People v alconga

Facts: On May 27, deceased Silverio Barion, the banker of the card game, was playing black
jack against Maria De Raposo. De Raposo and Alconga were partners in the game, they had
one money. Alconga was seated behind Barion and he gave signs to De Raposo. Barion, who
was suffering losses in the game, found this out and he expressed his anger at Alconga. The
two almost fought outright this was stopped.
The two met again on May 29. when Alconga was doing his job as a home guard. While the
said accused was seated on a bench in the guardhouse, Barion came along and said Coroy,
this is your breakfast followed by a swing of his pingahan, a bamboo stick. Alconga avoided
the blow by falling to the ground under the bench with the intention to crawl out of the
guardhouse. A second blow was given by Barion but failed to hit the accused, hitting the
bench instead. Alconga managed to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen.
While Barion was about to deliver the 3rd blow, Alconga fired at him with his revolver, causing
him to stagger and hit the ground. The deceased stood up, drew forth his dagger and directed
a blow to the accused who was able to parry the attack using his bolo. A hand to handfight
ensued. The deceased, looking already beaten and having sustained several wounds ran
away. He was followed by the accused and was overtaken after 200 meters.
A second fight took place and the deceased received a mortal bolo blow, the one which
slasehde the cranium. The deceased fell face downward besides many other blows delivered.
Alconga surrendered.
Issue: Whether or not self-defense can be used as a defense by Alconga
Held: No. Self-defense cannot be sustained. Alconga guilty of Homicide
The deceased ran and fled w/o having to inflicted so much a scratch to Alconga, but after,
upon the other hand, having been wounded with one revolver shot and several bolo slashes
the right of Alconga to inflict injury upon him has ceased absolutely/ Alconga had no right to
pursue, no right to kill or injure. He could have only attacked if there was reason to believe
that he is still not safe. In the case at bar, it is apparent that it is Alconga who is the superior
fighter and his safety was already secured after the first fight ended. There was no more
reason for him to further chase Barion. The second fight will be treated differently and
independently. Under the first fight, self-defense would have been valid, but that is not the
case in the second fight. In the second fight, there was illegal aggression on the part of
Alconga and as a result, he is found guilty of Homicide with no mitigating circumstance (MC)
of Provocation
Note Provocation in order to be an MC must be sufficient and immediately preceding the
act. It should be proportionate to the act committed and adequate to stir one to its
commission
People v Bataclan
Facts:

Issue:
WON
Held:
People v. Beronilla
People v Bindoy
POP vs. BINDOY (CASE BRIEF)
G.R. No. L-34665 AUGUST 28, 1931
FACTS:
On May 6, 1930, Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay, Faustino Pacas' wife. She
refused and
Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife and
attempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The disturbance attracted the
attention of
Emigdio Omamdam. In the course of the struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself
from
Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand, with such violence that the point of the bolo
reached Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy. The trial court held that Bindoy
was
guilty of the crime of homicide. Bindoy appealed, alleging that the death of Omamdam was
caused
accidentally and without malicious intent.
ISSUE:
WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the ground of
accident.
HELD:
Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Revised
Penal
Code
RATIO:
1.
There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed Omamdam.

No evidence that Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas.

No evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdam's presence.

No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy & Omamdam. On
the contrary, they were nephew & uncle, & were on good terms with each other.
2.
The witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy
were
actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former
had
pulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam, who was therefore hit in the chest, without

Bindoy's seeing him, because Omamdam had passed behind him. The testimony of this
witness
was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
3.
If, in the struggle, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing
so,
had wounded Omamdam, he would be liable for his act, since whoever willfully commits a
felony or
a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done is different from that
which
he intended.
This is not the case here. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas. He was only trying to defend his
possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him. His conduct was
perfectly lawful.
People v Cabungcal
PEOPLE V. CABUNGCAL
Facts:
NarcisoCabungcal (appellant) invited several persons to a picnic in a
fishery. They spent the day at the fishery and returned in two boats. In the
boat steered by the appellant, the majority were women, among them are
appellants wife andson and a nursing child.Upon reaching a place of great
depth, the deceased rocked the boat.Appellant asked the Juan Loquenario
(deceased) not to rock the boat. The deceased paid no attention.Appellant
struck him in the forehead by an oar.Deceased fell into the water and was
submerged.After a while appeared, saying that he is going to capsize it and
started to move it.Appellant struck him on the neck.
Issue:
Whether or not NarcisoCabungcal is exempt from criminal liability in
defense of wife and child.
Held:
The Appellant was acquitted and was exempted from criminal liability
for he acted in defense of his wife and child and other passengers and the
means employed.
Ratio:
Article 11 (3) : Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a
stranger provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first
circumstance of this article are present and that the one defending be not
induce by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.
People v Dela Cruz
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Keywords: excessive fines
Date: April 17, 1953
Ponente: Justice Bengzon
Facts:

In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the De La Cruz's store in
Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty
centavos.
As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms with Pablo
de la Cruz the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in this criminal
prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority of Republic Act No.
509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity.
Republic Act No. 509 provides in part as follows:
SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months nor more than twelve years or a
fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos, or
both, shall be imposed upon any person who sells any article, goods, or
commodity in excess of the maximum selling price fixed by the president; . . . .
In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons, corporations, partnerships, or
associations found guilty of any violation of this Act or of any rule or regulations
issued by the president pursuant to this Act shall be barred from the wholesome
and retail business for a period of five years for a first offense, and shall be
permanently barred for the second or succeeding offenses.
Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price, Pablo de la Cruz
was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first instance of Manila, to imprisonment for
five years, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos plus costs. He was also barred
from engaging in wholesale and retail business for five years.
Issue/s:
WON the trial judge erred in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate to the offence
WON the trial judge erred in not invalidating RA No. 509 in so far as it prescribed excessive
penalties.
Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant
who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive
Order?
Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a
ten-centavo profit to the accused?

Held: We may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts by the
same statutory enactment. Wherefore, reducing the imprisonment to six months and the fine
to two thousand pesos, we hereby affirm the appealed decision in all other respects.
Ratio:
The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted."
The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character
of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
apply to punishment which never existed in America of which public sentiment
has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance those
inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on

the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur., supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p.
561).
Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.
However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies as well to
punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be so severe as to fall
within the fundamental restriction. (15 Am. Jur., p. 178)
For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually holding, that too long a
prison term might clash with the Philippine Constitution. But that brings up again two
opposing theories
we are told the prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to the courts' decision imposing
penalties within the limits of the statute (15 Am. Jur., "Criminal Law" sec. 526).
the section would violate the Constitution, if the penalty is excessive under any and all
circumstances, the minimum being entirely out of proportion to the kind of
offenses prescribed
Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant
who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the
Executive Order?
NO. because in overstepping the price barriers Dela Cruz might derive, in some instances,
profits amounting to thousands of pesos
The prison term must be so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral
sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under
the circumstances (lb.).
authorities are not lacking to the effect that the fundamental prohibition likewise restricts the
judge's power and authority
The second theory would contrast the penalty imposed by the court with the gravity of the
particular crime or misdemeanor, and if notable disparity results, it would
apply the constitutional brake, even if the statute would, under other
circumstances, be not extreme or oppressive.
Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a
ten-centavo profit to the accused?
NO.
In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not measured exclusively by the gains
obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one violation would mean others,
and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price
controls.
People v Dino
Facts:
On June 20, 1946, Roberto Dino was hired as a driver of the US Army
at a station in Quezon City. At about 11:30 of that day, he brought
to Manila Harbor, a truckload of articles, which came from a of the
US Army. At the checkpoint, a guard approached the truck and found
three boxes, containing ten caliber .30 army rifles. The guard
brought Dino to the lieutenant of the US Army for questioning. Dino
pointed to the gang, but the latter denied. Subsequently, Dino
confessed that four persons put the boxes on board, and he was

instructed to bring them out of the area, while they were to meet
passed the checkpoint.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of theft was consummated considering the
foregoing.
Ruling:
Trial Court: Dino was found guilty as an ACCOMPLICE in the
CONSUMMATED crime of THEFT.
SC: Dino was found guilty as a PRINCIPAL in the FRUSTRATED crime of
THEFT.
Reason:
In order for the crime of theft to be consummated, the articles
should have passed the checkpoint, so that the thief could have full
control and could dispose of the stolen property.
People v Espiritu

People v Guillen
FACTS:
The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the President
of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas on March 10, 1947.
During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing candidate
of Manuel Roxas. According to the accused, he was disappointed with the latter for failing to
redeem and fulfill promises made by President Roxas during the elections. Consequently, the
accused determined to assassinate the President and found the oppoturnity to do so on the
night of March 10, 1947 when the President attended a popular meeting by the Liberal Party
at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. Guillen first intended to use a revolver to accomplish his
goal but he had previously lost his licensed firearm, so he thought of using two hand
grenades which were given to him by an American soldier in exchange for two bottles of
whisky. The accused stood on the chair he had been sitting on and hurled the grenade at the
President when the latter had just closed his speech. A general who was on the platform saw
the smoking grenade and kicked it away from the platform towards an open space where he
thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm. The grenade exploded in the middle of a
group of persons standing close to the platform and grenade fragments seriously injured
Simeon Varela, who died the next day due to the mortal wounds caused, and several other
persons. Guillen was arrested and he readily admitted his responsibility.
ISSUE:
WON the accused was guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the

death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to the other injured
persons.
HELD:
The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. In throwing the hand
grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice and
is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act. As provided by Art. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wronful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. As held by thie Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such unlawful act is
wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered reckless
imprudence.
The sentence of the trial court is affirmed by unanimous vote and death sentence shall be
executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code
People v Jaurigue
FACTS
1. Defendant/Respondent Avelina Jaurigue found guilty of
homicide (for killing Amado Capia) by Court of First Instance of
Tayabas
2. Defendant appealed to the CA contending that the lower court
erred in not holding appellant had acted in defense of honor
therefore she's completely absolved by criminal liability
ISSUE
W/N respondent should be completely absolved of criminal liability
considering her act done in defense of her honor. (Art 11 of RPC)
HELD
Defendant Jaurigue cannot be legally declared completely exempt
from criminal liability.
With the modification of the judgment appealed from, defendant is
sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 months and 1 day
arresto mayor minimum to 2 years 4 months and 1 day maximum with
necessary penalties of P2,000.
REASON
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the
learned trial court, when Amado Capia (deceased) sat beside the
defendant near the chapel door placing his hand on the upper portion
of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted

and there were already several people. Under these circumstances,

there was and there could be no possibility for her to be raped. And
so when she struck Capia with a knife on his neck resulting death,
the means she employed to defend her honor was excessive.
People v Kalalo
Facts:
Appellant Marcelo Kalalo and Isabela Holgado had litigation over a
parcel of land situated in Calumpang San Luis Batangas. Marcelo
filed a complaint against Isabela in the CFI Batangas, but by virtue
of motion filed by Isabela, his first and second complaints were
dismissed respectively. Marcelo cultivated such land in question but
when harvest time came Isabela reaped all the planted good thereon.
Isabela and his brother Arcadio Holgado (one of the deceased)
decided to order the land plowed. When it came to Marcelo's
knowledge about the plowing of the Holgados, He together with his
brothers Felipe and Juan, bro-in-law Gregorio Ramos and Alejandro
Garcia, mother and aunt Fausta and Alipia Abrenica (all herein
appellants) proceeded to place as well. They are armed with bolos
and thus ordered the laborers of Isabela to stop plowing. When
Isabela, Marcelino Panaligan (another deceased) and other companion
arrived at place with food for the laborers, after knowing the cause
of suspension for plowing ordered the laborers to ditch again. At
this juncture Marcelo approached Arcadio and Felipe, Juan and
Gregorio approached Marcelino. At the remark of the Kalalos' mother
saying "What is detaining you?" they all simultaneously stuck with
their bolos Arcadio and Marcelino inflicting wounds which caused
their death. Marcelo took the revolver from Palanigan's body and
fired 4 shots at Hilarion Holgado who was fleeing then from the
scene. The appellants attempted to prove that the fight which
resulted in the death of 2 deceased was provoked by Marcelino when
he fired a gun shot to Marcelo. The trial court did not give any
credit to the testimony of the appellants stating that the
improbabilities of the defenses of the accused. It held on 3
separate criminal cases guilty the defendants for the murder of
Marcelino Palanigan (1st case) and Arcadio Holgado (2nd case) and
Illegal charge of firearm (3rd case). Co-accused Fausta, Alipia,
Gregorio and Alejandro were acquitted with the charges therein.
Issue/s:
Whether the appellants guilty of murder or of simple homicide on 3
cases?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that under Art.248 RPC which defines murder,
the circumstance of "abuse of superior strength" if present, raises
homicide to the category of murder. However, said circumstance may
not properly be taken into consideration into the 2 cases at bar,

either qualifying or as a generic circumstance, if it is borne in

mind that the deceased were also armed (with bolo and revolver). The
risk was even for the contending parties and their strength was
almost balanced because a revolver is as effective as, if not more
so than 3 bolos. Thus, the SC finds these 2 cases constitute 2
homicides not murder.
As to the 3rd case, when Marcelo Kalalo fired 4 successive gun shots
at Hilarion, the fact that Marcelo not having contented himself
firing once and the circumstance that immediately before doing so ,
he and other appellants had already killed Arcadio and Marcelino,
shows that he was bent on killing Hilarion. He performed everything
necessary on his part to commit the crime that he determined to
commit but he failed by reason of causes independent of his will,
either of poor aim or because he intended victim succeeded in
dodging the shots. None of which found its mark. The Supreme Court
ruled that such act constitutes attempted homicide.
People v Lamahang
acts: Aurelio Lamahang was caught opening with an iron bar a wall of a store of cheap goods
in Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke one board and was unfastening another when a patrolling
police caught him. Owners of the store were sleeping inside store as it was early dawn.
Convicted of attempt of robbery
Issue: WON crime is attempted robbery?
Held: No. Attempted trespass to dwelling. Attempt should have logical relation to a particular
and concrete offense which would lead directly to consummation. Necessary to establish
unavoidable connection & logical & natural relation of cause and effect. Important to show
clear intent to commit crime. In case at bar, we can only infer that his intent was to enter by
force, other inferences are not justified by facts. Groizard: infer only from nature of acts
executed. Acts susceptible of double interpretation cant furnish ground for themselves. Mind
should not directly infer intent. Spain SC: necessary that objectives established or acts
themselves obviously disclose criminal objective.
People v Oanis
PEOPLE v. OANIS
[74 Phil. 257 (1943)]
Facts:
Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta were under
instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped convict, and if
overpowered, to get hi dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, they went
into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back toward the door,
simultaneously fired at him with their revolvers, without first making any reasonable
inquiry as to his identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and
not the wanted criminal..
Held:
Both accused are guilty of murder

Ratio:
Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the accused
would not be justified in killing him while the latter was sleeping. In apprehending
even the most notorious criminal, the law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is
only when the fugitive from justice is determined to fight the officers of law who are
trying to capture him that killing him would be justified.