Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 125955. June 19, 1997]
FACTS:
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy
Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an
administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas.
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District
of the City of Manila during the January 18, 1988, local elections. He won
and, accordingly, assumed office.
After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized
national elections. Again, he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one
of the six (6) City Councilors. However, his victory this time did not remain
unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-election, he found himself
besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge
him from his position.
One such case was a petition for quo warranto filed before the COMELEC
by Cenon Ronquillo, another candidate for councilor in the same district,
who alleged Bascos ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of the
Tordesillas ruling. At about the same time, two more cases were also
commenced by Honorio Lopez II in the Office of the Ombudsman and in the
Department of Interior and Local Government. All these challenges were,
however, dismissed, thus, paving the way for Bascos continued stay in office.
Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and ran
again for councilor in the May 8, 1995, local elections seeking a third and
final term. Once again, he beat the odds by emerging sixth in a battle for six
councilor seats. As in the past, however, his right to office was again
contested. On May 13, 1995, petitioner Grego, claiming to be a registered
voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Bascos
disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the
declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of
Manilas Second District.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any
elective position since he had been removed from office as a result of an
Contrary to petitioners assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco
from running for any elective position. As can be gleaned from the decretal
portion of the said decision, the Court couched the prohibition in this wise:
x x x AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY
POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.
In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term
reinstatement. Under the former Civil Service Decree,[16] the law applicable
at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively dismissed from
office, the term reinstatement had a technical meaning, referring only to an
appointive position. Thus:
ARTICLE VIII. PERSONNEL POLICIES AND STANDARDS.
SEC. 24. Personnel Actions. xxxxxxxxx
(d) Reinstatement. - Any person who has been permanently APPOINTED to
a position in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or
misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the
same level for which he is qualified.
x x x x x x x x x.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Presidential Decree No. 101 vested in the Board of Transportation the power,
among others "To grant special permits of limited term for the operation of
public utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the Board, be
necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators into legitimate and
responsible operators." (Section 1, PD 101)
In light of these definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that
Basco is likewise barred from running for an elective position inasmuch as
the petitioners argue that neither the Board of Transportation chairman nor
any member thereof had the power, at the time the petitions were filed (i.e. in
1977), to legitimize clandestine operations under PD 101 as such power had
The Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies issued by the Civil Service
Commission on November 10, 1975,[17] provides a clearer definition. It
reads:
been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of
the Decree on January 17, 1973. They state that, thereafter, the power lapses
and becomes functus officio.
ISSUE:
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION HAS THE
POWER TO LEGALIZE, AT THIS TIME, CLANDESTINE AND
UNLAWFUL TAXICAB OPERATIONS UNDER SECTION 1, P.D. 101;
HELD:
Justifying its action on private respondent's applications, the respondent
Board emphasizes public need as the overriding concern. It is argued that
under PD 101, it is the fixed policy of the State "to eradicate the harmful and
unlawful trade of clandestine operators by replacing or allowing them to
become legitimate and responsible ones" (Whereas clause, PD 101). In view
thereof, it is maintained that respondent Board may continue to grant to
"colorum" operators the benefits of legalization under PD 101, despite the
lapse of its power, after six (6) months, to do so, without taking punitive
measures against the said operators.
Indeed, a reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the
respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step towards the
legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time
limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest
the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the
Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal of the State's waiver of
its right to punish said colorum operators for their illegal acts. In other words,
the cited section declares when the period of moratorium suspending the
relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no
impediment to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction under its broad powers
under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to
achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7,
1936).
It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or
commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally
construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which
is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent
should be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the
findings are not in violation of law, whether they are free from fraud or
imposition and whether they find substantial support from the evidence.
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional
Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the
following pertinent provisions:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or
the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material,
or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review
center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during
the three days immediately proceeding every examination day
including examination day.
November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly
situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a
complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from
enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the
ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the
enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower
court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No.
105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the
lower court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila
had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the
Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional
Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies.