MJCI and PRCI vs COA

Facts: On June 18, 1948, Congress approved RA 309 entitled An Act to Regulate
Horse-Racing in the Philippines. This Act consolidated all existing laws and
amended inconsistent provisions relative to horse racing. It provided for the
distribution of gross receipts from the sale of betting tickets, but is silent on the
allocation of so-called breakages On October 23, 1992, petitioners were granted
franchise to operate and maintain race tracks for horse racing in Manila and Rizal,
and allowed to hold races with bets on the following dates: Saturdays, Sundays,
and official holidays of the year, excluding Thursdays and Fridays and holy week,
June 12th, Election Day, and December 30th. On march 1974, PD no. 420 was issued
creating the Philippine Racing Commission (PHILRACOM), herein co-respondent, with
the exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the conduct of horse
racing, including the framing and scheduling of races. The PHILRACOM authorized
the holding of races on Wednesdays starting December 22, 1976. PHILRACOM also
authorized the holding of races on Thursdays from November 15, 1984 to December
31, 1984, and on Tuesdays since January 15, 1985 up to the present. PHILRACOM
rendered its opinion regarding the breakages on the new betting days stating that it
shall belong to the racing club concerned. Petitioners allocated these breakages for
themselves. On December 16, 1986, President Aquino amended certain provisions
on laws on racing. Under these Executive Orders, breakages were allocated to
beneficiaries. The Office of the President communicated with PHILRCOM stating that
the latter is entitled to the breakages derived from Tuesdays and Wednesdays.
PHILRACOM subsequently sent demand letters to the petitioners requesting its
shares in the breakages of mid-week races and proof of remittances to other
beneficiaries as provided under franchise laws. Petitioner ignored the demand,
stating that there is a conflict between the opinions of PHILRACOM dated September
20, 1978 and the present. The lower court decided in favour of the petitioners.
Respondents referred the case to the CA, which eventually reversed the decision of
the trial court.
Issue: WON EO nos 88 and 89 cover breakages derived from mid-week races
Held: Petitioners position lacked merit. Since the new schedule became part of RA
6631 and 6632, the set of procedures in the franchise laws applicable to the
conduct of horse racing must likewise be applicable to Wednesdays or other midweek races. The period for the remittance of breakages to the beneficiaries should
have commenced from the time PHILRACOM authorized the holding of mid-week
races because RA nos. 6631 and 6632 are already in effect. While the petitioners
might have relied on the prior opinion by an administrative body, the wellentrenched principle is that the state could not have been estoppped by a mistake
committed by its officials or agents. The erroneous application of the law by a public
official does not prevent a subsequent correct application of the law. Although there
is an initial interpretation of the law by PHILRACOM, a court of law could not be

precluded from setting that interpretation aside is later on it is shown to be

inappropriate.
Decision of the CA Affirmed.

Cruz vs Youngberg
Facts:
Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act no. 3155, which at present prohibits
the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippines Islands.
Respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons,
namely, 1) that if act no. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the
petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because of act no. 3052
would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from
giving the permit prayed for; and 2) that act no. 3155 was constitutional and
therefore, valid. The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed
by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. Petitioner also
claims that the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by act no.
3155 to the governor general to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition
provided in the act, constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers.
Issue: WON the assailed law is unconstitutional
Held: We held that act 3155 is entirely valid as this was passed be the legislature to
protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle
diseases through importation of cattle. The promotion of industries affecting public
welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the
scope of police power.
The power given by act no. 3155 to gov-gen to suspend or not, at his
discretion, the prohibition provided in the act does not constitute an unlawful
delegation of legislative powers, but confers an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

LBP vs CA
Facts: Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the
DAR and subjected to transfer scheme to qualified beneficiaries. Their land were
acquired by the DAR and were suppose to have been compensated by the latter
through the landbank. The DAR enacted Administrative order circ no. 9 which opens
trust accounts in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property. Private
respondents argued that Administrative Order no. 9 was issued without jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts
by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank
designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the
titles are cancelled as provided under RA 6657. Private respondents also assail the
fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely earmarked, deposited in trust, or,
re erved the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear
mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be
deposited in cash or in bonds. Petitioner DAR maintained the Admin order no. 9 was
a valid exercise of its rule-making powers pursuant to RA 6657. CA rendered the
decision in favour of the respondent. Petitioner filed for motion for recon but it was
denied. Petitioner assails that opening of trust accounts is an acceptable form of
deposit through admin order no 9, further assailing that it did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and
regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657
Issue: WON the DAR committed a grave abuse of discretion when it issued AO no. 9?
Held: The petitioners contention is untenable. It is very explicit from RA 6657 that
the deposit must be made in cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does it appear nor
can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. There is no
ambiguity in Section 16 a of ra 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the
term deposit. There is no basis allowing the opening of trust accounts in behalf of
the landowner for compensation. Administrative regulations cannot extend the law
and amend a legislative enactment for settled is the rule that administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of law. Actions of an
administrative agency maybe disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if
there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse

of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
enactment. The function of administrative promulgation of rules and regulations
must be exercised solely for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into
effect. Administrative rules cannot extend the law and amend a legislative
enactment, for administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of
law.
Petition denied .

RMBSD vs HDMF
Facts: Petitioner, a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December
1995 from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent HDMF because of a superior
retirement plan. On September 1995, HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to RA 7742,
issued Board Resolution Number 1011 amending and modifying RA 7742, providing
that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, it
must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits
superior to those provided under Pag-IBIG fund. Petitioner filed for Waiver or
Suspension of Funds because of its superior retirement plan. The same was denied
by respoendent on the ground that the requirement that there should be both a
provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase
and/or, and that the Rules Implenmenting RA no. 7742 did not amend nor repeal
section 19 of pd 1752 but merely implemented the law. The CA dismissed the
petition on the ground that the coverage of employers and employees under the
HDMF is mandatory in character as clearly worded in section 4 of pd no. 1752 as
amended by ra 7742. Under pd 1742 and ra 7742, the Board is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations as well as amendments thereto, concerning
extensions, waiver, or suspension of coverage under the Pag-IBIG Fund. Petitioner
contends that the subject 1995 Amendments thereto by HDMF are inconsistent with
the enabling law, pd 1752, as amended by ra 7742, which merely requires as a preexisting condition for exemption from coverage the existence of either a superior
provident/retirement plan or a superior housing plan and not the concurrence of
both plans.
Issue: WON the amendment of the Board of Trustees of the HDMF is a valid as an
exercise of its rule-making power

Held: We find for the petitioners.

It is no doubt that the HDMF board has rule-making powers. However, it is a wellsettled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to
create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with the
standards prescribed by law. The amendment of the board in the rules and
regulations of ra 7742 is invalid as they are not within the delegated power of the
board. The HDMF cannot issue a regulation inconsistent with the law it seeks to
apply. Administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, nut
must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry. Only Congress can repeal
or amend the law.