EVIDENCE

may be inferred as
probable consequence

necessary

or

Expert evidence testimony of a witness

regarding a question of science, art or
trade, when he is skilled therein
(Part VIII of IX)

Evidence (Rule 128-133)

A. General Provisions
1. Definitions
Rule 128, Sec. 1. Evidence
defined. - Evidence is the means,
sanctioned
by
these
rules,
of
ascertaining in a judicial proceeding
the truth respecting a matter of fact.
(1)
Evidence the means, sanctioned by
these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter
of fact.
Relevant evidence evidence which has
a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence;
evidence which tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue.
Material evidence evidence which is
directed to prove a fact in issue as
determined by the rules of substantive
law and pleadings; evidence of such
quality of substantial importance to the
particular issue, apart from its relevance
Escolin: The terms relevant and
material are practically the same. They
are used interchangeably by the SC.
They differ in effect. Material evidence
has substantial effect.
Competent evidence evidence which
is not excluded by the law or by the Rules
of Court
Direct evidence evidence which proves
a fact in dispute without the aid of any
inference or presumption
Circumstantial evidence proof of
facts from which, taken collectively, the
existence of the particular fact in dispute

Prima facie evidence evidence which

suffices for the proof of a particular fact
until contradicted and overcome by other
evidence
Conclusive evidence evidence which
is incontrovertible and which the law
does not allow to be contradicted
Cumulative evidence evidence of the
same kind and character as that already
given and tends to prove the same
proposition
Corroborative evidence evidence of a
different kind and character tending to
prove the same point
Best evidence evidence which affords
the greatest certainty of the fact in
question
Secondary evidence evidence which is
necessarily inferior to primary/best
evidence and shows on its fact that better
evidence exists
Factum probans the evidentiary fact
by which the factum probandum is to be
established; material evidencing the
proposition, existent, and offered for the
consideration of the tribunal
Factum probandum the ultimate fact
sought to be established; proposition to
be established, hypothetical, and that
which one party affirms and the other
denies
Factum
probandum
Proposition to be
established
Conceived of as
hypothetical; that
which one party
affirms and the
other denies

Factum Probans
Material evidencing
the proposition
Conceived of for
practical purposes
as existent, and is
offered as such for
the consideration of
the court

Collateral facts matters other than

facts in issue and which are offered as a
basis merely for inference as to the
existence or non-existence of the facts in
issue
Real evidence evidence furnished by
the things themselves, or view or
inspection as distinguished from a
description by them of a witness; that
which is addressed directly to the senses
of the court without the intervention of a
witness
Rebuttal evidence evidence which is
given to explain, repel, counteract or
disprove facts given in evidence by the
adverse party
Positive evidence when a witness
affirms that a fact did or did not occur
Negative evidence when a witness
states that he did not see or know the
occurrence of a fact

2. Distinguish
Admissibility of
evidence
Pertains to the
ability
of
the
evidence
to
be
allowed
and
accepted
subject
to its relevancy
and competence
Substantive
essence
or
characteristic
feature of evidence
as would make it
worthy
of
consideration
by
the court before its
admission

Weight
of
evidence
Pertains
to the
effect of evidence
admitted

The
probative
value of evidence
which the court
may give to admit
after
complying
with the rules of
relevancy
and
competency

Proof
Evidence
Effect and result of Medium of proof
evidence

End Result

Means to the end

3. Scope
a. Rule 128 2
Sec. 2. Scope. - The rules of
evidence shall be the same in all
courts and in all trials and hearings,
except as otherwise provided by law
or these rules. (2a)

b. Cases
Reyes v. CA, 216 SCRA 25 (1992)

The Rules of Court, and its rules on

Evidence, are not even suppletorily
applicable to agrarian cases. Special law
allows affidavits to be admitted in
evidence in agrarian courts, even without
the witness testifying nor subject to
cross-examination.
Escolin: Note that in Reyes, what was
presented were affidavits. Ordinarily,
affidavits are not admissible before the
regular courts because there is no
opportunity for the other party to crossexamine. Depositions are admissible
because there was an opportunity for the
adverse party to cross-examine.
Pp v. Turco 337scra714 (2000)

Subject: Failure to qualify the doctor who

conducted the medical exam as an expert
witness. In People vs. Bernaldez (supra),
the court a quo erred in giving weight to
the medical certificate issued by the
examining physician despite the failure of
the latter to testify. While the certificate
could be admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule since entries in official
records (under Section 44, Rule 130,
Rules of Court) constitute exceptions to
the hearsay evidence rule, since it
involved an opinion of one who must first
be established as an expert witness, it
could not be given weight or credit unless
the doctor who issued it is presented in
court to show his qualifications.
We place emphasis on the distinction
between admissibility of evidence and the

probative value thereof. Evidence is

admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or the
rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of
Court)
or
is
competent.
Since
admissibility of evidence is determined by
its
relevance
and
competence,
admissibility is, therefore, an affair of
logic and law. On the other hand, the
weight to be given to such evidence, once
admitted, depends on judicial evaluation
within the guidelines provided in Rule
133 and the jurisprudence laid down by
the Court. Thus, while evidence may be
admissible, it may be entitled to little or
no weight at all. Conversely, evidence
which may have evidentiary weight may
be inadmissible because a special rule
forbids its reception (Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998 ed., p.
550).
Withal,
although
the
medical
certificate is an exception to the hearsay
rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has
very little probative value due to the
absence of the examining physician.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the
prosecution relied solely on the medical
certificate (stating that there was
"[h]ymen rupture, secondary to penile
insertion" as well as "foul-smelling
discharges."
The
diagnosis
was
"[r]uptured hymen secondary to rape" [p.
68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made
on the testimony of the victim herself
which, standing alone even without
medical examination, is sufficient to
convict (People vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA
601 [1997]). It is well-settled that a
medical examination is not indispensable
in the prosecution of rape (People vs.
Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17,
1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55
[1996]; People vs. Venerable, supra). The
absence of medical findings by a medicolegal officer does not disprove the
occurrence of rape (People vs. Taneo,
supra). It is enough that the evidence on
hand convinces the court that conviction
is proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In
the instant case, the victim's testimony

alone is credible and sufficient to convict.

Famador: medical certificate can be used
by the defense when:
1. the lacerations have already healed
or that the lacerations are already
old.
2. the admission of more fingers into
the vagina would prove the
sweetheart defense
Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC,
217 SCRA 237 (1993)

The unverified position paper is a mere

procedural infirmity which does not affect
the merits of the case. Procedural
technicalities do not strictly apply to
proceedings before the LA.
The rules of evidence does not apply to
1. probation board
2. CTA
3. SEC
4. Immigration cases
5. LA/NLRC
6. CAR

B.Admissibility of Evidence
Sec. 3.
Evidence
relevant
excluded
(3a)

Admissibility of evidence. is admissible when it is

to the issue and is not
by the law or these rules.

Requisites for admissibility

1. relevant
2. competent

1. Relevancy
a. Rule 128 4
Sec. 4. Relevancy;
collateral
matters. Evidence must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. Evidence on collateral
matters shall not be allowed, except
when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue. (4a)

Relevance relation to the facts in issue

as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence

Evidence is material when it is directed

to prove a fact in issue as determined by
the rules of substantive law & pleadings.

Evidence on collateral matters allowed

only when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue.

Competent Evidence one that is not

excluded by law in a particular case.

b. Cases
Bautista v. Aparece, 51 OG 805
(1954)

Nicolas Aasco sold 3 parcels of land to

Valentin Justiniani, who in turn sold the
same to Claudio Justiniani.
Claudio executed public instrument,
whereby he sold same property to
Apolonio Aparece. Hermogenes Bautista
illegally entered portions III & IV and
took possession thereof, prompting
Aparece to file complaint with guerilla
forces.
Upon hearing this, Bautista executed
public instrument recognizing Apareces
ownership of the property.
Possession was restored to Aparece.
Bautista filed complaint vs. Aparece for
allegedly usurping portion of his land.
Apareces special defense: portion of land
referred to in the complaint was acquired
by him from Claudio Justiniani and
prayed for dismissal of the case.
TC decision: Defendant Aparece is the
owner of portions III & IV.
Bautista appealed alleging that TC erred
in admitting in evidence the document
relinquishing plaintiffs ownership &
possession as embodied in exhibit I.
Bautista argued that the document was
executed
under
duress,
force,
intimidation and that guerilla officer has
no jurisdiction over the matter.
SC: Test of admissibility or inadmissibility
of a certain document is WON it is
relevant, material or competent.
Relevant Evidence one that has any
value in reason as tending to prove any
matter provable in an action.

The mere fact that the document in

question was executed before a guerilla
officer does not make the same
irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent to
the main issue raised in the pleading.
Lopez v. Heesen, 365 P.2d 448
(1961)

Both prosecution and defense presented

their respective expert witnesses. The
testimonies
were
naturally
in
contradiction with each other.
GR: Expert evidence is not conclusive
upon the court. The court is not bound to
accept said evidence. The court may use
it as an aid.
Exception: when the court is not
knowledgeable or completely ignorant on
the subject, the court should admit the
expert evidence.
State of Missouri v. Ball, 339 S.W2d
783 (1960)

2. Competence
a. Rule 128 3
Sec. 3.
Evidence
relevant
excluded
(3a)

Admissibility of evidence. is admissible when it is

to the issue and is not
by the law or these rules.

Competence not excluded by the law or

the RoC

b. Constitutional rules of
exclusion
1) Art. III, Secs. 2 and
3
Art. III, Section 2. The right of the
people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures

of whatever nature and for any

purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under
oath
or
affirmation
of
the
complainant and the witnesses he
may
produce,
and
particularly
describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be
seized.
Art. III, Section 3. (1) The privacy
of
communication
and
correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court,
or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by
law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

2) Art. III, Sec. 12

Art. III, Section 12. (1) Any person
under
investigation
for
the
commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or
Section
17
hereof
shall
be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
XXX

3) Art. III, Sec. 17

Art. III, Section 17. No person
shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
Absolutely
inadmissible

evidence
obtained
1. from unreasonable searches and
seizures, or
2. in violation of the right of privacy of
communication and correspondence
Relatively inadmissible (inadmissible only
against the person whose rights are
violated, admissible for other purposes)
evidence obtained
1. in violation of the right be informed of
the right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel
2. from means which vitiate the free will
3. in violation of the right against selfincrimination

c. Statutory
exclusion

rules

of

1) NIRC,
201,
as
amended by RA 8424
Sec. 201. Effect of Failure to
Stamp Taxable Document. An
instrument, document or paper which
is required by law to be stamped and
which has been signed, issued,
accepted or transferred without being
duly stamped, shall not be recorded,
nor shall it or any copy thereof or any
record of transfer of the same be
admitted or used in evidence in any
court until the requisite stamp or
stamps shall have been affixed
thereto and cancelled.
No notary public or other officer
authorized to administer oaths shall
add his jurat or acknowledgment to
any
document
subject
to
documentary stamp tax unless the
proper
documentary
stamps
are
affixed thereto and cancelled.
Failure to stamp a document required by
law to be stamped shall render the
document inadmissible in any court until

the requisite stamp or stamps shall have

been affixed thereto and cancelled (201
NIRC). This is an absolute inadmissibility.

2) General Banking Act

of 2000, RA 8791,
55.1 (b)
Sec. 55. Prohibited Transactions. 55.1.
No
director,
officer,
employee, or agent of any bank shall

(b) Without order of a court of

competent jurisdiction, disclose to
any
unauthorized
person
any
information relative to the funds or
properties in the custody of the bank
belonging to private individuals,
corporations, or any other entity:
Provided, That with respect to bank
deposits, the provisions of existing
laws shall prevail;
Elements of the exclusion
1. director, officer, employee, or agent of
any bank
2. disclosure to unauthorized person
3. information relative to the funds or
properties in the custody of the bank
belonging to private individuals,
corporations, or any other entity
4. without a court order
de Leon: Note that this provision covers
only property in the custody of the bank
other than bank deposits. For bank
deposits, RA 1405 governs. Note also that
the provision does not state the nature of
the inadmissibility. I submit that it is a
rule of absolute inadmissibility.

3) RA 1405: Law on
Secrecy
of
Bank
Deposits
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever
nature
with
banks
or
banking
institutions
in
the
Philippines
including
investments
in
bonds
issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions
and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely

confidential nature and may not be

examined, inquired or looked into by
any person, government official,
bureau or office, except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in
cases of impeachment, or upon order
of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation.
GR: All deposits of whatever nature with
banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in
bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and
its
instrumentalities,
are
hereby
considered
as
of
an
absolutely
confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or
office.
Exceptions
1. written permission of the depositor
2. impeachment, or
3. order of a competent court in cases of
a. bribery or
b. dereliction of duty of public
officials, or
4. where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
de Leon: I submit that this is a rule of
absolute inadmissibility.

4) RA
4200:
tapping

Wire-

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any

person, not being authorized by all
the
parties
to
any
private
communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as
a
dictaphone
or
dictagraph
or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape

recorder,
or
described:

however

otherwise

It shall also be unlawful for any

person, be he a participant or not in
the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record,
disc record, or any other such record,
or
copies
thereof,
of
any
communication
or
spoken
word
secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to
replay the same for any other person
or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial,
to any other person: Provided, That
the use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
Unlawful acts:
1. any person, not being authorized by all
the
parties
to
any
private
communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as
a
dictaphone
or
dictagraph or
dectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder,
or
however
otherwise
described:
2. any person to knowingly possess any
tape record, wire record, disc record,
or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured in the manner
prohibited by this law; or
3. any person to replay the same for any
other person or persons
4. any person to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or

5. any person to furnish transcriptions

thereof, whether complete or partial,
to any other person:
The use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation
or
trial
of
offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not
be covered by this prohibition.
Sec. 2. Any person who wilfully or
knowingly does or who shall aid,
permit, or cause to be done any of the
acts declared to be unlawful in the
preceding section or who violates the
provisions of the following section or
of any order issued thereunder, or
aids,
permits,
or
causes
such
violation
shall,
upon
conviction
thereof, be punished xxx.
Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this
Act, however, shall render it unlawful
or punishable for any peace officer,
who is authorized by a written order
of the Court, to execute any of the
acts declared to be unlawful in the
two preceding sections in cases
involving the crimes of treason,
espionage,
provoking
war
and
disloyalty in case of war, piracy,
mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion,
inciting
to
rebellion,
sedition,
conspiracy
to
commit
sedition,
inciting
to
sedition,
kidnapping as defined by the Revised
Penal
Code,
and
violations
of
Commonwealth
Act
No.
616,
punishing
espionage
and
other
offenses against national security:
Provided, That such written order
shall only be issued or granted upon
written
application
and
the
examination
under
oath
or
affirmation of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce and a
showing:
(1)
that
there
are
reasonable grounds to believe that
any of
the crimes
enumerated
hereinabove has been committed or is
being committed or is about to be
committed: Provided, however, That

in cases involving the offenses of

rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit
rebellion,
inciting
to
rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to
commit sedition, and inciting to
sedition, such authority shall be
granted only upon prior proof that a
rebellion or acts of sedition, as the
case may be, have actually been or
are being committed; (2) that there
are reasonable grounds to believe
that evidence will be obtained
essential to the conviction of any
person for, or to the solution of, or to
the prevention of, any of such crimes;
and (3) that there are no other means
readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
xxx
Conditions for valid wiretapping
1. any peace officer
2. authorized by a written order of the
Court
3. in cases involving the crimes of
treason, espionage, provoking war and
disloyalty in case of war, piracy,
mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion,
inciting
to
rebellion,
sedition,
conspiracy
to
commit
sedition,
inciting
to
sedition,
kidnapping, espionage and other
offenses against national security:
Sec. 4. Any communication or
spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial,
legislative
or
administrative
hearing
or
investigation.
Information obtained in violation of the
anti-wiretapping
act
is
absolutely
inadmissible.

Ramirez
(1995)

v.

CA,

248

SCRA

590

Even a person privy to a communication

who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the
latter violates the anti-wiretapping act.
The
recording
is
inadmissible
in
evidence.
Gaanan
(1986)

v.

IAC,

145

SCRA

112

Salcedo Ortaez v. CA, 235 SCRA

111 (1994)

C. What Need NOT be Proved:

3 things that need not be proved
1. matters of mandatory judicial notice
2. matters of discretionary judicial notice
3. judicial admissions

1. Judicial notice
a. Mandatory
1)

(Rule

129

Sec. 1. Judicial
notice,
when
mandatory. - A court shall take
judicial
notice,
without
the
introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of
government
and
symbols
of
nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the
laws of nature, the measure of time,
and the geographical divisions. (1a)
Mandatory Judicial Notice
1. existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality
2. the law of nations
3. the admiralty and maritime courts of
the world and their seals
4. the political constitution and history of
the Philippines

5. the official acts of the legislative,

executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines
6. the laws of nature
7. the measure of time, and
8. the geographical divisions
Sermonia v. CA, 233 SCRA 155
(1994)

In
determining
prescription
in
a
prosecution for bigamy, the reckoning
point is actual discovery of the
subsequent marriage by the offended
party, not from the registration of the
marriage contract. The doctrine of
constructive knowledge does not apply,
even if it is more favorable to the
accused.

b. Discretionary
129 2)

(Rule

Sec. 2. Judicial
notice,
when
discretionary. - A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions. (1a)
Discretionary Judicial Notice matters
which are
1. of public knowledge, or
2. are
capable
of
unquestionable
demonstration, or
3. ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions

c. When hearing required

(Rule 129 3)
Sec. 3. Judicial
notice,
when
hearing necessary. - During the trial,
the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
After
the
trial,
and
before
judgment or on appeal, the proper
court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the

parties to be heard thereon if such

matter is decisive of a material issue
in the case.(n)
When court takes judicial notice
1. During trial, on any matter allow the
parties to be heard thereon
2. After trial, and before judgment or on
appeal any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue
in the case
Hearing is necessary when
1. During the trial, the court
a. motu propio, on request of a party
b. announces its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter
2. After trial
a. before judgment or on appeal
b. motu propio, on request of a party
c. takes judicial notice of any matter,
and
d. if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case
Hence, the court can take judicial notice
of any matter during the trial as long as
there is a hearing. If trial is already over,
the court can take judicial notice only of
matters decisive of a material issue in the
case as long as there is a hearing (p. 88,
Francisco).
de Leon: Why on earth would a court take
judicial notice of a matter which is not
decisive of a material issue in a case?
City of Manila v. Garcia, 19scra413
(1967) L26053
Baguio v. Vda. de Jalagat, 42 SCRA
337 (1971) L28100
Prieto v. Arroyo,
(1965) L17885

14

SCRA

549

Ozaeta Romulo etc. , 92 SCRA 1

(1979) x

Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA

736 (1988) L55960

mistake or that no such admission

was made. (2a)

Tabuena v. CA,
(1991) 85423

Requisites for judicial admission

1. made by a party
2. in the course of the proceedings
3. in the same case

196

SCRA

650

As a general rule courts are not

authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of cases pending before
them, of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same
court, and notwithstanding the fact that
both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending before the same judge.
However, an exception is when in the
absence of objection, and as a matter of
convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its
archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose,
by name and number or in some other
manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record
of the former case or any part of it, is
actually withdrawn from the archives by
the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and
admitted as a part of the record of the
case then pending.
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676
(1995) 115908-09
BPI-Family Bank v. CA 330scra507
(2000) 122480

2. Judicial admissions

de Leon: If the admission was made in

outside the proceedings or in another
case, it is also admissible under
admissions of a party (Rule 130, Sec. 26).
The admission may be contradicted only
by showing that
1. it was made through palpable mistake
or
2. no such admission was made

b. Instances of
admissions

Judicial

Instances of Judicial admissions

1. the genuineness and due execution of
an actionable document copied or
attached to a pleading, when the other
party fails to specifically deny under
oath (Rule 8 8)
2. material allegations in the complaint,
when the other party fails to
specifically deny it (Rule 8 11)
3. admissions in superseded pleadings,
when offered in evidence (Rule 10 8)
4. act, declaration, or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact (Rule 130 26)
5. implied admission of guilt in an offer
of compromise by the accused in
criminal cases, except quasi-offenses
and those allowed by law to be
compromised (Rule 130 27)
6. admission by silence (Rule 130 32)

c. Cases
Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 48
(1914) 8200

a. Rule 129 4
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An
admission, verbal or written, made by
a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by showing that
it
was
made
through
palpable

Torres v. CA, 131 SCRA 24 (1984)

L37420
Bitong v. CA 292scra503 (1998)
123553

D. Object and
Evidence

Documentary

1. Rule 130 1-2

Sec. 1. Object as evidence.
Objects
as
evidence
are
those
addressed to the senses of the court.
When an object is relevant to the fact
in issue, it may be exhibited to,
examined or viewed by the court. (1a)
Object Evidence evidence addressed to
the senses of the court
Ocular inspection
evidence.

qualifies

as

object

Sec. 2. Documentary evidence.

Documents as evidence consist of
writings or any material containing
letters, words, numbers, figures,
symbols or other modes of written
expressions offered as proof of their
contents. (n)
Documentary evidence any material
containing modes of written expressions
offered as proof of their contents

2. Cases
People v. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388
(1980) L29271
Sison v. People,
(1995) 108280-83

250

SCRA

58

Adamczuk v. Holloway, 13 A.2d 2

(1940)
State v. Tatum, 360 P. 2d 754
(1961)

E. Best Evidence Rule

1. Rule 130 3-4
Sec. 3. Original document must
be produced, exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original

document
itself,
following cases:

except

in

the

(a)
When the original has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
(b)
When the original is in the
custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c)
When the original consists
of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined
in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result
of the whole; and
(d)
When the original is a
public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a
public office. (2a)
Best Evidence Rule When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself
Exceptions: When the original
1. has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
2. is in the custody or under the control
of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails
to produce it after reasonable notice;
3. consists of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
4. the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office

2. Cases
People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28
(1990) 80505

The best evidence rule does not apply to

the marked money in a buy bust

operation because the inquiry is not on

the contents of the marked bill, but
merely its existence.
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA
155 (1966) L21438
Meyers v. US, 171 F.2d 800 (1948)

BER only applies if the subject of inquiry

is the contents of a document; such an
inquiry need not be the main issue
People v. Tan,
(1959) L14257

105

Phil.

1242

Seiler v. Lucasfilm, 797 F.2d 1504

(1986)

US BER or their equivalents vs.

Philippine BER other modes of written
expression; is a disputed work in an
infringement
case
object
or
documentary?
US v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522 (1910)
5791
Fiscal v. Reyes, 55 Phil 905 (1931)
35366 05aug31

Sec. 4. Original of document.

(a)
The original of a document
is one the contents of which are the
subject of inquiry.
(b)
When a document is in two
or more copies executed at or about
the
same
time,
with
identical
contents, all such copies are equally
regarded as originals.
(c)
When an entry is repeated
in the regular course of business, one
being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the
entries are likewise equally regarded
as originals. (3a)
Original documents
1. one the contents of which are the
subject of inquiry.

2. When a document is in two or more

copies executed at or about the same
time, with identical contents, all such
copies are equally regarded as
originals.
3. When an entry is repeated in the
regular course of business, one being
copied from another at or near the
time of the transaction, all the entries
are likewise equally regarded as
originals

F. Secondary Evidence
1. Rule 130 5-8
Sec. 5. When original document is
unavailable. When the original
document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order
stated. (4a)
Sec. 6. When original document is
in adverse party's custody or control.
If the document is in the custody or
under the control of the adverse
party, he must have reasonable notice
to produce it. If after such notice and
after
satisfactory
proof
of
its
existence, he fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may
be presented as in the case of its loss.
(5a)
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when
original document is a public record.
When the original of a document is
in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified
copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. (2a)
cf Rule 132 25-27
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the

copy is a correct copy of the original, or a

specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be
the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court. (26 a)
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. - Any
public record, an official copy of which is
admissible in evidence, must not be removed
from the office in which it is kept, except upon
order of a court where the inspection of the
record is essential to the just determination of
a pending case. (27 a)
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. An authorized public record of a private
document may be proved by the original
record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the
legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has
the custody. (28a)

To prove loss, get affidavits of loss from

all the people who possibly has a copy of
the original, e.g. Notarized Deed of Sale
1.
2.
3.
4.

Vendor
vendee
notary public
clerk of the court which gave the
notary public commission
5. Bureau of Archives
Requisites for admission of secondary
evidence, according to grounds
1. the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court
a. prove execution or existence
b. prove
cause
of
unavailability
without bad faith of the offeror
c. proof of contents in the following
order
1)
copy
2)
recital of its contents in
a)
some authentic document,
or
b)
testimony of witnesses
2. the original is in the custody or under
the control of the adverse party
a. adverse party had reasonable
notice to produce the original
(Subpoena duces tecum)
b. proof of the originals existence
c. adverse party fails to produce the
original

d. proof of contents in the following

order
1)
copy
2)
recital of its contents in
a)
some authentic document,
or
b)
testimony of witnesses
3. the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought
to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
4. the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office contents
may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody
thereof
a. Rule 132 25: What attestation of
copy must state
1)
the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part
thereof
2)
under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any,
or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of
such court
b. Rule 132 27: Public record of a
private document - may be proved
by
1)
the original record, or
2)
by a copy thereof
a)
attested by the legal
custodian of the record
b)
with
an
appropriate
certificate that such officer
has the custody

2. Cases
Municipality of Victorias v. CA,
149scra32 (1987) L31189 31mar87

Facts: In action to recover land, a party

failed to produce the deed of sale, but
presented only a Certificate from the
Archives Division of the Bureau of
Records Management of an entry in a
notarial register.

Held: Certificate is admissible. Where the

original has been lost or destroyed, the
offeror may prove its contents by a recital
of its contents in some authentic
document or by testimony of witnesses.
The Certificate is one such authentic
document.
de Vera v Aguilar, 218scra602 (1993)
83377 09feb

In case of loss of the original of a

document, the order of proof is as
follows; 1) existence of the original, 2) its
due execution, 3) loss, and 4) its
contents. Failure to prove loss of all the
originals without fault of the offeror
renders secondary evidence inadmissible.
Vda. de Corpus v. Brabangco, (C.A.) 59
O.G. 8262 (1963)

When the existence of a document is

proven or admitted by both parties, the
court should allow the lost document to
be proven by parole; testimony of a
witness regarding the contents of the
document need not be verbatim or
perfect.
Compaia Maritima v. Allied Free
Workers Union, 77 SCRA 24 (1977)
L28999 24may77\/

Voluminous character of accounts must

be established, and it must be made
available to the adverse party before
parole; audit made by or testimony of
private auditor is inadmissible as proof of
original record or books of accounts;
auditors opinion not admissible; best
evidence on cost of equipment are sales
invoices not testimony of an auditor
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer ,
25scra845 (1968) L23893 29oct68

It is not necessary for a party seeking to

introduce copy to prove that original is in
actual possession of adverse party as
long as it is under his control; adverse
party need not admit that it is in his
possession before a copy may be
introduced.
Michael & Co., Inc. v. Enriquez, 33
Phil. 87 (1915) 10824 24dec15

To prove a lost document, must prove due

execution, delivery (if required), and the
fact of lost or destruction; it is important
to have qualified witnesses.
Sec. 8. Party
who
calls
for
document not, bound to offer it. - A
party who calls for the production of
a document and inspects the same is
not obliged to offer it as evidence.
(6a)

G. Parol Evidence Rule

1. Rule 130 9
Sec.
9.
Evidence
of
written
agreements. When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.
However, a party may present
evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a)
An
intrinsic
ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement;
(b)
The failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c)
The validity of the written
agreement; or
(d)
The existence of other
terms agreed to by the parties or
their successors in interest after
the execution of the written
agreement.
The terms "agreement" includes
wills. (7a)
Parol Evidence Rule:

When the terms of an, agreement have

been reduced to writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon
and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.

Exceptions:

a party may present evidence to modify,

explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading
1. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement
2. failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent and agreement
of the parties
3. validity of the written agreement; or
4. The existence of other terms agreed to
by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the
written agreement
If the ground is subsequently-agreed
terms, the subsequently-agreed terms
must also be put in issue in the pleadings.
The rule applies only to the terms of
an agreement. If the evidence sought to
be admitted refers to matters other than
the terms of the agreement (e.g.
statement of facts), then the PER does
not apply, such evidence is admissible.
PER applies only to the parties to the
agreement. It does not apply where
PER is invoked against a litigant who is a
stranger to the agreement.
Requisites for mistake as exception to
PER

1 mutual between the parties

5. of fact, not of law
6. alleged and put in issue in the
pleadings
7. proved by clear and convincing, not
merely preponderance of, evidence
Escolin: Note that the rule on self-defense
also requires that the circumstances of
self-defense be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.

2. Art. 1403 and 1405 Civil

Code (Statute of Frauds)
Art. 1403. The following contracts
are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
xxx
(2) Those that do not comply with
the Statute of Frauds as set forth in
this number. In the following cases

an agreement hereafter made shall

be unenforceable by action, unless
the
same,
or
some
note
or
memorandum, thereof, be in writing,
and subscribed by the party charged,
or by his agent; evidence, therefore,
of the agreement cannot be received
without the writing, or a secondary
evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms
is not to be performed within a year
from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for
the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another;
(c)
An
agreement
made
in
consideration of marriage, other than
a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of
goods, chattels or things in action,
at a price not less than five
hundred pesos, unless the buyer
accept and receive part of such
goods
and
chattels,
or
the
evidences, or some of them, of
such things in action or pay at the
time some part of the purchase
money; but when a sale is made by
auction and entry is made by the
auctioneer in his sales book, at the
time of the sale, of the amount and
kind of property sold, terms of
sale,
price,
names
of
the
purchasers and person on whose
account the sale is made, it is a
sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for
a longer period than one year, or
for the sale of real property or of
an interest therein;
(f) A representation
credit of a third person.

as

to

the

Art. 1405. Contracts infringing the

Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2
of article 1403, are ratified by the
failure to object to the presentation
of oral evidence to prove the same, or

by the acceptance of benefit under

them.
Statute of Frauds: (Art1403 NCC)

If the following agreements are not in

writing
and
subscribed,
it
is
unenforceable and evidence thereof is
inadmissible
1. not to be performed within a year from
the making thereof
2. special promise to answer for the debt,
default, or miscarriage of another;
3. agreement made in consideration of
marriage, other than a mutual
promise to marry;
4. agreement for the sale of goods,
chattels or things in action, at a price
not less than P500, unless the buyer
accept and receive part of such goods
and chattels, or the evidences, or some
of them, of such things in action or pay
at the time some part of the purchase
money;
5. lease for more than 1 year, or sale of
real property or of an interest therein;
6. representation as to the credit of a 3rd
person.
Exceptions (Art1405 NCC)

1 failure to object to the presentation

of oral evidence, or
7. acceptance of benefit under the
agreement

3. Parol Evidence Rule vs.

Best Evidence Rule
Parol Evidence Rule
No issue as to the
contents of a writing
Parol evidence is offered
Presupposes
that
original is in court
Effect is: cannot add,
subtract, or explain the
contents
Invoked only if the
controversy is between
parties to the agreement
Applies
only
to
agreements and wills

Best Evidence Rule

Issue is contents of a
writing
Secondary evidence is
offered
Applies
when
the
original is not available
Effect
is:
cannot
present any evidence
on the contents other
than the original
Invoked by anybody,
whether a party to the
instrument or not
Applies to all kinds of
writing

4. Cases
Cruz v CA, 192 SCRA 209 (1990)
79962

Facts: Conrado Salonga (respondent)

filed a complaint for collection and
damages vs. petitioner Lucio Cruz in
Lucena RTC alleging that in the course of
their business, Cruz borrowed from him
35T as evidenced by a receipt. Cruz
admitted having received the 35T not as
a loan but as consideration for their fish
pakyaw
purchase
and
sublease
agreement. RTC ruled in favor of Cruz
and found that the transactions were
indeed pakyaw and sublease agreements.
On appeal, CA reversed the RTC ruling.
CA ruled that the receipts are clear in its
language and its tenor must not be
clouded by any parol evidence introduced
by Cruz such as self-serving testimonies.
Held: PER does not apply to receipts
because it is not an agreement. It is proof
only of delivery of money. Furthermore,
the parole evidence bars only evidence as
to the terms, it does not bar evidence as
to statement of facts. The receipt of
money is merely a statement of fact.
Lastly, failure of the adverse party to
object
renders
parole
evidence
admissible.
Pioneer Savings & Loan Bank v. CA,
226 SCRA 740 (1993) 105419 27sep93

Facts: Pioneer execute an DoAS of a car

in favor of Michael Santos. Pioneer
claims that the car was merely a security
for the time deposit placements of
Santos relatives. Since Santos relatives
have recovered their placements, Pioneer
sued for recovery of the car.
Held:
Evidence
of
a
prior
or
contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally
not
admissible
to
vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a
valid instrument. While parol evidence is
admissible in a variety of ways to explain
the meaning of written contracts, it
cannot serve the purpose of incorporating
into
the
contract
additional
contemporaneous conditions which are
not mentioned at all in the writing, unless

there has been fraud or mistake. Pioneer

failed to produce any instrument or
written document which would prove that
the deed of sale in question was only a
security for the time deposit placements
of Santos' relatives in Pioneer. The 2 main
witnesses for Pioneer, were not mere
employees of the bank. They were bank
officers; one being a lawyer and supposed
to be steeped in legal and banking
knowledge and practices.
They were
expected to know the consequences of
their act of signing a document which
outrightly transferred ownership over the
subject vehicle in favor of Santos. They
could have incorporated in the deed of
sale (if such was the intention or
agreement of the parties) a stipulation
that
transfer
of
ownership
and
registration of the vehicle in Santos'
name were conditioned on the failure of
his relatives to recover their time deposit
placements in petitioner bank. No such
stipulation was incorporated in the deed
of sale which was an outright and
unconditional transfer of ownership of
the motor vehicle to respondent Santos.
de Leon: Note that the PER exceptions of
other term agreed by the parties refer to
those agreed after, not before, the
execution of the agreement. Pioneer
should have invoked the exception that
the agreement did not express their true
intent and agreement.
Enriquez v. Ramos, 6 SCRA 219 (1962)
L18077 29sep62

Facts: In a foreclosure of REM case,

plaintiff invokes the registered mortgage
agreement. Defendant answers that the
contract did not express the true
agreement of the parties because it did
not include the undertaking of plaintiff to
construct
roads
on
the
land.
Furthermore, defendant argues that the
ordinance that requires the construction
of such roads in the subdivision before
the lots could be sold is deemed included
in the contract.

Held: Since the answer alleged that the

contract did not express the true
intention of the parties, it has therefore
been put in issue in the pleadings. The
same may therefore be subject of parole
evidence.
Canuto v. Mariano, 37
(1918) 11346 21mar

Phil.

840

Facts: Canuto executed a DoS with 1year right to repurchase of a parcel of

land to Mariano.
Redemption period
elapsed so Mariano set up a claim of
absolute ownership despite the insistent
demand of Canuto that she be permitted
to exercise said right in accordance with
an alleged oral agreement for the
extension of the redemption period.
Canuto
presented
witnesses
to
corroborate her testimony on the oral
agreement.
Mariano contends that
Canuto should not be permitted to alter,
vary, or contradict the terms of the
written instrument by the introduction of
oral evidence. Manila CFI ruled in favor
of Canuto.
Held: The rule forbidding the admission
of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter,
vary contradict a written instrument does
not apply so as to prohibit the
establishment by parol of an agreement
between the parties to a writing, entered
into subsequent to the time when the
written
instrument
was
executed,
notwithstanding such agreement may
have the effect of adding to, changing,
modifying, or even altogether abrogating
the contract of the parties as evidenced
by the writing; for the parol evidence
does not in any way deny that the original
agreement of the parties was but merely
goes to show that the parties have
exercised their right to change or
abrogate the same, or to make a new and
independent contract.
It makes no difference how soon after the
execution of the written contract the
parol one was made. If it was in fact
subsequent
and
is
otherwise
unobjectionable it may be proved and
enforced.

Parol evidence may be introduced to

prove subsequent agreement regardless
of how soon such agreement was made.
Yu Tek & Co. v. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384
(1915) 9935 01feb

Facts: Yu Tek & Gonzales had a written

contract where Gonzales will deliver
sugar to Yu Tek. Gonzales received 3T in
advance. The contract stipulated that in
the event there is no delivery of sugar,
Gonzales will return the 3T and pay 1.2T
in damages. Sugar was not delivered, 3T
was not returned and 1.2T was not paid.
Judgment was rendered on the 3T only.
Both parties appealed. Gonzales alleges
that the court erred in refusing to permit
parol evidence showing that the parties
intended that the sugar was to be
secured from the crop which Gonzales
raised in his plantation, and that he was
unable to fulfill the contract due to total
failure of his crop.
Held: Parol evidence inadmissible to
incorporate additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all
in the writing, unless there is fraud or
mistake.
Land Settlement & Development
Corp. v. Garcia Plantation, 7 SCRA
750 (1963) L17820 24apr

Facts: LSDC sued Garcia Plantation for

specific performance of contract and for
payment of unpaid balance of the
purchase price of 2 tractors.
Salud
Garcia was made a co-defendant because
of 2 IOU notes executed by her.
Defendants admitted the execution of the
IOU notes but contended that the same
had been novated by a subsequent
agreement in a letter giving them an
extension to pay the account. LSDC in
their
reply
and
answer
to
the
counterclaim, admitted the due execution
and genuineness of the letter but
contended that the same did not express
the true intent and agreement of the
parties, thereby placing the fact in issue,
in the pleadings.

At the trial, LSDC presented Atty. Guinto

to testify on the true agreement and
intention of the parties at the time of the
letters execution.
Upon Garcias
objection, the lower court ruled out said
testimony and prevented the introduction
of evidence under the parol evidence
rule. LSDC intended to present Kintanar
(the writer of the letter) to testify but in
view of the courts ruling, LSDC rested its
case.
The parol evidence consisted of the
testimony of Attys. Guinto and Kintanar,
to the effect that in view of the plea of
defendant Vicente B. Garcia to give the
defendants an extension of time to pay
their accounts, Atty. Kintanar gave the
defendants up to May 31, 1957, to
coincide with their ramie harvest
"provided that they will make a
substantial down payment immediately,
with the understanding that upon nonpayment of the substantial amount, the
extension shall be deemed as not granted
and the LASADECO shall feel free to seek
redress in court". That there was such
condition precedent is manifested by the
second paragraph of the letter.
Lower court dismissed the case stating
that the action was premature due to the
agreed extension. LSDC appealed to CA.
CA certified case to SC.
Held: Exception to PER may be put in
issue in answer to counterclaim; when
operation of contract made to depend
upon occurrence of an event, which for
that reason is a condition precedent, such
may be established by parol evidence,
since if it is proven, there will be no
contract.
PER does not apply to
condition precedent because such
condition is part of the terms of the
contract. It does not modify, alter, or
vary the terms or tenor of the
contract.
Had the trial court permitted, as it
should, LSDC to prove the condition
precedent to the extension of the
payment, LSDC would have been able to
show that because the defendants had

failed to pay a substantial down payment,

the agreement was breached and the
contract contained in Exhibit "L", never
became effective and the extension
should be considered as not having been
given at all. So that, although the
complaint was filed on February 20,
1957, three months before the deadline
of the extension on May 31, 1957, there
would be no premature institution of the
case. The lower court, therefore, erred in
dismissing the case.
The decision
appealed from is reversed, and case
remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.
Maulini v. Serrano,
(1914) 8844 16dec

28

Phil.

640

Facts: Maulini brought an action upon

the contract of indorsement alleged to
have been made in his favor by Serrano
on a IOU note executed by Padern,
Moreno & Co with Serrano as payee. The
indorsement did not indicate without
recourse. Maker failed to pay the note
upon presentation for payment. Maulini
opted to collect from Serrano as indorser.
Manila CFI although it received parol
evidence on the subject provisionally,
held that such evidence was inadmissible
to alter, vary, modify or contradict the
terms of the contract of indorsement.
Thus this tended to show that, by verbal
agreement between Maulini and Serrano,
Serrano, in making the indorsement, was
acting as agent for the indorsee, as a
mere vehicle for the transfer of title and
that
his
indorsement
was
w/o
consideration.
It seems that according to the parol
evidence, Serrano was a broker doing
business of looking up and ascertaining
persons who had money to loan as well as
those who desired to borrow money and
acting as a middleman, negotiate a loan
between the two.
Issue: WON Serrano may show by parol
evidence that the indorsement was w/o
consideration and that in making it,
Serrano acted as agent for Maulini as a
mere vehicle of transfer of the naked title

from Padern to Maulini for which he

received no consideration.
Held: CFI erred in ruling as so.
Consideration of a negotiable IOU note is,
between the immediate parties to the
contract, open to attack, under proper
circumstances, for the purpose of
showing an absolute lack or failure of
consideration.
PER does not apply where the purpose of
parol evidence is to show that no written
contract ever existed.
CFI ruling is
REVERSED.
FAMADOR:
opinion.

agree

with

dissenting

PNB v. Seeto, 91 Phil. 756 (1952)

L4388 13aug

Facts: Seeto went to PNB Surigao and

presented a 5T check dated 10Mar pay to
cash/bearer drawn by Gan Yek Kiao
against PBCom Cebu. After consultation
with PNB employees, Seeto made a
general and unqualified indorsement of
the check and PNB accepted it and paid
Seeto. Check was mailed to PNB Cebu
20Mar and was presented to PBCom
09Apr but the check was dishonored for
ISF. PNB demanded refund of the check
but Seeto refused claiming that at the
time of the negotiation of the check the
drawer had sufficient funds and that had
PNB forwarded the check earlier, it would
have been paid.
PNB filed a complaint with Surigao CFI
alleging that Seeto gave assurances that
the drawer of the check had sufficient
funds and that upon these assurances
PNB delivered the 5T to Seeto after the
latter had made a general and unqualified
indorsement. Seeto denied having made
the alleged assurances. PNB presented 2
witnesses who testified that it was not the
practice of PNB to cash out of town
checks and that check was cashed
because of Seetos assurances.
CFI
found that Seeto made an undertaking to
refund the check in the event of dishonor
and that there was no unreasonable delay
in the presentation of the check.

CA held that PNB was guilty of

unreasonable retaining and withholding
the check and that the delay in the
presentment
for
payment
was
inexcusable,
so
that
Seeto
was
discharged from liability. It also held that
parol evidence is incompetent to show
that one signing a check as indorser is
merely a surety or guarantor, rejecting
the evidence adduced at the CFI about
Seetos assurances and promise to
refund. CA reversed CFI ruling. PNB
appealed to SC.

the presentation of the check for

payment. The judgment appealed from
is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against
the petitioner.

PNB argues that the verbal assurances

given by Seeto to the employees of the
bank that he was ready to refund the
amount if the check should be dishonored
by PBCom is a collateral agreement,
separate
and
distinct
from
the
indorsement, by virtue of which PNB was
induced to cash the check, and,
therefore, admissible as an exception to
the parol evidence rule.

Facts: Robles was a co-heir and at the

same time a lessee of Hacienda
Nahalinan. Lizarraga Hermanos wanted
to buy the hacienda 2yrs before the
expiry of Robles lease.

Held: Assurances made by an indorser

that the drawer has funds, which
assurances induced bank to cash the
check, are admissible in evidence. We
find,
however,
that
the
supposed
assurances of refund in case of dishonor
of the check are precisely the ordinary
obligations of an indorser, and these
obligations are, under the law, considered
discharged by an unreasonable delay in
the presentation of the check for
payment.
There was no express obligation assumed
by the respondent herein that the drawer
would always have funds, or that he (the
indorser) would refund the amount of the
check even if there was delay in its
presentation, so that while the CA may
have committed an error in disregarding
the evidence submitted by petitioner at
the trial of the assurances made by
respondent herein at the time of the
negotiation of the check, such error was
without prejudice, because the supposed
assurances given were part of his
obligations as an indorser, which were
discharged by the unreasonable delay in

Woodhouse v. Halili, 93Phil526 (1953)

L4811 31jul

Inducement by fraud may be proved by

parol (drafts of the agreement as in this
present case) because it goes into the
validity of the agreement.
Robles
v.
Lizarraga
Hermanos,
50Phil387 (1927) 26173 13jul

Held: Parol may be received regardless

of whether the written agreement
contains any reference to the collateral
agreement and whether the action is at
law or in equity even if it deals with
related matters
Lechugas v. CA, 143scra335 (1986)
L39972 06aug

PER not applicable where suit is between

one of the parties to the document and 3 rd
persons; PER does not apply and may not
be invoked by either party to the
litigation against the other, where at least
one of the parties to the suit is not party
or privy to the written agreement and
does not base a claim on the instrument;
both parties to the agreement must be
parties to the suit
Inciong v. CA, 257 SCRA 578 (1996)
96405 26jun

PER does not specify that the agreement

be a public document; need not be in any
particular form or signed by the parties;
fraud must be corroborated
Facts: Petitioner's liability resulted from the
promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00
which he signed with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio
D. Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding
themselves jointly and severally liable to private
respondent Philippine Bank of Communications,
Cagayan de Oro City branch.

Said due date expired without the promissors

having paid their obligation. Both obligors did not
respond to the demands made, private respondent
filed a complaint for collection of the sum of
P50,000.00 against the three obligors.
Petitioner alleged that five (5) copies of a blank
promissory note were brought to him by Campos
at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but
in one copy, he indicated that he bound himself
only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by
trickery, fraud and misrepresentation that he was
made liable for the amount of P50,000.00.
The lower court ruled in favor of the bank. The
petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the
ruling of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not parol evidence may
overcome the contents of a promissory note.
Held: Petitioner asserts that since the promissory
note "is not a public deed with the formalities
prescribed by law but . . . a mere commercial
paper which does not bear the signature of . . .
attesting
witnesses,"
parol
evidence
may
"overcome" the contents of the promissory note.
The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule
states:
When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the
written agreement be a public document.
What is required is that the agreement be in
writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long
experience that written evidence is so much
more certain and accurate than that which
rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be
unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of
their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence
to control and vary the stronger and to show that
the parties intended a different contract from that
expressed in the writing signed by them." Thus,
for the parol evidence rule to apply, a
written contract need not be in any
particular form, or be signed by both parties.
As a general rule, bills, notes and other
instruments of a similar nature are not
subject to be varied or contradicted by parol
or extrinsic evidence.

Ortaez v. CA 266scra561 23Jan97

Contemporaneous conditions not referred

to in the contract can not be proven by

parol; merely alleging that the contract is

subject to conditions does not put the
exception in issue in the pleadings
Facts:
On September 30, 1982, private
respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of
registered land in Quezon City for a consideration
of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively.
Private respondents received the payments for
the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the
titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter
demanded from the former the delivery of said
titles. Private respondents, however, refused on
the ground that the title of the first lot is in the
possession of another person, and petitioner's
acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to
certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents
for specific performance before the RTC. In their
answer with counterclaim private respondents
merely alleged the existence of the following oral
conditions which were never reflected in the deeds
of sale:
3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No.
243273) remains with the defendants
(private
respondents)
until
plaintiff
(petitioner) shows proof that all the
following requirements have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his
right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants
the approved plan for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall
between .
During
trial,
private
respondent
Oscar
Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the
sale was subject to the above conditions, although
such conditions were not incorporated in the
deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely
objections on the ground that the introduction of
said oral conditions was barred by the parol
evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless,
admitted them and eventually dismissed the
complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo.
Held: The parol evidence herein introduced is
inadmissible.
First, private respondents' oral testimony on the
alleged conditions, coming from a party who has
an interest in the outcome of the case, depending
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as

written or documentary evidence. Spoken words

could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written
contract which speaks of a uniform language.
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private
respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement
Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation where the
Court ruled that a condition precedent to a
contract may be established by parol evidence.
However, the material facts of that case are
different from this case. In the former, the contract
sought to be enforced expressly stated that it is
subject to an agreement containing the conditionsprecedent which were proven through parol
evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case,
made no reference to any pre-conditions or other
agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as
absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be
introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid instrument.
Although parol evidence is admissible to
explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot
serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract
additional
contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in
the writing unless there has been fraud or
mistake." No such fraud or mistake exists in
this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents'
argument that their parol evidence is admissible
under the exceptions provided by the Rules,
specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to
express the true intent of the parties.
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without
any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less
obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED

H.
Interpretation
Documents

of

1. Rule 130 10-19

Sec. 10. Interpretation of a writing
according to its legal meaning. The
language of a writing is to be
interpreted according to the legal
meaning it bears in the place of its
execution,
unless
the
parties
intended otherwise. (8)
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so
as to give effect to all provisions. In
the construction of an instrument

where there are several provisions or

particulars. such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all. (9)
Sec. 12. Interpretation according
to intention; general and particular
provisions. In the construction of an
instrument, the intention of the
parties is to be pursued; and when a
general and a particular provision are
inconsistent, the latter is paramount
to the former. So a particular intent
will control a general one that is
inconsistent with it. (10)
Sec. 13. Interpretation according
to circumstances. For the proper
construction of an instrument, the
circumstances under which it was
made, including the situation of the
subject thereof and of the parties to
it, may be shown, so that the judge
may be placed in the position of those
whose language he is to interpret.
(11)
Sec. 14. Peculiar signification of
terms. The terms of a writing are
presumed to have been used in their
primary and general acceptation, but
evidence is admissible to show that
they have a local, technical, or
otherwise peculiar signification, and
were so used and understood in the
particular instance, in which case the
agreement
must
be
construed
accordingly.(12)
Sec. 15. Written words control
printed. When an instrument
consists partly of written words and
partly of a printed form, and the two
are inconsistent, the former controls
the latter. (13)
Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters
to be used in explaining certain
writings. When the characters in
which an instrument is written are
difficult to be deciphered, or the
language is not understood by the
court, the evidence of persons skilled
in deciphering the characters, or who

understand
the
language,
is
admissible to declare the characters
or the meaning of the language. (14)
Sec. 17. Of two constructions,
which preferred. When the terms of
an agreement have been intended in
a different sense by the different
parties to it, that sense is to prevail
against either party in which he
supposed the other understood it,
and when different constructions of a
provision
are
otherwise
equally
proper, that is to be taken which is
the most favorable to the party in
whose favor the provision was made.
(15)
Sec. 18. Construction in favor of
natural right. When an instrument
is
equally
susceptible
of
two
interpretations, one is favor of
natural right and the other against it,
the former is to be adopted. (16)

sense by the different parties to it,

that sense is to prevail against either
party in which he supposed the other
understood it
16. When different constructions of a
provision
are
otherwise
equally
proper, that is to be taken which is the
most favorable to the party in whose
favor the provision was made
17. preference for natural right
18. usage may be considered

2. Arts.
Code

1370-1379

Civil

Art. 1370. If the terms of a

contract are clear and leave no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary
to the evident intention of the
parties, the latter shall prevail over
the former.

Sec. 19. Interpretation according

to usage. An instrument may be
construed according to usage, in
order to determine its true character.
(17)

Art. 1371. In order to judge the

intention of the contracting parties,
their
contemporaneous
and
subsequent acts shall be principally
considered.

Rules of interpretation of documents

Art. 1372. However general the

terms of a contract may be, they shall
not be understood to comprehend
things that are distinct and cases
that are different from those upon
which the parties intended to agree.

1 Interpretation of a writing according

to its legal meaning in the place of
execution
8. Instrument construed so as to give
effect to more provisions
9. Interpretation according to intention
of the parties
10. particular over general
11. Interpretation
according
to
circumstances of the parties and the
subject
12. Terms presumed to be used in
primary and general acceptation,
evidence of local, technical, or
peculiar signification use admissible
13. Written words control printed
14. When the characters are difficult to
decipher, or the language is foreign,
the
evidence
of
experts
and
interpreters is admissible
15. When the terms of an agreement
have been intended in a different

Art. 1373. If some stipulation of

any contract should admit of several
meanings, it shall be understood as
bearing that import which is most
adequate to render it effectual.
Art. 1374. The various stipulations
of a contract shall be interpreted
together, attributing to the doubtful
ones that sense which may result
from all of them taken jointly.
Art. 1375. Words which may have
different
significations
shall
be
understood in that which is most in
keeping with the nature and object of
the contract.

Art. 1376. The usage or custom of

the place shall be borne in mind in
the interpretation of the ambiguities
of a contract, and shall fill the
omission of stipulations which are
ordinarily established.
Art. 1377. The interpretation of
obscure words or stipulations in a
contract shall not favor the party who
caused the obscurity.
Art. 1378. When it is absolutely
impossible to settle doubts by the
rules established in the preceding
articles, and the doubts refer to
incidental
circumstances
of
a
gratuitous
contract,
the
least
transmission of rights and interests
shall prevail. If the contract is
onerous, the doubt shall be settled in
favor of the greatest reciprocity of
interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the
principal object of the contract in
such a way that it cannot be known
what may have been the intention or
will of the parties, the contract shall
be null and void.
Art. 1379. The principles
interpretation stated in Rule 123
the Rules of Court shall likewise
observed in the construction
contracts.

of
of
be
of

22. If some stipulation of

should admit of several
shall be understood as
import which is most
render it effectual.

23. The various stipulations of a

contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that
sense which may result from all of
them taken jointly.
24. Words which may have different
significations shall be understood in
that which is most in keeping with the
nature and object of the contract.
25. The usage or custom of the place
shall be borne in mind in the
interpretation of the ambiguities of a
contract, and shall fill the omission of
stipulations which are ordinarily
established.
26. The interpretation of obscure words
or stipulations in a contract shall not
favor the party who caused the
obscurity.
27. When it is absolutely impossible to
settle doubts by the rules established
in the preceding articles
a. the doubts refer
circumstances of

19. If the words appear to be contrary

to the evident intention of the parties,
the intention shall prevail
20. In order to judge the intention of
the
contracting
parties,
their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts
shall be principally considered.
21. terms of a contract shall not be
understood to comprehend things that
are distinct and cases that are
different from those upon which the
parties intended to agree

to

incidental

1)

a gratuitous contract, the

least transmission of rights and
interests shall prevail

2)

an onerous contract, the

doubt shall be settled in favor of
the
greatest
reciprocity
of
interests

Statutory rules of interpretation

1 If the terms are clear, the literal

meaning shall control.

any contract
meanings, it
bearing that
adequate to

b. If the doubts are cast upon the

principal object of the contract in
such a way that it cannot be known
what may have been the intention
or will of the parties, the contract
shall be null and void.
28. The principles of interpretation
stated in the Rules of Court shall
likewise be observed

3. Cases
Lambert v. Fox, 26 Phil. 588 (1914)

If from the words the meaning is plain,

contract should be enforced according to
the words
Facts: Early in 1911 the firm known as John R.
Edgar & Co., engaged in the retail book and
stationery business, found itself in such condition
financially that its creditors, including the plaintiff
and the defendant, together with many others,
agreed to take over the business, incorporate it
and accept stock therein in payment of their
respective credits. This was done, the plaintiff and
the defendant becoming the two largest
stockholders in the new corporation called John R.
Edgar & Co., Incorporated. A few days after the
incorporation
was
completed
plaintiff
and
defendant entered into the following agreement:
Therefore, the undersigned mutually and
reciprocally agree not to sell, transfer, or
otherwise dispose of any part of their present
holdings of stock in said John R. Edgar & Co.
Inc., till after one year from the date hereof.
Either party violating this agreement shall
pay to the other the sum of one thousand
(P1,000) pesos as liquidated damages, unless
previous consent in writing to such sale,
transfer, or other disposition be obtained.
Notwithstanding this contract the defendant
Fox on October 19, 1911, sold his stock in the said
corporation to E. C. McCullough of the firm of E. C.
McCullough & Co. of Manila, a strong competitor of
the said John R. Edgar & Co., Inc.
The trial court in dismissing the case, decided
favor of the defendant upon the ground that the
intention of the parties as it appeared from the
contract in question was to the effect that the
agreement should be good and continue only until
the corporation reached a sound financial
basis.chuva chu chu.

Issue: Whether or not interpretation is needed in

enforcing the contract.

the contract itself. It is to be presumed that

persons mean what they say when they speak
plain English. Interpretation and construction
should by the instruments last resorted to by a
court in determining what the parties agreed to.
Where the language used by the parties is plain,
then
construction
and
interpretation
are
unnecessary and, if used, result in making a
contract for the parties. (Lizarraga Hermanos vs.
Yap Tico, 24 Phil. Rep., 504.)
In the case at bar the parties expressly
stipulated that the contract should last one year.
No reason is shown for saying that it shall last only
nine months. Whatever the object was in
specifying the year, it was their agreement that
the contract should last a year and it was their
judgment and conviction that their purposes would
not be subversed in any less time. What reason
can give for refusing to follow the plain words of
the men who made the contract? We see none.

Capital Insurance v. Sadang, 21

SCRA 1183 (1967)

Doubt resolved against one who prepared

the document
Facts: Plaintiff Capital Insurance & Surety Co.,
Inc., subscribed to a bond in behalf of Mateo Pinto
and in favor of the Macondray Farms, Inc., the
purpose of which was to guarantee the payment of
rentals of the fishpond and other obligations of
Mateo Pinto.
To protect the interest of plaintiff Capital
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. from any liability that
may arise from the above-mentioned bond, Mateo
Pinto and the defendants in this case, Esteban M.
Sadang and Maria Lachica, executed an idemnity
agreement and a deed of real of real estate
mortage on the property of the defendants.
Mateo Pinto failed to pay the rentals of the
leased fishpond to Macondray Farms, Inc.
Because of the failure of Mateo Pinto to pay the
said amount to Macondray Farms, Inc., plaintiff in
the instant case as surety had to pay, as it did pay
Macondray Farms, Inc., to settle the obligation of
Mateo Pinto with the said Macondray Farms, Inc.

Held: Contracts should be enforced as they read.

The first duty of courts in enforcing contracts is to
give attention to the words thereof. If from the
words the meaning is plain, the contract should be
enforced according to its words.

Notwithstanding repeated demands, Mateo

Pinto and his indemnitors including herein
defendants failed to reimburse the Capital
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., the the said amount.

The intention of parties to a contract must be

determined, in the first instance, from the words of

Because
of
such
failure
to
make
reimbursement, the Capital Insurance & Surety
Co., Inc., filed Civil Case against Mateo Pinto and

his indemnitors including the defendants in this

instant case for the collection.
On the strength of the agreement of the
parties in the Civil Case wherein it is agreed
among others, that if after the sale of all the said
properties, the judment shall not have been fully
satisfied, then plaintiff may file as separate civil
action against the defendants-spouses, Esteban M.
Sadang and Maria Lachica, the other indemnitors,
but at the same time dismissed the case against
the herein defendants without prejudice.
Two executions were issued by the court for
the enforcement of the above-mentioned decision
in Civil Case No. 30061 and after applying the
proceeds of the sale of the properties in public
auction there is still a deficiency in the amount of
P14,456.44 which, in view of the failure of the
herein dependants to pay in spite of plaintiff's
repeated demands, had to become the subject of
this instant case.
The trial court rendered judgment on April 20,
1961 (pp. 93-101, Record on Appeal) ordering
defendants to pay to plaintiff only, the amount of
P300.00.
Issue: Which among the two interpretations is
correct?
Held: To point on which the parties disagree is the
interpretation of the following stipulation in the
mortgage contract executed by defendantsappellees:
This mortgage is constituted to indemnify the
mortgagee for any damage, cost, expenses and
charges of whatever kind and nature that it may
incur or sustain as a consequence of having acted
as surety on the bond referred to above, and or its
substitution, modification, alteration, change
and/or renewals. That liability secured by the
above properties is limited to the first P20,000.00
that might be incurred under the bond issued in
favor of the Macondray Farms, Inc.
Appellant lays stress on the general statement
of appellees' liability as it appears in the contract,
to wit; "to indemnify the mortgagee for any
damage, cost, expenses and charges of whatever
kind and nature that it may incur or sustain as a
consequence of having acted as surety or the
bond.
Esteban Sadang agreed to be an indemnitor
only on condition that he would answer for the
"first P20,000.00 of the total P42,000.00 bond,"
and that "the moment the first P20,000.00 is paid
the bonding company automatically releases my
responsibility to them." The trial court found the

said testimony to be uncontradicted. If the

mortgage contract as actually drafted seems
to be vague or ambiguous, the doubt must
be resolved against appellant, whose lawyer
prepared the document, and in accordance
with the real intention of the parties as
explained by defendants-appellees.

I. Rule 130 20: Qualifications

of Witnesses
Sec.
20.
Witnesses;
their
qualifications. Except as provided in
the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their
perception
to
others,
may
be
witnesses.
Religious
or
political
belief,
interest in the outcome of the case,
or conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not
be a ground for disqualification. (18
a)
Qualifications of witnesses
1. can perceive
2. perceiving
3. can make known their perception to
others
NOT ground for disqualification
1. Religious belief
2. political belief
3. interest in the outcome of the case, or
4. conviction of a crime, unless otherwise
provided by law, e.g.
a. A state witness must not have been
convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude [Rule 119, Sec. 17
(e)]
b. A person who has been convicted of
falsification of a document, perjury
or false testimony is disqualified
from being a witness to a will (Art.
821 NCC)

1. Mental
Incapacity
Immaturity
a. Rule 130 21

or

Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason

of mental incapacity or immaturity.
The following persons cannot be
witnesses:
(a)
Those
whose
mental
condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such
that
they
are
incapable
of
intelligently making known their
perception to others;
(b)
Children
whose
mental
maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined
and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
For a mentally defective person to be a
witness, he must be mentally capable at
the time of production, even if he was not
so at the time of perception. A child must
be mentally mature both at the time of
perception and at the time of production.
With regards to the subject matter of the
testimony, we must make a distinction
between absolute disqualifications and
relative
disqualifications.
Objections
based on absolute disqualifications may
be raised upon the calling of the
disqualified witness. Objections based on
relative disqualifications may be raised
when it becomes apparent that the
subject matter of the testimony covers
inadmissible matters.
Absolutely disqualified witnesses

1 cant perceive
2 not perceiving
3 cant make known their perception to
others
4 whose mental condition, at the time of
their production for examination,
render them incapable of intelligently
making known their perception to
others
5 whose mental maturity is such as to
render them incapable of perceiving
the facts respecting which they are
examined and relating them truthfully
6 marital disqualification
7 parental and filial privilege
Relative disqualifications

1
2
3
4

dead mans statute

marital communication privilege
attorney-client privilege
an attorney's secretary, stenographer,
or clerk concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired
in such capacity
5 Physician-Patient Privilege
6 Priest-Penitent Privilege
7 State Secrets

b. Cases
People v. de Jesus, 129 SCRA 4
(1984)

Even though feeble minded, there is no

showing that she could not convey her
ideas by words or signs competent; even
if she had difficulty comprehending the
questions.
Facts: Clara Mina, an unmarried woman of 28,
lived with her parents. Clara Mina, however, is
feeble-minded. She is unable to comb her hair,
bathe herself and wash her clothes. Because of
her mental condition, she just stayed in the house,
doing no household chores
The accused, Rogelio de Jesus, a 19-year old
farmer, who lived in the house of his sister some
15 meters away from the victim's house, knew of
Clara's mental infirmity, and has often seen her
left alone in the house.
While home alone, Clara Mina was seated on
top of a trunk when Rogelio de Jesus suddenly
entered the house, carried her in his arms and laid
her on the floor. Objecting to what was being done
to her, Clara gave an outcry "Madi! Madi!" ( or
SHODI! SHODI! which translated means "I don't
like! I don't like!") Rogelio, ignoring her cries,
removed her panties as well as his own trousers.
He lay on top of her, inserted his penis into her
vagina and performed the sexual act. Otherwise
stated, BOMBA NA SHO!
Pastora Simon, Clara Minas mother caught
Rogelio doing The Nasty. Rogelio sensed the
mother and ran away shouting: ADTO NA MI
NANG!
Returning from the barrio captain's house,
Pastora Simon investigated Clara, who revealed to
her that she was carried away from the trunk
where she was seated, then forcibly laid on the
floor to have sexual intercourse with Rogelio.
Medical examination conducted the following
day revealed the following:

(1) hymenal lacerations at 3 o'clock, 8 o'clock

and 11 o'clock.
(2) vagina admits one finger with ease. Two
fingers with difficulty.

o'clock position. There are isolated

erythematous areas on both thighs. There
is also the presence of sandy particles on
the genital area.
Speculum exam,
however, showed negative findings.

(3) fresh perineal abrasion.

(4) smear,
microscope.

not

done

due

to

lack

of

(5) contusion left temporal area. Lesions to

heal within one week.
LOVERBOY(Rogelio) was later surrendered by
his brother-in-law.
The trial court found LOVERBOY guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape
Issue: Whether or not a feeble-minded person
(naay teriring) may be a competent witness.
Held: That the complainant was feeble-minded
and had displayed difficulty in comprehending the
questions propounded on her is an undisputed
fact. However, there is no showing that she
could not convey her Ideas by words or
signs. It appears in the records that
complainant gave sufficiently intelligent
answers to the questions propounded by the
court and the counsels. The court is satisfied
that the complainant can perceive and
transmit in her own way her own perceptions
to others. She is a competent witness.

People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 402

(1993)

Being mental retardate is not per se a

disqualification; although speech was
slurred, testimony was positive, clear,
plain and unambiguous.
Facts: While Sylvia Soria, a 20-year old mental
retardate, was walking along the Maharlika
Highway
at
Casabahan,
Gandara,
Samar,
Alejandro Salomon and Feliciano Conge, who were
apparently waiting for her, accosted her and
forcibly took her to the ricefield some ten meters
away. There she was raped by Salomon with
Conge's assistance. On her way home, she met
her brother Senecio, to whom she related her
ordeal. The two of them reported her rape to their
father. That same night, the family walked the
three-kilometer distance to the police station,
where Restituto Soria signed a complaint for the
rape of his daughter by Salomon and Conge.
Sylvia was medically examined at the Gandara
General Hospital by Dr. Susan Tanseco, who issued
the following certificate:
A physical examination has been done on
Miss Sylvia Soria, 20 years of age, a
resident of Brgy. Casab-ahan, Gandara,
Samar. P.E. showed a single, linear,
laceration on the labia minora at 6:00

Three days later, Salomon and Feliciano could no

longer be found. It was only after a four-month
search that they were arrested in Aguado, Plaser,
Masbate, from where, after being detained there
for one month, they were taken back to Samar.
Following
a
protracted
investigation,
an
information for rape was filed against them with
the RTC.

The principal witness for the prosecution was

Sylvia Soria herself, who recounted in detail the
manner of her ravishment by Salomon with the
help of his co-accused Conge. She described how
she was dragged to the ricefield by the two
accused and there undressed against her will. As
Conge spread and pinned her legs, Salomon
mounted and penetrated her, although with
difficulty because she was still a virgin. She felt
pain in her vagina and "something slippery." She
could not cry out or repel the attack because the
two were stronger than she and Conge was
holding a bolo. After her rape, Salomon sucked
and twisted her nipples and demanded that he
suck his penis.
Her low mentality was
demonstrated in her angry testimony of her
refusal: "The devil with him, it is not an icedrop."

The trial court found respondents guilty.

Issue: Whether or not a mentally retarded person
is qualified to testify.
Held: A mental retardate is not for this reason
alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the
case of other witnesses, acceptance of his
testimony depends on its nature and credibility or,
otherwise put, the quality of his perceptions and
the manner he can make them known to the court.
Thus, in People v. Gerones, the Court accepted the
testimony of a rape victim notwithstanding that
she had the mentality of a nine or ten-year old
"because she was able to communicate her
ordeal... clearly and consistently." In the case of
People vs. Rondina, this Court declared:
The testimony of the offended party herself
was especially telling and credible despite
the fact that she was somewhat mentally
deficient, as the trial court noticed.
Although she was really of limited

intelligence, the complainant nevertheless

did not forget the harrowing experience she
suffered during that frightful night in the
bushes when the three men seared her
memory with the lust they forced upon her.
The tale she narrated in court was not
woven out of sheer imagination but born in
anguish and remembered with pain and as
plain an unembellished as the simple life
she led. If she spoke in forthright language
at the trial, it was because she was
speaking the truth of that horrible
ravishment she could not push out of her
mind.

During his rebuttal testimony, Paul Michael

categorically declared that it was his father who
"burned" his mother.
The trial court gave full credence to the
testimony of eyewitness Paul Michael and ruled
against the accused. The appeal was likewise
unfavorable to the accused.
Issue: The competence of the five-year old
witness.
Held: Any child, regardless of age, can be a
competent witness if he can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known his perception to
others and of relating truthfully facts respecting
which he is examined.
The requirements then of a child's competency
as a witness are the:

In the case before us, the trial court noted that

although Sylvia's speech was slurred and it was
necessary at times to ask her leading questions,
"her testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent
and credible." Her mental condition did not vitiate
her credibility. We also believe, as we have
observed often enough in many cases that a
woman will not expose herself to the humiliation of
a rape trail, with its attendant publicity and the
morbid curiosity it will arouse, unless she has been
truly wronged and seeks atonement for her abuse.

People v. Mendoza,
113791, Feb. 2, 1996

G.R.

No.

Any child, regardless of age, can be a

witness as long as he meets the
qualifications
for
competency:
observation,
recollection,
and
communication.
Facts: Maria Gina Avila Mendoza, a mother of
three young children, was put to fire in her home.
She suffered extensive second to fourth degree
burns and died of hypostatic pneumonia and
infected fourth degree burns on 30 November
1989. Her husband, accused-appellant Rolando
Mendoza, was charged with the crime of parricide.
As to how Gina was burned, only five-year
old Paul Michael could testify thereon.
In his testimony during the presentation of the
evidence in chief on 18 February 1991, Paul
Michael declared that one evening inside their
house, his father boxed his mother on her mouth
and then tied her up. However, the witness did not
answer succeeding questions which sought to
elicit what happened thereafter, although he kept
on looking at his father throughout this period. He
later revealed that he saw matches and kerosene
in their house. He likewise declared that his
mother was now in heaven because she was dead.

(a) capacity of observation,

(b) capacity of recollection, and
(c) capacity of communication.
And in ascertaining whether a child is of
sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing
requirements, it is settled that the trial court is
called upon to make such determination. As held
in United States vs. Buncad,
quoting from
Wheeler vs. United States,
and reiterated in
People vs. Raptus and People vs. Libungan:
The decision of this question rests
primarily with the trial judge, who sees the
proposed witness, notices his manner, his
apparent possession or lack of intelligence,
and may resort to any examination which
will tend to disclose his capacity and
intelligence as well as his understanding of
the obligations of an oath. As many of
these matters cannot be photographed into
the record, the decision of the trial judge
will not be disturbed on review unless from
that which is preserved it is clear that it
was erroneous.
The trial court has adjudged Paul Michael
competent to testify. We agree. A close and careful
examination of the testimony of Paul Michael
shows that at the time he testified, he could be
deemed a child of above average intelligence, i.e.,
capable of giving responsive answers to the
questions asked of him by the trial judge, as well
as recalling events and relating them to such
recollections.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED.

2. Marriage

a. Rule 130 22: Marital

Disqualification Rule
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason
of marriage. During their marriage,
neither the husband nor the wife may
testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants. (20a)
Requisites for marital disqualification
rule
1. marriage subsists
2. a spouse is a litigant
3. no consent from the spouse-litigant
4. not a civil case by one against the
other, or a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants.
GR: During their marriage, spouses may
not testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected
spouse
Exceptions:
1. in a civil case by one spouse against
the other spouse, or
2. in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one spouse against
a. the other spouse or;
b. the
other
spouses
direct
descendants or ascendants
The marital disqualification rule refers to
all
matters,
whether
or
not
communicated by one spouse to the
other. It applies only during the existence
of the marriage. It can be invoked only if
one spouse is a party to the action. It is
an absolute disqualification and can be
invoked the moment that one spouse is
called to testify.
This is a testimonial disqualification, as
opposed to the testimonial privilege of
ascendants and descendants (Rule 130
25). Hence, the witness has no say
whether the objection is to be raised or
not. The holder of the privilege is the

spouse-litigant. When the spouse-litigant

consents to the testimony, the spousewitness must testify whether he wants to
or not.
cf
Rule
130
Communications

24

(a),

Marital

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of

privileged communication. The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after
the marriage, cannot be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage except in a civil case by
one against the other, or in a criminal case for
a crime committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;

Marital
Disqualification

Marital
Communications

Covers all matters Covers only those

regardless
of communicated
by
source
one
spouse
to
another
Applies during the Applies during and
marriage
after the marriage
A spouse must be A spouse need not
a litigant
be a litigant
Invoked when a Invoked when the
spouse is called to testimony appears
testify
to cover privileged
matters
Note that the exceptions under the
marital disqualification and marital
communications rule are the same.

b. Cases
Ordoo v. Daquigan, 62 SCRA 270
(1975) L-39012 jan31

The wife can therefore testify against her

husband in such a case for rape against
her daughter because it is considered a
crime against the wife. When an offense
directly attacks, or directly impairs the
conjugal relation, it comes within the
exception to the marital disqualification
rule.

de Leon: Note that when this case was

decided, a crime by a spouse against the
others descendant was not yet an
express
exception
to
the
marital
disqualification rule.
Facts: Avelino Ordoo was charged in
the municipal court of San Gabriel, La
Union with having raped his daughter,
Leonora, on 1970. The verified complaint
dated November 7, 1973 was signed by
the twenty four year old victim.
In support of that complaint, Catalina
Balanon Ordoo, the mother of Leonora,
executed a sworn statement wherein she
disclosed that on that same date, October
11th, Leonora had apprised her of the
outrage but no denunciation was filed
because Avelino Ordoo threatened to kill
Leonora and Catalina (his daughter and
wife, respectively) if they reported the
crime to the police.
Catalina Ordoo in her sworn statement
further revealed that her husband had
also raped their other daughter, Rosa, on
March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was
charged in court with that offense.
Catalina Ordoo said that the rape
committed by Avelino Ordoo against
Leonora was mentioned during the
investigation and trial of Avelino Ordoo
for the rape committed against Rosa
Ordoo.
The defense counsel objected to the
wifes competency. He invoked the
marital disqualification rule.
The trial court overruled the objection.
After the denial of Avelino Ordoo's
motion for the reconsideration of the
adverse ruling, he filed the instant action
for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether the rape committed by
the husband against his daughter is a
crime committed by him against his wife
within the meaning of the exception
found in the marital disqualification rule.
Held: Under the marital disqualification
rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court providing that the husband or wife

cannot be a witness for or against the

other, ". . . except in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the
other." the wife is competent to testify
against her husband in a case of rape
committed by the husband against
their daughter, In the law of
evidence, the rape of a daughter is a
crime committed by the husband
against his wife within the meaning
of the exception.
The phrase "in a tribunal case for a
crime committed by one against the
other," an exception to the marital
disqualification
rule,
should
be
interpreted to refer to an offense
which directly attacks, or directly and
vitally impairs the conjugal relations.
In Wilkinson vs. People, 282 Pac. 257, it
was held that the wife was a competent
witness against the husband in a
prosecution for rape committed by the
husband against his stepdaughter, who is
the wife's natural daughter because the
crime was "an outrage upon nature in its
dearest and tenderest relations as well as
a crime against humanity itself." The
court adopted the interpretation the "a
criminal action or proceeding for a crime
committed by one against the other" may
refer to a crime where the wife is the
individual partially and directly injured or
affected by the crime for which the
husband is being prosecuted."
In State vs. Chambers, 87 Iowa 1, 53 N.W.
1090, it was held under the statutory
provision the husband or wife shall in no
case be a witness for or against the other,
except in a criminal proceeding for a
crime committed by one against the
other, that the wife was competent to
testify against the other, that the wife
was competent to testify against the
husband in a case where he was
prosecuted for incest committed against
his stepdaughter.
In State vs. Shultz, 177 Iowa 321, 158
N.W. 539, it was held that the wife may
testify against the husband in a case
where he was prosecuted for incest

committed against their eleven-year old

daughter because incest is a "crime
committed against the wife."
People v. Castaeda, 88 SCRA 562
(1979) L-46306 feb27

The wife can testify against the husband

in a case for falsification of the wifes
signature (marital consent) in public
documents to sell share of wife in
conjugal property because it is a crime
committed by the husband against the
wife.
Facts: The above-named a BENJAMIN F.
MANALOTO, forged the signature of his
spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of
sale executed by said accused wherein he
sold a house and lot belonging to the
conjugal partnership of said spouse in
favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, thereby
making it appear that his spouse Victoria
M. Manaloto gave her marital consent to
said sale when in fact and in truth she did
not.
At the trial, the prosecution called the
complaint-wife to the witness stand but
the defense moved to disqualify her as a
witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
The prosecution opposed said motion to
disqualify on the ground that the case
falls under the exception to the rule.
Notwithstanding
such
opposition,
respondent Judge granted the motion,
disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from
testifying for or against her husband. A
motion for reconsideration petition was
filed but was denied by respondent Judge.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal case
for Falsification of Public Document
committed by a husband against his wife,
an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification.
Held: We sustain petitioner's stand that
the case is an exception to the marital
disqualification rule.
A criminal case for Falsification of
Public Document filed against the
husbandwho allegedly forged the

signature of his wife in a deed of sale,

thereby making it appear that the latter
gave her marital consent to the sale of a
house and lot belonging to their conjugal
partnership when in fact and in truth she
did not may be considered as a
criminal case for a crime committed
by a husband against his wife, and,
therefore, an exception to the rule on
marital disqualification.
Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's
breach of his wife's confidence which
gave rise to the offense charged. And
it is this same breach of trust which
prompted the wife to make the
necessary complaint with the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly,
filed the aforesaid criminal case with the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To
rule, therefore, that such criminal
case is not one for a crime committed
by one spouse against the other is to
advance
a
conclusion
which
completely disregards the factual
antecedents of the instant case.
In Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac
64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must
amount to a physical wrong upon
the other spouse is too narrow; and
the rule that any offense remotely
or indirectly affecting domestic
within the exception is too broad.
The better rule is that, WHEN AN
OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS,
OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY
IMPAIRS,
THE
CONJUGAL
RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN
THE EXCEPTION to the statute
that one shall not be a witness
against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime
committed by one against the other.
With more reason must the exception
apply to the instant case where the victim
of the crime and the person who stands
to be directly prejudiced by the
falsification is not a third person but the
wife herself. And it is undeniable that the
act complained of had the effect of

directly and vitally impairing the conjugal

relation.
Finally, overriding considerations of
public policy demand that the wife should
not be disqualified from testifying against
her husband in the instant case. For, as
aptly observed by the Solicitor General,"
to espouse the contrary view would
spawn the dangerous precedent of a
husband
committing
as
many
falsifications against his wife as he
could conjure, seeking shelter in the
anti-marital privilege as a license to
injure and prejudice her in secret
all with unabashed and complete
impunity.
Lezama v Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166
(1968) L-25643 jun27

Wife who is a co-defendant of her

husband in a case of collusive fraud,
where their interests are not separate,
can not be examined as a hostile witness
by the adverse party.
Facts: Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver
of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage
Co., together with C.N. Hodges and
Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action for the
annulment of a judgment rendered
against the La Paz Ice Plant. Named as
defendants were Marciano C. Roque, in
whose favor judgment was rendered, and
the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita
Lezama. The complaint alleged that,
because of mismanagement by the
Lezamas, the La Paz Ice Plant was placed
under the receivership of Dineros; that
during the pendency of the receivership,
Marciano C. Roque brought an action
against the La Paz Ice Plant in the Court
for the collection of P150,000, which sum
he had supposedly lent to it; that
summons was served not on the receiver
but on the spouses Jose Manuel and
Paquita Lezama; and that, through the
collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able
to obtain judgment by default against the
company. It was claimed that, because
the summons was served on Jose Manuel
Lezama instead of on the receiver, the
Court of First Instance of Manila

acquired no jurisdiction over the La Paz

Ice Plant and that, therefore, the decision
of that court was void.
In their answer, the defendant spouses
(the herein petitioners), while admitting
that the company was placed under
receivership,
maintained
that
Jose
Manuel Lezama nevertheless remained
president of the La Paz Ice Plant and that
as such he had authority to receive in
behalf of the company the court summons
in civil case 39827. They denied entering
into collusion with Roque and averred
that they did not contest Roque's claim
because they knew it to be a legitimate
obligation which the La Paz Ice Plant had
incurred pursuant to a resolution of its
board of directors.
Issues having been joined, the case was
thereupon heard. At the hearing Dineros
asked the court to issue a subpoena to
Paquita Lezama to testify as "a witness
summoned by the plaintiffs in accordance
with the Rules of Court." The request was
granted over the objection of the
petitioners.
Issue: Whether a wife, who is a codefendant of her husband in an action,
may be examined as a hostile witness by
the adverse party under section 6 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, without
infringing on her marital privilege not to
testify against her husband under section
20 (b) of Rule 130.
Held: The reason for the privilege of
husband and wife not to testify against
each other is the natural repugnance in
every fair-minded person to compelling a
wife or husband to be the means of the
other's condemnation and to subjecting
the culprit to the humiliation of being
condemned by the words of his intimate
life partner.
Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked
to testify on what actually transpired
during the meeting and will be asked
questions on the matter of the veracity or
falsity of the entry in the books of the
corporation. Whether her testimony

will turn out to be adverse or

beneficial to her own interest, the
inevitable result would be to pit her
against her husband. The interests of
husband and wife in this case are
necessarily interrelated. Testimony
adverse to the wife's own interests would
tend to show the existence of collusive
fraud between the spouses and would
then work havoc upon their common
defense that the loan was not fictitious.
There is the possibility, too, that the
wife, in order to soften her own guilt,
if guilty she is, may unwittingly
testify
in
a
manner
entirely
disparaging to the interests of the
husband.
In a suit charging fraud against the
spouses, the wife cannot be compelled
to testify as an adverse party witness
concerning her participation in the
alleged
fraud
without
violating
section 20(b) of Rule 130, where as in
this case, the main charge is collusive
fraud between the spouses and a third
person, and the evident purpose of
examination of the wife is to prove that
charge. Indeed, in those jurisdictions
which allow one spouse to be subjected to
examination by the adverse party as a
hostile witness when both spouses are
parties to the action, either the interests
of the spouses are separate or separable,
or the spouse offered as a witness is
merely a formal or nominal party.
People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694
(1947) L-568 jul16

When the husband imputes crime against

wife,
he
waives
the
marital
disqualification rule.
Facts: On March 4, 1945, defendant, who
had been previously arrested on charges
of robbery, was being held as detention
prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay,
Mindoro.
On that date he requested
permission from the chief of police, and
he was allowed to go with Sergeant
Pacifico Pimentel, who was detailed to
guard him.
Upon their reaching the
house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner

to see his wife who was at the time in a

room of said house, while said sergeant
remained at the foot of the stairs. After a
few moments, Pimentel heard the scream
of a woman. Running upstairs, he met
defendant's wife running out of the room
and holding her right breast which was
bleeding. Still moments later, Pimentel
saw defendant lying down with his little
son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on
his breast.
Pimentel also found
defendant to have a wound in his belly
while his child had a wound in the back.
Pimentel found the child dead.
The prosecution, in recommending the
imposition of the capital penalty upon the
accused, relies mainly on: (1) the
affidavit, Exhibit C (translation, Exhibit C1), which is a virtual confession of the
accused; (2) Exhibit D, which is the
record made by the justice of the peace of
Mansalay of the arraignment of the
defendant upon which the latter entered
a plea of guilty; and (3) the rebuttal
testimony of Emilia Taladtad, wife of
the appellant.
Issue: Whether or not the rebuttal
testimony of the wife of the appellant
violates the rule on disqualification by
reason of marriage.
Held: "The reasons given by law textwriters and courts why neither a husband
nor wife shall in any case be a witness
against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed by one
against the other have been stated thus:

First, identity of interests;

second, the consequent danger of
perjury;
third, the policy of the law which
deems it necessary to guard the
security and confidences of private
life even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice, and which rejects
such
evidence
because
its
admission would lead to domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and,
fourth, because, where a want of
domestic tranquility exists, there is
danger of punishing one spouse

through the hostile testimony of the

other." (70 C. J., 119.)
The rule that the husband and wife
cannot testify for or against each other,
as all other general rules, has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between
the spouses and in criminal cases for
offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions
are backed by sound reasons which, in
the excepted cases, outweigh those in
support of the general rule. For instance,
where the marital and domestic relations
are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the
reason based upon such harmony and
tranquility fails. In such a case identity of
interests disappears and the consequent
danger of perjury based on that identity
is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of
private life which the law aims at
protecting will be nothing but ideals
which through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home.
The defendant, who was accused of
killing his son, testifying in his own
behalf, not only limited himself to
denying that he was the killer, but went
further and added what was really a new
matter consisting in the imputation of the
crime upon his wife. Held: That in giving
such testimony, the husband must, in all
fairness, be held to have intended all its
natural and necessary consequences. by
his said act, the husband--himself
exercising the very right which he would
deny to his wife upon the ground of their
marital relations must be taken to
have waived all objection to the
latter's testimony upon rebuttal, even
considering
that
such
objection
would have been available at the
outset.
As
above
modified,
the
appealed
judgment is affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.

3. Dead Mans Statute

a. Rule 130 23
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason
of death or insanity of adverse party.
Parties or assignors of parties to a
case, or persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person,
or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound
mind, cannot testify as to any matter
of fact occurring before the death of
such deceased person or before such
person became of unsound mind.
(20a)
Requisites for dead mans statute
1. the witness sought to be disqualified is
the plaintiff
2. Executor,
administrator
or
representative of a deceased person,
or the person of unsound mind is the
defendant
3. upon claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind
4. as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became
of unsound mind.
5. [no counterclaim is filed]

b. Cases
Razon v. IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992)
GR#74306 16mar

The dead mans statute does not apply

where the case is filed by the estate.
Besides, cross-examination of the witness
is a waiver of the privilege.
Facts: In his complaint, Vicente B.
Chuidian prayed that defendants Enrique
B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc., et. Al. be
ordered to deliver certificates of stocks
representing the shareholdings of the
deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E.
Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an order to
restrain the defendants from disposing of

the said shares of stock, for a writ of

preliminary attachment vs. properties of
defendants having possession of shares of
stock and for receivership of the
properties of defendant corporation . . .
In their answer, defendants alleged that
all the shares of stock in the name of
stockholders of record of the corporation
were fully paid for by defendant, Razon;
that said shares are subject to the
agreement between defendants and
incorporators; that the shares of stock
were actually owned and remained in the
possession of Razon. Appellees also
allegedthat neither the late Juan T.
Chuidian nor the appellant had paid any
amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares
of stock in question
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique
Razon assails the appellate court's
decision on its alleged misapplication of
the dead man's statute rule under Section
20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
According to him, the "dead man's
statute" rule is not applicable to the
instant case. Moreover, the private
respondent, as plaintiff in the case did
not object to his oral testimony regarding
the oral agreement between him and the
deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the
ownership of the shares of stock was
actually vested in the petitioner unless
the deceased opted to pay the same; and
that the petitioner was subjected to a
rigid cross examination regarding such
testimony.
Issue: Whether or not the Dead mans
statute is applicable in the case at bar.
Held: In the instant case, the testimony
excluded by the appellate court is that of
the defendant (petitioner herein) to the
effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the
father of private respondent Vicente
Chuidian, the administrator of the estate
of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant
agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian
that the 1,5000 shares of stock in E.
Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the
defendant unless the deceased Juan
Chuidian opted to pay the same which

never happened. The case was filed by

the administrator of the estate of the late
Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock
in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the
late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear,
therefore, that the testimony of the
petitioner is not within the prohibition of
the rule. The case was not filed
against the administrator of the
estate, nor was it filed upon claims
against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the
private respondent never objected to
the testimony of the petitioner as
regards the true nature of his
transaction with the late elder
Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was
subject to cross-examination by the
private respondents' counsel. Hence,
granting that the petitioner's testimony is
within the prohibition of Section 20 (a),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
private respondent is deemed to have
waived the rule.
Reyes v. Wells, 54 Phil 102 (1929)

If the witness sought to be disqualified is

not the plaintiff (e.g. disinterested 3 rd
party), the dead mans statute is not
applicable.
Guerrero v. St. Clares Realty, 124
SCRA 553 (1983) L58164 02sep

Mere witnesses not parties to the case

are not disqualified by the dead mans
statute. Furthermore, the rule requires
that the defendant must be the estate. It
does not apply where the heirs are being
sued in their individual capacities.
Representatives are only those who,
like the executor, one sued in their
representative, not personal, capacity.
Facts: During their lifetime the spouses
Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were
the absolute owners of the disputed
property, which is a parcel of land. The
spouses had six children, named Andres,
Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and Cristina,
and all surnamed Guerrero. Panay Ramos
predeceased Isidoro Guerrero. Before his

demise, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed

and ordained that the questioned lot be
assigned and adjudicated to Andres
Guerrero as his share in the inheritance,
the other children having been assigned
other lots. Accordingly, upon the death of
Isidoro
Guerrero,
Andres
Guerrero
physically
possessed
the
lot
and
cultivated
it
through
his
tenant
Dominador Ramirez. Shortly after the
beginning of the Japanese occupation,
Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his
sister, Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her
to have the property cultivated and to
retain the owner's share in the harvests.
The arrangement between brother and
sister was that Cristina Guerrero could
continue in the cultivation of the land and
enjoyment of the owner's share in the
produce for as long as she needed the
property. Dominador Ramirez continued
his tenancy until shortly before the death
of Andres Guerrero. Sometime in July
1943, Andres Guerrero died survived by
his widow, Segunda Laquindanum, and
their children, who are the petitioners in
this case. Cristina Guerrero continued as
trustee of the deceased Andres Guerrero.
The land was surveyed by the Bureau
of Lands for and in the name of Andres
Guerrer. Sometime during the latter part
of 1971 certain people who introduced
themselves as agents or buyers of the
land approached some of the plaintiffs in
order to secure their consent to the sale
of the property. Said plaintiffs were
informed that the land was titled in the
name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero.
Plaintiffs made inquiries and discovered
the following: that Manuel Guerrero was
able to have the lot titled in his name on
the basis of a 'Deed of Sale of Land'
purportedly
executed
by
Cristina
Guerrero; that in 1963, Manuel Guerrero,
assisted by Felicisimo Guerrero, father of
the defendants Guerreros, filed an
application for registration of land; that
notwithstanding the opposition of the
heirs of Cristina Guerrero, the court
ruled that Manuel Guerrero owned the
lot; that despite oppositors' appeal to a

higher court, the Register of Deeds

issued Original Certificate of Title to the
applicant; that on there was filed with the
Register of Deeds of Rizal a "Deed of
Absolute Sale" purportedly executed by
Manuel Guerrero in favor of the
defendants Guerreros; that the Register
of Deeds gave due course to the
registration of that deed; that on the
same day that the deed of sale was
registered, the defendants Guerreros
caused to be notarized an "Articles of
Partnership" of St. Clare's Realty
Company, Ltd., constituting themselves
as partners; that on September 28, 1971,
the defendants Guerreros sold the
disputed lot in a "Deed of Absolute Sale"
to the St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd.;
that by virtue thereof, the Register of
Deeds issued TCT in the name of said
realty company.
On October 19, 1973, Laura Cervantes
testified that her mother, Cristina
Guerrero, had been sick for a long time
before she died at the age of 80 years in
1948; and that her mother could walk
only inside their house in Paraaque; that
the money spent for the illness of her
mother came from Manuel Guerrero; and
that, through her children, Cristina
Guerrero could ask money from Manuel
Guerrero because of the land that Andres
Guerrero had lent to her.
After Laura Cervantes had thus
testified, counsel for the defendants
Guerreros objected to the line of
questioning on the ground that the said
witness was testifying "on matters which
are prohibited under Sec. 20(a), Rule
130, of the Rules of Court."

The defendants Guerreros filed a

written motion to disqualify Laura
Cervantes as a witness on the basis of
Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the New Rules
of Court. The motion was opposed by the
plaintiffs. On November 16, 1973, the
trial court granted the motion and
declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose
Cervantes as well as other witnesses
similarly situated, are disqualified to
testify in the case.

And that is emphasized by the law by

using the words 'against the estate of
such deceased persons,' which convey
the idea of an estate actually owned by
the deceased at the time the case was
brought and that, therefore, it is only his
rights that are to be asserted and
defendant in the litigation by the person
representing him, not the personal rights
of such representative." (Moran, ibid., pp.
169-171)

The CA affirmed the trial courts

ruling.

The plain truth is that Laura

Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not
parties in the present case, and
neither are they assignors of the
parties nor "persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted." They are mere
witnesses by whose testimonies the
plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was
not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres
Guerrero, who owned the disputed land
at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel
Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not
really sell but merely mortgaged the
property to Manuel Guerrero

Issue: Whether or not the witnesses

Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes were
correctly disqualified from testifying in
the case and their testimonies excluded.
Held: Upon the facts and under the law,
this Court is fully persuaded that the
affirmative rulings of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were made in
error.
The present case is not a claim or
demand against the estate of the
deceased
Manuel
Guerrero.
The
defendants Guerreros are not the
executors
or
administrators
or
representatives of such deceased. They
are being sued as claimants of ownership
in their individual capacities of the
disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the
estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the
inapplicability of dead man's rule. "
It has been held that statutes
providing that a party in interest is
incompetent to testify where the adverse
party is dead or insane, must be applied
strictly in accordance with their express
wording, irrespective of their spirit. The
law uses the word 'against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a
deceased person.' It should be noted that
after the mention of an executor or
administrator the words or other
representative follows, which means that
the word 'representative' includes only
those who, like the executor or
administrator,
are
sued
in
their
representative, not personal, capacity.

Abraham v. Recto-Kasten, 4 SCRA

298 (1962) L16741 31jan

A cross-examination of the disqualified

witness is a waiver of the dead mans
privilege, even if there was a continuing
objection.
Facts: Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan
from Alfonso Abraham, Sr. and executed
a promissory note in favor of the latter
promising to pay the loan within 90 days
with interest. The note was executed in
the presence of Florencia Q. Abraham,
the creditor's wife, who affixed her
signature at the bottom thereof as a
witness thereto. Upon the maturity of the
note, a demand was made for its
payment, but the debtor failed to pay.
On
February
9,
1945,
Alfonso
Abraham, Sr. died. On the other hand,
Juan C. Ysmael died intestate on April 23,
1952 leaving the note still unpaid.
In Special Proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Juan
Ysmael, Florencia Q. Vda. de Abraham,

together with her sons, filed a pleading

entitled
"Reclamation"
demanding
payment of the amount represented by
the note. As soon as Priscilla RectoKasten was appointed administratrix, the
claimants reproduced their "Reclamation"
before the lower court and the same was
finally set for hearing. The counsel for the
administratrix interposed a general and
continuing objection to the testimony of
Florencia Vda. de Abraham invoking the
provisions of Section 26(c), Rule 123 of
the Rules of Court. However, after the
claimant had testified, he lengthily crossexamined her on the very matters against
which he interposed a general objection.

Adm'r vs. Jacobs, 89 VT. 133, 94 A. 497,

Ann. Cas. 1918A, 465).

The trial court issued in Order-Decree

allowing the claim against the intestate
estate of Juan C. Ysmael

Facts: Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the

president and one of the largest
stockholders of Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Company of Manila when the Pacific war
broke out.
He held 1,000 shares of
stocks, of which 545 shares had not been
fully paid for, but for which he had
executed promissory notes in favor of the
company. In 1941 the sum of P64,500
had been credited in his favor on account
of the purchase price of the said 545
share of stock out of bonuses and
dividends to which he was entitled from
the company. Under his agreements with
the company dated April 4 and July 12,
1939, should he die without having fully
paid for the said 545 shares of stock, the
company, at its option, may either
reacquire the said 545 shares of stock by
returning to his estate the amount
applied thereon, or issue in favor of his
estate the corresponding number of the
company's shares of stock equivalent to
the amount paid thereon at P450 a share.

The appellate court concluded that

"the lower court erred in finding that the
claimants have established a just and
valid claim.
Issue: Whether or not the wife of the
deceased was disqualified from testifying.
Held: There was a waiver of the
prohibition contained in Section
26(c), Rules 123 of the Rules of
Court, when the counsel for the
administratrix
extensively
crossexamined the witness on the very
matters subject of the prohibition.
The reason for the rule apparently is that
a litigant cannot be permitted to
speculate as to what his examination of a
witness may bring forth. Having made his
selection of one of two courses which he
may pursue, he has no right, after he
discovers that the course selected is not
to his advantage, and after he has put the
opposite party to the expense, and has
consumed the time of courts in a trial of
the case in accordance with the course
selected, to change his position and make
another and different selection. Such
course would be unfair both to the
opposite party and to the court and
should not be countenanced in any court
of justice (IV Francisco, Rules of Court,
876, 877, citing the case of Comstock's

Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil.

330 (1949) L2016 23aug

This in effect ruled that the Dead Mans

statute can not be invoked against a
plaintiff-corporation. Interest no longer
disqualifies
a
witness.
Officers/stockholder of corporation may
testify in a case filed against the estate of
a deceased by the corporation
Escolin: In an action where the
administrator
is
the
plaintiff,
the
defendant may testify on facts occurring
prior to the death of the decedent.

Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27,

1944 and special proceeding was
subsequently instituted for the settlement
of his estate.
In due course the said company filed a
claim against the estate of Richard T.
Fitzsimmons.
In his answer to the
amended claim the administrator denied
the alleged indebtedness of the deceased
to the claimant.

It is admitted that all the prewar books

and records of the company were
completely destroyed or lost during the
war so testimonies of witnesses were
admitted.
The claimant called as witnesses Mr.
Henry J. Belden and Mr. Samuel Garmezy,
vice-president-treasurer and president,
respectively, of the claimant company, to
testify on the status of the personal
account of the deceased Fitzsimmons
with the company; but upon objection of
the administrator the trial court refused
to admit their testimony on that point on
the ground that said witnesses were
incompetent under section 26(c) of Rule
123,
they
being
not
only
large
stockholders and members of the board
of directors but also vice-presidenttreasurer and president, respectively, of
the claimant company.
Issue: Whether or not the officers of a
corporation which is a party to an action
against an executor or administrator of a
deceased person are disqualified from
testifying as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such
deceased person.
Held:
Officers
and
directors
of
corporations are not considered to be
parties within the meaning of the law.
(City Savings Bank vs. Enos)
Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 of
the Rules of Court disqualifies only
parties or assignors of parties, the
officers and/or stockholders of a
corporation are not disqualified from
testifying
for
or
against
the
corporation which is a party to an
action upon a claim or demand
against the estate of a deceased
person as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such
deceased person.

Escolin: The dead mans rule does not

apply in cadastral cases.
Escolin: If there is no instrument
evidencing the claim, it would be difficult
to prove the claim in the estate
proceeding because of the dead mans
statute. However, if there is such an
instrument, it is not barred by the dead
mans statute (Neibert v. Neibert)
Facts: Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia
Vianzon contracted marriage on July 5,
1894. Marcelino died leaving Anastacia
as his widow. The niece of the deceased,
Josefa Tongco, was named administratrix
of the estate. It appears that shortly
before the death of Marcelino Tongco, he
had presented claims in a cadastral case
in which he had asked for titles to certain
properties in the name of the conjugal
partnership consisting of himself and his
wife, and that corresponding decrees for
these lots were issued in the name of the
conjugal partnership not long after his
death.
In the cadastral case, the widow began
action when she presented a motion for a
revision of certain decrees within the
one-year period provided by the Land
Registration Law. Issue was joined by the
administratrix of the estate. A decision
was rendered by ordered that in lieu of
the issued decrees, new decrees and
certificates of title be issued as the
exclusive
properties
of
Anastacia
Vianzon. Sometime later, a motion for a
new
trial
was
presented
with
accumulated affidavits by counsel for the
losing party (administratrix). This motion
was denied by the trial judge.

Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil 698

(1927) 27498 20sep

The administratrix of the estate began

action against Anastacia Vianzon for the
recovery of specified property and for
damages. The court renders judgment
absolving the defendant from the
complaint. The motion for a new trial was
denied by His Honor, the trial judge.

Action must be brought against the

estate, not by the estate, to be covered
under the dead mans statute

From both of the judgments hereinbefore

mentioned, the administratrix of the
estate of Marcelino Tongco had appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of

the widow should be discarded.
Held: Counsel is eminently correct in
emphasizing that the object and purpose
of this statute is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in
regard to the transaction is question on
the part of the surviving party. He has,
however, neglected the equally important
rule that the law was designed to aid in
arriving at the truth and was not
designed to suppress the truth.
The law twice makes use of the word
"against." The actions were not
brought "against" the administratrix
of the estate, nor were they brought
upon claims "against" the estate. In
the first case at bar, the action is one by
the administratrix to enforce demand
"by" the estate. In the second case at
bar, the same analogy holds true for the
claim was presented in cadastral
proceedings where in one sense there
is no plaintiff and there is no
defendant.
Moreover, a waiver was accomplished
when the adverse party undertook to
cross-examine the interested person
with
respect
to
the
prohibited
matters.
The reason for the rule is that if
persons having a claim against the estate
of the deceased or his properties were
allowed to testify as to the supposed
statements made by him (deceased
person), many would be tempted to
falsely impute statements to deceased
persons as the latter can no longer deny
or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting
their properties or rights to false or
unscrupulous claims or demands. The
purpose of the law is to "guard against
the temptation to give false testimony in
regard to the transaction in question on
the part of the surviving party."
We are of the opinion that the witness
was competent.
Goi v. CA, 144 SCRA 222 (1986)

Heirs of a deceased are representatives

within the ambit of the dead mans
statute; waived by defendant if he files
counterclaim against plaintiff; adverse
party may testify to transactions or
communications with deceased which
were made with an agent of such person
if the agents is still alive and can testify
as long as it is confined to the
transactions

J. Privileged Communications
Privileged Communications
1. marital
2. attorney-client
3. physician-patient
4. priest-penitent
5. state secrets
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason
of privileged communication. The
following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
This is a rule of relative disqualification.
Each of those enumerated is disqualified
to testify as to specific matters only. It
does not disqualify them from testifying
on matters not privileged. Hence, it is
improper to object to their testimony
upon mere subpoena. One must wait
until it becomes apparent that their
testimony covers matters that are
privileged (e.g. upon asking of a question
that covers privileged matters; when the
purpose of their testimony as admitted by
the offeror covers privileged matters)
before one may properly object.
Though a relative disqualification, it is
nevertheless
a
testimonial
disqualification, as opposed to the
testimonial privilege of ascendants and
descendants (Rule 130 25). [careful not
to be confused in the multiple meanings
of the word privilege] Hence, the
witness has no say whether the objection
is to be raised or not. When the holder of
the privilege (not necessarily the
opposing
party)
consents
to
the
testimony, the witness must testify.

Note that the wording of the law is to the

effect that (someone) may not be
examined
without
the
consent
of
(another). The law does not say that one
can not testify or be examined over the
objection of another. The wording of the
law is to the effect that an objection of
the other party in the privileged
communication is not necessary for the
privilege to hold. Consent of the other
party in the privileged communication is
an act that needs to be proved for the
testimony to be admitted. This is not to
say that failure of a such a party to object
will never render such testimony
admissible. This is to say that where the
other
party
to
the
privileged
communication is not a litigant in the
case, and privileged communication is
offered in evidence without the consent
of such party, the litigant against whom
the testimony is offered may object to its
admission on the ground of privileged
communication. Where the other party in
the privileged communication is a
litigant, then his failure to object will be
taken as a consent to the testimony or a
waiver of a privilege.
The communication that is privileged
need not be in any form. It can be oral or
written.
The
communication
ceases
to
be
privileged if knowingly communicated in
the presence of 3rd persons. In such a
case, the privilege may not be invoked at
all.
However,
if
the
privileged
communication
was
within
the
rd
surreptitious observation of a 3 person,
then the communication can be invoked if
either
the
communicator
or
communicatee called to testify. However,
the privilege can not be invoked if the 3 rd
person is called to testify.

1. Marital Communications
a. Rule 130 24 (a)
(a) The husband or the wife,
during or after the marriage, cannot
be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication

received in confidence by one from

the other during the marriage except
in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the
other
or
the
latter's
direct
descendants or ascendants;
Requisites for Marital Communications
Rule
1. communication received
a. from the spouse
b. in confidence
c. during the marriage
2. without the consent of the spouse
Note that the marital communication rule
applies even after the marriage.
It
applies only to matters communicated by
one spouse to another in confidence. It
does not cover knowledge of matters that
a spouse obtains from a source other
than other spouse. It can be invoked
even if neither spouse is a party to the
action. It is a relative disqualification
and can be invoked only when it is
apparent that the testimony would cover
privileged matters.
The exceptions to the rule are:
1. in a civil case by one against the other,
or
2. in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants
cf Rule 130 22: Marital Disqualification
Rule
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of
marriage. During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against
the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the
latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
(20a)

The marital disqualification rule refers to

all matters, whether or communicated by
one spouse to the other. It applies only
during the existence of the marriage. It
can be invoked only if one spouse is a
party to the action. It is an absolute
disqualification and can be invoked the

moment that one spouse is called to

testify.
Marital
Disqualification
(Rule 130, Sec. 22)

Marital
Communications
(Rule 130, Sec. 24
[a])

Covers all matters Covers

only
regardless
of matters
source
communicated by
one
spouse
to
another,
during
the marriage
Applies during the Applies during and
marriage
after the marriage
A spouse must be A spouse need not
a litigant
be a litigant
Invoked when a Invoked when the
spouse is called to testimony appears
testify
to cover privileged
matters
MEMORIZE!

b. Cases
People v. Carlos, 47
(1925) L22948 17mar

Phil.

626

Where the privilege communication from

one spouse to the other comes into the
hands of a 3rd party, without collusion or
voluntary disclosure on the part of either
spouse, not privilege; illegality of seizure
must be raised by motion before trial for
return of letter; unanswered letter
inadmissible
Facts: It appears from the evidence that
the victim of the alleged murder, Dr.
Pablo G. Sityar, performed a surgical
operation upon the defendant's wife for
appendicitis and certain other ailments.
After her release therefrom she was
required to go several times to the clinic
of Doctor Sityar for the purpose of
dressing the wounds caused by the
operation. On these occasions she was
accompanied by her husband, the
defendant. The defendant states that on
one of the visits, Doctor Sityar sent him
out on an errand to buy some medicine,
and that while defendant was absent on

this errand Doctor Sityar outraged the

wife. The defendant further states that
his wife informed him of the outrage
shortly after leaving the clinic.
In the afternoon of May 26th the
defendant again went to the office of the
deceased and found him there alone.
According to the evidence of the
prosecution, the defendant then, without
any preliminary quarrel between the two,
attacked the deceased with a fan-knife
and stabbed him twice. The deceased
made an effort to escape but the
defendant pursued him and overtaking
him in the hall outside the office, inflicted
another wound upon him and as a
consequence of the three wounds he died
within a few minutes. The defendants
made his escape but surrendered himself
to the Constabulary at Malolos, Bulacan,
in the evening of the following.
The court below found that the crime
was committed with premeditation and
therefore
constituted
murder.
This
finding can only be sustained by taking
into consideration Exhibit L, a letter
written to the defendant by his wife and
seized by the police in searching his
effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated
two days before the commission of the
crime and shows that the writer feared
that
the
defendant
contemplated
resorting to physical violence in dealing
with the deceased.
Counsel for the defendant argues
vigorously that the letter was a privileged
communication
and
therefore
not
admissible in evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the letter was a
privileged communication.
Held: The letter in question was obtained
through a search for which no warrant
appears to have been issued.
The letter Exhibit L must, however,
be excluded for reasons not discussed in
the briefs. The letter was written by the
wife of the defendant and if she had
testified at the trial the letter might have
been
admissible
to
impeach
her

testimony, but she was not put on the

witness-stand
and
the
letter
was
therefore not offered for that purpose. If
the defendant either by answer or
otherwise had indicated his assent to the
statements contained in the letter it
might also have been admissible, but
such is not the case here; the fact that he
had the letter in his possession is no
indication of acquiescence or assent on
his part. The letter is therefore nothing
but pure hearsay and its admission in
evidence violates the constitutional right
of the defendant in a criminal case to be
confronted with the witnesses for the
prosecution and have the opportunity to
cross-examine them. In this respect there
can be no difference between an ordinary
communication
and
one
originally
privileged.
The question is radically different from
that of the admissibility of testimony of a
third party as to a conversation between
a husband and wife overheard by the
witness. Testimony of that character is
admissible on the ground that it relates to
a conversation in which both spouses
took part and on the further ground that
where the defendant has the opportunity
to answer a statement made to him by his
spouse and fails to do so, his silence
implies assent. That cannot apply where
the statement is contained in an
unanswered letter.

2. Attorney-Client Privilege
a. Rule 130 24 (b)
(b) An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a
view to, professional employment, nor
can
an
attorney's
secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and
his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge
of
which
has
been
acquired in such capacity;

Requisites for attorney-client privilege

1. existence
of
an
attorney-client
relationship
2. witness is an attorney
3. as to communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given
thereon
4. the communication was made in
confidence
5. communication was made in the
course of, or with a view to
professional employment
The privilege extends to the attorney's
secretary,
stenographer,
or
clerk
concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity.
The difference being consent of only the
client is needed for the attorney to testify.
However, the consent of both the
attorney and the client is necessary for
the attorney's secretary, stenographer, or
clerk to testify.
The attorney-client privilege does not
apply if the attorney was sued by his
client.

b. Cases
Uy Chico v. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163
(1915) L-9231 06jan

Communication made by client to

attorney
for
purpose
of
being
communicated to others not privileged,
e.g. compromise agreement.
Facts: The plaintiff seeks to recover the
face value of two insurance policies upon
a stock of dry goods destroyed by fire. It
appears that the father of the plaintiff
died in 1897, at which time he was
conducting a business under his own
name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his
brother took over the business and
continued it under the same name, "Uy
Layco." Sometime before the date of the
fire, the plaintiff purchased his brother's
interest in the business and continued to
carry on the business under the father's
name. At the time of the fire "Uy Layco"
was heavily indebted and subsequent
thereto the creditors of the estate of the
plaintiff's father. During the course of

these proceedings, the plaintiff's attorney

surrendered the policies of insurance to
the administrator of the estate, who
compromised
with
the
insurance
company for one-half their face value, or
P6,000. This money was paid into court
and is now being held by the sheriff. The
plaintiff
now
brings
this
action,
maintaining that the policies and goods
insured belonged to him and not to the
estate of his deceased father and alleges
that he is not bound by the compromise
effected by the administrator of his
father's estate.
The defendant insurance company sought
to show that the plaintiff had agreed to
compromise settlement of the policies,
and for that purpose introduced evidence
showing that the plaintiff's attorney had
surrendered
the
policies
to
the
administrator with the understanding
that such a compromise was to be
effected. The plaintiff was asked, while
on the witness stand, if he had any
objection to his attorney's testifying
concerning the surrender of the
policies, to which he replied in the
negative. The attorney was then called
for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for
the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver
previously given by the plaintiff and
objected to the testimony of the attorney
on the ground that it was privileged.
Counsel, on this appeal, base their
argument of the proposition that a waiver
of the client's privilege may be withdrawn
at any time before acted upon
Issue: Was the testimony in question
privileged?
Held: It is evident that a communication
made by a client to his attorney for the
express
purpose
of
its
being
communicated to a third person is
essentially
inconsistent
with
the
confidential relation. When the attorney
has faithfully carried out his instructions
be delivering the communication to the
third person for whom it was intended
and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by
any reasoning whatever, be classified in a

legal
sense
as
a
privileged
communication between the attorney and
his client. It is plain that such a
communication, after reaching the party
for whom it was intended at least, is a
communication between the client and a
third person, and that the attorney simply
occupies the role of intermediary or
agent.
AS to whether a waiver of the client's
privilege personally made in open court
can be withdrawn before acted upon,
quaere. (consider whether it is correct).
Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262
SCRA 124 (1996) 105938 20sep

Prosecution can not use attorneys as

leverage to compel them to name their
clients; clients identity is protected when
there is a strong probability exists that
revealing clients name would implicate
him in the very activity for which he
sought advice.
Facts: The matters raised herein are an
offshoot of the institution of the
Complaint before the Sandiganbayan by
the RP, through the PCGG against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the
principal defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes
shares
of
stocks
in
the
named
corporations.
ACCRA Law Firm performed legal
services for its clients, which included,
among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations
and/or organizations, with the correlative
and incidental services where its
members acted as incorporators, or
simply, as stockholders. More specifically,
in the performance of these services, the
members of the law firm delivered to its
client documents which substantiate the
client's equity holdings, i.e., stock
certificates
endorsed
in
blank
representing the shares registered in
the client's name, and a blank deed of
trust or assignment covering said
shares. In the course of their dealings
with their clients, the members of the law
firm acquire information relative to the

assets of clients as well as their personal

and business circumstances. As members
of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and
private respondent Raul Roco admit that
they assisted in the organization and
acquisition of the companies included in
Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with
the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted
as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration
proceedings.
The PCGG alleged that ACCRA law firm
was involved in setting up financial and
corporate framework and structures
through the use of coco levy funds. In
their answer, ACCRA said that the acts
were made the course of rendering
professional and legal services to clients.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set
the following conditions precedent for the
exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the
disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b)
submission
of
documents
substantiating
the
lawyer-client
relationship; and (c) the submission of
the deeds of assignments petitioners
executed in favor of its client covering
their respective shareholdings.
On
March
18,
1992,
respondent
Sandiganbayan
promulgated
the
Resolution, herein questioned, denying
the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case
No. 33, for their refusal to comply with
the conditions required by respondent
PCGG
ACCRA
lawyers
moved
for
a
reconsideration of the above resolution
but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the
ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not a lawyer may
refuse in giving the identity of his client.
Held:
Petitioners'
contentions
impressed with merit.

are

It is quite apparent that petitioners were

impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants
to force them to disclose the identity of
their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is

not after petitioners but the "bigger fish"

as they say in street parlance.
The general rule in our jurisdiction as
well as in the United States is that a
lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of
this client.
Reasons:
First, the court has a right to know that
the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only
after the attorney-client relationship has
been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a
client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to
the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations
require that the opposing party should, as
a general rule, know his adversary. "A
party suing or sued is entitled to know
who his opponent is."
He cannot be
obliged to grope in the dark against
unknown forces.
Exceptions:
Client identity is privileged where a
strong probability exists that revealing
the client's name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer's advice.
Where disclosure would open the client
to civil liability; his identity is privileged.
Where the government's lawyers have no
case against an attorney's client unless,
by revealing the client's name, the said
name would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the client's name is privileged.
Summarizing
these
exceptions,
information relating to the identity of a
client may fall within the ambit of the
privilege when the client's name itself has
an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.

What these cases unanimously seek to

avoid is the exploitation of the general
rule in what may amount to a fishing
expedition by the prosecution.
The
circumstances
involving
the
engagement of lawyers in the case at
bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the
instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information,
because the privilege, as stated earlier,
protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be
not attorney-client relationship).
There is no question that the preparation
of the aforestated documents was part
and parcel of petitioners' legal service to
their
clients.
More
important,
it
constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore,
have a legitimate fear that identifying
their clients would implicate them in the
very activity for which legal advice had
been
sought,
i.e.,
the
alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main
exception, revelation of the client's name
would obviously provide the necessary
link for the prosecution to build its case,
where none otherwise exists. It is the
link, in the words of Baird, "that would
inevitably form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict the (client) of a . . .
crime."
The logical nexus between name and
nature of transaction is so intimate in this
case that it would be difficult to simply
dissociate one from the other. In this
sense,
the
name
is
as
much
"communication" as information revealed
directly about the transaction in question
itself, a communication which is clearly
and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot
reveal such communication without
exposing himself to charges of violating a

principle which forms the bulwark of the

entire attorney-client relationship.
Boss
Joel
manifestation:
it
is
premature to apply the rules on evidence
for there is no case yet, hence, there is no
compulsion on the part of the lawyer to
disclose the identity of there client.
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt and
Mineral Oil Co., 46 Phil. 938 (1924)
L-21237 22mar

Letter from client to attorney obtained by

adverse party, admitted authentic in
court, not privileged regardless whether
legally or illegally obtained (what about
constitutional rule of exclusion on
evidence obtained in violation of the right
to
privacy
of
communication
and
correspondence?); one who overhears the
communication with or without clients
knowledge is not privileged.
Facts: The plaintiff is a citizen of the
United States, resident in the City of
Manila, while the defendant is a
corporation organized under the law of
the Philippine Islands with its principal
office in the City of Cebu. Said company
appears to be the owner by a valuable
deposit of bituminous limestone and
other asphalt products, located in Leyte
and known as the Lucio mine. William
Anderson, as president and general
manager of the defendant company,
addressed a letter to the plaintiff Barton,
authorizing the latter to sell the products
of the Lucio mine in the Commonwealth
of Australia and New Zealand upon a
scale of prices indicated in said letter.
Plaintiff alleges that during the life of the
agency indicated in Exhibit B, he
rendered services to the defendant
company in the way of advertising and
demonstrating the products of the
defendant and expended large sums of
money in visiting various parts of the
world for the purpose of carrying on said
advertising
and
demonstrations,
in
shipping to various parts of the world
samples of the products of the defendant,
and in otherwise carrying on advertising
work.

Anderson wrote the plaintiff, to the effect

that the company was behind with
construction and was not then able to
handle big contracts. (Exhibit FF.) On
March 12, Anderson was in Manila and
the two had an interview, in the course of
which the plaintiff informed Anderson of
the San Francisco order. Anderson
thereupon said that, owing to lack of
capital, adequate facilities had not been
provided by the company for filling large
orders and suggested that the plaintiff
had better hold up in the matter of taking
orders. The plaintiff expressed surprise at
this and told Anderson that he had not
only the San Francisco order (which he
says he exhibited to Anderson) but other
orders for large quantities of bituminous
limestone to be shipped to Australia and
Shanghai. In another interview on the
same Anderson definitely informed the
plaintiff that the contracts which be
claimed to have procured would not be
filled.
Barton sued for specific performance. In
the course of the trial, the defendant
offered in evidence a carbon copy of a
letter written by the plaintiff to his
attorney in which plaintiff states, among
other things, that his profit from the San
Francisco contract would have been at
the rate of eigthy-five cents (gold) per
ton. The authenticity of this city
document is admitted, and when it was
offered in evidence by the attorney for
the defendant the counsel for the plaintiff
announced that he had no objection to
the introduction of this carbon copy in
evidence if counsel for the defendant
would explain where this copy was
secured. Upon this the attorney for the
defendant informed the court that he
received the letter from the former
attorneys of the defendant without
explanation of the manner in which the
document had come into their possession.
Upon this the attorney for the plaintiff
made this announcement: "We hereby
give notice at this time that unless such
an explanation is made, explaining fully
how this carbon copy came into the

possession of the defendant company, or

any one representing it, we propose to
object to its admission on the ground that
it is a confidential communication
between client and lawyer." No further
information was then given by the
attorney for the defendant as to the
manner in which the letter had come to
his hands and the trial judge thereupon
excluded the document, on the ground
that it was a privileged communication
between client and attorney.
Issue: Whether or not the letter should
be
considered
as
privileged
communication bet. Atty & client.
Held: We are of the opinion that this
ruling was erroneous; for even supposing
that the letter was within the privilege
which protects communications between
attorney and client, this privilege was lost
when the letter came to the hands of the
adverse party. And it makes no difference
how the adversary acquired possession.
The law protects the client from the
effect of disclosures made by him to his
attorney in the confidence of the legal
relation, but when such a document,
containing admissions of the client,
comes to the hand of a third party, and
reaches the adversary, it is admissible in
evidence. In this connection Mr. Wigmore
says:
The
law
provides
subjective
freedom for the client by assuring
him of exemption from its processes
of disclosure against himself or the
attorney
or
their
agents
of
communication. This much, but not
a whit more, is necessary for the
maintenance of the privilege. Since
the means of preserving secrecy of
communication are entirely in the
client's hands, and since the
privilege is a derogation from the
general testimonial duty and should
be strictly construed, it would be
improper to extend its prohibition
to third persons who obtain
knowledge of the communications.
One
who
overhears
the

communication, whether with or

without the client's knowledge, is
not within the protection of the
privilege. The same rule ought to
apply to one who surreptitiously
reads or obtains possession of a
document in original or copy.
Orient Insurance v. Revilla, 54 Phil.
919 (1930) 34098 17sep

Introduction in evidence of a part of a

paper by one party waives privilege as to
other parts of the same writing; when a
party invokes BER, it is the party who
produces the original who is deemed to
have introduced it in evidence; contract
for attorneys fees is not privileged; there
is no partial waiver of privilege.
Facts: The respondent Teal Motor Co.,
Inc. is plaintiff in a civil action instituted
in the CFI of Manila for the purpose of
recovering upon two fire insurance
policies issued by the Orient Insurance
Company, upon merchandise destroyed
by a fire. In one of the clauses of the
policies sued upon is a stipulation to the
effect that all benefit under the policy
would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the
claim should be rejected by the insurer
and action or suit should not be
commenced within three months after
such rejection. In the answer of the
Orient Insurance Company, interposed in
the case mentioned, it is alleged, by way
of defense, that the company rejected the
claim on April 15, 1929, that notice of
such rejection was given to the plaintiff
by letter on the same day, and that suit
was not instituted on the policy until
August 3, 1929, which was more than
three months after the rejection of the
claim.
In the Course of the trial the witness E.
M. Bachrach, president of the Teal Motor
Co., Inc., while being examined in chief
by the attorneys for the plaintiff, and
speaking
of
the
circumstances
surrounding the institution of the action,
said that he had reported certain
conversations to plaintiff's attorneys, and
he added: he waited for about a week

longer and not having heard anything

about it, in the meantime, on the 13th of
July, he (Bachrach) received a letter from
their attorneys urging him to file these
cases. The attorney for the defendant,
Orient Insurance Company, thereupon
interposed, asking that the witness be
required to produce the letter referred to
from Mr. Guevara, or else his answer be
stricken out. The witness replied that he
had the letter with him and that he had
no objection to show that part of the
letter in which Guevara urged him to
proceed with the cases. Upon being
asked about the other part of the letter,
the witness said that the other part
contained private matter, "between the
attorney and ourselves. Thereupon the
attorney for the defendant, Orient
Insurance Company, said he would like to
see the letter, inquiring as to its date. The
witness replied that it bore date of July
13, 1929; and upon the court inquiring
whether the witness had any objection to
the reading of the letter by the attorney
for the defendant, the witness replied
that he wished to consult with his
attorney. Upon this the attorney for the
adversary party, the Orient Insurance
Company, suggested that he would like to
have the letter marked without his
reading it and it was accordingly marked
as Exhibit 49. The attorney then said: "In
view of the production of the letter, I
withdraw the objection to the statement
of the witness as to its contents," and he
added: "I now ask the permission of the
court to read the letter for my
information."
The
court
thereupon
inquired of the attorney for the Teal
Motor Co., Inc., whether he had any
objection, and the attorney observed that
he would have no objection to the
disclosing of that part of the letter which
referred exactly to the point of the urging
of the filing of the complaints, and he
added: "Unfortunately, the other part of
the letter being a communication
between a client and attorney, I don't
think, if your Honor please, it can be
disclosed without the consent of both."

Issue: Whether or not a communication

may be presented only in part, excluding
other
parts
for
being
privileged
communication.
Held: The introduction in evidence of
part of a paper writing by one party
waives privilege as to other parts of the
same writing.
When part of a writing is introduced in
evidence by one litigant, his adversary is
entitled to use other parts of the same
writing, so far as relevant to the issues in
the case; and to this end the attorney of
the latter has a right to inspect the
writing and to require its production in
court.
A witness for the plaintiff made an oral
statement as to the substance of part of a
letter which had been received by the
plaintiff from its attorney, and when the
fact was revealed that the communication
had been made by letter, the attorney for
the defendant requested that the witness
be required to produce the letter in court,
and if not, that his answer should be
stricken out. This in legal effect was a
demand for the production of "the best
evidence," it being a well-known rule of
law that a witness cannot be permitted to
give oral testimony as to the contents of a
paper writing which can be produced in
court. In response to this request that
portion of the letter to which the witness
had supposedly referred was read into
the record.
It was stated in the court by the attorney
for the plaintiff, in opposing the
introduction of other portions of the
letter in proof, that the other parts were
privileged, because they related to the
terms of employment between attorney
and client, or to the fee to be paid to the
attorney. With respect to this point it is
difficult to see how a contract for fees
could be considered privileged. Irrelevant
it might, under certain circumstances,
certainly be, but not privileged. Of course
contracts between attorneys and clients
are inherently personal and private
matters, but they are a constant subject

of litigation, and contracts relating to

fees are essentially not of privileged
nature. Privilege primarily refers to
communications from client to attorney,
an idea which of course includes
communications from attorney to client
relative to privileged matters.
But, even supposing that the matter
contained in the letter and withheld from
the inspection of the adversary was
originally of a privileged nature, the
privilege was waived by the introduction
in evidence of part of the letter. The
provision in section 283 of the Code of
Civil Procedure making the whole of a
declaration, conversation, or writing
admissible when part has been given in
evidence by one party, makes no
exception as to privileged matter; and the
jurisprudence on the subject does not
recognize any exception.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947)

Privilege does not extend to information

gathered by an attorney from witnesses;
Work-Product of atty can not be secured
without sufficient justification.
Facts: On February 7, 1943, the tug 'J. M.
Taylor' sank while engaged in helping to
tow a car float of the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad across the Delaware River at
Philadelphia.
The
accident
was
apparently unusual in nature, the cause
of it still being unknown. Five of the nine
crew members were drowned. Three days
later
the
tug
owners
and
the
underwriters employed a law firm, of
which respondent Fortenbaugh is a
member, to defend them against potential
suits by representatives of the deceased
crew members and to sue the railroad for
damages to the tug.
A public hearing was held on March 4,
1943,
before
the
United
States
Steamboat Inspectors, at which the four
survivors were examined. This testimony
was recorded and made available to all
interested parties. Shortly thereafter,
Fortenbaugh privately interviewed the
survivors and took statements from them

with an eye toward the anticipated

litigation; the survivors signed these
statements on March 29. Fortenbaugh
also
interviewed
other
persons
believed to have some information
relating to the accident and in some
cases he made memoranda of what
they told him. At the time when
Fortenbaugh secured the statements of
the survivors, representatives of two of
the deceased crew members had been in
communication with him. The fifth
claimant, petitioner herein, brought suit
in a federal court under the Jones Act on
November
26,
1943,
naming
as
defendants
the
two
tug
owners,
individually and as partners, and the
railroad.
One year later, petitioner filed 39
interrogatories directed to the tug
owners. The 38th interrogatory read:
'State whether any statements of the
members of the crews of the Tugs 'J.
M. Taylor' and 'Philadelphia' or of any
other vessel were taken in connection
with the towing of the car float and
the sinking of the Tug 'John M.
Taylor'.
The tug owners, through Fortenbaugh,
answered all of the interrogatories except
No. 38 and the supplemental ones just
described.
While
admitting
that
statements of the survivors had been
taken, they declined to summarize or set
forth the contents. They did so on the
ground that such requests called 'for
privileged matter obtained in preparation
for litigation' and constituted 'an attempt
to obtain indirectly counsel's private
files.' It was claimed that answering these
requests
'would
involve
practically
turning over not only the complete files,
but also the telephone records and,
almost, the thoughts of counsel.'
The District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, sitting en banc, held that
the
requested
matters
were
not
privileged. The court then decreed that
the tug owners and Fortenbaugh, as
counsel and agent for the tug owners

forthwith
'Answer
Plaintiff's
38th
interrogatory
and
supplemental
interrogatories. Upon their refusal, the
court adjudged them in contempt and
ordered them imprisoned until they
complied.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, also
sitting en banc, reversed the judgment of
the District Court.
Issue: Whether or not any pre-trial
device at the disposal of either counsel be
used to inquire into materials collected
by an adverse party's counsel in the
course of preparation for possible
litigation.
Held: In urging that he has a right to
inquire into the materials secured and
prepared by Fortenbaugh, petitioner
emphasizes that the deposition- discovery
portions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are designed to enable the
parties to discover the true facts and to
compel their disclosure wherever they
may be found. It is said that inquiry may
be made under these rules, epitomized by
Rule 26, as to any relevant matter which
is not privileged; and since the discovery
provisions are to be applied as broadly
and liberally as possible, the privilege
limitation must be restricted to its
narrowest bounds. On the premise that
the attorney-client privilege is the one
involved in this case, petitioner argues
that it must be strictly confined to
confidential communications made by a
client to his attorney. And since the
materials here in issue were secured
by Fortenbaugh from third persons
rather than from his clients, the tug
owners, the conclusion is reached
that these materials are proper
subjects for discovery under Rule 26.
We also agree that the memoranda,
statements and mental impressions
in issue in this case fall outside the
scope of the attorney-client privilege
and hence are not protected from
discovery on that basis. It is unnecessary
here to delineate the content and scope
of that privilege as recognized in the

federal courts. For present purposes, it

suffices to note that the protective cloak
of this privilege does not extend to
information
which
an
attorney
secures from a witness while acting
for his client in anticipation of
litigation. Nor does this privilege
concern the memoranda,
briefs,
communications and other writings
prepared by counsel for his own use
in prosecuting his client's case; and it
is equally unrelated to writings which
reflect an attorney's mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions or legal theories.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Appeals.
Upjohn Company v. US, 449 U.S.
383 (1981)

Privilege extends to information given by

employees to corporate communications
not to facts.
Facts: Certain foreign subsidiaries of the
parties, made questionable payments to
foreign govts to secure business. The
main offices directed their counsel to
interview those employees and advise
them on acceptable courses of conduct.
The corporation thereafter voluntarily
submitted a report to the SEC disclosing
the questionable payments, which in turn
transmitted a copy of that report to the
IRS. The IRS was given a list of all those
interviewed, but the attys refused to
produce their notes and memorandum.
Issue: Whether atty-client privilege is
available to communications between
corporate officers and employees and
attys for corporation
Held:
The
communications
by
petitioner's employees to counsel are
covered by the attorney-client privilege
If
an
employee
making
the
communication, of whatever rank, is in a
position to control or even to take a
substantial part in a decision about any
action which the corporation may take
upon the advice of the atty, then he is (or
personifies), the corporation when he
makes his disclosure to the lawyer and

the privilege would apply. The privilege

exists to protect not only the giving of
professional advice, but also the giving of
information to the lawyer to enable him
to give sound and informed advice,
because the lawyer must be fully
informed in order for his client to obtain
full advantage of the legal system. The
ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold
inviolate the confidences and secrets of
his client not only facilitates the full
development of facts essential to proper
representation of the client, but also
encourages laymen to seek early legal
assistance (Hickman v. Taylor).
The
privilege only protects disclosure of
communications; it does not protect
disclosure of the underlying facts by
those who communicated with the atty.
The protection of the privilege extends
only to communications and not to
facts. A fact is one thing and a
communication concerning a fact is an
entirely different thing. The client cannot
be compelled to answer the question
>What did you say or write to the atty?=
but may not refuse to disclose any
relevant fact . . . merely because he
incorporated a statement of such fact into
his communication to his atty.
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 732
F.2d 447 (1983)

The general rule is the identity of a client

is not protected; legal advice exception
may be defeated through prima facie
showing that the legal representation was
secured in furtherance of present or
intended continuing illegality, as where
the representation itself is part of a
larger conspiracy; it is the link between
the client and the communication, not the
link between client and possibility of
potential criminal prosecution which is
protected;
last
link
exception
is
abandoned; disclosure might possibly
implicate client in criminal activity not an
exception
US v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th
Cir. 1979)

Statement made by co-defendant to an

investigator
acting
for
defendants
counsel protected; communication by
client to attorney remain privileged when
attorney shares them with co-defendant
for a common defense
US v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972
(5th Cir. 1975)

Protection does not extend to the

communication regarding an intended
crime;
communication
divulged
to
strangers not protected
US v. Nobles, 422 US 225 (1975)

Facts: During respondents federal

criminal trial, which resulted in a
conviction, defense counsel sought to
impeach the credibility of key prosecution
witnesses by testimony of a defense
investigator
regarding
statements
previously obtained from the witnesses
by
the
investigator.
When
the
investigator was called as a witness, the
District Court stated that a copy of the

investigators report would have to be

submitted
to
the
prosecution
for
inspection at the completion of the
investigators testimony. Defense counsel
said he did not intend to produce the
report, the court ruled that the
investigator could not testify about his
interviews with the witnesses.
CA,
considering such ruling to be a reversible
error,
held
that
both
the
Fifth
Amendment and Federal Rule Criminal
Procedure 16 prohibited the disclosure
condition imposed.
Held: Work-Product Doctrine waived
when client presents investigator as
witness. Statements made by 3rd persons
gathered by investigation not covered by
the privilege.
People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA
505 (1997)

Facts: