LTD

G.R. No.
92013 July 25, 1990

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, Petitioner, vs. RAMON
GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization
Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as
Executive Secretary, Respondents.
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, Petitioner, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR.,
ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN
RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON
DEL ROSARIO, et al., as members of the
PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON
THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN
JAPAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayes for a writ of

mandamus to compel the respondents to
fully disclose to the public the basis of their
decision to push through with the sale of the
Roppongi property inspire of strong public
opposition and to explain the proceedings
which effectively prevent the participation
of Filipino citizens and entities in the
bidding process.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013,

Laurel v. Garcia, et al. were heard by the
Court on March 13, 1990. After G.R. No.
92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al.
was filed, the respondents were required to
file a comment by the Court's resolution
dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions
were consolidated on March 27, 1990 when
the memoranda of the parties in the Laurel
case were deliberated
upon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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These are two petitions for prohibition

seeking to enjoin respondents, their
representatives and agents from proceeding
with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179
square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on
February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer
for a temporary restraining order effective
February 20, 1990. One of the petitioners (in
The Court could not act on these cases

immediately because the respondents filed a
motion for an extension of thirty (30) days
to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed
by a second motion for an extension of
another thirty (30) days which we granted
on May 8, 1990, a third motion for extension
of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a
fourth motion for extension of time which
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.
we granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the

attention of the respondents to the length
of time the petitions have been pending.
After the comment was filed, the petitioner
in G.R. No. 92047 asked for thirty (30) days
to file a reply. We noted his motion and
resolved to decide the two (2)
cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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I chanrobles virtual law library
The subject property in this case is one of
the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by
the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement entered into with
Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots being:
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24
Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which
has an area of approximately 2,489.96
square meters, and is at present the site of
the Philippine Embassy Chancery;
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63
Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of around
764.72 square meters and categorized as a
commercial lot now being used as a
warehouse and parking lot for the consulate
staff; and chanrobles virtual law library
(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku,

Kobe, a residential lot which is now
vacant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The properties and the capital goods and
services procured from the Japanese
government for national development
projects are part of the indemnification to
the Filipino people for their losses in life and
property and their suffering during World
War II.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The Reparations Agreement provides that
reparations valued at $550 million would be
payable in twenty (20) years in accordance
with annual schedules of procurements to
be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
governments (Article 2, Reparations
Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the
Reparations Law, prescribes the national
policy on procurement and utilization of
reparations and development loans. The
procurements are divided into those for use
by the government sector and those for
private parties in projects as the then
National Economic Council shall determine.
Those intended for the private sector shall
be made available by sale to Filipino citizens
or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipinoowned entities in national development
projects.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Roppongi property was acquired from
the Japanese government under the Second
Year Schedule and listed under the heading
"Government Sector", through Reparations
Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The
Roppongi property consists of the land and
building "for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became
the site of the Philippine Embassy until the
latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July
22, 1976 when the Roppongi building
needed major repairs. Due to the failure of
our government to provide necessary funds,
the Roppongi property has remained
undeveloped since that
time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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A proposal was presented to President
Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine
Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to
make the property the subject of a lease
agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima
Corporation - which shall construct two (2)
buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in
Nampeidai and renovate the present
Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The
consideration of the construction would be
the lease to the foreign corporation of one
(1) of the buildings to be constructed in

Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in
Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi
shall then be used as the Philippine
Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease
period, all the three leased buildings shall
be occupied and used by the Philippine
government. No change of ownership or title
shall occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to
Comment) The Philippine government
retains the title all throughout the lease
period and thereafter. However, the
government has not acted favorably on this
proposal which is pending approval and
ratification between the parties. Instead, on
August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a
committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine
government properties in Tokyo and Kobe,
Japan through Administrative Order No. 3,
followed by Administrative Orders
Numbered 3-A, B, C and
D.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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On July 25, 1987, the President issued
Executive Order No. 296 entitling nonFilipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in
the event of sale, lease or disposition. The
four properties in Japan including the
Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the
first "Whereas"
clause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the

Executive branch of the government has
been pushing, with great vigor, its decision
to sell the reparations properties starting
with the Roppongi lot. The property has
twice been set for bidding at a minimum
floor price of $225 million. The first bidding
was a failure since only one bidder qualified.
The second one, after postponements, has
not yet materialized. The last scheduled
bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained
by his Court. Later, the rules on bidding
were changed such that the $225 million
floor price became merely a suggested floor
price.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the

following issues: chanrobles virtual law
library
The Court finds that each of the herein

petitions raises distinct issues. The
petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 objects to the
alienation of the Roppongi property to
anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No.
92047 adds as a principal objection the
alleged unjustified bias of the Philippine
government in favor of selling the property
to non-Filipino citizens and entities. These
petitions have been consolidated and are
resolved at the same time for the objective
is the same - to stop the sale of the
Roppongi
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others

of its kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government?; and chanrobles virtual law
library
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers
and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047,
apart from questioning the authority of the
government to alienate the Roppongi
property assails the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 296 in making the
property available for sale to non-Filipino
citizens and entities. He also questions the
bidding procedures of the Committee on the
Utilization or Disposition of Philippine
Government Properties in Japan for being
discriminatory against Filipino citizens and
Filipino-owned entities by denying them the
right to be informed about the bidding
requirements.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
IIchanrobles virtual law library

In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts
that the Roppongi property and the related
lots were acquired as part of the reparations
from the Japanese government for
diplomatic and consular use by the
Philippine government. Vice-President
Laurel states that the Roppongi property is
classified as one of public dominion, and not
of private ownership under Article 420 of
the Civil Code (See
infra).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The petitioner submits that the Roppongi
property comes under "property intended
for public service" in paragraph 2 of the
above provision. He states that being one of
public dominion, no ownership by any one
can attach to it, not even by the State. The
Roppongi and related properties were
acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic,
and consular quarters, buildings and other
improvements" (Second Year Reparations
Schedule). The petitioner states that they
continue to be intended for a necessary
service. They are held by the State in
anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3
Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be
appropriated, is outside the commerce of
man, or to put it in more simple terms, it
cannot be alienated nor be the subject
matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of

Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting
the non-use of the Roppongi property at the
moment, the petitioner avers that the same
remains property of public dominion so long
as the government has not used it for other
purposes nor adopted any measure
constituting a removal of its original
purpose or use.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The respondents, for their part, refute the
petitioner's contention by saying that the
subject property is not governed by our Civil
Code but by the laws of Japan where the
property is located. They rely upon the rule
of lex situs which is used in determining the
applicable law regarding the acquisition,
transfer and devolution of the title to a
property. They also invoke Opinion No. 21,
Series of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of
the Secretary of Justice which used the lex
situs in explaining the inapplicability of
Philippine law regarding a property situated
in Japan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The respondents add that even assuming for
the sake of argument that the Civil Code is
applicable, the Roppongi property has
ceased to become property of public
dominion. It has become patrimonial
property because it has not been used for
public service or for diplomatic purposes for

over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article
422, Civil Code) and because the intention
by the Executive Department and the
Congress to convert it to private use has
been manifested by overt acts, such as,
among others: (1) the transfer of the
Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the
issuance of administrative orders for the
possibility of alienating the four government
properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of
Executive Order No. 296; (4) the enactment
by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on
June 10, 1988 which contains a provision
stating that funds may be taken from the
sale of Philippine properties in foreign
countries; (5) the holding of the public
bidding of the Roppongi property but which
failed; (6) the deferment by the Senate in
Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future
date; thus an acknowledgment by the
Senate of the government's intention to
remove the Roppongi property from the
public service purpose; and (7) the
resolution of this Court dismissing the
petition in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et
al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin
the second bidding of the Roppongi property
scheduled on March 30,
1989.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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III chanrobles virtual law library

In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once
more asks this Court to rule on the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296.
He had earlier filed a petition in G.R. No.
87478 which the Court dismissed on August
1, 1989. He now avers that the executive
order contravenes the constitutional
mandate to conserve and develop the
national patrimony stated in the Preamble
of the 1987 Constitution. It also allegedly
violates: chanrobles virtual law library
(1) The reservation of the ownership and
acquisition of alienable lands of the public
domain to Filipino citizens. (Sections 2 and
3, Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and
23 of Commonwealth Act
141).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in
the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony (Section 10, Article VI,
Constitution); chanrobles virtual law library
(3) The protection given to Filipino
enterprises against unfair competition and
trade practices; chanrobles virtual law
library
(4) The guarantee of the right of the

people to information on all matters of
public concern (Section 7, Article III,
Constitution); chanrobles virtual law library
(5) The prohibition against the sale to nonFilipino citizens or entities not wholly owned
by Filipino citizens of capital goods received
by the Philippines under the Reparations Act
(Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789);
and chanrobles virtual law library
(6) The declaration of the state policy of
full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest (Section 28, Article
III, Constitution).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public
funds in the execution of an unconstitutional
executive order is a misapplication of public
funds He states that since the details of the
bidding for the Roppongi property were
never publicly disclosed until February 15,
1990 (or a few days before the scheduled
bidding), the bidding guidelines are
available only in Tokyo, and the
accomplishment of requirements and the
selection of qualified bidders should be done
in Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or
entities owned by them did not have the
chance to comply with Purchase Offer
Requirements on the Roppongi. Worse, the
Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum price

of $225 million from which price capital
gains tax under Japanese law of about 50 to
70% of the floor price would still be
deducted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
IVchanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners and respondents in both
cases do not dispute the fact that the
Roppongi site and the three related
properties were through reparations
agreements, that these were assigned to
the government sector and that the
Roppongi property itself was specifically
designated under the Reparations
Agreement to house the Philippine
Embassy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property
for public service is expressly spelled out. It
is dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract
of procurement which bind both the
Philippine government and the Japanese
government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There can be no doubt that it is of public
dominion unless it is convincingly shown
that the property has become patrimonial.
This, the respondents have failed to

do.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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As property of public dominion, the
Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is
a special collective ownership for general
use and enjoyment, an application to the
satisfaction of collective needs, and resides
in the social group. The purpose is not to
serve the State as a juridical person, but the
citizens; it is intended for the common and
public welfare and cannot be the object of
appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69;
cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II,
p. 26).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The applicable provisions of the Civil Code
are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public
dominion or of private
ownership.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ART. 420. The following things are property
of public dominion chanrobles virtual law
library
(1) Those intended for public use, such as

roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks
shores roadsteads, and others of similar
character; chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the
development of the national
wealth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ART. 421. All other property of the State,
which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified
under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil
Code as property belonging to the State and
intended for some public
service.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Has the intention of the government
regarding the use of the property been
changed because the lot has been Idle for
some years? Has it become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been
used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion

happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene
Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A
property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a
formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such
(Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335
[1960]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The respondents enumerate various
pronouncements by concerned public
officials insinuating a change of intention.
We emphasize, however, that an
abandonment of the intention to use the
Roppongi property for public service and to
make it patrimonial property under Article
422 of the Civil Code must be definite
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the
non-use alone specially if the non-use was
attributable not to the government's own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack
of financial support to repair and improve
the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v.
Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment
must be a certain and positive act based on
correct legal
premises.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrob
les virtual law library
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to

Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of
the Roppongi property's original purpose.
Even the failure by the government to repair
the building in Roppongi is not
abandonment since as earlier stated, there
simply was a shortage of government funds.
The recent Administrative Orders
authorizing a study of the status and
conditions of government properties in
Japan were merely directives for
investigation but did not in any way signify
a clear intention to dispose of the
properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Executive Order No. 296, though its title
declares an "authority to sell", does not
have a provision in its text expressly
authorizing the sale of the four properties
procured from Japan for the government
sector. The executive order does not declare
that the properties lost their public
character. It merely intends to make the
properties available to foreigners and not to
Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or
other disposition. It merely eliminates the
restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789 that
reparations goods may be sold only to
Filipino citizens and one hundred (100%)
percent Filipino-owned entities. The text of
Executive Order No. 296 provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No.

1789, as amended, and of other laws to the
contrary notwithstanding, the abovementioned properties can be made available
for sale, lease or any other manner of
disposition to non-Filipino citizens or to
entities owned by non-Filipino citizens.
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the
wrong premise or assumption that the
Roppongi and the three other properties
were earlier converted into alienable real
properties. As earlier stated, Rep. Act No.
1789 differentiates the procurements for the
government sector and the private sector
(Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only
the private sector properties can be sold to
end-users who must be Filipinos or entities
owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality
provision which was amended by Executive
Order No. 296.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the
CARP Law) which provides as one of the
sources of funds for its implementation, the
proceeds of the disposition of the properties
of the Government in foreign countries, did
not withdraw the Roppongi property from
being classified as one of public dominion
when it mentions Philippine properties
abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties
which are alienable and not to those
reserved for public use or service. Rep Act

No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the
Executive Department to sell the Roppongi
property. It merely enumerates possible
sources of future funding to augment (as
and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund
created under Executive Order No. 299.
Obviously any property outside of the
commerce of man cannot be tapped as a
source of funds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The respondents try to get around the
public dominion character of the Roppongi
property by insisting that Japanese law and
not our Civil Code should
apply.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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It is exceedingly strange why our top
government officials, of all people, should
be the ones to insist that in the sale of
extremely valuable government property,
Japanese law and not Philippine law should
prevail. The Japanese law - its coverage and
effects, when enacted, and exceptions to its
provision - is not presented to the Court It is
simply asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or
Japanese law should apply without stating
what that law provides. It is a ed on faith
that Japanese law would allow the
sale.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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We see no reason why a conflict of law rule

should apply when no conflict of law
situation exists. A conflict of law situation
arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over
the title or ownership of an immovable, such
that the capacity to take and transfer
immovables, the formalities of conveyance,
the essential validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a
conveyance, are to be determined (See
Salonga, Private International Law, 1981
ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on
land ownership and its conveyance is
asserted to conflict with a domestic law on
the same matters. Hence, the need to
determine which law should
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In the instant case, none of the above

elements exists.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The assertion that the opinion of the

Secretary of Justice sheds light on the
relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced.
The opinion does not tackle the alienability
of the real properties procured through
reparations nor the existence in what body
of the authority to sell them. In discussing
who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
Secretary merely explains that it is the
foreign law which should determine who can
acquire the properties so that the
constitutional limitation on acquisition of
lands of the public domain to Filipino
citizens and entities wholly owned by
Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in
belaboring whether or not this opinion is
correct. Why should we discuss who can
acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no
showing that it can be sold? chanrobles
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The issues are not concerned with validity of

ownership or title. There is no question that
the property belongs to the Philippines. The
issue is the authority of the respondent
officials to validly dispose of property
belonging to the State. And the validity of
the procedures adopted to effect its sale.
This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule
of lex situs does not
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988

by President Aquino of the recommendation
by the investigating committee to sell the
Roppongi property was premature or, at the
very least, conditioned on a valid change in
the public character of the Roppongi
property. Moreover, the approval does not
have the force and effect of law since the
President already lost her legislative
powers. The Congress had already convened

for more than a
year.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Assuming for the sake of argument,
however, that the Roppongi property is no
longer of public dominion, there is another
obstacle to its sale by the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 provides
Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts
to which the Government is a party. - In
cases in which the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines is a party to any
deed or other instrument conveying the title
to real estate or to any other property the
value of which is in excess of one hundred
thousand pesos, the respective Department
Secretary shall prepare the necessary
papers which, together with the proper
recommendations, shall be submitted to the
Congress of the Philippines for approval by
the same. Such deed, instrument, or
contract shall be executed and signed by the
President of the Philippines on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines unless the
Government of the Philippines unless the
authority therefor be expressly vested by

law in another officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement has been retained in
Section 48, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real
Property. - Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law to be
conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be
executed in behalf of the government by the
following: chanrobles virtual law library
(1) For property belonging to and titled in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
by the President, unless the authority
therefor is expressly vested by law in
another officer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(2) For property belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines but titled in the name of
any political subdivision or of any corporate
agency or instrumentality, by the executive
head of the agency or instrumentality.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is not for the President to convey valuable
real property of the government on his or
her own sole will. Any such conveyance must
be authorized and approved by a law
enacted by the Congress. It requires
executive and legislative

concurrence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June
8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale
of the Roppongi property does not withdraw
the property from public domain much less
authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it
is not a formal declaration abandoning the
public character of the Roppongi property.
In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations is conducting hearings on Senate
Resolution No. 734 which raises serious
policy considerations and calls for a factfinding investigation of the circumstances
behind the decision to sell the Philippine
government properties in
Japan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v.
Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not
pass upon the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents'
assertion, we did not uphold the authority of
the President to sell the Roppongi property.
The Court stated that the constitutionality
of the executive order was not the real issue
and that resolving the constitutional
question was "neither necessary nor finally
determinative of the case." The Court noted
that "[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions
is the use of the proceeds of the disposition

of the Roppongi property." In emphasizing
that "the decision of the Executive to
dispose of the Roppongi property to finance
the CARP ... cannot be questioned" in view
of Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the
Court did not acknowledge the fact that the
property became alienable nor did it
indicate that the President was authorized
to dispose of the Roppongi property. The
resolution should be read to mean that in
case the Roppongi property is re-classified
to be patrimonial and alienable by authority
of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used
for national economic development projects
including the
CARP.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not
materialize. The petitions before us question
the proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi
property. We are resolving the issues raised
in these petitions, not the issues raised in
1989.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Having declared a need for a law or formal
declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
property from public domain to make it
alienable and a need for legislative
authority to allow the sale of the property,
we see no compelling reason to tackle the
constitutional issues raised by petitioner

Ojeda.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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The Court does not ordinarily pass upon
constitutional questions unless these
questions are properly raised in appropriate
cases and their resolution is necessary for
the determination of the case (People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not
pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record if
the case can be disposed of on some other
ground such as the application of a statute
or general law (Siler v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909],
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496
[1941]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble
s virtual law library
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why
the Roppongi property should not be sold:
The Roppongi property is not just like any
piece of property. It was given to the Filipino
people in reparation for the lives and blood
of Filipinos who died and suffered during the
Japanese military occupation, for the
suffering of widows and orphans who lost
their loved ones and kindred, for the homes
and other properties lost by countless
Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo
properties are a monument to the bravery

and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the
face of an invader; like the monuments of
Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we
do not expect economic or financial benefits
from them. But who would think of selling
these monuments? Filipino honor and
national dignity dictate that we keep our
properties in Japan as memorials to the
countless Filipinos who died and suffered.
Even if we should become paupers we
should not think of selling them. For it would
be as if we sold the lives and blood and
tears of our countrymen. (Rollo- G.R. No.
92013, p.147)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:
Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one
ceded by the Japanese government in
atonement for its past belligerence for the
valiant sacrifice of life and limb and for
deaths, physical dislocation and economic
devastation the whole Filipino people
endured in World War
II.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
It is for what it stands for, and for what it
could never bring back to life, that its
significance today remains undimmed,
inspire of the lapse of 45 years since the war
ended, inspire of the passage of 32 years
since the property passed on to the

Philippine
government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Roppongi is a reminder that cannot - should
not - be dissipated ... (Rollo-92047, p. 9)
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property
is valuable not so much because of the
inflated prices fetched by real property in
Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic
value to all Filipinos - veterans and civilians
alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and
related properties will eventually be sold is
a policy determination where both the
President and Congress must concur.
Considering the properties' importance and
value, the laws on conversion and
disposition of property of public dominion
must be faithfully
followed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of
prohibition is issued enjoining the
respondents from proceeding with the sale
of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan.
The February 20, 1990 Temporary
Restraining Order is made
PERMANENT.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, GrioAquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pea

& Marcos for Respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the
legal classification of mangrove swamps, or
manglares, as they are commonly known. If
they are part of our public forest lands, they
are not alienable under the Constitution. If
they are considered public agricultural
lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondents claim
to the land in question must be judged by
these criteria.
[G.R. No. L-32266. February 27, 1989.]

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Petitioner, v.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, Respondent.
The Solicitor General for Petitioner.
The said land consists of 178,113 square

meters of mangrove swamps located in the
municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto
Villareal applied for its registration on
January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land for more than forty
years. He was opposed by several persons,
including the petitioner on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the
application was approved by the Court of
First Instance of Capiz. 1 The decision was

affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The
Director of Forestry then came to this Court
in a petition for review on certiorari claiming
that the land in dispute was forestal in
nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration
be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both
the petitioner and the private respondent
agree that the land is mangrove land. There
is no dispute as to this. The bone of
contention between the parties is the legal
nature of mangrove swamps or manglares.
The petitioner claims, it is forestal and
therefore not disposable and the private
respondent insists it is alienable as
agricultural land. The issue before us is
legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we
have to go back to the Philippine Bill of
1902, one of the earlier American organic
acts in the country. By this law, lands of the
public domain in the Philippine Islands were
classified into three grand divisions, to wit,
agricultural, mineral and timber or forest
lands. This classification was maintained in
the Constitution of the Commonwealth,
promulgated in 1935, until it was
superseded by the Constitution of 1973.
That new charter expanded the classification
of public lands to include industrial or

commercial, residential, resettlement, and
grazing lands and even permitted the
legislature to provide for other categories. 3
This provision has been reproduced, but
with substantial modifications, in the
present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution,
which was the charter in force when this
case arose, only agricultural lands were
allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition
was provided for under C.A No. 141. Mineral
and timber or forest lands were not subject
to private ownership unless they were first
reclassified as agricultural lands and so
released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular
Government, 6 promulgated in 1909,
mangrove swamps or manglares were
defined by the Court
as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . mud flats, alternately washed and
exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except
when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their
seeds, which also germinate there. These
constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics,
which exist naturally, but which are also, to
some extent cultivated by man for the sake
of the combustible wood of the mangrove

and like trees as well as for the useful nipa
palm propagated thereon. Although these
flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of
the opinion that they cannot be so regarded
in the sense in which that term is used in
the cases cited or in general American
jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them
are not available for purpose of navigation,
and they may be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what
remains.
x
"Under this uncertain and somewhat

unsatisfactory condition of the law, the
custom had grown of converting manglares
and nipa lands into fisheries which became a
common feature of settlement along the
coast and at the same time of the change of
sovereignty constituted one of the most
productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested
interests and prove a public disaster."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Mangrove swamps were thus considered
agricultural lands and so susceptible of
private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature

categorically declared, despite the abovecited case, that mangrove swamps form part
of the public forests of this country. This it
did in the Administrative Code of 1917,
which became effective on October 1 of that
year, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 1820. Words and phrase defined.
For the purpose of this chapter public
forest includes, except as otherwise
specially indicated, all unreserved public
land, including nipa and mangrove swamps,
and all forest reserves of whatever
character."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is noteworthy, though, that
notwithstanding this definition, the Court
maintained the doctrine in the Montano case
when two years later it held in the case of
Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
". . . the words timber land are always
translated in the Spanish translation of that
Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos
forestales. We think there is an error in this
translation and that a better translation
would be terrenos madereros. Timber land
in English means land with trees growing on
it. The manglar plant would never be cited a
tree in English but a bush, and land which
has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants
growing on it cannot be called timber land.
The fact that there are a few trees growing

in a manglare or nipa swamps does not
change the general character of the land
from manglare to timber land."cralaw
virtua1aw library
More to the point, addressing itself directly
to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court
declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the case of Mapa v. Insular Government
(10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the
phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
"Whatever may have been the meaning of
the term forestry under the Spanish law,
the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902,
classifies the public lands in the Philippine
Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural
lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries
or ordinary farm lands.
"The definition of forestry as including
manglares found in the Administrative Code
of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested

prior to its enactment.
"These lands being neither timber nor
mineral lands, the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they
are agricultural lands, then the rights of
appellants are fully established by Act No.
926."cralaw virtua1aw library
The doctrine was reiterated still later in
Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8
promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than
fifteen years after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand
declared for a unanimous
Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The opposition rests mainly upon the
proposition that the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as
shown in his opponents Exh. I, but we think
this opposition of the Director of Forestry is
untenable, inasmuch as it has been
definitely decided that mangrove lands are
not forest lands in the sense in which this
phrase is used in the Act of
Congress."cralaw virtua1aw library
No elaboration was made on this conclusion
which was merely based on the cases of
Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above
ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director
of Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando

declaring that the mangrove lands in litis
were agricultural in nature. The decision
even quoted with approval the statement of
the trial court that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Mangrove swamps where only trees of
mangrove species grow, where the trees are
small and sparse, fit only for firewood
purposes and the trees growing are not of
commercial value as lumber do not convert
the land into public land. Such lands are not
forest in character. They do not form part of
the public domain."cralaw virtua1aw library
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10
the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa
case that "all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries
or ordinary farm lands."cralaw virtua1aw
library
But the problem is not all that simple. As it
happens, there is also a line of decisions
holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983,
the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries
has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamplands
or mangrove lands forming part of the

public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest lands."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry, 13 the Court was more
positive when it held, again through Justice
Gutierrez:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that
Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest
land because it is not thickly forested but is
a mangrove swamps. Although conceding
that a mangrove swamp is included in the
classification of forest land in accordance
with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue
that no big trees classified in Section 1821
of the said Code as first, second and third
groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885,
even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still
subject to land registration proceeding
because the property had been in actual
possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already
private land better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes and not required by the public
interests to be kept under forest
classification."cralaw virtua1aw library
"The petition is without merit.

"A forested area classified as forest land of
the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers.Forested lands do not have
to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing
in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as forest is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply."cralaw virtua1aw library
The view was maintained in Vallarta v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this
Court agreed with the Solicitor Generals
submission that the land in dispute, which
he described as "swamp mangrove or
forestal land," were not private properties
and so not registerable. This case was
decided only twelve days after the De

Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions,
the Court feels there is a need for a
categorical pronouncement that should
resolve once and for all the question of
whether mangrove swamps are agricultural
lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a
function initially belonging to the
legislature, which has the authority to
implement the constitutional provision
classifying the lands of the public domain
(and is now even permitted to provide for
more categories of public lands). The
legislature having made such
implementation, the executive officials may
then, in the discharge of their own role,
administer our public lands pursuant to their
constitutional duty "to ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed" and in accordance
with the policy prescribed. For their part the
courts will step into the picture if the rules
laid down by the legislature are challenged
or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed
that they are not being correctly observed
by the executive. Thus do the three
departments, coordinating with each other,
pursue and achieve the objectives of the
Constitution in the conservation and
utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly

delegated to the President of the Philippines
the function of making periodic
classifications of public lands,
thus:chanrobles law library
Sec. 6.
The President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
(a)
Alienable or disposable,
(b)
Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and

in a like manner transfer such lands from
one class to another, for the purposes of
their administration and disposition."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"Sec. 7.
For the purposes of the
administration and disposition of alienable
or disposable lands, the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this
Act.
With particular regard to alienable public

lands, Section 9 of the same law
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For the purpose of their administration and
disposition, the lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition shall be
classified, according to the use or purposes
to which such lands are destined, as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a)
Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or

for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other
similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for
public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time make the
classifications provided for in this section,
and may, at any time and in a similar
manner, transfer lands from one class to
another."cralaw virtua1aw library
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised
Administrative Code states as
follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"Sec. 1826.
Regulation setting apart
forest reserves Revocation of same.
Upon the recommendation of the Director of
Forestry, with the approval of the
Department Head, the President of the
Philippines may set apart forest reserves
from the public lands and he shall by
proclamation declare the establishment of
such reserves and the boundaries thereof,
and thereafter such forest reserves shall not
be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of,
but shall remain as such for forest uses, and
shall be administered in the same manner as
public forest.
"The President of the Philippines may in like
manner by proclamation alter or modify the
boundaries of any forest reserve from time
to time, or revoke any such proclamation,
and upon such revocation such forest
reserve shall be and become part of the
public lands as though such proclamation
had never been made.
"Sec. 1827.
Assignment of forest land
for agricultural purposes. Lands in public
forest, not including forest reserves, upon
the certification of the Director of Forestry
that said lands are better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes and not required by the public
interests to be kept under forest, shall be
declared by the Department Head to be

agricultural lands."cralaw virtua1aw library
With these principles in mind, we reach the
following conclusion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be
understood as comprised within the public
forests of the Philippines as defined in the
aforecited Section 1820 of the
Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature
having so determined, we have no authority
to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect
veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion.
The statutory definition remains unchanged
to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted
and invoked by the executive department.
More importantly, the said provision has not
been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic
or unconstitutional, assuming the requisite
conditions, to justify our judicial
intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus
presumed valid and so must be respected.
We repeat our statement in the Amunategui
case that the classification of mangrove
swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. That determination having been
made and no cogent argument having been
raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges
but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in

question as pertaining to our agricultural
lands should be understood as covering only
those lands over which ownership had
already vested before the Administrative
Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands
could not be retroactively legislated as
forest lands because this would be violative
of a duly acquired property right protected
by the due process clause. So we ruled
again only two months ago in Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 15 where
the possession of the land in dispute
commenced as early as 1909, before it was
much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under
contention being admittedly a part of the
mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which
a minor forest license had in fact been
issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920
to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It
could therefore not be the subject of the
adverse possession and consequent
ownership claimed by the private
respondent in support of his application for
registration. To be so, it had first to be
released as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land pursuant to the
certification the Director of Forestry may
issue under Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey

plan of the mangrove swamps approved by
the Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the
land is registerable. It should be plain,
however, that the mere existence of such a
plan would not have the effect of converting
the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into
agricultural land. Such approval is
ineffectual because it is clearly inofficious.
The Director of Lands was not authorized to
act in the premises. Under the aforecited
law, it is the Director of Forestry who has
the authority to determine whether forest
land is more valuable for agricultural rather
than forestry uses, as a basis for its
declaration as agricultural land and release
for private
ownership.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus we held in the Yngson
case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is elementary in the law governing the
disposition of lands of the public domain
that until timber or forest lands are released
as disposable and alienable neither the
Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries
has authority to lease, grant, sell or
otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for
grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases
and other modes of utilization.
"The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction

to administer and dispose of swamplands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public
domain while such lands are still classified
as forest land or timber land and not
released for fishery or other
purposes."cralaw virtua1aw library
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta
case, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is elementary in the law governing
natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not
registerable. The adverse possession which
can be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has
been declared alienable and disposable.
Possession of forest land, no matter how
long cannot convert it into private
property."cralaw virtua1aw library
We find in fact that even if the land in
dispute were agricultural in nature, the
proof the private respondent offers of
prescriptive possession thereof is
remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no
convincing evidence of the existence of the
informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by
the original transferor of the property, let
alone the fact that the conditions for

acquiring title thereunder have been
satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that
the informacion posesoria has been
inscribed or registered in the registry of
property and that the land has been under
the actual and adverse possession of the
private respondent for twenty years as
required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17
These matters are not presumed but must
be established with definite proof, which is
lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by
the private respondent were practically the
only basis used by the appellate court in
sustaining his claim of possession over the
land in question. Tax declarations are, of
course, not sufficient to prove possession
and much less vest ownership in favor of the
declarant, as we have held in countless
cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private
respondent has not established his right to
the registration of the subject land in his
name. Accordingly, the petition must be
granted.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
It is reiterated for emphasis that,
conformably to the legislative definition
embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, which remains
unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or

manglares form part of the public forests of
the Philippines. As such, they are not
alienable under the Constitution and may
not be the subject of private ownership until
and unless they are first released as forest
land and classified as alienable agricultural
land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is
DISMISSED, with cost against him. This
decision is immediately executory.
cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or

errors of its officials or agents. (Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and
Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 [1983])
2. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST
LAND; CAN NOT BE SUBJECT TO
REGISTRATION. Considering that the
subject parcel of land is forest land, the
patent and original certificate of title
covering the subject parcel issued to Rama
did not confer any validity to his possession
or claim of ownership. (Sunbeam
Convenience Foods, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
181 SCRA 443 [1990] and other cases cited)
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 69138. May 19, 1992.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of
Forest Development), Petitioner, v.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil
Cases Division) and HILARIO P.
RAMA,Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL;
STATE NOT SUBJECT THERETO. The State
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TITLES ISSUED THERETO,

VOID AB INITIO. The titles are void ab
initio. (Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry, 126 SCRA 69 [1983]; Republic v.
Animas, 56 SCRA 499 [1974]) The titles
issued cannot ripen into private ownership.
(Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA
1183 [1968]; Heirs of Amunategui v. Director
of Forestry, supra; Vallarta v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SQUATTERS POSSESSION
THEREOF, NOT IN GOOD FAITH; CASE AT BAR
DIFFERENT FROM DIZON CASE. In effect,
Ramas possession of the parcel from the
beginning was fraudulent and illegal. He
was merely a squatter on the parcel. Under
these circumstances, we cannot see any

reason why Rama should be considered a
possessor in good faith as defined in Article
526 of the Civil Code. In the Dizon v.
Rodriguez, 13 SCRA 704 [1965], however,
the occupants of the parcels of land which
were adjudged as part of the seashore or
foreshore area and part of the public domain
bought the land from Alfonso and Jacobo
Zobel relying on the original certificate of
title covering the parcels. This intervening
event constitutes the difference between
the Dizon case and the present case. Dizon,
Et. Al. buyers of the foreshore lands were
protected by the principle that an innocent
buyer of a registered land may rely on the
torrens title of the seller.
5. ID.; LAND REGISTRATION ACT; BUYER,
ORDINARILY, NOT OBLIGATED TO LOOK
BEYOND THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. In the
absence of anything to excite suspicion, the
buyer is not obligated to look beyond the
certificate to investigate the title of the
sellers appearing on the face of the
certificate. (Philippine National Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 735 [1990];
Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
157 SCRA 587 [1988]; Philippine National
Cooperative Bank v. Carandang-Villalon, 139
SCRA 570 [1985]); Penullar v. Philippine
National Bank, 120 SCRA 171 [1983])
6. ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND;

GOOD FAITH NEGATED WHERE CLAIMANT
PURSUED THE TITLING OF THE LAND IN HIS
NAME. Respondent Rama was the one who
secured a certificate from the office of the
District Forester, Tagbilaran City as regards
the status of the parcel of land with his
representations that "he had a plan of the
land." It appears, therefore, that it was
through the representations of Rama that
the land was titled in his name. Some
months later, however, or on November 7,
1967, the Office of the District Forester
suspected that the parcel of land thus titled
was forest land. Why this angle was not
pursued is not shown in the records. It,
however, negates the good faith of Rama
who actively pursued the titling of the
parcel in his name.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIMANTPOSSESSOR NOT ENTITLED TO NECESSARY
EXPENSES WITH RIGHT OF RETENTION.
Good faith which entitled the possessors to
necessary expenses with right of retention
until reimbursement was explained in the
Dizon case, (supra). The appellate courts
ruling as regards the unregistered parcel of
land which is to the effect that Rama is also
entitled to necessary expenses with right of
retention until reimbursed of the necessary
expenses must be reversed. His title over
the forest land is null and void for the same
reasons. There are no special circumstances

which would warrant the application of the
Dizon case.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The decision of the trial court in this case
declared the disputed parcels of land to be
forest land and, therefore, inalienable. The
appellate court sustained the factual
finding. The issue raised in this petition
refers to the propriety of awarding
necessary expenses to the alleged
possessor in good faith with right of
retention until the expenses are paid.
In May 1974, Anselmo Logronio, in his
official capacity as officer-in-charge of the
Bohol Reforestation Project of the Bureau of
Forest Development, bulldozed portions of
two (2) parcels of land which he believed to
be forest lands located at Talibon, Bohol,
occupied the same, and planted mulberry
and other trees.
Soon thereafter, respondent Hilario P. Rama
commenced in the then Court of First
Instance, now Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
a complaint for recovery of possession,

ownership and damages against Logronio
alleging that he is the absolute owner and
possessor of the two (2) parcels of land
occupied by Logronio. He specifically
described the two (2) parcels of land as
A. A parcel of land, Lot 1, Psu-218360
beginning at a point marked "1" of Lot 1,
Psu 218360, being N. 41-39 E., 15391.24 m.
from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Municipality of Carmen,
Province of Bohol, thence N. 47-35 W.,
163.40 m. to point 2; S. 67-59 W., 173.82 m.
to point 3; N.5-17 E 7 250.71 m to point 4; S.
7133 E., 168.51 m. to point 5; S. 8211 E ,
107.55 m to point 6; S. 0-45 W , 228.32 m. to
point 1; point of beginning . . . containing an
area of FIFTY ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED AND TWENTY SIX (51,226) square
meters . . . evidenced by Original Certificate
of Title No. 6148 (Free Patent No. 319750)
Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Bohol . . . also covered by Tax
Dec. No. R-3859 in the name of Plaintiff . . .
assessed at P990.00 . . ..chanrobles
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chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
B. A parcel of land (as shown on plant H154932, LRC Rec. No.), situated in the Barrio
of Malitbog, Municipality of Trinidad,
Province of Bohol. Bounded on the H., (sic)
along lines 1-2-3 by the property of Rufino

Autida (H-166571), on the E , along lines 45-6-7 by Creek; on the S., along lines 7-8-910, by the Marinao Creek 4.00 m. wide; on
the W., along line 10-11 by Public Land
(Forest Zone), and on the N., along lines 1112-1 by the property of Angel Jumawan . . .
containing an area of Ninety Six Thousand
Three Hundred Forty Three (96,343) square
meters . . . covered by Tax Dec. No. R-4019
in the name of Plaintiff . . . with an assessed
value of P1,390.00 . . .
x
(Record on Appeal, pp. 54-56)

In his answer, Logronio claimed that the two
parcels of land are forest lands and that the
questioned acts were performed by him in
the regular and lawful performance of his
duties as officer-in-charge of the Bohol
Reforestation Project of the Bureau of
Forest Development. He prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner Republic filed a motion for leave
to intervene attaching its complaint-inintervention.
The complaint-in-intervention alleged that
Logronio s acts were authorized by the
government through the Director of the

Bureau of Forest Development in connection
with the reforestation program of the
government; that the two (2) subject parcels
of land are located within the timberland
Block D, L. C. Project No. 33 of Talibon,
Bohol per BF Map L. C. 686 and, therefore,
are forest lands; that the said lands were
never released by the government as
alienable and disposable lands, hence, are
not susceptible of disposition or private
appropriation under the provisions of the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 41),
as amended, nor were the said parcels of
land registered under the provisions of the
Land Registration Law (Act No. 496), as
amended. It prayed that Free Patent No.
319750 covering the forest portion of the
first lot be declared null and void; that the
Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel OCT
No. 6148 covering the said forest portion;
that both forest lands be reverted back to
the public domain; and that the complaint
against Logronio be dismissed.chanrobles
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The motion was granted and the complaintin-intervention was admitted by the lower
court.
Rama, then, filed an answer to the
complaint-in-intervention alleging that the
Republic has no cause of action, and is
guilty of estoppel for having caused the

issuance of the certificate of title covering
the forest land. He claimed that if his title is
to be canceled, and he is deprived of
ownership over the parcels of land, he
should be paid by the Republic for all
existing improvements plus whatever
expenses he has incurred in connection with
the improvement of said lands.
The trial of the case resulted in the
following undisputed facts stated in the
decision of the lower court:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x
"1. On parcel A in the complaint. The

evidence discloses that Lot 1, Psu-218360,
as described in the complaint, and
containing an area of 51,226 square meters,
is one of the two lots covered by OCT No.
6148 (Free Patent Title No. 319750) in the
name of Hilario Piscos Rama (Exhs. A and A1) and is, according to the plaintiff, free
from any liens or encumbrances.
Thus, plaintiff Hilario P. Rama, 42 testified
that of the two parcels of land mentioned in
the complaint, one parcel was covered by
title, as shown by a xerox copy of OCT No.
6148 (Exhs. A and A-1), and by tax
declaration No. R-3859 (Exh. B); that he

secured a certification from the Office of the
District Forester, Tagbilaran City, regarding
the status of the land covered by OCT 6148
(Exh. C); that he had a plan of the land
covered by OCT No. 6148 (Exh. D); that in
the memorandum of encumbrances on OCT
No. 6148 (Exh. A-1), Entry No. 3382 referred
to a real estate mortgage executed on 23
November 1967 by Hilario Piscos Rama and
Socorro Regaon in favor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines, but
the obligation was already paid, and there
was a written release of the mortgage in
1975, which was not yet registered because
when he went to the Registry of Deeds
payment was required for registering the
release and he did not have money at that
time.
As shown in OCT No. 6148 (Exh. A), the free
patent title was given on 13 January 1967,
and the certificate of title was issued on 4
May 1967. Then on 7 November 1967, the
Office of the District Forester, Tagbilaran
City, issued Certification No. 57 (Exh. C) to
the effect that according to the records of
this Office, there is no pending case as far
as the Bureau of Forestry is concerned,
involving the validity of the title over a
parcel of land containing an area of 10.2450
hectares covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 6148 (Free Patent No. 319750
situated in barrio of Malitbog, Municipality

of Dagohoy, Province of Bohol issued by the
Register of Deeds of Tagbilaran City on
January 13, 1967 in the name of Hilario
Piscos Rama, Filipino, of legal age, married
to Socorro Rigaon and resident in Malitbog,
Dagohoy, Bohol.
Meantime, on 11 September 1967, Hipolito
Amihan, Forester in Charge of the Bohol
Reforestation Project, Dagohoy, Bohol,
addressed a letter to the Administrator,
Reforestation Administration, Diliman,
Quezon City, thru the Regional Officer, Cebu
City, (Exh. 8), stating that relative to OCT
No. 6148 in the name of Hilario Piscos Rama
chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Upon verification of the area in question it
is found out that Lot I in an area of 51,226
sq. m. is within the area of Bohol
Reforestation Project, Dagohoy, Bohol. . .
and recommending that Lot No. 1 under
PSU-218360 with an area of 51,226 sq. m.
under Free Patent No. 318750 issued in
favor of Mr. Hilario Piscos Rama be
canceled.
On 29 October 1974, Lope D. Reyes,
Assistant OIC, Legal Staff, Bureau of Forest
Development, Diliman, Quezon City, sent a
memorandum to the OIC Silviculture Division
(Exh. 1), requesting that OCT No. 6148

issued in favor of Hilario Piscos Rama be
verified as to whether or not the area is
inside a timberland or alienable or
disposable land. And on 22 November 1974,
Primo P. Andres, Officer in Charge,
Silviculture Division, Bureau of Forest
Development, Diliman, Quezon City,
returned by first indorsement (Exh. 2) the
aforesaid memorandum with the information
that per verification and control
1. Lot 1, PSU-218360 is within the
Timberland Block-A of LC Project No. 33 of
Talibon, Bohol, per BF Map LC-685, and;
2. Lot 2, PSU-218360, is within the Alienable
or Disposable Block-I, of LC Project 33 of
Talibon, Bohol, certified as such on
September 7, 1927, per BF Map LC-685.
And the Commissioners Report (Exh. ACommissioner) finds that
On Lot 1, Psu-218360 and (sic) approximate
area of 45,826 sq. m. colored green on the
sketch is inside the Timberland and 5,400
sq. m. more or less is in the Alienable and
Disposable Area.
And the Commissioner, Emmanuel Maboloc,
38, Junior Geodetic Engineer, Bureau of
Forest Development, Region VII, Cebu City,
testified to this effect, stating, however, that

he did not make technical descriptions of
the portion of the lot within the Bohol
Reforestation Project and the portion
outside it, so that, if required, he would
have to go to the field again to make such
technical descriptions." (Record on Appeal,
pp. 61-65).
x
"2. On parcel B in the complaint. . . ..

The land is covered by TD No. R-4019 in the
name of plaintiff Hilario Piscos Rama (Exh.
F) and was surveyed for the Heirs of German
Remarata in 1952, as shown by the technical
description (Exh. G) and plan H-154932 (Exh.
H). But the land is not covered by any
certificate of title.
On 12 March 1968, the Office of the District
Forester, Tagbilaran City, issued Certification
No. 90 (Exh. I) to the effect that the parcel
of land containing an approximate area of
9.6345 hectares situated in Barrio Malitbog,
Municipality of Dagohoy, Province of Bohol,
described in the Tax Declaration proposed in
the name of German Remarata, a resident of
Bo. Malitbog, Dagohoy, Bohol was verified
by a representative of this Office and was
found to be within the Alienable and
Disposable Block "1", Land Classification

Project No. 33, Talibon, Bohol, L C. Map No.
685, certified on September 7, 1927. And on
4 March 1970, the Office of the District
Forester, City of Tagbilaran, thru Acting
District Forester Pastor O. Ibarra, issued
Certification No. 101 (Exh. J), which is
similarly worded as Certification No. 90
(Exh. I), except that the proposed tax
declaration is in the name of HILARIO
PISCOS RAMA.
But on 15 May 1974, the Office of the
District Forester, City of Tagbilaran, thru
District Forester Pastor O. Ibarra, sent a
letter to Hilario P. Rama (Exh. 4) informing
him that CERTIFICATION NO. 101, issued to
you on March 4, 1970, by the District
Forester of Tagbilaran City, is hereby
revoked on the ground that after thorough
(sic) investigation by representative of this
Office the parcel of land which you claim and
the subject matter in the above-mentioned
CERTIFICATION NO. 101, is found to be
within the Bohol Reforestation Project. And
on the same date, a letter to the same effect
was sent by District Forester Ibarra to the
Provincial Assessor, City of Tagbilaran (Exh.
5).
The Commissioners Report (Exh. ACommissioner) inter alia states:chanrob1es
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It was found out that on lot H-154932 an

approximate area of 94,719 Sq. M. is inside
Timberland block A, Project No. 33 a part of
Bohol Reforestation Project (colored green
on the sketch plan) and only approximately
1,624 Sq. M. is inside the Alienable and
Disposable area colored orange on the
sketch plan.
Likewise, Commissioner Maboloc declared
that he did not make technical descriptions
of the portion of said lot within the Bohol
Reforestation Project and the portion
outside it." (Record on Appeal, pp 66-68)
In view of its findings that the two (2)
subject parcels of land are forest lands, the
lower court declared as null and void the
Certificate of Title covering the first lot in
the name of Rama and ordered him to
vacate the said parcel "upon being
reimbursed by the intervenor in the sum of
SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as
necessary expenses" As regards the second
parcel of land, the lower court ordered Rama
to vacate the same parcel of land "with right
to refund from the intervenor for the
necessary expenses in the sum of THREE
THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000 00), but without
rights of retention." The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,

as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Relative to Lot 1, Psu-218360, (parcel A in
the complaint): declaring that portion
thereof indicated in the Commissioners
Report (Exh. A-Commissioner) as having an
approximate area of 45,836 Sq. M. and
shown on the sketch (Exh. B-Commissioner)
as timberland and therefore part of the
public domain (colored green, Parcel B in
said sketch); declaring null and void Original
Certificate of Title No. 6148 in the name of
HILARIO PISCOS RAMA insofar as it includes
the aforesaid portion, and ordering the
plaintiff to vacate said portion upon being
reimbursed by the intervenor in the sum of
SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as
necessary expenses;
2. Relative to the parcel of land shown on
plan H-154932 (parcel B in the complaint):
declaring that the portion thereof indicated
in the Commissioners Report (Exh. ACommissioner) as having an approximate
area of 94,719 Sq. M. and shown on the
sketch (Exh. B-Commissioner) as timberland
and therefore part of the public domain
(colored green, Parcel A in said sketch);
declaring null and void Tax Declaration No.
R-4019 (Exh. F) insofar as it includes the
aforesaid portion; and ordering the plaintiff
to vacate said portion, with right to refund
from the intervenor for the necessary

expenses in the sum of THREE THOUSAND
PESOS (P3,000.00), but without right of
retention;
3. Dismissing the complaint as against
defendant Anselmo Logroo, both in his
private and in his official capacity;
4. Dismissing defendant Logroos
counterclaim; and
5. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Bohol to annotate this judgment
relative to Lot 1, Psu-218360 at the back of
Original Certificate of Title No. 6148.
Without pronouncement of costs." (Record
on Appeal, pp. 77-79).
Petitioner Republic appealed the lower
courts decision to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
insofar as it ordered petitioner Republic to
pay Rama the necessary expenses with the
right of retention over the titled parcel of
land.
The appellate court, however, did not only
affirm the questioned decision, but modified
it by ruling that as regards the second
parcel which is not covered by any
certificate of title, Rama has also the right
of retention until the necessary expenses

awarded to him are paid by petitioner
Republic.
A motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
In a resolution dated March 27, 1985, the
Court gave due course to the petition.
Because of the reorganization of the Court
after the 1986 political upheaval and
subsequent changes caused by retirement
of certain Justices, the case could not be
decided until its recent assignment to the
undersigned ponente.
On May 15, 1989, we issued another
resolution stating
therein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Considering the length of time that this
case has remained pending and as a
practical measure to ease the backlog of
this Court, the parties shall, within ten (10)
days from notice, MANIFEST whether or not
they are still interested in prosecuting this
case, or supervening events have transpired
which render this case moot and academic
or otherwise substantially affect the same."
(Rollo, p. 70)
In response to this resolution, the Solicitor
General, representing petitioner Republic,
filed on August 4, 1989, a manifestation

stating that he is not aware of any
supervening event that may have transpired
which would render the case moot and
academic.
As stated earlier, the only issue in this
petition is the propriety of awarding
over the two (2) parcels of land in favor of
the possessor in this case, Rama, until the
payment of the necessary expenses by
petitioner Republic on the ground that Rama
is a possessor in good faith as defined in
Article 526 of the Civil Code.
In ruling that private respondent Rama, the
possessor of the two forest lands is entitled
to payment of necessary expenses, the
appellate court cited the case of Dizon v.
Rodriguez (13 SCRA 704 [1965]).
The background facts of the Dizon case are
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Hacienda Calatagan owned by Alfonso and
Jacobo Zobel was originally covered by TCT
No. T-722. In 1938, the Hacienda constructed
a pier, called Santiago Landing, about 600
meters long from the shore into the
navigable waters of the Pagaspas Bay, to be
used by vessels loading sugar produced by
the Hacienda sugar mill. When the sugar
mill ceased its operation in 1948, the

owners of the Hacienda converted the pier
into a fishpond dike and built additional
strong dikes enclosing an area of about 30
hectares (of the Bay) and converted the
same into a fishpond. The Hacienda owners
also enclosed a similar area of about 37
hectares of the Bay on the other side of the
pier which was also converted into a
fishpond.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In 1949, the Zobels ordered the subdivision
of the Hacienda by ordering the preparation
of the subdivision plan Psd-27941 wherein
fishpond No. 1 (with 30 hectares) was
referred to as Lot No. 1 and fishpond No. 2
(with 37 hectares) was referred to as Lot No.
49. The plan was approved by the Director
of Lands, and the Register of Deeds issued,
from TCT No. T-722, TCT No. 2739 for lots 49
and 1 in the name of Jacobo Zobel.
In 1950, Jacobo Zobel sold to Antonino
Dizon, Et. Al. Lot 49 for which said
purchasers obtained at first TCT No T-2740
and later T-4718, Lot 1, on the other hand,
was purchased by Carlos Goco, Et Al., who in
turn, sold one-half thereof to Manuel SyJuco, Et. Al. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
4159 was issued in the names of the Gocos
and Sy-Jucos. On May 24, 1952, Miguel
Tolentino filed with the Bureau of Fisheries
an application for ordinary fishpond permit
or lease for Lot 49, and an application for a

similar permit, for Lot 1, was filed by his
daughter Clemencia Tolentino.
with the Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources. This time, the same was
dismissed for being filed out of time.
The Dizons, Sy-Jucos, and Gocos filed a

protest with the Bureau of Fisheries,
claiming the properties to be private land
covered by a certificate of title. This protest
was dismissed by the Director of Fisheries,
on the ground that the areas applied for are
outside the boundaries of TCT No T-722 of
Hacienda Calatagan. This ruling was based
upon the findings of the committee created
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to look into the matter, that Lots
1 and 49 are not originally included within
the boundaries of the hacienda.
On August 16, 1956, the Dizons filed Civil

Case 135 and the Sy-Jucos and Gocos, Civil
Case 136, in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, to quiet their titles over Lots 49
and 1. Named defendants were the
Resources and applicants Tolentinos The
Republic of the Philippines was allowed to
intervene in view of the finding by the
investigating committee created by the
respondent Secretary, that the lots were
part of the foreshore area before their
conversion into fishponds by the haciendaowners.
On October 1, 1954, the protestants Dizons,

Sy-Jucos, and Gocos, filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Civ. Case
No 24237) to restrain the Director of
Fisheries from issuing the fishpond permits
applied for by the Tolentinos. The court
dismissed this petition for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedy, it appearing that
petitioners had not appealed from the
decision of the Director of Fisheries to the
Resources. On appeal to this Court, the
decision of the lower court was sustained
(G. R. No. L-8654, promulgated April 28,
1956). The protestants then filed an appeal
On January 30, 1958, after due hearing, the

Court of First Instance of Batangas
promulgated a joint decision making the
finding, among others, that the subdivision
plan Psd-27941 was Prepared in disregard of
the technical description stated in TCT No. T722, because the surveyor merely followed
the existing shoreline and placed his
monuments on the southwest lateral of Lot
49, which was the pier abutting into the sea;
and made the conclusion that Lots 1 and 49
of Psd-27941 were part of the foreshore
lands. As the certificate of title obtained by
petitioners covered lands not subject to
registration, the same were declared null

and void, and Lots 1 and 49 were declared
properties of the public domain. Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
"In its decision of October 31, 1961, as well
as the resolution of August 20, 1962, the
appellate court adopted the findings of the
lower court, that the lots in question are
part of the foreshore area and affirmed the
ruling canceling the titles to plaintiffs.
Although in the decision of October 31,
1961, the Court of Appeals awarded to
applicants Tolentinos damages in the
amount of P200.00 per hectare from October
1, 1954, when plaintiffs were notified of the
denial of their protest by the Director of
Fisheries, such award was eliminated in the
resolution of August 20, 1962, for reason
that plaintiffs, who relied on the efficacy of
their certificates of title, cannot be
considered possessors in bad faith until
after the legality of their said titles has been
finally determined. Appellant were thus
declared entitled to retention of the
properties until they are reimbursed by the
landowner, the Republic of the Philippines,
of the necessary expenses made on the
lands, in the sums of P40,000.00 (for Lot 49)
and P25,000.00 (for Lot 1). It is from this
portion of the decision as thus modified that
defendants Tolentinos and the intervenor
Republic of the Philippines appealed (in G.
R. Nos. L-20355-56), claiming that plaintiffs

possession became in bad faith when their
protest against the application for lease was
denied by the Director of Fisheries. In
addition, the intervenor contends that being
such possessors in bad faith plaintiffs are
not entitled to reimbursement of the
expenses made on the properties." (at pp.
705-708; Emphasis supplied).
The appellate courts decision was appealed
to us by both the Republic and the Dizons,
Et. Al. We dismissed both appeals.
A comparative study of the present case and
the Dizon case shows different
circumstances which make the Dizon case
not applicable to the instant case.
In the present case, the parcel of land titled
in the name of Hilario P. Rama is covered by
an original torrens title issued in Ramas
name on May 4, 1967. Earlier, he applied for
the issuance of title based on a patent which
was given on January 13, 1967. The fact that
he applied for a patent title shows a
recognition on his part that the parcel is
part of the public domain. True, government
officials caused the issuance of the patent
title and the original torrens title covering
the land in Ramas name. However, the wellentrenched principle is that the State
cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors of its officials or agents. (Republic v.

Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and
Republic v. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 [1983]).
Considering that the subject parcel of land is
forest land, the patent and original
certificate of title covering the subject
parcel issued to Rama did not confer any
validity to his possession or claim of
ownership. (Sunbeam Convenience Foods,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 443
[1990]; Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 151 SCRA 679 [1987]; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480 [1987];
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 156
[1985]).
The titles are void ab initio. (Heirs of
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 126
SCRA 69 [1983]; Republic v. Animas, 56
SCRA 499 [1974]) The titles issued cannot
ripen into private ownership. (Director of
Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968];
Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,
supra; Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra) In effect, Rama s possession of
the parcel from the beginning was
fraudulent and illegal. He was merely a
squatter on the parcel. Under these
circumstances, we cannot see any reason
why Rama should be considered a possessor
in good faith as defined in Article 526 of the
Civil Code.cralawnad
In the Dizon case, however, the occupants of

the parcels of land which were adjudged as
part of the seashore or foreshore area and
part of the public domain bought the land
from Alfonso and Jacobo Zobel relying on
the original certificate of title covering the
parcels. This intervening event constitutes
the difference between the Dizon case and
the present case. Dizon, Et. Al. buyers of the
foreshore lands were protected by the
principle that an innocent buyer of a
registered land may rely on the torrens title
of the seller. In the absence of anything to
excite suspicion, the buyer is not obligated
to look beyond the certificate to investigate
the title of the sellers appearing on the face
of the certificate. (Philippine National Bank
v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 735 [1990];
Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
157 SCRA 587 [1988]; Philippine National
Cooperative Bank v. Carandang-Villalon, 139
SCRA 570 [1985]); Penullar v. Philippine
National Bank, 120 SCRA 171 [1983]).
Another distinction between the two (2)
cases is in the degree of participation of the
parties and the public officials in the titling
of the subject parcels of land. In the present
case, respondent Rama was the one who
secured a certificate from the office of the
District Forester, Tagbilaran City as regards
the status of the parcel of land with his
representations that "he had a plan of the

land." It appears, therefore, that it was
through the representations of Rama that
the land was titled in his name. Some
months later, however, or on November 7,
1967, the Office of the District Forester
suspected that the parcel of land thus titled
was forest land. Why this angle was not
pursued is not shown in the records. It,
however, negates the good faith of Rama
who actively pursued the titling of the
parcel in his name.
Such reconciliation can only be achieved by

holding that the possessor with a Torrens
Title is not aware of any flaw in his Title
which invalidates it until his Torrens Title is
declared null and void by final judgment of
the Courts.
Good faith which entitles the possessors to

until reimbursement was explained in the
Dizon case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Art. 526. . . .
"On the matter of possession of plaintiffsappellants, the ruling of the Court of

Appeals must be upheld. There is no
showing that plaintiffs are not purchasers in
good faith and for value. As such titleholders, they have reason to rely on the
indefeasible character of their certificates.
"On the issue of good faith of the plaintiffs,
the Court of Appeals reasoned
out:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The concept of possessors in good faith
given in Art. 526 of the Civil Code and when
said possession loses this Character under
Art. 528, needs to be reconciled with the
doctrine of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
Even if the doctrine of indefeasibility of a

Torrens Title were not thus reconciled, the
result would be the same, considering the
third paragraph of Art. 526 which provides
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult

question of law may be the basis of good
faith.
The legal question whether plaintiffsappellants possession in good faith, under
their Torrens Titles acquired in good faith,
does not lose this character except in the
case and from the moment their Titles are
declared null and void by the Courts, is a
difficult one. Even the members of this Court
were for a long time divided, two to one, on
the answer. It was only after several
sessions, where the results of exhaustive
researches on both sides were thoroughly
discussed, that an undivided Court finally
found the answer given in the next
preceding paragraph. Hence, even if it be
assumed for the sake of argument that the

Supreme Court would find that the law is not
as we have stated it in the next preceding
paragraph and that the plaintiffs-appellants
made a mistake in relying thereon, such
mistake on a difficult question of law may be
the basis of good faith. Hence, their
possession in good faith does not lose this
character except in the case and from the
moment their Torrens Titles are declared
null and void by the Courts.
Under the circumstances of the case,
especially where the subdivision plan was
originally approved by the Director of Lands,
we are not ready to conclude that the above
reasoning of the Court of Appeals on this
point is a reversible error. Needless to state,
as such occupants in good faith, plaintiffs
have the right to the retention of the
property until they are reimbursed the
necessary expenses made on the lands.
With respect to the contention of the
Republic of the Philippines that the order for
the reimbursement by it of such necessary
expenses constitutes a judgment against
the government in a suit not consented to
by it, suffice it to say that the Republic, on
its own initiative, asked and was permitted
to intervene in the case and thereby
submitted itself voluntarily to the
jurisdiction of the court." (at pp. 709-
710; Emphasis supplied)

With the foregoing findings, the appellate
courts ruling as regards the unregistered
parcel of land which is to the effect that
Rama is also entitled to necessary expenses
with right of retention until reimbursed of
the necessary expenses must be reversed.
His title over the forest land is null and void
for the same reasons. There are no special
circumstances which would warrant the
application of the Dizon case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
questioned decision and resolution of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now
Court of Appeals, are SET ASIDE in so far as
they ordered petitioner Republic to pay
private respondent Hilario P. Rama the
necessary expenses incurred by him, with
right of retention over the two (2) parcels of
land adjudged as forest lands until
reimbursed of the necessary expenses. The
decision of the then Court of First Instance
of Bohol (now Regional Trial Court of Bohol)
in Civil Case No. 2613 is MODIFIED in that
the portion of the decision which ordered
petitioner Republic to pay private
respondent Hilario P. Rama necessary
expenses with right of retention in parcel
number one described in the complaint is
DELETED. In all other respects, the
questioned decision and resolution are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ.,
concur.
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 24, 2006
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
- versus -
CELESTINA NAGUIAT,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 134209
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
Before the Court is this petition for review

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Decision[1] dated May
29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court at Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration
Case No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the
factual backdrop, as follows:
This is an application for registration of title
to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan,
Botolan, Zambales, more particularly
described in the amended application filed

by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989
with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales,
Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent]
alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of
the said parcels of land having acquired
them by purchase from the LID Corporation
which likewise acquired the same from
Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and
Fausto Monje and their predecessors-ininterest who have been in possession
thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and
that to the best of her knowledge, said lots
suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of
whatever kind nor is there any person
having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the
Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an
opposition to the application on the ground
that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in
question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto;
that the muniments of title and tax payment
receipts of applicant do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for
or of his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof
in the concept of (an) owner; that the
applicants claim of ownership in fee simple

on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed of . . .; and that the
parcels of land applied for are part of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued
an order of general default as against the
whole world, with the exception of the Office
of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with
the hearing of this registration case.
After she had presented and formally
offered her evidence . . . applicant rested
her case. The Solicitor General, thru the
Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no
objection to the admission of the exhibits.
Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest
(sic) that the Government had no evidence
to adduce. [3]
In a decision[4] dated September 30, 1991,

the trial court rendered judgment for herein
respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating
unto her the parcels of land in question and
decreeing the registration thereof in her
name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this

Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land
situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales,
appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing
an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing
on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of
15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square
meters to herein applicant Celestina T.
Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident
of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all
the improvements existing thereon and
orders and decrees registration in her name
in accordance with Act No. 496,
Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141]
as amended, and Presidential Decree No.
1529. This adjudication, however, is subject
to the various easements/reservations
provided for under pertinent laws,
presidential decrees and/or presidential
letters of instructions which should be
annotated/ projected on the title to be
issued. And once this decision becomes
final, let the corresponding decree of
registration be immediately issued. (Words
in bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having
been denied by the trial court, petitioner
Republic went on appeal to the CA in CAG.R. CV No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the

herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998,
affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republics present recourse on its
basic submission that the CAs decision is not
in accordance with law, jurisprudence and
the evidence, since respondent has not
established with the required evidence her
title in fee simple or imperfect title in
respect of the subject lots which would
warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529
or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141. In particular,
petitioner Republic faults the appellate
court on its finding respecting the length of
respondents occupation of the property
subject of her application for registration
and for not considering the fact that she has
not established that the lands in question
have been declassified from forest or timber
zone to alienable and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless
declassified and released by positive act of
the Government so that they may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, are not capable of private
appropriation.[5] As to these assets, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do

not apply.[6] Given this postulate, the
principal issue to be addressed turns on the
question of whether or not the areas in
question have ceased to have the status of
forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain.
Forests, in the context of both the Public
Land Act[7] and the Constitution[8]
classifying lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands
and national parks, do not necessarily refer
to a large tract of wooded land or an
expanse covered by dense growth of trees
and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of
Amunategui [9]A forested area classified as forest land of
the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or
settlers have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. xxx.
The classification is merely descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the

Constitution,[10] which embodies the
Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land.[11]
All lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion presumptively belong to
the State.[12] Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released
as alienable agricultural land or alienated to
a private person by the State remain part of
the inalienable public domain.[13] Under
Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the
prerogative of classifying or reclassifying
lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest
or mineral to agricultural and vice versa,
belongs to the Executive Branch of the
government and not the court.[14] Needless
to stress, the onus to overturn, by
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption
that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable or disposable rests
with the applicant.[15]
In the present case, the CA assumed that
the lands in question are already alienable
and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:
The theory of [petitioner] that the
properties in question are lands of the
public domain cannot be sustained as it is
directly against the above doctrine. Said
doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle
established in the earlier cases . . . that
open, exclusive and undisputed possession

of alienable public land for period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period, ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to
be public land and becomes private property
. (Word in bracket and underscoring added.)
The principal reason for the appellate courts
disposition, finding a registerable title for
respondent, is her and her predecessor-ininterests open, continuous and exclusive
occupation of the subject property for more
than 30 years. Prescinding from its above
assumption and finding, the appellate court
went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)[16]
and Herico vs. DAR,[17] among other cases,
that, upon the completion of the requisite
period of possession, the lands in question
cease to be public land and become private
property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other
cases cited by the CA are not, however,
winning cards for the respondent, for the
simple reason that, in said cases, the
disposable and alienable nature of the land
sought to be registered was established, or,
at least, not put in issue. And there lies the
difference.
Here, respondent never presented the

required certification from the proper
government agency or official proclamation
reclassifying the land applied for as
alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. It calls for proof.[18] Aside from
tax receipts, respondent submitted in
evidence the survey map and technical
descriptions of the lands, which, needless to
state, provided no information respecting
the classification of the property. As the
Court has held, however, these documents
are not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain.
[19]
It cannot be overemphasized that
unwarranted appropriation of public lands
has been a notorious practice resorted to in
land registration cases.[20] For this reason,
the Court has made it a point to stress,
when appropriate, that declassification of
forest and mineral lands, as the case may
be, and their conversion into alienable and
disposable lands need an express and
positive act from the government.[21]
The foregoing considered, the issue of
whether or not respondent and her
predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive and continuous possession of the
parcels of land in question is now of little

moment. For, unclassified land, as here,
cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession; occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.[22]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED and the assailed decision dated
May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents application
for original registration of title in Land
Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional
Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is
DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133250. May 6, 2003.]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC

ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL
BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
motions for reconsideration.chanrob1es

virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
To recall, the Courts decision of July 9, 2002
("Decision" for brevity) on the instant. case
states in its summary:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
CARPIO, J.:
We can now summarize our conclusions as

For resolution of the Court are the following

motions: (1) Motion to Inhibit and for ReDeliberation filed by respondent Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation
("Amari" for brevity) on September 13,
2002; (2) Motion to Set Case for Hearing on
Oral Argument filed by Amari on August 20,
2002; (3) Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Amari on July 26, 2002 and August
20, 2002, respectively; (4) Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplement to Motion
for Reconsideration filed by respondent
Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity)
on July 26, 2002 and August 8, 2002,
respectively; and (5) Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Clarification filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General on July 25,
2002. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez filed on
November 13, 2002 his Consolidated
Opposition to the main and supplemental
1.
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name
of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands
to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until
classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands
qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural

resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the

public domain.
3.
Since the Amended JVA seeks to
transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly

Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is
contrary to law," or whose "object is outside
the commerce of men," are "inexistent and
void from the beginning." The Court must
perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the
Amended JVA null and void ab
initio.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
4.
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to
transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila
Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary
to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim
these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands
as alienable or disposable, and further
declare them no longer needed for public
service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain to
AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from
Amari seeks the inhibition of Justice Antonio

T. Carpio, ponente of the Decision, on the
ground that Justice Carpio, before his
appointment to the Court, wrote in his
Manila Times column of July 1, 1997, "I have
always maintained that the law requires the
public bidding of reclamation projects."
Justice Carpio, then a private law
practitioner, also stated in the same column,
"The Amari-PEA reclamation contract is
legally flawed because it was not bid out by
the PEA." Amari claims that because of
these statements Justice Carpio should
inhibit himself "on the grounds of bias and
prejudgment" and that the instant case
should be "re-deliberated" after being
assigned to a new ponente.
The motion to inhibit Justice Carpio must be

denied for three reasons. First, the motion
to inhibit came after Justice Carpio had
already rendered his opinion on the merits
of the case. The rule is that a motion to
inhibit must be denied if filed after a
member of the Court had already given an
opinion on the merits of the case, 1 the
rationale being that "a litigant cannot be
permitted to speculate upon the action of
the Court . . . (only to) raise an objection of
this sort after a decision has been
rendered." Second, as can be readily
gleaned from the summary of the Decision
quoted above, the absence of public bidding
is not one of the ratio decidendi of the
Decision which is anchored on violation of
specific provisions of the Constitution. The
absence of public bidding was not raised as
an issue by the parties. The absence of
public bidding was mentioned in the
Decision only to complete the discussion on
the law affecting reclamation contracts for
the guidance of public officials. At any rate,
the Office of the Solicitor General in its
Motion for Reconsideration concedes that
the absence of public bidding in the
disposition of the Freedom Islands rendered
the Amended JVA null and void. 2 Third,
judges and justices are not disqualified from
participating in a case just because they
have written legal articles on the law
involved in the case. As stated by the Court

in Republic v. Cocofed, 3
The mere fact that, as a former columnist,
Justice Carpio has written on the coconut
levy will not disqualify him, in the same
manner that jurists will not be disqualified
just because they may have given their
opinions as textbook writers on the question
involved in a case.
Besides, the subject and title of the column
in question was "The CCP reclamation
project" and the column referred to the
Amari-PEA contract only in passing in one
sentence.
Amaris motion to set the case for oral
argument must also be denied since the
pleadings of the parties have discussed
exhaustively the issues involved in the case.
The motions for reconsideration reiterate
mainly the arguments already discussed in
the Decision. We shall consider in this
Resolution only the new arguments raised
by respondents.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
In its Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration, Amari argues that the
Decision should be made to apply
prospectively, not retroactively to cover the
Amended JVA. Amari argues that the

existence of a statute or executive order
prior to its being adjudged void is an
operative fact to which legal consequences
are attached, citing De Agbayani v. PNB, 4
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . .. It does not admit of doubt that prior to
the declaration of nullity such challenged
legislative or executive act must have been
in force and had to be complied with. This is
so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties
may have acted under it and may have
changed their positions. What could be more
fitting than that in a subsequent litigation
regard be had to what has been done while
such legislative or executive act was in
operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine
that prior to its being nullified, its existence
as a fact must be reckoned with. This is
merely to reflect awareness that precisely
because the judiciary is the governmental
organ which has the final say on whether or
not a legislative or executive measure is
valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of
nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there
be no recognition of what had transpired

prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme
Court decision: "The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects, with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official." This
language has been quoted with approval in
a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the
decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v.
Flores. . . ..
x
. . . That before the decision they were not

constitutionally infirm was admitted
expressly. There is all the more reason then
to yield assent to the now prevailing
principle that the existence of a statute or
executive order prior to its being adjudged
void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached.
Amari now claims that "assuming arguendo

that Presidential Decree Nos. 1084 and
1085, and Executive Order Nos. 525 and 654
are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution,
the limitation imposed by the Decision on
these decrees and executive orders should
only be applied prospectively from the
finality of the Decision." chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
Amari likewise asserts that a new doctrine
of the Court cannot operate retroactively if
it impairs vested rights. Amari maintains
that the new doctrine embodied in the
Decision cannot apply retroactively on those
who relied on the old doctrine in good faith,
citing Spouses Benzonan v. Court of
Appeals, 5 thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence
interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as
amended was that enunciated in Monge and
Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan
and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound
by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8
of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." But while our decisions form
part of the law of the land, they are also
subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which
provides that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided." This

is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex
prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward
not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually
divests rights that have already become
vested or impairs the obligations of contract
and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v.
Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]).
The same consideration underlies our
rulings giving only prospective effect to
decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus,
we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA
607 [1974]." . . when a doctrine of this Court
is overruled and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof.
There may be special cases where weighty
considerations of equity and social justice
will warrant a retroactive application of
doctrine to temper the harshness of
statutory law as it applies to poor farmers or
their widows and orphans. In the present
petitions, however, we find no such
equitable considerations. Not only did the
private respondent apply for free
agricultural land when he did not need it
and he had no intentions of applying it to
the noble purposes behind the law, he would

now repurchase for only P327,995.00, the
property purchased by the petitioners in
good faith for P1,650,000.00 in 1979 and
which, because of improvements and the
appreciating value of land must be worth
more than that amount now.
The buyers in good faith from DBP had a
right to rely on our rulings in Monge and
Tupas when they purchased the property
from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13) years ago.
Under the rulings in these two cases, the
period to repurchase the disputed lot given
to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982.
He failed to exercise his right. His lost right
cannot be revived by relying on the 1988
case of Belisario. The right of petitioners
over the subject lot had already become
vested as of that time and cannot be
impaired by the retroactive application of
the Belisario ruling.
Amaris reliance on De Agbayani and
Spouses Benzonan is misplaced. These cases
would apply if the prevailing law or doctrine
at the time of the signing of the Amended
JVA was that a private corporation could
acquire alienable lands of the public domain,
and the Decision annulled the law or
reversed this doctrine. Obviously, this is not
the case here.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Under the 1935 Constitution, private

corporations were allowed to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. But
since the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, private corporations were
banned from holding, except by lease,
alienable lands of the public domain. The
1987 Constitution continued this
constitutional prohibition. The prevailing
law before, during and after the signing of
the Amended JVA is that private
corporations cannot hold, except by lease,
Decision has not annulled or in any way
changed the law on this matter. The
Decision, whether made retroactive or not,
does not change the law since the Decision
merely reiterates the law that prevailed
since the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. Thus, De Agbayani, which
refers to a law that is invalidated by a
decision of the Court, has no application to
the instant case.
Likewise, Spouses Benzonan is inapplicable
because it refers to a doctrine of the Court
that is overruled by a subsequent decision
which adopts a new doctrine. In the instant
case, there is no previous doctrine that is
overruled by the Decision. Since the case of
Manila Electric Company v. Judge CastroBartolome, 6 decided on June 29, 1982, the
Court has applied consistently the

constitutional provision that private
corporations cannot hold, except by lease,
Court reiterated this in numerous cases, and
the only dispute in the application of this
constitutional provision is whether the land
in question had already become private
property before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. 7 If the land was already
private land before the 1973 Constitution
because the corporation had possessed it
openly, continuously, exclusively and
adversely for at least thirty years since June
12, 1945 or earlier, then the corporation
could apply for judicial confirmation of its
imperfect title. But if the land remained
public land upon the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, then the corporation could
never hold, except by lease, such public
land. Indisputably, the Decision does not
overrule any previous doctrine of the Court.
The prevailing doctrine before, during and
after the signing of the Amended JVA is that
private corporations cannot hold, except by
lease, alienable lands of the public domain.
This is one of the two main reasons why the
Decision annulled the Amended JVA. The
other main reason is that submerged areas
of Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are
inalienable and beyond the commerce of
man, a doctrine that has remained
immutable since the Spanish Law on Waters

of 1886. Clearly, the Decision merely
reiterates, and does not overrule, any
existing judicial doctrine.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
Even on the characterization of foreshore
lands reclaimed by the government, the
Decision does not overrule existing law or
doctrine. Since the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine in this jurisdiction, the sea and its
foreshore areas have always been part of
the public domain. And since the enactment
of Act No. 1654 on May 18, 1907 until the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
statutory law never allowed foreshore lands
reclaimed by the government to be sold to
private corporations. The 1973 and 1987
Constitution enshrined and expanded the
ban to include any alienable land of the
public domain.
There are, of course, decisions of the Court
which, while recognizing a violation of the
law or Constitution, hold that the sale or
transfer of the land may no longer be
invalidated because of "weighty
considerations of equity and social justice."
8 The invalidation of the sale or transfer
may also be superfluous if the purpose of
the statutory or constitutional ban has been
achieved. But none of these cases apply to
Amari.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that

where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien
who later sells the land to a Filipino, the
invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by
the subsequent sale to a citizen. 9 Similarly,
where the alien who buys the land
subsequently acquires Philippine
citizenship, the sale is validated since the
purpose of the constitutional ban to limit
land ownership to Filipinos has been
achieved. 10 In short, the law disregards the
constitutional disqualification of the buyer
to hold land if the land is subsequently
transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer
himself becomes a qualified party. In the
instant case, however, Amari has not
transferred the Freedom Islands, or any
portion of it, to any qualified party. In fact,
Amari admits that title to the Freedom
Islands still remains with PEA. 11
The Court has also ruled consistently that a
sale or transfer of the land may no longer be
questioned under the principle of res
judicata, provided the requisites for res
judicata are present. 12 Under this principle,
the courts and the parties are bound by a
prior final decision, otherwise there will be
no end to litigation. As the Court declared in
Toledo-Banaga v. Court of Appeals, 13 "once
a judgment has become final and executory,
it can no longer be disturbed no matter how
erroneous it may be." In the instant case,

there is no prior final decision adjudicating
the Freedom Islands to Amari.
There are, moreover, special circumstances
that disqualify Amari from invoking equity
principles. Amari cannot claim good faith
because even before Amari signed the
Amended JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner
had already filed the instant case on April
27, 1998 questioning precisely the
qualification of Amari to acquire the
Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of
this petition, two Senate Committees 14 had
already approved on September 16, 1997
Senate Committee Report No. 560. This
Report concluded, after a well-publicized
investigation into PEAS sale of the Freedom
Islands, to Amari, that the Freedom Islands
are inalienable lands of the public domain.
Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA
knowing and assuming all the attendant
risks, including the annulment of the
Amended JVA.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Amari has also not paid to PEA the full
reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in
reclaiming the Freedom Islands. Amari
states that it has paid PEA only
P300,000,000.00 15 out of the
P1,894,129,200.00 total reimbursement cost
agreed upon in the Amended JVA. Moreover,
Amari does not claim to have even initiated

the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas covered in the Amended
JVA, or to have started to construct any
permanent infrastructure on the Freedom
Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to
have introduced any physical improvement
or development on the reclamation project
that is the subject of the Amended JVA. And
yet Amari claims that it had already spent a
"whopping P9,876,108,638.00" as its total
development cost as of June 30, 2002. 16
Amari does not explain how it spent the rest
of the P9,876,108,638.00 total project cost
after paying PEA P300,000,000.00. Certainly,
Amari cannot claim to be an innocent
purchaser in good faith and for value.
In its Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration, PEA claims that it is
"similarly situated" as the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA) which under
R.A. No. 7227 is tasked to sell portions of
the Metro Manila military camps and other
military reservations. PEAs comparison is
incorrect. The Decision states as
As the central implementing agency tasked
to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed
lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the
government agency charged with leasing or
selling reclaimed lands of the public domain.

The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by
PEA are not private lands, in the same
manner that DENR, when it disposes of
other alienable lands, does not dispose of
private lands but alienable lands of the
public domain. Only when qualified private
parties acquire these lands will the lands
become private lands. In the hands of the
government agency tasked and authorized
to dispose of alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain, these lands are still
public, not private lands.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
PEA is the central implementing agency
tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide. PEA took the place of
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR" for brevity) as the
government agency charged with leasing or
selling all reclaimed lands of the public
domain. In the hands of PEA, which took
over the leasing and selling functions of
DENR, reclaimed foreshore lands are public
lands in the same manner that these same
lands would have been public lands in the
hands of DENR. BCDA is an entirely different
government entity. BCDA is authorized by
law to sell specific government lands that
have long been declared by presidential
proclamations as military reservations for
use by the different services of the armed

forces under the Department of National
Defense. BCDAs mandate is specific and
limited in area, while PEAs mandate is
general and national. BCDA holds
government lands that have been granted to
end-user government entities the military
services of the armed forces. In contrast,
under Executive Order No. 525, PEA holds
the reclaimed public lands, not as an enduser entity, but as the government agency
"primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National
Government." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
In Laurel v. Garcia, 17 cited in the Decision,
the Court ruled that land devoted to public
use by the Department of Foreign Affairs,
when no longer needed for public use, may
be declared patrimonial property for sale to
private parties provided there is a law
authorizing such act. Well-settled is the
doctrine that public land granted to an enduser government agency for a specific public
use may subsequently be withdrawn by
Congress from public use and declared
patrimonial property to be sold to private
parties. R.A. No. 7227 creating the BCDA is a
law that declares specific military
reservations no longer needed for defense
or military purposes and reclassifies such
lands as patrimonial property for sale to

private parties.
Government owned lands, as long they are
patrimonial property, can be sold to private
parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
private corporations. Thus, the so-called
Friar Lands acquired by the government
under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property
18 which even private corporations can
acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain if sold
or transferred to a public or municipal
corporation for a monetary consideration
become patrimonial property in the hands of
the public or municipal corporation. Once
converted to patrimonial property, the land
may be sold by the public or municipal
corporation to private parties, whether
Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations.
We reiterate what we stated in the Decision
is the rationale for treating PEA in the same
manner as DENR with respect to reclaimed
foreshore lands, thus:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the
public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation
of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. PEA will

simply turn around, as PEA has now done
under the Amended JVA, and transfer
several hundreds of hectares of these
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to
a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively
nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
was intended to diffuse equitably the
ownership of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipinos, now numbering
over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied
to alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and
all kinds of lands." This will open the
floodgates to corporations and even
individuals acquiring hundreds, if not
thousands, of hectares of alienable lands of
the public domain under the guise that in
the hands of PEA these lands are private
lands. This will result in corporations
amassing huge landholdings never before
seen in this country creating the very evil
that the constitutional ban was designed to
prevent. This will completely reverse the
clear direction of constitutional
development in this country. The 1935
Constitution allowed private corporations to
acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of
public lands. The 1973 Constitution
prohibited private corporations from

acquiring any kind of public land, and the
1987 Constitution has unequivocally
reiterated this prohibition.
Finally, the Office of the Solicitor General
and PEA argue that the cost of reclaiming
deeply submerged areas is "enormous" and
"it would be difficult for PEA to accomplish
such project without the participation of
private corporations." 19 The Decision does
not bar private corporations from
participating in reclamation projects and
being paid for their services in reclaiming
lands. What the Decision prohibits, following
the explicit constitutional mandate, is for
private corporations to acquire reclaimed
lands of the public domain. There is no
prohibition on the directors, officers and
stockholders of private corporations, if they
are Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public
auction reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain. They can acquire not more
than 12 hectares per individual, and the
land thus acquired becomes private land.
Despite the nullity of the Amended JVA,
Amari is not precluded from recovering from
PEA in the proper proceedings, on a
quantum meruit basis, whatever Amari may
have incurred in implementing the Amended
JVA prior to its declaration of nullity.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motions for

Reconsideration to be without merit, the
same are hereby DENIED with FINALITY. The
Motion to Inhibit and for Re-Deliberation and
the Motion to Set Case for Hearing on Oral
Argument are likewise DENIED.cralaw : red
TRONO, MA. DIVINA TRONO, INOCENCIO

TRONO, JR., CARMEN TRONO, AND ZENAIDA
TRONO, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, CarpioMorales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., took no part.
Before us is a Petition for Review

on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision2 dated
May 20, 1997 and Resolution3 dated
September 5, 1997 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 40263, "Ayala Land, Inc.,
Fil-estate Management Inc., Megatop Realty
Development, Inc., Peaksun Enterprises and
Export Corp., Arturo E. Dy, and Elena Dy
Jao, Petitioners, v. Hon. Florentino
Alumbres, George H. Trono, Ma. Teresa
Trono, Edgardo Trono, Ma. Virginia Trono,
Jesse Trono, Ma. Cristina Trono, Inocencio
Trono, Jr., Carmen Trono, and Zenaida
Trono, Respondents."
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 130871 February 17, 2006]
FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC., MEGATOP
REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., PEAKSUN
ENTERPRISES AND EXPORT CORP., ARTURO
DY, AND ELENA DY
JAO, Petitioners, v. GEORGE H. TRONO, MA.
TERESA TRONO, MA. VIRGINIA TRONO, JESSE
TRONO, MA. CRISTINA TRONO, PATRICIA
The petition alleges that on November 9,

1994, George, Ma. Teresa, Edgardo, Ma.
Virginia, Jesse, Ma. Cristina, Inocencio, Jr.,
Carmen, and Zenaida, all surnamed Trono,
herein respondents, filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Pias City, an
application for registration4 of a parcel of
land, docketed as LRC Case No. M-228. The
land is located at Bo. Almanza, Las Pias
City, Metro Manila consisting of 245,536

square meters.
Mr. Salvador L. Oriel, Chief of the Docket
Division, Land Registration Authority (LRA),
issued a Notice of Initial Hearing,5 stating,
among others, that:
NOTE: This lot is covered portion of Lot 2271
that which is overlapped by Lot 10, Psu80886 Lot 2276, that which is overlapped by
Lot 2, Psu-56007 which is also Lot 6, Psu80886; Lot 2270, portion of that which is
overlapped by Lot 7, Psu-56007 and the
whole Lot 8, Psu-56007.
On August 11, 1995, the above-named
petitioners filed their opposition to LRC Case
No. M-228 alleging that as per Survey Plan
Psu-31086, respondents' property partly
overlaps their lot. As early as April 28, 1989,
this lot was registered in their names under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-9182
of the Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City.
Earlier, or on July 25, 1995, Ayala Land, Inc.

(Ayala Land) also filed an opposition to
respondents' application for registration
anchored on the ground that the land
applied for overlaps the parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. T-5331, T-41326, T15644, T-41325, T-36979, T-36891, and T36982 registered in its name in the Registry
of Deeds, same city.
During the hearing, respondents presented
the July 24, 1995 Report of the LRA and the
Survey Report of the Land Management
Services, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, showing that the land
they sought to register under Plan Psu31086 overlaps the property already
registered in the names of petitioners.
Thereafter, petitioners and Ayala Land filed
their respective motions to dismiss
respondents' application for registration on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They
claimed that "since the property was
previously Torrens registered in their
names, the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the proceedings."
On March 4, 1996, the trial court issued a
Resolution denying the motions to dismiss,
holding that the Regional Trial Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of title

to lands.
any action for reconveyance of the property

has prescribed.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of

Appeals a Petition for Certiorari.
Meanwhile, on July 9, 1997, Ayala Land and

respondents executed a Compromise
Agreement.6 On July 10, 1997, they filed
with the Court of Appeals a "Motion for
Judgment Based on Compromise
Agreement."
On May 20, 1997, the Appellate Court

rendered its Decision granting the Petition
for Certiorari, holding that:
The incontrovertibility of a title prevents a
land registration court from acquiring
jurisdiction over a land that is applied for
registration if that land is already decreed
and registered under the Torrens System.
The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and
the assailed Order dated March 4, 1996
(Annex "A," Petition) is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Instead, the respondent Judge is
directed to DISMISS without prejudice LRC
M-228.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners then filed their motion for partial
reconsideration praying that LRC Case No.
M-228 be dismissed with prejudice and to
declare that the right of respondents to file
On July 25, 1997, the Court of Appeals

rendered an Amendatory Decision, holding
that in view of the Compromise Agreement,
the case as between Ayala Land and
respondents has become moot and
academic.
In a Resolution dated September 5, 1997,
the Appellate Court denied petitioners'
motion for partial reconsideration.
Petitioners then filed the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari ascribing to the Court
of Appeals the following errors:
IN REFUSING TO DECLARE THE DISMISSAL OF
LRC M-228 TO BE WITH PREJUDICE AND THAT
ANY ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE TO HAVE
LONG AGO PRESCRIBED, THE COURT OF
APPEALS DECIDED THE ISSUE NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND PERTINENT
JURISPRUDENCE, IN THAT '
I.
HAVING ALREADY FOUND THAT THE LAND
WAS TITLED, THE COURT OF APPEALS'
REFUSAL TO DISMISS THE LAND
REGISTRATION CASE WITH PREJUDICE
CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINES THAT A)
DECREES OF REGISTRATION ARE IN REM, B)
TITLED LANDS CANNOT BE DECREED AGAIN
AND C) THERE CAN BE NO COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON TITLES.
228) is a collateral attack against

petitioners' land titles.
In their comment, respondents claim that
they were misled by their lawyers and that
what they should have filed was a complaint
for nullification of titles instead of an
application for registration of land.
The petition is impressed with
merit.rbl r l l
lbrr
II.
HAVING FOUND THAT THE DECREES FROM
WHICH PETITIONERS' TITLE IS DERIVED,
WERE ISSUED IN 1966, THE COURT OF
APPEALS' REFUSAL TO DECLARE AS ALREADY
PRESCRIBED, ANY DIRECT ATTACK OR
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE CONTRAVENES
SECTION 32 OF PD 1529 AND THE
DOCTRINES IN CARO v. COURT OF
APPEALS AND SALVATIERRA v. COURT OF
APPEALS.
Petitioners contend that the dismissal of a
subsequent application for original
registration of title already covered by a
Torrens title should be with prejudice; that
an action for annulment of title or
reconveyance of the property involved has
prescribed; and that respondents'
application for registration (LRC Case No. M-
The fundamental issue for our resolution is

whether the trial court has jurisdiction over
respondents' application for registration of a
parcel of land.
Section 2 of Presidential Decree (PD)
15297 partly provides:
Sec. 2. Nature of registration proceedings;
jurisdiction of courts. - Judicial proceedings
for the registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem, and shall be
based on the generally accepted principles
underlying the Torrens System.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, and
over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and

determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions. x x x
altered, modified, or cancelled except in a

direct proceeding in accordance with law.
(Underscoring ours)
Pursuant to the above provisions, the

Regional Trial Court (formerly Court of First
Instance) has the authority to act, not only
on applications for original registration of
title to land, but also on all petitions filed
after the original registration of title. Thus,
it has the authority and power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such
applications or petitions.8
Respondents' application for registration of

a parcel of land already covered by a
Torrens title is actually a collateral attack
against petitioners' title not permitted
under the principle of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title. It is well settled that a Torrens
title cannot be collaterally attacked; the
issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or
not it was fraudulently issued, can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for
the purpose.9 Hence, whether or not
respondents have the right to claim title
over the property in question is beyond the
province of the instant proceeding. That
should be threshed out in a proper action. It
has been invariably stated that the real
purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet
title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting on the
"mirador su casa" to avoid the possibility of
losing his land.10
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in

ruling that the Regional Trial Court, Branch
255, Las Pias City has no jurisdiction over
LRC Case No. M-228 on the ground that the
land subject of respondents' application for
registration was already registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Las Pias City.
Significantly, even respondents themselves
admit in their comment on the instant
petition that what they should have filed
was a complaint for nullity of petitioners'
titles.
Likewise, Section 48 of PD 1529 provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral
attack. - A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
In Ramos v. Rodriguez,11 we held:

It must be noted that petitioners failed to
rebut the LRA report and only alleged that
the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious,

without offering any proof to substantiate
this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having
been issued under the Torrens System,
enjoys the conclusive presumption of
validity. As we declared in an earlier case
(Reyes and Nadres v. Borbon and Director of
Lands, 50 Phil. 791), "(t)he very purpose of
the Torrens system would be destroyed if
the same land may be subsequently brought
under a second action for registration." The
application for registration of the
petitioners in this case would, under the
circumstances, appear to be a collateral
attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed
under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (underscoring
ours)
Corollarily, Section 32 of the same law
states:
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration;
Innocent purchaser for value. - The decree
of registration shall not be reopened or
revised by reason of absence, minority, or
other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in
any court for reversing judgment, subject,
however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches
thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud, to file in the proper Court of First

Instance a petition for reopening and review
of the decree of registration not later than
one year from and after the date of the
entry of such decree of registration, but in
no case shall such petition be entertained by
the court where an innocent purchaser for
value has acquired the land or an interest
therein whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser
for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in
this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one
year, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by
such decree of registration in any case may
pursue his remedy by action for damages
against the applicant or any other person
responsible for the fraud. (underscoring
ours)
A decree of registration that has become
final shall be deemed conclusive not only on
the questions actually contested and
determined, but also upon all matters that
might be litigated or decided in the land
registration proceedings.12
As per records of the Registry of Deeds of

Las Pias City, TCT No. T-918213 was
registered in petitioners' name as early
as April 28, 1989, or five (5) years before
the filing of respondents' application for
registration. Thus, it is too late for them
(respondents) to question petitioners' titles
considering that the Certificates of Title
issued to the latter have become
incontrovertible after the lapse of one
year from the decree of registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40263
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents'
application for registration of land in LRC
Case No. M-228 pending before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Pias City is
ordered DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

LTD

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G.R. No.

92013 July 25, 1990

G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayes for a writ of

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013,

These are two petitions for prohibition

The Court could not act on these cases

Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.

we granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the

(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku,

(1) of the buildings to be constructed in

Amidst opposition by various sectors, the

The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the

The Court finds that each of the herein

(1) Can the Roppongi property and others

IIchanrobles virtual law library

matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of

public service or for diplomatic purposes for

III chanrobles virtual law library

(4) The guarantee of the right of the

Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum price

This, the respondents have failed to

(1) Those intended for public use, such as

patrimonial property. Any such conversion

A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to

Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No.

reserved for public use or service. Rep Act

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule

In the instant case, none of the above

The assertion that the opinion of the

The issues are not concerned with validity of

The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988

powers. The Congress had already convened

authority therefor be expressly vested by

executive and legislative

is the use of the proceeds of the disposition

constitutional issues raised by petitioner

properties are a monument to the bravery

since the property passed on to the

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pea

[G.R. No. L-32266. February 27, 1989.]

The said land consists of 178,113 square

First Instance of Capiz. 1 The decision was

of public lands to include industrial or

of the combustible wood of the mangrove

"Under this uncertain and somewhat

Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature

The fact that there are a few trees growing

of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested

of Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando

or mangrove lands forming part of the

"The petition is without merit.

decided only twelve days after the De

In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly

(c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and

With particular regard to alienable public

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or

declared by the Department Head to be

Our previous description of the term in

The private respondent invokes the survey

"The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction

alone the fact that the conditions for

unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or