200/210 MW Turbogenerator

TESTS OF GENERATOR PROTECTIONS AND SYNCHRONISING.

1.0

After the generator dryout is declared completed, short circuit tests on the
generator with short circuits at different locations of the bus are carried
out. During these tests the operation and stability of the protective relays
are checked. Proper planning and prior arrangement with the appropriate
agencies at site is called for to carry-out the tests sequentially and
continuously so that minimum time is taken to complete the tests and thus
minimizing the period of no-load running of the TG set.

2.1

In the unit lock out relay 86 U, the outgoing wires are removed for
preventing operation of 86G and 86 GT during testing (i.e. tripping of
boiler and turbine).

2.2

Ensure that the operation of 86 U would trip only the field breaker.

2.3

Rotor Earth Fault:This protection is recommended to be tested and kept operative prior to
the commencement of the generator dryout itself.
By extending the a.c. auxiliary supply to I and II rotor E/F relays the
operation of these relays are checked by making a temporary short of the
positive pole of the generator field to ground. Test with 20V field voltage
has been found to suffice.

3.0

15.75 KV 3 phase short:(a) 3-phase short circuit made (location 1 in the enclosed sketch) after the
15.75 KV line side CTs, for the generator dryout is retained. Close the
field breaker and slowly increase the excitation.
During the tests, currents are measured in the following relays.
87G
87GT
21
40
37-1
37.2
46

Gen. Diff. Relay.

Gen. Tr.Diff. relay.
Back up impedance relay.
Field breaker relay.
Low forward power relay
Neg. ph. Sequence relay

i)
ii)

During this test the following are checked:The pickup of the overall diff. Relay (87GT); back up impedance
relay (21G)
Non-operation of Gen. Diff. Relay (87G) proving its stability for
external faults (Even upto 60% rated stator current).

(b) 3-phase short circuit shifted to a location before the 11 KV line side
CTs (location 3 in the enclosed sketch) closoe the field breaker
and slowly increase the excitation.
Check operation of Gen. Diff. Relay (87G). All the three flags should
appear.
Measurement differential current in the neutral side CTs and
voltage across relay terminals when the relay picks up.
(c) Checking of inter turn fault relay R6
4.0

15.75 KV 2 phase Short:Make a 2 phase Short circuit between R and Y phases on the 15, 75 KV
side (location of the short same as in 3 b). Close the field breaker and
increase the excitation. Check for the following. Checking should be done
rapidly to avoid rotor heating during this 2-phase short circuit test.
Generator Impedance back up relays 21G.

5.0

Single Phase Ground 64G:

Neutral grounding trasformer to be put in service. On the 15.75 KV side
ground R phase to create stator ground fault. Close field breaker. As soon
as this is done check that the stator E/F relay has operated.

6.0

Generator open circuit test:

Keep all protections tested earlier in service. Include Generator P.T. in the
15.75 KV bus for measurement of voltage.
Generator transformer, Unit Aux. Transformer to remain isolated from the
generator by keeping open the links.

Close the field breaker and gradually increase the Excitation.

6.1

Record the measurement in the proforma enclosed. On reaching the rated

generator voltage.

6.2

Measure and record the voltage across the stator earth fault relay
terminals 64G.

6.3

Measure and record leakage current in the rotor earth fault circuit.

6.4

Measure bearing voltages and record in the performa enclosed.

6.5

Check phase sequence in the PT terminals in the UCB which should be

RYB clockwise. Record these. The phase sequence observed should tally
with the phase sequence checked carlier at the same terminals by back
charging through the Generator Transformer (or Unit Aux. Trans.) from the
Grid.

6.6

Raise the voltage to 110% (or 130% depending on site requirement) and
check operation of over fluxing relay.

6.7

Check the under voltage relay of the losos of excitation relay 40. Record
the pick-up and drop out values during the voltazge building up.

7.0

6.6 KV 3 Phase Short:- (Tests are carried out individually for Bus 1-A
and Bus 1-B).
All the links for the unit auxiliary and main transformers are made through.
Measure and record the IR value of the complete generator, bus ducts,
PTs and transformer windings.

7.1

3-Phase Short Circuit made on the 6.6 KV Transformer incoming before

the CTs.
Close the field breaker and gradually increase the excitation.
Check the operation of UAT diff. Relay 87 UAT. Measure the CT
secondary currents in UAT overcurrent relays.

7.2

3-phase short circuit on the unit Aux-transformer shifted to the 6.6 KV side
after the CTs. (Locattion 6, 7 in the enclosed sketch).

Close the field breaker and gradually increase the excitation.

Check the non-operation of UAT diff. relay proving its stability for external
faults. (Excitation raised to get about 60% o the rated currents on the LT
Side of the UAT transformer).
Measure the CT secondary current in over current relays mounted on
6.6KV Switchyard (if provided).
8.0

400 KV, 3-phase Short:3-phase short circuit made on 400 KV side after the CTs. (Location 4 in
the enclosed sketch).
The bus bar protection CT Secondary leads are kept shorted to prevent
operation of bus bar protection relays.
Close the Field breaker and gradually increase the excitation to circulate
about 60% of the rated current of the machine.

8.1

Check the non-operation of the overall differential relay (87 GT) proving
its stability for external faults.
Measure CT Secondary currents in the 400 KV over current relays.

8.2

Check the operation of generator impedance back up relays 21G.

8.3

Check stability of 87 UAT.

8.4

Check stability of negative sequence protections.

8.5

Check stability of reverse power protection. After the tests remove the
short circuit made on the HV Side.

9.0

400 KV Single phase Ground 51G:On the 400 KV side ground R-phase to create a single ground fault. Close
field breaker. Check the operation of relay on gradual excitation. After test
remove the ground.

10.0

400 KV Breaker Operation:All the protections 86G, 86U and 86T are in service. Repeat DG tests of
the protective relays and satisfactory operation of all relays is ensured.
Check all the alarm and annunciation systematically. Keep the HT
isolators open. Close the 400 KV breaker. Check the breaker operation
both by manual and by ready operation. Ensure satisfactory closing and
tripping operation of the breaker with necessary interlocks.

11.0

400 KV Bus A & B:Check phase sequence of the 220 KV Bus A PT Secondary terminals at
the appropriate UCB terminals (RYB clockwise). Check phase sequence
of the 220 KV Bus B PT Secondary Terminals at the appropriate UCB
terminals (RYB clockwise). Check polarity of PTS by measuring voltages
R-R1, Y-Y1, B-B1 etc.

12.0

400 KV Forward Charging:Take a shutdown on the 400 KV Bus B (or A) and de-energise the bus
from the existing grid. After ensuring that the bus is dead, close the 220
KV isolators and the breaker to bus B. Bring the TS set to rated speed
and build up voltage gradually to rated value thus forward charging the
Bus B.
Check the voltages and phase aequence of the incoming and running bus.
Check secondary voltages and phase sequence of 400 KV PT of Bus B,
in the respective UCB terminals. Check the generator 11 KV PT
Secondary Voltage and phase secuence (RYB Clock-wise) in the
respective UCB terminals. The phase sequence and polarity should tally
with that checked from the secondary of 400 KV PTs measured above.
Set proper tap on the main transformer.
As the rated voltage, put the synchronizing switch into ON position. The
check synchronizing relay should operate after a slight time delay with the
green lamp glowing on the synchronizing panel. Close the synchroscope
switch. The synchroscope should indicate 12-0 clock position with bright
lamp.

13.0

Unit Trip:
After the above tests, Co-ordinate all the agencies and prepare for a unit
trip.

Keep the Master Feul Trip (MFT) out of circuit. BY manually operating the
relay contacts of 87G trip the unit:(a)

Observe that lock out relays 86G, 86T and 86U operates with
respective annunciations.

(b) Observe operation of field breaker trip 220 KV breaker trip, and the
turbine trip. Reset all the relays and bring back turbine to rated
speed. Arrange for synchronizing the set.
14.0

Synchronising:Return the shut down on 400 KV Bus B and energise the bus from the
existing grid. Build up rated voltage on the generator. Adjust the frequency
to the running (grid) frequency. Put the synchronizing switch and the
synchroscope switch to ON position. When the green lamp appears
synchronise the set by closing the 4500 KV breaker.
Record the date and time of synchronization.

15.0

Loss of Excitation:
After synchronizing, with the machine delivering certain active load to the
grid (say 10 MW), check that the impedance relay is stable for forward
reactive power (Say 40 MVAR).

15.1

With current to the relay reversed (keeping trip wire out) check the
operation of relay at a certain MVAR.

15.2

Under voltage relay has been checked during the open circuit test of the
generator.

15.3

Check operation of reactive power relay when current connections are

reversed (at 10 MW & 10 MVAR).

15.4

With current connections and trip restored to normal conditions the relay s
kept in service.

16.0

Low Forward Power Relay:

After synchronizing for the first time keep about 6-10 MW load and tip the
turbine. The relay should trip the generator breaker after 2 seconds.

FURNACE SAFEGUARD SUPERVISORY

THERMAL POWER STATION

SYSTEM

FOR

BOILERS

IN

INTRODUCTION:
With Indis launching massive power development programme Bharat Heavy
Electricals Ltd., (BHEL) introduced in late 70s Large capacity Boilers or Steam
Generators in the Indian Power Scene, in collaboration with Combustion
Engineering, U.S.A. These modern large capacity steam generators are
designed to burn a variety of fuels and are expected to operate at divergent
complex conditions. Generally , any boiler furnace burning any or all types of
fuels is susceptible to explosion or implosion resulting in extensive damage to
equipment and or personnel. History of Boiler operation reveals that most ofo the
furnace explosions occur during start-up/shut down. Some of the attributable
causes are:i)

Improper purging of the furnace, gas & air paths.

ii)

Incorrect or inadequate ignition procedure.

iii)

Maintaining fuel supply for too long a period without establishing

combusion.

iv)

Re-lighting burners too soon after a flame-out.

v)

Introduction 6of main fuel without ensuring adequate ignition energy.

Operation of large capacity boilers therefore demands very safe & reliable
operating procedures. Regardless of how alert the of operators are, mistakes
often happen. Under some circumstances human response time is not quick
enough to prevent accidents. Since elements controlled are large in numbers
and complex in nature, human element is gradually substituted by automatic
features in Burner Management and control systems for such boilers.
Furnace Safeguard Supervisory System or FSSS introduced by BHEL in
their boilers is one such system and is designed to ensure the execution of a
safe and ordely operating sequence during strart-up and shut-down of the
complex fuel firing equipment with minimum operator intervention.
TANGENTIAL FIRING:
The furnice deasign of such boilers is based on the tangential firing concept.
In a tangential fired furnace, the air and fossil fuels such as pulverized coal,

oil or gas is injected on an elevation basis through fuel nozzle assembly

located at corner box of the furnace (fig.1).
These nozzles are arranged to fire fuel tangentially at an imaginary circle in
the center of the furnace. Adjacent to each fuel nozzle is the pilot ignitor which
is located so as to fire directly across the line of admission to the main fuel
steam.
Solid angle optical flame scanners are strategically located at each corner for
flame detection. Fuel air and auxiliary air damper associated with each corner
wind box are automatically regulated to distribute incoming air for optimum
firing conditions. Firing is initiated on an elevation basis with ignitors providing
the ignition energy. Direct ignition of pulverized coal is recently introduced to
avoid usage of oil.
SYSTEM PHILOSOPHY
The Furnace Safeguard Supervisory System supervise, command and
monitor the preparation, distribution and admission of fuel and air into the
furnace. The system protects against unsafe operation of the boiler by
excluding improper action in operating sequence & initiating trips when
approaching unsafe conditions. The system operates on energise to open
and energise to close/trip philosophy so as to ensure maximum safety and
availability.
The following operational functions are achieved through FSSS.
i)

Furnace purge supervision.

ii)

Secondary Air Damper Control (Modulating Control)

iii)

Ignitor On/Off operation.

iv)

Warm-up on/off operation.

v)

Mill and feeder On/Off operation.

vi)

Flame scanning.

vii)

Boiler trip protection.

ARRANGEMENT OF FSSS (Fig-2)

The system consists of three basic parts that operate in Unison to provide for
maximum boiler protection and minimum nuisance trips.

i)

System Cabinet:
The most complex part is the system cabinet which is usually located in
the control equipment room. This cabinet houses the system logic and is
responsible for processing of all incoming signals/commands/feed-back
and issue output command for field devices through interposing relays.
This system also interface, secondary air-control sub-system and other
boiler automatic control loops.

ii)

Operators Panel console insert:

Console insert panel is located in the Unit Control Desk. It contains status
indicating lamps, pushbuttons for operator initiation of commands
including master fuel trip. Apart from giving commands this insert also
displays various permissives; feed-back and status signals.

iii)

Field Devices:
The field devices form the rest of the system and consists of local or boiler
front hardware such as pilot ignitors, fuel valves, positioning devices,
pressure switches & flame scanners. Almost all these devices provide
status signal and receive command signals from the system logic cabinet.
The system is functionally checked out and fully similated in the factory
before shipment to site.

ORGANISATION OF FSSS LOGIC (Fig:3)

The FSSS is arranged in a hierarchically distributed concept with three levels of
controls; viz. Unit level elevation level and corner level control.
Unit level Logic supervises furnace purge, overall boiler conditions such as drum
level, furnace pressure air-flow, etc. and initiates action to trip boiler, if dangerous
condition buildup by closing of the fuel inlet to the furnace.
The elevation control receives its permissives from the Unit Control and the
start / stop commands from the operators console. The control logic for the
elevation depends on the type of fuel being used i.e. oil, coal, gas etc. the
elevation control initiates the starting and stopping of all corners in an orderly
sequence.
The corner control logic receives its commands from the elevation control logic
and computes the corner release conditions before acting on the elevation

commands. It also takes care of the safety/ protection functions of the corner and
issues the corner trip commands.
SECTION 2
Digital Hardware:
Back ground:
Relay based FSSS is in use in the power station for quite some time now. The
components used in implementing the relay logic include control contactors, latch
relays, Electro-pneumatic timers for On/Off delays, etc.
For maximisng availability, two reliable control supplies are used in the system
namely 110VAC and 220VDC. The DC supply is taken from station battery while
the AC supply is derived from dual source with a back-up feeder and changeover
panel or from UPS.
In case of loss of AC power the trip functions are achieved by the DC logic
whereby an oil trip valve or pulveriser is tripped by the DC power. In case of
failure of the DC source, the trip functions are achieved by closing the corner
nozzle valves, feeders and hot air gates which operate on 110V AC.
With the emergence of solid state semi-conductor technology and the availability
of high reliability components the system logic functions could easily be realized
using solid state technology ensuring improvement with increased unit
availability, low maintenance cost.
Apart from these advantages the solid state equipment offered size reduction,
lower power consumption, use of lower operating voltages etc. facilities such as
improvement in man-machine communication, a systematic fault annunciation
philosophym hierarchical and decentralized structuring of the control system
contribute greatly to improved automation which has become a necessity in more
complex control system being used now-a-days.
DEVELOPMENT OF HARDWARE:
Keeping in view the above advantages of the solid state system BHEL developed
a hardware family of cards called CEMODIC for digital logic control application.
This comprises of a family of printed circuit ** for Binary control in power plant
through which FSSS system is being realised.
BHEL introduced the hardware for FSSS system for Thermal Power Stations and
some are already in operation. At the component level CMOS was chosen as the
basic technology for integrated circuits. This was done as this technology was
then well proven and used in industrial systems. It offers well know advantages

of better noise immunity, lower power dissipation, lesser current requirements,

etc.
The mechanical construction of the modules, racks, cubicles, etc. are kept in
conformance to the existing International practices such as Euro-standard racks
& connectors.
At the module level these generally conform to the environmental conditions
typical to power plants as per specifications of IEC 68-2, IEC-60 and IEC-225-4.
The CEMODIC Modules can be divided into the following major categories:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Power supply modules.

General purpose logic modules.
Special purpose logic modules.
Input modules.
Drive control modules.

Power Supply Modules:

The Poser Supply Modules consist of the distribution and the supervision
modules. The power supply is distributed through miniature circuit breakers to
various functional sub-groups. Fault in any sub-group resuls in its isolation. The
supervision modules further monitor the power supply voltage. If the power
supply exceeds or fails below the specified limits, the incoming breakers are
tripped to prevent system maloperation and damage to the lectronices. Further
distribution of the power supply to packs is done through fuses, which are
monitored for healthiness.
General Purpose Modules:
These modules consisting of logic gates, flip-flops, timers, etc. serve as
combinational logic building blocks in addition to the dedicated functions
performed by the special purpose modules.
Special Purpose Modules:
As mentioned earlier these modules serve to realize the decontralised and
distributed control structure. The independent function group in the process
structure demand corresponding group control module to co-ordinate the group
function. This module works as the single point control co-ordinator in the system
for the function group. It receives the appropriate commands either from manual
or automatic super-ordinate systems and issues commands to the subordinate
drive control level. It also annunciates status of the group as a whole. Availability
of certain other special modules like step control, time supervision, etc.
performing standard functions corresponding to the power plant process

simplifies the planning and engineering of the system. Changes or expansion, if

desired later, are found easy to incorporate.
Input modules:
These modules are used to interface the signals from field contacts to the control
system. Field contacts are interrogated through a fused 24V DC supply from the
corresponding input module. Separate fusing and fuse monitoring for each input
is provided. Monitoring of wire breakage for critical inputs is also possible.
Following are some of the special design features of these modules:
a)

Interrogation voltage across the field contact is 48V DC (+24V DC to

24V DC).

b)

A minimum of 10mA current is driven through the closed contact.

c)

Field devices being located in the most noiseprone areas of the plant,
these inputs are provided with surge suppressor elements for
protection against voltage transients, conforming to relevant
International Standards.

Drive Control Modules:

The drive control modules incorporate all the necessary electronics required for
the control of specific drives. Three types of drive control modules are in vogue.
These modules receive commands from the super-ordinate automatic system,
from the operator initiated pushbuttoms or directly from the protection system.
The orders to the field drives are issued only under the correct process
conditions.
The On/Off commands are processed separately so that any fault in electronics
does not result in malperation.
The modules also contain the necessary electronics for displaying the status of
field drive and annunciating the drive related faults, on the operators desk.
Type Tests:
Type tests have been carried out on all the modules to check conformance to
specified standards.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SOLID STATE FSSS USING CEMODIC RANGE
HARDWARE:
The solid state hardwired system has been designed using the features of the
Cemodic hardware advantageously so that the hierarchical structure and

partitioning of the system is strictly maintained. For each drive or valve in the
system a drive control module has been assigned which would issue open/close
command to the drive, monitor its field status and ammunciate the same on
operators console. The protection command to the drive control module assumes
highest priority.
The partitioning of the system is maintained by using different set of modules for
each corner control, elevation control, etc. the modules for control of various
elevations are mounted in separate cubicle sections. In these cubicles, the
modules controlling each corner are housed in separate racks. The drive control
modules for the elevations are mounted on the lowest racks.
The elevation control logic is built using the group control and general purpose
logic modules. The unit is also built using the general purpose logic modules.
The output commands to the field drives are issued through the interposing
relays mounted in the respective elevation cubicles.
POWER SUPPLY:
The system operates on + 24V DC. The 24V DC power supply to the system is
derived from two battery backed power supply sources. Each battery is sized to
cater the full load current for a period of appx. 30- minutes after a loss of power.
One feeder from each of the sources is brought to the FSSS panel and
subsequently taken to the distribution module in each elevation. In the
distribution modules these power supplies are monitored for over / under voltage
& then diode tioneered to form the elevation supply bus. Zeners are mounted on
the supply buses to arrest the switching transients.
FAULT ANNUNCIATION SYSTEM:
The fault annunciation philosophy is built so as to simplify the locatiosation of
fault in the system.
In case of fault in the system the following annunciations are available which
enable the operator to easily identify of the type of fault.
a)

a fault lamp in the central annunciation panel glows warning the

operator.

b)

Similtaneously a lamp on the cubicle door glows identifying the cubicle

in which the fault has occurred.

c)

A LED on the Buffer module in top rack glows indicating the type of
fault.

d)

Another LED on the front plate of the drive control/input module glows
identifying the drive where the fault has occurred.

This type of fault localization results in reduced downtime and increased

availability of the system.
SECTION 3
ENERGING TRENDS:
Having made its presence felt in the process industry, the microprocessors are
now being accepted by utilities in total power plant automation, with greater
confidence. Furnace Safeguard Supervisory System is also being configured with
the microprocessor based controls. The programmable control system has the
following inherent advantages:
-

System is software based, hence allows logic changes to be easily made

even in the field during commissioning using portable programming
unit.

Reduced spare parts inventory.

Increased reliability and easier maintenance due to reduction in hardware.

System self diagnostic features enable faster trouble-shooting.

CRT display and keyboard/control (optional) allows the operator to have

an active graphic display of the boiler fuel firing equipment and its
associated valves, piping alarm switches, flame status/quality. It ,
further enables the operator to select displays and optional control of
boilers through CRT.

Both geographical and functional distribution of the system are possible. In

the case of geographical distribution each local station is linked to each
other through high speed data link.

Data link with plant computer system possible.

SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE:
To meet very stringent reliability and very high availability criteria of a furnace
protection system, a highly effective fault tolerant system architecture is
necessary. Further FSSS being a hierarchically distributed system the
decentralized structure should also be reflected in the control system
architecture.

BHEL is now introducing microprocessor based FSSS system in their Boilers. A

typical system configured for a 210 MW boiler is illustrated in the Fig.4
The system architecture utilizes a multiple microprocessor configuration whereby,
the control of different coal elevations is assigned to separate microprocessors
and further the control of important drives in the system is assigned to
independent drive control modules having their own dedicated micro-processors.
The microprocessors are assigned for the boiler trip functions (MFR) in
redundant mode. Yet another processor controls the unit functions like boiler
purge, group control of scanner fans, seal air fans, etc. the various
microprocessor in the system are linked via data highway using dual redundant
co-axial cables. In order to ensure maximum safety and availability of the boiler,
redundancies are built into the system, by suitably assigning the protection
functions, the drive control module as well as the sequencing processor, both of
which issue trip commands to the field drives under emergency conditions.
The conventional operators console with push button controls and indicating
lamps may be linked to the processors via the data highway. However,
commands to important drives and trip commands are hardwired directly to
corresponding drive control card. Besides, a central VDU and key-board may be
connected to the system via data highway.
The built redundancles in the system in ensure that failure of any processor does
not endanger the boiler nor does it lead to any unwanted shut-down. The easy
localization of fault and On-line replacement of a failed processor module with a
spare unit is accomplished in a bumpless fashion, obviating the need of a boiler
shut-down.
DIAGNOSTIC STATION:
A diagnostic station may be connected to the system which acts as a central
working place for commissioning ./ maintenance personnel. It enables
supervision/ interaction with the entire control and monitoring system. All
modules in the system monitor therein is alarmed through the diagnosite station
where the type and location of fault is displayed on CRT.
PROGRAMMING:
The Programme For The System Is Done Through Easily Understandable
Functional Block Oriented Language. Pre-programmed software modules,
breakdown the complex logics into simplified readily understandable
programmes. The modularity also facilitates easy expandability.
CONCLUSION:

The design of the Furance Safeguard Supervisory System is process oriented

and takes into account the boiler design and fueld firing system, operational
characteristic and limitations and integrates them to ensure maximum safety,
reliability and operational flexibility.
The control system logic can be accomplished with
a) Electromagnetic relays
b) Hardwired solid state electronics, or
c) New generation of microprocessor based programmable controls.
A trend in emerging towards use of programmable control system. Three main
components that make up the programmable control system are the Power
Supply, Central Processing Unit and the input / output system. The central
processing unit is the heart of the system and uses the control programme which
has the flexibility of changing at site, using the programming panel. This unique
feature eliminates the need for wiring changes required under the other two
system, allowing economical modifications and expansion of the control system
with improved reliability.
The Burner Management System is engineered and supplied as dedicated
control systems as part of the steam generating unit.

START UP OF KWU TURBINES

Even though starting of KWU turbines are similar to other design,
automation and instrumentation available in this turbines. Before we go to the
start up procedure, let us expose ourselves to the basic instrumentation available
in these type of turbines which is more important for operation and identifying the
areas of fault.
ATRS (Automatic turbine run up system):Starting the turbine from rest to turning gear operation, raising vacuum
and yarm up the burbine, rolling synchronizing, loading and vice versa (i.e.,)
shutting down in the reverse requence.
SGC (Sub Group Control):
Automatic sequential starting or shutting down of each group viz., oil
supply, vacuum and turbine.
SLC

(Sub Loop control)

Automatic interlock for individual equipment like pumps, or for a group of

equipments like actuators.
STARTUP DEVICE:
By which the turbine if reset and the turbine stop valves are kept opened.
With start up device the starting can be done and speed can be raised upto 2400
RPM. This is a part of hydraulic governor this also works as a load limiter.
SPEEDER GEAR:
The further speeding upto 3000 RPM and then loading is done by speeder
gear. This is also part of hydraulic governing. Governing comes into action
beyond 90% of rated RPM.
ELECTRO HYDRAULIC GOVERNING:
This consists of speed reference, load reference and frequency reference.
SPEED REFERENCE
Rolling of Turbine and speeding to 3000 RPM and loading is done. Eventhough
full loading is possible, beyond 20% of the load, load reference comes into
service. For speed reference, 4 halls probes are mounted out of which 3 will be in

service conditions 2 probes are continuously giving reference and third one
comes into service when one of the two fails.
LOAD REFERENCE:
Beyond 20% of the load, load reference comes into service. For this load
controller has to be switched on. When the machine is on load, load reference
comes into service For this load controller has to be switched on when the
machine is on load, load reference is more accurate than speed reference. Load
limiter is also available. By selecting the set point on load limiter, the load is
controlled in that limit.
FREQUENCY REFERENCE:
With this the load will get varied to maintain the frequency constant. In our
country it is very difficult to operate in this mode. Hence it is not put in operation.
REFERENCE SET POINT (SPEED / LOAD) BLOCK:
This occurs at various conditions. It blocks the status of turbine for further raising
of speed / load due to the following conditions.
1)
2)
3)
4)

Turbine stress evaluator fault

Plunger Coil off (EHC)
ESV I Closed
dn Speed slope value /- min
dt
5) Turbine stress margin /- ok
ISOLATED GRID:
Whenever load is thrown off and comes down to station load, or the
deviation between set point and actual load goes beyond 20% load reference
changes into speed reference.
STEP:
It is an activity which caused ac action by a command. From 1 49 stops
are for starting and from 51 onwards for shut down.
CRETERIA:
The condition to be satisfied for occurrence of a step.

AUTOMATIC CONTROL INTERFACE:

This control comes in LPBP system. The set point gets varied by 2 kg
more than initial pressure in Reheater, the opening of LPBP valves straight away
goes to 25% and maintains there till the setting raises upto 12 kg and afterwards
maintaining at 12 kg by variable opening or closing of LPBP valves.
FIXED SET POINT:
Fixed set point in LPBP control is the set point of HRH pressure limit what
we select.
SLIDING SET POINT:
Sliding set point is the variable set point of HRH pressure limit after
synchronizing. The set point varies directly proportional to the wheel chamber
pressure.
TURBINE STRESS EVALUTOR:
This continuously monitors the temperature variation across the metal of
turbine causing shaft and valves and guides action. It cautions the occurrence of
thermal shock at any movement. Turbine stress evaluator gives the upper
margin and lower margin on speed and upper and lower limit of loads on loaded
conditions. If turbine stress evaluator is faulty, then it blocks further raising of
speed or load. Any how, between 600 to 3000 RPM while raising the speed, the
TSE influence is bypassed so as to cross the critical speeds smoothly.
CRITICAL SPEED:
The critical speed of the rotor for (210 MW Sets)
HP rotor:
HP rotor:
LP rotor:

70.5 RPS
64.3 RPS
80.3 RPS

All the rotor coupled condition

25.74 RPS
35.43 RPS
71.40 RPS
76.18 RPS

EXAMPLE OF SGC

02

WAITING
TIME

MONITERING
TIME

COMMAND

Auxiliary oil pump 1 on.

Auxiliary oil pump 1 on

Auxiliary oil pump 2 on
Turbine speed - / 2950 RPM
1

Pressure oil pressure 4.8 Kg

&

03

WAITING
TIME

MONITERING
TIME

COMMAND -- SLC OIL Temperature

Control on.

02, 03 - The step number

02 step action Auxiliary oil pump 1 is switched on
03 stop - SLC Oil temperature control is switched on.
For this 2 creterias are required one of the Auciliary oil pump or Main oil pump
should be in service and the control oil pressure should be more than 4.8 kg.
1

- OR GATE

&

KKS: KRAFT WERK KODE SYSTEM:

AND GATE.

Lot us see in brief how to indetify the codes in this system.

ALPHA SYMBOL

NUMERICAL
SYMBOL

MA
Mk
MY

MAAA MAB MAC MAD MAW MAL MAG MAN MAV MAX MAJ LB
LBA LBB LBC LBW -

Main Machinery (Turbine

& Generator)
Steam, condensate Gas
Cycle
Parts of instrumentation,
& control.
Steam Turbine
Generator.
Control, Governing,
Protective system.
HP Turbine
IP Turbine
LP Turbine
Bearing
Seal Steam
Drain
Condenser System
LP Bypass
Lub Oil
Control Civil System
Air Eytraction
Steam System
Main Steam Piping
ARH Piping
CRH Piping
Seal Steam Piping

Units including drives

Heat In change

C
D

G
CP
CT

CT
CY

CL

Measuring instruments
Close loop control
circuts
Processing of Measured
Values.
Electrical Equipment
Pressure Measurements
Temperature Measure monts.
Position Measurements
Vibration, Expansion
Measurements
Level Measurements

Numerical symbol are given to identify the individual equipments.

Number of panels for entire C & I package is Fourteen. Nine Panels for
CJJ and Five Panels for CCA.
CCA CJJ -

Drive control and Binary signal Conditioning

Analog Signal Conditioning and Analog Controls.

CCA 1
2
3
4
5

Function group control, Protection & interlocks

Limit Value Monitoring
Drive Control interface
Binary Signal Conditioning Curve Generator.
Synchronising Unit Rolay interface

CCJ

Turbine storess evaluator

Electro Hydraulic Turbine Control
LP Bypass & Gland steam control
Trubovisory
Ana log Signal Conditioning
Load shedding Relay
Turbine Protection
Automatic Turbine test and Binary Signal conditioning for A T T
Relays for ATT

1
2
3
4
5
8
10
11
12

START UP OF TURBINE:
PREPATION
START UP
OIL SYSTEM ESTABLISHED
OPERATION
BARRING GEAR OPERATION
SHUT DOWN
TURBINE PROTECTIONS CHECKED
STAND STILL

VACUUM SYSTEM ESTABLISHED

DRAIN VALVES OPERATION
BY PASS OPERATION
WARMING UP OPERATION
DUXPING OPERATION

TURBINE PROTECTIONS:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF
STEAM PURITY

Romoto trip from UCB

Manual Tripping from local
Low Vacuum Trip (Electrical)
Low Vaccuum Trip (Hydraulic)- done at 3000 RPM on ATT
Aril Shift High Trip-done By Att

6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)

Over speed test Striker 1&2 done at 3000 RPM on ATT

Fire protectionChannel 1
Fire Protection- Channel-2
Low level in main Oil Tank (2 out of 3 from sonar probe)
Low lub oil Pressure (2 out of 3 from Pressure switches)
Boiler Fir out
Main steam Temperature Low
Generation Protections.

PRE PARATION:
LINE CLEARS RETURNED
POWER SUPPLY READY
INSTRUMENTS? RECORDS, DAS,AIR CONDN OF UCB ON
DM PLANT GENERATION ON
COMPRESSORS ON SERVICE
OIL PLANT ON OPERATION
HYDROGEN PLANT ON OPERATION H2, Co2 CYLINDERS
CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM COOLING TOWER,-IN
OPERATION
DRG COOLING WATER SYSTEM IN OPERATION
LEVEL INDEAERATOR - OK
ELECTRICAL ACTUATORS OPERATION CHECKED
LEVEL IN BOILER DRUM - OK
LEVEL IN HOTWELL- OK
LEVEL IN MAIN OIL TANK -OK
PROTECTIONS OF BFPS, CEP,S CHECKED, IR
VALUES OF ALL H.T. MOTORS CHECKED

CONDENSATE SYSTEM ESTABLISHED

FEED SYSTEM ESTABLISHED
DIESEL GENERATOR READY
OIL SYSTEM:
CENTRIFUGE IN OPERATION
ANALYSIS OF OIL SAMPLES
VAPOUR EXTRACTOR FAN ON

AUXILARY OIL PUMP IN SERVICE

OIL TEMPERATURE CONTROL IN AUTO
OIL COOLER WATER SIDE CHARGED
PROTECTIONS AND INTBRLOCKS CHECKING

SEAL OIL SYSTEM INSERVICD

OIL TEMPER TUBE 450 REACHED
GATDVALVE GEARING OPEN
JACKING OIL PUMP IN SERVICE
TURBINE ON TURNING GEAR OPERATION

INTER LOCKS AND PROTECTIONS FOR TURNING GEAR

CHECK 1
STEP 1:
SLC
SLC
SLC

AOP
AOP
EOP
AOP
AOP
EOP

STEP 2:
1
2
1
2

OFF
ON
OFF
ON
OFF
OFF

Switch off AOP 1

Result : A O P 2 Comes in
auto

CHECK 2
STEP 1:
SLC
SLC
SLC

AOP
AOP
EOP
AOP
AOP
EOP

STEP 2:
1
2
1
2

ON
OFF
OFF
OFF
ON
OFF

Switch off AOP 2

Result : A O P 1 Comes in
auto.

CHECK 3
STEP 1:
SLC
SLC
SLC

AOP
SOP
EOP
AOP
AOP
EOP

STEP 2:
1
2
1
2

OFF
OFF
ON
ON
OFF
OFF

Switch off AOP 2

Result : E O P Comes in auto.
(This test is done independently
For actuating each prossure
switch)

CHECK 4
STEP 1:
SLC
SLC
SLC

JOP
JOP
JOP
JOP

1
2
1
1

OFF
ON
ON
OFF

STEP 2:
Switch off JOP 1
Result:
JOP 2 Comes in auto.
VACUUM SYSTEM:
CHECK CONDENSER ON SPRING SUPPORTS WITHOUT PROPS
CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM CHARGED
CONDENSATE PUMP ON SERVICE IN RE CIRCULATION
THROUGH GSC
TURBINE ON TURNING GEAR

VACUUM BREAKER CLOSE

AUXILIARY PRDS CHARGED

WARM UPTO GLAND STEAM CONTROLLER
VACUUM PUMS/STARTING/MAIN
ERECTOR STARTED.

START GLAND STEAM CONTROLLER

AND KEEP IN AUTO

OPEN DRAIN VALUE

Open gland steam HEADER DRAIN
MAL 81

CHARGE GSC ON STEAM SIDE

VACUUM < 0.12KG / M2
LOAD
> 5%
START VAPUUR EXHAUST FAN
SWITCH OFF ONE OF THE VACUUM
PUMPS

DRAIN OPERATION:
VACUM ACHIEVED
MS, HRH STARINER DRAINS OPEN

CHARGE MAIN STEAM LINE

CRH LINE DRAINS OPENS

DRAINS BEF CHR NRV OPEN
HP BP DRAINS OPEN
ESV SEAT DRAINS, IV SEAT DRAINS OPEN
DRAINS BEFORE INTERCEPTIVE VALVE OPEN
DRAINS BEFORE LPBP STOP VALVE OPEN

DRAINS AFTER INTERCEPTIVE VALVE OPEN

DRAINS BEFORE HPCV OPEN

BY PASS OPERATION STARTS

OPEN HP & LPBY PASS

AUTOMATIC CONTROL
INTERFACE IN AUTO

DRAINS AFTER HPCV OPEN

LPBP CONTROLLER IN AUTO
DRAINS HP CASING OPEN
DRAINS BEFORE EXTN NRVS
2,3,4,5 OPEN

DUMPING OPERATION

STEAM PURITY OK
DRAINS AFTER EXTN NRVS
2,3,4,5,6 OPEN

ROLLING STARTS
SYNCHRONISING
CHARGING OF LP & HP
HEATERS

**

Numorical symbols are given to indentify the individual equipments.

Number of panels for entire C & I package is Fourteen. Nine Panels for
CJJ and Five Panels for CCA.
CCA
CJJ

Drive control and Binary signal Conditioning

nalog Signal Conditioning and Analog Controls.

CCA 1
2
3
4

Function group control, Protection & interlocks

Limit Value Monitoring
Drive Control interface
Binary Signal Conditioning Curve Gonerator.

5
CCJ 1
2
3
4
5
8
10
11
12

Synchronising Unit- Relay interface

Turbine stress evaluator

Electro Hydraulic Turbine Control
LP Bypass & Gland steam control
Trubovisory
Ana log Signal Conditioning
Load shedding Relay
Turbine Protection
Automatic Turbine test and Binary Signal conditioning for A T T
Relays for ATT

START UP OF TURBINE

****
MICRO PROCESSOR BASED PASS
1.1

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The proposed FSSS is foro a 210MW Boiler with six coal and three oil
elevations. The system design is based on BBCs control philosophy using
procontrol P system hardware. The system has a decentralized
hierarchical structure. The proposed configuration is for a functionally
distributed but geographically centralized system. All the electronic
modules of the control system for the FASS will be housed in panels
placed in the control room.

To maintain the decentralised and hierarchical structure of FSSS, the

design envisages a local bus for control of each coal and oil elevation with
the oil elevation busses controlling the associated coal elevation too (ref
fig.1) i.e. the local bus for oil elevation AB also houses the control
modules for coal elevation , etc.
Further two local buses are in turn linked via the intraplant bus system
which is arranged in redundant mode. The operator commands from
console to the various local buses are connected through prefab cables.
1.2

DRIVE CONTROL FUNCTIONS

The decentralized structure of the system is further enhanced by
assigning the control of important drives in the system to independent
drive control modules (nozzle valves, Pulveriser, hot air gate etc). These
drive control modules which have their own independent microprocessor
are programmed to take care of the protection and manual interlocks of
the drive. They issue the open/close or ON/OFF command to the field
drive receive and further process its feedback.

1.3

LOCAL BUS TRAFFIC

The chief components of the local bus are the bus traffic director (70BV01)
and the bus circuit board (70BL01). The signal transmission sequence on
the local bus is controlled by the bus traffic director. It generates the local
bus addresses cyclically. Two traffic directors are mounted on each local
bus in redundant mode. At any instant of time one of the traffic directors is
active while the other remains as a hot stand by.

1.4

INPUT & OUTPUT FUNCTIONS

Input and output modules for the system are mounted on the local bus.
The input modules receive the field status criterion and float this data on
the local bus, when addressed by the traffic director. This data which is
floated in normal and inverse mode on the data lines is received by the
drive control / processor modules on the local bus.
The output modules receive the updated status information every cycle in
normal and inverse mode (DN & DI). This data is checked for plausibility
before driving the outputs and rejected in the event of non agreement. The
modules in this case store the data, last received correctly. In case non
agreement exists for more than 70ms an alarm is generated and the
module outputs are reset to O.

1.5

SEQUENCING & INTERLOCKING

The sequencing and interlocking of the elevation start / stop is done by the
programmable processor modules (70PR03) mounted on the local bus.
These processor modules commnicate exclusively via the local bus. They
receive the status information and process them in accordance with
instructions, preprogrammed in the non-volatile memory of the module
and transmit results via the local bus.
1.6

PROTECTION
As mentioned earlier the protection functions of the individual drives are
taken care by the respective drive control modules. Additionally protection
signals of the important drives i.e. nozzle valves, pulverisers would also be
processed by the programmable processor module (70PR03) on the same
local bus and trip command issued through the output modules. This trip
command would be in parallel to the command issued by the drive control
module. This further enhances the safety of the boiler.

1.7

INTRAPLANT BUS
The status of drives in the local buses for various elevations are
communicated to the local buses for unit trips purge etc via the intra plant
bus. Similarly, the permissive condition / trip conditions are communicated
from the local bus for unit trip / purge to the local bus for various
elevations via the intraplant bus.
Two entirely independent intra plant bus system are used for transmission
of redundant signals from the local buses. The two intra plant bus systems
are physically and electrically independent. The transmission sequences
on the intraplant bus are controlled by the address transmitter, and the
transmission takes place through co-axial cable. Two nos of address
transmitters are installed on each intraplant bus in a redundant mode. The
various measures taken to ensure transmission reliability on the intraplant
bus like time tolerance, parity bits, cyclic transmission etc together with the
bus redundancy ensure the total system integrity for boiler protection.

1.8

CONVENTIONAL OPERATORS CONSOLE

The start / stop commands to the drives in the system would be hardwired
from the miniature push buttons in the console to the respective drive
control and processor modules through prefab cables. A mosaic grid type
console insert would be provided for the purpose.

1.9

For trouble free testing, commissioning and maintenance of the system a

variety of equipment are available.

2.0

Servicing, test and commissioning units for commissioning and

maintenance of the system.

Programming units for programming the processing modules.

Diagnostic station the central station for localization and analysis of

plant system disturbances.

DIAGNOSTIC STATION
The diagnostic station with CRT and keyboard provides a window to the
whole process. It is the central working station for the dialogue with the
entire control and monitoring system. This station is capable of modular
expansion and performs the following functions:
- Continuous
Indication and logging of the system hardware alarms in clear text. The
failure of any drive control, input module field cable short circuit etc is
alarmed on the diagnostic station.
- On request
Indication / logging of local bus signals
Indication / logging of internal operational values.
Indication / logging of marshelling links in the local bus / intraplant bus
couplers.
Optimising of control loops (remote setting control parameters)
Print out of programme contents of programmable modules.
Hence in case of failure of any start / stop sequence it is possible to get a
display of various field input criterions, processor status etc on the
diagnostic station and localize the faulty field component. A printer can be
connected to the diagnostic station for getting a hard copy.

2.1

MONITORING AND ANNUNCIATION CONCEPT

Each module of the PROCONTROL P13/42 system contains circuits for
monitoring its most important functions as well was the thermocouple
/MCC). If a fault occurs, the location and type of the malfunction is
annunciated according to a monitoring and annunciation concept. These
monitoring and annunciation features indicate to the servicing personnel
without delay the location of the fault and permit its rapid elimination (see
fig.2)

Depending on the type of the main function, the malfunction, the

annunciation is either made via a hardwired output or via the local bus,
together with the respective data word of in a specific disturbance
annunciation word (see fig.3)
For example :
The wire break of a thermocouple is annunciated by means of a
disturbance bit, which will be Trasmitted in the same data word as the
analog Value of this thermocouple.
The different disturbances in relation with an individual drive control are
transmitted in a disturbance annunciation word of the drive control
module.
Each module has one hardwired disturbance annunciation output and a
red light emitting diode (LED) on the front plate for common annunciation
of module failures.
With the LED a faulty module can easily be detected in a station. The
hardwired disturbance annunciation outputs of all modules of one local
bus system are hardwired according their significance to the inputs of the
disturbance annunciation port of the LB/IPB coupler 70BK02 if a local
bus system is connected to more than one intraplant bus channel and
therefore is equipped with more LB/IPB couplers. These outputs will be
wired only to one LB/IPB coupler which will be defined as responsible for
the service traffic with the diagnosis station respectively the man machine
interface (MMI).
The LB/IPB coupler combines the inputs on his disturbance annunciation
port together with LB/IPB coupler internal disturbance annunciations with
the disturbance annunciation words transmitted via the local bus and form
a specific diagnosis word.

The diagnosis word is called up cyclically via service addresses by the

diagnosis station respectively MMI.
The annunciation signals can be displayed on the CRT with type location
and clear text of the specific fault.
By calling up the diagnosis word of each local bus station cyclically the
diagnosis station, respectively the MMI can also detect a failure of a local
bus system.

Various possibilities for interconnection of these are provided, depending

on the size of the control and monitoring system and the type of
communication means employed.
The following shows an excerpt of a preferred version:

3.

SME 0 =

Station failure
Interconnection of all SME outputs from central modules (e.g
bus traffic director, power supply) which shut down an entire
station in the event of a disturbance.

SME 1 =

Input module disturbance

Inter connection of all SME outputs from input modules.

SME 2 =

Module Disturbance (without input modules)

Inter connection of all SME outputs from processing or
output modules.

SME 3 =

Redundant system failure

Inter connection of all SME outputs from modules used in
redundant mode.

SME 1 =

Input module disturbance

Inter connection of all SME outputs from input modules.

SMS

Simulation
Inter connection of all SME outputs from all modules etc. In
addition to activation of the annunciation output the
disturbances detected also have an influence on the function
of the module concerned depending on the type of
disturbance.

PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE PROCONTROL P10

The programme documentation for programmable processors of the
procontrol P family is based on functional control diagrams which provide
the foundational information for programming. All tasks to be performed by
the processors are represented on these diagrams by symbols (for AND,
OR etc). An instruction code is assigned to every symbol.

4.

POWER SUPPLY

The power supply required for the operation of the procontrol P system is
24V DC with a permissible voltage variation from 22.5 to 30V DC. The
standard practice for procontrol system envisages 2 battery backed power
sources. The 2 feeders are diode auctioneered in the supply distribution
modules placed in various cubicles. These distribution modules further
feed the local buses placed within the cubicles.