Moral Models in Anthropology

Author(s): Roy D'Andrade

Source: Current Anthropology, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jun., 1995), pp. 399-408
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research

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CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number 3, June I995

Research.All rightsreservedOII-3204/95/3603-0002$2.50
? I995 bytheWenner-Gren
FoundationforAnthropological

OBJECTIVITYAND
MILITANCY: A DEBATE

For over a decade therehave been concertedattacks in

anthropologyon objectivity (Rosaldo I989), science

(Scheper-Hughes
I99I),

thenotionoftruth(TylerI986),

makinggeneralizationsof any kind (Abu-Lughodi99i),

doing ethnography(Dwyer i982), and anthropologyitselfas a typeofWesterncolonialism (Asad I973). These
attackscome not fromsome fringegroupbut fromwellknown and establishedanthropologists.Why should so
many anthropologistsattack the very foundationsof
their discipline? Originally,I thought these attacks
came frompeople who had the same agenda I did, just
differentassumptions about how to accomplish that
agenda.I now realize thatan entirelydifferent
agendais
beingproposed-that anthropology
be transformed
from
a disciplinebased upon an objective model of the world
to a disciplinebased upon a moral model of the world.
By a "model" I mean a set of cognitiveelementsused
to understandand reason about something.The term
"moral" is used here to referto the primarypurpose of
this model, which is to identifywhat is good and what
is bad and to allocate reward and punishment.In the
usual languageofphilosophy,goodnessand badness,like
beautyand taste,are consideredsubjective,not objective
towards
This paperexaminesthecurrenttrendin anthropology
ofa moraldisciplinewithmodelsoftheworld things;the beautyof a human baby may not be beauty
thedevelopment
The currentmoralmodel to an ostrichand the badness of killingone's lover may
thatcontainexplicitmoraljudgments.
withits emphasison oppression,
demystificain anthropology,
notbe badnessto a prayingmantis.An objectivedescripis outlined.Variousattackson science
tion,and denunciation,
moralmodel,are consid- tion tells about the thingdescribed,not about the agent
and objectivity,
also partofthe current
The
and scienceis presented.
ered,and a defenseofobjectivity
doing the description,while a subjective description
problemsinvolvedin theuse ofmoralmodelsare thenconsidtells how the agent doing the descriptionreacts to the
moral
ered,bothin generaland withrespectto thecurrent
object. "He is a good guy" is a subjectivedescriptionof
is made thatanymoralauthority
thatanmodel.An argument
mayhold dependsupon an objectiveunderstanding someone; "He helps his friends"would be a moreobjecthropologists
tive descriptionof the same person.
oftheworldand to thatend moraland objectivemodelsshould
be keptdistinct.
The distinctionbetween object and subject is one of
the basic human cognitive accomplishments.Normal
ofAnthropology
at theUniversity people are expectedto be able to recognizethe difference
ROY D'ANDRADE
iS Professor
San Diego (La Jolla,Calif.92093-OIOI,
ofCalifornia,
U.S.A.).
betweentheirresponseto an objectand the objectitself.
ofConnecticut
Bornin I93I, he was educatedat theUniversity
Despite
the cognitivesalience of the objective/subjec(B.A., I957) and Harvard University (Ph.D., i962). He has taught
tive distinction,in ordinarytalk the two are often
and at Rutgers(i969-70)
and
at Stanford
University
(i962-69)
has donefieldresearchin Chiapas,Mexico,and in WestAfrica.
blended.To say someone is a "crook" is to referto more
His researchinterestsare in cognitiveanthropology,
quantitative thanthe objectivefactthatsomethingwas intentionally
methods,and Americanculture.Amonghis publicationsare "A
taken by someone who had no legal rightto it; part of
FolkModel oftheMind,"in CulturalModelsin Languageand
the meaningof "crook" is that the personwho did this
editedbyD. Hollandand N. Quinn (Cambridge:CamThought,
did somethingbad and is a bad person. Many of the
Press,i987), HumanMotivesand Cultural
bridgeUniversity
Models (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press,I992), and The termsof natural language blend the way the world is
(Cambridge:Cambridge and our reactionto it, perhapsbecause in this way we
Developmentof CognitiveAnthropology
Press,I994). The presentpaperwas submittedin final
University
can tell othershow we want them to respondalso ("reformi5 Ix 94.
spond as I do"). Althoughit may be impossible to present an entirelyobjective account, when we want to
understandsomethingoutside ourselves we use terms
that,so faras possible, tell about that thingso we can
understandthat thing,ratherthan our responseto that
thing.One triesto be objectiveifone wantsto tell others
about the object, not about oneself.
It should be noted that an objective account is not
necessarilyvalue-free.For example, the statement"X
cures cancer" is not freeof positivevalue formost people. Nor are objective accounts necessarily unbiased.
One well-knownway of producinga biased account is
to reportonly those factswhich reflectbadly on something.As used here,objectivityrefersjust to the degree

Moral Models in
Anthropology
by Roy D'Andrade

399

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400

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

Volume 36, Number 3, June1995

to which an account gives informationabout the object evil. In the currentmoral model in anthropologythis is
being described.Finally,it should be noted that trying done by unmaskingthe symbolichegemonythat hides
otherpeo- and legitimatesoppression.The morallycorrectiveact
to be objectivedoes notprecludeinvestigating
ple's subjectiveworlds. One can be as objective about is denunciation. One can also act morally by giving
what people think as one can be about the crops they voice to thosewho resistoppression;thisat least identigrow.
fies the oppressionand the oppressors.Nowadays, one
One result of the attempt to be objective-to talk can have a moral careerin anthropology;
havinga moral
about the thing,not oneself-is that it is more likely careerin anthropologyis beingknownforwhat one has
that what one says can be tested to see if it is true or denounced.
Nancy Scheper-Hughes's"HungryBodies, Medicine,
false. And because it is more likely that an objective
account can be tested,an objective account can be at- and the State: Toward a Critical PsychologicalAnthrotemptedagain by someone else and the replicabilityof pology" (i992a) is a good illustrationof the use of the
the account assessed. For knowledgeto accumulate,ac- currentmoral model in anthropology.In her paper,
countsmustbe objective,but theymust also be testable Scheper-Hughesexplicitlysays that she wants to rediand replicable. What Pons and Fleischman said about rectpsychologicalanthropologytowardthe new model.
cold fusion was objective enough, but unfortunately Accordingto Scheper-Hughes(igg92a:229):
what theydescribedseems to be unreplicable.
The essential insight,derivedfromEuropeancritical
In contrastto an objective model, which triesto detheory,is that the givenworld or the "commonsense
scribethe object,the aim ofa moralmodel is to identify
reality"may be false,illusory,and oppressive.It is
what is good and bad, to allocate praise and blame, and
an insightsharedwith all contemporary
criticalepisalso to explain how thingsnot in themselvesgood or
temologiesincludingmodem psychoanalysis,femibad come to be so. Typically,this is done using words
nism and Marxism.All variantsof moderncritical
thatKennethBurke(I945) calls "god" terms,wordsthat
theorywork at the essential task of strippingaway
standforthingsthatare an ultimategood or an ultimate
the surfaceformsof realityin orderto expose conevil and which are the source of furthergood or evil.
cealed and buriedtruths.Their aim, then,is to
opThus, in the currentmoral model in anthropology,
"speak truth"to power and domination,both in indipressionis an ultimate evil; nothingcan make oppresviduals and submergedsocial groupsor classes.
sion good,and it is assumed thatmost ofthe bad things
in the world are the result of oppression.The truthof Demystification-"exposing concealed and buried
the badness of oppressionis not an empiricalmatter.If truths"-is thusseen as a necessaryremedyforthe domyou lack moral sense, no recountingof the facts can inationofindividuals,groups,and classes. And the "critfrom"objecexplain it to you. And given the ultimate badness of ical theories" which do this are different
oppression,anythingthat creates or maintains oppres- tive" theories.
sion must also be bad. Thus colonialism is bad because
[Criticaltheories]are reflexiveratherthan objective
it necessarilyinvolves the use of oppression.Power is
epistemologies.Critical theoriesdifferradicallyin
bad because it is an instrumentof oppression.The hetheirepistemologyfrompositivisttheoriesderived
gemonyof Westernculture is bad because it supports
fromthe naturalsciences. All theoriesin the "natuand maintainsWesterncolonialistoppression.Silencing
ral" sciences presupposean "objective" structureof
and violence are bad because theyare typicalmeans of
realityknowable by minds that are likewise underoppression.And so on.'
stood as sharinga uniformcognitivestructure.CritiEverymoral model must containat least partiallyobcal theoriesassertthe subjectivityof knowable phejectivetermsifit is to applyto thingsin theworld.Thus
nomena and propose "reflection"as a valid category
"oppression" is not totally subjective; like the term
and methodof discovery.
"crook," it refersto somethingobjective-the use of
powerbysome individualsor groupsto affectotherindi- The problemScheper-Hughesis addressinghere,I think,
viduals or groupsin ways not to theirliking.The subjec- involves the term"truth."Immediatelybefore,she has
tivepartofthe term"oppression"is the evaluationbuilt said thatthe goal is to "speak truthto power." B-utisn't
into it that definesthis use of power as somethingbad findingout the truthwhat science-old-fashioned anand as somethingthat bringsabout thingsthat are bad. thropology-does?She claims that"criticaltheories"do
In most moral models there is some way to correct somethingelse-they know in a "subjective" way, not
just an "objective" way, by "reflection." ScheperHughes is not explicitabout how reflectionworks as a
i. A reviewerof an earlierdraftof thisarticledisagreedwithmy
of discovery,but she is clear that it is different
method
ofthe "oppressionmodel"as moral,arguingthat
characterization
positionderivesfromtheworkofNietz- from"positivism" and "natural science." In her view,
"postmodern"
thecurrent
sche,Derrida,DeMan, and Foucault,all in thereviewer'sopinion "The objectivityof science and of medicine is always a
Whateverthemeritsof thisreviewer'sposi- phantomobjectivity,a mask that conceals more than it
"amoralrelativists."
cited reveals"
tion, it is neverthelessthe case that the anthropologists
(p. 229). Thus, positivisticnatural science is a
Rabinow,Dwyer,Abu-Lughod,
here-Rosaldo, Scheper-Hughes,
moralistswhowishto makethisworld bad way to findout about the world because it is part
andothers-areprincipled
of the process of mystification.
Objectivityturnsout to
better.

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D'ANDRADE/SCHEPER-HUGHES

Objectivityand Militancy I 40I

be a mask fordomination.One ofthe most salient char- nizingthe problemsof hungerthat underlienervos,derageagainstdominationand mystiacteristicsof the currentmoral model is exactly this flectstheunderlying
fiesthe source of the problem(p. 230):
attackon objectivity.
Scheper-Hughescontinues (p. 229):
In the contextof this discussion,doctorsoccupy the
At the heartof all criticaltheoriesand methodsis a
pivotalrole of "traditional"intellectualswhose funccritiqueof ideologyand power.Ideologies (whether
tion is, in part,to fail to see the secretindignation
political,economic, or religious)can mystifyreality,
of the hungrypoor expressedin theirinchoatefolk
obscurerelationsof power and domination,and preidiom of "nervos." But anthropologists,
too, often
vent people fromgraspingtheirsituationin the
play the role of the "traditional"intellectualin their
world.Specificformsof consciousnessmay be called
unconscious collusions with hegemonicinterpretaideologicalwhen theyare invokedto sustain or legittions of social realityfosteredby powerfullocal interimate particularinstitutionsor social practices.
ests.
reproduceinWhen these institutionalarrangements
the aims The specificationofthe immoralagentsmoves fromthe
equality,domination,and human suffering,
state to bureaucratictechniciansto doctorsto teachers
of criticaltheoryare broadlyemancipatory.
All are
and social workersand finallyto anthropologists.
This repeatsofsome ofthe ideas alreadypresented:real- in complicitywith oppression,althoughtheymay not
ity gets mystifiedto obscure relations of domination; know it. So-"What is to be done?" According to
the goal is to emancipate by revealingthe ideologies Scheper-Hughes 229),
(p.
which mystifysuch relations(pp. 229-30):
As social scientists(and not social revolutionaries)
The process of liberationis complicated,however,
criticalpracticeimplies an epistemologicalstruggle
by the unreflexivecomplicityand identificationof
in
which the contesteddomain is anthropologyitpeople with the veryideologies and practicesthat
self.
The struggleconcernsthe way knowledgeis
are theirown undoing.Here is where Antonio
the class intereststhat it serves,and the
generated,
useful.
GramGramsci's notion of hegemonyis
challengeis to make our disciplinemore relevant
sci ... recognizedthat the dominantclasses exerand non-oppressiveto the people we study.Finally,
throughthe
cised powerboth directlyand forcefully
it
is addressedto clinical practitionersas a challenge
civil
with
the
state,and also indirectlyby merging
to reintegratethe social and political dimensionin
theirown class-basedintersocietyand identifying
theirpracticeso as to put themselvessquarelyon
ests with broad culturalideas and aims, making
the
side of human suffering.
them appearindistinguishablefromeach other.
Here Scheper-Hughesbegins to specifyhow mystification works-by the identificationof the interestsof the
dominantclasses with "broad" culturalideas and aims.
The stateis the powerthatacts to createthismystification (p. 230):
Increasinglyin modernbureaucraticstates technicians and professionals-laboratoryscientists,geneticists,doctors,psychologists,teachers,social workers,sociologists,criminologistsand so forth-come
to play the role of the "traditionalintellectuals"in
sustaining"commonsense" definitionsof reality
throughtheirhighlyspecialized and validatingforms
of discourse.Gramsci anticipatedFoucault (see Foucault I972) in his understandingof the diffusepower
circuitsin modernstates and of the role of "expert"
formsof power/knowledgein sustainingthe "common sense" orderof things.
Scheper-Hughesmakes the case thatin NortheastBrazil people sufferfroma disordercalled nervos that involvesweakness,sleeplessness,heartpalpitations,shaking,headache,fainting,etc., and that this disorder"is a
primary idiom through which hunger and hungeranxiety are expressed" (i992a:23f). For this disorder,
minortranquilizersare consideredby the Brazilianmedical establishmentto be an appropriatetreatment.This
treatment,accordingto Scheper-Hughes,by not recog-

The call to action is clear. Anthropologyhas been part

oftheprocessofmystification,
servingintereststhatoppressothers.The moralthingto do is to denouncethose
who maintainthis mystificationand transform
anthropologyfroman objectivenatural science, which is just
a charadeand a means of continuingoppression,into a
criticalanthropologywhich will help changethe world.
It is importantto keep in mind that one can also use
an objectivemodel formoral purposes,as forexample,
in investigatingthe biochemical basis of schizophrenia
in orderto make possible bettermedicine for schizophrenics.The separationbetweenmoral models and objective models is not based on the motives or biases of
the investigator.In most scientificfieldswhich aim to
help people, thereare both moral and objectivemodels,
linked together.For example, in medicine, thereis an
objectivelanguageof physiologyand biochemistrythat
describeswhat various pathogensdo and how the body
reacts to them. This biological model describes how
thingswork,not whethervirusesor antibodiesare good
or bad. Linked to this objective model is a less formal
model concerningwhat is healthy,what is safe,what is
medically ethical, etc., in which, for example, melanoma is considereda bad cancerwhile wartsare usually
consideredbenign.This languageofhealth and ethicsis
carefullykept separate fromthe objective language of
biologicalprocesses.One ofmy colleagues calls this the

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402

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

Volume 36, Number 3, fune 1995

"separationof church and state." You can have both,

but theyshould be kept separateand distinct.
The separationof moral models and objectivemodels
is a crucial issue. It is exactly this separationthat is
explicitlyattackedby anthropology'scurrentmoralists.
Forexample,Rabinow (1983:68-70, emphasisadded) offers what he calles a "schematization of relations of
truthand power" as follows:

conceptionof a humanistactivitywhich has unwittinglypushed these anthropologistsinto a kind of nihilism which is the exact oppositeof theirintent.

Rabinow is clear that in his opinion the separationof

moral models fromobjective models is a mistake resultingin an anthropologywithoutmorality("politics"
is a code wordfor"morality").He presumesthatanthropologyshould be moraland thatthefailureofanthropologists to maintain Boas's moral passion condemns the
In the firstposition,that representedby Boas, the
idea
of separatingmoral and objective models; Geertz
role of the anthropologistas scientistwas to speak
failed
us because he has no politics.2
has
man:
political
truthto power. Boas was a profoundly
Rabinow asserts that all anthropologistsmust have
a typicalsecular,emancipated,German,JewishlibBoas's moral passion. I do not agree. In my moral unieral with a strongfaithin the forceof reason as a
verse,one can be an anthropologistsimplybecause one
functionaltool of political emancipationand as an
is interestedin human life and still be a good person.
absolute value in its own right.The calling of the inwhetheror not one has politics, or believes
However,
tellectual,forBoas, consistedof the advancementof
thatall anthropologists
shouldhave politics,I arguethat
reason throughscience and the conquest of tradianthropology'sclaim to moral authorityrestson knowand injustice.
tion,irrationality,
ing empirical truthsabout the world and that moral
The dignityand achievementsof Boas and his stu- models should be
kept separatefromobjective models
dentsare not in question-they were centrallyremoral models are counterproductivein disbecause
sponsibleformakingantiracisman accepted partof
coveringhow the worldworks.This is not an argument
the Americanacademic agenda-but neitherare
thatanthropologistsshould have no politics; it is an artheirlimits and contradictions.The position of
that they should keep their politics separate
gument
speakingtruthto power,opposinghumanismto nifromthe way theydo theirscience.
hilism,is still with us; and it is by no means the
Without attemptingto meet all attacks, I will first
worstalternative.But ultimatelythisposition has
take
up some of the most egregiousargumentsagainst
hardy,eitherintellectuallyor
not proved sufficiently
objectivity.
politically,to have spawned a science or politics
i. Objective models are dehumanizing.
which lives up to the standardsof coherenceand efAccordingto Rorty(i983:i64), "Foucault is doubtless
ficacyby which these individualswished to be
rightthat the social sciences have coarsenedthe moral
judged.
fiberofourrulers.Somethinghappensto politicianswho
In an importantsense, the second position,that
are exposed to endless tabulations of income levels,
asThe
all.
at
representedby Geertz,has no politics
rates of recidivism,cost-effectiveness
of artilleryfire,
cetic imperativeof Boas or Weber,who soughtto
and the like-something like what happens to concenseparatetruthand politics,still entailed an active
trationcamp guards."Here is completefantasy.No evivigilancelest these two realms fuse.It neverocdence besides a mentionof Foucault is cited. Certainly
curredto these Europeanintellectualsthatpolitical
I know of no researchthat shows that social science
concernswere not centralto the life of an intellecresearchfindingshave a dehumanizingeffecton people.
tual-they saw them as so centraltheyhad to be
What seem to be operatinghere are the assumptionsof
kept in check. The sacrificedemandedof the scienthe currentmoral model; objectivityis part of science,
tistwas not the loss of political passions but only
science is used in the dominationof others,domination
that theybe kept clearlydistinctfromscientificacis the inhumantreatmentofothers,hence objectivityis
tivitiesqua science. Over the time of two generadehumanizing.All this followsfromfirstprinciplesand
tions,the tensionbetween these two callings,and
need not be proved.
hence the potentialthreattheyposed foreach
2. The distinctionsbetween objectivityand subjecother'sautonomy,was graduallydissipated.In its
tivity,
fact and language, knowledge and opinion, deplace an ethics of scientificcomportmentbecame a
a realist conceptionof the worldand the correon
pend
code of civility.As this code took centerstage,the
spondence theoryof truth.This theoryis flawed, and
more directlypolitical concernswere weakened.
the distinctionswhichgrowout ofit are contherefore
I am not advocatingthat we jettisonthe moral
and unnecessary.
fusing
and intellectualachievementsof the aggressivelyanThe realistconceptionof science arguesthat science
tiracistanthropologyof Boas, nor thatwe discard
what has been constructedand made to functionas
a civilitywhich allows fordisputewithina commu- 2. In his DistinguishedLectureto the AmericanAnthropological
Geertz(i984) protestsRabiAssociation"AntiAnti-Relativism,"
nityof shareddiscourse.The main conclusion I
makesthepointthathis politicsof
Geertz
now's
characterization.
is
this
in
paper
drawfromthe analysis presented
toleranceand understanding-offightingagainstprovincialism
thatit is the doggedseparationof truthand power
just as moralas otherpositionsand that
and ethnocentrism-are
it is unfairto be labeled "withoutpolitics"by thosewho have
in orderto constructa science which has had the
otherpolitics.
most deleteriouseffectson anthropology;it is the

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D'ANDRADE/SCHEPER-HUGHES

"works" because it correspondsin some degreeand in

some mannerto the "way the worldreallyis." That is,
science tries to findout the "truth,"and "truth" consistsofstatementsthatcorrespondto "reality."It is this
correspondenceto realitythat explains why science is
successfulat predictionand control.The argumentof
Rorty(i99i) and others,who call themselves "relativists," or "antirealists"or "antirationalists,"is that the
''correspondence"between statementsand the world is
not an obvious matter.Various conventionsabout what
counts as evidence are needed in orderto decide the
truthor falsityof statements;in a maturescience these
conventionsare quite complex.Forexample,in psychology, the value of experimentalevidence depends on a
varietyofstatisticalconsiderationsinvolvingreliability,
controlcases, proportionof the variance accounted for,
typei and type2 errors,etc. But wheredo these conventions come from?They are conventionsagreedupon by
a community.Thus truthdepends on the consensus of
the community,and objectivityreduces to social soli-

darity(Rorty199I:e2e2).

Objectivityand Militancy | 403

sons can be made between a highlydeveloped

traditionand an underdevelopedrival....
Kitcherpointsout thatthe firstthreepointsare not central to the antirationalistargument;the crucial points
are 4 and 5, which denythat,over the long term,correspondencewith the "truth,"or with "the way theworld
really is," tips the battle so that scientificknowledge
progresses.All fivepointsare empiricalgeneralizations;
if theyare true it is a matternot of firstprinciplesbut
of fact.Kitcherarguesthat a more empiricallyaccurate
characterization
would modifypoints4 and 5 as follows:

[4]During the earlyphases of scientificdebate,the

processesundergoneby the ultimatevictorsare (usually) no more well designedforpromotingcognitive
progressthan those undergoneby the ultimatelosers.
[5] Scientificdebates are closed when, as a resultof
conversationsamong peers and encounterswith naturethat are partiallyproducedby earlydecisions to
modifyindividualpractices,thereemergesin the
communitya widely sharedargument,encapsulating
a processformodifyingpracticewhich,when judged
by [an externalstandard]is markedlysuperiorin promotingcognitiveprogressthan otherprocessesundergoneby protagonistsin the debate: power accrues
to the victoriousgroupprincipallyin virtueof the integrationof this process into the thinkingof members of the communityand recognitionof its virtues.

This argumenthas also been put forwardby a number

of individualsworkingin the historyof science and the
sociology of knowledge. Latour (i988), Latour and
Woolgar(I979), Shapin and Schaffer(i985), and others
have presentedspecificcase historieswhich theyargue
show that scientificdebate is determinednot by the
winners'beingcloserto some abstracttruthbut by their
havingmore social and culturalpower. Philip Kitcher,
a philosopherof science who is a vigorousdefenderof
the rationalityof science, summarizes the position of
There is probablyno "knock-down" argumentfrom
amongwhom he explicitlyincludes
the antirationalists,
Collins and firstprinciplesto demonstratethat the correspondence
Feyerabend,Barnes,Bloor,Shapin,Schaffer,
theoryof truth is right (or wrong) or that scientific
Latour,as follows (I993: I98):
knowledgehas advanced (ornot advanced).Whetherthe
correspondencetheoryof truthis rightand whethersci[i] The communitydecision is reachedwhen suffipowerfulsubgroupswithin entificknowledgehas advancedare empiricalquestions,
cientlymany sufficiently
the communityhave arrivedat decisions (possiblyin- and I think that the empirical answers are reasonably
has said:
dependent,possiblycoordinated)to modifytheirprac- clear.As Gellner(i992:60-61)
tices in a particularway.
One particularstyleof knowledge[scientificknowledge]has provedso overwhelmingly
powerful,eco[2] Scientistsare typicallymoved by nonepistemicas
nomically,militarily,administratively,
that all sociwell as epistemicgoals.
eties have had to make theirpeace with it and adopt
it. Some have done it more successfullythan others,
and some more willing or more quickly than others;
[3] There is significantcognitivevariationwithinscibut all of themhave had to do it, or perish.Some
entificcommunities,in termsof individualprachave retainedmore,and some less, of theirprevious
tices,underlyingpropensities,and exposureto stimculture.
uli.
That is, the empirical supportforthe hypothesisthat
[4] During all phases of scientificdebate,the proscience advances is simplythe strongevidencethat scicesses undergoneby the ultimatevictorsare no
entific knowledge about the world has advanced.
more well designedforpromotingcognitiveprogress Whether,on balance,scientificknowledgehas been used
than those undergoneby the ultimatelosers.
forgood or evil is anotherquestion. My own unoriginal
conclusionis that,on balance, the worldis considerably
[5] Scientificdebates are closed when one groupmus- betteroffbecause of science. However, those who disterssufficientpower to exclude its rival(s)fromthe
agree on this point would, I believe, still have to agree
community;the subsequentarticulationand develop- thatscientificknowledgehas advanced.Given the obvious success of science as a way offindingout about the
ment of the successfulmodificationof practiceabsorball available resources,so that later compariworld,it is remarkablethat many anthropologistsare

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404

1 CURRENT

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attractedto philosophersand historianswho flirtwith

the idea that there is no true progressin scientific
knowledgeand no way of knowingwhat is true.3
The antirationalistsfurtherargue that there are no
independentcriteriafor explainingthe success of science (RortyI991). My own opinionis thatthe success of
science is due primarilyboth to the normof presenting
generalizationsin a formthat makes it possible to dispute them with evidence and to the norm of carrying
out extensivetestsofotherpeople's generalizations.The
testabilityof statements and the constant testing of
statementswardofftheverystrongtendencyofhumans
to believe what they want to believe. It is these two
normsthatgive the scientificenterpriseits power.
Finaily, there is something inconsistentabout the
statementsmade by Rortyand othersabout the badness
of the subject/object,language/fact,and knowledge/
opinion distinctions.For example, accordingto Rorty
(I99I:4i, emphasis added);
On the pragmatistview, the contrastbetween "relations of ideas" and "mattersof fact" is a special case
contrastsbetweenbeof the bad seventeenth-century
ing "in us" and being "out there,"between subject
and object,between our beliefsand what those beliefs(moral,scientific,theological,etc.) are tryingto
get right.... [The pragmatist]is suggestingthat instead of invokinganythinglike the idea-fact,or lanor mind-world,or subject-objectdistincguage-fact,
tions to explicate our intuitionthat thereis

to,we just
out thereto be responsible
something
dropthe intuition.

Imagine a lazy studentin one of Rorty'sclasses who

complains that he only got a D. ProfessorRortysays,
"That is what you deserve." The studentreplies,"You
are invokingthe intuitionthat thereis somethingout
objectivelyviewed)to be responthere(myperformance,
sible to. You should dropthat intuition.Subjectively,I
feel I did quite well, and althoughI said that I would
turnin a paper,the fact thatI did not simplyreinvokes
the language/factdistinction,which depends on the
flawed correspondencetheory of truth." Of course,
Rortywould explain thathe bases his judgmentson the
normalconsensusabout what countsas true(theprofessor's judgment)ratherthan some ultimate correspondence of the professor'sjudgmentwith reality.What
Rortymeans by "objectivity"and "truth"is not what
thestudentmeans; Rortyis talkingaboutultimatetruth
3. BrunoLatour(I993) appearsto have movedto a realistposition
fromthatof Kitcher.For example,in
different
not substantially
beaccountof the controversy
discussingShapinand Schaffer's
tweenBoyle and Hobbes about vacuum pumps and the role of
Latour(I993:28 emphasisadded)says,"Boyle...
experimentation,
machinescreatephewithinwhichartificial
inventsthelaboratory
costly,
nomenaout ofwholecloth.Eventhoughtheyareartificial,
and despitethe small numberof trained
and hardto reproduce,
natureas it is....
reliablewitnesses,thesefactsindeedrepresent
of the facts. Who is
Scientistsare scrupulousrepresentatives
speakingwhentheyspeak?The factsthemselvesbeyondall question,butalso theirauthorizedspokespersons."

and completeobjectivity,not ordinaryjudgmentsabout

courseperformance
and brokenpromises.Rortydoes not
mean (I think)that in ordinarylife the distinctionsbetweenobjectand subject,mind and world,idea and fact,
etc., should be dispensedwith (thatwould make an odd
world). It is only in certain kinds of philosophic discourse thatthese distinctionsare not to be made. However,in my opinion this speaks badlyforsuch kinds of
philosophicdiscourse.
3. The idea that people can be objective is illusory;
people constructtherealitythatsuits thembest. Hence
an objectivemodei is impossible,and anypretensethat
such a model can be achieved is simply hegemonic
mystification.
Scheper-Hughes'sstatement"The objectivityof science and of medicine is always a phantomobjectivity,
a maskthatconcealsmorethanit reveals"(i992:229)
is one example of this position.It should be noted that
themeaningof"objective" in theseargumentsis shifted
from"an account which describes the object, not the
describer"to "an account given without bias or selfinterest."This is a secondarysense ofthe term;literally,
"objective" glosses as "pertainingto the object." The
secondarysense of the term"unbiased" is an extension
based on the notionthatthose who have no axe to grind
give a more objectiveaccount. By shiftingfromthe primary sense to the secondarysense one can make the
case that,since people are always biased to some degree,
an "objective" account is impossible. Then, since "objectivity"(not having any interests)is impossible,any
claim to objectivitymust be a "mask," a mystification.
However,the accusation dependson the trickof substitutinga secondaryfora primarymeaning.Besides,who
ever claimed that scientists are unbiased? A briefacquaintanceshipwith the historyof science would certainlydisabuse anyoneofthatnotion.Science worksnot
because it produces unbiased accounts but because its
accounts are objectiveenoughto be provedor disproved
no matterwhat anyonewants to be true.
While I am objectingto the rhetoricaltricksthat are
used to identifyobjectivityand science with badness,I
should also note that similartricksare used to identify
objectivityand science with goodness. The methodsof
science and the use of objective accounts are the best
way to findout about the world (I would argue),but the
method has no guarantee of working.Employmentof
the term "science" as an honorificto give weight to
unreplicatedand oftenunsound generalizations,sometimes constructedwith considerablebias, is a continuing abuse. One could even argue that thereis so much
positive mystificationaround the term "science" that
is neededas a balance. Fine,
some negativemystification
if the result is intellectual balance-the recognition
that, on both sides, rhetoricis not evidence and that
"fact"isalways a probability,not an absolute.
It mightbe thoughtthat I am claiming that science
shouldbe value-freeand outsidepolitics.This is not the
case. Science is an institutionalizedactivity-a means,
not an end. It can be used forall sortsofends-to create
enginesofwar, to make new products,to cure physical

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D'ANDRADE/SCHEPER-HUGHES

Objectivityand Militancy | 405

acts just like the generalization"Washingtonwas honest" but hides the claim. Hence Burke's comment on
the rhetoricaluse of anecdotes: beware of people just
tellingstories.
It is strikingthat these attacks on objective models
do not presentany evidence of the damage done by objectivity.In the same vein,evidenceabout thegood done
by science is ignored.A major reason forthe unimportance of evidence,I believe, is what is being assertedis
not a set of empiricalfactsbut whetherone's firstalleI) writes:
(I99I:I50-5
Abu-Lughod
giance is to moralityor to truth.My hypothesisthat
Generalization,the characteristicmodel of operation what is being expressedis
allegiance to a set of moral
and styleof writingof the social sciences, can no
principlesexplainsanotherratherodd aspect ofmanyof
longerbe regardedas neutraldescription.... There
the attacks-their loose adherenceto the laws of logic.
are two reasons foranthropologyto be waryof gener- A numberof scholarswho have
critiquedvarious postalization. The firstis that,as partof a professional
modernist
positions(e.g.,SpiroI986, BaileyI99I, Gelldiscourseof "objectivity"and expertise,it is inevita- ner I992) have commentedon the internalcontradicbly a languageof power. On the one hand, it is the
tions,principlebegging,and appeals to authorityfound
languageof those who seem to stand apartfromand
in much ofthiswriting.These objectionshave not been
outside of what theyare describing.... On the
answered;the usual responseI have heard is that they
otherhand, even ifwe withholdjudgmenton how
are "beside the point." And, if the point is that relativclosely the social sciences can be associated with
ism is the correctmoral responseto culturaldifferences,
the apparatusesof management,we have to recogthen,indeed,logic and evidence are not relevant.
nize how all professionaldiscoursesby natureassert
One mightsay,"Well,some of these moral concerns
hierarchy.
may be overdone,but why not use the currentmoral
continuesto model? Isn't it a reasonablemodel of realityas well as
Here the contagiousbadness-of-oppression
spreadlike a plague; oppression'sbadness infectspower, a model which shows what is right?Can't one blend
power's badness infectsobjectivity("standingapart"), togetherobjectivityand moralityin a singlemodel?" So
and objectivity'sbadness infectsgeneralizations.Again, far as I know, a mixed model would not violate any
the badness is assertedon the basis of firstprinciples, principleof logic. However, thereare reasonablywellnot demonstrated.In oppositionto Abu-Lughod,I claim understoodproblemswith tryingto graftmoral and obthat it is not bad to make generalizationsabout people jective models togetherif one wants to findout about
and that ethnographicgeneralizationsdo not damage the world.It may need to be repeatedthatthe argument
people. Nor does objectivity.Nor do power differences. here is not against anthropologists'havingmoral modThis is anotherfantasy.Whatdamagespeople is theway els. Indeed, I believe that anthropologistsshould work
poweris used and the way generalizationsare used. And to develop more coherent, clearly articulated moral
whathelps people is the way poweris used and the way models. These moral models should, I think,describe
responsibilitiesand a vision of
generalizationsare used. It is irrationalto hold that boththe anthropologist's
poweras such is bad. The resultis a spreadingpollution what the good societyand the good culturewould look
thatmakes it bad to say thattheBedouinare polygynous like. The point has oftenbeen made that if anthropologists do not try to influence the ends to which the
I99I:I53).
(Abu-Lughod
One effectofthe currentban on objectivityis the sub- knowledgethey produce is used, others will do it for
stitutionof stories and narrativesfor generalizations. them.But-the pointI am arguing-these moralmodels
Abu-Lughodsays, "For these reasons I proposethat we should be kept separatefromthe objectivemodels with
experimentwithnarrativeethnographiesoftheparticu- which we debate what is.
The firstproblemwith blended models is identificawriting"
lar in a continuingtraditionoffieldwork-based
emphasisadded).By tellinga storyabout tion.To use the currentmoralmodel,withits emphasis
(I99I:I53,
does not have to make any on the badness of oppression,to understandthe world,
someone, the ethnographer
generalizationsand therebyappearsto avoid the danger one must be able to identifywhen somethingis or is
ofhegemonicdiscourse.However,the appearanceis de- not oppression.But what makes somethingoppression?
ceptive;quite the reversehappensin fact.It is a natural Is takingaway the freedomof serial murderersoppresassumptionof the readerthat any narrativeis, in some sion? Most people would say that it is not-that they
importantsense, typicalof what happens in thatplace, deserveto have theirfreedomtaken away, and thatit is
unless told otherwise.KennethBurke (I945) calls this prudentto do so as well. It is not oppression,then,if
rhetorical strategy that of the "reductive anec- the people being dominateddeserveto be dominatedor
dote"-the worldis "summarizedby" and "reducesto" need to be dominatedforthe common good. But who is
the storyone tells about it. Presentingan anecdote is to say who deservesto be dominated?And who is to say
just as essentializingand totalizingas statinga gener- what the common good is? Serbs believe that Croats
alization. Consider,forexample,the well-knownanec- should be dominatedfora varietyof reasons. Badness
dote about George Washingtonand the cherrytree: it and goodness are not simple propertiesof things but
and mental ills, and even just to discover things.The
determinationof the ends of scientificactivityin the
United States has long been a political matterin which
Congress and a variety of interestgroups, including
thosewho want to do science just forthe sake ofenlightenment,contendforthe money. Science demystifiedis
not intrinsicallygood or bad.
4. Objectivity is part of the general hegemony of
Westernculture,and is authoritarianand oppressive.

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406

| CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

Volume 36, Number 3, fune 1995

complexinteractionsbetweeneventsand human intentions and welfare.It becomes very difficultto define

what oppressionis exceptby one's reactionto the situation-whenever it seems to be a bad use of power call
it "oppression,"and wheneverit is a good use call it
"justice" or somethingelse. This is a centraldoctrineof
subjectivity;what one truly feels is bad is bad. Of
course,one can say that this is just quibbling,and that
everyone-or almost everyone-can tell a good froma
bad use of power. However, because of the complexity
of human life we oftenfindourselvesvehementlydisagreeingeven withpeople we respectabout exactlythis.
The experienceof people tryingto findout about how
the world works is that you find out more when you
avoid the use ofevaluativeterms-otherwiseyou spend
all yourtimearguingabout theuse oftheseterms,trying
to make the bad thingsget the bad words and the good
thingsget the good words.
A second problemin tryingto meld togethermoral
and objectivemodels is that the objectiveworld comes
in manyshades ofgreybut themoralworldtendstoward
black and white. Oppression,forexample,is not an allor-nonestate; it variesin degree.Not everyuse ofpower
is equally bad. To make a model account forwhat happens in theworld,one usually needs to distinguishmore
fromless. But moralitydoes not seem to like to do this;
each case of oppressionmust be treatedas an equal horrorbecause theyall are wrong.Sin is sin, and ifone sets
up a scale of greaterand lesser sins one quickly finds
out that lesser sins are no longerconsideredreal sins.
Thus the pragmaticsof moralityand the pragmaticsof
directions.
findingout about the worldpull in different
A thirdproblemis the powerfultendencyto believe
that good thingsproduce good results and bad things
produce bad results: "By their fruitsye shall know
them." But the complexitiesof causalitydo not respect
our human wish forthe good to producegood and the
the pragmaticsofmobad to producebad. Furthermore,
ralitytend stronglytowarda unicausal view of events;
foreverybad eventthereis a singlebad thingthatcaused
it. This makes assignmentof blame much easier. But
the worldtendsto be stronglymulticausal. When a fire
burnsdown a building,who is to blame? Why,the man
who threwthe match in the wastepaperbasket. But for
a physicistthe match would not have lit the material
in the wastepaperbasket if it had a highercombustion
point or if therehad been no oxygenin the air or if the
buildinghad been made entirelyof stone. We blame a
knowingand intentionalagent,but almost always what
happens is the resultnot just of a knowingintentional
act but of a complex web of causes. Use of the notion
that "bad causes bad" resultsin the kind of conclusion
that Abu-Lughodreaches about generalizations:power
poweris bad. Science
bringsabout oppression,therefore
science is bad. Objectivity
givespeople power,therefore
is part of science, thereforeobjectivityis bad. Generalgenizationsareproducedbyobjectivescience,therefore
eralizationsare bad. And some would take it further:
generalizationsare based on fieldwork,thereforefield-

work is, if not bad, at least a situationthat places one

in verygravemoral jeopardy.
A fourthpragmaticproblemin tryingto meld moral
and objectivemodels is thatwhereasan objectivemodel
can-at least sometimes-be changedbynew data,new
arguments,new theories,moral models are very hard
to change. The historyof the currentmoral model is
interestingin this regard.So faras I have been able to
ascertain,the presentmoralmodel was firstoutlinedby
JeremyBentham,a late-i8th-centuryEnglish philosopherand one of the foundersofutilitarianism.Bentham
said that those who governuse symbols which serve
the interestsof the governingclass. These symbolsare
fictions;thereis no such thingas the "Crown" or the
"Church," forexample. Bentham's interestwas in revealing the rhetoricalfictions and phantoms used to
hide what he termed "sinister interests" (Bentham
i952).
His goal was explicitlymoral: to demystifyand
therebydenounce these fictionsso that therecould be
clarificationof the "common good."
Marx,who read Benthamand commentedon his notions of sinisterintests and fictions,added Bentham's
ideas about mystificationto his own model of social
conflictand its resolution throughsocialism. He disclaimed ethical and humanitarianreasonsforpreferring
socialism. For him it was historicallydeterminedthat
socialism would overthrowcapitalism. The important
causal machineryin Marx's model concernsclass conflictand materialconditions.Symbolichegemonymight
have some effectin slowingdown the revolution,since
falseconsciousnesscould interfere
with the
temporarily
necessaryrecognitionof class interestson the part of
workers,but it was not a primaryforce.The Benthamite
model was, however, oftenused by Marxists in their
intellectualbattleswithotherpoliticalphilosophiesand
in theirbattleswith each other.The standardargument
was that the ideas of otherphilosophieswere nothing
morethanexpressionsof class interestsand attemptsat
symbolichegemony;Marxismalone had an "objective"
basis. Later,in Gramsci'swritings,the complexmachineryoftheMarxistmodel,involvingforcesofproduction,
relations of production,material conditions,etc., was
replacedby the role of symbols,culture,and intellectuals in the maintenance and legitimationof the status
quo (Femia I98I). The material parts of the Marxist
model were eliminated, and what remained was the
claim that governmentswere able to stay in power because the state controlledideologywhich became part
ofthe commonsense ofthe commonculture.The model
moved back fromMarx to Bentham, except that the
state remainedthe primarysource of oppression.
By the late i960s the currentoppressionmodel was a
well-entrenchedpart of the ideology of the American
intellectual radical left in the social sciences and the
humanities.The main outlines of this model were presented in a collection of essays, edited by Dell Hymes,
titled ReinventingAnthropology.Much of the moral
stirringin anthropologyat thattime was a resultof the
Vietnam war, and ReinventingAnthropologyreflects

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D'ANDRADE/SCHEPER-HUGHES

Objectivityand MilitancyI 40,

the conflictsof that time. But beyonddiscussion of issues relatingto Vietnam, the contributorswere clear
that anthropologyshould be permanentlychanged. In
the essays in this volume (Hymes I972), Berreman
called foran end to the pervasivehypocrisyofacademic
anthropology,William Willis definedanthropologyas
the studyof dominatedpeople done in aid of imperialism, Minna Caulfielddiscussed culturalexploitationin
termsof its effecton the colonialized cultureand individuals sharingit, Richard Clemmer discussed the developmentof resistanceamong AmericanIndians,Norman Klein speculated about the effectof the 1960
countercultureon Americanculturalhegemony,Robert
Jaydescribedhow he had come to feelthatanthropological theoryand anthropologicalfieldworkinvolveserious
moral problemsbecause of theirdehumanizingeffects
and Bob Scholte preon societyand on anthropologists,
sented an agenda foranthropologybased on a reflexive
and criticalepistemologyin contrastto "value-free"social science.
All of this was stated clearlyin the I96os. However,
unlike the currentmoralists,the moralistsof the I96os
and I970S were,with some exceptions,youngand relativelyunknownand also not epistemologicalrelativists.
What seems to have happened next is that this model
went "tacit" and then reemergedin full voice in the
as a part of the postmodernistmovement.4PostI980s
modernism,with its concems about the authorityof
representationand its interestin the deconstructionof
theverities,gave the moralmodel a much moreresplendent vocabularyand greaterepistemologicalbite. Writing Cultures(Cliffordand Marcus i986) was ostensibly
about a new way of writingethnography.Behind the
discussionofmodes ofpresentationwas the presupposition that the old way of writingwas the expressionof
model and therethe old objective (realist/hegemonic)
forehad to be replaced.The languageused in the essays
in Writing Cultures made strong claims to uppermiddle-classsensibilityin estheticmattersbut did not
modifythe basics of the moral model. It did, however,
make it possible to claim thatconcernwith writingand
countedas a seriousmoralpursuit.In any
representation
case, themoralmodel,as developedduringthelaterpart
of the i8th century,has changedverylittle because, I
believe,of its usefulnessin moral argumentby intellectuals againstotherintellectuals.
So far,I have discussed fourgeneral problemswith
theuse ofmoral models as a means offindingout about

the world: the difficultyin gettingreliable identifications forbasic terms,the tendencytowardsall-or-none

thinking,the tendencytowardsmonocausalityand evaluative contagion,and the difficulty
of changinga moral
model. There are also a numberof problemswith the
particularmoralmodel of oppressioncurrentin anthropology.
First,in my opinion, this particularmoral model is
not a verygood representationof the way the world is.
As an explanation of what is happeningglobally,the
model in its Gramscian formmade most sense in the
I950S and '6os, when the cold war was at its height.At
thattimetwo powerfulempires,one capitalist,theother
communist,held sway overmuch ofthe world.The differencebetween the two empireswas not a matterof
materialconditions;bothweremodernindustrialeconomies. What happenedto make the difference
was ideology. That is, to explain how the world could be so divided,it made sense to postulate that the division was
in beliefand thatthe commitmentto
due to differences
beliefwas the resultof the rhetoricproducedby mystifierswho managedthe flowofsymbolsand information
that createdthe common sense of ordinarypeople. The
Gramscianworldviewis clearlyinadequate,however,to
account for the breakup of the Soviet Union and the
currentworlddisorderin which nation-statesare unable
to containethnicconflicts.The presentproblemforany
macrosocialtheoryis not identifying
oppressionbut accountingforthefailureofcurrentgovernmentsto maintain order.
It can be arguedthat the moral model still has some
representationaladequacy in accountingforoppression
within particularcountries.However, in my opinion,
oppressionin China, Brazil,or the United States can be
better understood by recourse to theoretical models
about the privilegedaccess of special-interestgroups
to governmentalfunctions,the operation of political
parties, the lack of civil society, and other standard
kinds of political analysis than by explanation based
on a model of mass mystification.The only situation
to which the oppression/mystification/denunciation
model seems to have a reasonabledegreeoffitis to discrimination-racism and sexism. However, even with
respectto racism and sexism the moral model does not
explainmuch; it simplycondemnsdiscriminationas oppression.It does not tell us why discriminationis worse
at some times and in some places.
A numberof otherproblemswith the currentmoral
model may be consideredbriefly.The moral model has
no theoryofgood poweror good inequalityand so must
4. A reviewerofan earlierdraftpointsout thatduringthisperiod simplycondemnwithoutunderstanding
much oftheoptherewereextensivecriticisms
byfeminist,
ThirdWorld,and mi- erationof any social system.Also, the model is almost
norityscholarsofthebiasesin social sciencewriting
andresearch.
The influenceof these critiqueson anthropology
has been very entirelynegativein character;it createsa climate of deand in manycases theyhave been used to supporta nunciationand rage. Further,while those who use the
powerful,
blanketrejectionof objectivity
and a commitment
to the kindof model are reflexivein asking, "Am I acting oppresmoralmodel describedhere.However,manyfeminist,
minority, sively?" they are not at all reflexiveon other points;
and ThirdWorldscholarsdo notrejecttheidea ofobjectivity
and
in factfindthatthe epistemological
relativismtypicalof much they do not ask, "What is thereabout me that makes
postmodemist
writing
undercuts
attemptsto identify
whathas ac- me see oppressionas bad?" or "Why should othersbetuallyhappenedin theworldand whatneedsto be changed.
lieve my assertionswhen I do not believe theirs?" or

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408|

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

Volume 36, Number 3, fune I995

"Why have I been blessed with the knowledgeof good

However,even if the moral model were a more adeand evil thatothersdo not seem to have?" Overall,there quate representationof what is going on in the world,
is the unreflexiveassumptionthat one is a memberof included a theoryof good power and good inequality,
an elect that by naturalgrace knows what is right,and were less negative in character,more reflexiveabout
this elect consists of those who hold the currentmoral mattersofmoralbelief,and moreorientedtowarddoing
model. All othersare to be drivenout of anthropology somethingpositive in the world, gave betterexplanaby "epistemologicalstruggle,"as Scheper-Hughesputs tions forwhy people do not revolt,and were much less
it.
ethnocentric,
it would still be a mistake to tryto make
Anotherlimitationofthe currentmoralmodel is that such a model also serve as the model forunderstanding
it does not seem likely that it will bringabout very how thingswork.The drivingforceof a moral model is
much good in the world.It does not lead one to do any- the allocation of praise and blame, rewardand punishthingpositive about bad conditions.Instead it leads to ment, and this goal will shape its cognitivecharacter.
such as so- The drivingforceof an objective model is the goal of
denunciationsofvarioussocial practitioners,
cial workers,doctors,psychiatrists,economists, civil obtaininga surerunderstandingof how thingswork,of
servants,bureaucrats,etc., and especially otheranthro- what is happening"out there."It is nice to believe that
pologists. Isn't it odd that the true enemy of society one can have both in a single model, but the evidence
turnsout to be thatguyin the officedown the hall? But is strongthatone cannot.The currentmoral model is a
however case in point.
theintellectualdestructionofthesemystifiers,
It comes down to a choice: whateverone wants in
desirablewithintheframeworkofthemodel,is unlikely
to help the trulyoppressedverymuch. Steven Sangren, the way of political change,will the firstprioritybe to
in his article"Rhetoricand the AuthorityofAnthropol- understandhow thingswork?That would be my choice.
ogy" (i988), pointed to the will to power expressedby I believe that anthropologycan maintain its moral aupostmodernistadvocates of the moral model. The cur- thorityonly on the basis of empiricallydemonstrable
rentmoral model is a good instrumentforintellectual truths.But I am afraidthat my choice may be in the
battlewithintheuniversity;it hardlyseems likely,even minority.A largeand growingnumberof Americananon its own terms,to accomplishmuch else. This is what thropologistsappear to believe that the moral agenda
Benthamcreatedit for,and thishas been its most impor- of anthropologyshould take priorityover the scientific
agenda. An even largernumber appear to believe that
tantuse in Marxistthought.
The best partof the model is the analysis of different the scientificagenda of anthropologyis in deservedly
these do tell us somethingabout bad repute because of its association with oppression.
kindsofmystification;
Can
theworld.Much weakeris the assertionthatthesemys- "Science" has become a bad wordin anthropology.5
tificationsare effectivein maintainingoppression-that we at least hold on to "objectivity?"
I do not know how this will turnout. Perhaps after
ordinarypeople do not rise to overthrowthe capitalists
or colonialists or sexists because of the power of these anotherfewyearsof continuedmoral suasion, the interThis is undemonstratedthoughin some nal bickeringof the moralistswill begin to be more inmystifications.
cases plausible. More oftenit appearsto be the case that terestingthan theirmessage, and the currentwave of
people do not revolt eitherbecause (i) they face over- moralrighteousnesswill be followedby a periodofcyniwhelmingforce,(2) theyare receivingsatisfactionfrom cism and disillusionment.This seems to be what haptheirlives as lived,or (3) the persons,groups,or institu- pened afterthe French Revolution,afterCromwell in
tionsthatthesocial scientisthas identifiedas the source England,and afterStalin in Russia. In fiveor ten years
ofthe oppressionare not the truesourceofoppression- the New Young Turks will probablyflaunttheircynithe source being more diffuseand less amenable to so- cism and findthe moral pretensionsof theireldersunlution than the social scientist thinks and the social bearablyhypocritical.In any case, let us hope that anscientist'sexplanationin factbeingthe one thatis mys- thropology,as a science, will survive.As estheticized
journalismand moralisticpamphleteeringit can easily
tifying.
Finally,the currentmoral model is ethnocentric.It be replaced.
is strongforequality (the escape frominequality)and
freedom(the release fromoppression).In my opinion 5. LauraNaderhas a goodpointwithrespectto theconceptionof
these are not bad values, but they are veryAmerican. "science."She says,"One questionthatshouldinterestall ofus
These are not the predominantvalues of modernJapan, has to do withclarifying
themeaningofthehumansciencesqua
ofplurality
India, China, the Middle East, or Southeast Asia, but science.In orderto do thisthereneedstobe recognition
ofmanykindsof scienceas applied
recognition
they are the predominantvalues in the United States in science.... Aforces
us to considerthatthestudyofthehuman
to anthropology
and much of Europe. It is ironic that these moralists conditionrequiresa divisionoflaborin the researchprocess ....
should be so colonialistin theirassumptionabout what howdo anthropologists
Theyare
escapefromdogmaticorthodoxy?
drivenbytheresearchquestion"(Naderi989:154).
is evil.

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