The Categorical Imperative

Kant starts his ethical framework by saying that [i]t is impossible to conceive
anything at all in the world [] which can be taken as good without qualification, except
a good will (Kant 1965, 61). With that statement, Kant grounds his whole ethical
framework on the possession of the good will of man. This good will for Kant is not good
because of the result, or end, that it accomplishes, but rather the good will is good in itself
(Kant 1965, 62). Kant distinguishes his ethics from other forms of ethics by not
determining goodness in the end result that it accomplishes. This is contrasted from other
forms of ethics that have happiness, either personal or general, as to what determines
what is to be good. Kant argues that determining what qualities that are to be considered
good from the end that it accomplishes cannot be a proper basis for ethical principles
because qualities such as intelligence or courage can be considered as good in many
respects; but they can also be extremely bad and hurtful when the will is not good which
has to make use of these gifts of nature (Kant 1965, 61). The good will for Kant is also
an end in itself; meaning that even if a persons actions does not accomplish the desired
end, as long as the persons actions are done out of good will, then what the person did,
without achieving its end can be considered as good (Kant 1965, 62) 1. However, why is it
that Kant gives so much value to the good will? What makes the good will so valuable?
Kant says that it is reason that gives value to the good will.
Kant argues for reason by arguing that if the purpose of a rational being
possessing a will were his/her happiness, then reason would not be the most ideal tool for
carrying out his/her happiness since happiness can be achieved more accurately by
instinct. The use of reason then, would be merely to contemplate his/her disposition.
However, reason has a practical application. And the more that man uses his/her reason,
the more likely it is that he/she is to become unhappy (Kant 1965, 63). Reason, then, does
not have its practical use in determining what it is that makes us happy, but rather, its
practical use is as on which is to have influence on the will; its true function must be to
produce a will which is good, not as a means to some further end, but in itself (Kant
1965, 64). This means that the good will is an autonomous will because it is considered
as an end in itself and therefore, is a law to itself. But how does this good will become
autonomous? Kant says that the property of freedom can explain how a good will
becomes autonomous.
For Kant, the will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they
are rational (Kant 1965, 114). For a will to become a causality of rational beings,
freedom then must be presupposed, according to Kant. The presupposition of freedom
comes from Kants argument that every being who cannot except under the Idea of
freedom is by this alone [] really free (Kant 1965, 115). Kant reasons that it would be
contradictory if we attribute the causality, or the power of judgment, of the will, to any
property other than freedom because then, the will would be determined 2 (Kant 1965,
115). If a will is not presupposed to be free, then its ability to judge rests on
1 Even if, by some special disfavor of destiny or by the niggardly endowment of step-motherly nature, this
will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions [] and only good will is left; even then it would
shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself.

determinations of objects outside of its reason and therefore, would be a judgment based
on impulse rather than reason3 (Kant 1965, 116). The good will must look upon itself as
the author of its own principles independently of alien influences (Kant 1965, 116).
After arguing that the purpose of reason is to produce a good will and that
freedom must be presupposed as a property of the good will, Kant then moves on by
saying that man has a duty to act according to the good will. His proposition for this is:
An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be attained by it, but
in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon (Kant 1965 67-68). What this
means is the same as what was discussed above, that what is considered as good cannot
come from the results that an action achieves, but instead is found from the volition, or
duty, determined by the good will, to do the action regardless of the result that it
produces. Kant then makes another proposition by saying that: Duty is the necessity to
act out of reverence for the law (Kant 1965, 68). Reverence for the law is reverence to
the command that the will makes without influence to an end to be achieved or any
inclination. Kant adds that there is nothing left able to determine the will except
objectively the law and subjectively pure reverence for this practical law, and therefore
the maxim of obeying this law even to the detriment of all my inclinations (Kant 1965,
68-69). This duty in acting out of reverence for the law is what Kant calls the
Categorical Imperative.
The Categorical Imperative is a command that represents an action as objectively
necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end (Kant 1965, 82). What this
means is that the Categorical Imperative is a command that does not have an inclination
as an end for acting upon them because it is a command that stems from the good will in
itself of man. It holds as a duty that must be followed, irrespective of our desires, out of
reverence for the lawgiving body that is the good will of man. Kant represented his
ethical framework through three main formulations. These three are the Formula of
Universal Law, Formula of the End in Itself and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends 4.
These formulations, Kant says, are at bottom merely so many formulations of precisely
the same law, one of them by itself containing a combination of the other two (Kant
1965, 103). What this means is that when we apply the Categorical Imperative in our
maxims, we should always take into consideration all of the different formulations of the
Categorical Imperative instead of choosing just one.
2 Natural necessity, as we have seen, is a heteronomy of efficient causes; for every effect is possible only
in conformity with the law that something else determines the efficient cause to causal action. What else
then can freedom of will be but autonomy that is, the property which will has of being a law to itself.
3 [W]e cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its
judgements; for in that case the subject would attribute the determination of his power of judgement, not to
his reason, but to an impulsion.
4 The Formula of Universal Law: act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law.The Formula of the End in Itself: act in such a way that you always treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at
the same time as an end.
The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: act on the maxims of a member who makes universal laws for a
merely possible kingdom of ends.