's division joined
Rampon on Monte Legino; Massena passed through Altare down the
valley of the eastern Bormida; Augereau started for Carcare and
Cairo, his principal object being to prevent assistance from reaching
Argenteau. Serrurier was to make demonstrations oni the upper Tanaro.
April 12th. Argenteau was reinforced by two battalions during

the nightand resolvcd to capture the works at all cost. But he was
himself attacked by La Harpe at 5 a. m. He held his ground until
the lifting of the fog revealed the movement of Massena who had
crossed the ridge east of Cairo and debouched into the valley of the
Erro at Lower Montenotte. Argenteau then left two battalions under
Nesslinger to oppose La Harpe, and rushed to the assistance of his
right. But it was too late. Massena overthrew the Austrians and
pushed them in disorder into the valley of the Erro. Argenteau was
wounded but managed to escape down stream with about 700 men.
Nesslinger was in great difficulty. Unable to join his chief he made
his way to Provera's advance guard at Dego.
Serrurier made false attacks at Garessio.
Provera heard of the results at Montenotte in the afternoon, and
took 42 battalions'to the heights of Cosseria, between the two Bormidas,
with a view to relieving the pressure on Argenteau.
Beaulieu advanced again; but encountering nobody and hearing
the cannonade in the hills, he halted for information.
On the evening of the 12th Napoleon had his headquarters with
Angereau at Carcare. La Harpe, who was first ordered to Sassello to
to drive back the Austrians, was now on the ridge between the Bormida and the Erro. Napoleon's three divisions (Augereau, Massena,
and La Harpe) were thus concentrated in the valley of the Bormida.
April 13th. Napoleon decided to attack Dego with the divisions
of Massena and La Harpe, but the latter was not quite near enough.
Massena therefore limited himself to reconnaissance. With the other
forces Napoleon turned towards Millesimo.
Menard's brigade dislodged Colli's left at Cengio, but Augereau
was repulsed by Provera.
A brigade of Massena's division reinforced Augereau, who then
attacked in overwhelming numbers. A portion of Provera's force
escaped to join Colli, but Provera himself, turned by one of Augereau's
columns which had crossed the Col of Millesimo, shut himself up in a
ruined castle with 600 men and was surrounded by the French. He
refused to surrender, hoping that Colli would advance to relieve him.
The latter was still deceived by Serrurier and made only a feeble effort
at rescue; one battalion managed to join Provera.
Wukassowich arrived at Sassello.
Beaulieu ordered concentration at Dego. Argenteau was unable
to send reinforcements, but ordered Wukassowich to Dego.
Colli
was ordered to operate against the enemy's flank.
April 14th. Augereau beat off another attempt on the part of
Colli to relieve Provera. The latter, reduced by famine, surrendered
in the forenoon.
Massena on the right and La Harpe on the left bank of the
Bormida advanced on Dego. Owing to nonarrival of reinforcements
the Austrians were totally defeated. Mass6na's light infantry purSued
them as far as Spigno.
Augereau held Colli in check. Serrurier established comnunications with Augereau.
Beaulieu changed the point of concentration to Acqui.
Colli was assembling his forces at Ceva.
April 15th. Argenteau was occupied in the endeavor to get his
troops together.
La Harpe was ordered to join Augereau.
Wukassowich on his way to Dego came suddenly upon the French,
attacked with promptness and vigor, defeated Massena and captured
the town and intrenchments. La Harpe was recalled and with
Victor's brigade rejoined Massena. Dego was retaken late in the day.
Wukassowich left half of his men on the field ; the remainder retreated
on Acqui.
Augereau occupied Rocca Vignale and Murialdo.
The first half of the campaign thus ended in the complete separation of the Austrian and Piedmontese armies.
April 16th. Napoleon decided to throw the bulk of his army
against Colli,
Augereau drove the Piedmontese advance guard towards Ceva.
Massena also took up the march on Ceva.
Serrurier advanced from Garessio to Bagnasco, and then to
Nucetto. He captured the bridge of the Tanaro and joined Augereau's left.
La Harpe proceeded to San Benedetto and took position between
the western Bormida and the Belbo to observe the Austriais.
Victor's brigade remained at Cairo.
After the defeat of Wukassowich Beaulieu finally ordered abandonment of Voltri and concentration of his whole army on Acqui.
April 17th. i Augereau attacked Ceva without success, but
Massena continued to advance on Castellino while Serrurier was
moving towards Mombasiglio. Colli, about to be enveloped, withdrew
and took up an excellent position west of the Corsaglia; his right was
at Vico, his center at San Michele, and his left west of Lesegno.
April 19th. The French forces attacked Colli's position without
proper reconnaissance and were repulsed with great loss.
April 21st.
The French held a council of war at Lesegno and
determined to renew the attack on the 22nd.

Colli still had 12,000 men left, but decided not to risk a general
engagement.
He withdrew during the night April 21-22nd
to
another position between Vico and Mondovi.

The French communications with Nice by the line Ceva-Ormea
were thus made secure.
The French
April 22nd.
continued
to advance.
Massena
remained at San Michele to keep up communication with La Harpe.

Serrurier overtook Colli's rearguard
Colli's position was again turned.
at Vico and defeated
it.
His troops left the field in disorder
and were not rallied until they reached Fossano on the Stura.
The French Cavalry, which had a short time before been ordered
up from the Riviera,
now came into play for the first time (except
four squadrons which charged at Dego) under Stengel and Murat.
April
Stura.
23rd.
Serrurier received orders to pursue Co [Ii on the
The rest of the army started for Turin.
La Harpe continued
to watch Beaulieu.
Colli made overtures of peace on the part of the court at Turin.
April 24th.
Beaulieu reached reached Nizza two leagues from
Acqui on the roal to Alba.
April 25th.
Serrurier arrived at Fossano, Mass~na at Cherasco,
Augereau at Alba.
Colli retired on
Carmagnola.
Communications were opened with Tenda and the troops stationed

there were ordered to invest Coni.
April 26th.
on Turin.
April 28th.
The French united at Alba and continued to advance
Armistice with France was signed at Cherasco.
It
stipulated the surrender of Coni, Ceva, and Tortona or Alessandria;

also the free use of the military roads across the Alps and the privilege
of occupying Valenza with a. view to passage of the Po.
Direct communication
was established with
France by Mont
Clenis and Napoleon was free to resume operations against Beaulieu.
COMMENTS.
That form of the strategical offensive which is known as strategical penetration, or the interposition of an army between parts of the
enemy's extended front, became a prominent feature of the Napoleonic
wars and receivcd one of its best exemplifications in this campaign.
Napoleon, when he arrived to assume command of the Army of
Italy, had for several years been an industrious student of the military
geography of Piedmont and the Riviera, and of the campaigns which
had been conducted on that historic ground.
Careful examination of previous campaigns had revealed to him
that the genius of mountain warfare consists much less in direct
attacks than in the occupation of points on the enemy's flank or in his
rear, thus leaving him no alternative but to come out and fight or retire
to another position.
In the course of the campaign he repeatedly
made use of this principle, which, in 1864, was again brilliantly
illustrated by General Sherman's operations in the Atlanta campaign.
The commander of the Allied Armies was a soldier of the old
school who had gained distinction in the Low Countries; he still was
vigorous and enterprising although over seventy years of age. Colli
certainly was his superior in the information he had acquired concerning the country and the methods of war suitable therein, and, it would
appear, in knowledge of strategy also. The influence of the difference
between the physical and mental vigor, the professional attainments,
and the character of the two commanders, is noticeable throughout the
campaign.
The instructions of the Directory were for the greater part mere
copies of the principles and plans worked out by Napoleon himself
while on duty in the bureau at Paris. They endeavored to impress
upon him that the highest interests of the French government required
that the army should direct its principal efforts against the forces and
territory of the Austrians in Lombardy. This is the point at which
the views of Napoleon and those of the Directory parted company.
Napoleon had always maintained the necessity of first forcing the
court at Turin to conclude a treaty of peace. Instead of that he was
ordered to capture only Ceva and Tortona, to observe Coni and pursue
the Austrians to the Adige. The conclusion of an armistice and all
negotiations for peace were specifically reserved to the government.
However, it was not in the character of Napoleon to leave Colli's
practically intact army in his rear. He did not hesitate to interpret
his instructions with reference to the Piedmontese quite liberally, nor
even to exceed them when his operations were well under way. After
the battles at Dego he no longer feared possible enterprises on the
part of Beaulieu. The sequelshowed how correctly he had judged the
latter's character. As he made progress towards the west, shorter and
shorter lines to his base, and, finally, direct roads to Savoy and France
were opened to his army. He asked for a reinforcement of 15,000
from the Army of the Alps, and the fortifications supplied him with a
large amount of much needed war material. The prompt conclusion
of a treaty with the Piedmontese was by far the more judicious plan;
for the capture of the strong places and subjugation of the country
would have been a tedious and onerous task, especially as Napoleon
had as yet no siege artillery and this subjugation accomplished the
French rear would still have been comparatively insecure. To have
waited for negotiations between Paris and Turin would have delayed
the pursuit of Beaulieu.
'The possession of Genoa, which Beaulieu supposed was one of Napoleon's objectives, would have been of little advantage to the French,
since the English commanded the harbor with their fleet. Operations
against the enemy's left would have been difficult, for the Austrians
held the pass which, moreover, was closed by the fortifications of Gavi.
The Frech line of operations would have been extended still more
and exposed to the attacks of Colli in rear: In case of a successful
offensive the defeat of the Austrians would only have driven them to
junction with the Piedmontese. The necessity of making further
detachments to watch the passes on the flank would have reduced the
strength of the available active army so much that it would have been
unable to cope with the Austrians alone. It was only Beaulieu's overanxiety for his own communications which led him to imagine that
the French were contemplating a movement against his left.
The relations between Austria and Piedmont at the outbreak of
hostilities were far from cordial. When Beaulieu was finally selected
as commander-in-chief he received instructions to support his ally with
all his power, and to defend the country between the Tanaro and the
Bormida, "should it appear to him proper to do so from a military
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point of view." The Austrians considered their interests paramount,
and looked upon the Piedmontese more as auxiliaries than as allies
Consequently, after defeat of his right wing, Beaulieu sought only to
He
cover his own communications and wanted Colli to join him.
even demanded authority to place Austrian garrisons in Alessandria
and Tortona. These elements of discord had been foreseen by the
French-in fact, their plans were based upon them.
The operations against Cervoni at Voltri was conducted by Beaulieu in person; he directed the march of Sebottendorf's column against.
Cervoni's left. If he had taken a route further to the west, for instance,
on Arenzeno, Cervoni might have been cut off.
When Napoleon asumed the offensive his forces were already
concentrated; but when Beaulieu started on his movement against the
French right, only about half of his troops had come up from the Po.
At the beginning of hostilities his troops were disposed as follows:
8,000 against the French right;
4,000 against the French center;
6,000 in detached parts on the Apennine ridges;
15,000 concentrating at Acqui.
Colonel Rampon's determined resistance was of course very valuable
to the French; however, Argenteau's small force could not have withstood the divisions of La Harpe and Mass6na even if he had captured
the works at Monte Legino. This scattered condition of the Allied
forces caused them to be greatly outnumbered in every battle.
After the disaster to Argenteau's command rapid concentration
became an urgent necessity to the Allies. Provera's gallant defense at
Millesimo, which caused the loss of a whole day to the French, would
have been of great value to an energetic commander. In two days
20,000 men could have been assembled at Acqui, and in one day more
Sebottendorf's 8,000 could have reached the same place, as the distance from Voltri to Acqui, allowing fifty per cent increase for
sinuosities of the road, is only fifty miles. Beaulieu, however, did not
recall his left until the 16th, after the defeat of Wukassowich made
him realize the magnitude of the French movement. In spite of the
appeals of King.Amadeus he did not arrive at Nizza until the 24th,
and then his conduct was so irritating that the French negotiations
were greatly facilitated. So weak and selfish an alliance will always
be easy prey for an enterprising antagonist.
In examining the question whether the Allied armies after their
separation at Dego could have been reunited we must bear in mind the
distance separating them and the amount of time available.
Colli
performed his part very well. His object was to make an orderly
retreat, delay the progress of the enemy, and gain time. Napoleon's
divisions were not assembled at Alba, 35 miles from Turin, until the
26th. The last fight of the Austrians was at Dego on the 15th.
The distance from Acqui to Alba is about 30 miles. A few days of
energy, out of the eleven at their disposal, would have gone a long
way towards effecting what Napoleon feared; namely, junction of the
Allies. A position behind the Stura or the Tanaro would have
stopped the progress of the French and would at the same time have
protected the communications of both the Allies.
Further comments on this campaign will be reserved for the
general discussion of the subject of Strategic Penetration.
See Map
6 and 7.
Armies assembled in
the theatre.
The Inn to
the Isar, 40.
THE CAMPAIGN OF ECKMijHL (1809).

The maintenance of the war with France by the English in Portugal seemed to afford Austria an opportunity of effacing the results of
Ulm and Austerlitz, and of breaking the power of Napoleon. So
menacing was the aspect of the great German power, that the French
Emperor, abandoning the pursuit of Sir John Moore's army to Soult,
had returned to France to prepare for the anticipated campaign.
Early in the year the Austrian armies were behind their frontier
lines of the Bohemian mountains and the river Inn; and most of the
French forces were on their own side of the Rhine. But when war
was imminent the Austrians, leaving 50,000 men under Bellegarde in
Bohemia assembled most of the troops which they had ready for the
field, south of the Danube, on the frontier of Bavaria. On the
other hand, the Confederation of the Rhine, by which compact the
German territories along that river were open to Napoleon, gave him
free access to the Danube. When the war began, the troops already
assembled within the immediate sphere of operations were as follows:The Austrian corps on the Inn were those of
Hohenzollern.
Rosenberg,
Archduke Louis,
Hiller,
Lichtenstein,
Keinmaer, -
Total, 140,000.
CAMPAIGN OF ECKMUHL.
Bellegrade, who was to operate north of the Danube, debouching
from Pilsen and Saatz towards Amberg, 50,000. Behind these, about
100,000 militia covered Vienna,
Napoleon's corps were thus distributed:Lefebvre, (Bavarians)
on the Isar, ....
Davout,.
......
. Ratisbon,
. . .
Oudinot, . . . ...
.
Augsburg,
. . ..
Massina,..
. . . Ulnm,
....
Vandamme, (Wurtembergers) on march from Heidenheim to Ingolstadt, ....
Reserve cavalry,
. .
.
Jngolstadt,
....
Total,
..
30,000
50,000
30,000
30,000
12,000
15,000
.167,000
Behind the front of the French, the roads of Germany were

covered with columns marching from the Rhine, including the Imperial
French bases
and communications.
Guard, and with the reserves of the German allies of France.

Napoleon, based on the Rhine and Mayne, had for communications any or all of the roads leading from the Danube, between Ulm
and Ratisbon, to Wiirzburg, or to the fortresses on the Rhine.
Those
mainly relied on, as most secure, were probably the roads from Strasburg, Mannheim, and Mavence
to Ulm.
The Archduke Charles had for immediate lines of supply those of

Steyer-Braunau and Linz-Passau.
If he should operate north of the
river, he must of course rely on the northern portion of his base, Budweis-Th eresienstedt.
Napoleon's object was Vienna ; hut as the Austrians took the
initiative, his plan must depend on the opportunities which their movements might offer.
The Archduke's design wa.s to pass the Inn, push the Bavarians
from the Isar, and, crossing the Danube between Donauwerth and
Ratisbon, cut Davout from the French army, and form a junction
with Bellegarde on the northern bank.
The Bavarians were extended
along the Jsar from Munich to Straubing; the Prince Royal at the
former and Wrede at the latter place. Deroi's division held the
passage at Landshut.
10th to 16th April. The Auist.rians crossed the Inn thus:Hiller,
Archduke Louis,
at Brannan
Hohenzollern, below Brannan;
Rosenburg,
at charding;
Lichtenstein, ( tShrig
Austrian
baseandcommunications.
and reaching the Isar on the 15th, forced the passage thus, on thel6tl :
Hiller
Moorsburg to
at Moosbnrg,
Archduke Louis,
Dlingolfing.
28.Hohezollern,
at
L andshut.
2osenberg at Dingolfing.
Reserves in rear of the center.
On the right a brigade (5,000) moved on Straubing.
On the left 10,000 from Wasserburg towards Munich.
The Bavarians, at Landshut, attacked in front and turned on
both flanks, fell back to the Danube behind the Abens, between
Neustadt and Keiheim, where they united with the Prince Royal and
Wrede, who were permitted by the dilatory movements of the Austrians to concentrate at that point.
Lefebvre was here reinforced by
a body of Wurtembergers, and a division of French cavalry which

raised his strength to about 40,000 men.
17th April.
Austrians
approch the
Danube.
Moorsburg to
Mainburg, 14.
The Austrians moved thus:-
[iller . . . . from Moosburg to Mainurg.

Landshut towards Nenstadt.
Louip..........,
Hohenzollern,
Lichtenstein,
Landshut towards Kelheim.
Kienmayer,
J
Dingolfing by Eckmuhl towards Ratisbon.
. .
Rosenberg,
Bellegarde was to draw lown upon Davout's rear.

French movements:Massna moved fronm Ulna to Augsburg, and took command of
the right wing.
Marshal Berthier, Chief of Staff, had been sent forward by

Napoleon with orders to concentrate
the army behind the Lech,

between Donauwerth and Augsburg, on the first indication of all
offensive movement by the Austrians, or at Ratisbon if hostilities had
not commenced.
When the Emperor arrived at Donauwerth
he
found the two wings of the army more than a hundred miles apart,
and the unsupported center under Lefebvre, which was immediately
confronted by the vastly superior numbers of the Austrians, constituted
the only force at his immediate disposal.
In astonishment and indig-
nation he declared to Berthier: "Davout is at this moment more at the

These dispositions
disposal of the Archdnke Charles than of myself.
seem so strange that if I did not know you to be my friend, I would
suspect you of trying to betray me." The right wing was at once
ordered from Augsberg to Pfaffenhofen, and the left wing from Ratisbon to Abensberg. Davout, appreciating the strategical situation,
CAMPAIGN OP ECHMUHL.
had, however, begun the march before he received Napoleon's orders.
April 18th.
Hiller was now in command of the left, numbering

his own corps being at Mainburg and those of
about 50,000 men,
Louis and Keinmaver . moving towards Abensberg.
Rohr to Ratisbon, 21.
The Archduke
with the center and right, 65,000 strong, moved to Rohr, and Langquaid, with Ratisbon as an objective.
French movements:Massena from Augsburg towards Pfaffenhofen.
Davout, leaving a regiment to guard the stone bridge at Ratisbon,
began his march by the right flank.
April 19th. Hiller directed Louis upon Seigenburg and marched
with the rest to the left from Mainburg towards Pfaffenhofen.
Archduke, with the center and right,
and Teugen,
The
Austrians
separate.
noved from Rohr by Hansen
and from Langquaid by Schneidart and
Saalhaupt
towards Ratisbon.
French movements:Davout, leaving the high road along the Danube free for his
baggage and trains, marched his infantry divisions in two columns,
each of two divisions, one by Teugen, the other by Saalhaupt, by
country roads, whence they were to gain by cross-roads the high
road to Abensberg by Feking.
His cavalry
protected the move-
French left
joins the
center.
ment by advancing on the road Ratisbon-Eckmiihl, and then following

through Dingling, the general direction on Abensberg.
Lefebvre, with the left of' the Bavarians,
was directed to move
from Abensberg upon Arnhofen to lend a hrand to Davout.

The inner flanks of the columns of Davout and the Archduke
necessarily encountered ; and they sidled around each other, fighting
principally with the rearmost divisions, while the leading troops continued their advance.
As a result of this combat, known as the battle

communiof Thann, Davout's two lending divisions nade good
cation with Abensberg by Feking, and the other two held Teugen.
'their
Austrian
right wing
halts.
The Austrian march on Ratisbon was stopped, and the Archduke

remained facing the French front. Oudinot arrived with his corps at
Pfaffenhansen.
April 20th. French movements;Davont with half his corps to hold Tengen, to check the Archduke,
The other half under Lannes on Rohr, to seize the road from Keiheim to
Landshut and interpose between the Austrian wings.
Combination
against Aus-
trian left
wing.
Abensberg to
Ror, 7.
Pfffhfas
tfaffnhut,
to
Landshut,
36.
French pursuethebeaten
wing.
Bavarians on Siegenburg,
Wurtembergers between Lannes and the Bavarians,
Massfnafrom Pfaflbnhofen on Landshut by Freising and Moosburg,
The result of the attacks against the Austrian left wing, known
the battle of bensburg, which followed this last combination was,

that the French reached Rottenburg-the Austrians were driven on
Pfaffenhausen-and continued their retreat in the night upon Landshut.
April 21st.
o Lanshut
Part of the Bavarians by Pfaffenhansen,
Lannes bybyRottenburg,
Moosburg,
Masskna
where they drove the Austrian left wing across the Isar.
The Austrian left wing took post across the Eckmiihl road, backed
on Ratisbon, facing Landshut. The Archduke seems to have been
ignorant of Hullers' defeat and Napoleon's advance on Landshut.
After holding Bellegarde's 50,000 men for twenty-four hours, the
French regiment left at Ratisbon surrendered, and the Austrians
gained possession of the passage. Davout, not understanding the
quietness of the Austrians in his front, concluded that the best way to
hold the Archduke would be by attacking him. He accordingly
moved from Teugen against Paring and Schierling. Part of the Bavarians, with some cavalry, were ordered from Rottenburg to join him.
April 22nd. Bellegarde sent Kollowrath's corps of the Bohemian

Eckmuhl to
Abach, 9.
army through Ratisbon to join the Archduke, who, leaving his left at
Eckmiihl, attempted to throw his right to Abach, so as to issue from
thence on the French rear.
On the French side,Bessieres with two divisions of infantry to
pursue the beaten Austrian left wing from Landshut by Braunau.
Oudinot's two divisions were echeloned between Landshut and Neustadt as a reserve.
Combination
against the
Austrians.
right wing,
which, de-
feated, retreats apart.
Napoleon having now reinforced Davout with the corps of

Lannes, Lefebvre, and Vandamme, attacked the left of the Archduke's
immediate forces, and defeated him in the battle of Eckmiihl.
April 23rd. The Austrian right wing, covered by Kollowrath,
crossed the Danube at Ratisbon.
Napoleon took Ratisbon by assault, after bombarding
it.
Massna to Straubing.
CAMPAIGN OF ECHMUHL.
April 24th to 27th.
Ratisbon to
Davout to follow the Archduke Charles towards Bohemia.

Bavarians to occupy Munich.
Lannes to follow Bessseres by Landshut.
Straubing,24.
Movements
in pursuit.
Austrian movements:Archduke Charles and Bellegarde to Cham.

Archduke Louis and Hiller from Neumarkt towards the Inn.
Ratisbon to
Cham, 33.
April 28th to 30th.

Archduke Charles from Cham to Pilsen.
Davout having seen the Archduke's retreat to Bohemia begun,

returns to Ratisbon to follow Massena down the right bank.
French pursuing columns from Landshut arrive on the Inn and
its tributary at Salzburg, Burghausen, Braunau.
Massena to Passau.
There were but two bridges between Passau and Vienna-namely,
at Mathausen (just below Linz), and at Krems, by which the Archduke Charles could cross to the right bank, join the other corps, and
cover the capital.
May 1st to 3rd.
The French columns from the Inn to the Traun.
Mass6na at Ebersburg attacks the Austrian rear-guard, and pushes

it past Mauthausen, where there was a bridge over the Danube, thus
rendering it impossible for the Austrians to communicate from one
bank to the other above Krems.
Archduke Charles at Budweis.
May 3rd to 8th.
The French columns to St. Polten.
Part of the Austrians were seen crossing to the left bank at

Krems, breaking the bridge behind them, part retreating on Vienna.
Detachments had been left by Napoleon to guard the passages at
Passau and Linz. The Archduke Charles had marched from Budweis
southward to Freystadt to cross at Linz. Finding the bridge destroyed,
and the right bank in possession of the French, he had marched for
Krems, but, owing to the circuit he had made, he was 'anticipated
there also.
May 11th. Napoleon pushed the A ustrian garrison out of Vienna,
and occupied the capital.
Passau, to
Vienna, 140.
COMMENTS.
Both armies at the outset were operating on extended fronts, their

right wings (Bellegarde and Massena) being indeed beyond the sphere
of immediate action. Setting these aside, the Austrian front on the
18th from Mainburg to Eckmiihl, and the French from Neustadt to
Ratisbon, each covered about the same distance.
When the Archduke on the 19th advanced on Ratisbon to attack
Davout, he was obliged to leave a strong force on the Abens, for he
knew that a great part of Napoleon's army was collected on the other
bank; and had he withdrawn his whole force towards Ratisbon, the
enemy from Abensberg would have cut him from the line LandshutBraunau by the single march on Rottenburg. Hence he could only
perform the movement by dividing his army.
But while he was making a movement of separation, Napoleon
was making one of concentration. On the night of the 19th, Davout
by his own right was connected with the Center.
Next day the successful march on Rohr interposed the main
French army between the parts of the Austrian front. While Napoleon was defeating the left wing, Davout was left in front of a very
superior enemy; and it would seem at first as if an attack upon him
would have balanced the fortunes of the day. But Davout, if compelled to retreat, would have approached Napoleon, whereas the
Austrian left wing, when defeated, was receding from the Archduke
Charles. T'he result of the Archduke pressing back the force in front
of him would have been that the main French army, supporting Davout,
would have fought on the 20th or 21st the battle of the 22nd, without
the trouble of going to seek the enemy.
Having, then, first strengthened his right for a blow against the
Austrian left wing, Napoleon now diminished the right to the amount
of force necessary to pursue the beaten corps, and concentrated on his
left for a second blow. This successful, the consequent retreat widened the gap in the Austrian front.
On the 20th, Mass4na being beyond the sphere of action, the suin
total of the armies actually inl presence of each other was greatly in
favor of the Austrians by about 140,000 to 110,000. Yet Napoleon
was superior to the force immediately opposed to him by about 80,000
to 70,000. And without Massena, he could still, after detaching
CAMPAIGN OF ECHMUHL.
20,000 in pursuit on Landshut, have made the force on Davout's side
next day superior to the Archduke's. Thus wo get something like an
approximate idea of the actual equivalent in force of the advantage
possessed by the army whose action is concentric over that which is
divided.
All these advantages were on the 18th within reach of the Archduke. If, instead of marching from Rohr on Ratisbon, he had moved
on Kelheim, for a grand attack along a front extending from thence to
Abensberg, he would have brought a greatly preponderating force
against the French; and if, as was to be expected, they were driven
over the river, he would have turned with his mass onm Davout
approaching from Ratisbon, and pushed him back on the lower Danube.
These operations of 1796 and 1809 also prove how powerful an
influence is exercised upon commanders of parts of armies by uncertainty as to what is passing elsewhere. So long as there is constant
communication between the supreme directing authority and his dispersed subordinate leaders, so long may a coherent impulse be given to
all the portions of an army. But when the intervention of a hostile
force destroys this communication, the action of every part is checked.
Combined action is the aim of a commander-in-chief, and combination
is impossible when concert is destroyed. Nor is the apprehension
which paralyses a commander who is thus separated from his colleague
the result merely of uncertainty. For had Beaulieu from Voltri,
or the Archduke from Teugen, advanced boldly on the enemy, each
would have encountered a victorious and superior army. It would
seem, therefore, that, under such circumstances, the only prudent
course is to effect a reunion with the utmost promptitude, and that the
advantages of the concentric position of the interposing army are substantial, and are only augmented, not altogether caused, by the moral
effect of the situation.
There is one especial point of difference between Napoleon's operation (if1809 and that of 1796. In the first case the containing force
(Davout's) was left in front of the Austrian wing. In the second case
the containing force (Cervoni's) was altogether withdrawn, and joined to
the divisions which attacked on the side of Montenotte.
It may be
asked why was not Davout withdrawn like Cervoni ? or why was not
Cervoni kept in front of the enemy like Davout?
Very useful
questions to consider.
Approximate
value of the
advantage of
concentric
over divided
action.
Advantage of
the concentric against
the divided
army not due
to the moral
effect only.
Different
ways of employing the
containing
force.
General deductions.
The answer is, that the sole use +f the containing force is to prevent a
reunion of the enemy's parts. If it is not necessary to this purpose, it
will be better employed at the point of attack. Had the Archduke
Charles suddenly resolved, on the evening after the action of Teugen,
to retrace his steps and rejoin the left wing, he might, if unopposed,
have effected the concentration, and would have had, on the field of
Abensberg, a great preponderance of numbers over the united forces
of Napoleon and Davout. It was to prevent this that Davout was
left in front of him. But had Beaulieu suddenly resolved, on the
night of the 1 lth or morning of the 12th, to rejoin Argenteau, he could
only have done so by retiring again through the passes and making a
circuit around the other side of the mountains which separated them.
But, long before he could make this circuit, the action at Monte
Legino must be decided ; and if he did make the attempt, Cervoni was
powerless to prevent it, for he could not interpose--he could onuly follow Beaulieu. Therefore Napoleon rightly drew Cervoni towards that
point where the action of his force would be most decisively important.
We may therefore assume, that when distance alone will prevent the separated wing of the enemy from joining the other, before that other may be attacked
and defeated, the containingforce should be withdrawn to the point of attack,
unless it is requiredto cover the communications.
To sum up the effects of a successful operation of this kind, it
appears1st, That either part of the separated army which stands to fight
may find itself exposed to the blows of the full force of the antagonist
minus a detachment left to contain the other part; as is seen by the
examples of Millessimo, Ceva, and Eckmifihl.
2d, That by alternating such blows, the assailant may continue
both to weaken his antagonist and to interpose between the parts.
3d, That as the commander of a separated part of an army will be
playing the enemy's game if he stands to fight, his best course will be
retreat for reunion; and that this will be best effected by taking advantage of every position to retard the enemy on both lines.
4th. That a commander who perceives an opportunity for separating the enemy and overwhelming a portion of his force, need not
generally be solicitous to cover his own communications during the
operation, since the enemy will be in no condition to assail them.
CAMPAIGN OF VICKSBURG,
Lastly, It is necessary to remark that the force which aims at
separating the parts of an enemy should be so superior to either part
singly, as to preserve a superiority after detaching a force in pursuit of the
portion first defeated; and that if the attacking force does not fulfil
this condition, it will have no right to expect success.
Modern conditions have added greatly to the difficulty of such
operations as those which succeeded so brilliantly in the campaigns
just considered. In the Napoleonic era the rate at which information
and orders could be conveyed bore a limited ratio, probably not exceeding ten to one, to the marching rate of troops. It was therefore
possible to make considerable progress and secure the accomplishment
of great results before the more distant portions of ascattered force could
be informed of events and receive orders for movement. But the
introduction of the electric telegraph has now practically made this
ratio infinite, for the slightest occurrences can be instantly reported
everywhere. Had the present conditions existed in 1796, the distant
courts of Turin and Vienna would have had ample time to confer, and
the result would have been imperative orders for concentration, or: else
open rupture between the courts and the abandonment of the alliance,
long before the arrival of the French on the Stura.
The effect of steam transport in connection with the telegraph will
also be felt in cases of "strategical penetration." Railways enable a
nation to concentrate at once all its military forces and to keep its troops
constantly and fully supplied. As a result the armies are now everywhere larger than they were at the time of the most brilliant examples
of strategical penetration; and with the increased size of armies the
advantages of interior lines rapidly diminish.
"It is very clear to me", says Jomini, "that an army of one hundred thousand men, occupying a central zone against three isolated
armies of 30,000 or 35,000 men, would be more sure of defeating them
successively than if the central mass were 400,000 strong against three
armies of 135,000 each, and for several good reasons:1. "Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to bring a very large force into action on the day of the battle,
an army of 130,000 or 140,000 men may easily resist a much larger
force.
Necessary
proportion of
the hostile
forces.
2. "If driven from the field, there will be at least 100,000 mneil
to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with one
of the other armies.
3. "The central army of 400,000 men requires such a quantity
of provision, munitions, horses and materiel of every kind that it will
possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts from one part of
the zone to another ; to say nothing of the impossibility of obtaining
provisions from a region too restricted to support such numbers.
4. "T'he bodies of observation detached from the central mass to
hold in check two armies of 135,000 men each must be very strong
(from 80,000 to 90,000 each); and, being of such magnitude, if they
are drawn into a serious engagement, they will probably suffer reverses
the effect of which might outweigh the advantages gained by the
principal army".
Finally, the increased defensive power given to armies by the
introduction of modern arms has added greatly to the difficulties of
strategic. penetration. The tactical frontal attacks will be attended
with much greater losses, progress will be slower, and there will be
danger, owing to the rapid transmission of orders, that the offensive
army may be enveloped on both flanks.
THE CASE OF AN ARMY INTERPOSING BETWEEN PARTS OF AN
ENEMY'S EXTENDED FRON'I', AND COMPLETELY INTERCEPTING THE COMMUNICATIONS OF ONE OF ITS
A DVE RSARIES.
The effect of an army prolonging its movement against the
enemy's communications by placing itself across them, and the results
that follow a successful interposition of an army between parts of an
enemy's extended front have been considered. It may be possible to
.combine both of these strategical advantages, as was shown in 1863,
when Grant penetrated between Johnston and Pemberton, separated
them, completely intercepted the communications of the latter and
locked him up, as it were, in Vicksburg.
CAMPAIGN OF VICKSBURG.
April 1st, 1863, a Confederate army of nearly 50,000 men under
General J. C. Pemberton, held the Mississippi River fro:n Vicksburg to
Confederate
positions.
Port Hudson. This force covering a front of more than 230 miles,
was divided into three principal commands occupying respectively
CKMPAIGN OF VICKSBURG.
Vicksburg, Fort Pemberton, and Port Hudson. In the Vicksburg
position, from Haines' Bluff on the right to Grand Gulf on the left,
were about 22,000 men under Major General Stevenson ; at Fort Pemberton and vicinity were 7,000 men under Major General Loring; and
at Port Hudson 16,000 under Major General Gardner. The remaining
4,000 or 5,000 men were in Northern Mississippi observing the line
of the Memphis and Corinth Railroad.
Pemberton's headquarters were at Jackson.
The Confederate communications were with Jackson and the
South by the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad, but extensive supplies
had been drawn by way of the Red River from Louisiana, Arkansas,
and Texas.
The Union army under General Grant also numbered on April
1st about 50,000 effectives, and held the west bank northwards from
Milliken's Bend and Young's Point, just above Vicksburg. It was
composed of McClernand's corps, about 19,000; Sherman's about
12,000; and McPherson's about 19,000, A powerful fleet of river
gun boats under Admiral Porter was at Milliken's Bend. At Baton
Rouge was an army of 17,000 meli under General Banks, which though
not under Grant's command, was intended to cooperate with him and
therefore affected his plans; but it failed to join Grant, and did not
even contain Gardner's force in its front until the critical period of the
campaign was over.
Supplies were received by river from St. Louis, Memphis, and
Columbus, Ky., which were in rail communication with the North.
Pemberton's sole object was to maintain his hold of the river,
Vicksburg being the key point. Being, therefore, entirely on the
defensive, he made of Vicksburg an entrenched camp, with batteries
commanding the river and land approaches, and awaited the movements of the enemy, having no plan of campaign other than to defend
his position.
Grant's objective was Vicksburg. For two months he had tried
fruitlessly every conceivable plan for gaining the high ground east of
the Yazoo delta and turning the position on its right flank. Convinced
of the impracticability of this plan, he considered the three alternatives
left, viz., 1st. To concentrate at Memphis and operate against Vicksburg by the line of the Mississippi Central Railroad. 2nd. To assault
Ft Pembertod
on the Yazoo
River, about
90 m. above
Vicksburg.
Port Hudson
on the Miss.
bout 140 m.
These distances measure
in air line.
Confederate
Communications.
Federal
positions.
Federal Communications.
Pemberton's
object.
Grant'sobject
Grant'splans.
Vicksburg from the front with the aid of the gun boats. 3rd. In
Grant's own language. "To get below Vicksburg, unite with Banks
against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base, and with that base
and Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against
Vicksburg."
Terrain.
McClernand
to New
Carthage.
Passage to
the Batteries.
Concentration towards
Grand Gulf.
The first he rejected as having the appearance of a retrograde

movement-at the time a most important consideration politically;
the second would result in great loss if not certain defeat; and the
third plan was therefore adopted.
Opposite Vicksburg the low bottom lands of the Mississippi
formed a great marsh intersected by creeks and bayous with roads
partially submerged and apparently almost impracticable even for the
troops themselves, much more for artillery and trains. It was determined, therefore, to move the army and material by transports through
the bayous from Milliken's Bend and Young's Point past Richmond to
New Carthage, thence to proceed by the river to Grand Gulf, take
that place, and land the army on the east bank. This movement was
to be rendered practicable by means of a canal dug from Duckport
into the bayou. But while the work was in progress on the canal, a
division of McClernand's corps was started by the road towards New
Carthage, and after considerable labor in building corduroy roads and
bridges over minor bayous, it succeeded in reaching that point on
April 6th. The whole of McClernand's corps was then directed on
New Carthage, and by April 10th or 12th the feasibility of this route
was demonstrated. On the 20th Grant issued orders for the final
movemernt across the peninsula.
Admiral Porter with seven gun boats and three river transports
loaded with supplies had run past the Vicksburg batteries on the night
of April 16th, and on the night of the 22nd five more transports
manned by volunteers from the army-mainly from Logan's division
of McPherson's corps- succeeded in passing. Each transport had
two barges in tow, both barges and transports being loaded with
supplies. Thus on the 23rd Grant had below Vicksburg about ten
days rations for his army and the means of crossing to the left bank.
On this date McClernand's corps was at New Carthage, McPherson's on the march via Richmond to New Carthage, and two divisions
of Sherman's at Duckport and Young's Point.
Sherinan's other division (Steele's), now moving south, had been
sent north to Greenville, one hundred and fifty miles above Vicksburg,
to make a demonstration for the purpose of distracting the attention of
the enemy from the main movement. The raid of Colonel Grierson,
6th Illinois Cavalry, who moved with 1,700 men from La Grange in
northern Mississippi to Baton Rouge, between April 18th and May
2nd, though not ordered by Grant, occurred most opportunely for him
and aided materially in effecting the same object.
April 29th. A bombardment by the fleet of the batteries at Grand
Gulf made it apparent that an assault of the works would not succeed,
Diversions.
At Grand
Gulf.
and Grant decided to cross the river below Grand Gulf. The transports, under cover of a second bombardment by the fleet, and afterwards
the fleet itself , then slipped by Grand Gulf in the night. Meantime
Sherman was ordered to make a demonstration on the 29th with one
division against Haines'Bluff, to repeat the demonstration on the 30th,
and then to move his whole corps promptly to Grand Gulf.
April 30th. Ten miles below Grand Gulf is the village of Bruinsburg, from which a good road led to Port Gibson. Here by noon of
the 30th, McClernand's corps of 18,000 men was landed on the east
bank; it was followed May 1st by McPherson's.
Passage to
the leftbank.
May 1st. McClernand's corps and part of McPherson's (about

20,000) advancing towards Port Hudson met two brigades (about
5,500) under General Bowen, commanding at Grand Gulf. The Confederates, strongly posted, made a stubborn resistance and held their
ground until near sunset when they retired in good order through
Grand Gulf and Port Gibson, burning the bridges over Bayou Pierre
and its South Fork.
Battleof Port
Gibson.
Sherman was moving down the west bank on Bruinsburg.

Pemberton ordered a concentration of all his forces on Vicksburg
and sent Loring to reinforce Bowen.
May 2nd to 10th. On the 2nd McClernand moved to Willow
Springs and McPherson to Hankinson's Ferry, where they remained
until the 7th waiting for Sherman and supplies. Loring and Bowen
retreated beyond the Big Black. On the same date Grant received a
dispatch from Banks, who was operating towards the Red River, to
the effect that the latter could not reach Port Hudson for ten days.
From this moment Grant gave up all idea of cooperation with Banks
Grant's Final
Plan.
100
Advance toward Bolton.
and determined on the plan which resulted in the fall of Vicksburg

and the surrender of Pemberton's army.
He decided to abandon his base, move upon two points, Edward's
Station and Bolton, midway between Jackson and Vicksburg, thus
interposing between the two main forces of the enemy, with the hope
of beating them in detail.
May 7th. Sherman was across and the march was resumed. The
army left the river with five days rations and received no more from
the commissary for about three weeks. Sufficient ammunition for the
campaign was carried in vehicles impressed from the country.
McClernand, followed by Sherman, took the Cayuga-Auburn
McPherson was directed on Raymond.
May 11th. McClernand and Sherman at Fourteen Mile creek. McPherson beyond Utica on the road to Raymond.
road.
Raymond.
May 12th. McPherson advancing struck the enemy, 3,000 strong,

at about noon, two miles from Raymond, and after a severe encounter
drove him through Raymond upon Jackson.
Grant learning that Johnston was expected at Jackson and that
reinforcements were arriving there, determined to turn his whole force
upon Johnston.
Pemberton was concentrating at Edward's Station.
May 13th and 14th. McPherson on Jackson via Clinton. Sherman, communicating with McPherson, on Jackson via Mississippi
Springs. McClernand to Raymond, Clinton and Auburn.
Jackson.
About 11 a. m. on the 14th McPherson and Sherman came upon

the enemy strongly entrenched outside of Jackson : and by 3 p. m. the
Confederates were driven through the city and joined Johnston who
had retired with the rest of his force by the Canton road.
Johnston's
Order to
Pemberton.
Johnston had arrived at Jackson from Tennessee on the 13th and

assumed command of all the troops on the Mississippi. Learning that
there was one corps, as he supposed, between him and Pemberton, he
ordered the latter to move east at once and come upon its rear.
Pemberton, however, fearful of uncovering Vicksburg, hesitated to
obey the order, called a council of his generals, and finally decided to
move south-east against Grant's communications, not appreciating the
fact that the Union commander having cut loose from his base was
independent of all communication therewith.
May 15th.
Pemberton moved to Elliston on the Raymond road.
On the 14th Grant in Jackson learned of Johnston's order to Pemberton and immediately ordered: McClernand at Raymond, Clinton,
and Auburn, to seize the
Raymond-Bolton
road ; McPherson
to
Concentrat
tion upon
Pemberton.
Bolton; Sherman to remain in Jackson long enough to destroy the

arsenal, foundry, etc, and then to follow McPherson the same day.
The bulk of his army was thus to concentrate on its right.

May 16th. Early in the morning Pemberton received another
order from Johnston to move on Clinton. This time he decided to
obey; and accordingly ordered a counter march. The movement had
already begun when McClernand's corps attacked the rear of his
columns, and he was compelled to face abont and fight the battle of
Champion's Hill. McPherson attacked his left, McClernand his right,
and by sundown they drove his army in ront over Baker's Creek to
Big Black bridge, night stopping the pursuit. McClernand's failure to
press his attack with vigor, as repeatedly ordered, alone saved Pemberton's army from annihilation or capture. Loring, cut off from the rest
of Pemberton's army in the course of the action, and losing his way in
the night, turned up two days later at Crystal Springs, on the New
From
Orleans R. R. without artillery, wagons, or camp equipage.
this point he proceeded to join Johnston who was endeavoring to
assemble an army in the vicinity of Canton.
Battle of
Champion's
Hill.
1I1ay 17th. Sherman from Bolton to Bridgeport. McClernand and

McPherson to Big Black bridge by the direct road to Vicksburg.
The Confederates made a feeble stand at the river but soon withdrew,
burning the bridge, and retreated the same day into Vicksburg.
To the Big
Black.
May 18th. Sherman bridged the river by the night of the 17th,
crossed part of his corps that night, and followed with the remainder
next morning. His advance reached the Benton road at 10 a. n.,
thus interposing between Hl:es' Bluff and Vicksburg. A regiment of
cavalry sent at once to Haines' Bluff, drove out the garrison and took
Retreatof the
Confederates
into Vicksburg.
possession.
McPherson followed Sherman.
McClernand bridged the Big Black on the main road and crossed
there.
At noon of this day, Pemberton received an order from Johnston
102
Investment.
Recapitulation of the
Campaign in
rear of Vicksburg.
to evacuate Vicksburg and niarch to the north-east. But Sherman

already barred the way.
May 19th. The investment of Vicksburg was complete : Sherman
on the right, McPherson in the center, and McClernand on the left.
At 2 p. m. Grant ordered a general assault. It resulted merely
in a gain of ground.
"It was now eighteen days since Grant had secured a foothold on
the east bank of the Mississippi by the battle of Port Gibson. In that
time he had marched 200 miles, and by keeping his army together
had defeated the enemy's scattered detachments in four engagements,
at Raymond, Jackson, Champion's Hill, and Big Black, all fought
within six days; he had inflicted a loss upon them of 8,000 in killed,
wounded, and missing, had captured 88 pieces of their artillery,
and,
causfinally, had driven them into the narrow defences of Vicksburg,
ing their outworks at Haines' Bluff, Warrenton, and Grand Gulf to be
abandoned, and established his own base on the Yazoo River in easy
and safe reach of his gunboats and transports. He had not only prevented the junction of the enemy's detachments, but had still further
scattered their forces, so that they had fully 14,000 less men available
in Vicksburg at the close of this period than at the beginning. During these eighteen days Grant's men had had but five days' rations,
having lived for the rest on the country; their own losses had been a
little less than 3,500. We must go back to the campaigns of Napoleon
to find equally brilliant results accomplished in the same space of time
with such small loss". *
May 21st. Communication was established with the Yazoo and
Grant's army received full rations.
May 22nd. Another unsuccessful assault was made, and the
army settled down to a regular siege.
Surrender of
Vicksburg
and Port
Hudson.
May 24th. Banks invested Port Hudson, and thus prevented

Gardner from obeying the order which the latter had just received to
evacuate the place and join Johnston at Jackson. Gardner's force had
already been reduced by reinforcements sent to Pemberton and Johnston, to about 7,000 men.
May 25th to July 4th. The investment continued, Grant meantime
receiving sufficient reinforcements to prosecute it with vigor and to
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103
eover his rear against Johnston, until July 4th when Pemberton capitulated, surrendering together with Vicksburg and its supplies and
munitions of war his army of 31,000 men.
Gardner, as soon as assured of the fall of Vicksburg, surrendered
Port Hudson ; and the Mississippi was again open to the gulf.
"Grant's losses in the entire campaign were a little less than
10,000, some of which, being men slightly wounded, were only temrn
porary. Of the army which, on Pemberton's return for March, numbered
61,495 actually present, all had now been lost except about 6,000 who
escaped with Loring from Champion's Hill, 4,000 who were operating
in the northern and eastern part of the state, and 7,000 from Port
Hudson, who had joined Johnston at Jackson. The losses in the
battles of Raymond and Jackson were about 2,000. The net total of
losses to the Confederates was therefore over 46,000 men, 60,000 small
arms, and 260 cannons, which they had but poor means of replacing;
add to this the loss of the Mississippi River and the resources of the
fertile region beyond it". *
COMMENTS.
The operations terminating in the battle of Marengo constitute

probably the nearest parallel to the Vicksburg campaign to be found
in military history, and a strong resemblance can also be found in the
Ulm campaign; for in both of these campaigns, Napoleon threw his
army completely across the communications of his adversary, and gave
battle while facing towards his late rear. But in one very important
particular, viz., the complete abandonment by Grant's army of its base
and line of communications after the turning movement had begun,
the Vicksburg Campaign is distinguished from all of its kind.
At Marengo, Napoleon still had open to him, in case of defeat, a
line of retreat by the St. Gothard pass, on which he relied, and in the
campaign of Ulm his superiority of numbers and his rectangular base
secured his communications against any sustained movement of the
enemy. In neither campaign did Napoleon abandon evjn his :main
lines of communication, much less his base; and supplies were drawn
over the original lines to the last. Grant, however, abandoned utterly
both his main line and his base, with the avowed purpose of living on
the country until victory had secured hin either -another base or
another line to his former base.
* Ibid.
iR6sumd of
losses.
104
Nor is there to be found an exact parallel to the campaign of

Vicksburg in any subsequent military operations. Sherman's "March
to the Sea" resembles it in some features, but differs from it radically
in others. Sherman transferred his base from the interior to the coast,
with reasonable certainty of being practically unopposed in the operation; Grant resolved to transfer his base when absolutely certain of the
prior necessity of beating an army equal in numbers to his own.
It has been asserted that Grant's daring movement involved, in
case of defeat, the destruction of his army; that having no line of
retreat open, defeat meant annihilation or surrender. This is not the
case; for, in the event of defeat, Grant could have fallen back upon
Banks at Port Hudson; he would have had the powerf'ul support of
Porter's fleet of gunboats which held the river, and he could have
drawn supplies at once from New Orleans. In other words, defeat
would have compelled him to do what he expected to accomplish by
victory, viz., change his base. An army that has abandoned its base
can suffer nothing from being driven away from it; and its position is
only improved when it is driven toward another one.
Thy advantages of concentric over divided action so evident in
Napoleon's ope"rations in Italy in 1796, and in the Eckmiihl campaign,
are strikingly illustrated in the Vicksburg campaign.
Although at the beginning of the operations the opposing armies
were practically equal in numbers, Grant, operating concentrically,
contrived to bring upon the battlefields of Port Gibson, Raymond,
Jackson, Champion's Hill and Big Black, at least double, and somnetimes triple, the forces of his opponent. Having driven Johnston from
Jackson and seen him well on his way northwards, he was able from
his interior position to turn with his whole force upon Pemberton,
defeat his army heavily, and finally drive him into Vicksburg before
the Confederates could re-unite.
Perhaps the junction would have been effected if Pemberton had
promptly obeyed Johnston's order of the 14th ; but it would have been
the junction of two beaten wings on a front such as Livingston-Vernon,
parallel to their line of communications. For Pemberton, advancing
directly on Jackson, according to his orders, and thus encountering
McPherson and Sherman in his front, and probably McClernand on
his right flank, would, if not crushed, have been driven northwards
off the Jackson-Vicksburg road.
Ve riio
A.MPANIGN
OF
Bluzff
-VICKSBUH
.863:,
Livingston
-V
na1
1/~y"
CAMPAIGN OF VIRGINIA 1862.

Pemberton's move toward the southeast against what he supposed
to be Grant's communications greatly favored the latter's purpose: 1st,
By increasing the separation from Johnston. 2nd, By promptly
bringing on the conflict Grant was seeking.
The primary cause therefore of the Confederate disasters was the
division of their forces in the effort to hold at once both Jackson and
Vicksburg.
Had Pemberton, when assured of Grant's presence in force on the
east bank, promptly concentrated all his troops at some point, as Raymond, to cover Jackson, the railroad center where his reinforcements
were arriving and were to arrive, he would have met Grant with
superior forces and with all the advantages of a position covering his
Pemberton with superior force
communications with the south.
covering Jackson, and maintaining communication with his base,
would hold Vicksburg more securely than when cooped up with inferior
force behind its intrenchments and cut from his base. At any rate
the capture of Vicksburg would not have entailed the capture of his
army.
Grant's operations against Vicksburg constituted the most brilliant
campaign ever conducted on the American Continent, and perhaps the
most brilliant one recorded in military history since the days of
Napoleon. When Grant's army, with its five days rations, left the
Mississippi on a campaign of unknown length, abandoning its base
with the determination of securing a new one by victory, it began a
chapter in military history on which the fame of its commander will
chiefly rest, and which in some of its essential features differs from all
others either before or since.
THE CASE OF INDEPENDENT AGAINST COMBINED
LINES OF OPERATIONS.
Having investigated the consequences which follow when parts of
an army are separated and driven asunder, we come to the apparently
different case, of two armies allied, or of the same nation, which, when
about to act against the common enemy, voluntarily separate, and
operate against him by independent paths, and without concert.
A variety of this problem is offered by the case of an army which,
in covering some point, such as the capital of an empire, is assailed by
106
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS:
armies whose general aim is to reach that point, and who, so far, act
in concert, but who follow distinct paths towards it.
THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA, 1861.
Washington
to Richmond
in
miles
100
a100 mdirect
line.
In 1861 each side aimed its best efforts at the hostile capital. The
Union troops were at a disadvantage from the first by the position of
Washington, which occupied a salient on the enemy's border
line; its
river drained the soil of Virginia; it vas connected with lhe North by
a single railroad; and troops marching to its defense were mobbed by
the hostile population in its rear. On the other hand Richmond had
every advantage of communication by land and water, and was surrounded by its devoted friends.
One of the most important railroads of the North stretched in a
general direction from east to west, following for a long distance the
southern side of the Potomac river, within easy reach of the raiding
parties of the enemy.
The loyal population of the border States insisted upon protection.
All these considerations caused the opposing forces in northern and
western Virginia to be divided into several armies. On July 16 they
were as follows:
In West Virginia McClellan with 20,000 men opposed Garnet
with 4,500.
In the Shenandoah Valley Patterson with 20,000 opposed Johnston with 11,000.
Between Washington and Richmond McDowell with
opposed Beauregard with 22,000.
35,000
POSITIONS.
Huttonsville
to Staunton
60 miles in a
direct line.
In West Virginia McClellan had captured and dispersed the Confederate forces. He occupied Huttonsville on the Staunton road on
the 14th. On the 17th he proposed to unite with Patterson or to
move on Staunton. His ideas were pronounced excellent, but no
move was made. He was not informed of the plans of the other commanders, and his force may be here dismissed from consideration.
Martinsburg
to Winches-
In the Shenandoah, Patterson was at Martinsburg.

was at Winchester.
ter 25 miles.
McDowell was at Alexandria covering Washington.

was covering the railroad junction at Manassas.
Johnston
Beauregard
THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN.

PLANS.
The plans of the Union commander-in-chief, General Scott, were

for Patterson to hold Johnston, and prevent him from reinforcing
Beauregard, while McDowell advanced and captured the junction at
Manassas. No course was prescribed for the troops in Western Virginia, but they gave great anxiety to the Confederates.
The advantages of uniting the armies of Beauregard and Johnston
against the separated armies of the Federals had been long considered
by the Confederate generals.
The troops of the North were mostly three months men whose
terms of service were nearly out. Political considerations compelled
their advance against the better judgment of the generals.
MOVEMENTS.
July 16th. McDowell marched from Alexandria to Fairfax

Courthouse.
Patterson marched from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill.
17th. McDowell marched to Centerville.
Patterson marched to Charleston.
Beauregard covered the passages over the Bull Run which might
be approached from Fairfax.
18th. McDowell concentrated at Centerville, and Tyler's division
made a weak attack on the line of the Bull Raun, which was repulsed.
Johnston left Winchester with eight thousand men and marched
by Ashby's Gap toward Piedmont on the railroad.
19th. McDowell passed the day in reconnoitering.
Jackson's brigade of Johnston's army reached Manassas.
20th. McDowell continued his reconnaissance.
Enough regiments of Johnston's army arrived at Manassas to form
one more brigade. The cavalry and artillery also joined, having
marched by the road.
About six thousand men of the army of the Shenandoah were
now available for the battle of the next day.
21st. The att.ck on the 18th and the reconnaissance had caused
McDowell to abandon both the front attack and the attack on the
enemy's right. His plan now was to reach out by a flank march and
turn the Confederate left. Beauregard was planning, at the same
time, an attack on Centerville. Thus each commander was contemplating a maneuver by his right.
Alexandria
to Centerville
20 miles.
Centerville to
Maniasas,7m.
Piedmont to
Manasas, 34
miles.
108
The Conifederates were extended on about eight miles of front

guarding the crossings over Bull Run when the flank attack developed
on the south side of the stream. At first it was successful but finally
in the afternoon a panic seized the Federal troops and they retreated
in great confusion. This was probably started by the unexpected
arrival of a small number ofJohnston's troops on their flank.
The Confederates did not pursue.
COMMENTS.
This campaign illustrates the advantage of combined as opposed
to independent lines of operation. The Confederates were able to
concentrate at either extremity of the line and thus defeat one of the
Union armies while the others were useless. The proper action of
Patterson's force would have been to join McDowell. This would
have thrown the benefit of interior lines on the side of the Federals.
Patterson did, in fact, propose on July 9th that he should move to
Leesburg, where he would have been on the flank of Johnston and
would have been not more than 25 miles from Centerville. It is now
well settled that it was false strategy to order Patterson to hold Johnston in the valley. To do this he would have been obliged to follow
the Confederates down the valley and to attack the intrenchments at
Winchester, while at any time the railroad might have been used to
bring reinforcements from Manassas. His idea of going to Leesburg
was accepted in a half-hearted way, but he was so hampered by conflicting orders that he did nothing. Even from Charleston as matters
turned out, he could have reached Centerville sooner than Johnston
did, starting at the same time.
THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA, 1862.
By the beginning of 1862, the Union government was prepared
to prosecute the war with vigor. In the East, its greatest efforts had
been directed to the construction of defenses to insure the safety of
Washington, and to the creation, equipment and instruction, at the
capital, of a great army whose objective was to be the Confederate
Allamy of
capital, Richmond.
Potomac
orgacized
By the end of February this army, the Army of the Potomac,

was ready to take the field under the then general-in-chief, General
McClellan. Its strength was about 150,000 men exclusive of the forces
necessary to garrison the defenses of Washington, guard the Maryland
shore of the Potomac river, and watch the Shenandoah Valley.
into corps
March 8-1st
McDowell's;
3r2nd
HeiSumner'lman's; 4th
Keyes's.
109
The main Confederate army, 56,000 strong, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, was in position at Centerville, Va,, facing
Washington. Considerable detachments of Confederate troops were
also in the Shenandoah Valley, at Richmond, Yorktown and Norfolk,
Va., and at several points in North Carolina.
Two principal plans for the movement on Richmond had been
under consideration. One proposed a direct advance through Virginia,
commencing with a movement on the position at Centerville, which
was to be held in front and turned on its right. The other was to
descend the Potomac river, enter the Rappahannock, establish a base
at Urbana, and by a rapid march gain West Point at the head of the
York river. Richmond would thus be seriously threatened before Johnston's army at Centerville could fall back and meet McClellan, in a
condition to resist his progress. This plan also comprehended active
operations in the Shenandoah Valley.
The second plan was authorized March 8, but the following day
Johnston evacuated his position at Centerville and retreated to one
on the Rapidan river. This change caused Fort Monroe to be selected
as the base instead of Urbana. The further details of the plan
now contemplated the rapid advance of the army up the peninsula
formed by the York and James rivers, with the co6peration of the
navy on each, while one corps of the army was to operate
upon the right, on either bank of the York, against positions offering
resistance on the direct route. Contemporaneous events, however,
modified these details. The navy, occupied by Confederate naval
movements in Hampton Roads, was unable to render efficient
cooperation; and President Lincoln, alarmed by "Stonewall'
Jackson's activity in the Shenanidoah Valley, fearing that Banks'
Corps, designated to cover Washington on the Winchester-Centerville line, was insufficient for the purpose, retained, at the last moment,
one of McClellan's corps, (McDowell's), to occupy the latter point.
On March 17, the movement of the Army of the Potomac to Fort
Monroe, by means of a large fleet of transports, began from Alexandria,
Va., and on April 4 the advance up the Peninsula commenced. Progress, however, was blocked at Yorktown, from April 5 to May 4, by
Confederate works, across the Peninsula, held by Magruder with 11,000
men, afterwards increased to 33,000. On May 7, Franklin's division
Campaign
plans.
Fort Monroe
to Yorktown,
18 m.-to
White House
51 m.-to
Richmond,
75 m.
Jackson attacked
Shield's divWinchester
March 23,but
was repulsed.
Seige of
Yorktown.
110
Battle of
Williamsburg.
Union army
re-organized
into six corps
May 15Franklin
commanding
5th and Por-
ter the 6th.

Fredericksburg to Richmond, 55 m.
of McDowell's Corps, sent April 20, to reinforce McClellan, was transported by boats from Yorktown, and landed at White House, where
the rest of the army assembled after an engagement with the retreating Confederates at Williamsburg.
At White House McClellan established his depots, and on May
16, with 95,000 men, resumed his advance on Richmond by roads
leading across the Chickahominy.
When McClellan reached white House, the opposing forces were
distributed as follows:
UNION.
McDowell, with 35,000 effectives, at Fredericksburg advancing

to cooperate with McClellan,
Banks, with 19,000 men, at Ijarrisonburg in the Shenandoah
Valley.
Fr6mont, with the army of Western Virginia, 15,000, was enter ing the upper Shenandoah Valley from Franklin.
Detachments were also operating against Norfolk and several
points on the North Carolina coast.
CONFEDERATE.
General Johnston, on the development of McClellan's movement,

had withdrawn from his position on the Rapidan towards Richmond,
sending reinforcements to Yorktown where he personally took command. He was now falling back to the lines of defense around
Richmond.
Anderson, with 13,000 men, faced McDowell on the Rappahanock.
Jackson beginsdiversion
in Shenandoah Valley
in favor of
Johnston and
Richmond,
beingfavored
by lack of
unity in Union councils
and strategic
situation of
Valley.
Jackson, after his repulse by Shields at Winchester, (March 23),

had retired up the Shenandoah Valley, and was now with 17,000 effectives, in the vicinity of Swift Run Gap, his force distributed so as to
cover the issues through the mountains from Franklin, and flank
Banks' further advance.
8th May. Jackson, leaving a force to oppose Banks, concentrated
superior numbers and defeated Milroy's and Schenck's brigades, the
advance of Fremont's column, at McDowell, pursuing them towards
Franklin. Fremont thus checked, remained at Franklin.
12th May. Banks, weakened by the withdrawal of Shield's division (10,000) to reinforce McDowell, fell back to Strasburg, where lie
took up a defensive position to cover the lower valley, and sent 1,000
-CAMPAIGN :OF VIRGINIA 1862.

men to Front Royal to protect the bridges at that point over the two
forks of the Shenandoah river.
Staunton to
Strasburg,
19th May. Jackson, with his entire force, about 17,000 effectives, moved down the Valley against Banks.
20th May. McClellan's army reached the Chickahominy. Three
days later Keyes' Corps, on the left, had crossed at Bottom's Bridge,
Winchester,
90 m.-to
Williamsport, 125 m.
and the remainder of the army was echeloned along the north bank to
Mechanicsville, to facilitate junction with McDowell, whose advance
troops were approaching Hanover Court House. By this time the
Confederate detachments in North Carolina and at Norfolk had been
Union army
astride the
Chickahom-
called to Richmond.
men.
72 m.-to
inv.
Johnston now opposed McClellan with 73,000
23rd May. Jackson attacked and destroyed the detachment at

Front Royal, and then moved rapidly to Middletown to cut off Ba nks'
retreat from Strasburg.
24th and 25th May. Banks reached Winchester, offered determined
resistance to Jackson, but was finally driven over the Potomac
at Williamsport. President Lincoln, alarmed by Jackson's success
and fearing for the safety of Washington, countermanded McDowell's
movement, and dispatched 20,000 of his troops to Strasburg, by Manassas Gap, to intercept Jackson. Fremont, still at Franklin, marched
to Strasburg for the same purpose. Jackson moved to the vicinity of
Harper's Ferry, made feints at crossing the Potomac until the 30th,
when, finding superior forces converging on his rear, he began a retrograde movement up the Valley.
27th May. McClellan, finding his right and rear threatened by
Anderson, detached 12,000 troops under Porter, who occupied Handestroyed
over Court House, drove Anderson towards Richmond, and
Jackson's
success stops
McDowell's
advance.
advance.
McClellan
seizes HanCourt
over
House.
all bridges and railroads, which gave access to theUnion rear, as far as
Ashland.
30th May. The afternoon of this day, Jackson's main body was
at Winchester, rear guard at Halltown. Banks, with 14,000, across
McDowell's
the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, moving on Halltown.
advance at Front Royal, Fremont's at Wardensville.
Johnston
takes advan-
31st May and 1st June. McClellan advancing. Johnston, from the
defenses of Richmond, with 40,000 men, attacked McClellan's left wing
(Keyes and Heintzelman's Corps), on south bank of Chicka-
rilous position-attle
of Fair Oaks.
tage onMc-
112
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS
hominy. After a partial success, Johnston was repulsed, Sumner's

corps having crossed with great difficulty the imperfectly bridged river
and reinforced the left wing. Johnston having been wounded in this
battle was succeeded by General Robert E. Lee. The Union Commander now occupied himself with strengthening his position and
bridging the Chickahominy at many points before resuming his advance.
Jackson
retreats.
Strasburg to
Harpers Ferry, 50 m.-to
Front Royal,
12 m.-to
Wardensville, 20 m.
Jackson
stands and
defeats his
pursuers in
detail. His
campaign
an example
in strategy.
Jackson reached Strasburg the evening of the 31st, having outmarched Banks and passed between the converging columns of
McDowell and Fremont, the next morning he continued his
retreat up the Valley followed by Fremont. Shields, with 10,000
men, pursued on east side of Massanutten Mts. with a view to prevent
Jackson escaping through gaps of the Blue Ridge.
25th June. Jackson reached Harrisonburg, having destroyed all
bridges over the Shenandoah by which Shields could have united with
Fr6mont. Fr6mont at Harrisonburg June 6th.
8th June. Jackson repulsed Fremont at Cross Keyes; crossed
the Shenandoah at Port Republic the following morning, destroyed
the bridge, and attacked and defeated the advance guard
of Shields,
Also of skillful and rapid
who then retired down the Valley. Jackson withdrew from the
Shenandoah Valley June 17, and on June 25 arrived at Ashland, 14
maneuvering
miles north of Richmond.
offsetting
superior
numbers.
Stuart raids
aroundUnion
Army.
12th to 15th June. Lee, to ascertain the dispositions of McClellan's

right and rear, sent General "Jeb" Stuart, with 1,200 cavalry and 2
guns to reconnoiter at Hanover Court House. Stuart left Richmond
the afternoon of June 12, and, moving by Ashland and Hanover
Court House, made the circuit of the Union Army, crossing the Chickahominy below it, and returned to Richmond the morning of June 15.
McClellan
begins his
final advance
on Richmond
Lee attacks
McClellan's
right and
communications.
25th June. McClellan began his final advance on Richmond.

His army was now on south bank of Chickahominy, except Porter's
corps which faced Richmond on north bank.
26th June, Jackson, reinforced by Lee with troops from
Richmond to 65,000, attacked Porter who had 30,000. Porter, by desperate
fighting, retained his hold on the river, and regained the left wing
during the night of June 27-28. McClellan, whose communications
were now compromised, let go his base on the York river and withdrew to Harrison's Landing on the James. The series of Confederate
THE
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN.
113
attacks, known as "The Seven Days' Battles", commenced with Jackson's attack, and lasted until July 3,
when McClellan gained the
shelter of his gunboats on the James.
The Union strength during
these battles was 88,000 effectives;
Confederate,
80,000 to 90,000
effectives.
26th June to 19 July. McDowell's Corps, (Rickett's division of which
"Seven Days9
Battle-Mcchanicsville,
June 26;
Gaine's Mills
27 and 28;
Savage Station and
Peach ( rchard, 29;White
Oak Swamp,
30; Malvern
Hill, July 1.
was at Manassas Junction and King's- at Fredericksburg),
and the
commands of Banks and Fremont in the Shenandoah Valley were this
day organized into the "The Army of Virginia",
50,000 men, under
General Pope, whose instructions were to advance upon Gordonsville

to take the pressure off McClellan.
of Fremont's corps June 29).
(Sigel succeeded to the command
Pope concentrated his army, (except
King's division which remained at Fredericksburg until August 11),

in the vicinity of Sperryville. July 19 his advance was at Culpepper
Court House.
15,000 men.
The same day .Jackson
reached
Gordonsville with
\Nfeanwhile McClellan, had been strengthening his posi-
The Army of
Virginia is
farmed and
advances under Pope.
Gordonsville
a railroad
center of
great importance to Confederates.
tion at Harrison's Landing, and planning another advance, on the line

of the James, against Richmond, still covered by the main Confederate army.
7th and 8th August.
Jackson,
reinforced
from
Richmond
to
25,000, crossed the Rapidan towards Pope, who was now advancing.
9th Augusts
Jackson, advancing, met at Cedar Mountain and
forced back toward Culpepper, Pope's advance under Banks, 7,500,

reinforced during battle to 18,000.
11th August.
The battle of the 9th and the fear of encountering
Pope's whole force caused Jackson to retire over the Rapidan to Gordonsaville.
Pope advanced
McClellan
was now
and occupied the line of the Rapidan.
withdrawn
from
the
Peninsula.
His
army
marched back to Fort Monroe and thence moved by water to Acquia

Creek and Alexandria, to cover Washington and reinforce Pope.
17th August. Lee, from Richmond, approached the Rapidan.
Including Jackson's troops his army numbered 55,000.
18th and 19th August.
Pope, in order to facilitate his reinforce-
ment from McClellan's army preparatory to further advance, retired

over the Rappahannock, which he held from Kelly's Ford to Beverley's
Ford and Sulphur Springs.
Battle of Cedar mountain
23rd August. Pope received, via Acquia Creek, the first reinforcement from McClellan 2,500 men under Reynolds.
Jacksonturns
Pope's left
and gains his
rearandeommunications.
25th and 26th August. Jackson, with 25,000 men, moved up the
Rappahannock, 'crossed and marched northward along the eastern
slope of the Blue Ridge, by Orleans and Salem, covered by the hills
of Bull, Run.
Having made this circuit, he descended through
Thoroughfare Gap upon Bristoe Station, on the Orange Railway, in
rear of Pope. Lee with remainder of army engaged Pope's attention
during Jackson's march by feints at crossing the Rappahannock. On
these days Pope was reinforced by two, corps of the Army of Potomac,
Heintzelman's by rail from Alexandria, on the 25th, and on the 26th
by Porter's, which marched from Acquia Creek.
Pope interposesbetween
Jackson ai.d
27th August. Pope, finding Jackson on his communications,

moved by the Warrenton road and by the railroad upon Jackson.
At his approach Jackson retired along the railroad to Manassas, where
Longstreet.
Failure of
Pope to re-
main interposedbetween
Confederate
wings or to
Thareap
hold
allows Longstreet to unite
with Jackson.
he destroyed. a great depot and captured a vast amount of stores.

Longstreet, commanding the right wing of Lee's army, followed Jackson's line of march and reached Salem. McDowell's and Sigel's
corps, moving on the Warrenton road, reached Gainesville.
28th August. Jackson moved early towards Sudley Springs, on Bull
Run, to secure a position north of the Warrenton-Centerville road in
which to await Longstreet.
Pope withdrew McDowell's column
towards Manassas Junction, but, on reaching the latter place at noon
and finding Jackson gone, ordered his army towards Centerville.
Longstreet arrived that night at Thoroughfare Gap, which was held
by Rickett's division left by McDowell for that purpose.
29th August. Jackson in position, left on Bull Run near Sudley
Manassas
junction to
Gainesville,
15,-to Thoroughfare
Gap, 20.
Springs, right rear iear Groveton, was joined on his right by Longstreet, whose march through Thoroughfare Gap was but faintly
opposed. Lee's army is now united and ready for battle, its right
extending to the Manassas Gap Railroad, south of Groveton. Pope
SBattle of 2nd
Bull Run.
30th August. Pope, whose troops were massed mainly in front of

Jackson; attacked him and was repulsed. A general attack by the Confederates followed, which drove Pope, with heavy loss, from the field:
spent the day operating with a view to destroying the corps of Jackson, whom he believed alone opposed him. Pope had now, for the next
day's battle, about 63,000; Confederates, about 54,000.
Firnaldii
SCALE OF:MILES
30
30
"43u
.R

31st August. Both armies remained in position until afternoon,
when Jackson moved by his left to gain the Centerville-Alexandria
road in rear of Pope. Pope was further reinforced this day by troops
from McClellan's army.
1st Sept. Pope fell back on Alexandria. Jackson made an unsuccessful attempt, at Chantilly, to check him.
2nd Sept. The Union
Washington at Alexandria,
army retired
within the defenses
of
CO:MMENTS.
In this campaign the advantage given to Lee by his interior lines

was very great, as they enabled him, while standing on the defensive
with his main army, to detach Stonewall Jackson for an offensive
movement against the Union armies in the Shenandoah Valley, and
then to withdraw him promptly; and with his army thus united to fall
upon McClellan, who, from the nature of the independent lines upon
which the Union armies were operating, was unable to draw corresponding forces to his assistance.
There were many elements, however, aside from the disadvantage
of independent against combined lines of operation, that militated
against the success of the Union arms. At the beginning of the campaign McClellan was relieved from the command of all the armies
except the army of the Potomac, and he was thus not only separated
by distance from the other forces operating in Virginia, but was
deprived of all authority to order concerted movements. A more
enterprising commander might, under the circumstances, have
achieved success in spite of the interference with his plans, to which
he was subjected by a Secretary of War who, though a patriotic and
able man, was ignorant of the art of war; for his army was at least
equal in numbers to that of Lee, it was in fine morale, and .had unbounded (though perhaps unjustified) confidence in its chief.
McClellan had, however, been promised reinforcement by McDowell's corps, which was marching via Fredericksburg and Hanover
Court House to join him. The necessity of reaching out. to effect
a junction, was a justification for placing lalrge part of his army on
the north bank of the Chickahominy. Otherwise he would doubtless
have effected his change of base to the James before that movement
was thrust upon him by necessity.
...
Battle of
Chantilly.
116
A less sagacious commander than Lee could easily have seen that
the junction of McDowell and McClellan would give the latter such
numbers as to render Confederate success almost hopeless. Lee accordingly sent Stonewall Jackson to make a diversion in the Valley, with
the object of drawing McDowell's corps away from the neighborhood
of McClellan. Alarmed for the safety of Washington, the Administration played into Lee's hands. Against the protests of both McClellan
and McDowell, the latter was ordered to strike across the country and
interrupt J ackson's retreat from the Valley. At the time of receiving this order McDowell was not more than thirty miles from
McClellan's right, and the junction was almost effected; but he was
hurried away on the impossible errand of intercepting Jackson, and
he %as thus definitely removed from all hope of junction with McClellan. Freed thus from an imminent danger, Lee, as we have seen,
drew in Jackson, and with his whole force fell upon McClellan.
With Pope on the north and McClellan south-east of Richmond,
Lee still had the advantage of interior lines. He could count on the
improved morale of his own army, and could feel reasonably certain
that McClellan would wait for reinforcements before he would assume
the cffensive. We accordingly find him reinforcing Jackson to a
sufficient degree to make the operations of' that commander seem formidable, and to alarm the authorities in Washington; but we observe
that he does not leave Richmond with his main army until the Federal administration, again unwittingly playing into his hands, withdraw's McClellan from the Peninsula. .No longer fearing for the
safety of the Confederate capital, he then falls on Pope with his full
force.
Notwithstanding the advantage of his situation, Lee had not sufficient force to profit by it fully, if opposed by intelligent and vigorous
effort. He could not employ a containing force of sufficient size against
either of his opponents and have a large enough army left to insure
the crushing defeat of the other. There was danger that he might be
unsuccessful on one side and defeated on the other. Indeed, as we
have seen, the mere presence of McClellan at Harrison's Bar was
sufficient to limit Lee to a menace against Pope, and a sustained
offensive was begun only when McClellan was out of the way. *
* In his official report General Lee says: "Jackson, on reaching Gordonsville, ascertained that the force under General Pope was superior to his own,,
but the uncertainty that then surrounded the designs of General McClellan, rendered it
inexpedient to reinforce himfrom the army at Richmond."
117
it would have been the part of wisdom to draw Pope back for the passive defense of Washington, and reduce his force to reinforce McClellan's
army. Owing to the strained relations between McClellan and the
Administration, it would doubtless have been wise to replace him at
this juncture with a general in whom the President had more confidence.
As the columns of a single army, designed for combined action,
are often separated by considerable intervals while approaching their
object, it is evident that the fact of separation alone cannot constitute
a double line. It is when the separation is so complete-whether
owing to distance, to obstacles, or to want of communications-that no
concert exists between the armies, and the action of each is independent, that the case of the double line is presented.
When the parts of a combined force are interposed between
independent armies advancing from a common base or divergent bases
the advantages of the former consist, 1st, in the power of mutual reinforcement and support; 2nd, in the ignorance of the enemy as to the side
on which the blow will fall ; 3rd, in the direction of the attack which
keeps them asunder and prevents their concerted action. The present
case will, therefore, be worse than that of an originally combined force,
the front of which has been pierced, inasmuch as the absence of preconcert for such a contingency will render the junction still more
uncertain.
For these reasons, then, it seems that for two armies to operate
against a combined enemy by lines where, from distance or want of
concert, they are independent of each other, is to confer on the enemy
an advantage greater than that which has been demonstrated to follow from
interposing between the parts of an extended front, and that advantage
will therefore be such as to compensate for considerable inferiority of
numbers.
In all these cases the advantage of operating from the common
center against widely separated bodies advancing towards that center is
apparent. Against one line of invasion a retarding and inferior force
is used, while on the other a preponderating force is brought into
action; and the first victory is the signal for the general derangement
and failure of the enterprise.
To operate methodically to the best advantage, the covering army,
if assailed on two lines, should place on each of these a retarding force
at first, considering these as wings, while the mass in reserve is held
ready to give a preponderance to either wing, or to both in succession.
In all Napoleon's operations against a divided enemy this principle is
apparent-at Jena for example, at Millesimo, at Eckmiihl, at Rivoli,
and in the case yet to be quoted of Waterloo, and of the campaign
against the Allies on the Seine and Marne.
If then, in such a case, the covering army were to be disposed on
the two lines in exact proportion to the hostile numbers advancing on
them, it would be operating on a false principle. For if in total numbers inferior to the enemy, it would be inferior on each line, and would
therefore, presumably, be defeated on each: whereas, as already shown,
the situation ought to be made to compensate for inferiority.
If an army is not intended to fight, but only to retard the enemy,
any increase of numbers beyond what is necessary will only serve to
embarrass its own retreat rather than the advance of the enemy. For
the essence of the retarding operation is, that the force performing it
shall withdraw promptly before it is outnumbered. But with the
extent of front occupied the difficulty of withdrawing without a battle
increases, and with it the risk of loss. Consequently, if a retarding
force be only just so inferior to the enemy as to be unable to accept
battle, a great part of it will always be in column on the roads, and
will therefore be only an encumbrance.
As the first movements will generally be in retreat towards the
common center, and as there can only be a limited number of transverse lines which will afford the opportunity of codperation and
combination between center and wings, it becomes important.to inquire
to what distance from the point covered the parts of a covering army
can operate without risk to the general principle.
If the parts of the covering army should fall back so far before
striking a decisive blow, that the enemy's forces, converging, communicate and form one force, all the advantage of the situation is lost,
and the defenders are thrown on their tactical resources. Thus, in
1864, Lee, on the Rappahannock and Breckenridge in the Shenandoah
Valley, opposed Grant on the one side, Sigel on the other; while
Beauregard on the side of Petersburg confronted Butler. Breckenridge defeated Sigel, and then reinforced Lee against Grant at Cold

Harbor; and Beauregard successfully opposed Butler. But Grant,
by a flank march to the James, came into communication with Butler:
hence forward they formed one force; and Lee, notwithstanding his
fortifications, could never subsequently shake them off. We can,
then, form an idea of the minimum distance at which the concentric
army can advantageously operate in front of the point it coversnamely, such as will keep the enemy's forces, as they gradually
approximate on the converging lines, from uniting.
The maximum distance is less determinate. Yet it is desirable
that it should be fixed in some degree, since a natural wish to protect
as much territory as possible from the presence of the enemy might
lead an army to operate on too great a front. Space alone, when
very long radii are used, may effectually destroy concert between
parts of an army, even if those parts be nearer to each other than are
the parts of the enemy. Even since the introduction of the field-telegraph, cooperation must be more difficult when the distance which
mutual reinforcements must pass over is great, and the chances have
thereby proportionately increased that, during their transit, unforeseen
changes may have taken place in the situation of the opposing forces.
But there is also another reason why the lines of operation should
be limited in extent. It has been pointed out that the retarding force
should be strictly limited, since a superfluous number would be an
encumbrance on the one line, while its aid would be vitally important
on the other. But a force thus retarding a superior enemy performs
its duty with a certain loss. For the troops which the enemy first
brings into action, being assured of immediate support from the army
in rear, can maneuver to a flank with unusual boldness, and may moreover feel confident that no sustained offensive operation will be
attempted against them. On the other hand, if the troops. on the
flanks of the deployed retarding force are slow in withdrawing towards
the line of retreat, they are apt to be cut off-or, if they withdraw too
soon, they may lay bare the rear of the center; and it cannot be
expected that on all occasions their movements should be exactly
timed. Thus Zieten, in effecting his object of retarding the French
columns on the Sambre, lost, in his retreat upon Fleurus, 1,200 men.
Were there not a reserve to make good these losses, the force would
in a few days be so reduced as to be unable to make a stand, and
120
could only be driven in perpetual retreat. According to the length of

time that the force will probably be called on to act separately, must
its numbers be increased; and on a very extended line, therefore,
either the principle of the campaign would be lost sight of by the
undue increase of numbers, or else the retarding force would be practically destroyed.
It must not of course be forgotten that an invading army uses as
many roads for its advance as are conveniently near and sufficiently
direct. In proportion to the number of these which are available will
be the difficulties of the retarding force. For if it were to neglect any
of them, the enemy's column on that road would turn its flank and
arrive in its rear. Supposing, then, that 50,000 invaders are advancing along two roads; in an ordinary country, 7,000 or 8,000 defenders
should be disposable on each of those roads, with a general reserve, say
of 4,000, for casualties. Thus 20,000 men will perform the duty of
opposing the 50,000 on that line. Supposing, further, that the
invaders are in two armies, 50,000 each; that, on the other side,
20,000 are at first thrown out to oppose them- on each line, and the
mass of the defensive army assembled at some central point; then
40,000 reinforcing one wing will give sufficient superiority to insure
victory in a battle on that side, and, after detaching a pursuing force,
will also bring a superiority on the other, and probably strike also in
a fatal direction. Thus 80,000 operating concentrically will be successful against 100,000 divided in an ordinary country; but of course,
if circumstances admit (as at Monte Legino and Bull Run) of the
whole retarding force being withdrawn,. and its weight cast on the
other side, this increases the odds in favor of the combined army.
It is clear, also, that when one line lies through an open country, and
the other is dificult, ofering few roads to the advance, and many natural
obstacles, the retardingforce should act on the latter.
Also, when an invaded frontier is very distant from the object,
and the defensive army decidedly inferior to the total forces advancing
on a double line, it will be better, on military grounds, to make no
serious stand near the frontier, but to direct the first efforts to keep the
.enemy on separate lines, and to fall back to a point where, his forces
being diminished by the necessary conditions of invasion, the parts of
the combined army shall be near enough to each other to strike con-
CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO.
certed blows. For the purpose of combination, good and direct roads
will manifestly be indispensable.
The additional advantages of railway communication between the
parts of the defensive army, and from these to the point they cover,
need no comment.
Lastly, it is evident that the situation is of decisive advantage
only when turried to account by a leader who acts with promptitude
and resolution. Slowness and indecision will be fatal to the inferior
army, the commander of which must be swift to perceive and to use
his opportunity.
THE CASE OF COMBINED
ARMIES
OPERATING
FROM
DIVERGENT BASES.
In March, 1815, Napoleon returning from Elba, amidst the

enthusiastic acclamations of the French people, again ascended the
throne of France. He at once endeavored to enter into communication with the other great powers, and declared his policy to be one of
peace; but they refused to receive his agents; they formed a new
coalition against him; and they proceeded at once to mobilize their
armies and set them in motion for the avowed purpose of driving him
from the throne.
War being thus thrust upon him, two choices were open to Napoleon; either to remain on the defensive or to assume a vigorous
offensive. The former course would have made France the theater of
war; and though he might reasonably expect a campaign that would
rival in brilliancy his operations of the year before in Champagne, he
would, at best, be playing alosing game if opposed to theconcentrated
Choice of
offensive or
defensive.
Situation on
June 1, 1815.
The French
Army.
Choice of
theater of
operation.
The Prussian
Army.
Charleroi to
Brussels, 35
-road,
Namur to
Ciney, 20road.
forces of the Allies. The second course would afford him an opportunity to beat his enemies in detail: and a new Austerlitz or Jena
might incline the Allies to listen to reasonable terms of peace, instead
of pushing the war to its last extremity.
France and her enemies at once prepared for a desperate struggle;
and on the first of June, the situation was as follows-A Russian
army of 167,000 men was rapidly traversing Germany; the Austrians
were concentrating 90,000 men on the Rhine between Bile and Mannheim, and 120,000 in Lombardy; the German States were sending
80,000 to the Upper Rhine; and the British army, under Wellington,
and the Prussian army under Bliicher, aggregating more than 200,000
men, were already in Belgium.
To meet these formidable forces, Napoleon had after providing
for the garrisons of fortresses, a field army of only 125,000 men.
This army was composed mostly of veterans, and so far as the men
were concerned it was one of the finest that he ever led; but the organizations were new, the men were not acquainted with their officers,
and of the great marshals who had shared the Emperor's glory in the
past, only Davout, Soult and Ney remained. Davout was placed in
command of Paris, Soult was made chief-of-staff, and only Ney-the
bravest but not the ablest of Napoleon's lieutenants - alone remained
for active command.
Everything demanded that Napoleon should make Belgium the
theater of his first operations. The position of the Allied armies in
that country constituted an immediate menace to Paris; there was a
prospect of being able to beat the British and Prussians in detail; he
could then, with the prestige of victory, move forward to the Rhine;
the Rhenish provinces, ever luke-warm in their opposition to the
Emperor, might abandon the alliance; and with the Rhine as a barrier
and its passages in his possession, he might well hope to be able to
baffle the Austrians, Russians, and the defeated remnants of the Prussian army.
Bliicher's army was composed entirely of veteran troops, and had
a strength, in round numbers, of 121,000 men. The headquarters
and strength of his several corps were as follows:I. Corps (32,692), Zieten, at Charleroi.
II. Corps (32,704), Pirch, at Namur.
CAMPAIGN' OF WATERLOO.
123
1233
Namur to
Charleroi, 24
III. Corps (24,456), Thielmaun, at Ciney.

IV. Corps (31,101), Biilow, at Liege.
In addition to these, Kleist's corps covered Luxembourg, but was
-road.
Nro
Namur
t
Liege, t5-
not engaged actively in the campaign.
road.
Wellington's army, aggregating about 95,000 men, was composed

of diverse elements. More than 29,000 were Dutch-Belgian troops of
Wellington's
Ar~my.
indifferent quality; of the remainder more than one-half were Germans,

the British troops numbering less than 32,000.
Wellington's head-
quarters were at Brussels. His several corps were stationed as follows:I. Corps, (25,000),
Prince
of
Orange, at Braine-le-Comte,
on each side of the highway from Mons

to Brussels.
II.
Corps, (24,000),
Reserve.
(33,000),
Lord Hill, at Ath, the right extending
Brussels to
Braine-leComnte, 21; to
Ath, 33; to
Enghien, 21.
as far as the Lys, left as far as Mons.
Engtre nras,
Duke of Wellington, at Brussels.
24.
at Enghien.
Lord Uxbridge,
CLvalry. (1,500),
14,50),enarde.
Cavary.
men
The artillery distributed among these corps aggregated 8,166
Ath to Ond21; to
Co.tr, 2 o9;
and 196 guns.
to Mons, 15.
The Prussian army drew its supplies from Cologne, and its nearWellington was based ni n
est communication lay through Liege.
The front of the Allied armies was almost
Ostend and AntwCrp.
Bases and
commnication of the
Allies.
parallel to their lines of communications, and extended from Oudenarde to Liege, over 100 miles from east to west.
Not only were these
armies occupying a greatly extended front, but their depth was about
40 miles from north to south.
The entire front was covered with a
cordon of sentries and videttes, and the Prussian cavalry patrolled

beyond the Sanibre.
After assembling his army upon the frontier, Napoleon had four
courses open to him : 1st, he might move from his right, in the space
Napoleon's
between the Meuse and the Moselle, against the Prussian communica-
plan.
tions; but this would require a long detour overbad roads, and would,
after all, merely force the Prussians into a junction with their allies,
and necessitate the French forming front to a flank, while
fighting
their enemies.
2nd.
He might move against Kleist, who covered
the Prussian comrnunications with the Rhine; but this would lead only
to menaces which would avail nothing against a resolute commander
like Bliicher, and, moreover, it led too far away from the objective,
Nivelles to
Braine-leComte, 9,
road; to
Quatre Bras,
7-road; to
Namur, 21road.road.
French concentration.
namely, the main body of the enemy. 3rd. He might move from
Lille against Wellington's communications with Ostend ; but this was
open to the same objections as the movement against the Prussian
communications. 4th. He might move upon Charleroi, where he
would be able to strike the Allied front at the point of junction of the
two armies. The last was the plan adopted. Napoleon expected that
upon his approach each of the Allied armies would endeavor to concentrate. The Prussians being less scattered than Wellington's army,
and being likely to discover the French approach before the English
could, would probably be the first to concentrate; and he expected,
therefore, to strike them before they could be supported by Wellington.
The line of communication between the Allied armies was by the road
Nivelles-Namur. If this line were held by Napoleon the next good
road by which the Allies could form their junction would be the
Wavre-Brussels or Louvain-Brussels road, where they would be on a
line joining their bases, from both of which a defeat would cut them off.
To effect a junction on this road, it would be necessary for the Prussians to retreat over the difficult, marshy, and intersected region
watered by the Dyle. If this junction were sought by the defeated
Prussians, a force on the Dyle could be expected to retard them while
Napoleon with his main army fell upon Wellington. It was to be expected, however, that if the Prussians were heavily defeated in the
first battle, they would be in no condition to effect so difficult a junction or take up so perilous a position, but would retreat at once upon
Namur, to preserve communication with their base. Napoleon would
thus be left free to deal with Wellington alone.
By causing skilful demonstrations to be made by National
Guards and fortress garrisons, all along the frontier, from the English
Channel almost to Metz, the Emperor deceived the enemy as to his
real point of concentration; and by marches carefully timed and
accurately executed, five corps of infantry and four of cavalry,
cantoned from Lille to Metz (on a line of about 185 miles), were
concentrated before Charleroi at the very moment that the Guard
arrived from Paris. Wellington, occupied with festivities in Brussels,
thought Napoleon in Paris at the moment when the Emperor reached
the Sambre with 125,000 men.
On the night of June 14th, the French army was concentrated
as follows:-
CAMPAIGN -OF WATERLOO.

Right wing (Geard), 16,000, Philippeville,
Beaumont to
Center (Napoleon),
64,000, becore Beaumont.
Left Wing (Ney),
45,000,
Charleroi, 18;
to Philippetole 15 road;
Leers and Solre-sur-Sanmbre.
The center consisted of the corps of Vandarnme, and Lobau, the
Imperial Guard, and the Cavalry Reserve under Grouchy.
The left
consisted of the corps of D'Erlon and Reille. Ney did not assume
command of the left in person until 5 o'clock, p. in., on June 15.
A
general order for. the forward movement of the army was issued, the
march to begin at 2 o'clock, a. i.,
to Solre-sur-
Smbre,
7-
on the 15th.
During the day the Dutch outposts between Mons and Binche,
and those on the Prussian right, had observed and reported that
French troops had moved through Beaumont towards Philippeville.
The commander of a brigade on the Sambre, reconnoitering on tl;e
right bank, apprised Zieten at Charleroi of the concentration
of
the enemy about Beaumont.

Later in the day Zeiten
ascertained through his outposts, which extended to the borders of
the forests surrounding Beaumont, that strong French columns of all
arms were assembled in his front, and that everything portended an
attack for the following day.
June 15th.
The left moved on Marchienne and crossed a mile

above the town. The right moved upon Chatelet, and the center
Sol-sur-Sam-
upon Charleroi.
Owing to an accident to a courier, Vandamme had

not received his orders to march, and as his was the leading corps the
ienne; 16.
march of the center was seriously delayed.

Vandamme did not take
the road until 7 o'clock, having been passed in the meantime by a
division of the Guard and Pajol's cavalry corps. Pajol entered
Philippeville
to Chatelet,
bre to March-
18.
Charleroi about noon, and halted to await the arrival of Vandamme.

Zeiten defending the passages of the Sambre was everywhere
forced back, but he delayed the French as long as possible, and finally
Charleroi to
took up a position oi
Gilly, 24
Charleroi.
rdroato
the heights of Gilly, a little north and east of

Vandamme and Grouchy (who ha come upwithanother
cavalry corps) hesitated to attack him; but Napoleon, coiing up at

5 o'clock, ordered an immediate attack, and Zeiten was quickly driven
back to Fleurus.
Gerard with the right was delayed by heavy roads, and by the
desertion
of General Bourmont commanding the leading division,
( h uFlers,
5road.
126
who went over to the enemy with his entire staff, thus causing confusion and delay in the movements of the division. The right did
not reach Chatelet until late in the day.
Marchienne
to Frasnes,
13-road.
Charleroi to
Frasnes, 10-road; to Quatre Bras,
12-road.
On the left, Reille, pushing the enemy back, crossed at Marchienne, overthrew a Prussian rear guard at Jumet, and moved at once
upon Gosselies. Here he was overtaken by Nev who assumed
command. Arriving at Gosselies, Ney at once pushed forward, with
a division of infantry and a small cavalry division of Reille's corps, to
Frasnes where he encountered the outposts of a Dutch brigade which
fell back to Quatre Bras. Another division of Reille's corps was sent
in pursuit of the Prussians who had been driven from Gosselies upon
Fleurus.
On the evening of the 15th the French positions were as follows:( 1 division infantry and
1 division cavalry,
Frasnes.
Reille.
Charleroi to
Left.
Gosselier 6
Wangenies
1 m. west of
Fleurus.
2 divisions infantry,
1 division infantry,
Gosselies.
Wangenies.
D'Erlon mainly between Jumet and Marchienne, about one-fourth of his troops
not yet having crossed the Sambre.
Center.
Right.
Infantry of the Guard at Charleroi.

Heavy cavalry of the Guard and two of Grouchy's reserve
cavalry divisions with Lobau's corps, south of the Sambre.
Vandamme and Grouchy with two Cavalry corps, before
Fleurus and at Gilly.
Gerard atChatelet, half north, half south of the Sambre.
Thus 35,000 men at least were not over, though the order of the
day designed that they should be across by noon; but though the progress was not all that was desired, it was in the main satisfactory, and
the front of the army, which from Philippeville to the Sambre had
extended about eighteen miles, covered only six miles, being sufficiently
contracted for the line of battle.
The Prussian army was concentrating on Ligny, which had been
previously selected by Bliicher as a battle-field. On the night of the
15th its position was as follows :
Zieten, near Fleurus.
Thielemann, at Namur.
Pirch, at Mazy, six miles from Ligny.
Billow had received orders to concentrate his corps and then
march; but not understanding the urgency of the case, he had not
yet left Liege.
The Dutch-Belgian division of Perponcher, constituting a part of
the I. Corps, formed the extreme left of Wellington's army. The left
brigade of this division, cantoned along the turnpike from Genappe to
Frasnes, was assembled at Quatre Bras, with outposts at Frasnes, at
the first ilews of the French advance. This was the force with which
Ney came into contact at Frasnes.
Namur to
Fleurus, 15road.
Charleroi to
Genappe, 14.
Fearing for his communications with Ostend, and expecting that

the French attack would fall upon his right, Wellington was reluctant
to concentrate upon his left ; but at 5 p, m., he issued orders for the
concentration of two divisions (Dutch-Belgian) at Nivelles, if that
place had been attacked. The other parts of the army were ordered
to assemble in readiness for immediate marching. The order to move
to Nivelles was not received by Perpoucher until late at night; and
instead of obeying it, he determined to reinforce the brigade at Quatre
Bras on his own responsibility. Thus that important point was held,
not because of Wellington's foresight, but in spiteof his oversight,
which would have caused its abandonment. It is a disputed question
whether Ney had orders on the 15th to seize Quatre Bras. If he had
shown the aggressiveness which characterized him in former campaigns
he surely would have done so, for that point was held by a single brigade of troops by no means excellent.
Napoleon's headquarters were at Charleroi.
June 16th. At 8 a. m. Napoleon issued his orders to Ney and
Grouchy The latter was placed in command of the right wing consisting of the corps of Vandamme and Gerard and three cavalry corps.
To Ney's command, the left wing, was added acorps of cavalry. Napoleon informed Ney that he expected to be in Fleurus in person before
noon on the 16th. It was his intention to attack the enemy there if
he encountered them, and clear the road as far as Gembloux.
He
would then decide upon his course according to the condition of affairs.
Ney was ordered to occupy Quatre Bras, and to be in readiness
to march upon Brussels as soon as Napoleon decided upon
Napoleon's
orders.
128
his own course of action. Grouchy was directed with the entire
right wing upon Sombref. Seven valuable hours were lost by Napoleon on the morning of this day. Had everything been in readiness,
his columns might have moved at daybreak (3 a. m.), whereas they
did not move until 10 a. m., nor were the orders issued until 8 o'clock.
The slowness of D'Erlon's corps on the preceding day caused some
delay on the part of Ney in getting his forces well in hand; and the
attack upon the Prussians could not be prudently made until it was
certain that Ney was in a position to "contain" Wellington while the
Emperor fell upon Bliicher.
While the heads of the French column of the center and right
wing passed Fleurus towards Ligny, the rear portions closed upon them
and came into line. The left wing also, consisting of the corps of
Reille and D'Erlon, and Kellermann's reserve cavalry began to advance
and to close up to its front.
Welli'ngton
concentrates.
Quatre Bras
to Ligny, 8.
Frasnes toSt.
Amand, 7.
Early in the morning Wellington gave orders for the concentration of his forces at Quatre Bras. At 10 a. m., two divisions of the
I. Corps were at Quatre Bras and the immediate vicinity. The reserve
The cavalry was
had passed Waterloo en route from Brussels.
approaching Nivelles. Two divisions of the II. Corps were marching
from Oudenarde, and two from Braine-le-Comte, upon Nivelles. The
two former were too far away to be available for action at Quatre
Bras on this day.
Zieten's corps at Ligny was reinforced at 9 a. m. by Pirch's from
Mazy, and about noon by Thielemann's from Namur. At 2 p. m. Soult
wrote to Ney, informing him that the enemy had assembled one corps
between Sombref and Bry, and that Marshal Grouchy would attack it
with the III. and IV. Corps at 2.30 p. m. He added: "His majesty
intends that you also should attack whatever is in front of you, and,
having pressed the enemy vigorously, that you should maneuver
towards us, to aid in enveloping the corps of which I have spoken. If
this corps is driven back first, then his Majesty will maneuver in your
direction, to facilitate in like manner your operations."
Ney had also been informed in the morning by the commander
of the I. Corps, Reille, who was at Gosselies, that the Prussian cavalry
was still about Fleurus, and that large columns from Namur were
advancing, and forming at St. Amand.
129
He put the left wing in motion, in obedience to the Emperor's

orders, and, pushing back the Dutch-Belgian detachment before
Frasnes, continued to advance, till at 2 o'clock the head of his column
was in presence of Perponcher's division at Quatre Bras.
Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras from Brussels between 11 and
He reconnoitered Ney's position, and, concluding the
12 o'clock.
enemy was not in f )rce there, rode off to consult with Bliicher, whom
he found at a windmill between Ligny and Bry. He then saw the
French dispositions for attack, and concluded that Napoleon was
bringing his main force against the Prussians. To assist Blficher the
Duke proposed to concentrate a sufficient force as soon as possible at
Quatre Bras, march it upon Frasnes and Gosselies, and from thence
operate against the enemy's flank and rear. However, on calculating
the time that must necessarily elapse before this sufficient force could
be concentrated, and finding that Bliicher might be defeated in the
interval, it was agreed that, in order to save time, the Duke should
move this supporting firce down the Namur road, and thus come
directly to the aid of his colleague.
About 11 o'clock Napoleon arrived on the field beyond Fleurus.
By 1 o'clock he had formed all his troops that had then arrived
(60,000 with 204 guns) in order of ba.ttle. After making a reconnaiss.nce in person, and receiving reports from his generals of the
assembling of the Prussians for battle, he still thougl.t that only one
corps, that of Zieten, was before him. He directed Grouchy, with
two corps of infantry and three of reserve cavalry, to attack it about
2.30, and thus commenced the battle of Ligny. The three Prussian
corps numbered more than 87,000 men, with 224 guns. About 5.30,
Lobau, bringing the rear of the center from Charleroi, augmented
the French force to 71,000 with 242 guns.
In less than an hour after the beginning of the battle, Napoleon
became aware of the fact that he was opposed by an army instead of a
single corps. Accordingly at 3.30 p. in., Soult again wrote to Ney,
urging him to maneuver at once, so as to envelop the enemy's right,
and to fall on his rear. He told him that the Prussian army was
lost if he acted vigorously; that 'the fate of France was in his hands'
"Thus", the order proceeds, "do not hesitate an instant to make the
movement which the Emperor orders, and direct yourself on the
Battle of
Ligny.
STRATEGICAL OPERA'TIONS.
heights of Brye and St. Amand to assist in a victory perhaps decisive."
Ney, after getting Napoleon's first orders (dated 8 o'clock), had
directed D'Erlon on Frasnes. The latter was near that place with the
advance guard of his corps when an aide-de-camp from Napoleon reached him, who said that the Emperor, hotly engaged, needed aid, and
that he had taken on himself to turn the head of the column towards
St. Amand by Villers Perruin. D'Erlon, sending to apprise Ney,
followed to direct the movement of his corps (20,050 men and 46 guns).
He arrived on the flank of the Prussians, and the head of his column
had entered into the action at Ligny, when he received from Ney a
peremptory recall. Accordingly he countermarched towards Frasnes,
and reached Ney at nightfall, after the action at Quatre Bras was
ended.
It was 9.30 p. m. when the battle of Ligily drew to a close with
the defeat of the Prussians. The corps of Zieten and Pirch retired to
Tilly and Gentinnes; that of Thielemann, which covered the retreat,
to Gembloux. Owing to the lateness of the hour and the severity of
the battle, no immediate pursuit was made.
About 2 o'clock, Ney attacked Perponcher at Quatre Bras, the
French having 17,000 men and 38 guns to the British 7,000 men and
16 guns. Reinforcements were hurried up by the British, and Wellington came up and assumed command in person. Ney also received
reinforcements, and opposed about 21,000 men and 50 guns to Wellington's 32,000 men and 68 guns. Ney relinquished the conflict at
nightfall. Both sides bivouacked on the ground.
June 17th. Early in the morning Soult sent Pajol's cavalry on a
reconnaissance in the direction of Namur. Before 8 o'clock Pajol
reported the capture of a battery and some prisoners at Le Mazy,
which seemed to confirm the assumption that Bliicher was retreating
in that direction. Although there were four cavalry corps with
Grouchy, no reconnaissance was made in the direction of Tilly and
Wavre, and all contact with Blicher was lost. This strange neglect
was an irreparable error.
On the part of Napoleon there was a surprising delay in acting.
His plan, thus far, had succeeded ; for he had encountered the Prussians alone, and had defeated them. In order to carry out his plan, it
was now necessary only to leave Grouchy with two corps of infantry
CAMPAIQN OF WATERLOO.
and a strong force of cavalry to follow the Prussians, while he turned
with the Guad and Lobau's corps to reinforce Ney and fall upon
Wellington, who was still at Quatre Bras, exposed to attack in front
and flank. This movement could have begun at day break, but Napoleon did not give the necessary orders until after 8 a. m., and Lobau
did not begin his march until two hours later, while the Guard and
Cuirassiers did not leave until eleven.
Shortly before noon Grouchy received verbal orders from Napoleon to pursue the enemy. Soon after, the Emperor received information that 20,000 Prussians were in the vicinity of Gembloux; and
appreciating the possibility of Bliicher effecting a junction with
Wellington, he gave Grouchy a written order in which he said: "It is
important to penetrate what the enemy is intending to do; whether
they are separating themselves from the English, or whether they are
intending still to unite, to cover Brussels or Liege, in trying the fate
of another battle. In all cases, keep constantly your two corps of
infantry united in a league of ground, and occupy every evening a
good military position, having several avenues of retreat. Post intermediate detachments of cavalry, so as to communicate with headquarters".
About 2 p. m. Grouchy began his march to Gembloux, his force
consisting of 33,000 men.
Wellington remained ignorant of Bliicher's fortunes all night.
But daylight showed him that Ney was still in position in his front,
which would have hardly been the case had Napoleon been defeated. A
reconnaissance along the Namur road ascertained that the French were
upon it, between Quatre Bras and Ligny, and an aide-de-camp from
Blficher shortly afterwards reached the Duke, having come by a road
farther in rear. Wellington sent his ally word that he would fall
back towards Waterloo to effect a junction with him; and that, if
Biiicher would join him with two corps, he would await Napoleon's
onset there.
Notwithstanding the Emperor's repeated orders to Ney to attack
the British at Quatre Bras, the Marshal had failed to move. Wellington had assembled at that point about 45,000 men, the rest of his
army being at Nivelles and Braine-le-Comte. Ney had 40,000 men,
25,000 of whom had not been engaged the day before. He might
Quatre Bras
to field of
Waterloo, 8.
STRATEGICAL OPXERATIONS.
132
easily have attacked and held

Ninove to
Qunatre Bras,
35-road.
Wellington until the arrival of the
Emperor, but his disobedience enabled the Duke to begin
in the
forenoon to withdraw his forces without molestation through Genappes

upon Waterloo, covered by Uxbridge's cavalry which had come in
from
Ninove
in the
night.
vigorous forward movement
Upon
the
arrival of Napoleon
was begun, and the British rear guard
was constantly pressed until Wellington
reached
Mont St. Jean, in
front of Waterloo, where the Duke took up a position in front of the

junction of the Nivelles and Genappes road, with his center across
the latter.
The British and French armies bivouacked within a few
hundred yards of each other.
Gentinnes
to
Wavre, 10-road.
On the side of the Prussians, Zieten and Pirch retired from Tillv
and Gentinnes by Mont St. Guihert.
Zieten's corps crossed the Dyle
at Wavre and took up a position; Pircb's halted on the right banik.

Thielemann, arriving at Gembloux,
found Bdlow iear that place.
Receiving orders for the general concentration, Bilow's corps iioved

on Wavre, followed by Thielemann's.
At 10 p. m. Grouchy wrote to the Emperor that the reconnaissance indicated that the Prussians were retreating in three columns,
one taking the road to Wavre, one to Perwez, and another on Namur.
He added : "According to their reports, if the mass of the Prassians is
retiring on Wavre, I shall follow them in that direction, in order that
they may not be able to gain Brussels, and to separate
them
from
Wellington".
This communication indicated that Grouchy understood the part
that he was to play, and justified the Emperor ini expecting that on the
following morning he should encounter the forces of Wellington alone.
June 18th,
Although the attack on'the Allied center at Quatre
Bras and Ligny should have rendered evident Napoleon's design to

keep the Allies asunder and beat then in detail, Wellington was still
Ninove to
Quatre Bras
35-road.
so uneasy about his communications
Hal to Wellington's right

10.
rest of his army hie awaited the French attack.
with Osteid that h e detached
18,000 men -excellent British trools5-to Hal,
where they rcn

itii ted
idle during the day, though desperately needed elsewhere.
With the
The Duke's army.
actually engaged numbered nearly 68,000 men and 156 gunis.

leon's army numbered nearly 72,000 men and 246 guns.
Napo-
1333:
Between 11 and 12 o'clock the. French began their attack upoii

Wellington.
The Prussian movements were as follows:-r
Billow at daybreak, through Wavre to St. Lambert.

Zieten at noon, by Ohain towards Frischermont.
Pirch at noon, through Wavre to follow Billow.
Wavre to
Namur, 28road.
Wavre to
10-Proad.
Wavre
At daybreak Grouchy learned that the Prussians had concentrated

at Wavre. In order to separate them from Wellington, lie should
have moved at once across the Dyle at Moustier and Limale. He
could then have either joined Naloleon or compelled the Prussians to
halt to avoid an attack in flank as they marched to join Wellington.
He waited, however, until about 8 o'clock a.
march via S irt-a-Walhaini,
upon Wavre.
m., and then began his
At noon his advance guard
attacked Pirch's rear guard on the right bank of the Dyle. Thiele
mann's corps which was to have followed Pirch was left on the Dyle to
oppose Grouchy.
Thus Grouchy who, with 33,000 men, was to have
contained Bliicher's entire army, held back only a single corps of less
than 25,000 fron the junction with Wellington.
Between 4 and 5 p. m. Billow's advanced troops issued on the
French right at Planchenoit.
About 7 p.
in.,
Zieten and
Pirch arrived, the former joining
Wellington's left ait Frischermont, and the latter being, directed upon
Maransart.
The arrival of the Prussians saved Wellington from ruin ; and the
French,
being
attacked in flank and rear by Blicher while hotly
engaged with the British in front, were completely routed.
They fled
in great confusion over the frontier by' the great road of Charleroi,
pursued relentlessly by the Prussians.
19th June. The main French army, almost dispersed, continued

its flight.
Grouchy, who had spent the preceding day in attacking Thiele-
mann on the Dylc, renewed the engage aent at daybreak, and drove
Thielemann's corps towards Louvain;
but intelligence reached
him at 11 o'clock of the defeat of Napoleon the day before. Masking
the movement by troops on the Dyle, he at once began his retreat by
Mont St. Guibert, upon Gembloux, for Namur.
to
F'rischer-
mont, 10rad.
Sombreff to
Wavre, via
Gembloux &
Sart-a-WalSa,
road.
134
Pirch's Prussian corps marched on the night of the 18th to intercept Grouchy. It reached a point between Tillyand Gentinnes on the
19th at mid-day, but failed to advance further, or to discover that
Grouchy's force was crossing its front.
Next day Thielemamn and Pirch pressed the rear of Grouchy,
who, leaving a division in Namur, made good the retreat of his
corps along the Meuse by Dinant, and passed the frontier in good order.
COMMENTS.
On the part of Napoleon the Waterloo campaign was an attempt
to apply, in a new theater and on a grander scale, the same strategic
plans which had resulted in such brilliant success in his first Italian
campaign. The positions of the opposing forces were in fact quite similar. As in 1796, Beaulieu had advanced from Acqui and Colli from.
Turin, so in 1815 Bliicher was based upon Cologne and Wellington
upon Ostend and Antwerp. As in theformer campaign, the center of
the Allied line being pierced, Beaulieu and Colli had fallen back to
their respective bases, so in 1815 the center of the Allied line being
pierced, Bliicher might be expected to fall back upon Liege and Well-ington upon Ostend or Antwerp. The situation of the Allies would,
in fact, be worse in this case than it was in 1796; for if Bliicher after
his defeat should attempt to rejoin Wellington before Brussels, he
could do so only by a march on the road Liege-Wavre parallel to his
own communications with his base. The perilous nature of such a
movement is shown by the events as they actually occurred; for the
defeat of Thielemann at Wavre severed the Prussian communications,
and if Waterloo had resulted in a victory for Napoleon, Bliicher's situation would have been desperate. Even if he had attempted to
regain his base by the road Louvain Maestricht, the French on the
Dyle would have anticipated him on that route, and his retreat would
have been completely intercepted.
Napoleon having decided upon the plan of strategic penetration,
placed his army in the formation so frequently and so successfully
employed by him; namely, in two wings and a central reserve. With
his right he could oppose Bliicher, and with his left, Wellington, while
the center could be thrown from one side to the other as circumstances might decide.
135
The two points of Sombreff and Quatre Bras were of great strategic
importance, as the possession of these two junctions of roads would
enable Napoleon to prevent the direct union of the Allies. Napoleon
had the choice of assailing Bliicher with his main force at Sombreff
while holding Wellington with a containing force at Quatre Bras; or,
making his main attack at the latter place, and holding Blucher in
check at the former. His reasons for attacking Bliicher rather than
Wellington have already been intimated. The situation of the Prussian army was such as to render it certain that it could effect its
concentration more promptly than the Anglo-Dutch army could.
Moreover the resolute and enterprising nature of the Prussian conmmander was so well known that there could be no doubt of his moving
with the greatest energy and promptness to the assistance of his ally.
If, therefore, Napoleon had attacked Wellington with his main body,
an enormous detachment would have been necessary to contain Bliicher.
On the other hand, throwing his weight upon Blicher, he could rely
upon the slower concentration of the British army to enable him to
hold Wellington in check with a comparatively small force until
Bliicher was eliminated from the strategical problem. Moreover, the
British commander, while brave and resolute, was of a more cautious
nature than his colleague, and his character, so far as shown by his
previous campaigns, would indicate a greater likelihood of his watching carefully over his own communications than his rushing impetuously to the assistance of Bliicher.
The strength of Napoleon's army was scarcely sufficient for the
proper execution of his plans. As we have already seen, he had -but
125,000 men to oppose to 216,000. After leaving a force to contain
either of the Allies, he could not, therefore, count on having such a
superiority over the other as to insure a decisive victory. Still, his
own genius and the quality of his troops justified his expectation of
success. The French were superior to the Prussians, whom they had
often defeated, and with equal numbers they might well expect victory.
As to Wellington's army, the British troops were undoubtably
superior in fighting capacity to anything in Europe; but they constituted less than a third of Wellington's force. The Dutch-Belgians
were not formidable; and the Duke's German troops were by no means
equal to the British soldiers, There was every reason, consequently,
136
for Napoleon to hope for success; but even had the operations against
the Allies in Belgium seemed desperate from the outset, they presented
the best opportunity that was open to Napoleon.
It is interesting to consider the causes which produced the failure of
a brilliant plan executed by excellent troops under the leadership of the
greatest soldier of all time. To sum up briefly the causes of Naipoleon's
failure, we may say that they were mainly of the nature of delays, for
some of which he was doubtless himself responsible, but most of which
were entirely beyond his control. The movements on the 15th were,
as we have seen, delayed in the morning, and owing to unaccountable
slowness on the part of D'Erlon, his corps was stretched out on the
Gosselies-Marchiennes road, in such a manner as to render necessary
considerable time on the following day for the concentrati,n oi' Ney's
command. Again, Ney delayed his attack upon Quatre Bras, which
he might easily have seized on the night of the 15th. Had he shown
the enterprise that formerly constituted his chief military merit, he
would have seized Quatre Bras either on the night of the 15th or
early on the morning of the 16th; for it was not held in force by the
British until late in the day. On the 16th, the fatal wandering of
D'Erlon's corps neutralized a large force which was sorely needed both
at Ligny and at Quatre Bras. Though this was due primarily to the
assurance of an aid, it could not have occurred had D'Erlon been well
up to the front on the night of the 15th, for he would in that case
have been directly engaged under Ney's orders at Quatre Bras before
the superserviceable staff officer could have turned him aside. Had
D'Erlon been engaged at Quatre Bras, Ney's superiority to Wellington
would, almost certainly, have caused the defeat of the latter; and the
British army instead of taking up its position at Waterloo with the
inspiring prestige of recent victory, would probably have been so badly
mauled as to be in very poor condition for the battle on the 18th. On
the other hand, had D'Erlon been actively engaged at Ligny his strong
reinforcement and the direction of his attack would doubtless have
rendered Napoleon's victory over the Prussians so complete and
decisive that they would have been in no condition to reinforce Wellington. Moreover, the appearance of D'Erlon's corps as it approached
the battle-field caused doubt in the mind of Napoleon as to their being
friendsor enemies. The decisive attack of the Gtiard, which was in
137
complete readiness, was consequently suspended for more than an hour,

Had thisattack been made when intended, there would have been
enough daylight left after the defeat of the Prussians to enable a pursuit
to have been made that night. The delay in pursuing the Prussians
and in reconnoitering the roads by which they might have retreated
was a strange and fatal error. How far this was due to Napoleon
himself, it is not easy to say. His strange lethargy after the battle of
Ligny has been attributed, apparently with justice, to the exhaustion
resulting from great physical and mental efforts combined with ill
health. Be this as it may, it certainly would seem to have been the
duty of Grouchy to cause reconnaissance to be made. Napoleon never
hampered his lieutenants with hard and fast orders, but always left
much to their intelligence and discretion.
The delays on the morning of the 17th lost to Napoleon the
advantages that he had gained. Ney had been repeatedly ordered to
attack Quatre Bras. As we have seen, he could have done so on the
morning of the 17th with every prospect of success. He could at least
have held Wellington until the arrival of Napoleon, and the battle of
Waterloo would have been fought at Quatre Bras, with the Prussians
left out of the game.
The failure of Grouchy either to retard Bliicher or to reinforce
Napoleon was the final error of the campaign. He well understood
that he was expected to interpose between Wellington and Bliicher;
and notwithstanding his delay in ascertaining the exact situation of
the Prussians, he knew on the morning of the 18th that they were at
Wavre,and by crossing the Dyle promptly at Moustier and Limale he
would have checked their advance; for they would have been compelled to make a flank march across his front-in other words, it
would have been necessary for them to form front to a flank to
oppose him, and even if they had defeated Grouchy, Napoleon would
have gained time to dispose of Wellington. There has been much
needless discussion on the part of various critics in regard to the exact
wording of the orders sent by the Emperor to Grouchy. It is sufficient
to say that these orders were sufficiently explicit to enable him to
understand the vital importance of keeping Bliicher from joining
Wellington. A Davout or a Massena in his place would have caused
history to read differently.
138
In brief, the causes of the French failure may be summed up in

two words, delay and disobedience.
Not the least remarkable feature of the Waterloo campaign is
Wellington's failure to appreciate the strategic situation from beginning to end. Until the last moment he expected Napoleon to assail
his communications on the right, though such a movement could have
had no other result than to force him into that junction with Bliicher
which it was the Emperor's great object to prevent. This, as we have
seen, caused him to station at Hal 18,000 choice troops, who were
sorely needed on the field of battle. He failed to appreciate the
importance of Quatre Bras, and ordered a concentration on Nivelles
which would have given the former important point to the French
without a struggle. He did not, in fact, give orders for the occupation of Quatre Bras, until it had been occupied by a brigade conmmander practically in disobedience of orders. Wellington's coolness
and courage in the battle of Waterloo give him, perhaps, a just title
to. fame; but never before or since did so poor a strategist gain such
great renown by fortuitous success.
Notwithstanding the many mishaps on the part of the French,
the campaign would doubtless have terminated in their success, but
for the courage and enterprise of the heroic old blackguard who
commanded the Prussian armies. * Although his horse had been
killed under him, and he had been knocked down and ridden over
by the French, at Ligny, this old man, seventy-two years of age, was
again on horseback on the following day, and on the 18th he was, by
word and example, engaged in encouraging his men in their difficult
march over the muddy roads from Wavre to the battle-field. Physical
injuries that would have placed many a younger man upon the sick
report produced no effect upon his dauntless spirit. Refusing to
consider the disastrous consequences that would follow another defeat,
he entertained no other idea than to march promptly to the assistance
of his ally and risk all upon the result of another battle.
* The term here applied to the Prussian commander is believed to be fit-
ing and accurate. As to his heroism, his history leaves no doubt. As to his
other characteristic, it is sufficient to refer to the narratives of Siborne and
Gardner and note the words applied by him to Bourmont when the latter was
iresented to him. The gross and insulting obscenity of his words can be
excused only on the ground of their exquisite appropriateness when applied to
such a contemptible traitor as Bourmont.
139
The advantages of operating on interior lines against enemies

operating from divergent bases have been rendered evident by previous
discussions. In brief, the general so operating can hold one of his
enemies with a containing force and throw his weight upon the other.
Defeating the latter, he can pursue him with a smaller force, unite his
main body with the containing force, and defeat his other opponent,
thus destroying his enemies in detail. But, under some circumstances,
the situation is not without positive advantages to the armies operating from the divergent bases. Thus, when Napoleon was engaged at
Ligny, if Wellington had had his entire army well in hand, he would
have been in a position to overwhelm Nev and strike a blow in a most
decisive direction, while covering his own communications with his
base. Similarly, had Napoleon been engaged in force at Quatre Bras,
Bliicher could have assailed his communications, and could have
attacked the right and rear while covering his own proper line of
retreat. Finally, at Waterloo we find Bliicher making an attack in a
most decisive direction, while his own communications were perfectly
secure from the troops in his front. Had the Allies been operating
from a common base, this could not have been the case; and, in fact,
if allied armies operating from divergent bases can combine, their
action is more effective than if they operate from a common base.
The Atlanta Campaign in 1864.

CASE OF DISLODGING AN ARMY BY OPERATING WITH A
DETACHMENT AGAINST ITS REAR.
The Confederate situation.
At the beginning of 1864 the territory still in possession of the

Confederates consisted of the long narrow strip cut off from the main
body of the continent by the Appalachian ranges, and was terminated
in the north by the Rappahannock, and to the east and south by the
coast which was held under strict blockade by the Federal fleet. The
Confederates were thus completely surrounded, in the north by the
Army of the Potomac, beyond the Appalachian watershed by the
Western armies, and along the coast by the blockading fleets. In the
southern portion of the Appalachian range, opposite the line Chattanooga-Knoxville, there is a considerable gap, in front of which lie the
Great Smoky Mountains. This mountain system extends from opposite
Chattanooga northeastward into Virginia, and, throughout its length,
remains wholly disconnected from the main Appalachian range. In
this manner a pass is opened from Knoxville into Virginia and another
from Chattanooga into Georgia. The two cities named lie at the
western outlets of these passes, were strongly.fortified, and were in the
possession of the U. S. forces. The opposite outlets were in possession
of the Confederates. Opposite Chattanooga, General Johnston was
intrenched at Dalton with a considerable Confederate army, to prevent
the Union forces from issuing through the gap and invading Georgia.
THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

General Grant, the Commander in Chief of the U. S. armies was
with the Army of the Potomac. His plan was to assail both Confederate armies with superior forces, so as to prevent them from profiting
by their interior lines. General Sherman was to invade Georgia for
the double purpose of destroying the enemy's forces and occupying his
territory; for from Georgia and the neighboring states the Confederates drew their supplies of provisions, munitions of war; aiid men ; the
Gen. Grant's
plan.
inhilitaiits' were nost bitterly opposed to the causeiof the Union, and,
moreover, had not as yet tasted the miseries of war. An invasion of

Georgia would, therefore, intercept the main source of the supplies of
the Confederate armies, mak~e tlhe ifhabitaits more favorably disposed
toward submission, cut off the southin. third of their teiritory, leaving
it practicallyVa& the mercy of the Union armies in the southw'est, andi
furnish the means of driving the Confederate armies into' their :last
corner.
At the opening of the campaign General Shermau's 'troops were
disposed as follows :
The Army of the Ohio, under General Schofield, at Knoxville.
The Army of the Cumberland, under General Thomas, at Chattanooga.
The Army of the Tennessee, under General McPherson, at
Huntsville.
According to General Sherman's Memoirs, the following troops
were available for the campaign:
Inf.
Cay.
Art.
Guns.
1,697
679
28
Army of the Ohio,
11,183
3,828
2,377
130
Army of the Cumberland, 54,568
Army of the Tennessee,
22,437
624
1,404
96
Total,
88,188
6,149
4,460
254*
* These figures do not include Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry divisions,

which joined dun ring the campaign. The aggregate strength -lresent and absent
of the three armies was 352,270 men. Part of these were detached to other
theaters of operation. many were on furlough and considerable garrisons had to
be left behind to keep the hostile population in subjection and guard the lines
of corni nnication. The fgires=given in different works for the army, with
which Sherman opened the campaign, differ somewhat, but they are all in the
neighborhood of 100,000 men.
Sherman's
army.
142
The theater.
Resaca-Dalton, 15 in.
ResacaAdairsville,
4in.
AdairsvilleCassville, 10
miles.
The Confederate army was about 60,000 strong. *.

The whole theater is generally wooded and hilly. The district
between Dalton and Chattanooga is crossed by considerable ridges in
the direction of the rivers, penetrated by gaps, in one of which lies the
Western and Atlantic Railroad connecting Nashville and Atlanta.
The nature of the country and communication made this railway indispensable to both armies.
Sherman was based on Chattanooga and Nashville, Johnston on
Atlanta.
May 6th to 11th. Johnston's position in front of Dalton being too
strong for direct attack, Sherman directed his center (Thomas) and
left (Schofield) against Dalton to hold Johnston at bay, while the
right (McPherson) marched by Snake Creek Gap on Resaca to cut
Johnston's railway and cause the evacuation of the Dalton position.
McPherson, meeting with resistance at Resaca, retired and intren-hed at
the mouth of Snake Creek Gap. Sherman now decided to make his
main attack at Resaca and on the 11th issued orders for the concentration of his army in front of Resaca, leaving the IV. Corps (Howard)
and Stoneman's cavalry to contain Johnston.
May 12th to 191h. Provided with ten days' rations Sherman's army
assembled at Snake Creek Gap during the 12th. Johnston, learning
of Sherman's move evacuated Dalton during the iight of the 12th, and
was in position at Resaca on the morning of the 13th, in trenched across
the bend of the Ostenaula river, within which Resaca is situated. Sherman deployed in Johnston's front, drove back the latter's left on the
14th, and on the 15th, while holding the enemy in front, sent a -division (Sweeny's) from his right across the Gostenaula, threatening
Johnston's rear. With a river at his back, the' enemy in his front, and
his rear threatened, Jobhnston decided to afbandon heis position.
He
evacuated Resaca during the night of the 15th, burning the railroad
bridge behind him, and took up positions at Adairsville and then at
Cassville, at which latter place he made preparation, for battle.
Sherman marched on Kingston and Cassville (one divisioi by the
right bank of the Oostenaula on Romne) and concentrated on Johnston's
front on the 19th.
*The exact strength is somewhat uncertain. A detailed statement on
this point is to be found in Cox's "Atlanta", Scribner's "Army ins the Civil
War"., vol. rx, Appendix "A".

May 20th to 23rd. Johnston withdrew during the night of the
20th, and crossed the Etowah that daiy, burning the bridge behind him.
Sherman halted until the 23rd to rest his troops and allow time
for bringing up supplies. Resaca was made the principal, Kingston the
immediate, depot
of supplies,
been restored in three days.
Kingston-Allatoona, 29
the bridge at the former place having
miles.
The railroad, whose possesion was indis-
Kingston-
pensable to the Union Army, bends at Kingston to the east.
If he
followed this railroad, Sherman would have to force the strong pass
of Allatoona. He decided to turn the pass and advance by his right.
On the 22nd, rations were issued for 20 days, and orders were given
for an advance on Dallas
Informed by his cavalry of Sherman's move, Johnston took up a
position extending from south of Dallas beyond New Hope Church,
and intercepting all the roads by which his adversary advanced.
May 23rd to June 4th. Sherman found his opponent strongly

intrenched, and was repulsed at New Hope Church May 25th. He
then gradually extended his left to outflank -Johnston's right and
approach his immediate objective, the railroad. The cavalry seized
Allatoona June 1st and Ackworth June 3. Being outflanked, Johnston abandoned his position on the night of June 4.
June 5th to 28th. Johnston took up an intrenched position extending from Lost Mountain to Pine Mountain and Brush Mountain.
Sherman novel his army past the rear of his own left which stood fast;
when beyond his former left, he faced south and confronted Johnston
in his new position. The Army of the Ohio and that of the Tennessee
thus exchanged flanks.
June 11th. The railroad was repaired to Big Shanty.

June 14th. Johnston abandoned Pine Mountain, and on the 18th
withdrew from his advanced position to one nearer to Marietta, on
Kenesaw Mountain, facing north and covering town and railroad.
June 22nd. Hood's corps attempted to roll up the Union right
flank, but was repulsed at Culp's farm.
Sherman assaulted Kenesaw Mountain and was
June 27th.
repulsed.
June 28th to July 10th. Sherman brought McPherson (Army of
the Tennessee) back to the" right flank, and sent him down the Sandtown roal ,to a point three miles from the river and five miles from the
Dallas, 21 m.
144
railroad. On the niight of July 2, Johnston evacuated Marietta and

halted in a previously intrenched bridgehead on the right bank of the
Chatt:ahoochie.
July 8th. Shermai seized and intrenched a crossing at the mouth
of Soap Creek (midway between Roswell and railroad bridge) and on
the 9th another at Roswell. Johnston now withdrew from the right
bank of the Chattahoochie.
July 10th to 21st. Sherman withdrew McPherson from the extreme

right to Roswell to cross there, Thomas to cross near railroad bridge,
Schofield at Soap Creek. While closing in on Atlanta from north and
east, Sherman was attacked by Hood, who had superseded Johnston
in command of the Confederate army. Hood was heavily repulsed at
Peach Tree Creek July 20.
July 22nd. Hood attacked the Union left flank, which was
unprotected by cavalry, Gerrard having been sent eastward to complete destruction of the Augusta railroad, and completely surprised it.
He rolled up part of two corps, killed McPherson and got into Decatur, but was repulsed and driven within his lines.
July 23rd to August 18th. The army intrenched before Atlanta
(north and east). Sherman decided to maneuver by his right flank;
the cavalry to co5perate against Hood's railway communications,
Stoneman to the east, McCook by the west of Atlanta. They damaged slightly the two railways which unite at East Point south of
Atlanta, lost 1600 men, and Stoneman was captured. Howard (who
succeeded McPherson) was brought from the left to the right, prolonging the line of the Army of the Cumberland ; his line was in turn
prolonged by Schofield and again by the XIV. Corps, Army of the
The enemy met every advance with intrenchments.
Cumberland.
Kilpatrick started on a raid around
August 18 to Sept:, 1st.
Atlanta, but failed to do permanent injury to the railroads. Sherman,
unable to get into Atlanta, decided to intrench the XX. Corps
(Slocum) at: his railway bridge over the Chattahoochie, and to maneuver by his right with the rest of the army. August 27 all the corps
(except the XX. in the bridgehead) were assembled between Atlanta
and Sandtown, facing southeast. Hood, whose cavalry had been
operating: against Sherman's communications, .,believed the latter
about to retire beyond the Chattahoochie from want of provisions.
yr'
_.__.
,_ A
't, , :
145
August 28. The Union army marched south and reached the West
Point railway, destroying it thorougly next day. August 30 the army
moved on the Macon Railway, seized and destroyed it next day,
and, on September 1st, defeated Hardee at Jonesboro. Hood
evacuated Atlanta, and took position at Lovejoy Station. Sherman
occupied Atlanta, removed the civil population, and converted the
place into an intrenched camp and fortified base for future operations.
COMMENTS.
Except in attacking Kenesaw Mountain on the 27th June, the

character of Sherman's operations was throughout the same. To protect
his main line from a counter-attack, he left a force intrenched across it.
He then reinforced his flanking wing to a strength sufficient to cope
with the whole army of the enemy, and directed it by a circuit off the
main line, upon the Confederate rear. In every case the operation
was successful, obliging Johnston forthwith to abandon his strongest
positions, and to retreat.
In these operations Sherman turned to the benefit of the offensive
the increased power given to the defensive by the use of hasty intrenchments. The separation of the army, which would otherwise have
been a rash proceeding, was justified by the fact that the force left on
his main line could, if attacked, be depended upon to hold in check
many more than its own numbers of the enemy, until the turning force
could accomplish its object. The additional power given to the defensive by the rifle of the present day, renders this operation even more
practicable than it was in 1864. It is evident that in order to check
the turning movement, it would have been necessary for Johnston to
attack the flanking wing on the march. He would thus be compelled
to forego all the advantages of the tactical defensive, and confer the
same upon his adversary. Nor could such an attack be made in sufficient force to justify hope of success without so denuding the position
in which his strength lay as to place it at the mercy of the force left in
his front. He thus had at best the sorry alternative of being beaten
in his'attack upon the turning force or of abandoning his position.
In order to execute this maneuver with reasonable prospect of success,
it is evident that the assailant should be strong enough to detach a
turning force equal to the total strength that the enemy can bring to
bear against it.
SKrRA'Al 1CAr(L OPERATI() )s.
It appears, then, that this separation is judicious :1st, When the front of a position is unassailable, and a movement against the enemy's flank with the entire army impracticable or
unsafe.
2nd, When the roads do not admit of the entire army advancing in effective order.
In 1866 the Prussian armies invaded Bohemia on a double line,
and one of the reasons given in the Prussian "Official Account" for
this separation was, that the entire army could not have advanced by
one set of mountain roads, but would have extended in columns so
lengthened that it would have been impossible to form to a front commensurate with its numbers.
3rd, When the superior army possesses divergent lines of
retreat to, and communication with, its own frontiers.
For, as in the case of the allied army of Wellington and Bliicher,
risk in case of defeat will be greatly diminished, as compared with
that of an army detaching a force from its single line; and the effect
will be greater, for the direction of the combined armies must bringone
of them on the enemy's flank or rear. It will depend on the relative
proportions of the hostile forces whether the promise of decisive success
will compensate for the risk of losing the power of concerted action,
and being separately defeated.
Risks of separation often
incurred
That the disadvantagesof separating the parts of an army, though

foreseen, are often incurred, is evident from history. And this may
happen from many causes. As at Eckmiihl, a commander ignorant
position of the adversary may, in expectation of an
of the
immediate result, make a movement which lays him open to the penalty for dividing his army. In 1859, Louis Napoleon would doubtless
have preferred to operate entirely from Genoa, where he possessed the
advantage of a fine and fortified harbor, and whither his troops and
stores could be conveyed en masse by the easy mode of water-transport.
But in the meantime the situation of the Sardinian capital, imminently menaced, and covered only by a very weak army, afforded a
pressing reason for sending part of the French troops by the Mont
Cenis. The junction of the French army was to take place in the
great plain between the Bormida and the Scrivia; but till it was
effected, the French corps on the two lines were exposed to all the
risk of being separately assailed.
;exact
141
Another fertile source of separation is the attempt, so frequently made, to cover two distant and divergent objects. Territories,
lying apart from the indispensable line, must perhaps be protected,
else they would be overrun by the enemy, or, by revolting, would
increase the difficulties of the situation. In 1866, the geographical
configuration of the Prussian frontier compelled the separation of the
Prussian army, inorder that Lusatia and Silesia might both be protected from Austrian invasion; and the only possible concentration
that would not yield to the enemy the advantage of the initiative, and
permit him to invade Prussia, was a concentration to the front, in the
hostile territory.
Causesofthis,
In fact, what has been called "the principle of interior lines", as

well as many instances of what are termed "decisive points", are
simply a concurrence of circumstances which render it practicable to
concentrate an army in opposition to an extended enemy. When an
army approaches its object by roads which meet and then again divide,
the possession of the point of junction or knot of the roads by either
party, cannot but afford opportunities of menacing at once several
points, or roads, which the enemy may desire to cover. The possession of points of this kind-for example, Milan and Mortara in 1849,
Gera in 1806, Ivrea in 1800, Charleroi, Quatre Bras, Sombreff, in
1815-is of itself an important step in the campaign.
Decisive
points.
Whenever an army, which is so confident in its fighting power as

to desire to engage the entire concentrated forces of the enemy, possesses the faculty (by reason either of an angular base, or of such
circumstances of obstacles as will hereafter be discussed) of striking at
its adversary's flank or rear, it enjoys, in that circumstance, an advantage and opportunity which it might vainly seek in maneuvers against
the hostile front. By a resolute advance it may even combine the
different advantages of forcing the enemy to form front to a flank, and
of separating his forces and engaging the parts successively, as will
subsequently be seen in the example of Champaubert. At any rate,
it will be highly advantageous to engage even his whole force in that
situation.
Comparison
But if an army be inferior in number, it will manifestly be wiser

to seek to separate the hostile forces and engage them separately. For
in 6triking at the flank it may compel that concentration which it
of the advan-
tages
of turning
the flank,
should be'its great aim to prevent; as Napoleon would have done, had
he turned Wellington's right in Belgium.
When the superiority of one army is sufficient, and no more than
sufficient, to warrant a detachment against the enemy's rear, the two
modes of operation-namely, that of aiming a blow at the communications on the one side, and that of concentrating against a separated
force on the other-come into direct opposition; when victory will
remain with the general who best appreciates and improves the conditions of the situation.
OF OBSTACLES WHICH DIRECTLY TRAVERSE THE PATH

BY WHICH AN ARMY ADVANCES.
Conditions of
a military
obstacle.
An obstacle-in order to be such in a military sense-must present advantages for defense, and must also prevent the approacliing
columns from deploying while passing it. A single defile of any kinld
a causeway on a swamp, or a bridge, leading to a commanding ground
or a mountain pass, fulfils these conditions. For an enemy must
advance on a narrow front against troops and artillery advantageously
posted, and, in the two first cases, deployed. In the case of a mountain-pass the defenders may not be able to deploy any more than the
assailants, and their advantage will consist in being screened from the
fire from below; while the advancing troops, besides being imperfectly
covered, will, even should they arrive at the crest, be greatly fatigued
and scattered by the difficulties of the ascent.
But the disadvantage, in such cases, is obvious; and the assailant
will at once decide whether to attack or turn the position. It is when
THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGNI
149
the obstacle is to a certain extent continuous, and includes in its range

several possibilities of action, that it presents a strategical problem. The
only natural impediments that fulfil this as well as the former conditions, are rivers and ranges of mountains.
In one respect the influence of both these obstacles is the same in
kind though not in degree. The expense of throwing bridges over a
wide stream, or of making roads over a high range of hills, causes the
roads on each side to converge as they approach it, and to merge in a
few highways, by which alone can the communications of a great army
be maintained. One of their effects, then, is to lessen the number of
avenues through a theater of war. But in many other respects they
differ.
Although the supply of a large army, operating beyond a mountain-range, can only be maintained by the highroads that cross the
range, yet in all mountain districts there are numerous paths by which
troops unattended by cumbrous trains, and carrying supplies for a few
days on the mens' persons and on pack animals, can pass over the
crests. But if the defensive army should spread itself to occupy all of
Its effect in
limiting the
number of
roads.
these, the communications between the parts of its front must be

broken and circuitous. An assailant mastering any of the passes
would descend in the rear of the defenders of other points, who, necessarily very sensitive about their communications, could never hold
their ground with confidence. Moreover, an army spread in this way,
in barren roadless, districts, on inhospitable summits, must suffer unusual privations. Evidently a prolonged defense conducted on such a
system would be very costly in men and material, and of very uncertain advantage.
dangerous.
Therefore, whenever the theater of war is in part mountainous,

like Southern Germany or North Italy, though bodies of troops may
maneuver in the hills, to protect a flank or to threaten an adversary's,
yet the main action of the campaign will be in the districts which are
practicable for great armies. And what is now the subject of discussion is not mountain warfare, such as is carried on against hill tribes,
but the nature of the obstacle interposed by a long narrow range of
mountains.
If, then, the defensive army, seeing the danger and futility of
occunvinz all the passes, concentrates in the chief of them. the enemy
Defense of a
long line of
mountains
difficult and
150
Defense of
a few chief
passes equally ineffectual.
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. .
would the more easily break through the front at unguarded points
and descend upon the rear; and the fate of a body of troops attacked
in front, and dependent on a single intercepted issue in rear, would
generally be the same as that of the Austrians at Monte Legino.
It is more usual, therefore, and more consonant with prudence,
to hold the principal passes--that is to say, those which lie most directly
in the line of operation, and have the best communications with the
rear-with advanced-guards, keeping the mass of the army disposable
at points in rear where many valleys and passes unite; thus
securing the retreat of the advanced posts, supporting them if necessary,
and opposing with a formidable force the first hostile troops that cross.
Passage to be
effected if
possible by
stratagem,
not by force,
and not at
several distant points.
If a long line be held by the defender, the assailant, keeping his

adversaries dispersed by feints on many points, will generally prefer to
pass at an unguarded issue rather than force a passage, certain of seeing the whole system of defense rapidly fall to pieces when the front is
broken. Thus Napoleon, while making feints on many points to turn
or distract the defenders, passed his main body, in 1800, at one point.
And this is doubtless the right way of conducting such an operation.
The crests of the chain once mastered, it is impossible for the defenders
to know what is passing behind the mouttains. Any of the assuilant's
columns may be the head of the main army. * The defenders, therefore, must either fall back and concentrate beyond the mountains,
leaving the passage free; or, if they block all the
issues, must expose
some part of their line to be overwhelmed, and the communications
of the rest threatened. Therefore a general, whose object is to pass a
m:)untain-range defended by the enemy, should make feints at many
points; but the main body should pass either in one column, or in
columns so near each other, and so well connected, as to unite
readily.
S"General Bragg had said petulantly a few days before the crossing into
Will's Valley: 'It is said to be easy to defend a mountainous country, but
mountains hide your foe from you, while they are full of gaps through which he
can pounce upon you at any time. A mountain is like the wall of a house full of
rat-holes. 'I he rat lies hidden at his hole ready to pop out when no one is
watching. Who can tell what lies hidden behind thatwall?' said he, pointing
D. H. Hill in "Battles and
to the Cumberland range across the river."-Gen.
41
6
Leaders of the Civil War", Vol. iii., p.
THE ATLANTA CAkMPAIGN.

On the whole it may be said, that if the crests of a mountainrange be held by an enemy entirely on the defeiisive, the strategical
advantage will be with the assailant, who ought either to turn or break
Continued
the enemy's front,
to be turned
to the advan-
The advantage of a nountain frontier to the

defender will be, 1st, that of retarding the eheriy'g advance,.thus giving
time to concentrate on the threatened line-an advantage which may
be increased by holding the passes with detachments to augment the

difficulties of advancing; aid, 2d, that of limiting the enemy to afew difficult lines of supply after he has passed it.
Unless the mountain-range be
of great depth, it will generally be better' to hold it only with detach-
defence of a
mountainchain ought
of the
assailant.
tage
Its real nss

as adefensive
obstacle.
iments, and to assemble the armny at some point where it will oblige the
Defeat in
enemy issuing from the mountains to form front to a flank.
such a case, driving him back into a single difficult road choked with
trains and supplies, or, perhaps, driving him off the line altogether,
cannot but he disastrous.
A river offers as an obstacle conditions different from these. The
defenders can deploy, so as to bring an overwhelming convergent fire,
both of small-arms and artillery, to bear on the columns crossing the
Rivers considered as
obstacles.
bridge; and these, as they successively pass the obstacle, must 'still
deploy under fire. The detachments of the defensive army along the
course of the stream
will generally have good communications with
The defense
each other; for as the banks of a river, especially one that is navigable,
are generally feertile and populous, good roads often follow its course
of rivers
on both banks.
Hence the defenders need not, as in mountain-passes,

fear the unexpected appearance of an enemy on their flanks or rear.
mountains,
On the other hand, as it is easier to throw bridges in a' rich popuIous territory than to make.roads over ruggel and desolate mountains,
the good passages over all but the largest rivers will generally be far
but the passages more
more numerous than over a corresponding extent of mountain-range.

_Thus; there are six passages on practicable roads over the Ticino ill 36
miles, from Turbigo to Pavia; while in the whole extent of the western face of the Italian Alps (about 100 miles) there is but one good
road fit to supply such a large army, that of the Mont Cenis. And
the more numerous the practicable avenues, the greater the difficulties
of the defense; for ither some must be left unguarded, or the army
must be spread. on an extended front.
safer than
that of
numerous.
Use of the
river toscreen
the assailthe
ant's, move-
When an army approaches a river defended by the enemy, its first

object will be to drive all the hostile troops then in its front to the
further side, and to extend a cordon of posts and vedettes along the
ments.
stream within the limits of possible operations. For, havingpossession

of one bank, it can maneuver unknown to the enemy; and as the
enemy's movements will also be screened, it will be better (instead of
forming a theory of his doings, which will very likely be'false) to follow a sound plan-that is, one which will enable the army to cross with
least risk, and at the' same time with the most effective strategical
result, whether by turning the flank or breaking the front of the
defensive line.
Possession of
the higher
bank at an
inward bend
very advantageous for
crossing.
There are two features of the case of special significance-namely,

that a river is generally winding, and that the higher bank is some-
Some rivers
indefensible.,
When the most important passages on the main line of operation

present conditions specially favorable to the assailant, it 'will be difficult and hazardous to oppose the passage. So important is the circumstance of the hither bank commanding the further, that the Austrian
army drawn up behind the Mincio, in 1859, to await the French and
Sardiniansrquitted its position and crossed the river to seek its adversaries; "for", said Giulay, the Austrian general, "the enemy, whom it
is impossible to observe from the left bank, can mask his movements
and bring all his forces suddenly on any point before our troops can
be warned and concentrated".
times on one side, sometmes on the other. The object of an assailant

will be to pass part of his troops at some point where he possesses the
commanding bank, for he can thus, with comparative impunity, drive
the defenders from the other shore, and bring his forces, and materials
for passing, undiscovered to the spot. And if at that place the river
also winds inward indenting his front, he will, by disposing his troops
round the bend, command and enclose the angle of the other bank.
It may be assumed, then, that when the assailant's bank decidedly

commands the other throughout its length, or at the points where the
roads forming the line of operation cross, the river is unsuitable for a
defensive line.
But.it must be observed that the mere command of one bank
bank still de
fensible if it
over the other will not be promptly effectual unless the opposing troops
offers strongtain
shelter from the assailant's fire. It willnaturlly
are unable to obtain shelter from the assailant's fire. It will naturally
points,
153
often happen that villages or towns are situated on one or both sides
of a bridge. In this case, even if the assailant's bank has a moderate
command, the buildings on the other side may, for a time, be defensible. At the battle of La Rothiere, in 1814, the French right rested
on the bridge of Dienville, on the Aube-and the Austrians sought to
See Map
No. 17.
turn that flank by sending a corps along the other bank. The Austrian bank commanded the other by about 30 feet, rising abruptly to
a plateau lessthan 50 yards from the bridge, which was 95 yards long
and 5 yards wide. But at 20 or 30 yards from its extremity on the
French side was a substantial church, proof against field artillery,
backed and flanked by the houses of the place. This was occupied so
successfully that the Austrians were unable to pass the bridge throughout the battle, or even to drive over the river a French detachment on
the left hank.
When the defender sees that the passage cannot be opposed,
his usual course will be to take a position in the neighborhood of the
bridge; and the assailant, after passing, cannot maneuver to turn this
position, for by so doing he would uncover the bridge, the sole link in
that part of his line of operation. He must therefore make a direct
attack on the position, which will almost certainly be on commanding
ground. After his repulse at Essling, Napoleon accumulated on the
island of Lobau such ample means of passage, and so strengthened his
communication with the Vienna side of the river, that it was in vain
to attempt to oppose his landing ; the Austrian army therefore took
post 6 miles off, on the heights of Wagram, its right stretching
towards the Danube. Napoleon, after passing, formed his columns of
attack, and was victorious in the battle.
In 1862, Burnside threw the Federal army on the right bank of
the Rappahannock, at Fredericksburg, almost without opposition,
covered by his powerful artillery. Lee observed the passage from his
strong position on Marye's Heights, and when the Union army
attacked him, he inflicted upon it a bloody repulse.
If, therefore, circumstances are so favorable as to enable an army
to pass a river in presence of an enemy, it must generally advance
afterwards to attack that enemy in a strong position. But, in the
great majority of cases, circumstances are unfavorable to an open
Passage in
presence of a
concentrated
enemy Iaz-
ardous.
154
passage. An army, however superior, seeking to force its way over a

bridge, against an enemy posted on the higher bank, would certainly
experience heavy loss. And if the banks were of equal command,
still the task would be too formidable for an equal army ; for the only
point at which an attacking column could advance being knownnamely, the bridge-provision could always be made for bringing an
overwhelming fire to bear on it. And if buildings, woods, or dykes,
near the bridge, afford a shelter for the defender's infantry, the passage
in face of their fire, will be still more impracticable; indeed, such
advantages will frequently balance the superiority conferred by the
commanding bank. It may be inferred, therefore, that the points
where a passage can be forced are comparatively few : and we may
conclude that, in the majority of cases, to attempt to pass an unfordable
river, at a known point, in presence of a prepared enemy, demands a great
superiority of force-especially of artillery.
Stratagem
For this reason commanders generally seek to gain a footing on
usually em-
the opposite bank by maneuvering.
ployed.
Having obtained a command of the whole or a large portion of

one bank, the assailant will show the heads of his columns, and make
preparations as if to cross, at many points; while the real bridge
will be constructed, or seized, and the first troops thrown across, elsewhere. Unless the defender's bank confers a very extensive and
commanding view, he will be doubtful which column will make the
real attempt-all must therefore be opposed; meanwhile, covered by
the high or wooded banks, the assailant's troops will be moving towards
the real point. In general, a bridge of some kind, fixed or flying,
must be thrown; and it will be a manifest gain to possess some creek
or tributary stream where the materials of the bridge may be prepared
unseen, and floated to the point of passage. If time allows, the means
for throwing great numbers across at once may be prepared. But,
in all cases, success will in great measure depend on the ability of the
assailant to augment his force on the opposite bank faster than the
Necessity for
multiplying
the means of
passage.
First troops
pass at a
weaklypointed
defender can bring troops to that point from other parts of the river,
and from the reserves.
Although it is essential to an advance of the army after passing,
that the assailant should possess the bridge of a great road on the line
of operation, yet it is not necessary that the first troops should pass at a
1B5
great road. On the contrary, if secrecy is an object, a point of passage will be more likely to be found unguarded elsewhere. All that is
essential for the passage of the first detachment is, that the ground on
both banks should admit of the maneuvering of troops of all arms.
And it will be a great advantage to find, unguarded or weakly guarded,
on the opposite bank, some easily defensible point, such as a village, a
church, farm-buildings, or small wood. For as the necessary preliminary to throwing a bridge is to establish a party on the other bank, so
some defensible point will enable the first troops to hold their ground,
and to protect the construction of the bridge, or the completion of
other modes of sending the rest of the troops across, such as the passage by boats or rafts. Even when a permanent bridge is mastered, it
will be necessary to throw other bridges at convenient spots near it, so
as to concentrate on the other bank faster than the enemy; and
throughout the operation feints should be persisted in at other points,
to confuse and deceive the opposing general.
A force, then, being thrown across sufficient to deal with any that
the defender can assemble at that point, it may advance along the
bank and assail in flank or rear the defenders of some important neighboring passage, at the same time that another column maktes a direct
attack from the other bank on the same bridge. This is the usual
method of gaining a footing-and it may be executed either between
the extremities of the enemy's line, or beyond one extremity-that is
to say, either by breaking his front or turning his flank. The expediency of preferring either of these methods to the other must depend
in great measure on the dispositions of the defender. For he must
conduct the defense in one of two ways : either he must guard only
the passages on the direct line of operation-in which case his front,
too compact to be broken, may be turned; or he will guard all the
passages by which the assailant can possibly seek to pass-in which case
his front, thus dangerously extended, should be broken.
Advantage of
seizing a defensible point
on the opposite shore.
First troops
that pass aid
in the attack
on the main
passage.
t56
EXAMPLES
OF PASSING A RIVER ON THE FRONT OF
THE DEFENSIVE LINE.-THE PASSAGE OF THE

DANUBE BY NAPOLEON IN 1809.
The passage of a broad river in the face of the enemy is well
illustrated by that of the French army across the Danube during the
campaign of 1809, ending with the defeat of the Austrians in the
battle of Wagram.
As an example-when we consider the preparations made and
precautions taken to make it a successful operation-it has no parallel
in history; besides being the most gigantic undertaking of its kind
that has ever been attempted by any general, ancient or modern.
The battle of Eckmfihl was fought on the 22nd of April, 1809.
The Archduke Charles, separated from Hiller and the Archduke
Louis, was forced back on Bohemia, having lost his line of operations
via the high road-south of the Danube to Vienna.
Napoleon,
pursuing Hiller on this road, entered Vienna on the" 13th of May.
Hiller avoided him by crossing to the left bank at Stein, and united
with the Archduke, who was moving in the direction of Vienna.
The united forces took position on and about the Bisamberg heights,
a short distance from the city. This force, about 100,000 strong, was
about to confront the French whenever they should cross the Danube.
Uncertain as to the plans of the Archduke, Napoleon deemed it
best to cross the river and seek him. He chose the Island of Lobau,
about six miles below Vienna, for this operation. It was admirably
adapted to his purposes. It was partly wooded and presented a
continous screen throughout its length. It was about three miles
long and two and one-half miles wide. To reach the island it was
necessary to cross two great arms of the river separated by a sandbank. One of these arms was 480 yards and the other 240 yards
wide. There was no difficulty in bridging to the island, no opposition
being offered by the enemy.
rst
emp
ffe t
passage, May 21st, this bridge
ic
b een
bo a
l hd
unk to the bottom of the river by
ed-nd raised by the French. The bridge
ia,
ut r
THE C rF RT LAkN M
fthe
~
f bank
i4
vn over during the night of the
PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE,
1809.
157
20th-was constructed of pontons captured at Landshut during the

retreat of the Austrians.
The Archduke had caused fire-rafts and boats laden with stones
to be collected at a point some miles up the river, whence they were
sent floating down the stream, which had been greatly swollen by
recent rains. The main bridge was broken and washed away, leaving
the two portions of Napoleon's army separated by a great river, the
part on the left bank, with reinforcements and supplies of ammunition
cut off, struggling against the entire army of the Archduke.
Having withdrawn to the island during the night of the second
day of the battle, and by the 25th having secured his communications
with the right bank, Napoleon looked about for a new and more convenient debouch to the left bank, The old site could not be used, on
account of the Austrians having thrown up a line of intrenchments
immediately in front, besides having the line between Aspern and
Essling well fortified. Another objection to the old landing place,
was that it was not spacious enough for thle deployment of a large
army in face of an equally large enemy already in position. A new
place for crossing this branch-100 yards wide-was accordingly chosen.
This part of the river, on reaching the northeastern extremity of
the island, turned to the right, and ran south 4,000 yards in an almost
straight line before joining the main channel. The main land in front
and beyond was a large plain very well suited to the deployment of
a large army; the only drawback being the fortified town of Enzersdorf which commanded the ground.
In order to facilitate the crossing, Napoleon caused numerous
intrenchments and redoubts to be built along the east side of the island,
the guns mounted therein--in all 109 heavy pieces-commanding the
plain and town of Enzersdorf. He caused also a staunch and capacious bridgeupon piles to be built, connecting the island with the
right bank; the old bridge of boats having been repaired was also used.
Thiers says: "In order to render the passage of his troops
simultaneous and crushing, Napoleon had recourse to arrangements
unknown before. It was his design that :in sone minutes several
thousand men should have crossed the small arm and surprised aid
"taken the Austrian advance posts, that in two hotirs 50,000 otlers
should have deployed on the enemi's side of the iyer :tfai fig t a: first,
158
IS.
ST1ATEGIC AL OPF:RATIO
battle, and that in four or five hours 150,000 soldiers, 40,000 horses
and 550 guns, should have passed over in order to decide the fate of
the Austrian Monarchy".
In order to carry out his designs, Napoleon caused to be built on
the island, large flatboats capable of carying 300 men each, having a
movable gunwale to protect the men from musketry, which being let
down would serve instead of planks for landing. Every corps d'armke
was provided with five of these boats, which made an advance guard
of 1,500 men carried over at once, and unexpectedly, at each point of
passage. A hawser was to be immediately attached to a tree and
stretched across the stream, so that the boats could ply along it to and
fro. The construction of the bridges was then begun. All the boats
and pontons being prepared, all the tackle arranged, the places selected,
and the men instructed as to what they had to do, there was reason to
believe that two hours would suffice for the completion of a bridge 100
yards long. Napoleon decided that four bridges at least should be
formed, two of boats, one of pontons, and one of large rafts, for the
cavalry and artillery; so that three corps d'arme might debouch
simultaneously, those, namely, of Massena, Davout and Oudinot. In
addition to these, a bridge in one single piece, composed of boats
fastened to gether beforehand, was to be floated down the stream to
the spot selected for it, one end was then to be made fast to the shore,
and the other being left free would be carried by the force of the current to the opposite bank, to which it was to be fixed by men who
were to run along it for that purpose ; this being accomplished, some
anchors were to be dropped in order to steady it in the middle.
On the 1st of July, everything being ready, Napoleon gave orders
that the troops should begin to assemble on the island on the 3rd,
that they should all be there on the 4th, and to cross the small branch
that night in order to give battle on the 5th, if they met the enemy
on landing, or on the 6th, if he did not present himself immediately.
All the corps having assembled on the 4th, the corps of Massena,
Davout, and Oudinot, took their positions at 4 p. m., Massena opposite
Enzersdorf, Davout a little lower down, Oudinot on the right
opposite a woody tract on the left bank. At 9 p. m. Oudinot began
the passage, using the boats for his advance.
PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE, 1809.

159
In order to attract attention elsewhere, and deceive the enemy,
Legrand's division of Massena's corps was ordered to cross at the old
site, which it did, debouching in front of Essling and Aspern, and drew
upon it a brisk cannonade from the intrenchments covering this
debouch. At 11 p. m. Massena's advance guard began the passage.
Fifteen hundred men crossed in five boats and landed on the opposite
bank under the fire of the Austrian advance posts, which Oudinot's
fusilade had put upon the alert. Meanwhile the bridge in one piece
issued from its place and was floated a hundred yards down the current, in order to leave a clear passage for the material of the other
bridge. It was safely placed in position, and the remainder of Massdna's troops passed over and took position. The ponton bridge, and
then the bridge of rafts, were next placed above the bridge already in
position, at 200 yards from each other.
By this time the project of Napoleon being unmasked, he ordered
the artillery of the redoubts to open fire, in order to demolish the
works and town of Enzersdorf, so that they might not form a point of
support for the Austrians; sweeping at the same time the plain below,
with such a fire that it would not be possible for any of the enemy to
to remain there. While these operations were in progress a terrible
storm of wind and rain raged.
At 2 a. m. the army had three bridges; and before daylight a
fourth bridge was thrown across and the corps of Massena, Davout
and Oudinot, had passed over. At daylight 70,000 men were in line
of battle on the left bank, ready to meet the enemy if he attacked.
Although Napoleon had bridges enough to convey his troops from
one bank to the other, he wished to receive his material more rapidly,
and above all to have numerous means for retreat in case of ill-success.
He therefore had three more bridges laid down, the debouch. to all
the bridges being secured by bridge-heads so that in case of retreat the
army would not be deprived of its means of passage by a sudden irruption upon its rear.
The Archduke had not expected that the French army would be
deployed with so much impetuosity and rapidity. A formidable army
with an immense material coming from Lintz, Vienna,, Presburg and
St. Polten, to the general rendezvous of Lobau, had established seven
bridges and crossed the Danube in a single night, notwithstanding the
160
most terrible weather and numerous defiles and islands, and on the
following day was drawn up, and in every respect ready to receive the
enemy should he venture to make the attack. So rapid and skilful
was this operation that the Archduke, instead of attacking the next
morning at the entrance of the bridges, was obliged to receive a
defensive battle in the evening.
PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE BY THE RUSSIANS IN 1877.
The Czar's declaration of war was read to his assembled troops at
Kischeneff on April 25, 1877. The Russian corps began crossing the
frontier between Ungheni and Kubei on the same day. One month
later they occupied the line Seatina-Bucharest-Galatz, the bulk of
their forces being in Bucharest and vicinity. Strong cavalry patrols,
backed by infantry supports, observed the river from Nikopolis to
Silistria.
Towards the end of June, after unusual delays resulting from the
lateness of the season and the consequent difficulty of bringing forward
the bridge train and other supplies, from defective organization of the
communications, and also from the high waters of the Danube, the
Russian army finally was in readiness to pass to the right bank In
the meantime, the lower and middle courses of the stream had been
divided into sections by means of torpedo barricades; several of the
Turkish monitors had been destroyed, and the other vessels were isolated or confined to the vicinity of fortresses, so that they no longer
formed a serious obstacle to the crossing. However, the Turkish army
defending the line of the river appeared to be active at all points, and
earthworks had been erected at many important places. The river
was wide and deep and the current rapid, which added greatly to the
dangers of the enterprise.
The Russian plan contemplated passage at two points-one on the
lower river and the other on its middle course. The portion between
Reni and Hirsova was free from Turkish gunboats and protected by
lines of torpedoes. A bridge was thrown across at Braila, June 12 16, without opposition. A further rise however placed the whole
country of the opposite shore' under water and rendered the bridge
temporarily useless.
On June 22 two regiments were sent across the river at Galatz by
means'of boats, rafts, etc. After a short struggle the arrival of rein-
PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE, 1877.

161
forcements enabled them to gain the heights of Boudjak, thus turning the p)osition of the Turks facing the bridge. The Dobrudja, as
far as Trajan's wall, was then abandoned by the Turks. The Russian
losses amounted to 200 in killed and wounded.
On the middle section of the Danube the operation was much
more difficult. The concentration of the Russians at Bucharest had
warned the Turks that passage would probably be undertaken in that
vicinity. They accordingly strengthened their fortifications, constructed detached earthworks, and posted forces in observation at
Sistova and other points..
The Russians determined to effect a crossing at Zimnitza-Sistova.
About Zimnitza the Roumanian bank is high but it is separated
from the Danube proper by a broad tract of lowland which then,
June 25, was just emerging from inundation. A narrow arm of the
river passes close to the town thus converting the flat into an island.
There are two low islands in the river opposite Sistova, which divide
the stream into three unequal channels. Although they thus became
useful in diminishing the length of the bridges subsequently constructed, they had no direct bearing on the first crossing. The main
stream flows close to the Turkish bank, which is steep, and in some
places quite precipitous. Back from the river there are steep wooded
slopes with numerous gardens and vineyards. A small stream, the
Tekir-Dere, comes in about three miles below Sistova. The width of
the Danube below the islands opposite Sistova is about three-quarters
of a mile. The ground on the Roumanian side shows a sloping face to
the Turkish higher bank, so that is was impossible to bring troops into
Zimnitza unobserved, in the daytime. The Turks had several batteries on high ground so placed as to bring a cross-fire on the cove and
beach at the mouth of the Tekir-Dere, which they seem to have
recognized as a weak point. One Russian corps was ordered to make
preparations for crossing at Flamunda, just below Nikopolis. This
was a feiznt. The siege batteries opposite Rustchuk and Nikopolis
were ordered to open bombardment on the 24th and 25th respectively,
and to continue until further orders.
On June 26 the 14th Division and attached troops, under Gen.
Dragomiroff, arrived at Zimnitza. At dark the pontons and boats
were launched in the creek which runs past Zimnitza, floated down to
the river, and thence to the point of embarkation. At the same time
five batteries of eight guns each were established opposite the intended
point of landing to cover the passage.
The troops began embarking at midnight. At 1 a. m. the first
convoy bearing the regiment of infantry and 60 Cossacks started for
the Turkish shore, aiming at one small cove at the mouth of the TekirDere. After 45 minutes of rowing they were near the southern bank
when they were fired upon by riflemen in position fifty yards from the
water's edge. When a sufficient number had disembarked the Russians charged and drove off the Turkish skirmishers. By two o'clock
in the morning the Russians had possession of both banks of the Tekir
-- Dere and of some high ground east of that stream and about 1,200
yards inland.
The enemy had a body of 5,000 men at Sistova, and another force
of about the same strength three miles to the east of the Russian landing place. At dawn the Turks were fully aroused and began to
reinforce their positions. At daybreak they opened fire on the boats
and succeeded in sinking five of them. At 5 a. in. Gen. Dragomiroff
arrived at the southern bank and took command. At 2 p. m. the
Russians captured the heights south-east of Sistova, and at 3 p. in. the
Cossacks entered the town. The Turks abandoned all their positions
and retreated on Tirnova and Nikopolis. By 9 p. m. the Russians
were firmly established in good defensible positions with a force of
25,000 men. Their total loss in the affair was 31 officers and 790
men. The construction of the bridges was finished on July 2.
In this case many of the favorable conditions usually sought for
in enterprises of this nature were lacking. There was no way of
approaching under cover; the bend of the river was convex towards
the enemy; the southern bank was considerably the higher and was
already fortified; and the intended surprise turned out to be a failure.
The procrastination and military inefficiency of the enemy, who
made no active defense, contributed largely to the success of the
undertaking. The power and precision of modern firearms, in the
hands of properly handled troops of good quality, will in future render
the issue of such operations, undertaken under similar conditions,
quite doubtful, to say the least.
Al
rw.4lCa
(Tuac.
fr';
r
.
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)'
PASSAGE OF THE GAVE DE-PAU.
1683
COMMENTS.
The communications of the assailant, after he has passed on the

center of the defensive line, being narrowed to a point, are more than
usually precarious at the point of passage; but an army being fairly
interposed between the parts of an enemy's front, will generally, in
this, as in the cases discussed before, be secured from counter-attack by
the anxiety of the hostile forces to reunite before taking the offensive.
But as the enemy will concentrate twice as fast upon the center as
upon one flank, the necessity for prompt and vigorous action on the
part of the assailant, if he would derive all the advantages from the
situation which it offers, is even more stringent after passing a river
than in any other case.
The apparent defensibility of a river or mountain-chain
frequently offers inducemeits to the defensive army to attempt
to guard a longer line than its numbers can adequately occupy;
and in such a case a great opportunity is offered to a skilful
assailant, who, inducing the enemy 1by dexterous feints to maintain or
even increase the extent of his front, while his own concentration is
concealed by the obstacle, should effect the passage on the center, or
between the center and a flank of the hostile line, and should then
seek, by vigorous attacks on one side, and the employment of a containing force on the other, to secure all the advantages which exist in
such a situation.
EXAMPLES
OF PASSING
A RIVER ON THE
OF THE DEFENSIVE
FLANK
ARMY.-PASSAGE
OF THE GAVE DE PAU, 1814.

In the winter campaign of 1813-14 in the western Pyrenees, the
French army under Marshal Soult was, by superior numbers, forced
to fall back in succession behind the numerous streams on the northern
slopes of the Pyrenees, from the Bidassoa to the Gave de Pau. The
A river frequently
affords an opportunity'of
breaking a
defender's
front.
164
Allied forces operating against the French consisted of British, German, Portuguese, and Spanish troops, the whole under command of
Wellington. On the 25th of February these armies faced each other
on the Gave de Pau, above and below Orthez. Soult had about 33,000
men, and Wellington 44,000 on the banks of the stream, no account
being taken of the Spaniards, nor of garrisons and investing forces.
The positions were as follows:
Allies :
Strength of
the Allies.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Four divisions of infantry and five regiments of Cavalry,

before Orthez.
One division of infantry and one brigade of cavalry, at the
broken bridge of Berenx.
Two divisions of infantry and one brigade of cavalry, (under
Beresford) near Peyrehorade.
Morillo's force (Spanish) investing Navarrenx.
French:
Strength of
the French.
The Terrain
Orthez to
Peyrehorade,
16.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Six divisions of infantry, vicinity of Orthez.

One division of infantry, retiring from Peyrehorade on Orthez.
One battalion of the above at Berenx.
One regiment of chasseurs at Peyrehorade.
Garrison of 450 men at Navarrenx.
Above Orthez the river spreads out and flows in a valley about
two miles wide; the ground on the southern bank is the higher and
the bluffs are nearer to the stream. Between Orthez and Puyoo the
river is enclosed between steep rocky banks and is only 50 yards wide;
the water is deep, the current swift, and the bed is full of pointed rocks.
Lower down, the stream again is shallower, but at Peyrehorade is
rendered unfordable by tide water.
The ancient bridge at Orthez was massive and difficult to force.
It had a tower in the center, the gateway of which was walled up;
moreover, the houses on both sides were occupied by the French, and
the river was deep.
There are seven fords above and below Orthez, and as the left
bank commands the right in many places, the stream formed neither a
serious obstacle to crossing of the Allies, nor a suitable line of defense
for the French.
PASSAGE OF THE TICINO, 1859.

165
Soult designed to fall in force on the head of the first column
crossing the river. His line extended from Baigts on the right to
above Orthez, where, as the river was less defensible, he had placed
strong bodies of troops.
During the 25th and 26th, Wellington carefully reconnoitered
Soult's position, and he formed his plans to cross above Orthez; but
when he received word that Beresford was already across, he suddenly
changed his design and commenced construction of a bridge at Berenx.
Soult's plan.
On the morning of the 26th Beresford crossed the Gave at the

fords of Cauneille and Lahontan and commenced his march on Orthez,
pushing back the 15th Chasseurs. He also detached a brigade of
infantry to cut the road from Orthez to Dax. As he approached
Baigts, Picton's division and Somerset's brigade of cavalry forded the
stream below Berenx, and two other divisions were directed by Wellington from his right and were approaching Berenx ready to cross.
Thus five of the seven Allied divisions were massed opposite the French
right and were across, or in the act of crossing the river.
Turning
Wellington's
plan.
Orthez to
Berenx, 5.
forces crosses
and covers
the passage
of the main
body.
At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 26th, when Soult returned

to Orthez from a reconnaissance, he found there Col. Faverot of the
15th Chasseurs who reported to him in person that several columns of
the enemy had crossed and that his regiment, pursued by the enemy,
was only three miles from Orthez. No report had been made of the
preparations of the enemy, nor of the fact that he commenced crossing
the day before. The neglect of this officer placed the French army in
grave peril. The plans of Marshal Soult to attack the enemy were
frustrated and he was obliged to take up a defensive position. He
pivoted on Orthez with his left, and swung his center and right back
from the river on the Dax road. Wellington's divisions, when all had
passed to the right bank, attacked the front of the position and dislodged the enemy by main force. Towards the close of the action, the
English right, passing above Orthez, turned the French left, and
accelerated the retreat.
PASSAGE OF THE TICINO, 1859.
In the middle of May the Austrians had their right towards the
Sesia, near Vercelli, where they had destroyed the bridge, extending
along that river to its confluence with the Po. Thence their line
See Map No.

15, also No. 5.
Preliminary
operations.
STRATEGICAL-OPERATIONS.
stretched along the Po (less than 309 yards wide in this part of its
course), watching the principal points of passage as for as Belgiojoso,
numerous bridges having been thrown over the Ticino below Pavia, to
render the communications easy. The left of the army, the 9th corps,
was south of the Po in the defile of Stradella. The total strength of
the Austrian army was 140,000 men and 350 guns.
The French divisions also extended along the Po from Valenza to
Casteggio, watching the passages, with the division on the right thrown
back to guard the issue of the defile. The Sardinians were massed on
the left about Casale. The French army consisted of 137,000 men
and 312 guns; the Sardinian army, of 62,000 men and 90 guns.
Three plans were open to the choice of the French Emperor:1. He might (like his great predecessor in 1796) aim at Piacenza
operating by his right; but this would require the Allies to defile by a
single road between the Po and the mountains, lending a flank to the
Austrians, who commanded the passages of the river.
2. He might cross directly from his center at Valenza, and the
other passages between that and the Ticino ; but this would require the
passage of the Po in the presence of the enemy, and the assault of
defensive positions prepared in advance.
3. He might cross by the passage he held at Casale, preferring to
cross the Ticino rather than the Po. This plan involved the risk of
losing his last line of communications with his base, and being thrown
back upon the neutral territory of Switzerland in case of a reverse.
The superior numbers and morale, of the French would, however,
justify incurring the risk, and Napoleon had hopes of throwing Giulay
back upon Pavia or Piacenza.
The Emperor accordingly took the third course. He placed the
Sardinian army between Casale and Vercelli, and threw it across the
Sesia. This might be preliminary to a passage of the Po opposite the
French center, therefore the Austrian line fronted as before.
Feint toward
Piacenza.
Vercelli to
Novara, 14.
Demonstrations were made on the French right as for an advance

on Piacenza, and then a movement from right to left was begun behind
the screen of the river. The 3d French corps (Canrobert) was withdrawn by rail from beyond the Scrivia to behind the Sesia, where it
crossed at Palestro and joined the Sardinians. This force was destined to cover the assembly of the army on the line Vercelli-Novara-
PASSAGE OF
Milan.
THE
TICINO, 1859.
1677
The remaining corps moved along the roads bordering the Po.
Demonstrations were made along the river by troops left for that purpose, as if to prepare for a passage; and when the 1st corpis, last of all,
quitted its position near Voghera, it broke up the roads and destroyed
the bridges behind it to prevent pursuit, or a counter-advance
south bank.
by the
1sf June. The French corps were passing from Ver'celli towards
the Ticino screened by Canrobert and the Sardinians, who had driven
bank the divisions forming the extreme right of the Austrian line to
Robbio.
The Austrian 2d line (three corps) was drawn on to the arc
Robhio-Vespolate-Vigevano,
thus fronting the enemy and becoming
the 1st line.
Two other corps were drawn from the Po and directed on the
Tincino
a.t Beregardo.
Buffalora to
Pavia, 27.
Part of the Ist corps was between Milan and San Martino, covering the passage there.
Novara to
9th corps between Bavia and Piacenza.
2d June.
French movements for the passnge of the Ticino-the
Turbigo and
object being to reach Milan by a flank march round the Austrians.
Trecate, 7.
1st division of the 2nd corps to Trecate, observing the issue of the
Ticino at San Martino, and thus covering the march of a division of
Advanceguard of
the Guard directed on Turbigo, to force the passage there and cover
turning force
the est,.blishinent of a bridge.
crosses,
equipage.
Five batteries accompanied the bridge
The division passed and occupied Turbigo.
3d Jane. The division at Trecate followed,

movement on Turbigo, and reached Robechetto.
by Galliate, the
The other division of the 2d corps advanced to San Martino. The

Austrians in the work covering the railway bridge retired, blowing up
two arches imperfectly.
Then the French division joined its corps at
Turbigo, being replaced by another division of the Guard.

Canrobert between Vercelli and Robbio.
Sardinians moving from Novara on Galliate for Turbigo.
The rest of the French about Novara.
The Ticino here is about 2,50 feet wide, quite unfordable and
rapid. The banks of the river are quite low,especially the left, and
being very woody at a short distance from the shore, they concealed
movements of troops.
followed by
the rest.
Trecate to S.
Martino, 31.
168
The Ticino had ceased to be an obstacle further thain that the

French must cross it at San Martino by a single damaged bridge. The
real impediment lay beyond. Standing on the bank at the foot of the
railway bridge, the spectator sees before him low, flat meadows, terminated three-quarters of a mile off by a huge mound spreading in a
wide semicircle. From the bridge of San Martino three roads diverge,
piercing this mound at different points; one to the left, to Buffalorathat in the center, raised 15 feet above the level, Ponte di Magentathe railway road, 300 yards from it, similarly raised- and from a
lower point on the river runs a fourth road to Ponte Vecchio, crossing the mound at 1200 yards from the railway. This mound is the
retaining wall of a great canal, deep and rapid, 30 yards, running
between steep bushy banks 30 feet deep. The problem was to file
over the bridge of San Martino and attack the four bridges of the
canal guarded by the Austrians, aided by the three divisions from
Turbigo under M'Mahon, who were already beyond the obstacle.
And as the Austrians held the passages of the Lower Ticino, and
might attack by either bank, it was necessary to keep a force about
Novara to cover the communications Turin.
Austrian Movements. Giulay's design was to carry his army
from the right to the left bank, and attack the Allied force that might
have crossed. To this end his troops on the 2d had been massed at
the two points of passage, Vigevano and opposite Beregardo. He
trusted to the bridge-head of San Martino to delay the French till he
should have his army assembled across the road to Milan. The chief
of staff of the Emperor of Austria, arriving at this critical moment
with instructions, suspended the movement, which was delayed for
several hours.
4th June. The 2d and 7th Austrian corps, covered by the 3d,
had crossed at Vigevano-their leading brigades were near the bridges
of the canal, from Robecco to Ponte di Magenta. The remainder of
these corps were 5 to 8 miles distant. A division of the first corps
held Buffalora; another at Cuggiono opposed M'Mahon.
The 5th Austrian corps from Beregardo was at Falla-Vecchio,
12 miles off. The 8th corps from Beregardo had been directed on
Milan, and was now at Binasco, 17 miles off.
'THEATLANTA CAMPAIGN.Allied Movements. The division of the Guard crossed at San

Martino and covered the repair of the bridge.
The 3d and 4th corps were put in motion from Novara for San
Martino-the 1st was to follow.
The Sardinians from Galliate to follow M'Mahon.
In face of the difficulties of forcing the bridges of the canal, it
was Louis Napoleon's design only to threaten them with the division of
the Guard, till M'Mahon's advance should have -caused the defenders
to turn their attention to him; then the Guard was to assault, and the
:attacks on the two banks would support each other.
The Guard was all on the left bank of the river at half-past 11.
M'Mahon was to leave Turbigo at 10 o'clock. He had 7 miles to
march, and might be expected to reach Buffalora about noon.
The approach of M'Mahon was immediately reported to the Austrian commander-in-chief. Nevertheless, the first reinforcetnents from
the Austrian rear did not arrive on the field till half-past 4 in the
evening.
M'Mahon directed a division of the 2d Corps on Buffalora, and

another division of the same corps on Magenta via Marcallo. A division of the Guard supported the former, following at an hour's distance.
A brigade of cavalry supported the movement, marching on the outer
flank. M'Mahon's right had already approached Buffalora, and his
foremost troops were engaged, when he found an Austrian force in the
space between his divisions. He recalled the leading troops, deployed
the 2d Corps across the space, and again pushed forward, the division
of the Guard constituting the second line.
But the fire of his advanced-guard had been the signal for the
Emperor to launch his troops at the bridges of the canal. Much
hard fighting ensued, and heavy loss. At Ponte Vecchio the Austrians were driven over the bridge, but blew it up in retiring.
At the railway bridge they were also driven over; and the French
passing there turned along the further bank and aided in the attack of
Ponte di Magenta, which was also carried.
Many repulses, however, had been suffered before so much success
was achieved; for the attack had been precipitated by the first discharges from M'Mahon's troops, which, occupied in their deployment,
caused no diversion at the bridges.
The front
attack is precipitated.
170
Turningforce
aids in attack
on the main
passage.
sSTRATEGICAL OPERATIONS.
At length, M'Mahon's preparations being complete, he assailed thd

village of Buffalora. Taken in flank there, the Austrians abandoned
the bridge, falling back to a line in rear-the French passed at Buffalora-and the connection between the separate parts of the army was
restored.
The remainder of the action was a struggle on the part of the
Austrians to make head against M'Mahon on the one side, and on the
other to drive the French from the bridges. Brigades arriving from
the rear were sent against them by both banks of the canal, principally the west side, and with partial success. On the other hand,
troops from the 3d and 4th French corps now began to arrive at the
contested points, after crossing from San Martino, and 60,000 of the
Allies were engaged against 58,000 Austrians. Finally, at the close
of the battle, the French held the bridges down to Ponte Vecchio-the
Austrians that of Robecco.
COM MENTS.
In all the foregoing cases the principle is apparent of throwing 'a
force on the opposite bank, at an undefended or unexpected point, to
codperate in clearing a passage on the main line of operation. -In
neither of the examples of turning a flank is the whole army thrown off
the direct line of operation for the sake of passing unopposed, but the
advance of the turning force is used to cover or aid the main passage
elsewhere.
The difference between the passage of the Gave and that of the
Ticino is, that Soult, being restricted to the right bank, could only
attack Beresford's force, and had not the option of attacking the
remainder of the army: Whereas the Austrians, possessing all the
lower course of the river from Vigevano to Pavia, could operate by
either bank, and the French were therefore detained astride the river.
Turningforce
not liable to
be separated
from main
body,
It is evident that if a force were detached off the main line to

make a circuit round the enemy's flank in a part of the theater where
no considerable obstacle existed, it would be in imminent danger of
being cut off, and an opportunity would be offered to the enemy of
interposing between it and the main body. But when, in making the
circuit, it crosses a river, this risk is in great measure obviated, because
the part of the river between its point of passage and the main body
is an obstacle to the enemy. The kind of disaster to which it is liable
PASSAGE OF BUL
RUN.
is to be forced back by a superior force upon the river. Thus, had the
Austrian army been more concentrated, a part might have held the
bridges while a force superior to M'Mahon's attacked him and drove
him back on Turbigo. If attacked on a front perpendicular to the
general course of the river, it will generally be able to recross without
serious losses-for a detachment of troops with artillery crossing in
advance of the rest, could in most cases line the further bank and protect the passage; and the risk would generally be limited to the losses
in the action, and those which must generally be incurred in retiring
over a river in presence of a superior force. In fact, the point of
passage will form a pivot for the operation of the turning force.
But it is evident that a turning force which advances along the
bank with one flank on the river, exposes the other flank to a direct
attack. Thus Soult, pivoting on Amou, might have come perpendicularly on Beresford's left and rolled him back on the river where there
was no passage; and Giulay from the Milan road might have directly
assailed M'Mahon's outward (left) flank, and driven him back on the
canal and river between Buffalora and Turbigo. This kind of risk is
exemplified in the two following instances.
even if separately defeated.
Real peril
lies in the
exposure of
outward
outward
flank.
PASSAGE OF BULL RUN.

From Union Mills, on the Orange and Alexandria R. R. to
Stone Bridge on the Warrenton turnpike, there are seven passages
over the stream. The Confederate ariny was distributed along this
space, seven miles in extent, on the 17th of July, six brigades guard-
Examples of
ing the passages, and two brigades in reserve.
line.
the risk in-
curred by a
turning force
of the
Extent
defensive
The Federal army, marching from Alexandria, reached Centreville on July 17th.
18th July. The Federals made a reconnaissance in force at Blackburn's Ford, and met with considerable loss, which had a demoralizing
effect on the raw troops.
21sLJuly. A brigade of Tyler's division advanced towards Blackburn's Ford; the rest of the division was directed upon the Stone
Bridge. Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions were directed on Sudley's Ford. Miles' division remained in reserve at Centreville.
Two of the Confederate brigades of the reserve were in rear of the
Centerville to
Blackburn's
Ford, 2.
right and right center of their line.
3 m.
Jackson's brigade arriving the
Centerville to
Stone Bridge,
172
preceding night, was posted in rear of Mitchell's Ford.

also arriving was placed in rear of Ball's Ford.
Turningforce
passes, and
descends the
bank.
Is opposed in
front.
Bee's brigade
The Federal turning column passed at Sudley's Ford without

opposition, but was met by the greater part of the brigade at Stone
Bridge which was detached to meet it on a ridge a short distance
north of the Warrenton turnpike. Here reinforcements were received
by the Confederates, who, after a stubborn fight lasting about an
hour were driven back. Tyler had crossed at a ford about half a
mile above Stone Bridge and joined McDowell's main force.
Stonewall Jackson, with five regiments, occupied a position on a
ridge south of the Warrenton turnpike. The Confederates falling back
from the first position rallied on Jackson, and further reinforcements
came up from the Confederate right. Beauregard, who had contemplated an offensive movement towards Centreville, with his right, now
found it necessary to order up most of his troops to stem the Federal
advance.
Turningforce
attacked on
its outward
flank.
The battle at this point continued from shortly after noon until
about half-past four in the afternoon. The raw Federal troops had
lost their cohesion in the forward movement. At four o'clock "there
were more than twelve thousand volunteers on the battlefield of Bull
Run who had entirely lost their regimental organization". They
could no longer be handled as troops, men and officers being mingled
together in a promiscuous crowd ; but they still continued in action.
The Confederates continued to receive reinforcements, Kirby Smith's
brigade arriving by rail at Manassas Junction during the battle and
being hurried into action without delay, and four regiments being
brought up from the lower fords. With these fresh troops Smith fell
upon the Federal right flank; many of the undisciplined Union regiments "went to pieces like the adjournment of a mass meeting;".
McDowell retired in great disorder across Bull Run, and the retreat
soon degenerated into a panic flight, which ended only at Washington.
The Confederates had nine brigades engaged. The brigades of
Ewell, Longstreet and Holmes remained at the lower fbrds and were
not actively engaged. Miles' Federal division remained at Centreville and did not participate in the battle. The Federal and Confederate forces actually engaged were almost exactly equal in numbers,
about 18,000 each.
PASSAGE OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK AND RAPIDAN.
173
Though having no special bearing upon the nature of the operations which it is sought to illustrate by this battle, it may be remarked
that the Bull Run campaign shows the danger of trying to maneuver
with raw troops, and the liability of such troops to causeless panic.
It teaches us the fault of a short term of enlistment and it gives an
idea of what may happen at any time to a brave but untrained American army.
27th April. Hooker encamped opposite Lee at Fredericksburg,
based on Aquia, and aiming at Richmond, broke up his camp. His
right wing, consisting of the corps of Meade, Howard, and Slocum,
moved up the Rappahannock to cross above the junction of the streams
and turn the Confederate left.
The corps of Sickles, Reynolds, and Sedgwick, under Sedgwick,
were to cross at the same time below Fredericksburg, and detain Lee
Falmouth to
Aquia, 12.
from the true point by menacing his front.

28th and 29th April. The right wing having passed the Rappahannock, crossed the Rapidan almost unopposed-Howard and Slocum
at Germanna, Meade at Ely's Ford-all moving on Chancellorsville.
22.
Sedgwick's cotps crossed below Fredericksburg.

30th April. Couch's corps from the reserve crossed at United
States Ford, and Sickles from Falmouth at the same ford, both on
Chancellorsville.
1st May. Hooker formed his line and intrenched it: Howard on
the right or outward flank, then Slocum and Couch in the center, and
Meade next the river-Sickles in reserve.
2d'May. Lee, aware of the movement against his left, sent Jackson by the "plank road" to meet the attack. Jackson, by a road
through the woods, moved past and round the Federal right.
Hooker sent Sickles to reinforce the right.
Jackson, attacking the right wing in flank and rear, broke and
routed Howard's corps, which retreated in confusion back to the river.
Jackson's advance was checked by the troops of Slocum, Sickles and
While Jackson was assailing Hooker's right, Lee
Pleasonton.
attacked the Union left and center.
Reynolds corps, from Falmouth, joined Hooker by United States
Ford.
Falmouth to
Germanna,
Turning
force passes,
and gains
other fords.
Defenders
attack the exposed flank.
Fredericksburge to
Chancellorsville, 12.
3d May. Lee attacked the angle and left face of the Federal line.
Hooker was driven entirely back on the river, huis right below Ely's
Ford, his left below United States Ford.
Sedgwick attacked the heights on the right bank at Fredericksburg, carried them, and pushed along the Rich nond road.
Operation
fails.
4th. May. Lee detached troops against Sedgwick, turned his left,
and drove hinm over Banks's Ford.
5th May. Hooker, who, on the preceding day, had cut roads to
the United States Ford, and laid bridges there, retreated over it in
the night.
Lee's great victory at Chancellorsville was the result not only of
his own military geniu s but of the tactical incompetency
nent.
of his oppo-
He had only 60,000 meii, while Hooker had 130,000.
Of
Hooker's force about 30,000 were perfectly fresh, the 1. Corps not
having been engaged at all, and the V. Corps not seriously.
On the
night of May 4, the condition and morale of Hooker's army had not
been seriously injured.
Swinton says: "Not the Army of the Potomac
was heaten at Chancellorsville, but its commander...... The rank all

file were puzzled at the result of a battle in which they had been foiled
without being fought, and caused to retreat without the consciousness
of having been beaten".
At a council of war called by Hooker on the
night of May 4-5, four out of five corps commallders present opposed
a retreat, and three were in favor of an advance : a fourth (Couch)
favored an advance if hie were allowed to designate the point of attack.
COM MENTS.
The point in common in these two cases is, that the forces which
had succeeded in crossing beyond the enemy's flank, and whica thereupon aimed.at his rear, advanced
course of the river.
on a front
perpendicullar to the
They thereby expose:] the outwvard flank ; and
that they escaped destruction in the first case was due to tho fact that
they continued to hold, at the time of the' attack, certain pcoints of
passage.
Had the Union army at Bull Run let go its 11ol1 of Stone
Bridge, by continuing to advance, without gaining Mitchell's Ford,
it would have been in great peril of being driven not across but into
the river.
At Chancellorsville the strength of Hooker's army would alone
have preserved him
from a similar peril, if; in moving down the

stream, he had passed by United States Ford.
175
As it was, such a sit-
uation would perhaps have been an advantage
to the Aray of the

Potomac, for it would have forced it to resume the offeasive, for which
everyone but the commander seemed to be ready.
'[his peril may be partially remedied by an advance in echelon,
retiring the outward flank; thou-1i that method, by rendering the
advance on the defender's rear less direct,
would also render it less
decisive.
But the inference may be drawn that, when the defender's forces
are entirely on one-bank, and the assailant has thrown a force across
beyond the flank, the most effective mode of meeting the attack
will
be to imarch against the outward flank of that force, with all time troops
available for immediate action.
It is also very useful to consider the circuanstances in which these

two cases differ.
At Bull Rain a large part of the Federal force
cover the line of possible retreat.
.\t Fredericksburg
vas retained to
Dis:advar-
the Nvigs
t!"' of a
were
both thrown across the river, and the advance assunmed the form of a
double passage and doable attack. It is evident that a passage on
both flanks exhibits at once, in its most disadvantageous
(!ourble
pas--
sanb ontsage oni the

hanks.
forin, the
case of an army between whose parts the enemy's forces are interposed
-since the parts are separated, not only
river,
anld
amy be successively
by the enemy, but by the
overwhelmed
and
driven
on their
bridges, while the vitiorious army, p tssia 4 a cenitral bridge, may cut
both from their lines of retreat, or of possible junction.
It inv h)e hiell as e.4 btlis'iel, then, that a double passage on the
fl tnks mrst be wrog u:iless with a gtreat superiority of force-and that

superi wiry m iyg (
lenally be turnel t'> better account otherwise. The
passage of BARl Ru by General N1,D )wall, wvas much less faulty than
that of the Rappaihan'ck by General Hooker.
Considering it, then, as established that the proper way to turn
the flank of the defenders of a river is to hold the passage on the

direct line with a, covering foerce during the movement, it remaiins to
cosider what should be the proportions of the covering andl turning
wings respectively, and their mode of operation.
.The first object of the covering force is to resist a counter-attack; therefore
full advantage should be taken of the circumstance that an inzferior
Distribution
of the turnlog ad covering forces,
force can generally, for a time, successfully oppose the passage of a
river at a known point. The covering force should therefore be
diminished to the utmost extent consistent with safety, and the wing
whose action will be most decisive should be reinforced in proportion.
To do this it will be necessary, of course, to possess the means, by
bridges or fords, of passing the greater part of the army promptly
across the river on the enemy's flank.
If the whole of the defensive army were assembled to meet the
flank attack, and the assailant's covering wing were to remain on the
hither bank, his chances in the battle would be proportionately diminished. The second duty of the covering force should be to occupy and
detain before it as large a number as possible of the enemy, by maintaining
a cannonade, fire of infantry, and demonstrations of forcing a passage.
Had the Federal force at Centreville advanced to the river and made
a persistent attack on the lower points of passage, it would have been
impossible to draw troops from thence to meet the flank attack. There
should be skilful and incessant reconnoitering of the opposite bank;
and when it is evident that the enemy has withdrawn all or most of
the opposing forces to meet the flank attack, the covering force should
cross at once, multiply its means of passage, and push the enemy on
the march. Should the turning wing be defeated before the arrival
of the covering force on the field, the latter should retire on the bridges
by which it advanced, for the enemy will, or ought to, try to intercept
the retreat on that line. But should the main army maintain the
engagement, or continue to progress, the covering force should
advance and join in the action in a direction still covering its own
bridges; for the example of Waterloo shows how effective is a combined attack from two divergent lines.
The risk of failure, so far as it is caused by the difficulty of com.
bining the assailant's movements, will be greatly diminished by the use
of the field-telegraph.
A passage effected on the direct line of operation, and between,
not beyond, the extremities of the enemy's front, presents none of
these difficulties and necessities for skilful combined action. Every
man should cross: for the divided army will certainly devote all his
efforts to recombination, not to counter-attack; and in case of the
nmilnnt's defeat. he covers his line in retirinv.
177
When a general throws a turning force off the line of operation,

beyond a river, he naturally collects the rest of his army on the road
forming the part of that line which is nearest to the turning force, for
the sake of concentration. Thus, Louis Napoleon, sending M'Mahon
by Turbigo, collects his army on the Novara-Vercelli road, neglecting
that of Mortara-Casale, by occupying which his forces would have been
dangerously extended on the day of battle. If, then, the enemy,
abandoning the defensive, crosses and attacks the covering force, on
the hither bank, it may be forced to fight on a front parallel to the
last road which connects it with its base while the turning force is
beyond the river; and if the covering force be defeated the whole army
may be ruined. When an army is astride a river it may be most effectually attacked on the bank nearest its base, if the hostile forces are already
on that bank, or can readily pass to it, and if their own last line of
retreat is not immediately threatened by the enemy's movements
beyond the river. Reviewing the operations on the Ticino in 1859, it
will now be readily seen what an opportunity was open to Giulay had
he met M'Mahon's attack with an inferior retarding force, and, massing
his troops on the right bank (instead of crossing, as he did, to the
left), thrown his whole weight, on the 5th of June, on the side of
The most
effectual
countermovements
open to the
defender.
Novara.
An increase in the width of the river increases in some respects

the difficulties of the assailant, by augmenting the difficulty of throwing a bridge; but without materially altering the case. The first
requisite for crossing is to establish some troops on the further bank
to cover the passage of the rest. And this object will be greatly aided
if artillery from the assailant's bank can bring such an effective fire to
bear on the defender's infantry, which may seek to overwhelm those
troops, as to keep it at a distance and prevent it from maneuvering,
and also crush any batteries which the enemy may attempt to establish
to prevent the passage. Thus, under the conditions of artillery up to
ten years ago, if a river were only two hundred yards wide, a defender's infantry assailing the first troops that passed over would be liable
to be cut to pieces by the fire of the guns on the hither bank. But
if the river were eight hundred yards wide, not only would the fire on
the enemy's infantry at that range be less certain and effective (since
neither case-shot from field-guns, nor grape from guns of position,
Effect of increased width

of thestream.
178
Improved
weapons, in
this case,
would reach it), but the defender's batteries established at six hundred
yards from the river would play effectively on the head of the bridge
and the troops covering it, while their distance-fourteen hundred
yards-from the assailant's bank would secure them from being overwhelmed by superior fire.
These conditions have been altered, on the whole, in favor of the
assailant, by the improvement in weapons. For though the relations
favor the
assailant.
of the opposing batteries might remain unaltered, yet the infantry

from the one bank could now bring an effective fire to the aid of their
comrades on the other; and thus the largest force-which, by the conditions of the case, it is supposed the assailant would always bring to
bear at the point of passage-would prevail. If French troops crossing
from Piacenza, and English troops thrown over the Douro at Oporto,
in both cases far beyond the range of their comrades' muskets, could
by surprise establish themselves and cover the passage, much more
would such enterprises be likely to succeed when the first troops should
be supported by the fire of the army on the other bank. And another
circumstance in favor of the assailant is, that a large river will generally be navigable, and it and its tributaries will in most cases furnish
a number of large boats sufficient to throw at once on the opposite
bank a force capable of maintaining itself.
Effect of fortified passages.
The possession by the defender of fortresses or bridge-heads giving the command of both sides of a bridge modifies the conditions of
passing a river. If they exist on the flanks of a line of operation, it
will generally be impossible to pass the river on a flank; for the force
attempting the turning movement must pass completely round the
fortified passage before it could aid in the attack on another passage
not so guarded. Therefore in such a case the passage will be sought
on the front of the defensive line. And if the defender be entirely
restricted to the defensive, he will still be probably unable to prevent
the passage. The possession of the bridge-head of Mannheim did not
prevent the French from crossing the Rhine; and even on the short
line of the Mincio the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera did not
prevent-the Allies from crossing between them in 1859. Their value
to the defensive army wil consist principally in the facility and support they would afford to it in assuming the offensive against the enemy
on his own bank : and the degree of their influence must depend on
their position.
179.
From a review of the chapter, the following deductions may be

gathered:1. Neither a mountain-chain nor a river affords a permanent
line of defense, unless in exceptional circumstances: and it does not
balance, in any appreciable degree, the disadvantage of decidedly
inferior force.
2. The conclusions formerly arrived at respecting the general
questions of turning a flank or breaking a front are only modified, not
changed', in the case of the passage of a defended river. For if the
defensive line be too extended, it will be best to pass the obstacle on
the front; otherwise to turn the flank.
3. In case of turning the flank, the risk incurred by the turning
force in case of defeat will be lessened by the river; since, to intercept
its retreat, the enemy must cross the river between its point of passage
and the point held by the rest of the army, where, it is. to be presumed, no ready passage will exist.
4. An army defending a river, on finding its flank turned, does
not generally seek to re-establish affairs by itself crossing to the
other bank, but rather seeks to concentrate against the part of the
enemy that has crossed.
5. Nevertheless such a counter-stroke, when the defender has the
means of speedily crossing, may be the most decisive course; and the
occasion for dealing it will be the defender's best, though very transient, opportunity.
6. On his own bank, the defender's most effective action will be
against the outward flank of the turning force if it advances on a front
perpendicular to the river.
7. Lastly-and very important for discussing the subject of the
next chapter-in the majority of cases the passage of a river at points
deliberately defended is difficult, doubtful, and costly to the assailant
in men and time.
The true use of obstacles, then, are not, as might at first sight
appear, merely to increase the means of passive resistance. Their best
effects will beTo give their possessor increasedpower of maneuvering offensively, and
of taking the enemy at a disadvantage. But their defensive uses are various:
--To cover a flank movement.-Thus, when Lee, after defeating Pope,
General con-
clusions.
True uses'of
obstacles.
180
Defensive
uses of obstacles.
crossed the Potomac above Harper's Ferry, and pushed his main force
towards the Susquehanna (which was, relatively to the Federal army at
Washington, a flank movement), he held the passes of South Mountain with Hill's corps. McClellan from Washington attacked the
passes with greatly superior numbers, but did not succeed in forcing
them till the main Confederate army had retraced its steps and was
assembled behind the Antietam, covering its line of retreat.
To afford opportunityfor rallying a beatenarmy-as the Mincio did
after Solferino, although found to be unsuitable as a permanent line
of defense. The impression which so generally prevails, that it must be
a mistake to fight with a river in rear, is a popular error. Provided
the passages are assured, and sufficiently numerous in proportion to the
force of the army, no circumstance can be more fortunate for a
defeated host than the existence of an unfordable river in its rear, at
such a distance as to leave full space for the retiring troops to file upon
the passages behind their rear-guards. The first effective troops and
batteries that pass line the bank on each side of the bridge, and give
time for restoring order. It is only when those passages are inadequate or precarious, or the river too close to the rear of the troops,
that the risk of disaster is increased.
To enable part of an army to hold a forward line and protect territory
till reinforcements arrive: as the Prussians might have awaited the Russians on the Elbe in 1806; or to cover a concentrationin rear like Zieten
on the Sambre in 1815.
To enable a rear-guardto cover a retreat.
MASSENA'S RETREAT (1811).
See Map
No. 16.
Example of
the use of obstacles to a
rear-guard
Thomar to
Leiria, 25.
Leiria to
Torres Ved-
In March 1811, Massena held Santarem with his 2d corps-the

8th corps was on his right at Pernes and Torres Novas--the 6th corps
in.reserve at Thomar, with a division under Loison guarding the bank
of the Tagus on its left.
Massena had resolved to retreat by the roads of Bombal and
Espinhal to Coimbra.
His first move was to march the 6th corps and cavalry, under
Ney, to Leiria. This seemed to threaten an attack on Torres Vedras,
guarded on the side of the Zizambre by two of Wellington's divisions.
Having sent all encumbrances to the rear, Massena began his
retreat on the 5th March-the 2d corps upon Thomar, the 8th corps

on Torres Novas. The bridges on the Alviella stream were destroyed.
6th March. 2d corps from Thomar on Espinhal.
The rest of the army, including Ney's corps at Leiria, concentrated
on Pombal.
The heads of the British columns followed the 8th corps on
Thomar to
Pombal.
Pombal, 25.
The 3d and 5th English divisions from Torres Vedras on

9th March. Massena assembled for battle in position
Pombal.
An English brigade followed the 2d corps on Espinhal.
10th March. Wellington formed to attack; when the
retired through Pombal, covered by a rear-guard under Ney
right bank of the Soure.
Leiria.
before
enemy
on the
In the night Massina regularly organized his retreat. The baggage and sick, protected by the reserve cavalry, were sent in advance
-the 8th corps followed; the 6th corps, under Ney, covered the
movment. "The country", says Napier, "was full of strong positions,
the roads hollow and confined by mountains on either hand, and every
village formed a defile: the weather also was moderate and favorable
to the enemy, and Ney, with a happy mixture of courage and skill,
illustrated every league of ground by some signal combination of war".
12th March. The head of the British column came upon part of
Ney's rear-guard (5000) deployed on a height across the fork of the
streams, and covering the ford and bridge of the Redinha. Behind
him was a narrow bridge and defile; beyond the stream, on heights
commanding his position, was a division of infantry with cavalry and
guns.
Wellington, unable to ascertain the real force of the enemy,
formed his army for attack. The reconnaissance and deployment occupied some hours. Ney waited to the last moment-then withdrew
his right and center, covered by his left, through the village, which he
set on fire, and over the river. His reserves from the heights on the
other bank covered the passage, then the French fell back on Condeixa.
"There is no doubt", says Napier, "that Ney remained, a quarter
of an hour too long upon his first position; and Lord Wellington,
deceived by the skilful arrangement of his reserve, paid him too much
respect".
Pombal to
Redinha, 6.
Rear-guard
forces the
enemy to
deploy.
Redinha to
Condeixa, 12.
182
Condeixa to
Coimbra, 6
13th. The British pursued and came oil the 6th and 8th corps in
order of battle at ten o'clock. Massena, who had intended to pass the
Mondego at Coimbra, found the further bank occupied by Portuguese
militia and the bridge destroyed, and resolved to retreat by the Puente
de Murcella up the left bank of the Mondego to Guarda and Almeida.
To insure this change of line, he had occupied Fonte Coberta strongly;
and the approach to Condeixa being difficult, he was confident of
effecting the operation.
Rear-guard
retards the
enemy till
turned.
Wellington detached a division

the French left. At three in the
enemy's flank. Ney, setting fire to
back towards Miranda. The British
F. Coberta to
Miranda, 10.
divisions at Fonte Coberta on the one side, and opened communications with Coimbra on the other. The French troops at Fonte
Coberta marched round the British in the night, and recovered com-
over the hills to his right, to turn

afternoon it arrived beyond the
Coudeixa to impede pursuit, fell
following, cut off from him the
munications at Miranda with the main body.
Rear-guard
repeats the
maneuver.
Miranda to
the Alva, 14.
14th. The French strongly posted on the heights bordering the

left bank of the Deuca, from Miranda downward. Wellington sent a
division by the road Panella-Espinhal to unite with the British brigade
on the Espinhal road, attack the 2d corps, and turn the French position by crossing the Deuca. Another division turned the position
more immediately, while the division leading the main column attacked in front. Ney held the position until the main column had
deployed, and the divisions had turned his flank, then retired through
Miranda. Massena, threatened in rear by the British troops on the
Espinhal road, burnt Miranda and passed the Ceira, leaving Ney to
cover the passage. "His whole army", says Napier, "was now compressed and crowded in one narrow line between the high sierras and
the Mondego, and to lighten the march he destroyed a quantity of
ammunition and baggage".
15th. Ney, deploying a large force on the left bank of the Ceira,
Rear-guard
suffers for
' was attacked and driven into the river with heavy loss. He blew up
committing
the bridge, however, and continued to guard the right bank, while the
itself to an
main army took post behind the Alva.
engagement.
16th. The British halted for supplies, and to await the subsidence
of the flooded river.
183
17th. Wellington crossed by a bridge thrown in the night, and

by fords, and found the French behind the Alva with its lower bridges
destroyed.
18th. Three divisions menaced the Upper Alva, two cannonaded the passages below. Massena thereupon concentrated on the
Moita ridge, thereby forcing Wellington also to concentrate.
19th.
Massena retreated on Celorico.
Wellington concentrated on the Moita ridge.

These operations will suffice to show the manner in which obstacles
aid, and are indeed essential to, the efforts of a retarding force, which
opposes a superior enemy, whether as a rear-guard or as a body covering some decisive movement of the rest of the army. Wellington,
coming up with Ney (who has about 10,000 against 40,000), must
choose between attacking with the head of his column, with certain
loss and with uncertain result-for he could not know, except by
experience, what force might be in front of him; or deploying his
whole army for battle, as as at Redinha; or having recourse to a turning movement: and either of the last two methods cost him half a day
in preparation.
On the other hand, the pursuing force, certain of support, operates boldly to a flank, and the retreating army is exposed to the risk
of losing troops, either from being cut off by withdrawing too late, as
at Fonte Coberta, or from being overwhelmed by superior forces, as on
the Ceira.
The difficulties of operating by a single road, and the manner in
which a part of an army may hold in check a superior force are well
illustrated by the remarks quoted from Napier.
The latter part of Massena's retreat exemplifies the use which
may be made of an obstacle to cover a change of front. The French
from Celorico made for the Coa by Guarda and Sabugal. Their position at Guarda threatened the flank of Wellington's line along the
Mondego, the head of his column being at Celorico. Had he followed
the same road as the French, that of Celorico-Guarda, with his whole
army, he might have found his communications endangered; but by
taking advantage of the bend of the Mondego, occupying the heights
looking on its upper bridges with his right wing, he brought his left
round, and changed the direction of his front in security.
184
Use of a
river to
secure the
communica-
tions:
But besides their value to a defensive or retreating army, rivers may

be turned to account by an army during its advance, in a very important manner, by securing the line of communication.
When an army is operating close to its base, and that base is
extensive, it can change the direction of its front, or of its line of
operation, freely, without endangering its communications. But as it
advances, and increases the distance from its base, its lengthened comnmunications become more and more open to attack. It can no longer
change the direction of its front, or of its line of operation, without
laying bare some essential communications. It is hampered by the
lengthening chain it drags after it ; and while the enemy, if near his
base, or in his own country, can maneuver freely on many sides, the
advancing army becomes more and more rigid and constrained, till at
last, far from thinking of offensive movements, its whole energies are
absorbed in covering its precarious communications.
But if, under these circumstances, it can master some defensive
line, strong for defense, and create thereon depots of material of all
kinds, collected from the surrounding districts, and transferred from its
own territory, it has carried its base forward, and recovers its freedom
of maneuver. Such a line is afforded by the course of a considerable
river.
Important passages on it, commanding many roads, are
strengthened-recruits are brought thither from the rear, invalids are
sent thither from the army, to occupy the works, and diminish the
number of effective men withdrawn from active operations. Henceforth, all the roads between the base and the river will be secure ; and
the relieved general, restored to full activity, will now be solicitous to
preserve only his communications with1ethe river.
Thus, Napoleon in 1813, advancing from the Rhine into Northern Germany, makes a secondary base of the Elbe from Pirna down to
the sea. Pivoted thus, and creating a vast depot in Dresden, he
directs his movements northward agains Berlin, eastward into Silesia,
southward into Bohemia, the line to France through Leipsic remaining all the time secure: and it is not till he quits the Elbe that this
line is endangered.
Thus, also, Marmont's Army of Portugal, linked to France by
the single road of Bayonne, broadens its base by fortifying the Douro
zo
10t
20
s0
40
CAMPAIGN OF 1814, IN CHAMPA GNE.
185
from the Elsa to Valladolid, and acquires all the latitude of action displayed in the campaign of Salamanca.
When a general, surveying the map of'the theater, finds direct
obstacles in the path he must advance by, he sees in them, if he be
confident in his own skill in maneuvering, increased opportunities for
And the opposing leader will, or
obtaining strategical successes.
ought to, find them illusory aids, if he attempts to hold them entirely
on the defensive. To turn them to account he must make of them
successively the pivots of offensive operations, or employ them as a
means of temporarily retarding the enemy. In fact, like any other
complications in a game, they offer on both sides additional opportunities to skill and talent, and additional embarrassments to incapacity.
CASE OF TWO OR MORE CONVERGENT RIVERS WHOSE GENERAL

COURSE IS PARALLEL TO THE PATH BY WHICH AN
ARMY ADVANCES TOWARDS ITS OBJECT.
CAMPAIGN OF 1814, IN CHAMPAGNE.
After the battle of Leipsic, October 16, 17, 18 and 19, 1813,
Napoleon retreated to France by way of Frankfort and Mayence,
leaving garrisons in many fortresses in Germany (where they were
lost to him), in Holland, and on the Belgian and German frontiers of
France.
The Allied army of Bohemia, under Schwartzenberg, approached
the Rhine at Basle.
The army of Silesia, under Bliicher, approached the Rhine at
Coblentz, Mayence, and Mannheim.
Basle to Coblentz, 220.
The army of the North, under Bernadotte, consisting of Russian,

Prussian, Swedish, German, Dutch, and English troops, in a series of
operations expelled the French from Holland.
Bliicher wished the united armies of the Allies to cross the Rhine
between Mayence and Coblentz. If the fortresses of the Moselle
should prove to be weakly garrisoned, he proposed to take them-if
Prussian plan
of invasion.
186
Austrian
plan.
strong, to observe them ; and then to march by this, the shortest, line
to Paris, returning if necessary, after overthrowing Napoleon, to capture the strong places.
The Austrians wished to turn the line of fortresses which guarded
Paris from the east, by advancing from Switzerland. They argued
that the investment of the great fortresses, by withdrawing so many
detachments superior in number to the garrisons, would tell against
the Allies. Moreover, they wished, by operating from Switzerland, to
separate Napoleon from his army in Italy. Therefore the Austrians
followed this route; and Bliicher moved on the intermediate line of
the Moselle to connect the main army with the Allied corps in Holland.
Allied forces.
ARMY OF BOHEMIA.
Commanded by Schwartzenberg-Radetzky, Chief of the Staff.
General Colleredo.
Austrian
Corps 1
Louis Lichtenstein.
Austrian
"
2
"
"
Austrian
Wurternberg
Austrian and Bavarian
Russian
5
6
Giulay.
Prince of Wnrtemberg.
Wrede.
Wittgenstein.
Two light divisions under Bubna and Maurice Lichtenstein.

In all-95,000 Infantry.
21,000 cavalry.
468 guns.
ARMY OF SILESLA.
Commanded by Bliicher-Gneisenau, Chief of the Staff.
Prussian
Prussian
Corps 1
2
"
"
Russian
Russian
" 10
Cavalry
Corps 6
"
I1
Cavalry
French
forces.
Russian
Russian
York.
Kleist.
Lageron.
Russian
Russian I.
Sacken.
Russian)
In all-69,000 infantry.
19,000 cavalry.
478 guns.
To oppose these Napoleon had the corps of Ney, Marmont, Victor,
and Macdonald, and the Imperial Guard under Mortier and Oudinot;
at the outset, about 70,000 infantry, and 17,000 cavalry, with a great
number of guns, with which to meet the heads of the Allied columns;
and at different times during the campaign he was reinforced from
reserves at Paris, and from the Pyrenees, where Soult struggling
187
against the greatly superior forces of Wellington could ill spare the
troops drawn from him for the operations in Champagne. On the
other hand, Schwartzenberg had a reserve of 50,000 men at Basle
under Barclay de Tolly, and the united reserved of the Allies aggregated 140,000 men.
The Vosges Mountains extend parallel to the Rhine, separating
its basin from that of the Moselle, and fall back at an angle opposite
Basle. From thence southward the barrier is taken up by the Jura.
The space between the extremities of these ranges is known as
the Gap of Belfort, which gives admission to the valley of the Rhone,
the only obstacles being the weak places, Belfort, Blamont, &c. Thence
the road to Paris leads over the Morvan range into the valley of the
Seine at Langres.
At the appearance of the Allies on the Rhine, Napoleon, notwithstanding the inferiority of his numbers, extended his troops near the
frontiers on a wide are of defense. He argued that the Austrians must
leave many men before the fortresses, and it would therefore be possible to close against them the great roads from Alsace; that Bliicher
also would invest so many places that Marmont could retard him and
fall on his left if he should attack Macdonald, whose corps was on the
lower Meuse.
First dispositions of
Napoleon.
Therefore Mortier was to bar the road by Langres, Ney by Nancy

-Victor was to hold the Vosges Mountains against Schwartzenberg.
Marmont was to oppose Bliicher.
Macdonald to hold Belgium.
Langres to
Nancy, 70.
Augereau to hold Lyons-thus communicating with the army of

Italy, and those of Soult and Suchet in the Pyrenees-and was to
watch for an opportunity of operating by the Rhone valley against
Schwartzenberg's communications.
Schwartzenberg's Movements.-Obviously the Gap of Belfort was
the point where, by turning both the Vosges and the Jura, it was easiest to pass. The mass of the army of Bohemia therefore passed there.
But to secure the flanks, corps were pushed out to the right to invest
the fortresses in Alsace (Strasbourg, Kehl, Colmar, &c), to the left to
oppose Augereau and to invest Dijon, Besan9on, Auxerre, Belfort, &c.
Giulay's corps moved on Langres, driving back Mortier.
Advance of
the Allies.
Wrede turned Victor's right in the Vosges, and movel on Neufchateau.

Wurtemberg up the Moselle to Epinal.
Wittgenstein on Nancy.
In
the middle of January, Giulay from Langres, in line with
Wrede at Neufchateau and Wurtenberg fromt Epinal, together pushed

Mortier back on Bar-sur-Aube, and thence through Vandcuvres to
Troyes.
Giulay occupied Bar.
Bar to Join-
25th January.
ville, 28.
Wurtemberg on his right.

Wrede between Chaumont and Joinville.
Sacken (left of Blicher's army), Joinville.
French retreat beyond

the Mense.
On the French side, Victor had retired from the Vosges and
joined Ney at Nancy. Marront, retreating before Biicher through
Metz, had joined the other Marshals at Nancy ; the three had retired
from
thence upon St Dizier; attacked there by Sacken, and turned
by the road from Joinville, they fell back to Vitrv.

The French fortresses left in Bliicher's rear were blockaded:
Mayence by the troops of Saxe-Coburg; Luxembourg and Thionville
by Hessians; Metz by a Prnssiain division ; and, until the arrival of
the Hessian and Saxe-Coburg forces, they were watched by Prussian
cavalry.
Meanwhile Winzingerode's corps, of
Coblentz to
Dusseldorf,
.
Bernadotte'sarny,
had passed
the Rhine at Ddsseldorf, and Macdonald, observing Biicher, had

retired up the Meuse by Liege and.Mezieres towards Chalons.
Winzingerode
march by Avesnes
halted at Namnur,
on Laon.
but subsequently
resumed 1=is
For the present he need not be taken
into account.
Junction of
the Allies on
the Marne.
Such were the movements that preceded the junction of Bliicher's

left with Schwartzenberg's right on the Marne, and the assembly of
the French corps on the arc of' which Paris is the centre, and the rivers
Seine, Aube, and Marne (and later the Aisne) are the radii.
With
this position of affairs the problem under investigation, of the influence

of convergent rivers, commences.
Description
ofthetheatre. .the
The district east of Paris, known topographically as the basin of

Seine, is bounded east, north, and south by hill-ranges.
Three
streams take their rise in the eastern range-the Seine, the Aube. and
189
the Marne-and along their banks lie the great direct roads from the
Rhine frontier to Paris. These rivers, though of no great width,
averaging fifty yards, are deep, and generally impassable except at the
bridges. These bridges were now barricaded, and important passages
on the main lines, as Troyes and Nogent, Chalons and Meaux, were
rendered secure against a sudden attack.
The country about these rivers is quite inclosed. Great fields,
without fence or division, extend across the spaces between them.
The roads are few; the open country would permit troops to move
freely in all directions, and to deploy for battle, in dry weather ; but
in this winter season the cultivated ground, and the swamps bordering
the small streams, would prevent this and restrict the columns frequenitly to the roads.
Only the great chaussees were suited to
sustained operations. The crossroads were of bad quality, and in
many parts wagon-trains could only move on them with difficulty.
In this theatre Napoleon now prepared to oppose a single line of
defence to a double line of invasion, for Schwartzenberg was bound to
the line Langres-Basle by the necessity of keeping open his communications with the troops investing the fortresses ; Bliicher to the line
Chalons-Mayence, to maintain his communications with Belgium and
the Rhine. The Emperor's general plan was to hold the bridges on each
side with his wings, and with the main body to maneuver between
them, casting his weight on each adversary alternately, while the other
wing, aided by the river, contained the other hostile army. And forseeing that these movements from side to side would be frequent, he
established his line of main supply on the central road between the
rivers, of La Fert6-sous-Jouarre-Sezanne-Arcis, and ordered those and
other points to be fortified sufficiently to secure them against a rush of
Cossacks.
25th January. Napoleon went to Chalons to commence operations.
Imagining Bliicher's different corps to be scattered on the march, he
resolved to unite the corps on the Marne at Vitry, and leaving
Marmont at St Dizier, and Macdonald then approaching Chalons, *
to bar the passage of the Marne against Blficher, to turn himself by
Joinville on Chaumont, calling up his right wing to him from Troyes
and Arcis, and falling on the head of Schwartzenberg's columns.
- Macdonald had passed Mezieres, and was near Rheims.
Allies still
operate on a
double line.
Napoleon's
general plan.
French commnnications.
Paris to Chalons, 100.
190
Vitry to St
Dizier, 18.
St Dizier to
Joinville, 17.
Joinville to
Brienne, 30.
Napoleon
pivots on the
Marne, to
strike the
flank of te
enemy moving between
the rivers,
Accordingly he moved from Vitry with 35,000 men on the 26th.
27th. He drove a Prussian detachment from St Dizier.
But Bliicher on the same day, leaving his right in St Dizier, was
moving to join Schwartzenberg on the Aube, and was crossing the
space between the Marne and Aube, with 30,000 men of Sacken's
command and part of Langeron's.
Learning this at St Dizier,
Napoleon turned to pursue Bliicher, in the hope of intercepting him
before he could be supported by Schwartzenberg
28th. Sending Marmont along the highroad by Joinville to
Brienne, he moved with Ney and Victor, by Vassy, on Montierender
across a difficult country, at the same time sending orders to Mortier,
then at Troyes, to remain on the Aube.
29th. He debouched into the valley of the Aube, near Brienne.
Blicher, from Bar, had hastened down the Aube to cut Mortier
from Napoleon, and crush him singly; but learning Napoleon's
Blucher
evades him
advance, he retraced his steps in time to reach Brienne.

Here
Napoleon attacked him, and after an indecisive action Bliicher retired
by
along the road toward Bar.
retreating.
Brienne to
Troyes, 25.
Brienne to
Chalons, 47.
Napoleon was now within easy distance of his wings at Chalons

and Troyes. With the latter point he was connected by Gerard's
division at Piney. Joining Mortier he would have 80,000 men to
meet Schwartzenberg-joining Macdqnald he would have 55,000
against Blficher, which he considered nearly sufficient. Posting his
own troops across the roads from Bar and from Joinville to Brienne,
and joined at Morvilliers by Marmont from Joinville, he awaited
events, his right on the Aube, at Dienville, his left at Morvilliers.
Bliicher had halted at Trannes, a few miles from Brienne.
Schwartzenberg's leading corps reinforced him.
Battle of
La Rothibre.
1st February. The main body of the Allies advanced by the right
bank of the Aube upon Napoleon, sending a strong detachment under
Giulay on the left bank to turn his right, and another, under Wrede,
beyond the Joinville road to turn his left. Napoleon would now have
joined Mortier at Troyes; but seeing the main body of the enemy
approaching, he judged that he could not pass the river without fighting,
and stood to receive them. More than treble his numbers on the field,*
they broke his center and captured a great part of his artillery, though
*French, 30,000; Allies, 100,000.

his right held fast at the bridge of Dienville. During the night he
fell back through Brienne to Lesmont, and passed the river, covered
by Ney's corps on the right bank, by Mortier on the left bank, and by
Marmont, who, retiring from Morvilliers, had taken post on the Voire.
The enemy at first imagined Marmont's corps to be the main army,
and sent Wrede's corps to attack it: but the French Marshal, retiring
over the Voire, defended the passage, inflicting considerable loss on the
enemy, and made good his retreat to Arcis, where he could, according
to circumstances, defend the Aube or join Napoleon at Troyes.
2d February. Macdonald at Chalons was attacked by the corps of
York from Metz.
The main body of the Allies was now directed by the roads of
Vandceuvres and Piney on Troyes. On the left, two corps, Giulay's
and Colloredo's, moved on Villeneuve-l'Archeveque and Sens, to compel Napoleon to evacuate Troyes, and to secure the Yonne.
3d February. Bliicher, as Napoleon had foreseen, had many
reasons for wishing to return to the Marne. York's corps was now at
Chalons, and Kleist's and part of Langeron's were moving thither
from Metz; joining these he would have near 60,000 men with which
to operate independently, and might be the first to enter Paris. By
moving thither at once he might cut off Macdonald's direct retreat, and
drive him on Epernay. Therefore, and because, also, his impatient
spirit rendered him dissatisfied with the slowness and. circumspection of
his associate general, he led the troops which he had brought from the
Marne to Brieune, across by Rosnay, St. Ouen, and Fere Champenoise, to the road Chalons-Montmirail, sending Sacken towards
Montmirail.
5th February. Macdonald, after destroying the bridge, evacuated
Chalons, retreating on Epernay.
York pursued Macdonald to Chateau-Thierry.
troyed the bridge after crossing.
Schwartzenberg advan-
ces on the
Seine and
Yonne.
Troyes to
Sens, 44.
Blucher returns to the

Marne.
Ma
French left
wing retreats,
Macdonald des-
Sacken moved by Montmirail on La Fert6-sous-Jouarre, and the

rest of Bliicher's troops from Fere Champenoise, followed towards
.Champaubert, while Kleist and Langeron were near Chalons.
Thus the army of Silesia was spread in lengthened columns along
the inner bank of the Marne.
Blucher's
army advan.
ces between
the rivers.
Troyes to
Nogent, 32.
Nogent to
Sezanne, 20.
Napoleon,
pivoting on
the Seine,
attacks
Blucher's
fank,
Napoleon hesitated whether to fall on Biiclcer, or Giulay and

Colloredo. He made a false attack from Troyes on the nain.lbody, to
ascertain their movements; and repulsed a counter-attack on the bridge.
6th February. Having resolved to strike at Bliicher, be and
Marmnont (from Arcis) joined at Nogent.
to cover the movement.
7th February. Marmont to Sezanne-to Nogent-Victor's corps, and Oudinot's
hold the bend of the Seine from Nogent to
18,000,
20,000
..
Olsuvieff (of Langeron's cormand),
the separated
corps of the
enemy.
and*routs
them at Mont
mirail;
Sezanne to
Mortier, with the Guard,

division of the Guard, to
Bray.
8th February. Ney's corps followed Marmont.

9h February. Napoleon followed with Mortier's division of the
Guard-in all, 30,000, Bliicher had sent some Cossack regiments to
occupy Sezanne-these were driven out and retreated on Sacken.
On this day Bliicher's corps were thus situated :-York,
Sacken,
pierces it at
(,hampaubert, turns on
Mortier remained at Troyes
Chateau-Thierry.
Between Montmirail and La
Fert-sous-Jouarre.
3,500,
Champanbert.
Bliicher with 2 corps, Kleist and
15,000, Vertus (from Chalons and Vitry,.
Langeron,
Chal ons an~itr4
0ertu-from
10th February. Macdonald was at Meaux.
Napoleon, from Sezanne, fell on Olsuvieff, who did not know of the expulsion of the
Cossacks, and destroyed his corps. Leaving Marmont to oppose

Blficher on the side of Etoges, he turned with Ney and the Guard to
follow Sacken, passing through Montmirail to the junction of the
roads from Chatean-Thierry and La Ferte-sous-Jouarre.
11th February. Sacken, who had purisued Macdonald's rear-guard
to Trilport, and destroyed the bridge there, warned of Napoleon's
approach, and sending to apprise York, imoved on Montnirail; York,
Champanbert, 13.
who had restored the bridge, holding Chateau-Thierry, sent part of

his corps to cooperate with Sacken. Napoleon defeated them with
very heavy loss, and drove them on Chateau-Thierry.
Champaubert
to Montmi-
12th February. Pursuing then, be drove them beyond the Marne.

In retreating they destroyed the bridge.
rail, 13.
12thand 13th February. The bridge was repaired.

Mortier passed it to pursue York and Sacken, who were retiring
Montmirail
to Chateau'FThierry, 16.
on Chalons by the circuit of Fismes and Rheims, there being no direct
Meaux to
Guignes, 24;
road. Macdonald
Victor.
from
Meaux was sent by Guignes to reinforce
193
3liicher advanced on Montmirail.

Schwartzenberg attacked the bridges of the Seine.
14th February. Napoleon joined Marnont, attacked Bliicher at
Vaucharnps, and drove him, with severe loss, half-way back to Chalons.
then returns
on Blucher,
Leaving the pursuit to Marmont, he returned to join Victor and Oud-
.and drives
him towards
inot.
Chalons.
These Marshals, far outnumbered and turned on the side of

Fontainebleau, had fallen back on a strong position behind the Yeres,
where Macdonald joined them.
This day
Winzingerode
entered
Soissons, expecting to join
Bliicher at Chateau-Thierry.
16th February.
the Seine:-
Army of Bohemia was thus situated after passing

Advance-guard at Mormant.
Wittgenstein at Nangis.
Wrede at Donnenarie.
Wurtembergers at Montereau.
Giula.y at Pont-sur-Yonne.
Colloredo at Fontainebleau.
Reserves at Sens and Nogent.
Army of the
North enters
the theatre.
hrues
berg pushes
hack the
French right
wing.
Napoleon had hesitated whether to fall on Schwartzenberg's flank

by' Sezanne, or to march round by Meaux and Guignes to join the
Marshals on the Yeres. The alarm of the Parisians at the approach
Napoleon
joins the
right wing.
of the Allies caused him to decide for the latter course.

17th February. Advancing from the Yeres, he drove the advanceguard of the Allies from Mormont on Nangis, and Wittgenstein
and Wrede retreated to the left bank of the Seine.
Ondinot was directed on Nogent.
Macdonald "
"
Bray.
i"
" Monterean.
Victor
Schwartzenherg retreats.
Nangis to
Nogent, 24.
Nangis
The Allies held the bridges long enough to cover Colloredo's

retreat to the right bank of the Yonne.
to
Montereau,
16.
18th February. Napoleon forced the passage at Montereau (where
Napoleon
the right bank, on which the Wurtembergers stood to fight, greatly
forces the
passage
commands the left), driving the defenders over the river and through
Oudinot and and Macdonald, relinquishing the attacks on
the town.
Bray and Nogent, where they had failed to force
a passage, filed
through Montereau.
18th to 23rd.
Napoleon had now been reinforced to 70,000, not
counting Mortier and Marmont.
Schwartzenberg, with 100,000 less
at
Montereau.
STRATEGICAL OPERA'TIONS.
194
concentrated, did not think it prudent to meet him.
He fell back
towards Troyes.
Blucher
again crosses
to the Marne,
Meanwhile York and Sacken had rejoined Bliicher at Chalons by

Rheimis. On the 18th, Blicher, from Chalons, moved with 50,000
men on Arcis. Finding that Schwartzenberg was retreating before
Napoleon, Bliicher occupied the bridge and town of Mery-on-the-Seine.
Napoleon, sending Oudinot to attack him and to secnre his flank at
Mery, followed Schwartzenberg, who retreated by Bar towards
Chaumon t.
24th.
Napoleon
entered Troves.
The Allies iow resolved to
call np from Bernadotte's Army of the North the corps of Bulow, by

Laon, to Soissons.
Winzingerode was at Rheims.
Bliicher, to join
them, to draw Napoleon from the pursuit of Schwartzenberg, and to

seek an
opportunity
of attacking Mortier
and Marmont,
moved
towards Sezanne, breaking the bridges of Plancy and Arcis.

mont had followed Bl icher as far as Etoges;
Mar-
had then returied to
Montmirail, where he was in communication with Mortier at ChateauThierry on one side, and Napoleon on the other. He then noved to
Sezanne, whence, by crossing at Arcis, be could join the Emperor.
Mortier was now at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre.
A French garrison had
been thrown into Soissons after Winzingerode qnitted it.

and pushes
back the
French left
wing,
25th. Marmont, from Sezanne, retreated before Bliicher, by La

Fert-Gaucher, and joined Mortier on the 26th.
Napoleon quitting
Troyes, and leaving a force, under Oudinot and Macdonald,
once more
to oppose Schwartzenberg, moved by Sezanne to attack Bliicher.
27th.
Bliicher,
on
the
left
bank
of the
Marne,
holding
the bridge at La Pert6 with his right, threw his left forward to cross
which contains him on
the Ourcq.
at Trilport, and cut the Marshals from Paris. But the Marshals
reached Meaux before him, and held the line of the Marne and Ourcq
from Meaux to Lisy, holding the bridge at Trilport with a brigade.
Meanwhile the Allies in council at Vandceuvres, feeling all the
difficulties of the situation, had formed a new plan.
The Grand Army
was to remain in observation in the center, throwing out a wing

towards Lyons and securing the line to the Rhine; while the army of
Silesia, considered as the other wing, and reinforced by Biilow, Worouzoff, and Winzingerode. was to take the offensive on the side of the
Marne.
195
The Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald, commanding the containing force, pushed Schwartzenberg's rear-guards over the Aube.
28th.
Napoleon
was
at Sezanne.
He
might
advance
from
thence eiter
by Montmirail or Chatean-Thierry, separating Bliicher

from Billow and Winzingerode, or towards the Marshals, so as to cover
Paris,
He moved on La Ferte-sous-Jouarre.
Napoleon,
ting on
vances to attack Blucher.
Bliicher, who had crossed at La Ferte, at Napoleon's approach

destroyed the bridge there, and continued to press the Marshals on the
Ourcq, sending Sacken, supported by Langeron, to attack Meaux, and
Sezanne to
La Fert&sous-Jouarre,
33.
York followed by Kleist to Lisy.
2d and 3d March.
Napoleon having thrown a bridge, crossed at
*La Ferte, and moved on Chateau-Thierry.

Bliicher, thus menaced,
retreated by cross-roads up the Ourcq to Oulchy, for the Aisne,
followed by the Marshals. Napoleon marched from Chateau-Thierrv
on Fismes-the Marshals from Oulchy on Soissons,-but were too late
to intercept the enemy. Kniowing, however, that Soissons was held
Chateau'Fhierry to
by a French garrison, he hoped to overtake the Army of Silesia and
r imes, 25.
bring it to action before it could bridge the Aisne.

dant
of Soissons,
threatened
on
the
But the comman-
north bank by Billow and
Worouzoff, who had just come from Laon, and on the south side by
Winzingerode from Rheims, opened his gates. Bliicher crossed the
Aisne, barred the passage to Napoleon, and received the large rein-
Blucher
crosses the
forcements of Billow and Winzingerode, who, meanwhile, had bridged
Aisne.
the Aisne at Vailly,

Thus the Army of Silesia had evaded the blow he hoped to inflict,
But it was beyond the Aisne; it was
and was stronger than before.
separated from its proper line of Chalons; and was at a great distance
from the Army of Bohemia.
Barring the Aisne against Blicher, and
decending on Schwartzenberg's rear by Rheims and Chalons, the situawas still advantageous.
But Napoleon wished to inflict some decisive
blow on Bliucher, and resolved to cross the Aisne and attack him55,000 against 90,000.
5th March.
Napoleon
seized the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, and
crossed there with Victor, Ney, and the Guard, leaving Marmont
before Soissons, and sending a detachment to Rheims.
6th March.
Bliicher, watching the enemy from the heights of
Craonne (part of a line of high wooded country that extends from
Napoleon
follows him.
196
Battle of
Craonne.
Soissons to
Laon, 20.
Battle of
Laon.
Soissons along the Lette, to the Rheims-Laon road), resolved to move

his army behiud the Lette, across the road from Rheims to Laon,
covering the movement with the Russian troops on the heights of
Craonne,
Napoleon pushed out Victor and Ney towards the position of the
Russians, and ineffectually assailed it.
7th March. Napoleon, reinforcing the two Marshals with the
Guard (Marmont still on the left bank,) attacked the Russians, and
after a very severe conflict they were ordered by Bliicher to retire, in
order to concentrate round Laon. The Allied garrison of Soissons
was also withdrawn.
8th March. Napoleon moved across the heights to the SoissonsLaon road, sending Marmont from Berry-au-Bac on the direct road to
Laon.
9th March. Napoleon attacked Bliicher round Laon. * This
town stands on a remarkable hill rising abruptly from the plain to a
height of 100 yards, with steep sides, and having villages, or
faubourgs, around its base. The position is extremely strong for
defense.
Napoleon sought to dislodge his enemy by directing his
attacks on the space between the roads of Soissons and La Fere, while
Marmont threw his right forward on that of Avesnes.
In the night, Blficher, passing corps from right to left behind
Laon, fell upon Marmont, and drove him, with the loss of his artillery,
back through the hills on the Rheims road.
Napoleon re-
10th March.
Blicher's right attacked Napoleon.
After hard
treats beyond
the Aisne.
fighting the French fell back on Soissons, Marmont taking post at

Berry-au-Bac.
Soissons to
Rheims, 31.
12th March. Napoleon at Soissons having heard that the last of

Bliicher's corps from the Rhine (St Priest's) had just arrived at
Rheims, ordered Marmont to leave a force to guard the passage at
Berry-au-Bac, and make a night march With the rest of his corps on
Rheims. Leaving a garrison in Soissons, he also marched thiLher
himself.
13th March. Napoleon and Marmont enveloped St Priest's corps,
took several thousand, and dispersed the rest. Holding Soissons and
According to Jomini, Napoleon had in this battle 35,000 nie
100,000.
Blucher

Berry-au-Bac, he paused at Rheims till the 17th, to rest his troops and
to organize his new levies.
Meanwhile Schwartzenberg, aware of his absence, had on the 27th
February once more advanced driving Oudinot and Macdonald through
Troyes to Nogent, Bray, and Montereau. The Army of Bohemia
followed, and the heads of its columns occupied the opposite bank.
17th March. Napoleon moved towards Schwartzenberg, Ney on
Chalons, main body on Epernay.
Rheims, to
Chalons, 26.
Mortier was left at Rheims.
right wing.
Schwartzenberg
back pushes
the
French right
wing.
Napoleon
joins the
Marmont at Berry-an-Bac.
Schwartzenberg having passed the Seine had advanced to

Provins.
18th March. Napoleon from Epernay by Fere Champenoise.
Schwartzenberg hearing of his presence at Chalons had begun to
retreat.
19th March. Napoleon crossed the Aube, at Plancy, directing
Ney, then on the march from Chalons, on Arcis. He called up
Oudinot and Macdonald by Provins, Villenoxe, Anglure, along the
right bank to Plancy. Thus, as soon as the movements were completed, with his centre and right wing united, he would be ready to
move against Schwartzenberg's rear.
20th March. Napoleon with the cavalry moved up the left bank
to Arcis; and hearing from the cavalry advance guards that the
Allied troops were moving between the Seine and Aube, he called Ney
across, and sent the cavalry against them.
But Schwartzenberg, who had united his army about Troyes, was
moving between the rivers with 90,000 men, and advanced upon
Arcis. Napoleon was forced to fight with very inferior numbers,
held his ground during the day, but fell back next day over the
Battle of
Arcis.
Troyes to
Arcis, 18.
Aube. *
He had long revolved a project for uniting his immediate forces
w'th the garrisons of the frontier forces on the upper Marne, and
pivoted on Metz, descending with a united army of above 100,000, on
Schwartzenberg's rear, and finally uniting with the corps at Lyons for
"~According
to Jomini, Napoleon having been reinforced by 6,000 men under

Lefebvre-Desnouttes on the night of the 20th, and by 12,000 of Macdonald's
men on the morning of the 21st, had somewhat less than 35,000 men.
zenberg had nearly 100,000.
Schwart-
Napoleon's
new plan.
198
a great combined movement to drive the Allies beyond the Rhine.

He had already, while operating on the Aisne, sent orders to the garrison on the Belgian frontier, on the Meuse, in the Ardennes, and in
the east of France, to sally out, unite, and move together upon the
Marne; for he believed the corps left by the Allies to invest these
places were too much weakened by the necessity of recruiting the main
armies to be able to oppose the movement. The moment now seemed .
to have arrived for the execution of this design. He marched on the
21st and 22d March from Arcis to Vitry, turned that place, which
was held by a Prussian garrison, by a ford above it, and assembling
his army there in expectation that Schwartzenberg would hastily
retreat as befotbe, he called Mortier and Marmont towards him. But
those Marshals were no longer in a condition to join him.
Blucher
moves on
the Marne.
Arcis to
Epernay, 40.
Marmont had held the Aisne against Bliicher till the 18th March;
when turned on both flanks he retreated to Fismes, and called Mortier
to him from Rheims, thinking thus still to fulfill the double object of
keeping up relations with Napoleon and covering Paris. Blficher
then moved on Rheims and Epernay to regain his communications
with the Grand Army.
The Marshals then moved to the Marne at Chateau-Thierry.
The Allies
unitebetween
the Aube and
Marne,
and move on
Paris.
Result,
Schwartzenberg crossed the Aube at Arcis after Napoleon; but

he did not continue to retreat. Many circumstances proved that the
political effect of occupying Paris would counterbalance any disasters
that might happen to their line of communication. The Army of
Bohemia, throwing forward its right from Arcis, met the left of
Bliicher extended from the Marne; and the combined armies, leaving
a corps under Wittgenstein to cover their rear from Napoleon, spread
across the space between the rivers and moved onward, crowding the
two Marshals on the capital. A last fight ensued on the slopes around
the city ; and the capitulation of Paris signed on the 30th March.
Napoleon on the Marne, looking on this as a purely military event,
was still resolute to disregard it and to carry out his plan. Moving
to the left bank of the Seine at Fontainebleau, he designed to fall from
thence on the rear of the Allies, and drive them through the capital;
or, failing that, still to fall back behind the Loire and join with Soult,
Suchet, and Augereau; but on the 4th April, Marmont at Essonne,
199
abandoned Napoleon and gave his adhesion to the provisional government; and the exhaustion of the people, the army, and the generals
was too complete to admit of futher effort. The Emperor accordingly
abdicated on the 6th April.
COMMENTS.
Since the main roads to Paris from the east crossed from bank to
bank of the rivers, it was necessary for the invading armies to force
the passages at the points of crossing. Thus we find the defenders
disputing the bridges of Chalons and Trilport on the Marne-of Dolancourt, Dienville, and Lesmont on the Aube-of Troyes, Nogent,
Bray, Montereau, on the Seine. These were certainly known beforehand as points for defense; and the fact that the advance of the
assailants would be there checked for a certain time by an inferior
force must be an important element in forming a plan of campaign.
If Blicher and Schwartzenberg had operated (as up to the beginning
of February they seemed to intend) entirely on one of the great lines,
they would not thereby have deprived Napoleon of the advantages of
the converging rivers. For, had they selected the Aube and Seine for
their line, he would none the less have used the upper Marne at
Chalons and Vitry as a pivot from whence to fall on their conmunithe
cations towards Bar and Chaumont; and had they concentrated on
Marne, he would equally have threatened their rear from the Aube at
Brienne or Arcis, and from the Seine at Nogent; in each case the
river on which he pivoted forming a line of defense in case he should
be defeated, upon which he could retreat, still threatening the enemy's
flank, and from which he could maneuver to cover Paris. Therefore,
as the lesser of two evils, the assailants were obliged to operate by both
lines.
This granted, the general plan of Napoleon is evident : to place a
retarding wing on each river to dispute the known points of passage,
It
and to join his main body to either, according to circumstances.
only remains to ascertain what circumstances should induce him to
join either wing rather than the other, in order to have possession of
the broad grounds on which to estimate the general plan of campaign.
The invading army on each line must adopt one or other of two
courses,-either to march in processional order with the principal mass
of the army on the main road (as the Army of Silesia was moving on
Points of
passage preVknow
Double line
compulsory
on the Allies.
General plan
of the defense.
200
Difference of
advancing
between, or
beyond, the
rivers.
the 10th Feb.), or to send columns along many roads-forming, in

fact, a line of columns (as the Army of Bohemia was moving between
the 14th and 17th Feb., and again in its last advance in March). In
the first case the defender might (as he did) descend from the Seine
perpendicularly on the flank of the column, separate its parts, and
throw them asunder across the river; in the second case, the army
must be either moving astride a river, in which case the part on the
inner bank might be taken in flank and overwhelmed singly,-or it
might be entirely beyond the river. In this last case its flank would be
defended by the river, the bridges on which it would, of course, hold
or destroy.
Thus, Blucher having pushed the Marshals on to the Ourcq, had
assembled his army on the right bank of the Marne, guarding the
bridge of Trilport, and having broken that of La Fert6; the river consequently protected his flank from Napoleon advancing from Sezanne.
And again in March, when Napoleon was at Rheims, Schwartzenberg,
while attempting to pass at Nogent and Bray, held the bridges of the
Aube up to Arcis, thereby protecting his flank.
Of all the various ways of operating for the defense, that of
attacking the flank of the enemy's column is most effective, because,
by separating and ruining his army, it reduces the odds in material
force against the defender, besides recovering ground for him in the
theater; whereas, in the most successful move against the communications, though the assailants may be recalled from their forward
positions, yet they may combine in superior numbers for battle, or, if
the defender evades them, may renew their advance with undiminished
forces. The defensive army being, then, divided into two wings, whose
General principles for the

defence,
business it will be to retard the enemy on either line, and a main body,
this central force will cooperate with one or the other wing generally,
according to the following rules:1st, Whenever possible, the main body should attack the flank of
an enemy moving between the rivers, for which purpose it will pivot on
a portion of one river held by one wing. In this case the main body
cannot combine directly with the other defensive wing, which will be
occupied in stemming the enemy's advance-like Mortier at Troyes,
when Napoleon aimed at Bliicher's flank at Brienne, and like Macdonald at Meaux, when Napoleon made his attack on Bliicher's flank
at Champaubert.

2d, To join the main body to a containing wing in order to oppose
in front an enemy advancing to force a river, who does not, in doing
so, expose a flank. Should the enemy seek to turn the defender by
advancing on both banks, the latter will have the opportunity of
falling on a separate wing-always preferring to attack that which
most directly covers the enemy's communications. Therefore,
To operate thus from side to side at need, the main body must
have free and direct communications between the rivers; and in this
campaign the transverse roads Joinville-Brienne, St Dizier-Brienne,
Vitry-Brienne, Chalons-Arcis, Epernay-Nogen t, Meaux-Melun, become
of the highest importance-indeed, nothing can be effected without them.
In order to render the defense complete there should be direct
communication with the objective along the outer bank of each river.
In this the Marne was defective. For instance, had Napoleon been
defeated in his first attack on Blicher at Brienne he must have
retreated behind the Marne at Vitry and Chalons. But the only
directroad from Chalons to Paris is on the left bank. Thus, to recover
communications with Paris he must make the circuit by Rheims and
Fismes, and the victorious enemy guarding the successive bridges of
Chataeu-Thierry, La Ferte, and Meaux, might reach the capital;
whereas Arcis, Brienne, or Troyes formed better pivots, since, forced
to retire over the river at either, he would still have direct communications with Paris.
From the previous deductions it follows that1st, To make a circuit in order to join a wing and confront an
enemy who, moving between the rivers, exposes a flank; or,
2d, To move against the flank of an enemy operating beyond the
river, and covered by it; or,
3d, To stand to receive battle beyond a river, unless in an exceptionally favorable position; or,
4th, To cross a river to attack in front a superior enemy,Are all violations of the principles on which the defense should be
conducted, sacrificing the advantages of the situation.
Judged by these rules, the campaign of Napoleon, while it shows
how thoroughly he appreciated the situation, nevertheless displays
many errors, the results either of over-confidence or of political
exigencies.
exigencies.
Necessity of
transverse
communications.
Courses improper for the

defensive
army.
Napoleon's
campaign
estimated by
these rules.
202.
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONRS
His march from St. Dizier on Brienne, his defense of Troyes

againstSchwartzenherg, his march to Champaubert, his descent on the
rear of the Army of Bohemia from Chalons, and finally from Vitry,
are all illustrations of the way in which rivers like these may be turned
to account.
The battle of La RothiBre, where Napoleon stood with inferior
forces to fight on the wrong side of the river would have been a terrible
error had it been avoidable; but, as the circumstances really were, it
can be characterized only as a misfortune for the Emperor. It was
necessary to unite with Mortier, so as to cover the road to Paris; and
as the bridge at Lesmont had been destroyed, it was necessary to hold
Brienne for twenty-four hours, pending its rebuilding. It was necessary to gain a day, to march to Troyes, and unite with Mortier and
Macdonald. The battle of Arcis, where the emperor gave battle in a
similar position, was a serious error on his part, for which an excuse
cannot be easily found. With a more vigorous foe, the French disasters in these battles might have been rendered fatal. The battles of
Craonne and Laon were serious errors, into which it is probable that
Napoleon was led by his exasperation towards Bliicher; and his desire
to strike a blow at "the old dragoon" for once got the better of his
judgment. All he gained to compensate the losses at Craonne was the
abandonment of Soissons; by the enemy, which would have been
effected with. equal certainty by an advance on the Laon road from
Berry-au-Bac, threatening the enemy's communications.
Soissons
occupied by a French garrison, and that road to Paris from the Aisne
secured, the former system of defense should have been reverted to.
The Marshals should have been left to oppose Bluicher on the Aisne
and afterwards on the Marne, while Napoleon, with his main force
undiminished by the losses of these severe battles,' descended on
Schwartzenberg. Blacher behind the Aisnee; the Marshals on its left
bank communicating with the Emperor by Rheirms; Napoleon with
the main body at Chalons and Epernay; Schwartzefiberg between
Provins and Troyes, retarded by Macdonald and Oudinot: here would
have been a situation as promising as any that could exist in the
theater; and it was one that did exist on the 17th March, and might
have existed without fighting the costly battles beyond the Aisne.
Nor did he turn the situation to full account. It was pointed out
in a former page that, in aiming at an enemy's communications, the
203
stroke should be dealt so far to the rear that the enemy will not be
able to evade it. Moving on Plancy, he found the army of Bohemia
beyond his reach. The battle of Arcis was completely injudicious and
useless.
When at Montmirail, after the several defeats of Bliicher, he had
the option of falling on the flank of Schwartzenberg on the inner bank
of the Seine, at Mormant and Nangis, by Sezanne. He sacrificed the
advantage of the situation in making the circuit by Meaux to Guignes,
which brought him on the enemy's front; but in this case the movement was really one of necessity. Marmont and Mortier were needed
to observe Biicher; and this left only Ney's corps with the Emperor.
A junction of all his available forces was necessary in order that he
might oppose Schwartzenberg successfully. This junction could be
effected only by opposing the enemy in front. Moreover, Paris was
in wild alarm, the Emperor received urgent appeals from the capital
for assistance; and as a matter of political necessity he was forced to
draw near that city.
The peril incurred by an assailant in attempting a turning movement on one bank of a river while operating with the rest of the army
on the other, is illustrated by the position of Colloredo's corps at Fontainebleau, which would have been irremediably separated from the
others had the bridge of Montereau not been defended by the Allies
against more than one attack.
It appears to have been a mistake to send a force in pursuit of
Sacken and York beyond the Marne at Chateau-Thierry. For not
only did the pursuing troops not intercept the retreat, or prevent the
reunion of Blicher's corps, but they were unable to perform their
proper function of assisting to contain the Army of Silesia on the
Marne ; and it marched unopposed from Chalons to menace Napoleon's
flank at Mery. That offensive movement of Bliicher, so soon after his
heavy defeats, was the most vigorous act performed by the Allies
throughout the campaign.
Turned to full account, the defender in a campaign like this has
not only the usual advantage of a combined against a double line of
operation, but also the power of dealing his blows in the most decisive
direction. In attacking Blicher from Nogent throngh Sezanne and
Champaubert, Napoleon combined the advantages of causing him to
204
Maneuvering
powers of the
defensive
army.
Advantages
for the defense conferred by the
rivers.
Effect of a
third convergent
stream.
form front to a flank, and of breaking his front, thereby gaining

every point that was possible in favor of the inferior army. And the
diversity of fronts he could operate on is exemplified in the different.
engagements. At Brienne he fought with his right flank towards
Paris, his back to Vitry and St Dizier. At La Rothiere and Troyes
he covered the direct road to the capital. At Champaubert he had
his left flank to Paris, his back to Lezanne and Nogent. At Montmirail he had turned half round towards Paris, still pivoted on Sezanne
and Nogent. At Vauchamps his front was exactly reversed. And
all the time the Allies were bound immovably, each to the line by
which he had advanced.
Manifestly, then, the situation gives the defender greater advantages than any other that has yet been discussed. If the ordinary
case of the single against the double line renders 80,000 a match for
100,000 (see page 120), this present case renders a superiority of more
than five to four necessary in order to enable the assailant to prevail.
In fact, remembering that whether he forces a passage or exposes a
flank to attack he suffers in proportion, while the containing wing
of the defender, strong in position and difficult to turn, suffers less
than usual loss in retiring before superior forces, it is evident that,
even with such odds at starting, he may, on advancing half-way to his
object, find his numbers reduced to an equality with those of his
adversary, when success should be impossible. And it is easy to conceive that two allied armies might each be nearly equal to the whole
force of the defenders, and yet, operating by independent lines, be
defeated and foiled.
The effects of a third convergent stream, like the Aube, tributary to
either of the others, and between them, and which is traversed by the
line of operation, are-to multiply the known points of attack-to
cause the assailant to disperse still more-and to oblige him(on whichever side of this intermediate stream he may operate) to expose a flank
to the enemy on one of the other rivers. Thus, when the assailant's
columns crossing the central river are divided by it, they are exposed
to be attacked piecemeal and in flank. " The intermediate line of the
Aube," said Napoleon, discussing the campaign, " materially increases
the difficulties of the invaders, while it strengthens the defenders'
means of resistance; for the enemy's forces divided between the rivers,
205
sometimes from necessity and sometimes from choice, would present

many opportunities of being attacked with advantage."
When, as in this theatre, a number of rivers converge like radii
towards the objective, the assailant's policy evidently is to include as
few of them as possible in his front of operations. Directly Schwartzenberg passes the Seine at Troyes, the Yonne, hitherto useless, is
brought into the system of defense: and he is forced, as we have
seen, for the guarding of his flanks, to disperse his forces so widely as
to render them ineffective either for attack or defense against a concentrated enemy.
So various are the lessons conveyed -by this campaign, that the
reader who has mastered it must be competent to investigate almost
any problem which strategy can offer. And he will doubtless be somewhat surprised to find how great is the importance of obstacles of the
kind discussed in this chapter, for their influence is by no means
obvious at first view.
This is a case where to assume the initiative, often so necessary
and successful, is not an advantage-since it is the army which
advances that offers opportunities to its adversary.
Railways, which the retreating army would destroy, while it
covered its own lines to the capital and the transverse lines connecting
them, would, in conjunction with telegraphs, greatly increase the
advantages of the defense by augmenting the power of rapidly throwing the main body towards either wing.
Campaign of Metz and Sedan.

The portion of the frontier which divided Germany from France
at the commencement of hostilities was about 220 miles long, from the
neutral Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in the north to the neutral Swiss
frontier at Basle in the south. Of this, about 55 miles were FrancoPrussian-from Sierck to Saargemund; 60 miles were Franco-Bavarian,
from there to the Rhine; and the remaining 105 to Basle were Rhine
frontier between France and Baden. The French territory projected
eastwards into Germany, forming an angle with an eastern and a
northern face of almost equal length, the salient being at Lauterbourg
on the Rhine. Within the space thus defined most of the French
forces were posted at the beginning of hostilities, and if the triangular
space be enlarged westward to include the valleys of the Moselle and
Meuse, it will cover all the ground in which the French Empire made
its last struggles. It has been a favorite battle-ground from the
earliest history.
On the northern face of the angular frontier the conditions were
not favorable to a rapid concentration of the German forces. Between
the frontier and the Rhine several ranges of mountains would isolate
the columns, make roads scarce, and in every way hinder the advance
of great armies. The line was marked by no natural obstacle and
could easily be crossed by whichever side should take the initiative.
On the eastern face, however, France was well protected by the
double line of the Rhine and the Vosges Mountains, supported by a
number of powerful fortresses.
CAMPAIGN OF METZ AND SEDAN.
207
The French plan of campaign counted on gaining much by

promptness and sudden action. Realizing the greater numbers of the
enemy, but not their superior readiness, it was proposed to cross the
Rhine frontier near the salient point, thus interposing between the
states of south and north Germany. In this way it was calculated
that Prussia could be isolated and that a number of the states, which
had been opposed in arms to her only four years before, would be easily
bound to neutrality, and perhaps that Austria and Italy might be
gained to the cause, With this view it was intended to assemble
150,000 troops about Metz, 100,000 about Strasbourg, and 50,000 at
Chalons. The enemy being by these dispositions kept in doubt of the
intended point of attack, the Metz and Strasbourg armies were to
unite rapidly for the passage of the Rhine, while the Chalons army
was to advance eastward for the protection of Lorraine.
The detailed scheme for the concentration of all the German
forces in the event of war with France was prepared by Count von
Moltke, the Chief of the German Staff, more than a year before. In
that plan it was resolved to seek out the enemy's main force and
to attack it and to press it as persistently as possible away from
the road to Paris and toward the Belgian frontier.
The northern face of the angular frontier was selected as proper
ground for the concentration of all the forces of Germany. In this
position they would be ready to assume the offensive at pleasure on
either bank of the Upper Rhine against the flank of the enemy's line
of invasion, and would soon compel him to halt or retire. Such a
scheme required that the southern states should be stripped of troops
in order to array themselves with the north German forces, but it was
freely done. The first concentrations also took place at from five to
seven marches from the frontier, on the Rhine, in order that the
organizations might be perfected and all equipment provided, to make
them ready to meet the enemy at any moment.
The railway system of France did not lend itself to a rapid concentration of her forces, having only four lines, one not finished,
leading to the threatened frontier. On the other hand, nine lines
were available for the use of the German armies.
The French army at the beginning of the war was somewhat in
the condition of a delicate time-piece, each part of which was kept in
208
STRATEGICAL O PERATIONS.
a different shop and never iput together to find if it would really work
when needed.
The system of centralization and responsibility in vogue required
that the smallest details should emanate from Paris. The organization
of the higher units had to be made, the staffs organized. The war
material was held in immense central store-houses, and consequently
was not-available for instant use. The corps headquarters were
rushed to the frontier and the troops joined by driblets from all over
the country.
The result was to tax the ability of the ablest and best men. The
roads most in use were hopelessly blocked, while others more remote
could not do their share of the work. The army that was finally collected could not fail to be affected by these unfavorable conditions. It
is probable that its supply was so badly provided, its comfort and
orderly preparation so clumsily arranged, and its spirit so broken by
aimless marching and contradictory orders, that it was almost beaten
before it fought. It did some good fighting on the defensive but was
quite helpless in maneuvering.
On the contrary, the German machine was in thorough order, each
part worked smoothly and fitted exactly in its place. The corps were
assembled by a system exactly the opposite to that of the French.
Each was mobilized and equipped in its home district. In eight days
after the order was given they were ready to begin the transport by
rail for concentration at the threatened point. In eight days more 13
corps, aggregating 450,000 men, with 1240 guns, complete to the
second line of trains, were waiting for the word of the King of Prussia,
on a front of about 90 miles from Treves to Germersheim.
The French had eight army corps, about 240,000 men and 1000
guns, in the angular front of 220 miles in length. The German reserves were near at hand, those of the French were widely scattered.
The French forces were assembled as follows:I. Corps, M'Mahon,
II.
"
Frossard,
Bazaine,
"
III.
"
Ladmirault,
IV.
De Failly,
V.
"
Canrobert,
VI.
"
Douay,
VII. "
Guard, Bourbaki,
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
Strasbourg.
S. Avold.
Metz.
Thionville.
Bitsche.
Chalons.
Belfort.
Nancy.
CAMPAIGN OF METZ AND SEDAN
209
August 1st to 3d. The German forces in three armies were assembled and marched as follows:First Army under- General Steinmetz, consisting of the I
VII., and VIII. Corps, assembled on the Rhine and moved from Coblentz and Cologne towards the Saar by way of Treves. It contained
75,000 infantry, 9,600 cavalry, and 268 guns.
The Second Army under Prince Frederick Charles, consisting of
the II., III., IV., IX., X., XII. Corps and the Guard Corps, assembled
in the Palatinate and moved toward the frontier by the line of Kaiserslauteru. It contained 181,000 infantry, 23,400 cavalry, and 630 guns.
The Third Army under the Crown Prince of Prussia, consisted
of the V., VI., and XI. Corps, the I. and II. Bavarian Corps, and the
Divisions of Baden and Wnrtemberg. It crossed the Rhine from
Mayence to Germersheim and moved toward the Lauter by Neustadt
and Landau. The Third Army numbered 152,000 infantry, 19,900
cavalry, and 576 guns.
French movements:Left. The Guard was brought to Metz from Nancy.
On the 2d, Frossard's corps marched from St. Avold to Saarbriliken, whence it drove a Prussian outpost. The town and environs
were occupied as advanced posts, and the main body of the corps took
position on the heights of Spicheren west of the town.
Bazaine's corps had moved eastward from Metz to about Boulay,
and Ladmirault's from Thionville towards Bouzonville.
Center. De Failly's main body was in and about Saarguemines,
with a division at Bitsche.
The
Right. M'Mahon moved a division from Hagenau to Weissembourg; one was already near Worth : and the remaining two divisions
of his corps were brought from Strasbourg by rail to join the other at
Worth for the defense of the Vosges.
Saarlouis to
Germersheim
70.
Bitsche to
Wtrth, 18.
4th August. The corps of Ladmirault and Bazaine were spread by

divisions along the frontier from the Saarlouis-Metz road to Saarguemines, extending about 35 miles.
The heads of the columns of the Third Army concentrated in an
attack on Weissembourg, and drove out the French division, which
retreated towards Worth. About 20,000 Germans overwhelmed 8,000
French.
Wissembourg
to Worth, 13.
210
French right
concentrates
for defense,
5th August. M'Mahon took position for battle at Wirth. He

covered there the railway from Bitsche to Strasbourg, and held the
defile by which the enemy might turn the French strategical line, and
strike at the Paris-Strasbourg railway.
A division of the 7th Corps from Belfort reached Hagenau by rail,
and marched to join M'Mahon.
De Failly's corps was placed, by a telegraphic despatch from the
Emperor, at M'Mahon's disposal, and he summoned it to join him in
the position he had taken.
The Third Army was approaching the Sauer; its advance guards
were on the east bank of that stream.
6th August. De Failly failed to reinforce M'Mahon, except by
the late despatch of one division, which reached him only in time to
cover the retreat.
German left
defeats
French right.
Worth to
Saverne, 27.
German right
defeats
French center.
S. Avoid to
Spicheren,
15.
Saverne to
Chalons, 175.
The Third Army (except the VI. Corps and Prussian Reserve
cavalry) attacked and defeated M'Mahon. The French right, separated from the center by the course of the action, fled through Hagenau,
and in part reached Strasbourg. The center and left, through Niederbronn and Ingweiler, reached Saverne in great disorder. The
Germans, misled by the line taken by De Failly's division, which
retired towards Bitsche, did not immediately pursue M'Mahon in force.
Accounts of this battle credit the Germans with from two to three
and four times the force of the French. The Germans were not well
informed of the position and force of the French and were not expecting a battle, or the disaster to the latter might have been much greater.
Frossard, at Spicheren, was attacked by the leading divisions of
the First Army, supported by part of the III. Corps. Defeated, his
corps was, by the direction of the attack, forced to retire toward
Saarguemines.
Bazaine's division at Saarguemines was withdrawn to join another

at Puttelange.
The Guard was at Courcelles.
French movements :7th to 13th August. M'Mahon retreated by Saverne, Saarbourg,
Luneville, Neufchateau, making for Chalons.
By the actions of the 6th, De Failly found a victorious enemy on
each flank and retreated by La Petite Pierre, following M'Mahon at
two marches in rear.
CAMPAIGN OP MtTZ AND SEDAN.
211
The corps of Bazaine, Ladmirault, Frossard, and the Guard, with

part of Canrobert's corps from Chalons and Paris, and one of De
Failly's brigades which followed Bazaine from Saarguemines, assembled
before Metz, numbering 122,000 infantry, 13,000 cavalry, and 540
guns. Bazaine took command of this army, which on the 12th was in
position before the eastern forts of Metz. His instructions were to
withdraw to the left bank for a retreat upon Verdun.
German movements:
The First Army was advancing towards Metz, its leading divisions
on the Nied.
The Second Army moved towards Pont--Mousson.
Its cavalry had seized the passages of the Moselle between Metz
and Frouard. Headquarters were established at Pont--Mousson.
Metz to the
frontier, 35.
Metz to Ponta-Mousson,
19.
The Third Army moved by Saverne upon Nancy, detaching the

Baden division to besiege Strasbourg, and small bodies to attack
Bitsche, Lichtenberg, La Petite Pierre, and Phalsbourg.
14th August. The withdrawal of the French army to the western
bank was already in progress, only a division of the 3d corps remaining
in position, when the advanced brigades-of the First Army, supported
by the nearest troops of the Second Army, attacked. The-4th Corps,
then partly across the Moselle, was recalled to meet the enemy; and
at the close of the action the 3d and 4th Corps remained between the
eastern forts of Metz.
A division of Prussian cavalry was at Thiaucourt--the advanced
guard of the X. Corps was between Thiaucourt and Pout--Mousson.
X. Corps at Pont-a-Mousson.
XII.
on the road to Pont-a-Mousson.

IX.-Buchy.
I.-behind the IX.
G ard.-Dieulouard.
IV.-Marbach, connecting the 2d with the 3d Army.
Main body of the Third Army was approaching Nancy. The

advance guard of the IV. Corps summoned Toul.
15th August. The French army resumed the march on Verdun,
which had been interrupted by the German attack.
The 2d Corps was to march by Rezonville and Mars-la-Tour, folowed by the 6th, the Guard, and the Reserve Artillery.
Battle of Colombey-Nouilly or Borny.
Pont-a-Mousson to Thiaucourt, 13.

Pont-a-Mousson to Noveant, 10.
Bouchy to
Pont-a-Mousson, 13.
Pont-a-Mousson to Tonl,
20.
Metz to Verdun, 40.
Metz to Marsla-Tour, 16.
STRATEG'I4CAL OPERATIONS.
212
The 3d and 4th Corps were to move by Jarny and Etain.

A division of reserve Cavalry accompanied each column.
The Corps of the first column arrived near the destined points;
but the 3d Corps only reached the plateau late at night-the 4th had
crossed the Moselle.
The I. Corps remained before Metz.
VII. and VIII. moved to take tp the line from Arry to Pommerieux, to cover the passage of the Moselle by the Second Army.
IX. and II. at first remained in position for the same purpose.
The remaining corps continued their march to the Moselle. The
X. Corps continued the passage, and pushed its advance
guard to
Thr remaining Cavalry Division and the III. Corps
Thiaucourt.
crossed by bridges thrown at Champey and Noveant, its artillery at

Pont--Mousson, and during the night reached Gorze and Onville.
The advance cavalry had continued to precede the movement
towards the Metz-Verdun road.
Corps was directed to follow the III. and the XII. to
The IX.
follow the X.
Noveant to
Vionville, 7.
16th. The III. Corps, supported by 2 battalions, 2 squadrons, and

1 light batter~y of the X. Corps, and 2 cavalry divisions, attacked the
army of Bazaine retreating from Metz. About 11 a. m. a brigade of the
X. Corps arrived and the remainder before 4 p. in. About 6 p. m. reinforcements arrived from the VIII. and later from the IX.
The French
Battle of
Vionville-
faced to the south along the Metz-Verdun road between Gravelotte

and Mars-la-Tour and in the course of the battle their center and right
Mars-ia-Tour
were driven off the road.
17th.
Corny.
Three additional bridges were thrown over the Moselle at
The VII. Corps crossed by them, and, resting its right on the
Moselle, extended its outposts thence to Gravelotte.
The VIII. Corps
at Gorze observed the space from Gravelotte to Vionville.
The IX.
Corps took post south of the road from Gorze to Vionville. The XII.
Corps and the Guard marched on Marsha-Tour. The III. and X
Corps were between Vionville and Tronville.
The IV. Corps moved on Toul. The I. remained as before. II
to Pont-a-Mousson.
The French army swung back on its left, and took position from
Jussy to Roncourt, facing nearly west.
213
18th. The five corps of the Second Army and the VIII., all pivoting on the VII. (next the Moselle), advancing in echelon to the road
from Gravelotte to Jarny. The French position being ascertained,
the Second Army changed direction, advancing on the front from Malmaison to St Marie-aux-Chenes, the II. Corps moving from Pont-aMousson to support the right wing. Successively arriving opposite
the French position they engaged throughout the front. A brigade
of the I. Corps took part in the action from the heights on the east
bank opposite Vaux.
The French army, outnumbered by more than two to one in
men, and a great preponderance of artillery, and turned on its right,
retreated at nightfall, when the long and severe battle of Gravelotte
ended, within the forts of Metz.
German movements:19th to 25th of August. Seven corps formed the investment of
Metz.
The remaining three were formed into a Fourth Army under the
Crown Prince of Saxony, which moved westward from the Moselle on
a front from Metz to Commercy, and made an unsuccessful attack on
Verdun with the corps on its right, which, leaving a brigade to watch
the place, passed the Meuse above and below it. The positions of the
Army on the 25th were these:-XII. Corps-Dombasle and Lenpire.
Gu ard-Triaucou rt.
IV. Corps-La Heycourt.
Headquarters-Fleury.
The Third Army continued its march toward Chalons, and on
the 25th took Vitry with its advanced cavalry, its halting places on
that day being as follows:I. Bavarian-S. Mard.
II. Bavarian-Charmont.
V. Corps and Wurtem- Heiltz.
berg DivisionXI. Corps-Heiltz-1'Ev~que.
VI. Corps-Eclaron.
Headqu arters-iRevigny.
French movements:M'Mahon had united in the camp of Chalons the 1st Corps from
Worth, De Failly's from Bitsche, Douay's from Belfort, and the
214
Camp of Chalons by
Rheims to
Rethel, 40.
Vitry to
Suippe, 30.
Clermont to
Buzancy, 24.
Rethel to
Mouzon, 35.
newly formed 12th Corps, with two divisions of Reserve Cavalry

numbering in all about 120,000 infantry and cavalry.
Considering the position of Chalons untenable, he moved on the
21st to Rheims; and thence, urged by orders from Paris to attempt
the relief of Bazaine, to Rethel, where he halted on the 25th.
26th to 28th of August. The German leaders became aware on
the 25th of the direction of M'Mahon's march. The Third and
Fourth Armies then heading west, in an echelon left in front as just
described, thereupon wheeled to the right,-the Third, which became
the rear of the new echelon, by S. Menehould and Suippe-the
Fourth upon Dun, Buzancy, and Vouziers; the general design being
that the Fourth Army should stop M'Mahon's march eastward, by
holding the Meuse against him, while the Third Army intercepted his
retreat on Vouziers.
M'Mahon had marched from Rethel by Le Chine to Stonne.
29th August. M'Mahon moved to Raucourt, and the passage of
the Meuse was begun at Mouzon.
30th August. The Fourth Army drove the 5th French Corps
through Beaumont on Mouzon. The 7th French Corps retired before
the Third Army, which extended from Raucourt to Villemontry.
Under the irresistible pressure of the German forces, the movement
toward Bazaine was of necessity abandoned, and the whole army
retired in disorder down the Meuse. The 1st and 5th Corps reached
Sedan.
31st August. The remaining French corps retired on Sedan.
The Fourth Army was at Mouzon, Mairy, Carignan.
The Third extended from Remilly to the Meuse west of Donchery, where a division crossed.
1st September. The Fourth Army advanced toward Sedan on
the east bank of the Meuse. Of the Third Army, the two Bavarian
corps advanced on both banks on the left of the Fourth Army. The
Wurtemberg division was at Donchery, and the V. and XI. Corps,
crossing there, and approaching the. right of the Fourth Army, completed the circle around Sedan. The battle that ensued ended in the
surrender of the enclosed French army.
COMM ENTS.
In making a strategic plan it is of first importance to find out
if its execution is possible. This is what the French Emperor failed
u,
,,rR,,,S1
MAP 16
UXI2TZ
Mil
Od'
7
ETY
S1)a1- 1870.
" 1'w,.l.
onth.11
1O
8 , t7
n l Zu
r
\ \
'
\
)ktzt
_'
u t trs
Iriauw113
C\
'l~nu.
CPZI1NAY
R."wn,....t\o
rnlsn,~tn.
LaThi
n~ -i1r.\"T~f"."D't
aV
"
lAS
1u,;,,,rC
u.,,
JUL 31, 1906

~COLLL
215
to do. His plan required superior quickness; it required not only

that a great army should assemble in a few days but that it should be
provided with everything necessary to make war. It should be maneuvered with great skill and show powers of marching not justified
by any of its recent history.
It may be briefly stated that the French army failed because it
was not ready for war. Where the unreadiness was so general it is
hard to notice one point as more fatal than another, but among many
conspicuous defects the most prominent seems to have been faulty
mobilization--regiments not being stationed in the localities from
which they were recruited and supplied. The completeness of the
French defeat was greatly aggravated by the unwise disposition of
their forces in the first instance, whereby they were placed in exposed
and isolated positions, to be beaten in detail. The best course was to
make a great effort to hold the line of the Moselle, where many railroads could be used and an efficient army might have been assembled in
time to resist the Germans, but if the scheme ever occurred to the
French leaders it is probable that political reasons made it impossible.
Von der Goltz directs attention to the excellent defense that
Bazaine's army could have made behind the Moselle, from Pont-aMousson to Ars, with the fortress of Metz as a strong point of support in advance of his left flank.
Hamley makes suggestions, based upon an assumption that the
French army had a mobility that it never showed, to traverse the communications of the Germans on the right bank of the Moselle. An
army which consumed sixty hours in retreating through Metz would
surely have been headed off by a more lively foe. But what was
not practicable for that army might perhaps have been easily
accomplished by the 13,000 cavalry. It would have been worth a
trial and no fate could have been worse than what subsequently befell
them in Metz. The damage that they could have done to the German
communications can be well imagined. But it must be remembered
that European cavalry of that day had not learned to consider itself
as an independent arm. They had no defensive power, relied unduly
upon the horse batteries for protection, and supposed that infantry
support was necessary.
216
Colonel LeComte shows the advantages that would have followed

if the corps of Frossard, which was in camp at Chalons on the declaration of war, had been transported at once to the frontier for a raid into
German territory. Such a plan would have caused much disturbance
of German mobilization but would have produced no more than a'
temporary result.
No different result from what occurred seems to have been possible
under the circumstances. It may be presumed that a prompt march
of DeFailly's corps to WSrth would have made the French defeat less
disastrous there. A concentration of 100,000 men at Spicheren instead
of 25,000, would have rudely shaken the self-confidence of a couple of
Prussian generals. An energetic offensive at Vionville might have
knocked to pieces the III. Prussian Corps, but all these things would
have only served to postpone the final result. It cannot be supposed
that troops which marched and maneuvered so clumsily and ponderously as did those of Bazaine and M'Mahon could have gained more
than a temporary benefit from any tactical advantage in the field.
The attempt of an army of 200,000 men to retreat by two roads while
the enemy was advancing by a dozen, came to its logical conclusion.
Bazaine has been criticised, probably unjustly, for persistently holding
on to Metz, but he seems to have merely realized that he could not
handle that force in the open field. It is therefore useless to speculate
upon what Bazaine could have done towards " cutting his way out "
after the investment of Metz, in view of what his army, under more
favorable circumstances, could not do, on the 14, 15, and 16th of
August.
The campaign furnishes many examples of that " Fog of War"
which a recent writer describes as a state of ignorance in which most
military operations are conducted. In this case, much is excusable
and easy to comprehend, but it is not always so. Thus, the French
At
were surprised at Wissemburg, at Beaumont, and at Vionville.
W6rth and Sedan they had no idea of the forces opposed to them.
The Germans had no idea of fighting
Prince ordered the troops to break off the
conception of the situation after the battle
defeated force. At Vionville, expecting
at Worth and the Crown

action; under a total misthey lost all trace of the
to attack a rear guard, they
217
ran into the entire French army. At St. Privat while endeavoring
to outflank the enemy, they had no idea of the extent of the line they
were to assail. M'Mahon's army had been marching for four days
to the north before the Crown Prince discovered that they had left
his front and that they were on his flank.
Although the disparity of force detracts largely from the value of
this as a strategical study, there are many points which establish the
claim of the Prussian chief of staff to an eminent rank among generals
and his troops to a high place among soldiers. The plan proposed by
Moltke in the winter of 1868-69 unfolded itself in 1870 with almost
mathematical accuracy and, to-day, reads like prophecy. In the
advance on Chalons, when he discovered M'Mahon on his flank, he
wheeled his army of 200,000 men to the right without confusion or
delay, and in four days he was able to concentrate at a point 48 miles
from where his left wing previously stood. The order for this movement occupies but eighteen lines of the official account. In every way
his movements were on a larger scale and brought about greater results
than ever before in history. The troops themselves were conscripts,
trained on the short service plan in time of peace, yet in one month
after the declaration of war they were standing up under enormous
losses and were making marches that have rarely been surpassed.

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OPERATIONS,

Great_ Campaigns in Europe and America.

PR.FPARED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART

THis book is not presented to the public as a treatise on strategy,

of War" relating to the subject of Strategy.

Some of the descriptions

Campaign of Moreau, 1800.

Campaign of Ulm, 1805.

Campaign of 1796, in Italy,

Campaign of Eckmiihl, 1809.

Campaign in Virginia, 1862.

Bull Run Campaign, 1861.

Passage of the Danube, 1809.

Passage of the Danube, 1877.

Passage of Gave de Pau, 1814.

Passage of the Ticino, 1859.

Passage of Bull Run,

Metz and Sedan,

Passage of the Rapidan and Rappahannock,

Campaign of Novara, 1849.

Cerano and Casalnuovo.

Romentino and Galliate.

STRATEGICAL OPE RATIONS.

The point to which all the operations of the Sardinians must

The fifth division could communicate either with Mortara through

produce of the surrounding district; that there were more permanent

THE NOVARA CAMPAIGN.

Reserve opposite Pavia, with a brigade at Pavia on the left bank in

THE NOVARA CAMPAIGN.

through Mortara on Trumello.

The 2d division from Cerano, which was nearest to Vigevano,

In executing these movements, the head of the Austrian 2d corps,

22d.--Sardinians concentrating on Novara.

23rd.-The Sardinian wings had met and taken position outside

Novara in the angle between the Trecate and Vercelli roads.

The Austrian 2d corps attacked on arriving near the enemy.

THE NOVARA CAMPAIGN.

The following points are to be specially noted with reference to

THE NOVARA CAMPAIGN.

THE NOVARA CAMPAIGN.

CAMPAIGN OF .1849 AND 1859

The Trabancos to the

It was not Marmont's design to bring matters to such a desperate

THE SALAMANCA CAMPAIGN.

It sometimes happens that both opposing armies form front to

about to enter the lists, single-handed, with the experienced leaders,

THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

Indeed, if Saxony were left defenceless it was possible that

she might save herself by submitting to conditions, one of which

Hohenlohe's main body was

THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

Hohenlohe, still imagining on the night of the 13th that he was

Napoleon's three columns marched with great rapidity to the Saal.

THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

the enemy will abandon his own designs, in order, if possible, to

THE JENA CAMPAIGN.

Why Hohenlohe occupied

Special reference of the

space. Napoleon had massed his troops in his preliminary dispositions

Campaign of Moreau, 18oo.

In former years the base of the Republican armies operating in

The left wing, General Ste Suzanne, 19,000, occupied Strasbourg