CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DEFINITION: The study of the maintenance of the proper

balance between authority as represented by the three inherent powers of the State
and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
120Manila Prince v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997)
HELD: A Constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.
What is the Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy? Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the Constitution,
that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997] [Bellosillo])
CLASSIFICATION
I. Written vs. Unwritten
1. Written one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of
documents.
2. Unwritten consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single,
concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statutes of fundamental
character, judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists, customs and traditions,
and certain common law principles.
II. Conventional vs. Cumulative
1. Conventional an enacted constitution, formally struck off at a definite time
and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or
ruler.
2. Cumulative result of political evolution, not inaugurated at any specific time
but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method.
III. Rigid vs. Flexible
1. Rigid one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process.
2. Flexible one that can be changed by ordinary legislation.

 The Constitution of the Philippines is written, conventional and rigid

ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION

1. Broad
Not only because it provides for the organization of the entire government and
covers all persons and things within the territory of the State but more so because it
is supposed to embody the past, to reflect the present and to anticipate the future.
The constitution must be comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency.
2. Brief
It must be brief and confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with
legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend.
3. Definite
Ambiguity in its provisions will result in confusion and divisiveness among the
people, and perhaps even physical conflict.
Exception: Found only in those cases where the rules are deliberately worded in a
vague manner, like the due process clause, to make them more malleable to judicial
interpretation in the light of new conditions and circumstances.
ESSENTIAL PARTS OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION
1. Constitution of Liberty
Series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the
citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of
securing the enjoyment of these rights.
ARTICLES II, III, IV, V, and, XII.
2. Constitution of Government
Series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its
powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration and defining the
electorate.
ARTICLES VI to XI
3. Constitution of Sovereignty
Consists of provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with
which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about.
ARTICLES XVII
INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
TAXATION - Power of the State to demand enforced contributions for public
purposes.

POLICE POWER - Power of the State to enact such laws in relation to persons and
property as may promote public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare of
the public. Use of property is regulated for the purpose of promoting the general
welfare.

EMINENT DOMAIN - Power of the State to take private property for public use
upon paying to the owner a just compensation to be ascertained according to law.
XXX..XXX
POLICE POWER
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328 SCRA 836, March 27, 2000,
1st Div. [Puno]
HELD: Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been
defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the
subjects of the same. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this
power to the President and administrative 122boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
The exercise of the police power lies in the discretion of the legislative
department. No mandamus is available to coerce the exercise of the police power.
The only remedy against legislative inaction is a resort to the bar of public opinion,
the refusal of the electorate to return to the legislature members who, in their view,
have been remiss in the discharge of their duties.
Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508 (1991)
HELD: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the
maxims, "Sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas" and "Salus populi est suprema lex."
Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience
of the people.
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and
most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends
the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an
existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life,

and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on
which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., p. 896) However, it is not confined within
narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the
legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. LAC, supra).
PASEI v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)
HELD: The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has
been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. "Its
scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." It
finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its
origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn
in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the
plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."
"The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it
is not inaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming necessity.' It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is
"rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare."
Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of
individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations.
For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to
further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of
the power.
Police power may sometimes use the taxing power as an implement for the
attainment of a legitimate police objective.

123Tio v. VRB, 151 SCRA 208 (1987)

HELD: "The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which
impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another.
"It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation'." Taxation has been made the implement of the state's
police power.
The power of eminent domain could also be used as an implement of the police
power.
Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA, 321 SCRA 106 (1999)
Q. What powers of the State are involved in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)? Discuss.
HELD: The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States police power
and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention
limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights
provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. The CARL was not intended to take away property without due
process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due
process be observed in the taking of private property.
Republic v. MERALCO, 391 SCRA 700 (2002)
Q. Discuss why rates to be charged by public utilities like MERALCO are
subject to State regulation.
HELD: The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the
police power of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and
regulations of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is
used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris
privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the
common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by
discontinuing use; but as long as the use of the property is continued, the same is
subject to public regulation. In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State
protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the
efficiency and quality of services rendered.
However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe
rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on
investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair

return on the public utility upon the value of the property performing the service
and one that is reasonable to the public for the service rendered. The fixing of just
and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer
interests.
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA, 329 SCRA 314 (2000)
Q. Discuss the nature of the authority of local government units to issue
or grant licenses or permits.
HELD: The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is
essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local
government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the
exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general
welfare clause of the Local Government Code.
Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508 (1991)
HELD: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal
corporations (Balacuit v. CFI
of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise
such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which
is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police
power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the
creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations
may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which
are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes
conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them
to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the
people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations
are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the
inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal
corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish
the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28
N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must
have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their
governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity.
(62 C.J.S., p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the
exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39
Phil. 102).
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause:
pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and
issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper
to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property
therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337,

"every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for
governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve
morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be
with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense
includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It
covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it
is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to
bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the
preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128).
Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Philtread Workers Union [PTWU] v. Confesor, 269 SCRA 393, March 12,
1997
HELD: Article 263(g) of the Labor Code (vesting upon the Secretary of Labor the
discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to the national interest
and thereafter, assume jurisdiction over disputes in said industries) does not
interfere with the workers right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the
exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the
Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to
ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers
and the employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given
undue preference.
The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what
industries are indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination of
the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, it
will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. The assumption of
jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. This is done for the promotion
of the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical
to the national economy.
REQUISITES
LAWFUL SUBJECT: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power
LAWFUL MEANS: The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

 The first requisite simply means that the subject of the measure is within the
scope of the police power, that is, that the activity or property sought to be
regulated affects the public welfare. As long as the object is the public welfare and
the subject of regulation may be properly related thereto, there is compliance with
the first test requiring the primacy of the welfare of the many over the interests of
the few.
Even if the purpose be within the scope of the police power, the law will still be
annulled if the subject is sought to be regulated in violation of the second
requirement. In Constitutional Law, the end does not justify the means. The lawful
objective, in other words, must be pursued through a lawful method; that is, both
the end and the means must be legitimate. Lacking such concurrence, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Phil 580 (1915)
HELD: There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine
Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the
Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and
undoubtedly foreign mto any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with
the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But
where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public
health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts
cannot substitute their own views for what is proper in the premises for those of the
Legislature. If a law relates to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, or general
welfare of the community, it is within the scope of the police power of the State.
Within such bounds the wisdom, expediency, or necessity of the law does not
concern the courts. "It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of
social and economic conditions affecting the community at large and collectively
with a view to bring about 'the greatest good of the greatest number.' Courts have
consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for
the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying
social conditions demand correction." From whatever direction the social, economic,
or general welfare of the people is menaced, there is legal justification for the
exercise of the police power; and the use of private property may be regulated or
restricted to whatever extent may be necessary to preserve inviolate these declared
essentials to the well being of the public. It has long been recognized that uses of
private property which are offensive to the senses of smell of hearing may be so
regulated or segregated as to disturb as little as possible the pursuits of other
persons.
It is not the adoption of a new principle but simply the extension of a wellestablished principle to hold that the police power may also regulate and restrict
uses of private property when devoted to advertising which is offensive to the sight.
The indiscriminate use of outdoor advertising tends to mar not only natural outdoor
landscapes but whatever of civic beauty has been attained by the expenditure of
public moneys for parks, boulevards, and buildings. The widespread agitation in
many European countries, as well as in the United States, against the so-called

billboards the most common form of this kind of advertising shows that they
are a source of annoyance and irritation to the public and interfere with the proper
enjoyment of outdoor life by the general public. This justifies their suppression or
regulation to the extent that they interfere with the right of the public.
Taxicab Operators of MM v. BOT, 117 SCRA 597 (1982)
HELD: Petitioners farther take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is
arbitrary and oppressive because of roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their
kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their
actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of
registration. As public respondents contend, however, it is impractical to subject
every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it
can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and
evens graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all
vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that
reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have
fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained.
At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is
also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. The Board's reason for
enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared
to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant
use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the
same in every city, a substantial distinction exist so that infringement of the equal
protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. As enunciated in the
preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is
the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare
of society. (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 48 [1970]. It may also regulate property rights.
(Samson vs. Mayor of Bacolod City, 60 SCRA 267 [1974]. In the language of Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". (The Constitution of the
Philippines, Second Edition, p. 548.)

Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 324 (1986)

HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It
is not the
non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to

coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of
sanctions,
the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act
not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for
nonpayment
of a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
Acts mala
in se are not the only facts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered
by
society as inherently wrong, hence not malum in se, but because of the harm that it
inflicts
on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The
state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
DECS v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533 (1989)
FACTS: The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After
three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT
for the fourth time.
HELD: The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject
and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It
is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is

not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives
and
health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose
of the
law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical
schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not
qualified to be
doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional
right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is
involved;
and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the
responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not
dissipated or,
no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will
best
promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If
one who
wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and
adviced.
Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not
force
his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise
as a
pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate
this career
may be for others.
127The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute.
The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or
course

of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic

requirements."
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those
better
prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in
our
already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like
him,
have been tested and found wanting.
Sangalang v. IAC, 176 SCRA 719 (1989)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and
Orbit
Streets to vehicular traffic?
HELD: There is no merit in BAVA's claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit
and
Jupiter Streets amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law or
expropriation without just compensation. There is no taking of property involved
here. The
act of the Mayor now challenged is, rather, in the concept of police power.
Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for
just
compensation. However, it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the
burden of
showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.
Our considered opinion is that BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit
Street
was unjustified, or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. The fact that it has led to the
loss of
privacy of BAVA residents is no argument against the Municipality's effort to ease
vehicular
traffic in Makati. Certainly, the duty of a local executive is to take care of the needs
of the
greater number, in many cases, at the expense of the minority.
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197 (1994)

Q. May solicitation for religious purposes be subject to proper regulation by the

State in the
exercise of police power?
HELD: Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight
inconvenience, in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without
doubt, a
State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in
the
community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to
establish his
identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The
State is
likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the
interest of
public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guarantees of the free exercise
of
religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said
that a law
advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one
interfering
with the free exercise of religion merely because it also incidentally has a
detrimental
effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the
public
interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not
unreasonably
obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection,
even
though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not
constitute a
prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an
inadmissible
obstacle to its exercise.
Villacorta v. Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480 (1986)

HELD: Regulation is a fact of life in any well-ordered community. As society becomes

more
and more complex, the police power becomes correspondingly ubiquitous. This has
to be so
for the individual must subordinate his interests to the common good, on the timehonored
justification of Salus populi est suprema lex.
In this prolix age, practically everything a person does and owns affects the public
interest
directly or at least vicariously, unavoidably drawing him within the embrace of the
police
power. Increasingly, he is hemmed in by all manner of statutory, administrative and
municipal requirements and restrictions that he may find officious and even
oppressive.
It is necessary to stress that unless the creeping interference of the government in
essentially private matters is moderated, it is likely to destroy that prized and
peculiar virtue
of the free society: individualism.
128Every member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare,
must not be
deprived of the right to be left alone or, in the idiom of the day, "to do his thing." As
long as
he does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must not be unduly
curtailed.
We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it
deteriorate
into an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the individual. The
so-called
"general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official
arbitrariness.
Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights
of the
individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public.
This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the
police

power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the
general
welfare clause.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006
May a Law be declared unconstitutional because of the illegal acts done in pursuant
of its
implementation?
FACTS: Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate direct injury.
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24,
2006, they
were arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th
Anniversary of
People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc.
claimed
that on February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives raided and ransacked without
warrant
their office. Three policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible
source of
destabilization. Again, the basis was PP 1017.
And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their
members
were turned away and dispersed when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala
Avenue, to
celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I.
A perusal of the direct injuries allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows
that they
resulted from the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.
ISSUE: Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the
basis of
these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it
unconstitutional?
HELD: Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid
although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for

abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be

determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end
desired, not from its effects in a particular case. PP 1017 is merely an invocation of
the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to
suppress all
forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired
which
prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017
allowing the
police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens
constitutional rights.
Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that
its
implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the
validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the
exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. This is
logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared
unconstitutional
just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so,
judging
from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court,
majority
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared
unconstitutional a
long time ago.
Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 485 (2000)
Q. How should laws that grant the right to exercise a part of the police power of the
State
be construed?
Held: Lest the idea gets lost in the shoals of our subconsciousness, let us not forget
that
PAGCOR is engaged in business affected with public interest. The phrase affected
with

public interest means that an industry is subject to control for the public good; it
has been
129considered as the equivalent of subject to the exercise of the police power.
Perforce, a
legislative franchise to operate jai-alai is imbued with public interest and involves an
exercise of police power. The familiar rule is that laws which grant the right to
exercise a
part of the police power of the state are to be construed strictly and any doubt must
be
resolved against the grant. The legislature is regarded as the guardian of society,
and
therefore is not presumed to disable itself or abandon the discharge of its duty.
Thus,
courts do not assume that the legislature intended to part away with its power to
regulate
public morals. The presumption is influenced by constitutional considerations.
Constitutions
are widely understood to withhold from legislatures any authority to bargain away
their
police power for the power to protect the public interest is beyond abnegation.
It is stressed that the case at bar does not involve a franchise to operate a public
utility (such as water, transportation, communication or electricity) the operation
of which
undoubtedly redounds to the benefit of the general public. What is claimed is an
alleged
legislative grant of a gambling franchise a franchise to operate jai-alai. A statute
which
legalizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed and every
reasonable doubt must be resolved to limit the powers and rights claimed under
its authority.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Who May Exercise?
Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137, March 14, 2000
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its

authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that
case is
that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by
individuals
with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the Constitution and the laws more
sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature
interferes with
that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of ah individual
without his
consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful]
interpretation.
Exercise of Eminent Domain by LGUs
Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678, July 20, 1998
[Panganiban]
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may
delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An
LGU may
therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized
by
Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints imposed "through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160,
which
delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for
its
exercise.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the
power
of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or
for

the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of
the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain
pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance
with the
first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter.
An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary
for an
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.
130Requisites for Proper Exercise
1- Taking of private property
2- Public use/purpose
3- Payment of just compensation
4- Valid offer to buy and refusal of offer
TAKING in the Constitutional Sense
> May include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of
the
value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses fro which the property was
intended.
Requisites for a valid taking:
1. Exproprietor must enter a private

property
2. Entry must be for more than a
momentary period
3. Entry must be under warrant or
color of authority
4. Property must be devoted to public
use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected
5. Utilization of the property must be
in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment
Taking under Eminent Domain distinguished from Taking under the Police
Power
PPI v. COMELEC, [G.R. No. 119694. May 22, 1995.]
To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions
specified in
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2722, amounts to "taking" of private personal property
for public
use or purposesxxx
The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de
minimis
temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary
value of the
compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The
taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the
Constitution, but not
without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the
necessity
of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be
avoided by
respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as
petitioner PPI

reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate"

free print
space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to
publishers to
donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest.
The
threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be
examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to
effect
the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by
respondent
Comelecxxx
Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has
been
granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative
authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed. . . . Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
TELEBAP, Inc. v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, April 21, 1998 [Mendoza]
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises,
do not
own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals
and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a
franchise is
a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
Consequently, a license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no
constitutional right
to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the
exclusion of
his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the
government

from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself
as a
proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from
the airwaves. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves,
no
private property is taken by the requirement that they provide airtime to the
Comelec.
131Meaning of Public Use
Traditional Concept: The number of actual beneficiaries determines public purpose.
If
the benefits redound in favor of individuals, then the purpose is not public.
Concept of vicarious benefit: Abandons the traditional concept. The purpose is
public
as long as the society in general is indirectly benefited, i.e. conversion of a slum
area into a
model housing community. There is a vicarious advantage to the society.
Filstream International Incorporated v. CA, 284 SCRA 716, Jan. 23, 1998 [Francisco]
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to
acquire
private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona
fide
tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the
city.
That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does
not
diminish its public character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and
shelter
for all who need them.
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into
a flexible
concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader
notion of

indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and
housing.
Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, 349 SCRA 240, Jan. 16, 2001, (Public Use
Requirement; Payment of Just Compensation)
In the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary
for the
legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term "necessary", in this connection,
does not
mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the
taking for the
stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. The respondent cannot
attain a
self-sustaining and viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the
surrounding
areas are hampered by the mere refusal of the private landowners to part with their
properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other facilities is better served
if
respondent directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.
The Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private
property for a
particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the
improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed
improvement,
the existence of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of
constructing it,
the suitableness of the location selected, are all questions exclusively for the
legislature to
determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own
views for
those of the representatives of the people.
In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the
necessity
and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially
political
and not judicial in their character.

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of
the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land
within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the
consequences of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. 46 Payment of
just
compensation should follow as a matter of right immediately after the order of
expropriation
is issued. Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, the
delay to
constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must
be
deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of justice.
Payment of Just Compensation
Just compensation is described as a full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from the
private owner by the exproprietor. This is intended to indemnify the owner fully for
the losss
he has sustained as a result of the expropriation.
Just compensation = actual or basic value of the property
+ consequential damages
- consequential benefits (which should not exceed the
consequential damages)
The basic or market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by
parties
willing but not compelled to enter into a contract of sale.
132Acquisition of Easement of Right-of-Way
The exercise of the power of eminent domain does not always result in the taking or

appropriation of title to the expropriated property; it may only result in the

imposition of a
burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss or title or
possession. In
this case, while it is true that the plaintiff is only after a right-of-way easement, it
nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as
manifested y the
imposition by the plaintiff upon the defendants that below said transmission lines,
no plant
higher than 3 meters is allowed. (NPC v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1)
How expropriation may be initiated? Two Stages in Expropriation of Land
Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000,
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not dismissal of the action, "of
condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned,
for the public use or purpose declared in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint"xxx.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the
court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by
the
court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissionersxxx
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been
completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over
the
property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has
been
completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains
with

the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to
an
owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the
State
ultimately to acquire it through expropriation.
Is prior unsuccessful negotiation a condition precedent for the exercise of
eminent domain?
SMI Development Corporation v. Republic, 323 SCRA 862, Jan. 28, 2000
Current effective law on delegated authority to exercise the power of eminent
domain is
found in Section 12, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:
SEC. 12. Power of Eminent Domain The President shall determine when it
is necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in
behalf of the National Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever
he deems the action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the
proper court.
The foregoing provision does not require prior unsuccessful negotiation as a
condition
precedent for the exercise of eminent domain. In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of
Appeals, the President chose to prescribe this condition as an additional
requirement
instead. In the instant case, however, no such voluntary restriction was imposed.
When Ownership transferred to Expropriator
Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from
the
owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.
Jurisprudence
on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic
jurisdictions.
When may the Expropriator enter the Property?
Upon receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection
or no

response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated
by DAR
of the compensation in cash or in Land Bank Bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR
shall take immediate possession of the land xxx (Land Bank v. CA & DAR v. CA)
When used as Implement of Police Power
133Power of Eminent Domain is utilized as an implement of Police Power to promote
the welfare
of the people.
It is the Constitution itself which mandated the pursuit of Agrarian Reform Program
to
address once and for all the plight of the landless and the poor which for centuries
has been
the source of discontent and unrest. (ASLP v. Sec. DAR)
POWER OF TAXATION
- Does the power to tax include the power to destroy?
The power to tax includes the power to destroy if it is used as an implement of the
police
power (regulatory) of the State. However, it does not include the power to destroy if
it is
used solely for the purpose of raising revenue. (ROXAS vs. CTA)
NOTES:
> If the purpose of taxation is regulatory in character, taxation is used to
implement
the police power of the state.
> If the power of taxation is used to destroy things, businesses, or enterprises and
the purpose is to raise revenue, the court will come in because there will be
violation
of the inherent and constitutional limitations and it will be declared invalid.
- Taxes distinguished from Licenses
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. CA, 329 SCRA 314, March 31, 2000, En
Banc [Purisima]
The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to

encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals,
comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory
in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised
for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this
power.
The power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be
exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all
concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.
Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do
business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular
profession. The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is
issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A
business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in
business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other
hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or
exercise of his or her profession.
The Life-Blood Doctrine
Taxes are the life-blood of the Government and their prompt and certain
availability are an imperious need. (CIR v. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105)
The existence of the government is a necessity; the main source of the
government is taxes. These are the life-blood of the government. The
government will not be able to survive and continue to perform its functions
without taxes. (CIR v. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 8)
- Can taxes be subject to off-setting or compensation?
Philex Mining Corporation v. CIR, 294 SCRA 687, Aug. 28, 1998 [Romero]
Taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the
government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There
is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the
Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in
its sovereign capacity. It must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a tax is

that it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain. Hence, a tax does not
depend upon the consent of the taxpayer. If any taxpayer can defer the payment
134of taxes by raising the defense that it still has a pending claim for refund or
credit, this would adversely affect the government revenue system. A taxpayer
cannot refuse to pay his taxes when they fall due simply because he has a claim
against the government or that the collection of a tax is contingent on the result
of the lawsuit it filed against the government.
- Tax Exemptions
Sec. 28[3], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 28. (3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages
or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and
all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall
be exempt from taxation.
Sec. 4[3], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 4. (3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the
dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions,
their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those
cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions
subject to the limitations provided by law including restrictions on
dividends and provisions for reinvestment.
CIR v. CA, 298 SCRA 83, Oct. 14, 1998 [Panganiban]
Laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for the
YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the abovecited provision, it
must prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification
nonstock,
non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be

exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was
submitted by private respondent to prove that it met the said requisites.
- Who may grant tax exemptions?
Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, Dec. 9, 1998 [Panganiban]
The power to tax and to grant exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a
certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28(4), Article VI of the
Constitution, specifically provides: No law granting any tax exemption shall be
passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even
under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.
- Tax Treaties; International Juridical Double Taxation
CIR v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA 87, June 25, 1999, 3rd Div.
[Gonzaga-Reyes]
The RP-US Tax Treaty is just one of a number of bilateral treaties which the
Philippines has entered into for the avoidance of double taxation. The purpose of
these international agreements is to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of
the contracting parties in order to help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxation
in two different jurisdictions. More precisely, the tax conventions are drafted with
a view towards the elimination of international juridical double taxation.
International juridical double taxation is defined as the imposition of
comparable taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in respect of the
same subject matter and for identical periods.
The apparent rationale for doing away with double taxation is to encourage
the free flow of goods and services and the movement of capital, technology and
persons between countries, conditions deemed vital in creating robust and
135dynamic economies. Foreign investments will only thrive in a fairly predictable
and reasonable international investment climate and the protection against
double taxation is crucial in creating such a climate.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS

THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

Sec. 1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31, Dec.
12, 1997 [Romero]
When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made
between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural
due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while
substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures
by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just."
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc
[Puno, Dissenting Opinion]
Proceeding from this premise of relativism of rights, I venture the view that
even assuming arguendo respondent's weak claim, still, the degree of denial of
private respondent's rights to due process and to information is too slight to
warrant the interposition of judicial power. As admitted in the ponencia itself, an
extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is, thus, futile to determine what it is.
What is certain is that it is not a criminal proceeding where there is an accused
who can claim the entire array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Let it be
stressed that in an extradition proceeding, there is no accused and the guilt or
innocence of the extraditee will not be passed upon by our executive officials nor
by the extradition judge. Hence, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
extraditee. Indeed, an extradition proceeding is summary in nature which is
untrue of criminal proceedings. 18 Even the rules of evidence are different in an
extradition proceeding. Admission of evidence is less stringent, again because the
guilt of the extraditee is not under litigation. It is not only the quality but even the
quantum of evidence in extradition proceeding is different. In a criminal case, an

accused can only be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In an

extradition proceeding, an extraditee can be ordered extradited "upon showing of
the existence of a prima facie case." If more need be said, the nature of an
extradition decision is different from a judicial decision whose finality cannot be
changed by executive fiat.
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000, En Banc
[Puno]
Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when
it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination
should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when
they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be
"condemned to suffer grievous loss." We have explained why an extraditee has
no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition
Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against
him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the
basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the
formal petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to know is momentarily
withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate
the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential
extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of
the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition
proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal
branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our
Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations.
136Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance
which can be adjusted as the extradition process moves from the administrative
stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that
will come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private
respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due

process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to
resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial of
due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
People v. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163, Jan. 24, 2001, 1st Div. [Kapunan] [Void
for Vagueness Doctrine]
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties. A criminal statute that "fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests
and convictions," is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or
indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an
offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.
We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario: As a rule, a statute or act
may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
Lumiqued v. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125, Nov. 18, 1997 [Romero]
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing
and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during
custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative
inquiry.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be
akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in
an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of

the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself,
and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or the law.
Fabella v. CA, 282 SCRA 256, Nov. 28, 1998 [Panganiban]
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following:
(1) The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights;
(2) A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend
one's rights;
(3) A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records
or made known to the parties affected.
Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard.
Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 220 SCRA 536, march 30, 1993, En
Banc [Bellosillo] (When prior notice and hearing may be dispensed with)
137We held that a previous hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor does the
constitutional requirement of due process demand that the correctness of the
Monetary Board's resolution to stop operation and proceed to liquidation of first
adjudged before making the resolution effective.
One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing; bank runs
would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process,

fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire
banking community." Admittedly, the mere filing of a case for receivership by the
Central Bank cab trigger a bank run and drain its assets in days or even hours
leading to insolvency even if the bank be actually solvent. The procedure
prescribed in Sec. 29 is truly designed to protect the interest of all concerned, i.e.,
the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank itself, and the general public,
and the summary closure pales in comparison to the protection afforded public
interest. At any rate, the bank is given full opportunity to prove arbitrariness and
bad faith in placing the bank under receivership, in which event, the resolution
may properly nullified and the receivership lifted as the trial court may determine.
TAN vs. BARRIOS, [G.R. Nos. 85481-82. October 18, 1990.]
In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in
principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or
not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no
retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal,
rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the
Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only
in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was
serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the
sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, is
no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against
him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due
processxxx
The public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without or
in excess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of the
dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority to
refile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners who had been tried
and acquitted by Military Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is
an unreasonable application of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will be

searched in vain for such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever
faced a court martial, much less those who had been acquitted by such bodies
more than a decade ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. hereinxxx
The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the
petitioners and their co-accused before Military Commission No. 1. The principle
of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should
not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of the
petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of
their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military
commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period
of martial law, had been affirmed by this Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission
No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and came before us.
Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information
against the petitioners would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in
constitutional logic.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Sec. 1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
TELEBAP, Inc. v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337, April 21, 1998 [Mendoza]
There are important differences in the characteristics of the two media which
justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes. Because of the
138physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of
necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them. There is
no similar justification for government allocation and regulation of the print
media.
From another point of view, the SC has also held that because of the unique
and pervasive influence of the broadcast media, [n]ecessarily x x x the freedom
of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the

freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.

ISAE v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000, 1st Div. [Kapunan]
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor
Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser
compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of
equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regards to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization. X x x
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the
long honored legal truism of "Equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School
(International School, Inc.), its "international character" notwithstanding.
People v. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163, Jan. 24, 2001, 1st Div. [Kapunan]
A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its
operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not
prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty,
although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on
its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated
alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it
an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the
face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only

be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not

to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not
presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination."
People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb. 3, 2000, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago]
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Sec. 2, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
139 Sec. 3, 2nd par., Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Requisites of Valid Search Warrant and Warrant of Arrest
Government of the USA v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002, En
Banc [Panganiban] [Vitug, Dissenting Opinion] (Is Prior Notice and Hearing
Required before Judge Issues Warrant of Arrest in Extradition
proceeding?)
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law

It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses

the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification
would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts
and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such
facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
considered immediate. The law could not have intended the word as a mere
superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of impairing a sense of urgency and
swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is
not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to
make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material
then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression a
prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards
the arrest and detention of the accusedxxx
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression
from these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether
the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to best
serve the ends of justice. He could have determined whether such facts and
circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact,
he actually concluded from these supporting documents that probable cause
did exist.
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the
petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the
Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez.

Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the
answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In
connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word hearing is
notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that
stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary (See Sec. 9,
PD 1069) in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the
more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a
hearing every little step in the entire proceedingsxxx
Verily x x x sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request
for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them
ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the
Law could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would
have been defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez,
does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest
xxx
140To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to
notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People (280 SCRA 365, October 9, 1997) and in all the cases cited
therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing
just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the judge must have sufficient
supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the
very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence
of probable cause.
In Webb v. De Leon (247 SCRA 652, 680, per Puno, J.), the Court categorically

stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a
warrant of arrest x x x.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely
further examine complainants and their witnesses (Ibid; citing Allado v. Diokno,
233 SCRA 192, May 5, 1994). In the present case, validating the act of
respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his
witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire
system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present
evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at
this stage if he so desires in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a
procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown
trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case
superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of
extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is
not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the
accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one
not the opposite would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated
predisposition to flee.
Determination of Probable Cause is a Judicial Function
Abdula v. Guiani, 326 SCRA 1, Feb. 18, 2000, 3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes]
The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose
different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged
and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on
the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should
base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be

no confusion as to their distinct objectives.

Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on
the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the
prosecutors report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge
the accused for an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must
decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the
existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This
responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic
law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the
judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the
information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of
the records and the evidence on hand as to enable the His Honor to make his
personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors
recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor
enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties
and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the
141Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable
cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that
a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the
report of the investigating officer.
Particular Description of Place to be Searched or Persons or Things to be
Seized
People v. Estrada, 296 SCRA 383 [Martinez]
The applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. In the
present case, it must be noted that the application for a search warrant was

accompanied by a sketch of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,

Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private
respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a squarexxx
With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the
residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to
segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound.
But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is
516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place
to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private
respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private
respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search
warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.
People v. CA, 291 SCRA 400, June 26, 1998 [Narvasa]
It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from
that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched
although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when
they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the
warrant itself, not what applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in
the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.
Instances of Valid Warrantless Searches
1- Search incidental to a lawful arrest
2- Consented search
3- Stop & frisk
4- Plain view
5- Search on a moving vehicle
6- Customs search
7- Check points
Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, June 17, 1999, En Banc [Davide]

While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to

discover dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of
the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control
where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid
arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large
majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed.
Consented Search
People v. Leila Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, Dec. 18, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza]
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure
of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
142recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security
procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has
come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well
as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search
and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply
to routine airport procedures.

(Her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it
was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in
flagrante delicto.)
Plain View Search
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, Jan. 22, 1999, En Banc [Puno]
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of
such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where
the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view
and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency,
or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view
and may be seized.
People v. Abe Valdez, G.R. No. 129296, Sept. 25, 2000, En Banc[Quisumbing]
For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
a) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
b) The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the
right to be where they are; and
c) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
Stop-and-Frisk Search
Manalili v. CA, 280 SCRA 400, Oct. 9, 1997 [Panganiban]
In the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s): Where a police officer

observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of

his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course
of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and make
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself or others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him.
Malacat v. CA, 283 SCRA 159, Dec. 12, 1997 [Davide]
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a stop-and-frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
143police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-andfrisk
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Searches at Checkpoints
People v. Usana, 323 SCRA 754, Jan. 28, 2000, 1st Div. [Davide]
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do
intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to free passage without
interruption, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief

detention of travelers during which the vehicles occupants are required to

answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor
its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of
an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks,
when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
Instances of Valid Warrantless Arrests
Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence.
(Inflagrante delicto)
b) When an offense had just been committed and there is
probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge or of other
circumstances, that the person to be arrested committed the offense. (Hot
pursuit)
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. (Escapee)
In Flagrante Delicto Arrest
People v. Molina, 352 SCRA 174, Feb. 19, 2001, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago]
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
Arrest in Hot Pursuit
When an offense had just been committed and there is probable
cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge or of other
circumstances, that the person to be arrested committed the offense.

Under this paragraph, 2 stringent requirements must be complied with, namely:

1- An offense had just been committed, and
2- There is probable cause, based on his personal knowledge of the
person making the arrest or of other circumstances, that the person to be
arrested committed the offense. [Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political
Law]
Can the place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, be amplified or modified
by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they
adduce in support of their application for the warrant?
144Held: Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia
the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of
choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the
warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant
to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has
precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the
place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the
warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting
the search.
It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from
that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched
although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when
they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the
warrant itself, not what applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in
the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. (People v. Court of
Appeals, 291 SCRA 400, June 26, 1998 [Narvasa])
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE
Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence

shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when

public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
- Zulueta v. CA (253 SCRA 699)
The right may be invoked against the wife who went to the clinic of her
husband and there took documents consisting of private communications
between her husband and paramour.
R.A. No. 4200
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND
OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF
COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or
by
using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or
acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape
record,
wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of
this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in
any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof,

shall not be covered by this prohibition.

SECTION 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or
cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or
who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order issued
thereunder,
or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the
offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the
offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
145SECTION 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or
punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court,
to
execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in
cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in
case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations
of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against
national security: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted
upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has
been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed: Provided,
however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal
to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and
inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a
rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being
committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be
obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the

prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or
persons whose communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to
be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic
communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its
location; (2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or
record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the
offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the
authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the
order
which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless
extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or
renewal is in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours
after the expiration of the period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a
sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the
peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the
dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records
included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or
any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are
included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or
package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in
evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not
be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the
person or persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of
First Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is
applied for are to be executed.
SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,

substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
SECTION 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed
or accordingly amended.
SECTION 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA, 235 SCRA 111, Aug. 4, 1994 [Padilla]
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations
allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Navarro v. CA, [G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999.]
146Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had
made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmativexxx
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Is there a Constitutional Right to Privacy?
Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno]
The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone.
The SC clarified that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in
several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of
the Bill of Rights. Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various
provisions of the Bill of Rights, i.e., Secs. 1, 2, 6, 8, and 17.
Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, En Banc [Pardo]
Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares
bank deposits to be absolutely confidential except:
1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general

examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board

after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank
fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is
necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank
to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit
purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the
bank,
3) Upon written permission of the depositor,
4) In cases of impeachment,
5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials, or
6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that [e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons and punishes as actionable
torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also
holds public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for
any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code
makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, revelation of trade and
industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in
special laws like the anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and
the Intellectual Property Code.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Sec. IV, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.

 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R No. 133486, Jan. 28,

2000, En Banc [Panganiban]
The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It
does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type
of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other
147valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding
or
minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.
It is concluded that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is
outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of
the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections,
exit polls properly conducted and publicized can be vital tools for the holding
of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of
election-fixing, fraud and other electoral ills.
Content-Based and Content-Neutral Restrictions on Free Speech
Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447, March 31, 1998 [Mendoza]
Content-based restrictions are imposed because of the content of the
speech and are, therefore, subject to the clear-and-present danger test. For
example, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad v. Comelec (181 SCRA 529
[1990]), prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from
campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have compelling
reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These
restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of
constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth
and vagueness.
Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, like Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No.
6646, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political
candidates during the campaign period, are not concerned with the content of the
speech. These regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to
support them. A deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validity.

The clear-and-present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for determining the

constitutional validity of laws, like Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which are not
concerned with the content of political ads but only with their incidents. To apply
the clear-and-present danger test to such regulatory measures would be like
using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is
needed.
SWS, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, En Banc [Mendoza]
Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of
freedom of speech, expression, and the press.
To be sure, Section 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech,
expression, and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results
affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days
immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a local
election. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech,
expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption
of invalidity.
O Brien Test should then be employed to determine the constitutional
validity of Section 5.4 (United States v. O Brien): A government regulation is
sufficiently justified
(1) if it is within the constitutional power of the government;
(2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
(3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and
(4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms (of
speech, expression and press) is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest
is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if the
purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should

nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is

greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question.
Live Media Coverage of Court Proceedings
Supreme Court En Banc Resolution Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of
the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case, dated Oct. 22,
1991
148The propriety of granting or denying permission to the media to broadcast,
record, or photograph court proceedings involves weighing the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, the right of the public to information and the
right to public trial, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the due process
rights of the defendant and the inherent and constitutional power of the courts to
control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial administration
of justice.
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as
well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further
that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be
served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video
footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to
shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken
prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the
Plunder Cases Against Former President Joseph E. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-403-SC, June 29, 2001, En Banc [Vitug]
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing
out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to
public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused,
on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance.
A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long
ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
The Doctrine of Fair Comment
Borjal v. CA, 301 SCRA 1, Jan. 14, 1999, 2nd Div. [Bellosillo]
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute
a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity,
it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a
public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of
opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens
to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
Vasquez v. CA, 314 SCRA 460, Sept. 15, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza]
Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to
official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement
was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in
the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan, which this Court has cited with
approval in several of its own decisions. 26 This is the rule of "actual malice." In
this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by
petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their
falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.

A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of
official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such
allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It
would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as
members of a self-governing community. Without free speech and assembly,
149discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice
Brandeis has said, "public discussion is a political duty" and the "greatest menace
to freedom is an inert people."
Right to Peaceably Assemble
Jacinto v. CA, 281 SCRA 657, Nov. 14, 1997, En Banc [Panganiban]
The exercise of the rights of free speech and of peaceful assembly to petition
the government for redress of grievances "is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society," regulation
was limited to the mayor's reasonable discretion in issuing a permit to determine
or specify only the streets or public places to be used for the purpose and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC Ricardo C.
Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Transparency in
Government [ULAT], G.R. No. 134621, Sept. 29, 1998
B.P. Blg. 880 did not establish streets and sidewalks, among other places, as
public fora. A close look at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations. Thus, it requires a written permit for the
holding of public assemblies in public places subject, even, to the right of the
mayor to modify the place and time of the public assembly, to impose a rerouting
of the parade or street march, to limit the volume of loud speakers or sound
system and to prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the
public assembly.
To insulate the judiciary from mob pressure, friendly or otherwise, and isolate

it from public hysteria, this Court merely moved away the situs of mass actions
within a 200-meter radius from every courthouse. In fine, B.P. Blg. 880 imposes
general restrictions to the time, place and manner of conducting concerted
actions. On the other hand, the resolution of this Court regulating
demonstrations adds specific restrictions as they involve judicial independence
and the orderly administration of justice. There is thus no discrepancy between
the two sets of regulatory measures. Simply put, B.P. Blg. 880 and the assailed
resolution complement each other.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Sec. 8, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Jacinto v. CA, 281 SCRA 657, Nov. 14, 1997, En Banc [Panganiban]
Does the right of civil servants to organize include their right to strike? Clarify.
Held: Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was
positively recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) v.
Ferrer-Calleja (203 SCRA 596, November 15, 1991). But, as in the exercise of the
rights of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable
limitations such as the legitimacy of the purposes of the association, the
overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic
institutions (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382, December 27, 1972, per Castro, J.,
where the Court, while upholding the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act which
outlawed the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive"
organizations, clarified, "Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of
association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be
clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national
security and the preservation of democratic institutions in this country." It
cautioned, though, that "the need for prudence and circumspection [cannot be

overemphasized] in [the law's] enforcement, operating as it does in the sensitive

area of freedom of expression and belief.")
150As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with
the proviso "in accordance with law." This is a clear manifestation that the state
may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such
right. Executive Order No. 180 (Issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on
June 1, 1987) which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of
government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC
circular which "enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government
officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves,
walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage
or disruption of public service" (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987, dated
April 21, 1987) by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sector
do not enjoy the right to strike. Alliance of Concerned Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1, August 3, 1983, also per
Gutierrez, Jr., J.) rationalized the proscription thus:
"The general rule in the past and up to the present is that the 'terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law.' X x x. Since the
terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by the workers
in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The
principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace
cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private
employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject
to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare
legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private
sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government

employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given

delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms
and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements." (Ibid., p. 13)
After delving into the intent of the framers of the Constitution, the Court
affirmed the above rule in Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA)
v. Court of Appeals (175 SCRA 686, July 28, 1989) and explained:
"Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations,
either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of
employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not
fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be
referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate
action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts
and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to
pressure the Government to accede to their demands. As now provided under
Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the
Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after
the instant dispute arose, '[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the
government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are
governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of
securing changes [thereto].'' (Ibid., p. 698)
Petitioners public school teachers walked out of their classes and engaged in mass
actions during certain dates in September 1990 protesting the alleged unlawful
withholding of their salaries and other economic benefits. They also raised national
issues, such as the removal of US bases and the repudiation of foreign debts, in
their
mass actions. They refused to return to work despite orders to do so and

subsequently were found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the
service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools
during regular school days, and penalized. They denied that they engaged in
strike but claimed that they merely exercised a constitutionally guaranteed right
the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances - and, therefore, should not have been penalized. Should their
contention
be upheld?
151Held: Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government
employees, do not seek to establish that they have a right to strike. Rather, they
tenaciously insist that their absences during certain dates in September 1990
were a valid exercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembly
to petition the government for a redress of grievances. They claim that their
gathering was not a strike, therefore, their participation therein did not constitute
any offense. MPSTA v. Laguio (Supra, per Narvasa, J., now CJ.) and ACT v. Carino
(Ibid.), in which this Court declared that "these 'mass actions' were to all intents
and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage
of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken
for essentially economic reasons," should not principally resolve the present case,
as the underlying facts are allegedly not identical.
Strike, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of work done by
the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A
labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions
of employment; or the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employers and employees. With these premises, we now evaluate the
circumstances of the instant petition.
It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the
petitioners resulted in the non-holding of classes in several public schools during

the corresponding period. Petitioners do not dispute that the grievances for
which they sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public authorities essentially, their "employers" - to fully and justly implement certain laws and
measures intended to benefit them materially x x x. And probably to clothe their
action with permissible character (In justifying their mass actions, petitioners
liken their activity to the pro-bases rally led by former President Corazon C.
Aquino on September 10, 1991, participated in, as well, by public school teachers
who consequently absented themselves from their classes. No administrative
charges were allegedly instituted against any of the participants.), they also
raised national issues such as the removal of the U.S. bases and the repudiation
of foreign debt. In Balingasan v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 124678, July 31,
1997, per Regalado, J.), however, this Court said that the fact that the
conventional term "strike" was not used by the participants to describe their
common course of action was insignificant, since the substance of the situation,
and not its appearance, was deemed controlling.
Moreover, the petitioners here x x x were not penalized for the exercise of
their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves
without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order
to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the
nonholding
of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they
were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time - recess,
after classes, weekends or holidays - to dramatize their grievances and to
dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one - not the
DECS, the CSC or even this Court - could have held them liable for the valid
exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary
stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public
services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes

by government workers. Their act by their nature was enjoined by the Civil
Service law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made
answerable.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
- Sec. V, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
- Sec. 6, Art. II, 1987 Constitution
152SECTION 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
- Sec. 29[2], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 29. (2) No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
- Sec. 3[3], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 3. (3) At the option expressed in writing by the parents
or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or
wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class
hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious
authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong,
without additional cost to the Government.
The Two Aspects of Freedom of Religion
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones belief. The first is absolute

as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare (J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256,
March 1, 1993, En Banc [Grino-Aquino]
While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of
their religion, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are
powerless to discipline them if they should commit breaches of the peace by
actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons.
If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates
and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose
a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right
(and duty) to prevent.
INC v. CA, 259 SCRA 529, July 26, 1996 [Puno]
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as
long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject
to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare.
The Iglesia Ni Cristo's postulate that its religious freedom is per se beyond
review by the MTRCB should be rejected. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious programs brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear
and present danger of a substantive evil which the State is duty-bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion
can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its

blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our

society today. "For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space
for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its
rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its
exercise destroys, the State should not stand still."
Did the MTRCB act correctly when it rated X the Iglesia Ni Cristo's pre-taped TV
program simply because it was found to be "attacking" another religion?
153Held: The MTRCB may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by the
Iglesia Ni Cristo but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however
unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the
State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.
Religious dogma and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their
followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion
prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis--vis religious
differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed
and immovable stance. In fine, the MTRCB cannot squelch the speech of the INC
simply because it attacks another religion. In a State where there ought to be no
difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the
remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of
religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace
of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of
opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas, that can fan the embers of truth.
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197, Sept. 1, 1994 [Regalado]
Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation
for "charitable or public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a
religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare purpose.
Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as those
solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor.
Such solicitation does not engage the philanthropic as much as the religious

fervor of the person who is solicited for contribution.

To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be
allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if
allowed, may well justify requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday
collections or enforce tithing.
Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, Aug. 16, 1999, 1st Div. [Kapunan]
An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship
of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of
needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power
of excluding from such associations those deemed not worthy of membership.
Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between
the
church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship
and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called
ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for
excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments
and other activities with attached religious significancex x x
Where what is involved is the relationship of the church as an employer and the
minister as an employee and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith,
worship or doctrines of the church, i.e., the minister was not excommunicated or
expelled from the membership of the congregation but was terminated from
employment, it is a purely secular affair. Consequently, the suit may not be
dismissed invoking the doctrine of separation of church and the state.
THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
- Sec. 6, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within
the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.

THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN

154 Sec. 7, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, Dec. 9, 1998 [Panganiban]
Some of the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern:
1) National security matters and intelligence information.
2) Trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code [R.A. No.
8293, approved on June 6, 1997] and other related laws) and banking
transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act [R.A. No. 1405, as
amended]);
3) Criminal matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and
the detention of criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest,
detention and prosecution;
4) Other confidential information. The Ethical Standards Act (R.A. No. 6713, enacted
on February 20, 1989) further prohibits public officials and employees from using
or divulging confidential or classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the public. (Sec. 7[c], ibid.)
5) Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic
correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either
house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
As to the meanings of the terms public interest and public concern, the Court, in
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, elucidated:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern
there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern like public interest is a

term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives,
or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether
the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Sec. 10, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
Is the constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations absolute?
Held: Nor is there merit in the claim that the resolution and memorandum
circular violate the contract clause of the Bill of Rights.
The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the
social justice provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which have been greatly
enhanced and expanded in the 1987 Constitution by placing them under a
separate Article (Article XIII). The Article on Social Justice was aptly described as
the "heart of the new Charter" by the President of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, retired Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma. Social justice is identified with
the broad scope of the police power of the state and requires the extensive use of
such power. X x x.
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not
absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts
with respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that may
be asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public
subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and
involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by
it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by
enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals,
155comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may

thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the
power of the State to regulate and control them.
Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect
them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to
change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may
require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate
the necessity. And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject
to the police power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are
impressed with public interest. Article 1700 thereof expressly provides:
Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual.
They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the
common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor
unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid
implementations of E.O. No. 797 (Creating the POEA), which was enacted under
the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that
they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established
constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause.
(The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA, 243 SCRA
666, April 21, 1995 [Davide, Jr.])
Petitioners pray that the present action should be barred, because private
respondents have voluntarily executed quitclaims and releases and received their
separation pay. Petitioners claim that the present suit is a "grave derogation of the
fundamental principle that obligations arising from a valid contract have the force of
law between the parties and must be complied with in good faith."
The Court disagrees. Jurisprudence holds that the constitutional guarantee of
non-impairment of contract is subject to the police power of the state and to
reasonable legislative regulations promoting health, morals, safety and welfare.

Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy, except (1) where
there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. In
these cases, the law will step in to annul the questionable transactions. Such
quitclaim and release agreements are regarded as ineffective to bar the workers
from claiming the full measure of their legal rights.
In the case at bar, the private respondents agreed to the quitclaim and
release in consideration of their separation pay. Since they were dismissed
allegedly for business losses, they are entitled to separation pay under Article 283
of the Labor Code. And since there was thus no extra consideration for the
private respondents to give up their employment, such undertakings cannot be
allowed to bar the action for illegal dismissal. (Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane
Planters Association, Inc. v. NLRC, 296 SCRA 108, 124, [Panganiban])
THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED
Sec. 12, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
156(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation
of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

 People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455, Feb. 1, 1999, En Banc [Per Curiam]
Procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or
investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of
making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation
in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438 (An
Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating
Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof):
1) The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language known to and understood
by said person;
2) He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement
he makes may be used as evidence against him;
3) He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have
the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own
choice;
4) He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a
lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by
any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the
person arrested or one acting on his behalf;
5) That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that
no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence
of his counsel of after a valid waiver has been made;
6) The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or
messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by
any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with

duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be

the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7) He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it
is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood
the same;
8) In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be
informed that it must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his
waiver and chooses to speak;
9) That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner
at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with
warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if
the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has
already begun;
10) The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to
remain
silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at
any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements;
11) He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be,
obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory,
in whole or in part, shall be admissible in evidence.
People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190, May 17, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza]
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this
constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods
such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in
paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) those which are given without the benefit of
Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same Section 12.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of
conclusive evidence showing the declarants consent in executing the same has

been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.

157Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the
crime could have given. X x x. It has been held that voluntariness of a
confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could
possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence
which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied.
When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could
not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated,
where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is
unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement
was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant.
There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is
corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts
contained in such confession.
But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact
that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under
the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the
United States from which Article III, Section 12(1) was derived, is
presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar
environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of
police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.
Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect
in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) he must be
informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he
says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right
to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent
himx x x
There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accusedappellant
without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have
counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to

appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this
Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit
meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have
been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was
specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth
grade of the elementary school. X x x
Moreover, Article III, Section 12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in
custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant
was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot
be considered an independent counsel as contemplated by the law for the
reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted
accused-appellant.
This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula (232 SCRA 566 [1994]), the
independent counsel required by Article III, Section 12(1) cannot be special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police
whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los
Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of the police
force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted
accused-appellant in the investigation. To allow such a happenstance would
render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation.
People v. Endino, 353 SCRA 307, Feb. 20, 2001, 2nd Div. [Bellosillo]
[Admissibility of Video-Taped Confessions Given to Media Men]
The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen.
Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given
to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and
forgiveness from the public.
It is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be
taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police,
with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to

legitimize coerced extra-judicial confessions and place them beyond the

exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a
situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus
imperil our criminal justice system.
158We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an
accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and
conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is
essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was
given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all
media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of
confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined
and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and
arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in
separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be
vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95, March 3, 1997
While it is true that a municipal mayor has operational supervision and
control over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement
officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution, however, appellants confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question
the appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It
was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to
confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant
and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not
violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement,

not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary

manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What
the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest
use of coercion by the State as would lead the accused to admit something false,
not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truthxxx
Appellants confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue
influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters
when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and
control of the police. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and
reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before
interviewing him. The Supreme Court further ruled that appellants verbal
confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III
of the Constitution and, therefore, admissible in evidence.
People v. Lugod, 352 SCRA 498, Feb. 21, 2001, En Banc [Gonzaga-Reyes]
Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain
silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice,
he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he
intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order
to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of
counsel. Consequently, the accused-appellant's act of confessing to SPO2
Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel
cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-appellant's rights
under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be
disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the
same vein, the accused-appellant's act in pointing out the location of the body of
Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused-appellant's right to remain
silent. The same was an integral part of the- uncounselled confession and is
considered a fruit of the poisonous tree.
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno]

In People v. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54 [1995]), later reiterated in the case
of Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, et al. (287 SCRA 581 at pp. 596-597 [1998]), we
laid down the doctrine that:
159We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial
trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media
gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake
criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is
not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an
accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has
always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public
scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair
trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-togavel
coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind
of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal
the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of
sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system
brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our
bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions
of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit
who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. x x
x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence
and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the
trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and

trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard
of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled
that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be,
by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the
trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by
evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
What are the two principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal
with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high
profile
cases?
Held: There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on
how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and
trial of high profile cases. The British approach the problem with the presumption
that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop
criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The
American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the
potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial.
They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present
danger, etc.
THE RIGHT TO BAIL
Sec. 13, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be

released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail

shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Government of the USA v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002, En
Banc [Panganiban] [Vitug, Dissenting Opinion][Is Right to Bail Available
in Extradition Proceeding?]
160Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction,
the constitutional provision on bail x x x, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17,
1971, per Fernando, Jr. [later CJ]) It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence
is not an issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does
not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. (Sec. 18,
Article VII, Constitution) Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for
the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is
available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in

the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying
the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
Lavides v. CA (GR 129670, Feb. 1, 2000)
In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is
authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused
may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed
and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of
the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of
petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence
at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused
shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these
Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between
(1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his
motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2)
foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
THE RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED DURING TRIAL
Sec. 14[2], Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 14. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,

and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence
The Question of Prejudicial Publicity
161 Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, En Banc [Puno]
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair
trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-togavel
coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind
of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under
certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial.
Thus, in Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.
The Right to Public Trial
Request for Live Radio/TV Coverage of Trial of Estrada (Vitug)
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance.
A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long
ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable
number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from
their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have
observed during the proceedings.
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

 Sec. 17, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
Sec. 12, 3rd par., Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 12. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation
of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
Immunity Statutes
Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (231 SCRA 783)
They are the transactional immunity and the use-and-derivative-use
immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By
its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever
arising out of the act or transaction. In contrast, by the grant of use-andderivativeuse
immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her particular
testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a
subsequent prosecution.
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT
Sec. 19, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
162(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard
or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt
with by law.
THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Sec. 21, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment

for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Two kinds of Double Jeopardy
People v. Quejada (259 SCRA 191)
The first sentence of Clause 20, Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
ordains that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. The second sentence of said clause provides that if an
act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act. Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense whereas, the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment
for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses,
or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the
crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the
offense charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a
violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of statute. If the two charges
are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law
or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such
conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy
of punishment or the same offense. So long as jeopardy has been attached under
one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in
the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither
conviction nor acquittal in either case.
Almario v. CA, 355 SCRA 1, March 22, 2001, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing][Will
Elevation on Appeal of Civil Aspect of Decision Constitute Double
Jeopardy?]
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a

competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to
speedy trial was made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial
court. It was made at the instance of the accused before the trial court, and with
his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in
acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion
will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy
trial. Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been prolonged
unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.
Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of
the trial so that violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused, herein
petitioner, resulted. For it must be recalled that in the application of the
constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
THE RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER
163 Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.