CASES-PERSONS

Art. 2 NCC- Date of Effectivity

Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA
446 (December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for
the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no
legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required
before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is
to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be
published in the Official Gazette. The word shall therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule
of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first
be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which
have not been published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated
on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of
general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that
the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must
be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called
upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if
it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs

Torres Case Digest

persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of

1987.)

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.

petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the
Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO,
as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making

requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book,
each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date
of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law,
or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public
health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency
shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules
known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
Prohibition granted.

[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]

FACTS:
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No.
16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by
private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going
to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order DOLE,
through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong
Kong bound workers.
The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private
employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and
authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining
overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a
petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to
prohibit implementation.

Tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank of the Phils. (G.R. No.
L-46158, Nov. 28, 1986)
FACTS:

HELD:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and
did not commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article
36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and
regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit:
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have
the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and
placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this
title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is
hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the
provisions of this title.
SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is
necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and
unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and
filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as
required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is
otherwise provided;

Tayug Rural is a bank in Pangasinan which took out 13 loans

from Central Bank in 1962 and 1963, all covered by promissory
notes, amounting to 813k. In late 1964, Central Bank released a
circular; Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 thru the Director of
Loans and Credit. This circular all informed all rural banks that
an additional 10% per annum penalty interest would be
assessed on all past due loans beginning 1965. This was
enforced beginning July 1965.
In 1969, the outstanding balance of Tayug was at 444k. Tayug
Rural filed a case in CFI Manila to recover the 10% penalty it
paid up to 1968, amounting to about 16k, and to restrain Central
bank from further imposing the penalty. Central Bank filed a
counterclaim for the outstanding balance including the 10%
penalty, stating that it was legally imposed under the Rules and
Regulations Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the
Monetary Board on 1958, under RA 720. Tayugs defense was
that the counterclaim should be dismissed since the unpaid
obligation of Tayug was due to Central Banks flexible and
double standard policy of its rediscounting privileges to Tayug
Rural and its subsequent arbitrary and illegal imposition of the
10% penalty. Tayug Rural contends that no such 10% penalty
starting from 1965 was included in the promissory notes
covering the loans.A judgment was rendered by CFI Manila in
favor of Central Bank ordering Tayug Rural Bank to pay10%
penalty in the amount of around 19k pesos for loans up to July
1969, and to pay nothing for the next remaining loans.
Tayugs claim in the case was however successful, and so Tayug
was also ordered to pay 444k, with interest to the Central Bank
for the overdue accounts with respect to the promissory notes.
Central Bank appealed to the CA, but also lost on the ground
that only a legal question had been raised in the pleadings. The
case was then raised to the SC, with each party arguing in the
following manner: CFI rules that the circulars retroactive effect
on past due loans impairs the obligation of contracts and
deprives Tayug Rural of property without due process of law.
Central Bank reasons that Tayug Rural, despite the loans, should
have known that rules and regulations authorize the Central
Bank to impose additional reasonable penalties.

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:

ISSUE:

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and

other government agencies charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the
necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general
circulation;
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

WON The Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty via
Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8

ISSUES:
whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars;
whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are
contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and
oppressive; and
whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with
the Office of the National Administrative Register were not
complied with.

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or

HELD:
NO. A reading of the circular and pertinent provisions, including
that of RA 720, shows that nowhere therein is the authority
given to the Monetary Board to mete out additional penalties to
the rural banks on past due accounts with the Central Bank. As
said by the CFI, while the Monetary Board possesses broad
supervisory powers, nonetheless, the retroactive imposition of
administrative penalties cannot be taken as a measure
SUPERVISORY in character.
Administrative rules have the force and effect of law. There are,
however, limitations in the rulemaking power of administrative

agencies. All that is required of administrative rules and

regulations is to implement given legislation by not
contradicting it and conform to the standards prescribed by law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the remittance for second installment of
registration fees was made beyond thetime fixed by law.

Rules and regulations cannot go beyond the basic law. Since

compliance therewith can be enforced by a penal sanction, an
administrative agency cannot implement a penalty not provided
in the law authorizing it, much less one that is applied
retroactively.

RULING:
The Motor Vehicle Office in Cagayan had no office on Saturday,
August 31, 1957.However, it was immaterial the last working
day contemplated in the Revised Motor Vehicle Lawshould not
necessarily mean the last working day of Motor Vehicle Office.
The fact that August31, 1957 was declared a special public
holiday did not have the effect of making the precedingday,
August 30, the last day for paying registration fees without
penalty.Moreover, under the said law, for payment of
registration fees by mail, the date of cancellation of the postage
stamps of the envelope containing the remittance is considered
thedate of application

The new clause imposing an additional penalty was not part of

the promissory notes when Tayug Rural took out its loans. The
law cannot be given retroactive effect. More to the point, the
Monetary Board revoked the additional penalty later in 1970,
which clearly shows an admission that it had no power to
impose the same. The Central bank hoped to rectify the defect
by revising the DLC Form later.
However, Tayug Rural must pay the additional 10% in case of
suit, since
in the promissory notes, 10% should be paid in attorneys fees
and costs of suit and collection. Judgment AFFIRMED with
modification.

Computation of Time Art. 13 NCC

Firestone Tire Company vs. Lariosa
GR no. 70479
February 27, 1987
FACTS:
Carlos Lariosa work in Firestone as factory worker. When he was
about to leave thecompany premises, he was frisked by security
guard because while his personal bag wasinspected, there were
16 wool flannel swabs all belonging to the company. As a result,
he was terminated by firestone on the ground of stealing
company propertyand loss of trust. The company also files
criminal complaint for attempted theft. Lariosa, onother hand,
filed a case for illegal dismissal Labor Arbiter found the dismissal
just bust theNLRC reversed the decision.Firestone contends that
NLRC erred in not dismissing Lariosas appeal for being late.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal filed by Lariosa n NLRC was filed late.
RULING:
Lariosa filed his appeal on June 7, 1984 or after the lapse of 14
days from the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter.Under
the Labor Code, the reglementary period for which an appeal
from decision of labor arbiter may be filed to NLRC is within a
period of ten days.The ten-day period has to be interpreted to
mean as ten calendar days and not ten workingdays
Gonzaga vs David

Rural Bank of Caloocan vs CA

GR no. L-32116
April 21, 1981
FACTS:
Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to
Rural Bank of Caloocan toapply for industrial loan. The loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage on Castors house,after that,
the bank approved the loan of P3000. Valencia obtained from
the bank an equalamount of loan affixing Castros signature as
co-maker without its knowledge. The sheriff then sent a notice
announcing the property would be sold at public auction
tosatisfy the obligation. Upon request, the auction sale which
was scheduled for March 10, 1961was postponed for April 10,
1961. But April 10 was subsequently declared a special holiday
sothe sheriff sold the property on public auction on April 11,
1961 which was the next succeedingbusiness day following the
special holiday.Castro prayed for the annulment of sale alleging
that there was fraud on the part of Valencias who induced her to
sign as co-maker of a promissory note since she is a 70-year
oldwidow who cannot read and write and it was only when she
receive the notice of sheriff, shelearned that the encumbrance
on her property was P6000 and not for P3000.

GR no. L-14858
December 29, 1960

ISSUE:
Whether or not the public auction sale was null and void for
transferring the date already set bylaw.

FACTS:
Mariano Gonzales, as owner of a cargo truck and passenger
bus, registers the vehiclesand pays the first installment for
registration fees due on 1957. To cover the second
installmentfor registration fees, he remitted to the provincial
treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, theamount of P500.00,
under postal money orders.The postal cancellation mark on the
envelope containing the remittance bears the date August 31,
1957. The registrar of the Motor Vehicle Office ruled that
pursuant to Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second installment
for registration fees was payable on or before the lastworking
day of August. The last working day of August 1957 was Friday,
August 30, 1957. Andconsequently, the remittance of Gonzaga
which bears cancellation mark dated August 31, 1957was made
beyond time fixed by law.

RULING:
The sale is null and void for not having in accordance with Act
3135 which states thatthat a notice shall be given by posting
notices of sale for not less than 20 days in at least 3public
places and if the property is worth more than P400 such notice
shall also be published for in a newspaper of general circulation
in the municipality or city once a week for 3
consecutiveweeks.The pretermission of a holiday applies only
where the day, or the last day for doing anyact required or
permitted by law falls on a holiday or when the last day of a
given period for doing an act falls on holiday. It does not apply to
a day fixed by an office or officer of thegovernment for an act to
be done.Since April 10, 1961 was not the day or the last day set
by law for the extrajudicialforeclosure sale, nor the last day of a
given period but a date fixed by deputy sheriff, the salecannot

be legally made on the next succeeding business day without

the noticef the sale inaccordance with Act no. 3135