GAN vs YAP

FACTS: On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of
Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with
a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased. Opposing the
petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor
executed any testament during her lifetime. After hearing the parties and considering their evidence,
the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for
reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen
it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
HELD: NO. The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will
may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The loss
of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof. Even if oral testimony were
admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein
petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear
and distinct "proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.

Rodelas v. Aranza
Facts: The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla in 1977.
The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground that the deceased did not leave any will,
holographic or otherwise, and the alleged hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must
be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509.
The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will was lost, a
photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.
Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy
RULING: Yes. If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will.
It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and
the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs.
Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that
"Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon
copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the
lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of
the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

Azaola v. Singson

FACTS: Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9, 1957. Petitioner submitted for
probate her holographic will, in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew, who
is the defendant. Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to testify on the handwriting of
the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more or less, before the death of the
testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife; and that it was in the testatrixs handwriting. He
presented documentary evedences to reinforce his statement. Two residence certificates showing the
testatrixs signature were also exhibited for comparison purposes. The probate was opposed on the
ground that"
(1) The execution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part
of the petitioner and his wife, and
(2) That the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was
actually written either on the 5th or 6thday of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears
on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must
present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.
HELD: Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will was not
contested, petitioner was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness
of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 cannot be interpreted to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the
probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none
being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not
merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know
the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the
law does not so express)"that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There
may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be
unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus
become an impossibility. This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court to
resort to expert evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or
what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the
authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency. What the
law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity.

Codoy vs Calugay
Facts: Respondents, Eugenia Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees
in the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal filed a petition for probate of the
holographic will of the deceased, claiming in the petition that the deceased was of sound and
disposing mind when she executed the will and that no fraud or undue influence and duress was
employed in the person of the testator, and the will was written voluntarily. Petitioners Eugenia Codoy
and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the probate stating that the holographic will was a forgery
and the same was illegible, giving an impression that a third hand of an interested party other than
the true hand of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will. The respondents
presented six witnesses with various documentary evidence but all the 6 witnesses that they
presented only expressed familiarity with the deceaseds signature but there was no mention of the
fact that they were witnesses during the execution of the will.
The lower court denied the probatefor insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits. However, the Court
Appeals, relying on the Supreme Courts previous ruling on Azaola vs Singson ruling that the

requirement is merely directory and not mandatory, sustained the authenticity of the holographic will
and allowed the probate.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory.
Held. The Court ruled that it is mandatory, stating that the article provides, as a requirement for the
probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the
signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator. The word shall connotes a mandatory
order. The Court have ruled that shall in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in
a statute is mandatory.

UY KIAO ENG vs Nixon LEE

Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao
Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of
his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. The RTC denied
the petition but upon appeal The Court of Appeals issued Writ of Mandamus and ordered the
production of the will.
Issue: Whether or not writ mandamus can be used to compel the petitioner to produce of the original
holographic will.
Held: NO. Mandamus is not the proper remedy, thus, the Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the
writ. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the
state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition
recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to
for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. Generally,
mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual
unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being
invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure
and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here
the production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules
that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a
photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The
Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance
of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

PALAGANAS vs PALAGANAS
FACTS: Ruperta C. Palaganas , a Filipino who became a naturalized United States citizen, died single
and childless. In her last will and testament which she executed in California, she designated her
brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines
and in the U.S. Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas , another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as
special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin
Gregorio Palaganas , nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will
should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Adding that, assuming
Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed
under duress and without the testators full understanding of the consequences of such act, and that
Ernesto is not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
HELD: NO. The Court Ruled that, "Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their
execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code
states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take
cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at
any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Gallanosa v. Arcangel
Facts: Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of
and at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequethed
his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what
occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is
Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.
The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an
action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will,
recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set aide the 1939
decree of probate.
Issue: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled
RULING: No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution
means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was
not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in accordance
with the formalities provided by law.
The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be set
aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment was
obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from the discovery).
Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.

DELA CERNA vs LEONIDAS

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS vs. LEONIDAS

FACTS: Grimm, a US citizen of Manila, executed 2 wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed
of his Philippine estate and the other disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. In both wills, the
second wife and two children were favored while the two children from the first marriage were only
given legtimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in the Philippines. Maxine, Grimms 2nd wife,
presented the two wills with codicil for probate in Utah.
Ethel Roberts, Grimms daughter by a first marriage, filed a petition for intestate proceeding in the
Philippines. Maxine, Grimms 2nd wife, and her two children Linda and Pete, with knowledge of the
intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement with Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris
and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm in Utah regarding the estate and proposed project of partition.
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers of both parties
but not signed by Maxine and her two children, Judge Conrado M. Molina ordered the intestate partition
of the estate pursuant to the compromise agreement. No mention at all was made of the will in that
order.
Maxine, through her new lawyer, filed a petition to annul partition and prayer for the probate of
Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah). Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge
Leonidas denied it for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether ot not the estate of a person who died testate can be settled in an intestate
proceeding.
HELD: No. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding
and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases. A testate
proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real
or personal property unless it is proved and allowed"

PASCUAL V DELA CRUZ

FACTS: Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died. A petition
for the probate of her alleged will was filed by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as
executor and sole heir of the decedent.
Pedro dela Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity
of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that the
testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution; that
the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and
that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.
Probate court upheld the due execution of the will and appointed Andres Pascual as executor and
administrator of the estate, as provided in the will, without bond. Oppositors appealed to SC directly
(value of properties involved more than P300k)
Dela Cruz et al. claim: lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the subscribing
witnesses and the notary that the will was duly executed, notwithstanding the existence of
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies, and in disregarding their evidence that the will
was not signed by all the witnesses in the presence of one another

CFIs response: alleged contradictions and inconsistencies were not substantial in nature sufficient to
discredit the entire testimony on the due execution of the will. Plus lapse of 8 years from execution of
the will to the testimony in court. There is unanimity and certainty in their testimony regarding the
identity of the signatures of the testatrix, the attesting witnesses, and the Notary Public, and the fact
that they were all present at the time those signatures were affixed on the document
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the contradictions and inconsistencies pointed out by Dela Cruz were substantial as
to discredit the entire testimony of the subscribing witnesses
2. Whether or not the execution of the will was tainted by fraud and undue influence
HELD:
1. NO. For the purpose of determining the due execution of a will, it is not necessary that the
instrumental witnesses should give an accurate and detailed account of the proceeding, such as
recalling the order of the signing of the document by the said witnesses. It is sufficient that they have
seen or at least were so situated at the moment that they could have seen each other sign, had they
wanted to do so. The contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the testimonies of the witnesses
and the notary, pointed out by the oppositors-appellants (such as the weather condition at the time
the will was executed; the sequence of the signing by the witnesses; and the length of time it took to
complete the act), relate to unimportant details of the impressions of the witnesses about certain
details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory, and
which inconsistencies, by themselves, would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the
due execution of the will
2. NO. To be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and
subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own; that the contention that a will was obtained by undue influence or
improper pressure cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion, as it is enough that there was
opportunity to exercise undue influence, or a possibility that it may have been exercised; that the
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it
was actually exercised; that the burden is on the person challenging the will to show that such
influence was exerted at the time of its execution; that mere general or reasonable influence is not
sufficient to invalidate a will; nor is moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed to
the testator; or omission of relatives, not forced heirs, evidence of undue influence

ROSALES v. ROSALES
FACTS: Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato and their 2 children
Magna and Antonio. Another child, Carterio, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox,
and his widow Irenea, the petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an estimated gross value of about
P30,000. In the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order declaring the following individuals
the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate: Fortunato
(husband), 1/4; Magna (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox (grandson), 1/4; and Antonio (son), 1/4. Irenea
insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio, son
of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox. The trial court denied her plea. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from her motherin-law.
HELD: NO. A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his/her parent-in-law. Intestate or legal heirs
are classified into 2 groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the
right of representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the
order of intestate succession provided for in the CC or by the right of representation provided for in Art
981 of the same law.

The relevant provisions of the CC are Arts. 980, 981, 982 and 999. There is no provision which states
that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of
any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by the
right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession
(Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with
the State as the final intestate heir. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an
intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.

ARELLANO vs PASCUAL
FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely
petitioner Amelia P. Arellano (who is represented by her daughters), Agnes P. Arellano, Nona P. Arellano,
Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration, filed
by the respondents before the RTC of Makati, there is an allegation that the donation to petitioner is an
advance of her legitime.
The said property is now registered under the name of the petitioner covered by TCT 181889 RD of
Makati. Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the
purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate, the probate court found the
Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on
to hold that it is subject to collation. An appeal to the CA was made, questioning the order of the trial
court to include the property subject of the donation as part of the advance inheritance of the
petitioner. The CA sustained the findings of the trial court as to the collation of the said parcel of land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property subject of the donation is subject of collation.
HELD: On the first issue: The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary
estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by
the testator during his lifetime. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory
heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that
inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its
purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is
no legitime to be safeguarded. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral
relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made
to a stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir,
however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

DIZIN-RIVERO vs RIVERO
FACTS: The testatrix, Agripina Valdez, a widow, died and was survived by 7 compulsory heirs: 6
legitimate children and a legitimate granddaughter. Six of the 7 compulsory heirs are the oppositorsappellants. The remaining 1/7 is Marina, the executrix-appelle. In her will, Valdez commanded that her
property be divided in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and
bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six
children and eight grandchildren. The executrix filed her project of partition: The executrix filed her
project of partition dated February 5, 1964. Marina, the executrix, and Tomas received in the will more
than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime. She proposed to pay cash of some
P230,552.38, principally as the largest beneficiary of the will, to be her five co-heirs, the oppositors
(excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes. On the other hand oppositors submitted
their own counter-project of partition dated February 14, 1964. The lower court sustained and
approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "Articles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code

specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and
satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of
partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which
the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime . The proposition of
the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion
of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her
will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the
law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the
executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding
Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "The payment in cash so
as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes
which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the
last wishes of the testatrix."
The oppositors invoke A1063 "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator
has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired"
ISSUE: Whether or not article 1603 of the Civil Code will apply.
HELD: NO. When the testatrix has not made any previous donations during her lifetime, nor left
merely some properties by will, collation isnt necessary to determine the legitime of each heir.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject
to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain
unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed
subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime",
while it may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case.
Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her
having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the
legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application
of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here
determined and undisputed.

Buhay De Roma v. CA (July 23, 1987)

Facts: Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died intestate. When
administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointed administratrix and filed an inventory of
the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties donated by their mother to
Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled P10,297.50 and the value
is not disputed. The Trial Court issued an order in favor of Buhay because when Candelaria donated the
properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of Donation sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na din a
mababawing muli which the Trial Court interpreted as a prohibition to collate and besides the
legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. On appeal, it was reversed as it merely described
the donation as irrevocable not an express prohibition to collate.
Issue: Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.
Held: The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be
reduced as inofficious. (1036)

The SC affirmed the appellate courts decision and that it merely described the donation as
irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donated properties
from collation as required under the provisions of the New Civil Code. Given the precise language of
the deed of donation the decedent donor would have included an express prohibition to collate if that
had been the donors intention. Absent such indication of that intention, the rule not the exemption
should be applied.

LOCSIN v CA
FACTS: Mariano Locsin and Catalina Jaucian (Locsin) were a childless married couple. Mariano
executed a will. Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the
sole and universal heir of all his properties. They had agreed that their properties, after both of them
shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go
to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her
"Jaucian relatives. 9 years after Marianos death, and 28 years before hers, she started transferring by
sale or donation, Marianos as well as her properties.
Her relatives who already received their hereditary shares, filed a case for recovery of property against
the Locsins (who received property during Catalinas lifetime) alleging that the conveyance was
inofficious, without consideration and intended to circumvent the law. The trial court ordered the
reconveyance of property. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reconveyance was proper.
HELD: No. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do
not vest in his heirs until such time. Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other
persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her
heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time
of her death devolved to her legal heirs. Even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as
donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the
donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. In addition to this, both the Trial Court and Court of Appeals
put much weight on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old when she died on July 6,
1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly
influenced and morally pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to
them the properties which she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate. This is not supported for as
early as 28 years before her death, she started such dispositions not only to Marianos side but also to
hers.

HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA vs. HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA

Facts: Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He has 14 children. He owned several
fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of
copra. In order to reduce inheritance tax Alfonso made it appear that he sold some of his lands to his
children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor
of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale
executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the
properties in dispute in this case.
Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given,
Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. On April 19, 1989, Alfonso's
heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that were covered by the
four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado,
Policronio's eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
in behalf of his co-heirs. After their father's death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his
name covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale
executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio. Believing that the six parcels of land
belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs
of Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving
futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession,
Annulment of Documents, Partition, and Damages against the Heirs of Alfonso before the RTC on
November 17, 1995
Issue: 1. Whether or not the Deed of Sale was valid; 2. Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition was valid
Ruling:
1)Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there was
sufficient consideration for the contract; and (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private
transaction. If shown to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie the transaction's validity, except
that it must yield to the evidence adduced.
2) It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of
real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other,
but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in
favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely a designation and
segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot,
therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is not
necessary.
In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected.
The requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions
effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a
conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of
that part which belongs to each heir.

AZNAR vs DUNCAN
Facts: Edward Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a will.
CFI admitted the will to probate, and declared that Helen Garcia was his natural child. The declaration
was appealed to this Court; affirmed. Meanwhile, CFI approved the project submitted by the executor
in accordance with the provisions of the will, which said court found to be valid under the law of
California. Helen Garcia appealed from the order of approval, and this Court reversed the same on the
ground that the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law, and returned
the case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said law. CFI
approved the project of partition submitted by the executor, wherein the properties of the estate were
divided equally between Lucy Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his
natural daughter, and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death.
Since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled.
Hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the
legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved by the lower
court and distributed to the legatees. Hence this appeal. The CFI ruled, and appellee maintains, that
there has been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the
annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.
Appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition. Considering the provisions of the will whereby
the testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless
although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited. Based on
Articles 906 and 918 of the Civil Code, Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not to a share
of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate.
Issue: Whether or not the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be divided in equal shares, OR
the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced
Held: Lucy's inheritance should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover Helen's legitime,
equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate. Edward Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his
natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently
declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come
during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he
would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized
by him.
When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to
the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir
could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be
completed.

Nuguid vs Nuguid
Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all
her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be
issued to her.Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of
Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct
ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

Issue: Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir
preterited the compulsory heirs.
Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs
in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them
but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of
ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the
parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of
petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

reyes vs. barretto-datu

ESCUIN vs ESCUIN
FACTS: On the 19th of January, 1899, Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos executed a will before a
notary public of Sevilla, Spain, stating therein that he was a native of Cavite, the son Francisco Escuin
and Eugenia de los Santos, the latter being deceased; that he was married about six months
previously to Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, and that he had no lawful descendants; the testator,
however, stated in clause three of his will, that in case he has a duly registered successor, his child
would be his sole and universal heir; but that if, as would probably be the case, there should be no
such heir, then in clause four he named his said father Francisco Escuin, and his wife Maria Teresa
Ponce de Leon and his universal heirs, they to divide the estate in equal shares between them.
The testator died on the 20th of January, 1899
Upon the will having been admitted to probate, commissioners were appointed to consider claims
against the estate
On the 10th and 12th of July 1907, the attorney for the widow, Ponce de Leon, and the attorneys who
represented the guardian to the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, appealed to the Court of First Instance
from the findings of the aforesaid commissioners.
It appears in the proposed partition that, according to the opinion of the administrator by whom it was
signed in the result of the proceedings, the property left by the estator, in accordance with the
accounts passed upon by the court, amounted to P8,268.02
From said sum the following must be deducted the credit alluded to be admitted by the
commissioners, 10% remuneration due to the administrator, all legal expenses paid and approved.
Deducting the abovementioned amounts, there remains a balance of P5,014.81.
The partition and adjudication was proceeded with of the sum of P5,014.81 into three shares of
P1,671.60 to each one of the parties in interest, that is, the natural son, Emilio Escuin y Batac, in full
control as general heir; the widow, Teresa Ponce de Leon, as legatee of one-half of the two-thirds of the
funds of free disposition; and the said widow the usufruct of the other half of the aforesaid two-thirds
of free disposition, the bare ownership of the last third held in usufruct by the widow being adjudicated

to Francisco Escuin, as legatee taking into account the provisions of article 817 of the Civil Code upon
making the division.
The representative of the minor natural child of the testator objected in writing to the partition
proposed by the administrator, and for the reasons he set forth asked that the same be disapproved,
and that in lieu thereof the entire estate be adjudicated to Emilio Escuin y Batac, the said minor.
It was also presented that in a certified proceeding, plaintiff asked on the 12th of January, 1905, that
an allowance be granted to him for subsistence for account of the estate of the late testator, Emilio
Escuin de los Santos, and that the same be paid him monthly in advance; that judgment be entered
declaring that the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is a natural child of the testator; that the said minor, as
the only natural son of the same is his general heir; that it be held that the said testator had died
without either lawful ascendants or descendants; that the designation of heirs made under his abovementioned will be declared null and void; and that the defendants be sentenced to pay the costs in
case they did not conform to the complaint, with any further remedy that the court might consider just
and equitable.
The administrator, Ricardo Summers, in answer to the complaint denied all and every one of the facts
alleged in all and every one of its paragraphs.
The court below found that Escuin y Batac was the recognized natural child of the late Emilio Escuin de
los Santos, had by Julia Batac; that the testator was also the natural son of the defendant Francisco
Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, and was recognized by his father; and that the plaintiff minor, Emilio
Escuin y Batac, is one of the heirs of the late testator.
By an order of the lower court, the judge expressed an opinion that a natural child is only entitled to
one-fourth of the hereditary property, the clause in the will being annulled only in so far as the amount
to be divided should be reduced, taking into account the share due to the natural son and the right of
the father and the widow of the testator, each to one-half of the remainder of the property of the
estate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was preterition
2. Whether or not the testator could be considered to have died intestate
HELD:
1. YES
There is preterition to 1/3 of the estate, which amount constitutes the legal portion of a natural child;
and for the reason that mino9r was ignored in the will, the designation of heirs made therein was, as a
matter of fact annulled by force of law, insofar as the legal portion of the said minor was thereby
impaired. Legacies, and betterments shall be valid, insofar as they are not illegal, for the reason that a
testator cannot deprive the heirs of their legal portions, express in the cases expressly indicated by
law.
2. NO
Notwithstanding the fact that the said designation of heirs was annulled and that the law recognizes
the title of the minor, Escuin y Batac, to one-third of the property of his natural father, as his lawful and
general heir, it is not proper to assert that the late Emilio Escuin de los Santos died intestate in order
to establish the conclusion that his said natural recognized child is entitled to succeed to the entire
estate under the provisions of article 939 of the Civil Code, inasmuch in accordance with the law a
citizen may die partly testate and partly intestate (art. 764, Civil Code). It is clear and unquestionable
that it was the wish of the testator to favor his natural father and his wife with certain portions of his
property which, under the law, he had the right to dispose of by will, as he has done, provided the legal
portion of his general heir was not thereby impaired, the two former persons being considered as
legatees under the will.

BALANAY v MARTINEZ

FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died leaving her husband Felix Sr., and six legitimate children, Felix, Jr.
Avelina, Beatriz, Carolina, Delia, and Emilia. She left a notarial will and in paragraph 5 of the will she
said that after the death of Felix Sr. her land and all conjugal lands should be divided in the manner set
forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned of in the will her husbands one-half share of
the conjugal assets. Felix Sr and Avelina opposed. Subsequently, Felix Sr withdrew and he conformed
and renounced his hereditary rights. However, Avelina continued on with her opposition. The lower
court declared the will as void and converted the testate proceeding to an intestate proceeding. Felix,
Jr. appealed.
ISSUE
1.
of
2.
3.
4.

Whether or not the will should first be determined to be intrinsically valid prior to the determination
its allowance or formal validity
Whether or not the declaration that the will was void is proper
Whether or not the renunciation of Felix, Sr. of his hereditary rights is valid
Whether or not Felix, Sr. will was intrinsically void because it preterited him

HELD
1. Yes, it was correct in passing upon the question of intrinsic validity first. The court was of the opinion
that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will (i.e. paragraph 5), which are of dubious legality,
and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate. It was correct to pass upon the wills
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity is established. The probate of a will might become an
idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical consideration demand
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue.
2. No, it was not proper. The invalidity of one of the several dispositions does not affect the validity of
the other dispositions. Except if the other dispositions is dependent on the first invalid disposition that
has been made. The valid parts should be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without
defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general scheme, or doing injustice to the
beneficiaries.
3. Yes, it was valid. Art. 793 of the Civil Code states that Property acquired after the making of a will
shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it
expressly appear by the will that such was his intention and Art. 930 The legacy or devise of a thing
belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to
him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will,
afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect. The partition then has
become valid.
4. No, Felix, Sr.s case In the case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not
produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wifes will and renounced his hereditary
rights. Thus it is different from the Nuguid case because where the testatrix as heir her sister and
preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the
direct line. Art. 854 of the Civil Code provides, The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. Since the preterition of
the parents annulled the institution of the sister as testatrix and there were no legacies and devises,
total intestacy resulted.
Moreover, testacy is preferable to intestacy. Doubts are resolved in favor of intestacy. As far as legally
possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the dispositions in the will should
be followed.

ACAIN vs. IAC

FACTS: Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will provided
that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father
of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundos children.

Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased,
and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) The petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) He is merely a universal heir and
(3) The widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
ISSUE: Whether or not Virginia and Rosa were preterited.

HELD: YES. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance (Art. 854, Civil Code). The nullification of such institution of universal
heirs, without any other testamentary disposition in the will, amounts to a declaration that nothing at
all was written
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited.
The requisites of preterition are:
1) The heir omitted is a forced heir (in the direct line);
2) The omission is by mistake or thru an oversight;
3) The omission is complete so that the forced heir received nothing in the will.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Art. 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Preterition applies only to Fernandez, as
her adoption by the testator was not questioned by Constantino.

EDROSO vs SABLAN
FACTS: Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro who inherited two
parcels of land upon the death of his father. Subsequently, Pedro died, unmarried and without issue,
the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother. Hence the hereditary title whereupon
is based the application for registration of her ownership. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio
Sablan (legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that either the registration
be denied or if granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be recorded in the registration of each
parcel. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that the land in question partake
of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only
be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1.
2.

Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a reservable property.

Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of the property to cause its registration.

RULING: A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable
consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who
acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of
law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of blood relationship.
Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired
without a valuable consideration from another descendant, or form a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the
third degree and belong to the line where the property proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of land which he
had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his

father Victoriano. Having acquire them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third
degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano),
where the lands proceeded. The trial courts ruling that they partake of the nature property required by
law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any
doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion, although
under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has under an express provision of the law the right to dispose
of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right
to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a
limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition,
reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do
anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually or constructively or formally, in their
possession; and moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can
transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should
die before them will they acquire it.

SIENES vs ESPARCIA
FACTS: Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he
had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left
by Saturnino upon his death were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to
Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion)
to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, an OCT covering Lot 3368 was issued in the
name of Francisco.
Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it
in her name for taxation purposes, and paid the taxes due thereon. When Francisco died at the age of
20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument
and sold the property in question to appellants in consideration of the sum of P800.00. Andrea Gutang
died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on
January 13, 1952. Said vendees demanded from Paulina and her husband, the surrender of the OCT
which was in their possession, the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding
motion in the cadastral, which was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the
estate of Cipriana Yaeso.
RULING: As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question
was reservable property.
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two
resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
property came. This Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title
and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life
usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said
alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights
acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the
death of the reservista.

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that
the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died
without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when
Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the
previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable
property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso
in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition.
The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and
dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case,
Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to
reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's
death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became
effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse
the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of
Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees did not appeal therefrom.

FLORENTINO vs FLORENTINO
FACTS: In 1890, Apolonio II died leaving a notarial will. He was survived by his ten children and his
widow as heirs. Apolonio III received in the partition of the subject property. When Apolonio III died, the
said property were inherited by his mother Severina, who latter died, leaving a will instituting her only
daughter as her universal heiress. Herein appellants demands from Mercedes to deliver their
corresponding share in the reservable property but Mercedes refused. CFI dismissed the complaint of
specific performance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question is reservable property
HELD: Even if Severina left in her will said property together with her own property to her only
daughter, nevertheless, this property had not lost their reservable nature in as much as it originated
from the common ancestor of herein appellants. The property was inherited by the son and was

transmitted by operation of law to his mother. Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property while there are living within the 3rd degree relative of the latter, is nothing but a life
usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. But if afterwards, all of such relative
die, the said property become free property by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the
legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legal succession. There are seven
reservatoris who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III:
(1) 3 children of the 1stmarriage;
(2) 3 children who are represented by their own children (nephews/ nieces);
(3) Mercedes
All of the appellants are the relatives of the posthumous son within the third degree. Hence, they are
entiled as reservatarios to the property which came from the common ancestors.

PADURA v BALDOVINO
FACTS:
Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first wife Gervacia Landig, he
had one child, Manuel Padura. With the second wife, Benita Garing, he had two children, Fortunato and
Candelaria Padura. Agustin died on Apr 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly probated,
wherein he bequeathed his properties among his three children and his surviving spouse, Benita
Garing. Fortunato was adjudicated four parcels of land. He died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without
having executed a will; and not having any issue, the parcels of land were inherited exclusively by his
mother Benita.
Benita was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, subject to the condition that the properties
were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came.
On Aug 26, 1934, Candelaria died, leaving as her heirs her four legitimate children: Cristeta, Melania,
Anicia, and Pablo Baldovino (Oppositors-appellants). On Oct 6, 1940, Manuel also died, survived by his
legitimate children Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino Padura (Petitionersappellees). Upon the death of Benita (the reservista) on Oct 15, 1952, the heirs took possession of the
reservable properties. CFI Laguna declared the children of Manuel and Candelaria to be the rightful
reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the original reservees, Candelaria and
Manuel, having predeceased the reservista). The Baldovino heirs filed a petition seeking to have the
properties partitioned, such that one-half be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees,
allegedly on the basis that they inherited by right of representation from their respective parents, the
original reservees. Padura heirs opposed, maintaining that they should all be deemed as inheriting in
their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal share. (In essence, the Baldovino
heirs, who are whole blood relatives of the reservista, were contending that they should get more than
their half-blood relatives, the Padura heirs. They anchor their claim on Articles 1006 and 1008 of the
Civil Code) trial court declared all the reservees, without distinction, co-owners, pro-indiviso, in equal
shares of the parcels of land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reserved properties should, as the trial court held, be apportioned among
the heirs equally.
HELD: NO. The nephews of the whole blood should take a share twice as large as that of the nephews
of the half blood.

The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property
to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid
its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista). Article 891 of the
Code provides:
ART 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The purpose of the reserva troncal is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified
relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In
the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying
Art 891 any longer; the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by
the ordinary rules of interstate succession.

CHUA v CFI (SUSANA DE LA TORRE)

FACTS
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he sired
three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a
second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias
Chua.
Manuel died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow
Consolacion and his son Juanito of the second marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first
marriage. In the Intestate Proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjudicating, among others, the
one-half portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose's widow, Consolacion, the
other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze; and P1,550.00 in favor of
Ignacio. By virtue of said adjudication, a TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of
Consolacion and Juanito. On Feb.27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue. After his death, his
mother Consolacion succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time, Consolacion
executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as
a result of which a TCT covering the whole lot was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966,
Consolacion died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her
brother and sisters. In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners herein, Ignacio,
of the first marriage and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the
deceased Lorenzo Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint before the respondent CFI of
Negros Occidental, praying that the one-half portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito
but which passed to Consolacion upon the latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the
reason that the lot in question was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the NCC. The
respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose
Frias Chua gratuitously or not. (In relation to the first requisite of reserva troncal)
HELD: YES. In Cabardo v. Villanueva, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be
not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by
an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the
recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by
an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so
gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident

from the record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua upon the death
of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.
The obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon
Consolacion and Juanito not personally by the deceased Jose in his last will and testament but by an
order of the court in the Testate Proceeding. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is
free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure
generosity, it is gratuitous. It does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case
Juanito, to pay the Standard Oil Co. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of
the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891.

GONZALES vs COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA

FACTS: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died and was survived by his
widow, Filomena Roces, and their seven children. The real properties left by Benito were partitioned in
three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito
Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda. Filomena Legarda y Roces died
intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. Mrs.
Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena
Roces succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held
proindiviso by her other six children. Mrs. Legarda executed two hand-written identical documents
wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children
of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). She later died and her will was
admitted to probate as a holographic will in the Court of First Instance of Manila which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motion to
exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which
should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of
Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator,
Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez filed an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a
declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath
in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons.
The lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzalez.
Mrs. Gonzales appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 and contends that the lower court erred in not
regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal?
2. Whether or not Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose of the properties in question
in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children?
RULING:

The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.
Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death
the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or
they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable
properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did
not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor. The said properties, by operation of article
891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena
Legarda.
The reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the
reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest
relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of
whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservor.

DE PAPA, et al. vs CAMACHO, et al.

FACTS: The plaintiffs are the grandaunt and granduncles of the defendant, Dalisay. They have as a
common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister named Romana Tioco), father of the
plaintiffs and great grandfather of Dalisay. During the lifetime of Romana, she gratuitously donated
four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs). The latter died
intestate survived by her husband Estacio Dizon and their two (2) legitimate children, Faustino and
Trinidad (mother of Dalisay) and leaving the said four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of the
children in equal pro-indiviso shares. Subsequently, Balbino died intestate, survived by his legitimate
children and bu his wife (among the plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren, Faustino and Trinidad. In
the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land were adjudicated as the inheritance of Toribia but
as she had predeceased her father, the said three (3) parcesl of land devolved upon her two legitimate
children, Faustino and Trinidad in equal pro-inidiviso shares. Faustino died intestate, singled and
without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land to his father,
Eustacio, as his sole intestate heir, who reserved the said property subject to a reserva troncal. When
Trinidad died intestate, her rights and interests in the land were inherited by her only child, Dalisay and
not long after, Eustacio died intestate survived also by his only legitimate child, Dalisay. Dalisay now
owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land as her inheritance from Trinidad. Dalisay also
claims the other half of the said parcels of land by virtue of reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the
death of Faustino but the plaintiffs opposed such claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the
one-half pro-indiviso interst in said parcel of land, which was inherited by Eustacio from Faustino, or
three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino. The lower court declared that the parties are entitled to one-half (1/2) of the seven (7)
parcels of land in dispute, as reservatarios, in equal proportions. Not satisfied, the defendant appealed.
ISSUES: Whether or not all the relatives of the propositus within the third degree in the appropriate
line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.
RULING: NO. The court ruled that the uncles and aunts shall not share in the reserveable property,
since, under the law of intestate succession a descendants uncles and aunts may not succeed ab
intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
inherit. The rule on proximity applies. (The relatives in the direct ascending shall exclude relatives in
the collateral line.) The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom
the property should be returned, but within that group, the individual right to the property should be

decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Article 891 does not specify
otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional
case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on instestate succession, the
plaintiffs must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino
(the propositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant, although they are
related to him within the same degree as the latter. Had the reversionary property passed directly from
the propositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs would have been excluded by the defendant under
the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply
because the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva, i.e., the
property took a detour through an ascendant thereby govong rise to the reservation before its
transmission to the reservatario.
Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of
the plaintiffs.