EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997]

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, and
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO,
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE,respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually
specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents
Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader
Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally mandated
so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third
reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it
with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21,
1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means,
proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was
first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.
Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.[1] Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but
his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation
he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November
21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5
and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the
question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the
report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next
week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep.
Arroyos interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall
immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C.
Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00
p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November
21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m.
of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also
obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four
versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word approved, which appears
on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996
the word no on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3)
the published version does not contain the sentence (Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise
the question of the quorum, which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this
point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit,
without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that
for purposes of this proceeding the word approved appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No.
7198 are in question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art.
VI, 16(3) that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently, violation of
the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De
Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the
rules of the House,[2] the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for
the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from
questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112, [3] the Chair deliberately ignored
Rep. Arroyos question, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? and did not repeat Rep. Albanos motion to approve
or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97,[4] the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead

proceeded to act on Rep. Albanos motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of
Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109, [5] the Chair suspended the session without first
ruling on Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued
that Rep. Arroyos query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28,
1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of
the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and
the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the
existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law
had been properly passed, considering the Courts power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave
abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[6] which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the
changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia
filed a supplemental comment. Respondents defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers
and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the
rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the
Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings,
enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional
requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all
events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as
well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were
faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false
and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is
barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and
21, 1996, shows that On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference
Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198.[7] This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone
objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.[8]
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of
R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for
the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only
that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that
each House may determine the rules of its proceedings [9] and that for this reason they are judicially
enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases,[10] the
constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings was invoked by
parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to
conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite
purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in
the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun,[11] it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body

adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by
a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[12] the rule was stated thus: The Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters
of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that
some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule
that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not
one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal.
In Crawford v. Gilchrist,[13] it was held: The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings
of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when
exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the
propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in
the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution.
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,[14] the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: The provision
for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of
judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United
States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules.
In State v. Savings Bank,[15] the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: The
Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all
powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are
the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House
has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of
the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House
has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure.
In McDonald v. State,[16] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: When it appears that an act was so
passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly
with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The
presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the
legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself, or the respective branches
thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline
to follow them.
Schweizer v. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma
provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature,
with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the
operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing
gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature
because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds
vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular
manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in accordance with its own rules, or
in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a
statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its

entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature
to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be
reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a
violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the
courts refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature,
and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis.
407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E. 641;
Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando,
commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject,
however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity
is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.[18]
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look
into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as
long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere
which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order
rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance
on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly
decline the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcions sponsorship in the
Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the
other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial
review.[19] Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the
jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and, therefore,
to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as
those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national
security,[20] it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of
foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Courts function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.[21]
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation
in which a branch of the government has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction so as to
call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was railroaded. They claim that Rep.
Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee
report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none,
approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . .
Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had
by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albanos motion for the approval
of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of
the Members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a
legislators nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as
this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a
viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in
which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has
basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which became the
Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and
Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was
answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr.
Tolentino said:
Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter
of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the
procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the
voting comes in.
....
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is now
on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with
the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying Is there
any objection? and nobody objects, then the Chair announces The bill is approved on second reading. If
there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance
here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how
many are in favor and how many are against.[22]
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate
and even more just.[23] The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present
any matter for judicial consideration. [24] In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court cannot
provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is
properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole
and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us
from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem.[25]
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a
House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, [26] at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, [27] and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
[28]
Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members
by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the
precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. [29] It would appear, however, that the
session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on
that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for
adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if
there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21,
1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four oclock
in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep.
Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting
the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyos question
as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyos question was not, in form or substance, a point
of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. [30] And even if Rep. Arroyos question were so, Rep.
Albanos motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration
of the question.[31]
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his
discretion. Indeed, the phrase grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has a
settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief
Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1
extends to cases where a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.[32]
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence
of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. [33] Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the
presence of a quorum.[34]
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on
November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo,
appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not
participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. [35] Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected
to the report[36] but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted,
Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report.[37]
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in
the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is
no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled

bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case[38] we went behind an enrolled bill and consulted the
Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the
presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to
determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had
not been obtained, because a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on
the courts.[39] This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if
old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings
of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them
a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary
to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not
to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities
with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.[40]
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained
provisions which had been surreptitiously inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have
no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted provisions
into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the
bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.[41]
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in
violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be
allowed. [42]
In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by
the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text
writers here and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.[45]
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases
and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say
that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an
open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and
Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since
been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus
simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of
the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which
became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the
Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals
have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as public memorials of the most permanent
character, thus: They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of
individuals. As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due
enactment has been duly proven.
___________________
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in
excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The
suggestion made in a case[48] may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment
of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the
Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his
capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of
Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR
LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER,
AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO,
MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO,
FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their
capacities as members of the Municipal Board,respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor
Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary and
Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act
4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further
Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as
Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives.
It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to
the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal
Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended
approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the
President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's
incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial
amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were
approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the
journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill
No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a
certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino
amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter
signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed.
The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16,
1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines,
who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic
Act No. 4065.

The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City
Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that
the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong
version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by
him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the
Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding
officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the
enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification
that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature
appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary
had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on
House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be
untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of
Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the
Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor
presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition
with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the
municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill
actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself
should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip, this
Court issued a restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from
exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under
the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until
further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila.
Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici
curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United States
Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the
"journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this Court
and elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil.
Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly
said that the question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment
to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had
been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo
F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not within the
province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled
bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being
that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly
certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the
Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy
of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of
Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil
Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided
for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or
of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such acts and of the due enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the
signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It
has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that
the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or
rejection. 4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved
after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities
are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the
statute invalid. 5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the
power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary 6 There is less reason to make the
attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the
presiding officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill
and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as conclusive
proof of its due enactment. 7 Another case however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill
was not conclusive evidence. 8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence
of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such
bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the
sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the
public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed
by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate,
and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty
of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to
coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that

assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent
departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all
billsauthenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is
absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and
other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a
number of decisions, 10although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the
attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not
require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following
provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays
on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the
Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its
passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate
enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the
question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's
due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, 11 is
neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid
and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect
than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in
logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect
already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the
Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same
"makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully
enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed both houses" will
satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by
the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation
at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would
remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or
absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry,
however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no
enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted?
In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it.
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other
errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill
No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a
risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This
We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their
signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President
of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and
bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065
entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE
CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The
temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA,
CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN
OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking
of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." [1] Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two,
it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:
"ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities;

WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic
services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security
providing agencies and other government instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A decentralized
Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby
established.
SEC. 2 Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up
the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by
the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and
Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance
System,
Administrator, Social Security System, Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
SEC. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC
and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.
SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall
serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC
Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the
standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective
systems.
SEC. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in coordination
with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall
undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on
the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.
SEC. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the
respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
SEC. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office
of the President, through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.
SEC. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and
Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS"
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January
23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:

"A.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF
THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B.
THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO.
308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM
WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION." [2]
Respondents counter-argue:
A.

THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;

B.
A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C.
THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D.

A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.[3]

We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to
sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our
Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the
issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.[4] As taxpayer and member of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds
and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.[5]
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules
of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as
infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal
defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. [6] Respondent
Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have
completed the guidelines for the national identification system. [7] All signals from the respondents show their
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass
judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing
is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a
fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges
that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and
liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws
and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be
allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another will be given
astricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." [8] The Constitution, as the will

of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines.[9] The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. [10] The
legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. [11] Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.[12] In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. [13]
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.[14] The
executive power is vested in the President. [15] It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer
the laws.[16] It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
[17]

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department.[18] He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has
the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere
with the discretion of its officials.[19] Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of
supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his
duties effectively.[20]
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. [21] It enables the President to fix a uniform standard
of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. [22] To this end, he can
issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders." [23]
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. [24] We reject the
argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of
1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional
and procedural principles of governance"[25] and "embodies changes in administrative structures and
procedures designed to serve the people."[26] The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with
Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of
Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on the
Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative
Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and administration of
departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as
well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers.
The Code covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and
recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials
on private individuals or parties outside government.[27]
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987.
It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies-- the primacy of national security, the
extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the
dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-avis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and
the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered
by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact
business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated
identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights

and enjoying his privileges.

no duty cannot stand.

Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes

Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation
and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established
approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: "x x x Many
regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must
be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the
general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative
regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
independent source of power to make laws."[28]
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot
pass constitutional
muster as an administrative legislation because
facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." [29] In the
1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,[30] the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the
right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of
privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments,
[31]
viz:
"Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees that
help give them life and substance x x x. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers `in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the `right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: `The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.'"
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc,[32] we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional
right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:
"xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense
on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons;
rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come
into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: 'The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one
of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the
public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector-- protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual--has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age --industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow
the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this
enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.'"
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution.[33] It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the
Bill of Rights:
"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:[34]

"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
x

x.

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
x

x.

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that
"[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of
another.[35] It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, [36] and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications.[37] The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer,
[38]
the revelation of trade and industrial secrets,[39] and trespass to dwelling.[40]Invasion of privacy is an
offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law,[41] the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act[42] and the
Intellectual Property Code.[43] The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the
privacy of certain information.[44]
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No.
308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling
enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to
privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a
mathematical analysis of biological data." [45] The term "biometrics" has now evolved into a broad
category of technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity through
the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. [46] A physiological
characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry
or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes
voice print, signature and keystroke.[47] Most biometric identification systems use a card or personal
identification number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the
individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. [48]
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip
and turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is
stored in computer data banks[49] and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This
technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided. [50] Another
method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern
of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print. [51] Another
biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique combination
of substances excreted from the skin of people. [52] The latest on the list of biometric achievements is

the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique
heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to
the individual's personal "heat signature."[53]
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now
science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an
individual. It is a new science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological
characteristics of an individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state
what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to
identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquet of options available to the
implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not
groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state
whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In
fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to
the "generation of population data for development planning." [54] This is an admission that the PRN will not
be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the
roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of
the individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed
as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime
he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the
government agency will necessarily be recorded-- whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file
of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns,
statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent
the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base
through the electronic linkage of the files. [55] The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes
a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to
resist.[56]
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and
other basic personal information about the individual. [57] Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O.
No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical
terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and
access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to
safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. [58] Well to note, the computer linkage
gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against
leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system
is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or
worse, manipulate the data stored within the system.[59]
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be
gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes.[60] The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[61] The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer
technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be
read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. [62] They threaten
the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.[63]
The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an
individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer
revolution.[64] The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of
information given at different times and for varied purposes. [65] It can continue adding to the stored data and
keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored data is simple. When information of a privileged
character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the subject.
[66]
Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its
danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a
laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it

would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that
could consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it
stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part
test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. [67] The factual circumstances of the case
determines the reasonableness of the expectation. [68]However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. [69] The
use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy.[70] As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. [71] The
measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes
more widely accepted.[72] The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical
inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No.
308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy,
regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect . Rules and
regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the IACC
virtually unfettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do our present laws provide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Commonwealth Act No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the
individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine.[73] Republic Act No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS
employment records and reports.[74] These laws, however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the
SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government agencies forming part of
the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its
enactment should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by
using the rational relationship test.[75]He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to
streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by
avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He concludes
that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the
end.[76]
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc,[77] we upheld the constitutionality of R.A.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in
compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of
income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.[78]
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an
administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices
were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308
may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly
drawn. And we now hold that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will
give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do
for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic
right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act
irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that
the law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the
1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent
authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in
danger the rights protected by the Constitution.
The case of Whalen v. Roe[79] cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United
States Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a
centralized computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant
to a doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substances Act of 1972 required physicians to
identify patients obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized
medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients can be recorded
in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were patients and
doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication because of their fear that the
computerized data may be readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may

stigmatize them as drug addicts.[80] The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected
zone of privacy, i.e, the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an
individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters is an aspect of the right to privacy, the statute
did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation. The Court found that the statute was
necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The
patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision
made upon recommendation by a specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings
on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards
against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the
gathering, storage and retrieval of the information. It enumerated who were authorized to access the data.
It also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these
safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police
power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se
against the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to
improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both government and
private industry seek. Many information systems in different countries make use of the computer to
facilitate important social objectives, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more
efficient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and
streamlining of financial activities.[81] Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good
administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and
make key decisions.[82] The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information technology. It developed
the internet,[83] introduced the concept of cyberspace [84]and the information superhighway where the
individual, armed only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of information
from libraries and databases connected to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be
narrowly focused[85] and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. [86] Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We
reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict
scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
"The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is
the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual-has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age-industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."[87]
IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The
threats emanate from various sources-- governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. [88] In the
case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it
will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to
compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the wellworded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an
unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping,
the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget." [89] Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we
should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement
that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.