VILLARICO V.

COURT OF APPEALS (305 SCRA 193)

Facts:
Spouses Teofilo Villarico and Maxima Villarico filed an application for confirmation of
title over a parcel of land in Meycauayan, Bulacan which they bought from Teofilos
father, Segundo Villarico and which they themselves and their predecessors-ininterest have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession thereof for
more than 30 years. The application was opposed by the Director of Forestry
contending that the land in question is part of the public domain hence, not
available for private appropriation.
The trial court dismissed the case reckoning that the property in question forms part
of the public domain, thus possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into
private property.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the property still forms part of the public domain.

Held:
Yes, the property still forms part of the public domain. The Supreme Court held that
both the trial court and the appellate court correctly adjudged the area to be within
the unclassified forest zone incapable of private appropriation. In the case at bar,
there has been no showing that declassification has been made declaring the land
in question as disposable or alienable. Thus, forest lands cannot be owned by
private persons, possession thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into a
registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or
confirmation of imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the
public domain.

Municipality of OAS v. ROA (7 Phil 20)

Facts:
The Municipality of Oas brought the action for the recovery of a tract of land in the
pueblo of Oas, claiming that it was part of the public square of said town. The
defendant, Roa, alleged that he was the owner of the property since he bought it
from Jose Castillo and was able to procure a possessory of information from the
justice of the peace of Oas and record it in the Registry of Property in 1894. Roa has
constructed upon the property a substantial building without opposition from the
Municipality. As early as 1852, however, the subject land had been used by the
municipality, constructed thereon buildings for the storage of property of the State.
It therefore had ceased to be property used by the public and had become a part of
the patrimonial property of the Municipality. And this fact was not unknown from the
defendant. In fact, there are admissions by him that the land was owned by the
pueblo and his grantor Castillo was not the owner of the land.

Issue:
Whether or not the land is part of the public square of the town of Oas and the
municipality owned it.

Held:
Yes, the land was owned by the Municipality of Oas. The defendant was not a
purchaser in good faith. The plaintiff, having permitted the erection of a building by
the defendant without objection acted in bad faith. The rights of the parties must be
determined as if they both had acted in good faith. To the case are applicable those
provisions of the Civil Code which relate to the construction by one of a building
upon land belonging to another. Article 364 (now Art.453) of the Civil Code is as
follows: When there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who
built, sowed, or planted on anothers land, but also on the part of the owner of the
latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in good faith. The
Supreme Court declared that the Municipality is the owner of the land and that it
has the option of buying the building thereon, which is the property of the
defendant, or of selling to him the land on which it stands.

Velayo v. Republic
GR No. L-7915, July 30, 1955

Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines filed a proof of debt in the proceedings for the
involuntary insolvency of the Commercial Airlines Inc., for its unpaid charges for the
use of Government airports and air navigation facilities. The claim has been
approved and declared preferred by the insolvency court. It is however contended
that the debts owing from the insolvent corporation was due not to the National
Government but to the National Airports Corporation. Thus, the National
Government claim cannot enjoy preference under the Insolvency Law.

Issue:
Whether or not the debt was due to the National Government.

Held:
Yes. The establishment, operation, and maintenance of airfields are air navigation
facilities undertaken by the government as a governmental function entrusted to
agencies. There appears to be no question that the airports and air navigation
facilities in question belong to the National Government. Such being the case,
compensation for the use thereof, that is, their civil fruits, must also belong to the
said government and not to the agencies that had been set up to administer or
manage them. The debt involved in the present case pertains to the Government
in its function as such government.

Lucero Jr. v. City Government of Pasig

GR No. 132834, November 24, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners were granted a lease contracts to occupy and operate stalls in the public
market of Pasig by virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983. In 1993, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 56, prescribing rules
and regulations in using and occupying market stalls. All stall occupants were
advised to submit the necessary application form which contains the terms and
conditions for the operation of the stalls, and if approved such would serve as the
lease contract. Petitioners refused to apply. The City Government of Pasig filed an
ejectment complaint against petitioners alleging that the petitioners failed to pay
the required P10,000.00 performance bond and their rental fees since January 1994
as required by the municipal ordinance. Petitioners claimed that they had faithfully
complied with their obligations as set forth in their 1983 lease contracts and it was
the City Government which refused their payments because of their failure to
submit new applications to lease. They also not pay the performance bond because
as previous stall occupants they were not required to do so.
The MTC finds the ejectment suit without merit. Dissatisfied with the lower courts
decision the city government appealed to the RTC which reversed the MTC decision.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. CA dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can claim a vested right to the market stalls they
were occupying by virtue of their lease contracts under Municipal Ordinance No. 25,
series of 1993.
Held:
No, they cannot claim a vested right upon their occupied stall by virtue of an
ordinance which has already been superseded.
A right is vested when the rights to enjoyment has become the property of some
particular person or persons as a present interest. It is unalterable, absolute,
complete and unconditional. This right is perfect in itself; it is not dependent upon a

contingency. The concept of vested right expresses a present fixed interest which
in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. It
includes not only legal and equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.
The petitioners 1983 lease contracts did not grant them irrefutable rights to the
market stalls. They were mere grantees of a privilege to occupy and operate such
booths.
What petitioners had was a license to occupy and operate particular stalls over a
period of time. Their possession and use of these facilities could not be
characterized as fixed and absolute. Indeed, petitioners did not have any vested
right to the stalls.