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1995]
Finally,there is what Even and Paz [11] call a "protocol,"and this is the only
kind of result we are going to analyze in the present paper. Since we will be
presentingexamplesof protocols, as opposed to provingtheir non-existence,we
can afford the same level of informalityin the descriptionof what is meant by a
protocol as Even and Paz used.
A protocolis a computer-programmable
interactiveprocedurethat can issue
queriesto the participantswhose answersmay affect future decisions.It may issue
instructionsto the participantssuch as: "Choose k pieces from among these m
pieces"or "Partitionthis piece into k subpieces."The protocolhas no information
on the measureof the variouspieces as seen by the differentparticipants this is
private information.Moreover,if the participantsobey the protocol, then each
participantwill end up with a piece after finitelymany steps.
Still following [11], we define a strategyfor a participantto be an adaptive
sequence of moves consistent with the protocol, which the participantschoose
sequentiallywhen called upon by the protocol.A protocol is proportional
if each
of the n participantshas a strategythat will guaranteehim at least 1/n of the cake
(by his own measure),independentlyof the other participants'strategies.(Purely
for convenience,we will henceforthuse only the masculinepronoun.)Departing
from [11], we will call a protocol envy-freeif each of the n participantshas a
strategythat will guaranteehim a piece that is, accordingto his own measure, at
least tied for largest.
A constructiveproof of the existence of, say, a proportionalprotocol involves
producingthree separate things:the rules of the protocol, a strategyfor each of
the players,and an argumentthat the strategiesdo, in fact, guaranteeeach player
his proportionalshare.We distinguishrules and strategiesby demandingthat rules
be enforceableby a referee implementingthe protocol.
Thisfmeansthat a statementlike "Player1 cuts the cake into n pieces" is an
acceptablerule, whereasa statementlike "Player1 cuts the cake into n pieces that
he considersto be equal" is not. This is because the latter statement cannot be
enforced by the referee, who has no knowledge of Player l's measure and so
cannot tell if the rule has been followed or not.
In presentingprotocols, we will separate rules from strategies by placing all
strategicaspects in parentheses.This providesone with the option of readingthe
rules alone in a reasonablysmoothway. All argumentsthat the strategiesperform
as advertisedare placed between steps and labeled as "Aside." For example, in
our method of presentation,cut-and-choosebecomes:
AN ENVY-FREE CAKE DIVISION PROTOCOL
10
[January
Cut-and-Choose
Step 1. Player 1 cuts the cake into 2 pieces (that he considersto be the same
size).
Step 2. Player 2 chooses a piece (that she considers to be at least tied for
largest).
Aside. Clearly,Player l's strategyguaranteeshim a piece of size exactly 1/2
in his measure,while Player2's strategyguaranteesher a piece of size
at least 1/2 in her measure.
The modern era of cake cuttingbegan with Steinhaus'observation"duringthe
war [World War II]" [25, p. 102] that the cut-and-choose protocol could be
extended to yield a proportionalprotocol for three players (see [18]). He then
asked if it could be extended to yield a proportionalprotocol for the case n > 3.
(Steinhaus,however,never used the word "protocol.")His questionwas answered
in the affirmativeby Banach and Knaster and reported in [25] and [26]. The
Steinhaus and Banach-Knaster protocols introduced two key ideas that would
resurfacein the envy-freesolutions 15 and 50 years later.
The first idea was that of having an initial sequence of steps resultingin only
part of the cake'sbeing allocated(to one playerin this case). The sequence is then
repeated a finite numberof times, after which the entire cake has been allocated.
The second idea and perhapsthe more importantof the two was that of having
a player trim a piece to a smallersize.
Explicit mention of the lack of a constructive procedure for producing an
envy-free allocation among more than two people dates back at least to Gamow
and Stern [14]. The first breakthroughson this problemoccurredin the late 1950s
and early 1960s, when the protocol solution to the envy-freeproblem for n = 3
was found by John L. Selfridge, and rediscovered independently by John H.
Conway.These solutions also involvedtrimmingand an initial allocation of only
part of the cake; they were widely disseminatedby R. K. Guy and others, and
eventuallyreportedby Gardner[15],Woodall[32],Stromquist[27], and Austin [1].
The moving-knifesolutionof Stromquist[27]was found two decades later, as was a
scheme due to Levmore and Cook [19], which can be recast as quite a different
moving-knifesolution to the envy-freeproblemwhen n = 3. Still other envy-free
moving-knifeschemesfor three people [7] and, more recently,four people [8] have
been discoveredand are summarizedin [6].
The extensionof the Selfridge-Conwayprotocolto the case of even four people
has remained an open, and much-commentedupon, problem. See, for example,
Gardner[15], Rebman [24], Stromquist[27], Woodall [31], [32], Bennett et al [3],
Webb [29],Hill [16],[17], and Olivastro[22].In what follows,we solve this problem
by producingan envy-freeprotocolfor arbitraryn.
We have chosen a uniform presentationof four protocols that highlightsthe
evolutionof two importantideas namely,trimming,and the use of sequences of
partialallocations.Historically,these four protocolsarose over a periodof 50 years
and nicely illustrate how ideas in mathematicsare built, one upon another. The
protocolswe present are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
1995]
ll
12
[January
The second protocolwe present followed quicklyon the heels of the first. It is
the Banach-Knasterprotocol,offered in responseto Steinhaus'questionof whether
his result could be extendedfrom 3 to n people. Note here the introductionof the
idea of trimming,whichwill be furtherexploitedin both of the upcomingenvy-free
protocols.
ProportionalProtocolfor Arbitraryn
(Banach-Knaster,circa 1944)
Step 1. Player 1 cuts a piece P1 (of size l/n) from the cake.
Step 2. Player 2 is given the choice of either passing (which he does if he
thinks P1 is of size less than l/n), or trimminga piece from P1 to
create a smallerpiece (that he thinksis of size exactlyl /n). The piece
P1, now perhapstrimmed,is renamedP2. The trimmingsare set aside.
Step 3. For 3 < i < n, Player i takes the piece Pi_l and proceeds exactly as
Player2 did in Step 2, with the resultingpiece now called Pi.
Aside. For 1 < i < n, Player i thinks that Pi is of size less than or equal to
l/n. We also have that P1 z *** 2 Pn. Thus, every player thinks Pn
is of size at most l/n.
Step 4. The last playerto trim the piece, or Player 1 if no one trimmedit, is
given Pn.
Aside. The playerreceivingPnthinks it is of size exactlyl/n.
Step 5. The trimmingsare reassembled,and Steps 1-4 are repeated for the
remainderof the cake, and with the remainingn - 1 playersin place
of the original n players.
Aside. The player who gets a piece at this second stage is getting exactly
l/(n - 1) of the remainderof the cake; he, and everyoneelse, thinks
this remainderis of size at least (n - l)/n. Hence, he thinkshis piece
is of size at least l/n.
Step 6. Step 5 is iterateduntil there are only 2 playersleft. The last 2 players
use cut-and-choose.
Aside As before, each playerreceivesa piece that he thinksis of size at least
l/n.
This ends the protocol.
The next protocolwe presentis the Selfridge-Conwayenvy-freeprotocolfor the
case n = 3. (There are slight differences in the presentationsof Selfridge and
Conway;we follow the latter.)This protocolinvolvesan elegant combinationof the
trimmingidea introducedby Banach-Knasterand the basic frameworkthat Steinhaus used. It also introduces the important notion of one player's having an
"irrevocableadvantage"over anotherplayer,followinga partialallocation.
Envy-FreeProtocolfor n = 3
(Selfridge,Conway,circa 1960)
Step 1. Player 1 cuts the cake into 3 pieces (that he considersto be the same
size).
Step 2. Player 2 is given the choice of either passing (which he does if he
thinks two or more pieces are tied for largest), or trimminga piece
from(the largest)one of the three pieces (to create a tie for largest).If
Player 2 trimmed a piece, then the trimmingsare named L, for
"leftover,"and set aside.
1995]
13
[January
15
Step 8.
Step 9.
Aside.
Step 10.
Aside.
Step 11.
Step 12.
Step 13.
Step 14.
true even if he chooses the second option.2 Player2 thinks all three
Zs are the same size, and each is at least as large as all three Ys.
Player 3 takes the collection of 6 pieces, and either passes (if he
thinks there alreadyis at least a 2-waytie for largest),or trims (the
largest)one of these (to the size of the next largest),thus creatingat
least a 2-waytie for largest).
Players4, 3, 2, and 1, in that order,choose a piece from amongthe 6
Ys and Zs as modified in Step 8 (that they considerto be largestor
tied for largest),with Player3 requiredto take the piece he trimmed
if it is available.Player 2 must choose Z1, Z21 or Z3. Player 1 must
choose Y1,Y2,or Y3.
This yields a partition {Xl, X2, X3, X4, L1} of the cake such that
{X1,X2,X3,X4} is an envy-free partial allocation, and L1 is the
leftoverpiece. Moreover,Player1 thinkshis piece X1 is strictlylarger
say by E than Player2's piece X2.
Player 1 names a positive integer s (chosen so that [4,ul(L1)/S]s< ,
where ,u1is Player l's measure).
The integer s specifies how many times the playerswill iterate the
basic trim-and-choosesequence to follow. Notice that if the rules
were instead to allow the iterations to continue until Player 1 said
"stop" (which he could strategicallydo at the point at which he
thinks the leftover crumbis smaller than the advantagehe has over
Player 2), then there is no guaranteethat a strategicallymisguided
Player 1 would not keep the game going forever.
Player1 cuts L1 into 5 pieces (that he considersto be the same size).
Player2 takes the collectionof 5 pieces, selects (the largest)3 pieces,
and trims(the largest)2 or fewer of these (to the size of the smallest,
therebycreatingat least a 3-waytie for largest).
Player3 takes the collectionof 5 pieces, perhapstrimmedin step 12,
selects (the largest)two, and trims,if he wants to, (the largest)one of
these (to the size of the smallest,thus creatingat least a 2-waytie for
largest).
Players4, 3, 2, and 1, in that order,choose a piece (that they consider
2The proof runs as follows:We are assumingthat both A and B have been partitionedinto r
pieces,and that B is not only smallerthan A but smallereven than A with the smallest7 pieces of A's
partitionremoved.Arrangethe sets in both partitionsfrom largestto smallestas A1, A2,. . ., Ar and
B1,B2,. . ., Br. Let ,u denote Player 1's measure, and suppose, for contradiction,that both of the
followinghold:
1. ,u(Br_2) 2 ,u(A3), which holds if A1, A2, and A3 are not all strictlylargerthan Br_2, Br_l,
and Br.
2. ,u(Br_2)2 ,u(Al)/3, which holds if Al cannot be partitionedinto 3 sets all largerthan Br_2,
Br_1, and BrIt followsfrom 1 that:
3. ,u(B7U *** U Br_3)2 ,u(A3 U *** UAr_7) since there are r - 9 sets in each union, and the
smallestone of the Bs is at least as largeas the largestone of the As.
It followsfrom 2 that:
4- y([B1 U B2 U B3] U [B4 U Bs U B6]) 2 ,u(Al u A2),
since each of the blocksof 3 Bs is largerthan each of the As.
But 3 and 4 clearlydemonstratethat:
5.y(B)2y(AlU
*--
UAr-7)
This is the desiredcontradictionsince the set on the rightis A with the smallest7 pieces of its partition
removed.
AN ENVY-FREE CAKE DIVISION PROTOCOL
16
[January
{1,2,3,4} x {1,2,3,4},
Step 15.
Aside.
Step 16.
Step 17.
Step 18.
Step 19.
Step 20.
Aside.
wants to minimize the amount of cake he or she receives. This and related
questions(e.g., the Pareto-optimalityof allocations)are discussedin [6].
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Department
of Politics
NewYorkUniversity
NewYork,NY10003
18
Department
of Mathematics
UnionCollege
Schenectady,
NY12308
[January