UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL

ESCOLA DE ADMINISTRAO (www.ea.ufrgs.br)

PROGRAMA DE PS-GRADUAO EM ADMINISTRAO
DISCIPLINA: ECONOMIA DA REGULAO
PROF: Gicomo Balbinotto Neto (Prof. Doutor USP)
E-mail: gicomo.balbinotto@ufrgs.br
Fone: 3316 31 50

PROGRAMA

1. 1. OBJETIVO DA DISCIPLINA
O objetivo da disciplina a de oferecer aos alunos uma introduo moderna economia
da regulao destacando os principais conceitos e modelos sobre tal tpico.
A regulao tem sido definida como uma limitao imposta pelo Estado sobre a
discrio que pode ser exercida pelos indivduos ou organizaes, as quais so
sustentadas pela ameaa de sanso. A regulao o uso do poder coercitivo que tem
como objetivo restringir as decises dos agentes econmicos.
A regulamentao econmica refere-se s restries impostas pelo governo sobre as
decises das firmas com relao ao preo, quantidades, entrada e sada do setor. A
regulao econmica envolve vrios aspectos: controle de preos; controle da
quantidade; controle da qualidade; controle da entrada e sada do setor; regulao da
qualidade mnima; regulao do nvel de investimento; regulao do nvel de reinvesti
mento dos lucros; regulao do nvel de pagamento de dividendos e em lidar com
algum tipo de falha de mercado e de governo.
A regulao ocorre em um ambiente de informao assimtrica entre agentes
econmicos que buscam seu prprio interesse, regulao na sua essncia uma
manifestao do problema principal-agente. No fosse a existncia de informao
assimtrica e a regulao de determinado setor seria um problema trivial - poderia ser
trabalhoso, porm trivial - e no justificaria uma disciplina inteira dedicada a ela.
O que torna o estudo da regulao interessante que a existncia de informao
assimtrica leva os agentes econmicos a contratarem e se organizarem de formas
especficas a contornar, mitigar e/ou criar salvaguardas contra os problemas inerentes s
relaes em tal ambiente. Portanto, se quisermos entender por que as relaes entre
reguladores, firmas, consumidores e polticos toma as formas especficas que
observamos na prtica, e se quisermos sugerir formas mais eficientes de estruturar estas
relaes, preciso um serie de instrumentos especficos para analisar relaes sob
informao assimtrica. O aprendizado do uso deste kit instrumental um dos objetivos
desta disciplina.

2. AVALIAO E PROCEDIMENTOS DIDTICOS

O curso baseia-se em aulas expositivas onde so utilizados modelos para as anlises dos
fatos econmicos. No final do curso ser distribuda uma lista de exerccios com base
nas aulas ministradas que ir cobrir as leituras recomendadas e de um trabalho final
sobre um dos tpicos vistos em aula. O trabalho poder ser feito em grupo (no mximo
4 alunos).
A avaliao ser baseada no desempenho de um trabalho escrito e questes
referentes aos contedos ministrados em aula.
O conceito final ser obtido da seguinte tabela de converso:
CONCEITO
GRAU
A
9,1 A 10,0
B
7,6 a 9,0
C
6,0 a 7,5
D
< 6,0
E
Mais de 25% de faltas

As aulas iro utilizar intensivamente lminas de power point baseadas nos seguintes
livros:
VISCUSI, W.K. et al, (2005). Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, Cambridge,
Mass, The MIT Press.
LAFFONT, J.J. e TIROLE, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and
Regulation, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
KUPFER, David e HASENCLEVER, Liam. (2002). Economia Industrial: Fundamentos
Tericos e Prticas no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Campus. [cap.22]
PINHEIRO, A.C. e SADDI, J. (2005). Direito Economia e Mercados. Rio de Janeiro,
Campus.
WILSON, R. (1993). Nonlinear Pricing, Oxford University Press.

As lminas iro ser disponibilizadas, na pgina de apoio da disciplina. A bibliografia

bsica e complementar ser indicada ao longo do curso.
O contedo do curso ser explicitamente terico, apresentando dos principais
instrumentos econmicos utilizados na moderna teoria da regulao. Os aspectos
empricos sero vistos atravs de textos e trabalhos prticos que ficaram a cargo dos
alunos.

3. CONTEDO PROGRAMTICO
1. Introduo Economia da Regulao
As definies de regulao na economia, no direito e na cincia poltica. O que
economia da regulao? Os instrumentos da regulao: (i) controle de preos; (ii)
controle da qualidade; (iii) controle de entrada e sada; (iv) controle de outras variveis.
A racionalidade da regulao: A importncia da regulao no processo econmico. O
processo regulatrio no Brasil. As agncias reguladoras.
2.

As Teorias econmicas da regulao

A teoria do interesse pblico: falha de mercado; Monoplio natural, grandes

investimentos especficos. A teoria da captura de Stigler (1971). A teoria do agente
principal. A teoria da public choice (escolha pblica). Os grupos de interesse e a
contribuio de Mancur Olson (1966).
3. A Teoria do Monoplio Natural e sua Regulao
O conceito de monoplio natural. Monoplio natural multiproduto. Indstrias de rede.
Formas de Regulao dos preos: regulao por taxa de retorno. Preo-teto (price cap).
Regulao de monoplio multiproduto: A regra de Ramsey. Tarifa em duas partes
(multipart tarifs). Preo de Pico (Peak-load pricing). Regulao por Gabarito (yardstick
ou benchmanrk). Leilo de Demsetz. O mecanismo de Vogelsang-Finsinger.
.
4. A estruturao de incentivos regulatrios a regulao num contexto de
informao assimtrica.
O conceito de informao assimtrica: seleo adversa, moral hazard e sinalizao. O
problema do agente-principal. A regulao por incentivos. Regulao num contexto de
informao assimtrica. Objetivos regulatrios mltiplos. O modelo simples de
reestruturao da poltica regulatria e o problema de agente-principal e incentivos. As
principais caractersticas das medidas de desempenho. O estabelecimento de padres de
desempenho. A proviso de opes na regulao por incentivos. O comprometimento
regulatrio. Diretrizes para a estruturao dos planos de incentivo regulatrio de
Sappington (1994). As instituies e o desempenho regulatrio: A contribuio de Levy
e Spiller (1994). Aplicao ao caso do Brasil.

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