Battle of Brody (1941)

The Battle of Brody (other names in use include Battle

of Dubna, Battle of Dubno, Battle of Rovne, Battle
of Rovne-Brody) was a tank battle fought between the
1st Panzer Group's III Army Corps and XLVIII Army
Corps (Motorized) and ve mechanized corps of the Soviet 5th Army and 6th Army in the triangle formed by the
towns Dubno, Lutsk, and Brody between 23 and 30 June
1941. It is known in Soviet historiography as a part of
the border defensive battles. Although the Red Army
formations inicted heavy losses on the German forces,
they were outmanoeuvred and suered enormous losses
in tanks. Poor Soviet logistics, German air supremacy
as well as a total breakdown in Red Army command and
control ensured victory for the Wehrmacht despite overwhelming Red Army numerical and technological superiority. This was one of the most intense armoured engagements in the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa
and one of the largest tank battles of World War II.

der to encircle and destroy the enemy group of

forces advancing along the Vladimir-VolynskiKrystonopol front, and by the end of June 24th
to capture the vicinity of Lublin.[4]
By the end of 22 June, Zhukov was on his way to the
Southwestern Front headquarters at Ternopil along with
Nikita Khrushchev, the former head of the Organizational
Department of the Ukrainian Communist Partys Central
Committee, to ensure these orders were carried out.

2 Disposition of forces
Six Soviet mechanized corps, with over 2,500 tanks, were
massed to take part in a concentric counter-attack through
the anks of Panzer Group 1. The intention was to later
attempt a pincer movement from the north (Soviet 5th
Army) and south (6th Army) that met west of Dubno in
order to trap units of the 6th and 17th German Armies
on the northern ank of Army Group South. To achieve
this, the 8th Mechanized Corps was transferred from the
command of the 26th Army, positioned to the south of
the 6th Army, and placed under the command of N. I.
Muzychenkos 6th Army. This essentially brought all the
mobile assets of the Southwestern Front to bear against
the base of von Kleists thrust toward Kiev. The primary German infantry formation operating on this sector of the front, IV Army Corps (von Schwedler) of the
17th Army (Carl-Heinrich von Stlpnagel) were advancing south-east with the objective of cutting Lviv-Kiev
railway line.

Prelude

1st Panzer Group, led by Generaloberst Paul Ludwig

Ewald von Kleist, was ordered to secure the Bug River
crossings and advance to Rovno and Korosten with the
strategic objective of Kiev. It deployed two Corps forward and advanced between Lviv and Rovno in an attempt to cut the LvivKiev railway line, thus driving a
wedge along junction point between the Soviet 5th and
6th Armies.
The Southwestern Front, under the command of General
Mikhail Kirponos, had received incomplete intelligence
on the size and direction of the German attack. They were
surprised when Stavka ordered a general counter-attack
under the title of directive No. 3 on the authority of Chief
of General Sta Georgy Zhukov. Most of the headquarters sta were convinced that the strategy would be to
remain in a defensive posture until the situation claried.
Later Hovhannes Baghramyan, a sta ocer of the front
headquarters who wrote the initial report to Moscow, said
that our rst combat report to Moscow was full of generalities and unclear instructions. The general orders of
directive No. 3 read:

2.1 German Armor

At the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, German armor was composed of a mix of Czech and German tanks,
as well as captured French and British tanks, in addition to vehicles supplied by the collaborationist Vichy
France. Furthermore, nearly 50% of the tanks deployed
by the Wehrmacht were the virtually obsolete Panzer I
and Panzer II light tanks. Of the 4000 armored vehicles available to the Wehrmacht, only 1400 were the new
Panzer III and Panzer IV. In the rst few hours of the invasion, German commanders were shocked to nd that
some Soviet tanks were immune to all anti tank weapons
in use by the Wehrmacht.[5]

While maintaining strong defence of the

state border with Hungary, the 5th and 6th
armies are to carry out concentric strikes in the
direction of Lublin, utilizing at least ve mechanized corps and aviation of the Front, in or-

During pre-war exercises, Heinz Guderian noted that on

their own, tanks were very vulnerable to infantry pla1

2 DISPOSITION OF FORCES

toons. To destroy a tank on its own, the infantry needed

to merely maneuver around to the more vulnerable sides
and rear. From these positions, enemy infantry could either destroy the drive sprocket gear completely immobilizing the tank, or simply climb on top and drop a
grenade down the hatch (hatches were never locked on
any tank due to the need to make a quick escape in the
event of a re). The tank could then be destroyed at
leisure. Furthermore, Guderian also noted that tanks
lacked the heavy caliber weapons needed to knock out
reinforced concrete bunkers and heavily fortied positions, a role that could only be performed by heavy artillery or air strikes. While dispersing tanks among infantry formations solved many of the tanks weaknesses,
it also negated all of their strengths. Therefore, German
military theorists concluded that to reach their full potential, armored units needed to be concentrated in their
own formations and integrated with mobile artillery, mobile infantry, and close air support.
Lastly, Guderian concluded that in order for tanks to be
at their peak eectiveness, all armored vehicles must be
equipped with radios so that each tank commander can
hear instructions from the column commander allowing
each tank to work with all others in an organized fashion.

2.2

so many of the 10,000 tanks in the Red Army arsenal

were still dispersed among infantry divisions on the eve
of the invasion. This ensured that even if the Red Army
had a unied command, many of its armored units would
be committed piece-meal.

2.3 German Logistics

At full strength, a German Panzer Division had between
150 and 200 combat tanks. However, tanks and crews
require regular supplies of food, fuel, ammunition, and
most critically; spare parts. To support these logistical needs, each panzer division was supported by 2000
trucks. Furthermore, each Panzer division had its own
integral artillery and infantry support which meant that
rather than providing a supporting role for infantry, German panzers performed a leading role, with infantry
providing support. Furthermore, Wehrmacht doctrine
stressed the importance of training soldiers in roles performed by other men. Tank crews were trained in artillery
roles, infantry trained as tank crews, etc. Most importantly, Tank crews were also trained as mechanics, giving
them the knowledge to x broken equipment in the eld.

Soviet Armor

At the beginning of June, the Red Army boasted over

10,000 tanks in their inventory, most of them light tanks
such as the T-26 or BT-7. The front armor for the T-26
was just 15mm thick, and the BT-7, just 22mm, oering virtually no protection against any anti tank weapon
at any range. Furthermore, the poor design of Soviet
shells meant that most rounds shattered on contact, rather
than detonating. More modern tanks and shells, such as
the KV-1 and the T-34, were only beginning to roll o
production lines in Leningrad, Kharkov, and Stalingrad
and were not available in anywhere near the numbers that
were needed to throw back the German advance. A Russian state television documentary, Soviet Storm, stated
that for Soviet light tanks, it would prove to be a very
short, very bloody war.[5]
During the interwar years, far sighted military theorists
such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky came to similar conclusions as Heinz Guderian regarding tanks in modern warfare. However old cavalry men such as Semyon Budyonny
held favor with Stalin and Tukhachevsky was executed.
Budyonny believed that tanks would never replace horses
in warfare, and only existed to support infantry platoons
in breaking through fortied strong points. Therefore,
Red Army tanks were dispersed widely throughout infantry divisions in the 1930s. Then came the shock of the
Fall of France. Surviving armored warfare theorists such
as Konstantin Rokossovsky were quickly and quietly reinstated in their positions and began assembling tanks into
concentrated formations with all possible speed. However, by June 1941 this process was barely half complete,

2.4 Soviet Logistics

At the insistence of Stalin, no defensive preparations were
made in the Soviet Union.[5] That meant that ammo and
supply dumps were not concealed. Compounding the
problem is that Stalin strictly forbid any Red Army unit
from opening re on reconnaissance patrols, allowing the
Germans to easily identify all major command posts, air
elds, and supply dumps in the border districts. The result
of these poor preparations meant that all of these points
were all knocked out or heavily damaged by air raids in
the opening hours of the war.
Furthermore, Soviet tank crews were not trained on the
mechanical details of their machines. That meant that
simple mechanical problems resulted in hundreds of Red
Army tanks being abandoned on the road side en route
to the battle. Those units that did manage to show up
at their jumping o points then discovered that the supplies had either been destroyed or moved to another location without updating their locations. After receiving
orders to attack and now out of fuel or ammo, the crews
of these tanks responded to their orders by blowing up
their own vehicles and retreating. Hundreds of additional
tanks were lost in this way before joining battle.[5][6]
Compounding these logistical diculties was that each
Red Army tank division had 300400 tanks, but were
supported by only 1500 trucks, contrasting with a
Wehrmacht tank division which had only 150200 tanks,
but 2000 trucks. Experience would prove that the Germans got it right.[5]

Balance of the tank forces

Battle in the air

between Sokal and Radekhiv, on the left ank of the

15th Mechanized Corps. The plan called for these forces
On 22 June 1941, the balance of tanks over the entire to assemble and begin oensive operations at 22:00 on
area of the German Army Group South and the Soviet 23 June, 36 hours after the initial German onslaught, in
Southwestern Front, including but not limited to the main an attempt to catch the attackers o guard, and before
they could solidify their position by bringing up reinforcebattle of Brody, was as follows.
ments from the rear in support of their fast-advancing
11th Panzer Division.

The condition of the Soviet Air Force assigned to the

Southwestern Front followed the pattern of the entire
front line: the majority of its aircraft had been destroyed
on the ground as a result of Stalin disregarding intelligence that a German attack was imminent refusing to
put Soviet forces on alert. For example, Lt. Arkhipenkos
17th Fighter regiment were caught on the ground and almost totally destroyed by the third day of the war. The remainder of the regiment, comprising only ten I-153s and
one MiG-1, retreated to a reserve aireld near Rovno.[7]
Still, the Soviets sent their surviving aircraft to support
the oensive.
The air battle resulted in heavy casualties for the attacking Soviets. JG 3, under the command of Fliegerkorps
IV, shot down 24 Tupolev SBs on the rst day. Among
the casualties was the commander of 86 SBAP, Lt.-Col.
Sorokin. Just 20 of the initial 251 SBs remained with
the unit. German losses were also heavy, with 28 destroyed and 23 damaged aircraft (including 8 He 111s and
Ju 88s).[8] The eorts of the Red Army Air force were
not without eect, as the Southwestern Front air force
ew 523 sorties between 22 June and 24 June, dropping
2,500 bombs. Gustav Shrodek, a tank commander of the
15th Panzer regiment (11th Panzer Division), recorded
the scene: At dawn of June 24th, the regiment underwent its rst attack by Russian bombers. It shall not be the
only one this day; completely the opposite. As a result of
this the regiment now has several dead and wounded.[9]
Near total Luftwae air superiority was to be a major factor in breaking up the Soviet counter-attack.

Mobilization

The attack combined six mechanized corps under the

command 5th Army to the north and the 6th Army to the
south, under the general direction of Southwestern Front
commander Kirponos. Under the 5th Army command,
Konstantin Rokossovsky's 9th and N. V. Feklenkos 19th
Mechanized Corps were to be deployed north-west of
Rovno, while the 22nd Mechanized Corps was to assemble northeast of Lutsk. To the south, under the command of the 6th Army, Dmitry Ryabyshev's 8th and I.
Karpezos 15th Mechanized Corps were to be deployed
to the south-west and north-east of Brody, while The 4th
Mechanized Corps under A. Vlasov was to be deployed

Conditions were dicult for the Soviet Corps commanders: loss of communications, constant harassment by the
Luftwae, lack of transportation, and the movement of
large numbers of refugees and retreating soldiers on the
roads made it dicult for the counter-attacking forces to
assemble at their jumping o points. While communication between the Front headquarters and the individual army commands was generally good, communication
to the front-line units was seriously awed, because it
was dependent on the civilian telephone and telegraph
network.[10] German sappers, air attacks, and Ukrainian
nationalist guerrillas had aggressively targeted these systems. Many Soviet front-line commanders were left to
their own devices, and this had an impact on the eectiveness of Soviet command and control. In one instance, the
commander to the 41st Tank Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps, for want of any new directives, moved his
division to the designated assembly point for his corps
at Kovel laid out in the pre-war plan and, and in so doing, moved his division away from the ghting.[4] Another
endemic problem was the lack of transport for the infantry component of the Mechanized Corps. Motorized
in name only, many of these divisions had only part of
their full transportation establishment. Individual corps
commanders had to improvise solutions to bring their full
complement of soldiers to their assembly points.
Rokossovsky commandeered 200 trucks from the district
reserve at Shepetivka, but this still left him in the position of mounting much of his infantry on tanks. Even
then, many soldiers had to walk, since the trucks were
carrying critical munitions and supplies.[11] In one case,
heavy artillery pieces belonging to the 22nd Mechanized
Corps was simply left behind for want of tractors to
pull them.[12] The commander of the 19th Mechanized
marched his corps forward in two echelons with the tank
divisions far in advance of his lagging infantry, which
meant that his armored units arrived at the battleeld
without infantry support.[13] Ryabyshev, commander of
the 8th Mechanized, reported similar problems. His artillery was towed by exceedingly slow tractors that held up
the movement of the entire column: The columns were
moving at top speed. Unfortunately, the tractor-towed
corps artillery was falling severely behind; the dierence
in speed was slowing down the overall concentration of
forces.[14]
These complications were compounded by the apparent
inability of the Soviet commanders to assess an appropriate axis of attack in the context of the rapidly developing German salient. Between 22 June and 24 June, the

SOVIET COUNTER-ATTACKS

8th Mechanized Corps received three dierent locations jectives. There was little to no communication between
for its assembly point: the original order from the Front the individual corps to ensure co-ordination.
Command, a new one from the commander of the 6th
Army, and on 24 June another order from the Front command. The Corps crossed its own path and backtracked 6.1 10th Tank Division
several times before nally arriving at Brody.
The Soviet 10th Tank Division was subordinate to 15th
Ryabyshev later wrote:
Mechanized Corps. On 22 June 1941, the forward battalions captured Radekhiv from the German infantry, losAround the second half of June 25, the
ing two tanks.[17] The next day it faced the German 11th
Corps units deployed to the northwest of
Panzer Division there, destroying 20 German tanks and
Brody. During the nearly 500 kilometer
losing 6 T-34 tanks and 20 BT tanks.[17] It withdrew in an
march, the Corps lost up to half of its older
orderly fashion for the lack ammunition.[17] On 26 June
tanks and a substantial portion of its artillery
1941, the division destroyed 23 German tanks and an inand anti-tank guns to both enemy air attack
fantry battalion near Radekhiv, losing 13 KV and 12 BT-7
and mechanical breakdowns. All of the tanks
tanks.[17]
still in service also required varying degrees
of maintenance work and were not capable of
operating over long distances. Thus, even be6.2 15th Mechanized Corps
fore the start of the counteroensive the Corps
found itself in a drastically weakened state.[3]
Commanded by I. I. Karpezo.[18]
As a result of these and other problems assembling the
forces for the attack, the scheduled time for the operation
was set back 6 hours to 04:00 on 24 June.[15] By the time
this decision was made on the evening 23 June, barely
48 hours since the war had begun, the 11th Panzer Division, with the 16th Panzer Division traveling in its wake,
had already penetrated 40 miles into Soviet territory. The
13th and 14th Panzer Divisions were well their way up
the road to Lutsk with the objective of reaching the Styr
River on the 24th, and the 44th, 298th, and 299th Infantry
Divisions were moving up to consolidate the advance.[15]
Even with the delayed schedule, the counter-attack began piecemeal, since the full complement of forces could
not be brought into position until two days later. The
4th, 8th, 9th, and 19th Mechanized Corps were still on
the march and supporting infantry corps were even further away. Kirponoss Chief of Sta, General Maksim
Purkayev, argued against the political ocer attached to
the Southwest Front, Commissar Nikolai Vashugin, on
this point but Vashugin and Zhukov won out: the attack
would begin without delay. Only two tank divisions of
15th Mechanized Corps in the south and a single tank division of 22nd Mechanized Corps in the north were in
position to begin the attack on the 24th.[16]

The 15th Mechanized Corps as a whole had 749 tanks, including 136 T-34 and KV tanks. Due to a series of inconsistent orders, the Corps spent the battle moving chaotically in the RadekhivBrodyBusk triangle. Except for
the two engagements with the 10th Tank Division, its
forces were not in combat. On 7 July 1941 it reported
in Berezovka (300 kilometres (190 mi) from the former
border) with nine per cent of its tanks.[19]

6.3 22nd Mechanized Corps

Commanded by Major-General S. M. Kondrusev.[18]
On 24 June the 22nd Mechanized Corps attacked towards
Vinnitsa. On 29 June it reported as having 19 per cent of
its former number of tanks.[19] On 1 July one regiment
unsuccessfully attacked toward Dubno.[20] On 15 July
1941 the 22nd MC had 4 per cent its tanks remaining.[19]

6.4 19th Mechanized Corps

Commanded by Major General N. V. Feklenko.[3]
On 26 June it attacked towards Dubno from the north, but
failed to reach it by a few kilometers.[20] On 29 June the
corps had 32 tanks[19] remaining out of the original 453.

Soviet counter-attacks
6.5 8th Mechanized Corps

Three Soviet formations deployed a potent force of modern T-34 and KV tanks: the 4th, 8th, and 15th Mechanized Corps.[2] The 717 such tanks comprised almost a
half of the countrys 1,600 production of these two models. Throughout the battles, the scale of the intended operations and the precise role of each corps in the plan were
communicated poorly or not at all. Ryabyshev noted that
the Corps battle orders spoke only to its own mission ob-

Ryabyshevs 8th Mechanized Corps nally arrived on the

scene on the 25th. On 26 June 1941, the 8th Mechanized
Corps as a whole successfully attacked in the direction
of BrodyBerestechko against parts of the German 11th
Panzer Division.[20] Despite haphazard arrangements and
diculties, the Soviet attack met with some initial success, catching the Germans on the move and outside their

6.6

4th Mechanized Corps

prepared positions, their tanks sweeping aside hastily arranged German anti-tank positions manned by motorcycle troops attached to the 48th Panzer Corps. Later
the 8th MC split, with some amalgamating into Popel's
group and a second force remaining under the command
of Ryabyshev.

6.6 4th Mechanized Corps

The 4th Mechanized Corps commanded by Andrei

Vlasov was the strongest in the Ukraine, having 313 T34 and 101 KV among its total of 979 tanks. It reacted
slowly to orders and failed to assemble for attack. The
most it achieved was on 28 June, when it secured the retreat of 15th Mechanized Corps from the pushing Ger6.5.1 Popels group
man infantry. Whilst not attacking or being attacked, the
corps reported it retained no more than 6 per cent of its
Popel's group had about 300 tanks, including no less than
KV tanks, 12 per cent of its T-34 tanks, and 4 per cent
100 T-34 and KV tanks. On 27 June, Popels group surof its light tanks on 12 July.
prised and defeated the rears of 11th Panzer Division and
captured Dubno, a road crossing of strategic importance. Besides these, there were no more notable Soviet counter[20]
This was the most successful Soviet action of the battle, attacks in this battle.
as it cut o supply lines of the German armoured spearhead (the 11th Panzer Division). However, this was not
exploited by Soviet command, who failed to communi- 7 Decision, indecision, and confucate with Popel and to provide supplies or reinforcements.
sion of command: the historical
The group waited in Dubno and prepared for defense, losing the operational initiative.
debate
The situation was considered serious by the German
high command:
The impact of the hesitation and confusion of command
on the 27th of June on the outcome of the battle and the
In the Army Group South sector, heavy
German attack into Ukraine is hard to determine.
ghting continues on the right ank of Panzer
When the Soviet forces took Dubno and cut o the leadGroup 1. The Russian 8th Tank Corps has
ing edge of the main German attack, Kirponos thought
eected a deep penetration of our front and is
that the same German attack threatened to outank and
now in the rear of the 11th Panzer Division.
encircle the Soviet forces attacking from the south. This
This penetration has seriously disrupted our
led him to order a halt to the oensive and a general rerear areas between Brody and Dubno. The
treat in order rationalize (shorten) his front line, so as to
enemy is threatening Dubno from the southprevent the enemy tank groupings from penetrating into
west ... the enemy also has several separate
the rear of the 6th and 26th Armies, according to H.
tank groups acting in the rear of Panzer Group
Baghramyan.[3]
1, which are managing to cover considerable
distances.
After a debate with the Front commander and his sta,
General Franz Halder, diary[3]
Georgy Zhukov quickly had these orders countermanded;
orders for a renewed attack were issued two hours later.
This led to even more of the confusion that was sympBy 28 June the Germans had gathered enormous forces. tomatic of the Soviet command at the Battle of Brody.
The Popels group came under attack by elements of the Rokossovsky, who was in command of the 9th Mecha16th Motorized, 75th Infantry Division, two other in- nized Corps attacking from the north, simply balked at
fantry divisions, and the 16th Panzer Division. Encir- these new orders, stating that we had once again received
cled in Dubno, Popel defended until 1 July, when he an order to counter-attack. However, the enemy outnumretreated.[21]
bered us to such a degree, that I took on the personal responsibility of ordering a halt to the counteroensive and
to meet the enemy in prepared defenses.[3] Meanwhile,
6.5.2 Ryabyshevs group
Ryabyshev commanding the 8th Mechanized Corps to the
Ryabyshevs group had 303 tanks, including 49 T-34 and south, complied with the order and remounted the attack.
46 KV. On 28 June, in an attempt to follow Popel, it
met and attacked the German 57th Infantry and 75th
Infantry Divisions, as well as elements of 16th Panzer
Division. The attack was unsuccessful and the Soviets
quickly retreated.[22] On 1 July Ryabyshev reported in
Tarnopol with 207 tanks, including 31 T-34 and 43 KV
tanks.[23][lower-alpha 2] With no further combat, the 8th MC
moved to Koziatyn, where on 7 July 1941 it had 43 tanks
5 per cent of the pre-war number.[19]

Ryabyshev seems to take the position held by Zhukov at

the time, which is that if the attack had continued aggressively and without delay, the Soviets might have been successful. However, subsequent events seem to vindicate
Kirponoss position, which was that the attack was premature and would destabilize the solvency of the entire
front. Shortly after the Soviet counter-attack was routed,
Marshal Semyon Budyonny was given overall command
of the combined Southwestern and Southern Front. Dis-

11

REFERENCES

aster unfolded at the Battle of Uman and 100,000 So- maining assets to other formations of the Southwestern
viet soldiers were killed or captured and another 100,000 Front.
wounded when three Red Army formations; the 26th,
12th and 18th army were encircled after Army Group
South renewed its attack by pivoting south from the posi- 10 Notes
tions it had achieved during the Battle of Dubnoan outcome that Kirponos had foreshadowed in his arguments [1] Total German tanks includes non-combat commander
with Zhukov about the wisdom of the counter-attack at
tanks as well as outdated Panzer I and Panzer II tanks.
Dubno.
The confrontation between Kirponos and Zhukov led
Zhukov to tell the Southwestern Front political ocer,
Nikita Khrushchev, I am afraid your commander (Kirponos) here is pretty weak,[24] a charge that Kirponos
would never be able to answer, since he died in the battle
of Kiev after it was surrounded.

Summary

The battle between Panzer Group 1 and the Soviet mechanized corps was the ercest of the whole invasion, lasting
four full days. The Soviets fought furiously and crews of
German tank and anti-tank guns found to their horror that
the new Soviet T-34 tanks were almost immune to their
weapons. The new KV-1 and KV-2 heavy tanks were impervious to virtually all German anti-tank weapons, but
the Red Armys logistics had completely broken down
due to Luftwae attacks.

[2] Quoting Ryabyshev: On July 1, 1941, the operational

strength of the 8th Mechanized Corps, now comprising
the 12th Tank and 7th Motorized Divisions, amounted to
19,000 men, 21 armored cars and 207 tanks, including
43 KVs, 31 T-34s, 69 BT-7s, 57 T-26s and 7 T-40s.
Ryabyshev 2002 These surviving elements were folded
into what became Ryabyshevs 38th Army.

11 References
[1] Popel 2001, p. 414.
[2] Soonin 2007, pp. 528529.
[3] Ryabyshev 2002.
[4] Kamenir 2008, p. 101.
[5] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0A6UWkK2U4s
[6] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N0WKPrgf9sY
[7] Kamenir 2008, p. 149.

The German Kampfgeschwader bomber wings, namely [8] Bergstrm 2007, p. 38.
KG 51, KG 54, and KG 55, contributed a series of
heavy low-level attacks against Soviet ground targets. [9] Kamenir 2008, p. 152.
The headquarters of the Soviet 15th Mechanised Corps [10] Kamenir 2008, p. 113.
was destroyed, and its commander, General-Major Ignat
Karpezo, was wounded. The Luftwae destroyed some [11] Kamenir 2008, p. 118.
201 Soviet tanks in this area.[25]
[12] Kamenir 2008, p. 111.
The ve Red Army corps were mishandled while being [13] Kamenir 2008, p. 120.
concentrated into large powerful groups. The German
troops sought to isolate individual units and destroy them. [14] Kamenir 2008, p. 156.
Meanwhile the Luftwae ranging over the battleelds was [15] Kamenir 2008, p. 127.
able to separate the supporting infantry and deny them resupply of fuel and ammunition.[26] Ultimately due to lack [16] Kamenir 2008, p. 126.
of adequate planning and overall coordination, the Soviet [17] Soonin 2007, pp. 310315.
counter-attack failed to meet at Dubno.
[18] Zaloga, Steven (1994). T-34/76 Medium Tank 194145.
Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781855323827.

After the battle

[19] Soonin 2007, pp. 261262.

[20] Soonin 2007, p. 379.

Panzer Group 1 took a severe battering in the battles

around Dubno, losing many of its tanks, but it survived
the battle still capable of operations. The Soviet forces
took severe casualties, rendering most of its forces nonoperational. This defensive success enabled the Germans
to continue their oensive, even if it had been delayed
substantially by the tenacity of the Soviet counter-attack.
The 8th mechanized corp was so badly depleted, that the
Stavka disbanded its headquarters and parceled out its re-

[21] Soonin 2007, pp. 361, 375.

[22] Soonin 2007, pp. 373, 379.
[23] Soonin 2007, p. 374.
[24] Khrushchev 1971, p. 175.
[25] Bergstrm 2007, p. 39.
[26] Deichmann 1999, p. .

12

Sources

Bergstrm, Christer (2007). Barbarossa The

Air Battle: JulyDecember 1941.
London:
Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-8578-0270-2.
Deichmann, Paul (1999). Price, Alfred, ed. Spearhead for Blitzkrieg: Luftwae Operations in Support
of the Army 19391945. New York: Ivy Books.
Kamenir, Victor (2008). The Bloody Triangle: The
Defeat of Soviet Armor in the Ukraine, June 1941.
Minneapolis: Zenith Press. ISBN 978-0-76033434-8.
Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1971). Talbott,
Strobe, ed. Khrushchev Remembers 1. Andr
Deutsch.
Popel, Nikolai (2001). (in Russian).
Moskva: Izd-vo AST. ISBN 5-17-005626-5.
Ryabyshev, D.I. (19 September 2002). On the role
of the 8th Mechanized Corps in the June 1941 counteroensive mounted by the South-Western Front.
The Russian Battleeld. Retrieved 19 June 2013.
Soonin, Mark (2007). 22 czerwca 1941 czyli Jak
zacza si Wielka Wojna ojczyniana (in Polish).
Pozna, Poland: Dom Wydawniczy Rebis. ISBN
978-83-7510-130-0.

13

Further reading

Haupt, Werner (1997). Army Group Centre: The

Wehrmacht in Russia 19411945. Atglen: Schier
Military History. ISBN 0-7643-0266-3.

14

14
14.1

TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

Text

Battle of Brody (1941) Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Brody_(1941)?oldid=671080751 Contributors: Cherkash, Auric,

Lysy, Wwoods, Irpen, Beringar, Pavel Vozenilek, Giraedata, Tabletop, Ketiltrout, Tswold, Vladko, Noclador, Bleakcomb, Grafen, Welsh,
Tony1, Reyk, Mercenary2k, SmackBot, Chris the speller, Horlo, Andrwsc, Filiep, Thijs!bot, Biruitorul, Kubanczyk, C-Star, Erik Baas,
JAnDbot, Tigga, Dodo19~enwiki, Buckshot06, The Anomebot2, Dapi89, Aleksandr Grigoryev, Mrg3105, MisterBee1966, DH85868993,
VolkovBot, Andrein, Rosiestep, Isaacblue72, Arbiter of Elegance, Tervan, AlanM1, WikHead, Addbot, Jncraton, SpBot, Lukaszrzepinski,
Luckas-bot, Ajh1492, AnomieBOT, Xqbot, Alexandre loichon, StoneProphet, Diwas, DocYako, Tim1357, Diannaa, Ryan.opel, WikitanvirBot, Muta112, Shortmagic11, Bahavd Gita, ChuispastonBot, Peter Karlsen, Helpful Pixie Bot, AvocatoBot, Livedawg, Hamish59,
ChrisGualtieri, BRICspert, Mogism, Cerabot~enwiki, Ukeduke, EyeTruth, Delisgore22, Monkbot and Anonymous: 36

14.2

Images

File:Battle_of_Dubno.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/11/Battle_of_Dubno.svg License: CC BY-SA

3.0 Contributors: Painted with Wacom Intuos3, prepared in Adobe Illustrator and exporterd to SVG 1.1 Original artist: Llaird McKinnley
File:Flag_of_German_Reich_(19351945).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Flag_of_German_
Reich_%281935%E2%80%931945%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fornax
File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1923-1955).svg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Flag_of_the_
Soviet_Union_%281923-1955%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: created by rotemliss from Image:Flag of
the Soviet Union.svg.

14.3

Content license

Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0