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LBP v Natividad

Caguiat, et al. (Los) filed a petition before the SAC for the determination of just
compensation for their AGRICULTURAL LANDS in Arayat, Pampanga
The SAC ordered the DAR and LBP to pay the Los P30.00 per square meter as just
*For purposes of agrarian reform the property was acquired on 21 October 1972,
the effectivity date of PD 27, therefore just compensation should be based on the value of the
property as of that time NOT at the time of possession in 1993
.The seizure of the landholding DID NOT take place upon the date of effectivity of PD 27 but
would take effect on the payment of just compensation (OP v. CA)
The agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid the
Los has yet to be settled
Considering the passage of RA 6657 before the completion of this process, the just
compensation determined and the process concluded under RA 6657
RA 6657 is the applicable law with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect
(Paris v. Alfeche)
It would be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided
by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation
for a consideration length of time
Just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator

Lubrica v LBP
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee2 of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of
agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of
3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the
land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972) 4 and Executive Order No.
228 (1987).5 The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54
which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
NenitaSuntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of
agricultural land consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2
containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed
under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and
valued the same at P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination
of just compensation.

ISSUE: WON the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the
expropriated properties at the time of payment.

HELD: Yes.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which, under
the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners. 27 The transfer
of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by
the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with
an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to
the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet
received just compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just
compensation based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering
the failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or
E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real,
substantial, full and ample.

ASL vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining
just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the
landowner and the government even without judicial intervention so long as both parties
agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner
agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that,
the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the
landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then
it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even
so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

Land Bank v CA
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and
subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, and sought to compel the
DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts
respectively earmarked, reserved and deposited in trust accounts for private respondents, and
to allow them to withdraw the same. Petitioner DAR maintained that Administrative Order No. 9
is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. Moreover, the
DAR maintained that the issuance of the Certificate of Deposit by the Landbank was a
substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
Whether or not the opening of trust accounts is a valid payment for just compensation
It is very explicit from the provisions of RA 6657 that the deposit must be made only in
cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be
made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a trust account among the valid modes
of deposit that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have
appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a trust account is allowed. In sum, there is no
ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term deposit.

Estribillo v DAR
Private respondent Hacienda Maria Inc. requested that 527.8308 hectares of its
landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving
compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the
landholdings so that the same may be covered under Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final
survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the
corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners,
among other persons. In December 1997, HMI filed with RARAD petitions seeking the
declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its
former landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the
area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. RARAD rendered a decision
declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not
devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI
and petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the RARAD Decision. On
appeal to the CA, the same was dismissed. Petitioners contended that the EPs became
indefeasible after the expiration of one year from their registration.
Whether or not EPs have become indefeasible one year after their issuance
After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree where the DAR is required to issue the
corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with
Presidential Decree No. 27, the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the
same protection accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the
issuance of the patent. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.


Andrea Millenes allowed Bienvenido Abajon to construct a house on a portion of her
landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00. Millenes likewise allowed Abajon to plant a
portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a 50-50 basis.
When Millenes sold her land to the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the spouses told
Abajon that they intended to build a poultry close to his house and persuaded him to transfer his
dwelling to another portion of the landholding. Abajon refused to leave, even after confrontation
before the Barangay Captain of the locality.
Subsequently, Yolanda filed a criminal case against Abajon for malicious mischief for harvesting
bananas and jackfruit from their property without her knowledge. All the planting on the property
however, had been done by Abajon. The trial court ordered the referral of the case to the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the
parties. The Ministry ruled that a tenancy relationship existed between the parties, and, as such,
the case is not proper for hearing.
On appeal, the DAR (the new MAR) reversed the findings and declared that the case was
proper for trial as the land involved was residential. The new minister of the DAR, however, set
aside the said order and declared that the criminal case was not proper for trial, as there was an
existing tenancy relationship between the parties.
W/N Abajon is an agricultural tenant.
NO. To invest Abajon with the status of a tenant is preposterous. He only occupied a miniscule
portion (60m2) of a 500m2 lot, which cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered as an
economic family-sized farm. Planting camote, bananas, and corn on such a size of land cannot
produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm familys
basic needs. Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of
RA 3844. Moreover, there exists no tenancy relationship between the parties because Abajons
status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion
to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort. Agricultural production as the primary
purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that Abajon was never a tenant of Millenes.
Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship:

The parties are the landowner and the tenant;


The subject is agricultural land;


There is consent;


The purpose is agricultural production;


There is personal cultivation; and


There is sharing of harvests.

Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing laws.

Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for
the primary purpose of agricultural production.

If justice can be meted out now, why wait for it to drop gently from heaven?

Gelos vs Court of Appeals

The Private Respondent owned the subject land of 25,000 square meters in Laguna. The
Landowner then entered in to a contract with the petitioner and employed him to be laborer on
the land with the wage of 5.00 peso a day.
The Petitioner first went the Court of Agrarian Relation and then went to Ministry of Agrarian
reform and asked the court to fix the agricultural lease rental of the land and his request was
The private respondent then filed a complaint of illegal detainer against the petitioner that was
that was dismissed by the Ministry of Agrarian reform for the existence of Tenancy relations
between the parties. The Private respondents appealed to the office of the President alleging
that there was no tenancy relation between the parties.
The RTC rendered dismissed the complaint and assailed that there was a tenancy relation
between the parties.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.
Is there a Tenancy relation between the parties?
No, it was clear that the petitioner were not intended to be tenant but a mere employee of the
private respondent as showed in the contract. The petitioner was paid for specific kind of work.
The court stressed many cases that:
"tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant
does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are
even more important."
It should also be considered that a tenant is defined under Section 5(a) R.A 1199 as a person
who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the
land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
tenancy system.
Therefore the court laid down the requisites for the tenancy relationship to exist:

1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2) The subject is agricultural land;
3) There is consent;
4) The purpose is agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation; and
6) There is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.
Absence of this clearly does not qualify someone to be a tenant. It is clear that it is not a
tenancy relationship that exists between the parties, what they have is employee-employer

Gabriel v. Pangilinan
Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of a 169,507 sqm
fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly rental was
entered between them. Defendant was notified that the contract would be terminated, but upon
request was extended for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the trial court had no
jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an
agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff, the
motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the land was originally verbally leased
to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted, subject to the
condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and that which was already a
fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his
heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that he could continue leasing as
long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take
cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings, repairing dikes and such,
personally with the aid of helpers since he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar
Pangilinan, took over who said that she helps her father in administering the leased property,
conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who is residing near the fishpond,
defendants other children are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing
in Manila. None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.
Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the
present case is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his
immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between
the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the
trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199.
Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a civil
lease and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction, the
cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The leasehold
tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban

property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally
attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally
cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is
devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful
pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas
leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available
from members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy
Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the
consideration for the use thereof. The mere fact that a person works an agricultural land does
not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4 of Republic Act No.
1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are
complied with.
The court doesnt want to decide on the second requisite since it wasnt raised. For the third
requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond
personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's
immediate farm household work the land. Only the members of the family of the tenant and
such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for
support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term
"immediate farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the
land. A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from
his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work
the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the
cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as
tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy
the status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the
appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under
Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its
Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.