RA NO.

9048
Case No. 1
Ponente: Tinga
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG
also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG.
Facts:
-Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang because in Singapore
middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person's name, the parents of the petitioner anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will
be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother
and sister since they have different surnames. And Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore's Mandarin language since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is,
they pronounce it as "L."
-The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. The trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that
petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial
court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed
to suit the convenience of the bearers.

-Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied. Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari arguing that the trial court
has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to
Article 174of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of
dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the "best interest of
the child." It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition to drop the middle name should be granted.
Held: No.
The petition to drop the middle name should not be granted. A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual
from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at
the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and
intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve
to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate
children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes
their filiation, in which case they may bear the father's surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother's surname, and does not have a
middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother's surname as his
middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of
a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of
his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of
the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

RA NO. 9048
Case No. 2
Ponente: Ynares -Santiago
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHULE Y. LIM
Facts:
Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte. In her petition, she
alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries (as enumerated below) and prays that they be corrected.
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2. Her father's name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
- The trial court granted respondent's petition.
-The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's decision. In its second assignment of error, the
Republic assails the Court of Appeals' decision in allowing respondent to use her father's surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a need for a court pronouncement in order for the respondent to use her father's surname.
Held: No.
The Republic's submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her father's surname. What it did allow was the correction of her
father's misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to
use her father's surname.
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname,there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already
been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed
change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general.
In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondent's case, the
change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in general.

#3

Case Doctrines:

A petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding; it cannot be decided through a summary proceeding

The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature.

A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. All the
requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.

Facts: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to
Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he was born on July 9,
1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him use the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them;
from the time Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and
spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers
surname; Giovannis mother might eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his
natural father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor.

Having found respondents petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the
local civil registrar and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to
present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court
granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni
Nadores.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary
proceeding. Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial courts decision which granted the petition for change of name despite
the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the childs change of name should have
been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.

2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?

3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?

4. When is a proceeding considered adversarial?

Held:

1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented
during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his
father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of
the reunification of mother and son.

2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of
clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a
summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or
typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same
in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name.

3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower
court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the
petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to
exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG
neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in
the lower court were not adversarial enough.

4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it. Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world
considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements
to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to
contest the petition (Republic of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007).

#4
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines

October 22, 2007 537 SCRA 473

Ponente: Justice Corona

Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner
alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male
transsexual. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated
on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. Petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. An
order setting the case for initial hearing. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration. February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but it was denied. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Issues:
(Issue in the RTC and CA) sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
Whether or not a persons first name be change because of sex reassignment?
Whether or not entries in the B.C. be change on the basis of equity?

Held: Where the RTC affirms the petition filed by the herein petitioner, through the OSG, the republic appealed the case in the Court of Appeals, whereby the
decision was set aside because there is no law that provides for the change of first name because of a sex reassignment. The SC rules out that the petition lacks
merit where it was denied. The SC held that a persons first name cannot be change because of sex reassignment and RA 9048 deliberately expounded on how a
name can be change and sex reassignment is not one of them. Furthermore, the SC held No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex
On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. It is but clear to state that a persons status is determined at birth and not by reassignment. "Status" refers to the
circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.

#5
RP VS CAGANDAHAN

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her
name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital,
who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally,
thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking
that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower court.
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all
persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of
the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court
ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the
determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts
present in this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent
is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the
compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence
presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development
in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The
Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.

#6
SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC

FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in
the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a
female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex
alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.
HELD:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or
write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the
change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

CASE no. 7
R.A. 9048
G.R. No. 198010

August 12, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,

vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, DIOSDADO J.:
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
RULING: In this case, Dr. Norma Lugsanay Uy (respondent) sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first name,
surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents
such as passport and school and professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay"
instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondents filiation and
citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes
her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly,
the changes are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. The pronouncement of the Court in that case is
illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves
of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Blacks Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as follows: One having opposing parties;
contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the
petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to
"Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have
interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of
the proceedings taken.37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential
oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties.38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. 39
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice
of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court
all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no
actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate
action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence
of which might be detrimental and far reaching. READ RULE 108 for the provisions :D
FACTS: Respondent filed the petition impleading as the only respondent the Local Civil Registrar of Ginoog City. In her petition she alleged the following: That
her full name is in fact Norma S. Lugsanay and not Anita Sy as shown by her birth certificate; that she is an illegitimate child of her parents and thus she should
follow her mother's surname; and that she is Filipino and not Chinese. The RTC granted the petition and concluded that respondents petition would neither
prejudice the government nor any third party.
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondents failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the
publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to
the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutors Office. As to whether the petition is a collateral attack on respondents filiation, the CA ruled in favor of
respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and that her siblings birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their
citizenship is Filipino. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011