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BIRAOGO VS PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

G.R. No. 193036
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. --- Justice Jose P. Laurel
Facts:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010
elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of
graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino
people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted
the good senator to the presidency.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner
Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order
No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office
and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order
No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and
question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Held:
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be
resolved for the guidance of all.Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to
know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country.
The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that
clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to
perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to
society.

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Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team
and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of
the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by
the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with
care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be
accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in
nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide
whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their
mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for
violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional
safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such
that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an
"adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission
must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of
former President Arroyo.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.
Decision
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent
initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is

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the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of
violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this
issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for
it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a
hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out
the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.

ABAKADA GURO vs. PURISIMA

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system
of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC officials and employees if they
exceed their revenue targets. It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with
at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality
of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that the limiting the scope of the system of
rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
Respondent
speculation
objective of
perform are

contends that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere
and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared
RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they
distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not there is a violation of equal protection clause.
HELD:
Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are
classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When
things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed.
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its
expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the
national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special
function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great
inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately

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related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR
and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO

G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the
DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took
the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been
fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them;
and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were
dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of
1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort
women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is wellestablished that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and
the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are
and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the
question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive
all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail
in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to
our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby
creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive
Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration
the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and
those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further
steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is
asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is
resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining
redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the
position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus
cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a
legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole.
Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of
the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified
only by general international norms of equivalent authority

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WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

DE JURE VS DE FACTO PRESIDENT ARROYO A DE JURE

PRESIDENT
Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that
slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4,
2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited
reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap
informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of Eraps
surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the
powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, Eraps legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged
the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about
its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estradas reference is to a
future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on
the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on
January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing
damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after
casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent

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Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
EDSA II
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.
EDSA I
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be
the subject of judicial review
EDSA II
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession
of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.
EDSA I
presented a political question;
EDSA II
involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8
of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise
call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material
relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was
going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission before, during
and after January 20, 2001.

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3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R.
178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No.
83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is
that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress
has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not
resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot
be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such
but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also,
since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that
Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the
cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the
case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be
more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194

SCRA 317)
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing
cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the
executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and
to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided
by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold
any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive
Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless otherwise allowed by
law which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such
as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member
and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the
constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional
provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government
for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad
exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both

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constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular
instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and
void.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER VS. ELMA

June 30, 2006, Chico-Nazario
*concurrent appointments, incompatible office
N: CPM + TRO to declare null and void the concurrent appointments of ELMA as PCGG Chair and
as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
F: Elma was appointed as PCGG Chair Oct 1998. Later on he was appointed as CPLC (Jan 1999
during his term), but waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
Supervening events: Theres actually no more controversy involved: In 2001, Elma was replaced
by Sabio as PCGG. Nachura was then appointed as CPLC but pending resolution of the case, he
was appointed SOLGEN.
Arguments: Public Interest Center
CLU vs. Exec Sec: Art IX-B, Sec 7, par2 and Art VII, Sec13 are violated by concurrent
appointments
CPLC and PCGG Chair are incompatible offices
Arguments: Elma
As interpreted in CLU vs. Exec Sec, the mentioned consti provisions dont cover other public
officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.
His appointment falls under the exceptions in Art IX-B, Sec7
The 2 positions are not incompatible
NOTE: even if issue already moot, SC still took cognizance of the case because the case is
capable of repetition, and to serve as a guide to the bench.
whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the prohibition
against multiple offices imposed by Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
YES.
The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out
in People v. Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one
office has the right to interfere with the other.
[I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; x x x
Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such
as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares
that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the word, in its
application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two places,
they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which
would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of
one, toward the incumbent of the other. x x x The offices must subordinate, one [over] the
other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one with the other, before they are
incompatible at common law. x x x
***In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the
CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the
actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review
investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive
Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC.
*note: Memorandum Order No. 152, issued on 9 July 2004 (provides that CPLC review Decision
on investigation involving Cabinet Secretaries, agency heads, or Presidential appointees with
the rank of Secretary conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC))
whether such appointments violate the other constitutional provision regarding multiple offices,
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
NO if based on position. YES if based on primary functions test.

10
the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to
the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an
assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.
*Review ulit CLU vs. Exec Sec: The language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple offices or employment.
The Court cautiously allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the VicePresident to become a member of the Cabinet; or
(2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said officials office.
The Court further qualified that additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must
be required by the officials primary functions. Moreover, the additional post must be exercised
in an ex-officio capacity, which denotes an act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by
the office.[18] Thus, it will not suffice that no additional compensation shall be received by
virtue of the second appointment, it is mandatory that the second post is required by the
primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity.
*Even Section 13, Article VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to the
position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice versa.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to
respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary,
undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13,
Article VII is applicable to respondent Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to the
offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because neither office was occupied by him in an exofficio capacity, and the primary functions of one office do not require an appointment to the
other post. Moreover, even if the appointments in question are not covered by Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited under Section 7,
Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the incompatibility between
the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
Disposition: Grant petition

DENNIS B. FUNA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R.

ERMITA,
Office of the President,G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.
Post under Political Law, villarama doctrines at Monday, November 28, 2011 Posted by
Schizophrenic Mind
Judicial review; requisites. The courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Respondents assert that the
second requisite is absent in this case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action. The question on standing is whether such parties have
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

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In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing
to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and for legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the
fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for
redress of such illegal act by public officials.
Public officials; multiple office. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an exofficio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The
reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on
said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any
compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her
designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her
office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly
persuaded by respondents submission that respondent Bautistas designation as OIC of MARINA
was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC
Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as
members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General
Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines
General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary.
It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and
temporary capacity, the words hold the office were employed. Such holding of office pertains
to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties
and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well
as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the
appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in
Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same,
or to be in possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration
of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the
history of the times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed
the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such
provision, and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the
Marcos regime, of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as
members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice of

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holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public
officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant
betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos
regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of
the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution
the provisions under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils
that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment. Dennis B. Funa vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President,G.R. No. 184740, February 11,
2010.