Battle of Rzhev, Summer 1942

The Battle of Rzhev in the Summer of 1942 was part

of a series of battles that lasted 15 months in the center of
the Eastern Front. It is known in Soviet history of World
War II as the First RzhevSychyovka Oensive Operation, which was dened as spanning from 30 July to 23
August 1942. However, it is widely documented that the
ghting continued undiminished into September and did
not nally cease until the beginning of October 1942.[4]
Rzhev lies 140 miles west of Moscow and was captured by the German Wehrmacht in Operation Typhoon
in the autumn of 1941, which took them to the gates
of Moscow. When the Soviet counteroensive drove
them back, Rzhev became a cornerstone of the Germans
defense.[5] By the summer of 1942, the city stood at the
apogee of a salient that protruded from the front lines,
pointing in the general direction of Moscow. In July and
August 1942, Stalin tasked two of his Front commanders, General Zhukov (commanding Western Front) and
General Konev (commanding Kalinin Front), to conduct
an oensive to recapture Rzhev and strike a blow against
the German Army Group Center forces that would push
them away from Moscow. The attack would fall upon one
of their main opponents of the winter battles, General
Models 9th Army, which occupied the majority of the
Rzhev salient.

The formation of the Rzhev Salient, January 1942

on to, in what otherwise seemed a wilderness of forest

and swamp in all directions. The salients existence was
threatened at the very moment of its creation, when the
Kalinin Fronts 39th and 29th Armies opened a gap just
west of Rzhev and thrust southwards into the German
rear.[10] Just managing to keep the encroaching Soviet
Armies away from the vital rail link into Rzhev, the 9th
Army, now commanded by General Model, managed to
close the Rzhev gap, thereby cutting the Soviet supply
lines and reducing their ability to deal a crippling blow
to the whole Army group.[11] The Soviet counter-attack
had run out of steam and the Germans recovered enough
to mount several operations to clear up their rear area. In
July 1942, Operation Seydlitz was mounted to trap and
destroy the two Soviet armies and succeeded in little over
a week in doing so, making the Army Group once more
an almost credible threat to Moscow.[12]

The two months of struggle left a lasting impression on

the Soviet soldiers who fought there,[6] where they suffered massive casualties for little gain,[7] earning the battle the title Rzhev meat grinder. By October, the strategic
balance in the centre of the Eastern Front remained essentially unchanged; the German army had suered grievous
losses,[8] and whilst their defence was tactically successful, they had achieved little more than maintaining the
status quo.[7] Although the oensive had failed, Zhukov
was given another chance to crush the Rzhev salient soon
afterwards.[9]

2 Prelude
2.1 Commanders

von Vietingho

Background

Konev

The closing stages of the Battle of Moscow saw the formation of the Rzhev salient. The Soviet counter-oensive
had driven the Wehrmacht from the outskirts of Moscow
back more than 100 mi (160 km), and had penetrated
the front of Army Group Centre in numerous places.[10]
Rzhev, a strategic crossroads and vital rail junction straddling the Volga, became the northern corner post of Army
Group Centres left wing. It was the only town of note
for many miles and gave the 9th Army something to hang

Model
Zhukov
General of Panzer Troops Heinrich von Vietingho was senior corps commander in the 9th
Army in June 1942, and temporarily led the Army
at the start of the summer battle, whilst Model was
1

2 PRELUDE
on convalescent leave. He later commanded 10th
Army and Army Group C in Italy.[13]
General of Panzer Troops Walter Model had
commanded 3rd Panzer division at the start of
Operation Barbarossa, and had become commander
of XXXXI Motorised Corps in October 1941.[14]
He had shown great resolve in the defensive winter
battles, and was promoted to 9th Army commander
on 12 January 1942.[14] He proved to be a tough soldier and a defensive specialist. Respected by Hitler,
his star continued to rise, becoming a Field Marshal
in March 1944.[15]
Georgy Zhukov was Chief of the General Sta
when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union but,
following a disagreement with Stalin concerning
the defense of Kiev, was demoted to command of
the Reserve Front.[16] He became a troubleshooter,
commanding the Leningrad Front in the autumn,
and back to Moscow to conduct its defense and
counteroensive. Zhukov remained in the central
sector, and he argued in the spring of 1942 that the
Moscow axis was the most critical and that Army
Group Center posed the greatest threat to the Soviet
Union. To him, the German forces at Rzhev represented a dagger pointed at Moscow[17] Zhukov convinced Stalin to give him the extra forces he needed.
He commanded Western Fronts attacks until, in
the latter part of August, Zhukov became deputy
supreme commander and was transferred to Stalingrad. Later, he continued to hold the highest commands in the Soviet Army, and became a Marshal of
the Soviet Union in January 1943. Zhukov remained
always in the thick of the ghting until the very end
of the war, commanding the 1st Belorussian Front
in the assault on Berlin, still in rivalry with Konev,
who commanded the 1st Ukrainian Front in the nal
battle.[18]

The Vazuza River near Sychevka

cally moderate, but the summer months of 1942 had seen

unusually heavy and persistent rainfall.
Rzhev had at, rolling country, with thick forests and
patches of swamp. The neighborhood of Rzhev had open
farmed land with a dense network of small village communities, which were often ribbons of houses along the
roadside. The roads were mostly mud tracks that became
almost impassible in the spring and autumn rains, but normally dried out in summer.
Of the Red Armys objectives, the city of Rzhev was by
far the largest, with over 50,000 inhabitants. Zubtsov
had under 5,000; Pogoreloye Gorodishche had but 2,500.
Karmanovo, to be the scene of much bitter ghting, was
in reality simply a large village.

Colonel-General Ivan Konev began the war against

Germany commanding the 19th Army, which become encircled around Vitebsk in the rst weeks
of the conict.[19] Stalin blamed Konev for the disaster but Zhukov intervened and ensured his survival and promotion to Front commander.[19] He
went on to command Kalinin Front in the winter
battles around Moscow with distinction,[19] and still
Rolling stock in Rzhev station today
commanded Kalinin Front at the start of the Rzhev
Operation. When Zhukov was promoted to deputy
supreme commander, Konev was given overall re- The Volga is the longest river in Europe, and in both
the central sector of the Eastern Front at Rzhev and at
sponsibility for the continuing oensive.
the southern sector at Stalingrad, German and Soviet
armies struggled for mastery of its banks. Both Rzhev
and Zubtsov straddled the river, which was 130 m wide
2.2 Battleeld
at this point.[21]
In the summer months the climate in the Rzhev area was Of major signicance to both attacker and defender were
warm, with long days and a high sun which allowed the tributaries of the Volga, the Drzha, Gzhat, Osuga, and
area to dry out after the spring thaw[20] Rainfall was typi- Vazuza Rivers, which ran south to north across the line of

2.3

Opposing forces

2.3 Opposing forces

2.3.1 German Order of battle

German infantry with MG 34, Army Group Center, 1942

The strength of 9th Army varied considerably during the

summer months, as the Army Group shifted forces between its armies for use in dierent operations and defensive commitments. In early July the 9th Army was
reinforced so that it could conduct Operation Seydlitz.
It reached a total of 22 divisions, including 4 Panzer divisions organised in 5 higher corps headquarters.[23] After the successful conclusion of the operation the Army
group shifted many of its oensive-capable divisions
southward for its next planned attack against the Sukhimchi bulge, leaving the 9th Army at the end of July with 16
infantry divisions, organised in 3 Corps, with 14 divisions
in the line, 1 in reserve and another in transit.[23]

Railway network in the Rzhev region

the Soviet attack. These were normally docile and fordable at this time of year, but they had become swollen
with the July rains and had risen to the depth of over 2
m. By August they constituted a major impediment to
Zhukovs Western Fronts attack. His forces would have
to cross the Drzha on the start line and then a further one
or even two ooded rivers to reach their nal objectives.
From the German point of view, by far the most important objective was the Viazma-Rzhev rail line,[22] the
loss of which would sever their supply line to Rzhev and
render the defense of the whole salient untenable. Also
important from the Soviet perspective was the ZubtovShakhovskaya rail line, which ran in the direction of their
intended advance, and could be used to ferry supplies forward.

Nearly all the divisions of Army Group Center had seen

heavy winter ghting, which had sapped away their ghting strength. According to rehabilitation reports, because
of the necessity of holding the line, and the 'unabated intensity of defensive ghting',[24] the divisions of Army
Group Center could only be partially restored to strength.
They would have limited mobility and reduced combat efciency, with the greatest gap being the shortage of motor
vehicles and horses.[24]
Following the collapse of its front east of Rzhev, the
Army was rapidly reinforced, but the continual strain
of persistent Russian attacks led General Model to demand further support. By the end of September, the
army commanded 25 divisionshalf the army group
strengthincluding 20 infantry and 4 Panzer, as well as
the Grodeutschland division.[23]
2.3.2 Soviet Order of battle
Stalin and his command group, the Stavka, sought to develop strong concentrations of forces which would attack
across narrow sectors with heavy assistance from supporting arms. For example, Kalinin Front was told to 'create
a shock group'[25] of no less than 11 rie divisions and

3 BATTLE

3 rie brigades, 8 tank brigades and 10 RGK artillery 3 Battle

regiments.[25] To achieve these high force concentrations
the Stavka handed over from its reserve to K front, 5 ri3.1 Kalinin Front attacks
e divisions, 6 tank brigades 2 RGK artillery regiments
of 152mm guns, 4 antitank artillery regiments, and 10
The front line, which had not changed in this sector since
M-30 battalions.[25]
January, had given ample time for Soviet intelligence and
Support for the operation was to be on a huge scale. In planners to pin point the German forward defenses and
an attempt to wrest air superiority from the Germans, plan their destruction or suppression. The situation beColonel General Alexander Novikov, Commander of the hind the front lines was more sketchy to the attackers, and
Soviet Air Forces, was told to concentrate 1100 aircraft in the Germans, on Models orders, had not been idle, and
the attack sectors, including 600 ghters.[26] They sought had constructed a secondary line outside of Rzhev and a
to smash through the German front by implementing nal belt of defenses on the cities outskirts.[34]
the idea of 'artillery attack' to maximize repower using
The terrain was in places low and prone to swampiness,
massed collections of guns, mortars and rocket launchwith the villages constructed on the higher and drier elers. 30th Army, for example, concentrated 1323 guns
evations. These were turned by the Wehrmacht into
and mortars along its 10 km stretch, achieving a density
strongholds, and linked by trench lines and defences.
[27]
of 140 tubes per kilometer. The correlation of infantry
They were described by Soviet accounts as having solid
in the attack sectors were calculated as between 3-4:1
mineelds, networks of bunkers, and barbed wire laid out
in the 30th, 31st, and 33rd army sectors and about 7:1
in dense lines. [35] Additionally, the unusually wet sumin 20th and 5th army sectors. Artillery advantage was
mer and continued downpours of late July and August
overwhelming with 6-7:1 in all armies except in the 30th
greatly enhanced the defenses, hindering the deployment
where it was calculated at 2;1.[28]
of both tanks and artillery for the Russians, who proved
unable to bring to bear their superiority in these areas.
The distance to Rzhev was 7.5 miles (12 km) which the
attacking forces hoped to cover in a rapid advance reaching the city in two days and fully occupying it by the third.

Soviet tank crews in training, 1942

To accomplish this mission, General Major D. D.

Lelyschenko, 30th Army commander, had received massive reinforcements, and had 4 rie divisions lined up
along narrow attack sectors, pointing straight at Rzhev,
and a further 2 anking rie divisions who would shove
the shoulders of the German defense aside. Behind these
he had 2 more rie divisions ready to reinforce the main
attack, and another behind the ank. The 6 rie divisions
in line would strike at the junction of the German 87th
and 256th infantry divisions and pierce the defenses along
a 6-mile (10 km) front.[29] Each of the main attacking divisions was reinforced by a tank brigade and backed by an
impressive array of army and front level artillery, as well
as Katyusha rocket launchers. In all, the 30th Army deployed 390 tanks, 1323 guns and mortars, and 80 rocket
launchers for the attack.[29]

The majority of the Soviet tank strength still lay in separate tank brigades that directly supported the infantry.
30th Army started the oensive with 9 tank brigades
with 390 tanks,[28] 31st army had 6 tank brigades with
274 tanks, and 20th Army had 5 tank brigades and 255
tanks.[29] Behind these Army-level forces were newly created tank corps, the 6th and 8th to the rear of 20th Army,
3.1.1 30 July 1942
and 5th Tank Corps behind 33rd Army.
The tank corps had been created between March and May
around a kernel of existing tank brigades and new men
from the training establishments. They were supplied
with the best tanks available, but lacked artillery and support units. Initially, even trucks were in short supply.[30]
Although formed around a core of veterans from the winter ghting, these units had supported the infantry armies
and were not yet used to independent action, and were not
able to fulll their exploitation role.[30] Their leaders were
experienced commanders, many of whom were cautious
of German armored units from the previous years campaigning and tended to overestimate German strength.

At 6.30 am on 30 July, in the low light of early morning,

the 30th Army artillery opened re in a tumultuous roar.
The artillery commander of the Kalinin Front, ColonelGeneral NM Khlebnikov, recalled: The power of re
impact was so great that the German artillery after several
faltering attempts to answer re with re stopped. First
two positions of the main strip enemy defenses have been
destroyed, troops occupying them - almost completely destroyed. [36]
After an hour and a half of bombardment, at 8am, the
rie divisions attacked. In spite of the sudden onset of

3.1

Kalinin Front attacks

Katyusha rocket launches in 1942. These batteries were used in

the nal crescendo of the artillery preparations.

German reinforcements move up in the mud

the numbers of supporting armour to a handful, which left

more heavy rain, and with infantrymen sometimes wad- them vulnerable to German panzerjager defenses. Withing through sodden elds with water up to their knees,[36] out massed artillery support, the German defensive posithe attack quickly acquired momentum.
tions remained intact. The Germans had managed to plug
The 16th Guards Rie Division in the center overran the the gaps with divisional reserves and were now ghting
forward trenches already in the rst hour, and the for- desperate battles, hanging on until further help could artied villages of the second position soon after, and by rive. By evening, battalions from 6th Infantry divisions
1pm its men were deep in the German rear and already 18th and 58th Infantry Regiments began arriving in the
approaching the village of Polunino, half way to Rzhev. vital central sector around Polunino and a small elevation
[37]
To its right, the 379th and the 111th Rie Divisions west of the village, hill 200. For the Soviets, the day failed
also smashed into the German front line, penetrating into to deliver anything except heavy losses. The 16 Guards
the depths and capturing 4 batteries of 87th Divisional Rie division begin a series of attacks on the village of
Polunino, which it continued all day, and suered over
artillery.[38]
1000 casualties.[37] As its divisional journal laconically
The Soviet 30th Army had broken through on a front stated, 'the attack was not successful'.[37] The frontal atnine kilometers and a reached a depth of 4 miles, (7 tacks of the 31 July set the pattern for the days to come;
km),[35] but already late on the rst day its spearheads Soviet commanders did not have the latitude (or somewere brought to a halt by German counter-attacks, and times the imagination) to develop exible tactics and ofominous signs of the diculties ahead started to appear. ten rigidly executed orders from above, even if it meant
In the breakthrough sectors the supporting tanks were lag- attacking head on across the same ground for days or even
ging behind, and many remained mired in the mud; the weeks at a time.[41][42]
riemen had come up against prepared German lines, and
upon digging in found their trenches immediately lled By 3 August the Germans were already counting the Soviet losses and wondering how much longer the Soviet
with water.[39]
formations could keep going. They estimated correctly
Generalleutnant Danhauser, commanding the German that many rie divisions had suered thousands of casu256th Infantry Division, committed his pioneer and re- alties, but also noted signs of new men arriving to ll some
connaissance battalion in a counter-attack from Polunino of the depleted ranks.[43] Three days later a frustrated
and committed his last reserve, the divisions eld re- Stavka issued a pronouncement, demanding 30th Army
placement battalion, to try and ll his open ank. Of his provide solutions to a variety of perceived problems, inoriginal front line, anchored by Strong-point Emma near cluding week leadership, failure to mass tanks and poor
the old 256-87 division boundary, nearly all was still in ammunition supply to the artillery. After the success of
German hands in spite of severe pressure from the Soviet the rst day, seven days of attacks had achieved nothing
anking attack. The 9th Army had reluctantly handed and the 30th Army called a halt in order to regroup and
over the 54th Motorcycle Battalion, 14th Motorized Di- reorganize.
visions only reserve, to ll the hole in the 256th Divisions
left ank.[40]
3.1.3 1030 August 1942
3.1.2

31 July 6 August 1942

On 10 August the Russians attacked the ank of the 256th

with renewed ferocity. 220th Rie Division, which had
The next morning the Soviet attackers expected to be able been battering away at the suborn defence of the 256th
to resume the advance, but had diculties coordinating Infantry Division since 30 July and had lost 877 dead and
their various arms. Numerous tank breakdowns reduced 3083 wounded in the rst four days alone, nally cap-

6
tured the key village of Belkovo on the 12 August.[44] Its
divisional commander, Colonel Stanislav Poplavsky, saw
that 'the elds were full with the bodies of the dead.' The
day before, Gilyarovich had received a call from the Front
commander, Konev, who had suggested the supporting
tank brigade be pulled out to lead the next infantry attack.
But his attached armour, as in so many other sectors, had
become mired in the mud and only four tanks could be
extracted.[44]

3 BATTLE
strikes reduced its buildings to smouldering ruins.[50]
By the end of the month, the stubborn German defence
of Putino came to an end as they nally withdrew under
heavy pressure, and took up new defensive positions on
the Rzhev perimeter.[50]

3.2 Western front attacks

The attack by western front, planned for 2 August, was

delayed by another two days, mainly for the additional
delays imposed by the abysmal weather. Zhukov planned
to penetrate the line at Pogoreloye Gorodishche, and advance towards the Vazuza river, destroying the defending forces of the XXXXVI Panzer Corps, known as the
Zubtsov Karmanovo grouping in the process. The front
mobile group, 6th and 8th Tanks Corps and the 2nd
Guards Cavalry Corps, would be committed towards Sychevka with the 20th Army while the 31st Army coThe continued Russian tank attacks were in danger of
operated with Kalinin Fronts forces to capture Rzhev.[51]
swamping the defence, but Soviet infantry tactics remained crude with dense masses of men rushing forward, shouting 'Hurrah'.[45][46][47] Replacements were of- 3.2.1 4 August 1942
ten thrown directly into battle directly from the trains
without orientation or any time to get to know their ocers or their outt.[48]
But in other sectors new rie formations had been brought
up. Strong-point Emma, the vital cornerstone of the defence that had held out for two weeks, fell; tanks from
the Soviet 255 Tank Brigade were roaming unhindered
in its rear.[40] Some German defenders noted that the Soviet tankers were employing new tactics: 'staying out of
the reach of our anti-tank guns, they systematically shot
up every position, which had a demoralizing eect on the
infantry, causing tank-panic.'[45]

Model, just returning from convalescent leave, saw that

the German defence had bent but not completely broken.
He issued 'not a step back' orders and funnelled in all
available reserves, including scratch battle groups thrown
together from troops returning on leave trains.[49] At the
same time, he demanded additional reinforcements from
higher commands.
Red Army losses were catastrophic, but the German
defenders were also under severe strain. The constant
attacks exhausted the troops, and break-ins had to be
constantly driven back by local counterattacks. The
481th Infantry Regiment was now reduced to 120 ghting troops,[40] mostly attached to battle group Mummert,
which was composed of units thrown together from 4 different divisions.[40] The antitank (Panzerjger) battalions
were the key to the defence against tanks, but the guns
could not be everywhere. It was common for the infantry
to use grenade bundles or mines to deal with tanks overrunning their trenches. These attacks required great individual daring.
The gains of the anking attacks, although meagre, did
nally open a new opportunity east of Pultuno, which
the 2nd Guards Rie division was able to exploit. Overrunning a sector which ran across swampy and forested
ground, the division in three days fought its way through
to the Rzhev aireld on the outskirts of the city. Counterattacks stabilized the front, and Model allowed the 256th
Infantry and 14th Motorised Divisions, whose positions
now bulged out into Soviet lines, to pull back across the
Volgas western bank. The Soviets, now in easy artillery
range, started to pound the city, which together with air

Attack of Western Front, 4 August 1942

In the early morning hours of 4 August 1942, General

Zukov unleashed the Western fronts attack against the
Rzhev salient. The oensive began with a massive preliminary bombardment. A concentration of artillery and
mortars along a narrow front rained down shells and
bombs on the German positions for nearly one and a half
hours, and was followed by a pause in which Soviet aircraft laid smoke along the front line. But the lull was a
ruse to lure the German defenders back into their forward

3.2

Western front attacks

trenches to suer the nal crescendo, which was topped viet Armies had torn a gaping hole in the German front,
o by a volley from Katyusha rocket launchers .[52]
and by evening their rie divisions and supporting Tank
had advanced 5 miles (8 km) into the German
The energy of the re-storm in many places destroyed the Brigades
[52]
lines.
German wire entanglements, and bunkers and xed positions lay smashed. The attack battalions from the Soviet
rie divisions, using rafts, boats and ferries to cross the
swollen river Derzha, secured the forward German line
within an hour and with little loss.[52]

The German command were quick to realize the dangers

of the new Soviet oensive, and Hitler immediately released ve divisions which had been held in reserve for
Operation Whirlwind, the planned attack on the Suchinici
bulge. These included 1st, 2nd and 5th Panzer Divisions and 102nd and 78th Infantry Divisions.[53] Von Vietingho, acting 9th Army commander, had already committed what reserves he had against the Kalinin Fronts
attack and had virtually nothing on hand to stop the new
Soviet advance except Army schools, teenage helpers and
a few ak guns, which he positioned at strategic points.
These were not going to stop Soviet tanks for very long;
German defences were wide open until the arrival of the
reinforcement divisions.[54]
3.2.2 59 August 1942

Soviet sappers 1942

Pogoreloye Gorodishche, a battalion stronghold of the

161st Divisions 364th Infantry Regiment and one of the
Soviet 20th Armys main initial objectives, was quickly
outanked and then cut o by Soviet infantry. Soon after
midday, aided by another sharp artillery strike and supported by tanks, Russian riemen stormed into the position from three directions and overwhelmed the garrison, Battle of Rzhev - Summer 1942, Soviet Western Front continues
capturing 87 ocers and men and leaving many more its attack against Army Group Center
dead.[52]
what Halder termed a
South of Pogoreloye Gorodishche, the 331st Rie Divi- On the morning of 5 August, in [55]
very
wide
and
deep
penetration,
the Soviet Rie Dision rapidly captured the forward trench line and moved
visions
pushed
on
into
the
depth
of
German positions
swiftly on to take Gubinka, a village in the secondary line.
against
negligible
opposition.
However,
as the Soviet
Until that morning it had been the location of 336 Incommands
began
to
commit
their
armoured
units forfantry Regiments headquarters, which was found abanward,
problems
started
to
emerge.
doned and strewn with sta documents and discarded
equipment. [52] All along the 161st Divisions entire front,
its soldiers had been attacked in overwhelming force, its
defences had crumbled and given way, and its remaining soldiers were in full retreat. The 20th and 31st So-

Crossing points along the river Darzha were interdicted

by Luftwae attacks and complicated by the high water
and the strong current. The Tank Corps were taking hours
to get across even fractions of their forces. The roads,

8
saturated by the incessant rains, rapidly deteriorated and
were clogged with trac of all sorts, some of which became hopelessly mired in the mud and could not move.[56]
Re-supply carts, artillery, and tanks were stuck in trafc jams and became disorganized and disorientated.[52]
11th Tank Brigade, part of 20th Army mobile group, became lost and only turned up days later ghting in the
wrong sector.[57] The accompanying motorcyclists, who
were attached to the Army mobile group, were unable to
move their machines forward, and had to abandon them;
the riders advanced instead as ordinary infantry, trudging
slowly forward through the mud.[57]
Nevertheless, 20th Army infantry advanced another 18
miles (30 km) and was joined by nightfall by the foremost parts of both 6th and 8th Tank Corps.[52] These
forces were approaching the rivers Vazuza and Gzhat, but
as light faded on the 5 August they began to make contact with fresh enemy units. These came primarily from
5th Panzer Division, which had been closest to the breakthrough area, and had been rushed to the crucial sector
north of Sychevka, where its forward elements crossed
the Vazuza at Chlepen and fanned out, hurriedly occupying defensive positions.[58]
At the southern corner-post of the breakthrough, 36th
Motorized Divisions stubborn defence had been the only
bright spot for 9th Army on the 4 August, but its opponent, the Soviet 8th Guards Rie Corps, had quickly inltrated forces around the divisions northern ank and into
its rear.[59]
The following day, the Soviets broke through from
the north with tanks and infantry, swept around and
over a battery of divisional artillery, 105mmm howitzers, and reached the tiny community of Dolgie Niwuj, barely a mile and a half from the 36th Motorised
Divisional headquarters in Voskresenskoye (Woskresenskoje). Generalmajor Gollnick, the divisional commander, watched the houses of Dolgie Niwuj go up in ames
and started to reorganize his defences to cope with what
was to be but the rst of a series of crises for the division.

3 BATTLE
rear towards Kamanovo, but were thwarted by the arrival
of 2nd Panzer Division, which pushed them back and sent
tanks and Panzer grenadiers to the aid of Gollnick.[59]
Meanwhile for the 5th Panzer Division, the 6 August
proved to be a day of crises. Both of its anks were 'hanging in the air', and it was assailed along its entire newlyacquired front by infantry and tanks, some of which broke
through to harass supply units and artillery positions. 14th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment had deployed both its battalions in line, only to have them badly mauled. Its 2nd Battalion became encircled and had to ght its way out, with
a supporting tank company losing 8 tanks fending o attacks by T34s which seemed to come from all sides.[60]
The intense ghting cost the 5th Panzer Division 285 casualties on this day alone,[58] but limited further Russian
advance to only 2 miles.[52]
Substantial Russian forces were getting forward so that by
the 8 August, the Soviet 20th Army had introduced over
600 tanks into its sector.[61] As additional forces from
both sides joined the battle, the intensity of the ghting
grew, but the forward momentum of the attackers rst
slackened, then stopped. Mounted regiments from 2nd
Guards Cavalry Corps reached the river Gzhat, exploiting the gap between the 5th and 2nd Panzer Divisions,
and were able to ford it and carve out a bridgehead on
the southern bank.[52] Its advance was checked by the arrival of 1st Panzer division, which attacked and drove the
line back. Likewise, 6th Tank Corps reached and crossed
the Vazuza along with some rie forces, but once across,
was met with erce counter-attacks and air-strikes, which
prevented further advance.
Soviet diculties persisted. 20th Army found its headquarters communications not up to the task and had difculty coordinating its many rie units and cooperating
with the fronts mobile group. Because of the ongoing logistical problems, resupply was dicult; 8th Tank
Corps complained of running low on fuel and ammunition, which hindered its operations. 17th tank brigade
found that not enough fuel were getting through to keep
all the tanks in action,[62] and artillery was having to be
held back in favour of advancing combat units.
On the other side, to prevent a breakthrough, von Vietingho was having to throw his infantry and armoured
units piecemeal info to combat immediately upon arrival,
but by 8 August, had managed to erect a rm cordon
around the Western Fronts entire penetration.

The 2nd Panzer division still operated a large number of obsolete

38t tanks, which it had inherited from the departing 7th Panzer
division

Soviet infantry from the 20th Army was pushing past his

With a breakthrough towards Sychevka looking increasingly unlikely in the face of German reinforcements,
Zhukov ordered the 20th Army to extract 8th Tank corps
and realign it to the south, to cooperate with renewed
5th Army attacks.[61] There was some improvement in
the weather which nally allowed the roads to dry suciently to bring up ammunition, and Soviet logistics were
further improved by the restoration of the rail line as far
as Pogoreloye Gorodishche.[52]
8th Tank Corps was still tied up with combat against the

9
to Konev. To keep unied command arrangements,
Kalinin Fronts 30th and 29th Armies were subordinated
to Western Front authority.
Once he had taken over, Konev saw that 'troops were
dwindling in number and shells were few' and called for
a halt to reorganize, restock ammunition, repair tanks
and aircraft.[65] He decided to launch the 31st and 29th
Armies from the south east and 30th again from the north
and 'close the encirclement ring around Rzhev'.
After its initial breakthrough, 31st Army had achieved
a steady but unspectacular advance in its sector against
German infantry, pushing them back step by step, and
inicting a steady drain on German resources but suering greatly itself. By 23 August it captured one of the
main objectives of the oensive, taking the southern half
of Zubtsov. Then, its units reached the river Vazuza and
carved out a shallow bridgehead on the western bank.[29]
Konev took the 6th Tank out from 20th Army and put it
back in the line just below Zubtsov utilizing 31st Armys
bridgehead. The attack was planned for 9 September,
when sucient ammunition had been brought up.
6th Tank Corps assembled in the forests, and at dawn
of the 9th, after a half hours artillery barrage, attacked
along side 31st Army Infantry. Achieving immediate success it cut through a dilapidated infantry battalion from
11th infantry regiment seized 2 villages. Moving on, it
1st Panzer Division and could only extract 49 of its tanks captured the village of Michejewo, threatening a comfor the attack.[52] Nevertheless, on August 11, after a plete breakthrough. After some hesitation and much telebrisk artillery preparation, it struck, advanced 3 miles (5 phoning, Hitler released the Grodeutschland division for
km) and captured the village of Jelnia. Its opponent, the a counter-attack.
2nd Panzer Division, noted 'especially heavy attacks on
that day[63] and had just received a delivery of new Pzkw
Mark IV tanks, which it committed immediately into the 4 Aftermath
ghting.[64]
Battle of Rzhev - Summer 1942, Soviet Western Front continues
its advance against increasing resistance from Army Group Center

5th Army had only managed to made a shallow dent in

the line on 8 August when its 1st rst attack had been
rapidly halted by German reinforcements, now rejoined
the struggle to add to the pressure on Zorns XXXXVI
Panzer Corps from the east. After this 20th and 5th Army
continued to attack, grinding a mile or two forward every day with bitter ghting for every village. The Germans, they complained, were continually developing their
trench systems, which were backed by concealed mortar
and anti-tank gun positions, and protected by mineelds
and booby-trapped obstacles.
Finally, on 23 August, Kamanovo fell, after which 20th
Army could get no further against a shortened and
strengthened German line and went over to the defensive
by 8 September[65]

3.2.3

Konev tries again for Rzhev - September 1942

4.1 Losses
The participating Soviet armies suered 290,000 casualties in the Rzhev ghting,[66] a gure that covers
the main army groupings for the period of their oensive commitments, but does not cover the independent
corps nor air force losses; overall losses were in excess
of 300,000. Some sources, such as some reports from
the participant armies themselves, give higher gures for
their casualties than those recorded by the Front.[66]
The rie divisions of the attacking armies had to receive
additional men to continue to attack due to the high attrition rate in men. To maintain the oensive into September, Konev requested 20,000 replacements for just two
of the armies involved.[67] By 10 September the Soviet
armies had been decimated: losses had reduced them to
half-strength, with 184,265 men and 306 tanks[28]
Table of Soviet losses[66]

On 26 August Zhukov was appointed Deputy German losses in the 9th army by 17 August already
Commander-in-Chief, and transferred to the Stalin- numbered 20,000.[68] On 1 September, von Kluge ew to
grad front, so command of Western front was handed the Fuehrer Headquarters to relay what Model had told

10

REFERENCES

him the day before: 9th Army was at the point of col- [20] Weather data for Rzhev on ru.wikipedia.org (Russian text)
lapse. Its casualties were up to 42,000 and rising at a
rate close to 2,000 a day. Hitler promised some modest [21] Geographical Dictionary of the World, entry on Volga, P.
1938.
reinforcements, possibly including the Grodeutschland
division. Someone, he stated, must collapse. It will [22] see Railway line Lihoslavl - Viazma
not be us!"[69]
By mid-September, the German infantry divisions in the
thick of the ghting suered had suered up to 4,000
casualties, and, in the case of the hard-hit 161st infantry
division, over 6,000. The Panzer divisions all had lost
between 1,500 to 2,000 casualties, and most of the tanks
they started the battle with. Overall, the 9th army toll lay
at above 53,000, including in excess of 1,500 ocers[70]
Additionally, in the 3rd Panzer army sector, casualty reports for around the time of the Soviet attack list over
10,000 losses.[71]

References

[1] Jentz 2004, p. 236: Total tanks possessed by 1st, 2nd, and
5th Panzer divisions at the end of June early July.
[2] Alfred Price, The Luftwae (World War II Data Book) as
of 27.July 1942 (gure in brackets = opperational) Aircraft available to Luftwaen Kommando Ost
[3] Gerasimova 2013, pp. 77-78.
[4] Gerasimova 2013, p. 87.

[23] Tessin, Verbnde und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waen SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945, 9
A Kommandoberhorden, P. 123.
[24] Grant, The German Campaign in Russia, planning and operations, P. 130.
[25] Glantz, Forgotten battles Vol III, P. 150.
[26] Glantz, Forgotten battles Vol III, P. 151.
[27] Beshanov, 1942 'Learning', Chapter - 'Rzhev and
Vyazma', P. 319.
[28] Gerasimova 2013, p. 78.
[29] Beshanov, 1942 'Learning', Chapter - 'Rzhev and Vyazma'
[30] Forczyk 2014, p. 171-172.
[31] Besganov, 1942 'training', P.318.
[32] Besganov, 1942 'training', P.332.
[33] Glantz, Forgotten basttles Vol III, P.157.
[34] Newton, Hitlers commander. P. 197.

[5] Forczyk 2006, p. 89.

[35] Isaev, When the surprise was gone, The oensive North
of Rzhev

[6] Gerasimova 2013, pp. 96-99.

[36] Gerasimova 2013, p. 80.

[7] Gerasimova 2013, p. 168.

[8] Glantz, Zhukovs greatest defeat, P. 12.

[37] Extracts from the journal of hostilities 16th Guards Rie Division, July 30 & 31, http://rshew-42.narod.ru/200/
diary16.html

[9] Glantz, Zhukovs greatest defeat, P. 18.

[38] Halder War Diary, entry 30 July 1942, P. 649.

[10] Ziemke, Earl; Bauer III, Moscow to Stalingrad, Chapter

VII Hitler And Stalin (Kindle Location 2764). Kindle
Edition.
[11] Ziemke, Earl; Bauer III, Moscow to Stalingrad, Model
Closes the Rzhev Gap, (Kindle Location 3733). . Kindle Edition.
[12] Ziemke, Earl; Bauer III, Moscow to Stalingrad, Chapter XX Summer On The Static Fronts, (Kindle Location
3733). . Kindle Edition.

[39] LA Sorin, Kondratiev, P. Karintsev, Smirnov, E. Ozhogin

. Rzhevskaya war of 1941-1943. / / History of Rzhev.
- Rzhev: 2000 - p. 149-222. Chapter 13 'ght in the
swamp'
[40] Selz, The Green Regiment, PP. 122 - 132.
[41] Gerasimova 2013, p. 101: Quoted conversation between
Stalin and Antonov
[42] Gorbachevsky 2009, p. 434.

[13] Mitcham, The Panzer Legions, P. 67.

[43] Slaughterhouse, p 209

[14] Mitcham, Men of Barbarossa, P. 254.

[44] LA Sorin, Kondratiev, P. Karintsev, Smirnov, E. Ozhogin

. Battles of Rzhev from 1941-1943.Chapter 13 'Fight in
the swamp'

[15] Roberts, Hitler and Churchill: Secrets of Leadership

[16] Chaney 1996, p. 122.
[17] Glantz, forgotten battles Vol III, P. 151.

[45] Haupt, Battles of Army Group Centre, P. 193.

[18] Forczyk 2012, p. 11-55.

[46] The battle for hill 200, 3 August, http://rshew-42.narod.

ru/200/200.html

[19] Forczyk 2006, p. 19.

[47] Gerasimova 2013, p. 100.

6.2

Russian sources

[48] Gorbachevsky 2009, p. 139: Replacements had been

brought up in rail cars, unloaded and sent into the attack
the same day
[49] Haupt, Army Group Centre, P. 198.
[50] History of Rzhev
[51] Glantz, Forgotten battles Vol III, P. 152.
[52] Sadalov, Oensive operations of the 20th Army
[53] Ziemke, Moscow to Stalingrad,(Kindle Location 8830)
[54] Ziemke, Moscow to Stalingrad, Chapter XX Summer On
The Static Fronts, Also von Plato, History of 5th Panzer
Division and Stoves, 1 Panzer Division
[55] Burdick 1988, p. 654.
[56] Getman, Tanks go to Berlin
[57] Svetlana, Rzhev Slaughterhouse P.85
[58] von Plato, 5 Panzer Division, PP. 234.237.
[59] Conrady, Rshew 1942/1943, PP. 88. - 100.
[60] von Plato, 5 Panzer Division, P 234-237
[61] Glantz, Forgotten battles Vol III, p 156
[62] Yaroslavovna and Chernov, article '70th anniversary' see
external reference
[63] Strauss, History of 2nd Panzer Division,
[64] Jentz 2004, p. 243.
[65] Gerasimova 2013, p. 94.
[66] Gerasimova 2013, p. 98.
[67] Glantz, Forgotten battles Vol III, P. 171.
[68] Ziemke, Moscow to Stalingrad (Kindle Locations 89008901)
[69] Ziemke, Moscow to Stalingrad, (Kindle Locations 89228924).
[70] 9th army report dated 10 September 1942, Geramisova
archives
[71] http://ww2stats.com/cas_ger_okh_dec42.html

Bibliography

6.1

English sources

Burdick, Charles (1988). The Halder War Diary,

19391942. Presidio. ISBN 978-0891413028.
Chaney, Otto Preston (1996). Zhukov. University
of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 978-0806128078.
Forczyk, Robert (2006). Moscow 1941: Hitlers
First Defeat. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-184603-017-8.

11
Forczyk, Robert (2012). Georgy Zhukov. Osprey
Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84908-556-4.
Forczyk, Robert (2014). Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt. Pen and Sword.
ISBN 978-1-78159-008-9.
Gerasimova, Svetlana (2013). The Rzhev Slaughterhouse. Helion & Company. ISBN 978-1-90891651-8.
Glantz, David M. (1999). Forgotten Battles of the
German-Soviet War Vol. III.
Glantz, David M. (1999). Zhukovs Greatest Defeat:
The Red Armys Epic Disaster in Operation Mars,
1942. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-07006-0944-4.
Gorbachevsky, Boris (2009). Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldiers War on the Eastern
Front, 19421945. University Press of Kansas.
ISBN 978-0700616053.
Jentz, Thomas L. (2004). Panzerttuppen: Vol 1.
Schier Publishing LTD. ISBN 978-0887409158.
Mikhin, Petr (2011). Guns Against the Reich: Memoirs of a Soviet Artillery Ocer on the Eastern Front.
Stackpole Books. ISBN 978-0811709088.
Newton, Steven H. (2005). Hitlers Commander:
Field Marshal Walther Model, Hitlers Favorite General. Da Capo Press Inc. ISBN 978-0306813993.
Ziemke, Earl F. (1987). Moscow to Stalingrad. Center of Military History, United States Army,. ISBN
9780880292948.

6.2 Russian sources

Beshanov, Vladimir (2008). Year 1942 - 'Learning'.
Eksmo, Yauza. ISBN 5699302689.
Getman, Andrei (1973). Tanks go to Berlin. Military. publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of
the USSR,. ASIN B007WVFFNW.
Isaev, Aleksey Valerevich (2006).

(When the element of surprise was lost). EKSMO, Jauza. ISBN

978-5699119493.
SANDAL0V, L.M. (1960). Oensive operations of
the 20th Army of the Western Front in August 1942.
Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR,.

12

6.3

German sources

Haupt, Werner (1983). Die Schlachten Die Mitte

der Heeresgruppe. Aus der Sicht der Divisionen. Podzun-Pallas-Verlag GmbH. ISBN 9783895555886.
Stoves, Rolf (1961). 1. Panzer-Division 1935
1945. Podzun. ASIN B0000BOBMM.
Strauss, Franz J (2005). Die Geschichte der 2.
(Wiener) Panzer-Division. Drer Verlag GmbH.
ISBN 978-3895552670.
Selz, Barbara (1970). Das Grne Regiment Der Weg
der 256.Infanterie-Division aus der Sicht des Regimentes 481. Kehrer. ASIN B0000BUNXD.
Detlev von Plato, Anton (1978). Geschichte der 5.
Panzerdivision (1938 bis 1945). Walhalla und Praetoria Verlag Regensburg. ISBN 978-3927292208.
Gromann, Horst (1987). Rshew, Eckpfeiler der
Ostfront. Podzun-Pallas-Verlag GmbH. ISBN 9783790901269.
Conrady, Alexander. Rshew 1942/1943. ASIN
B002HLXFZW.

External links
German 10 day casualty reports listed by Army
Articles about the Rzhez battles (Russian Text)
The battle for hill 200
Article On the 70th anniversary of the PogorelovGorodyshchenska and Rzhev-Sychevsky operations
in 1942. (Russian text)
Journal of hostilities - 16th Guards Rie Division 07/30/42 to 08/22/42

EXTERNAL LINKS

13

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

8.1

Text

Battle of Rzhev, Summer 1942 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Rzhev%2C_Summer_1942?oldid=674017417 Contributors: Llywrch, Pluke, Hohum, Ian Lancaster, Bgwhite, Buckshot06, MisterBee1966, Christwelfwww, Gbawden, Sturmvogel 66, Yobot,
AnomieBOT, FrescoBot, Zawed, BG19bot, Ymblanter, Robevans123, Yura2404, Jonas Vinther, KevinNinja, Kges1901, GeneralizationsAreBad and Anonymous: 6

8.2

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