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152 SCRA 284 Political Law Constitutional Law The Judicial Department Judicial

Autonomy Income Tax Payment By The Judiciary

Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to
prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)

from making any deduction of

withholding taxes from theirsalaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a

diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the
Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs the
continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the judges of the judiciary but the SC
decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once and for all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of
income tax.
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations,
was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just
like members of the other branches of the government, are subject to income taxation. What
is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during
their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims
and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general
income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and
such increase will immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at
the time of the passing of the law increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary but such
will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the
effectivity of such law.
Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and in Endencia vs David.

B2017 | Constitutional Law | Prof. Dante Gatmaytan | 1

J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. (petitioner) v. Land Tenure Administration (respondent)
Constitutional Construction
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
February 18, 1970
Justice Fernando
Short version:
R A 2 6 1 6 - - t h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n o f t h e Ta t a l o n E s t a t e a u t h o r i z e d b y
C o n g r e s s ( t h e fi r s t s t a t u t e t o b e specifically tailored to expropriate land), was
decided unconstitutional by the lower court, in favor of the petitioner JM Tuason &
Co. The Supreme Court then reversed this decision, reviewing the scope of power given to
Congress under theConstitution to authorize expropriation of lands.
With the ff opinions:
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
Barredo, J. concurs in a separate opinion.
Tehankee, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L. Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur in the opinion of Justice Tehankee
Congress: RA 2616
August 3, 1959
RA 2616 took effect without executive approvalexpropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quez
on City owned by petitioner JM Tuason & Co. (to be
subdivided into small lots and sold to their occupants) w a s authorized by Congress in view
of social and economic problems.
November 15, 1960
Respondent Land Tenure Administration instituted
the proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon EstateRA 2616, as directed by the
Executive Secretary.
Lower Court: RA 2616 is unconstitutional
November 17, 1960
Petitioner JM Tuason & Co. filed special action for prohibition of RA 2616 with preliminary
injunctionagainst the respondents to restrain expropriation proceedings.
January 10, 1963
RA 2616 was decided unconstitutional, granting the writ of prohibition.
SC: Reversing the decision and further proceedings
February 18, 1970
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts decisionthat RA 2616 is unconstitutional
denying the writ of prohibition, and setting aside the preliminary injunctionfiled by
petitioner JM Tuason & Co.

March 30, 1970

Motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner invoking his rights to due process & equal
protection of laws.
May 27, 1970
SG Felix Antonio filed detailed opposition to thereconsideration.
June 15, 1970
Petitioner filed for a rejoinder. The expropriation of Tatalon Estate in Quezon City is
unconstitutional pursuant to RA 2616 sec 4. (as amended by RA 3453)-- prohibiting the
enforceability of ejectment proceedings or the continuance of a proceeding that has already
: Is RA 2616 (rightfully amended) unconstitutionalbecause it violates the petitioners rights
to due processand equal protection of law?

Martinez vs Martinez
Martinez vs Martinez
GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005

Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land.
The former executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3
lots bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of
the estate), and Daniel Jr. In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of
sale purportedly signed by his father on September 1996 where it appears that the land was
sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint
against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of the deed of sale and
cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property which
the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint for
unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation
and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses
that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same proved futile.

ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same
have failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar.
The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the
respondent. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article
150. It should also be noted that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements
of Article 151 because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding
against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance
with PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at
resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.

G.R. No. 79543.

October 16, 1996
JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner,
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in
Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards
and commendations attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he
could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other side of the
investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery
van. Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers,
namely ,Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned out to be
adischarged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30, 1982,petitioner
executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P.
Espero. Peitioner however sought later that his confession be inadmissible evidence, saying
that the law should favour him as an accused.

Whether or not Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution shall be given a
retroactive effect and petitioners extrajudicial confession be held as inadmissible evidence.
No, since what he did was not a penal offense. Under the penal law, a person guilty of
felony who is not a habitual criminal may be given favour by the law.