Lay Judge January

Con
We negate Resolved: United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive
operations.
Contention 1: Harms Humanitarian Aid

A UN-backed offensive to destroy a Hutu rebel group in eastern DRC has had disastrous humanitarian
consequences, with more than 1,000 civilians killed, 7,000 raped, and 900,000 forced from their
homes. A group of 84 local and international organizations today described the human cost of the
attempt to defeat the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) as "unacceptable and
disproportionate to the results it has achieved". With 1,071 FDLR soldiers having given up their arms
since the start of military action in January, it effectively means that one civilian has been killed, seven
women and girls raped and 900 people displaced for every rebel disarmed, according to the Congo
Advocacy Coalition (CAC). Marcel Stoessel, head of Oxfam in Congo, said military action needed to
be immediately suspended. "This appalling violence is no accident. It is the result of the UN-backed
Congolese military operation against the FDLR militia," he said. This is not the only example. Ethnic
Lendu villagers have accused UN soldiers of massacring people, including women and children, at the
height of a two-day counter-offensive in the area. These horrible dehumanizing acts were a direct
impact of Offensive PKOs. The long term impacts of dehumanizing acts are even worse. Berube 97.
Dehumanizations destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural
calamity on record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life is beyond calculation. When we
calculate the actual losses we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can
currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and
genocide. When people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any
and every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable.
Offensive peacekeepers could have civilian casualties, which would undermine their success and
reputation as an impartial international organization. The shift from defensive to offensive operations,
as in DRC, may create dangers for humanitarian organizations in conflict zones. Michael Hofman, a
senior humanitarian specialist with Doctors Without Borders, You can have a helicopter, one day
used to deliver the Force Intervention Brigade troops to attack a village, and next day, to deliver aid to
the same village. In this case, it is not even a blurring of the lines, Humanitarian actors depend on
being perceived as impartial, neutral and independent in order to have access to and acceptance by
communities. This enables the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need across conflict
lines. The nature of the intervention brigade's mandate may mean that any humanitarian organization
perceived to be part of or affiliated with the mission is at greater risk of being targeted or having its
access blocked by armed groups. By allowing offensive operations we not only are harming civilian
humanitarian aid workers we harm civilian workers ability to provide aid.
Contention 2: External Military Powers Cannot

Create Peace
Local participation is a necessary ingredient to reach a successful settlement that will last. Looking at
the cases of Somalia from 1987 to 1997 and Bosnia from 1991 until 1996 we juxtapose the monthly
incidents of violence to attempts by the UN and other intervening actors to bring local leaders into the
peace-building process. The event data analysis strongly corroborates our argument that during
periods where the local population is even partially involved in the intervention process, the prospects
for a long-lasting settlement increase. Another example is Somaliland where a lack of external
involvement directly led to peace and development because it benefitted the economy, political
reconciliation and legitimate compromise. Eubank 10 A lack of outside support increased the
influence of the business community, which provided all government financing. The influence of the
business community has proved to be supportive of political reconciliation. With a large number of
political actors with relative parity a lack of outside support has forced compromise. Many times in
Somalilands history, small groups have tried to form a government and found themselves incapable of
maintaining it forcing the groups to expand their coalition at the cost of their own influence.
Somalilands ineligibility for foreign assistance helped allay concerns among the general population of
Somaliland about the emergence of a predatory state in Somaliland, facilitating the formation of a
national government. Schmidt 13 found that across the entire continent of Africa, external
intervention did more harm than good, saying quote foreign intervention in Africa generally did more
harm than good. External involvement often intensified conflicts and rendered them more lethal.
Contention 3: Military Intervention Will Result in

Blowback
If peacekeeping operations use force they are perceived as being a form of occupation; the example of
Haiti proves this. What is the seizure and control of an area by armed troops? Military occupation.
What is the use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of politico-economic aims? Terrorism.
What is the freedom from negative consequences of an injurious action? Impunity. These 4 words
have become synonymous with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, the MINUSTAH
which, for the past 10 years, has maintained a reign of terror in Haiti. Offensive operations only work
by occupying land with armed forces and that is empirically shown to increase terrorism. It is also
happening in the DRC. Pieter Vanholder, DRC country director of the Life & Peace Institute in
Bukavu, told Al Jazeera FIB could have a deterrent effect, but "if some things go wrong, which they
are bound to, the brigade may be seen as a kind of occupation force. "As a consequence it could
become a push factor for some to join armed groups, adding to local resistance," Vanholder said.
Research provides strong evidence that suicide terrorism is particularly sensitive to foreign military
occupation. More than 95 percent of all suicide attacks are in response to foreign occupation,
according to extensive research conducted at the University of Chicago's Project on Security and
Terrorism, where they examined every one of the over 2,200 suicide attacks across the world from
1980 to the present day. As the United States has occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, total suicide attacks
worldwide have risen dramatically -- from about 300 from 1980 to 2003, to 1,800 from 2004 to 2009.
Since Israel withdrew its army from Lebanon in May 2000, there has not been a single Lebanese
suicide attack. Similarly, since Israel withdrew from Gaza and large parts of the West Bank,
Palestinian suicide attacks are down over 90 percent. You cannot sustain peace through war. It is
counterintuitive and only causes more violence and death.
Its for these reasons my we urge a con ballot.
Case Cards
Harms Aid
DRC Humanitarian Disaster
Rice, Zan. UN-backed Congo military offensive a 'humanitarian disaster' The Guardian, October 13, 2009
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/13/democratic-republic-of-congo-civilian-deaths.
A UN-backed offensive to destroy a Hutu rebel group in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has had
disastrous humanitarian consequences, with more than 1,000 civilians killed, 7,000 raped, and 900,000
forced from their homes. A group of 84 local and international organizations today described the human
cost of the attempt to defeat the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) as
"unacceptable and disproportionate to the results it has achieved". With 1,071 FDLR soldiers having
given up their arms since the start of military action in January, it effectively means that one civilian has
been killed, seven women and girls raped and 900 people displaced for every rebel disarmed, according
to the Congo Advocacy Coalition (CAC). At least 6,000 houses have been burned down by rebels, some
as recently as September. Although many of the killings were carried out by Rwandan Hutu
militiamen in retaliation for the offensive, Congolese government soldiers have also targeted civilians,
the report said. Marcel Stoessel, head of Oxfam in Congo, said military action needed to be immediately
suspended. "This appalling violence is no accident. It is the result of the UN-backed Congolese military
operation against the FDLR militia," he said. "It is a strategy that is being supported in capitals and in
the highest echelons of the UN."
The United Nations does little to delineate between offensive and defensive peacekeepers
in the Congo.
Deen,Thalif. U.N. Peacekeeping Goes on the Offensive. Inter Press Service, November 13 2013.
<http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/11/u-n-peacekeeping-goes-on-theoffensive/>
Asked if these weapons are being purchased or provided gratis, Kieran Dwyer, chief of the public
affairs division at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, told IPS the United
Nations does not purchase military equipment such as attack helicopters. Member states provide
these, he said, explaining that troop-contributing countries also equip their own personnel. Some
worry that the shift from defensive to offensive operations, as in DRC, may create dangers for
humanitarian organisations in conflict zones. Michael Hofman, a senior humanitarian specialist
with Doctors Without Borders, was quoted by the New York Times Wednesday as saying: You can
have a helicopter, one day used to deliver the Force Intervention Brigade troops to attack a
village, and next day, to deliver aid to the same village.In this case, it is not even a blurring of
the lines, he added.
Humanitarian workers may provide less information or be less successful in delivering

aid because of the impartiality of offensive peacekeepers.
Gorur, Aditi. New U.N. Force May Increase Risks For Civilians. Stimson Organization, July 11 2013. <
http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/new-un-forcemay- increase-risks-for-civilians/ >
In addition, the intervention brigade's robust mandate may interfere with the work of humanitarian
groups that are also helping to protect civilians MONUSCO is an integrated mission, which means that
U.N. humanitarian agencies must coordinate and communicate with MONUSCO. At the same time, U.N.
agencies help to coordinate non-U.N. humanitarian organizations. U.N. agencies are often required to
coordinate and work alongside MONUSCO's military component in line with U.N. security protocols.
Humanitarian actors depend on being perceived as impartial, neutral and independent in order to have
access to and acceptance by communities. This enables the delivery of humanitarian assistance to
civilians in need across conflict lines. The nature of the intervention brigade's mandate may mean that
any humanitarian organization perceived to be part of or affiliated with the mission is at greater risk of
being targeted or having its access blocked by armed groups. In this context, humanitarian groups may
also be particularly reluctant to cooperate or share information with the mission, fearing that the
brigade's offensive operations could lead to civilian casualties or have a direct negative impact on local
perceptions.
Humanitarian workers could be mistaken for peacekeepers, which would put them in
danger from armed groups.
Kulish, Nicholas. New U.N. Brigades Aggressive Stance in Africa Brings Success, and Risks. New
York Times, November 12 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/world/africa/new-un-brigadesaggressivestance-in-africa-brings-success-and-risks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Samantha Power, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, described the new brigade as
having invigorated the efforts of both Congolese troops and the rest of the United Nations mission.
The decision to send the blue helmets into offensive operations has not met with universal
approval. Humanitarian aid organizations worry that the shift could put their workers at risk
because armed groups will not distinguish between soldiers and those who feed, heal and house
civilians in war.
Medical charities and humanitarian groups have expressed anger about offensive
peacekeepers due to fear of endangering their own facilities.
Doyle, Mark. DR Congo unrest: Fears over UN intervention. BBC News, July 25 2013.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23452735>
US-based aid advocacy group Refugees International urged Mr Kerry to recognise that:
"Unless certain safeguards are imposed, military action by the Intervention Brigade could
further exacerbate DR Congo's humanitarian crisis." The UN says more than 2.5 million people
have been made homeless by the conflicts in the DR Congo most of them in the eastern provinces
of North and South Kivu. Medical charity Medecins Sans Frontieres earlier said it was very
concerned about a blurring of the distinction between the UN's humanitarian and military
work. Because of the potential confusion between those roles, MSF said it no longer wanted any
military - including UN soldiers deployed near its health facilities. There was a real danger, MSF
said, that heightened tension could lead to a targeting of medical activities. The criticisms by aid
agencies illustrate a classic dilemma for the UN. It is damned if it does not act firmly enough, as when
rebels of the ethnic Tutsi-dominated M23 movement took the eastern DR Congo city of Goma last
year. But it is also damned when it takes tougher action that has humanitarian fallout.
RISKS HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS IN WAR-TORN REGIONS-Reghavan '13

[Sudarsan; Bureau Chief; In volatile Congo, a new U.N. force with teeth; Washington Post; 2 November 2013;
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-un-force-withteeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html; retrieved 8 December 2014]
U.N. and other humanitarian aid workers said in interviews that they remain worried about the new brigade.
The presence of the FIB is a problem for all the humanitarian actors, said Francesca Mangia, the head of
Doctors Without Borders France in Goma. When the population sees a white car, they dont differentiate
between whether it is us, the U.N. or FIB. It makes us military targets.
RISKS HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS ON THE GROUND-Ker '13

[Michelle; Former Research Associate with the Future of Peace Operations; New U.N. Force May Increase
Risks For Civilians; Stimson Center Spotlight; 11 July 2013; http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/new-un-forcemay-increase-risks-for-civilians/; retrieved 12 December 2014]
In addition, the intervention brigade's robust mandate may interfere with the work of humanitarian groups that
are also helping to protect civilians. MONUSCO is an integrated mission, which means that U.N. humanitarian
agencies must coordinate and communicate with MONUSCO. At the same time, U.N. agencies help to
coordinate non-U.N. humanitarian organizations. U.N. agencies are often required to coordinate and work
alongside MONUSCO's military component in line with U.N. security protocols.
RISKS THE MANDATE OF PEACEKEEPERS TO PROTECT CIVILIANS-Ker '13

Under either interpretation, however, MONUSCO's long-standing mandate to proactively protect civilians
under imminent threat of violence will be compromised. Peacekeeping operations are not neutral, but they are
expected to implement their proactive protection of civilians mandate in an impartial fashion, protecting
populations under threat regardless of the perpetrator's political or military affiliation.
If the intervention brigade is tasked with the proactive protection of civilians, it will face a difficult balancing
act managing tensions between impartially implementing its proactive protection mandate and its mandate to
neutralize armed groups. For example, the U.N. Security Council authorized the intervention brigade to
undertake counterinsurgency operations requiring offensive actions that will likely result in civilian casualties.
The force's responsibility is only to minimize them per international humanitarian law.
UN AIR AND HEALTH WORKERS ARE AT RISK WHEN INCREASING

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS-Bariyo and Rhoads '13
[Nicholas and Christopher; U.N. Enters Combat Role in Congo; Wall Street Journal; 16 July 2013;
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323394504578607922361583396; retrieved 12 December
2014]
The brigade's deployment has also raised concerns about potential reprisals against the U.N.'s aid and health
workers working in Congo.
Then there are the legal questions about how the force should handle defectors and captured fighters, since it is
now a party to the conflict rather than a neutral entity. The U.N.'s Congo mission has been at the forefront of a
shift in recent years toward a more aggressive use of force, what is known as "robust peacekeeping."
EXPANDING PEACEKEEPING TO OFFENSIVE ACTION RISKS ALL THOSE

WORKING FOR THE UN IN PEACEFUL OR HUMANITARIAN ROLES-Reghavan
'13
[Sudarsan; Bureau Chief; In volatile Congo, a new U.N. force with teeth; Washington Post; 2 November 2013;
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-un-force-withteeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html; retrieved 8 December 2014]
But the force is also an unparalleled gamble for the United Nations that challenges the basic principles of
peacekeeping. It has orders to react offensively to enforce peace, essentially transforming peacekeepers into
combatants. And it is openly supporting Congolese government forces, a move away from the principle of
neutrality that has guided other U.N. missions. That could affect the United Nations ability to negotiate peace
deals with the militias and risks deepening conflicts. Humanitarian agencies are worried that Congos brutal
militias could see the entire U.N. mission, which also includes aid workers, monitors and civilian experts, as
non-neutral potential targets.
USE OF OFFENSIVE PEACEKEEPING RISKS CIVILIANS WORKING ON THE

GROUND IN TARGET REGIONS-Ker '13
In response to fighting between government forces and rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that
threatens regional stability, the United Nations Security Council has authorized an "intervention brigade" - a
new kind of international stabilization force - that is expected to become fully operational by the end of July.
The intervention brigade has the unprecedented mandate to "neutralize" rebel groups through targeted offensive
operations. However, in its pursuit of armed groups, the brigade risks undermining the U.N.'s broader efforts to
protect Congolese civilians in three major ways. First, its mandate to "neutralize" inherently conflicts with the
protection of civilians; second, the brigade's activities may shift the conflict dynamics in eastern DRC in
dangerous ways; and third, its operations may interfere with the work of humanitarian organizations.
The DRC force has been accused of murder.

"Do Peacekeepers Have a Right to Fight?" BBC News. BBC, 03 Mar. 2005. Web. 02
Dec. 2014. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4315895.stm>.
The killings come just days after the deaths of nine Bangladeshi soldiers serving with the UN mission
in Congo (Monuc) in the north-eastern Ituri region. Ethnic Lendu villagers have accused UN
soldiers of massacring people, including women and children, at the height of a two-day counteroffensive in the area.
IMPACT: Global War
Burke-White 4 William W., Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean at the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge, "Human Rights
and National Security: The Strategic Correlation", The Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249,
Lexis
For most of the past fifty years, U.S. foreign policymakers have largely viewed the promotion of human rights anti the
protection of national security as in inherent tension. Almost without exception, each administration has treated the two
goals as mutually exclusive: promote human rights at the expense of national security or protect national security while
overlooking international human rights. While U.S. |*)licymakers have been motivated at times by human rights concerns,
such concerns have generally been subordinate to national security. For example, President Bushs 2(X)2 U.S. National
Security Strategy speaks of a commitment to protecting basic human rights. In the same document, President Bush
makes it clear that defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal
Government.1 This subordination of human rights to national security is both unnecessary and strategically
questionable. A more effective U.S. foreign policy would view human rights and national security as
correlated and complementary goals. Better protection of human rights around the world would make the
United States safer and more secure. The United States needs to restructure its foreign policy accordingly. This Article
presents a strategicas opposed to ideological or normativeargument that the promotion of human rights should be
given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic
human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct .
Among the chief threats to U.S. national security arc acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may
directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 19dl, or they may require U.S.
military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-G)ld War period indicates that states that
systematically abuse their own citizens human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the
degree that improvements in various states human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a
foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a states
domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that states propensity to engage in
international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the
prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U. S. policymakers with
a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between
national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes
the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters
some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a mean s of signaling benign international intent
through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government
to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of
human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.
IMPACT: Destroys the value to Life and outweighs all calculable impacts
Berube 97 Professor of Communication Studies and Associate Director of NanoScience and Technology
Studies at
University of South Carolina
[David M., NANOTECHNOLOGICAL PROLONGEVITY: The Down Side, http://www.cas.sc.edu/engl/faculty/berube/prolong.htm]
and Matson's treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn[s]: "its

destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity on record
-- and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this
sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse.... Behind the
genocide of the holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and dissidents... in the cuckoo's next of America,
This means-ends dispute is at the core of Montagu
lies a dehumanized image of man... (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impact dehumanizing ethics may have had on
When we calculate the actual losses

and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can currently
use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide.
humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone.
When people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every
atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is evil's most
powerful weapon.
External Cant Create Peace

Argument: Peace created by external intervention is fragile and unsustainable.
External military powers like peacekeepers create a weak peace that is likely to fail
because of a lack of a shared commitment to a forced compromise.
Rothstein, Robert. After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation. Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Jan 1999.
<http://books.google.com/books?id=gwKqGbuZu5kC&printsec=frontcover#v=on
epage&q&f=false>
A weak peace agreement rarely produces genuine peace, that is, a situation in which both
sides accept the need for painful compromises of long-term goals, an end to violence and
terrorism (or at least a sharp curtailment of such actions), and the beginning of an effort to
transform the structural conditions that have sustained a bitter and protracted conflict. What we
usually get, after a period of euphoria and dangerously rising expectations, are frustration,
disillusionment, misunderstandings about what has and has not been agreed to, the exacerbation
of underlying structural conditions (distrust, weakened leadership, psychological alienation, etc.)
and perhaps a return to violence and terror. None of this is especially surprising. There is very
rarely a shared vision of a final outcome that is driving the peace process; consent to begin
moving toward compromise is frequently forced by external powers or by the stronger side (thus
guaranteeing minimal commitment to an apparently temporary truce agreement); peace itself
means different things not only between the parties, but also within each party (thus guaranteeing
prolonged negotiations and unstable concessions); and weak leaders whose stature has come from
leading and symbolizing the conflict become even weaker as they are challenged by extremists, fail to
produce substantial gains, and are able or willing to risk less and less.
A lack of external involvement directly led to peace and development in Somaliland

because it benefitted the economy, political reconciliation and legitimate compromise.
Eubank, Nicholas. Peace-Building without External Assistance: Lessons from
Somaliland. Center for Global Development, January 2010.
<http://www.cgdev.org/files/1423538_file_Eubank_Somaliland_FINAL.pdf>
First, a lack of outside financial support increased the influence of the business community,
which provided all government financing. Because pastoral economies are dependent upon stability
and management of public goods like water and grazing lands, the influence of the business
community has proved to be supportive of political reconciliation. Second, with a large number
of political actors with relative parity in terms of resources, a lack of outside support has forced
compromise and cooption of opposition groups. Many times in Somalilands history, small groups
have tried to form a government and found themselves incapable of maintaining it forcing the
groups to expand their coalition at the cost of their own influence. Third and most importantly,
Somalilands ineligibility for foreign assistance helped allay concerns among the general
population of Somaliland about the emergence of a predatory state in Somaliland, facilitating
the formation of a national government. With no foreign assistance, the Somaliland government did
not have an independent revenue base, making it dependent upon the continued support of its
constituents.
The greater the involvement of local actors, as opposed to outside ones, the greater the
likelihood for long-lasting peace.
Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene. Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or Fail.
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association,
2005. <http://kar.kent.ac.uk/861/1/363.pdf>
Our research has explored to what extent policies that involve the local population can be applied to
humanitarian interventions under different contexts and situations. Using cognitive dissonance theory
we develop three hypotheses regarding the role of the local population and its interaction with external
actors in the post-intervention peace-building process. We argue that local participation is a

necessary ingredient to reach a successful settlement that will last. Looking at the cases of
Somalia from 1987 to 1997 and Bosnia from 1991 until 1996 we juxtapose the monthly incidents
of violence to attempts by the UN and other intervening actors to bring local leaders into the
peace-building process. In real-life interventions we cannot rely on the experimental designs used by
psychology. However, the event data analysis strongly corroborates our argument that during
periods where the local population is even partially involved in the intervention process, the
prospects for a long-lasting settlement increase.
Another harm of foreign intervention is how expensive it is: these funds could be better
spent in other arenas.
Valentino, Benjamin. The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention: The Hard Truth
About a Noble Notion. Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011.
<http://people.umass.edu/charli/docs/ValentinoFA.pdf>
These costs are considerable, since military intervention is a particularly expensive way to save
lives. Each of the more than 220 Tomahawk missiles fired by the U.S. military into Libya, for
example, cost around $1.4 million. In Somalia, a country of about 8.5 million people, the final bill
for the U.S. intervention totaled more than $7 billion. Scholars have estimated that the military
mission there probably saved between 10,000 and 25,000 lives. To put it in the crudest possible
terms, this meant that Washington spent between $280,000 and $700,000 for each Somali it
spared. As for Bosnia, if one assumes that without military action a quarter of the two million
Muslims living there would have been killed (a highly unrealistic figure), the intervention cost
$120,000 per life saved. Judging the 2003 Iraq warnow a multitrillion-dollar adventure
primarily on humanitarian grounds, the costs would be orders of magnitude higher.
Comparatively, one author finds that across the entire continent of Africa, external
intervention did more harm than good.
Schmidt, Elizabeth. Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on
Terror. Cambridge University Press. March 25 2013.
<http://books.google.com/books?id=k2-2wlVZUYC&
printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage
&q&f=false>
Together with the UN, the African Union, and various regional organizations played a growing
role in diplomacy and peacekeeping initiatives, which sometimes led to multilateral military
action. Emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and the Middle Eastern Gulf States,
which were heavily invested in African oil, minerals, and agricultural land, exerted increased political
influence. Although these countries often reinforced the powers of repressive regimes, in some
instances they used their authority to promote peace and security efforts. Public pressure for
humanitarian intervention in response to African crises also contributed to new foreign
involvement. Although activist groups in Western countries put the spotlight on mass atrocities
and mobilized support for action to protect African civilians, they often oversimplified complex
issues and proposed the kinds of military solutions that historically have had negative effects on
civilian populations. The fourth and final observation suggests that during the period under
consideration (1945 2010), foreign intervention in Africa generally did more harm than good.
External involvement often intensified conflicts and rendered them more lethal.
This increase in violence occurs overall, as well.

Pearson, Frederic. Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes. International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sep., 1974), pp. 259-290.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600156>
One of the most important findings in the present study is that intervention breeds civil conflict in
the target. Specifically, governments seem to suppress opposition groups in the midst of
increased armed attacks from such groups and in the midst of foreign military intervention; in
the process, many deaths result. While interveners and factions which invite intervention may seek
"stability," the result of intervention is all too frequently prolonged (for as long as a year or more)
violence and bloodshed. In addition, while both interventions and noninterventions were usually
preceded or followed by only one (mode) day of conflict, the maximum number of conflict days was
greater for conflicts (almost all types) preceding or following interventions than noninterventions. This
evidently means that some conflicts-especially armed attacks, deaths, sanctions, riots, and protests-are
indeed related to interventions, although most civil conflicts that occur are not. The highest number of
days of conflict preceding interventions (correcting for the number of months involved) tended to
come zero to three months before and after interventions, though considerable conflict occurred even
earlier and lasted even longer.
Analysis: This argument is unique as it is more offensive than it needs to be. However, due to a lack
of literature surrounding direct comparisons of offensive UN interventions to a lack of intervention or
a defensive one, the more general argument that foreign military intervention is bad might be the best
way to make a well-warranted argument on this topic.
Military intervention will result in blowback

Argument: The use of military force by the UN will result blowback because they will be perceived
as a form of foreign occupation.
UN Peacekeeping forces intervene in areas to try and prevent terrorism.

Diarra, Adama. Nine U.N. troops killed in worst attack yet on Mali force. Reuters. 3
Oct 2014. Web. 3 Nov 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/03/usmali-un-peacekeepersidUSKCN0HS0ZH20141003>.
Nine United Nations peacekeepers in Mali were killed when heavily armed gunmen on
motorbikes ambushed their convoy on Friday, the deadliest attack yet on U.N. troops in the
West African nation, the mission said. The attack on the peacekeepers from Niger took place in
the region of Gao and highlighted a sharp increase in strikes on foreign troops based in Mali to
prevent the return of al Qaeda-linked Islamists who seized its northern desert region in 2012.
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was "shocked and outraged" by the attack and called for the
perpetrators to be brought to justice, U.N. spokesman Stephane Dujarric said.
Peacekeepers, in UN seen as military occupation

Gallo, Jean Carol. Vogel, Christoph. UN's elite force raises the stakes in DRC Aljazeera. 16 July
2013.
Pieter Vanholder, DRC country director of the Life & Peace Institute in Bukavu, told Al Jazeera FIB
could have a deterrent effect, but "if some things go wrong, which they are bound to, the brigade may
be seen as a kind of occupation force."As a consequence it could become a push factor for some
to join armed groups, adding to local resistance," Vanholder said.
Even peacekeeping operations, if they use force, are perceived as being a form of
occupation; the example of Haiti proves this.
Dauphin, Nydia. The UN's Mission in Haiti Consists of Terrorism and Military
Occupation. Huffington Post. 6 October 2014.
<http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/nydia-dauphin/un-haiti_b_5937182.html>.
What is the seizure and control of an area by armed troops? Military occupation. What is the use of violence and
intimidation in the pursuit of politico-economic aims? Terrorism. What is the freedom from negative consequences
of an injurious action? Impunity. Military occupation. Terrorism. Impunity. To far too many of us, these 4 words have
become synonymous with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, the MINUSTAH which, for the past 10
years, has maintained a reign of terror in Haiti. Don't take my word for it: numerous articles have provided detailed
accounts of the UN's presence in Haiti since its arrival in 2004. While there are many articles in Kreyol and French that
attest to this, here are a few in English:
The major cause of terrorism is foreign occupation.

Pape, Robert A. Its the Occupation, Stupid. Foreign policy. October 18 2010. Web. 1
December 2014.
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/18/it_s_the_occupation_stupid>.
New research provides strong evidence that suicide terrorism such as that of 9/11 is particularly
sensitive to foreign military occupation, and not Islamic fundamentalism or any ideology
independent of this crucial circumstance. Although this pattern began to emerge in the 1980s and
1990s, a wealth of new data presents a powerful picture. More than 95 percent of all suicide attacks
are in response to foreign occupation, according to extensive research that we conducted at the
University of Chicago's Project on Security and Terrorism, where we examined every one of the
over 2,200 suicide attacks across the world from 1980 to the present day. As the United States
has occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, which have a combined population of about 60 million, total
suicide attacks worldwide have risen dramatically -- from about 300 from 1980 to 2003, to 1,800
from 2004 to 2009. Further, over 90 percent of suicide attacks worldwide are now antiAmerican. The vast majority of suicide terrorists hail from the local region threatened by foreign
troops, which is why 90 percent of suicide attackers in Afghanistan are Afghans. Israelis have their
own narrative about terrorism, which holds that Arab fanatics seek to destroy the Jewish state because
of what it is, not what it does. But since Israel withdrew its army from Lebanon in May 2000,
there has not been a single Lebanese suicide attack. Similarly, since Israel withdrew from Gaza
and large parts of the West Bank, Palestinian suicide attacks are down over 90 percent.
Terrorism undermines the peace that the UN is trying to achieve; the situation in Iraq
shows how terrorism escalates after the occupiers leave.
Holmes, Michael. Inside Iraq: Two years after U.S. withdrawal, are things worse than
ever? CNN. 15 Jan 2014. Web. 3 Nov 2014.
<http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/13/world/meast/iraq-anbar-violence-holmes/>.
More than 8,000 people were killed in Iraq in 2013, according to the U.N. estimates -- most of
them innocent civilians caught up in the tempest of violence that grips their country. The
groundwork for today's problems began almost as soon as that last American convoy left in
2011. Sunni lawmakers protested the rounding up of many of their aides and security guards, and the
country's vice president -- top Sunni leader Tariq al-Hashimi -- faced arrest and later fled the country.
The government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was supposed to usher in a political era of
inclusion and reconciliation. His critics say those first days after the American departure were a signal
of opposite intentions that have continued to this day. The Sunni minority that had ruled Iraq via the
iron fist of Saddam Hussein was at the political and social mercy of al- Maliki's Shia-dominated
government. Today, they say, "inclusiveness" never materialized, Sunnis have been marginalized and
resentment has festered in a divide-and conquer political climate. As one local put it, "It's like if you're
against us, you're a terrorist and we'll arrest you." This resentment, aided by the violent government
shutdown of Sunni protest camps, provided an opening for the al Qaeda-linked Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to move into the Sunni heartland of Anbar Province in force. Al Qaeda is a
beast that feasts on discontent and in Anbar there is no shortage of sustenance. A previous
version of ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq, comprised the core insurgents the Americans fought in
those cities during the war. They have regrouped and strengthened across the border in Syria
during that country's bloody conflict -- and extended their fight for a home for their brand of
hard-line Islamism into Iraq.
Analysis: The easiest way to make sure that a judge understands this argument is to describe it as
you cant achieve peace through war. It intuitively sounds right, and will appeal especially to lay
judges. This argument shows that offensive PKOs will create a larger problem that the UN does have
the resources to handle. This kind of argument functions best under a framework that argues that peace
is the most important value. A peace framework allows the impact of escalating conflict to the most
important impact in the round.
USE OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES OFFENSIVELY MAY CREATE UNINTENDED

CONSEQUENCES-News Record '13
[UNITED NATIONS AUTHORIZES OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO; News Record; 30 July 2013; http://www.newsrecord.co/unitednations-authorizes-offensive-operations-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/; retrieved 4
December 2014]
Other experts worry about the long-term effects of having an offensive force under the
command of the United Nations. Resolution 2098 explains the individual goals and purpose for
FIB as, to prevent the expansion of all armed [rebel] groups, neutralize these groups, and to
disarm them. Pieter Vanholder, the DRC country director for the Life and Peace Institute, believes
that attempting to accomplish these goals may result in unintended consequences. Speaking to AlJazeera, Vanholder explained, The brigade may be seen as a kind of occupation force. As a
consequence it could become a push factor for some to join armed groups, adding to local
resistance.
Block Cards
A2: Offensive PKOs Necessary to Stop Rebel Groups

Defeat of M23 hasnt deterred other groups
Dr Robert Besseling, January 1, 2014, Besseling is a Senior Political Adviser to the IHS Country Risk and Forecasting
Sub-Saharan Africa team, Janes Intelligence Review, Elusive riches - Continued threats to the DRC's minerals trade
The defeat of the M23 has not succeeded in motivating many members of other rebel groups and
community-based Ma-Ma self-defence militias that operate within the region to surrender and disarm. On 3
December, UN under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations Herv Ladsous said that the FIB would engage these
other armed groups. The FIB is most likely to be deployed against collaborators of the M23, including some Ma Ma
groups in North and South Kivu, and other groups that operate in areas now effectively under FARDC control, such as the
Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS), based in the town of Masisi, North Kivu, and the
Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la Paix/Forces Populaires Congolaises (UPCP/FPC) in Lubero, also in North Kivu.
According to the UN Group of Experts, both of these groups are involved in the mining of columbite-tantalum and gold.
Cant defeat all of the rebel groups in the Congo

Sudarsan Raghavan, November 2, 2013, Washington Post, Raghavan has been The Post's Kabul bureau chief since 2014.
He was previously based in Nairobi and Baghdad for the Post, In Volatile Congo, A New UN Force with Teeth,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-un-force-with-teeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html DOA: 12-5-14
U.N. officials say a political solution is still the best path forward, but in a phone interview last week, Amani Kabasha, the
rebels political spokesman, said his group had lost trust in the U.N. mission because it was supporting Congolese forces.
Even if they kill all of the M23, another group will rise in our place, he warned. The intervention brigade is expected to
go after more than 40 other militias who are committing atrocities, stealing Congos mineral wealth and preventing the
government from functioning a task that seems virtually impossible. There is also the problem of perception. The
Enough Project, a human-rights group, said in a report last week that the brigade risks being seen, or being used, as a
pawn of Kinshasa, the capital. Both Kobler and Cruz said the brigade would not work with any Congolese army units that
have committed human-rights abuses. They also said the brigade would work at times on its own.
Answer: Peacekeepers Facilitate Peaceful Resolution to Conflict
The fundamental role of peacekeepers is to keep peace

Principles of UN peacekeeping, United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml
In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; and
being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the
peace.
Peacekeepers stopped violence by disarming rebels peacefully

Sierra Leone: A success story in peacekeeping, Major Peacekeeping Operations. 2005.
United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/2005/PDFs/major_pk_operat
ions.pdf
Over the course of its mandate, the UN disarmed more than 75,000 ex-fighters, including about
7,000 child soldiers; assisted in holding national and local government elections, which enabled
people to participate in decisions that affected their daily lives; helped to rebuild the countrys police
force to its pre-war strength and contributed towards rehabilitating the infrastructure and bringing
government services to local communities.
eSierra Leone demonstrates success in peaceful conflict resolution

Sierra Leone: A success story in peacekeeping, Major Peacekeeping Operations. 2005.
United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/2005/PDFs/major_pk_operations.pdf
In 1999, UN peacekeepers moved into Sierra Leone to oversee a feeble peace process which
included monitoring a shaky ceasefire and supporting a transition to democratic governance.
Since then, the UN has helped the war-ravaged country to make impressive gains towards peace,
demonstrating how the world body can respond to the needs and demands of countries
emerging from conflict in a rapidly changing global environment.
Answer: Peacekeeping operations succeed in the status quo without offensive capabilities
Impact: Peacekeeping operations are effective at preventing major conflict

Hegre, Havard. Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations.
University of Oslo. 2013 June 11.
http://havardhegre.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/pko_prediction_2012.pdf
Increasing PKO expenditures does not affect the probability that a country is in minor conflict in a
given year, but clearly reduces the probability of major conflict. Figure 3 shows the estimated
short-run effect on the risk of major conflict of the budget of PKO based on the results in Table 2.
Impact: Peacekeeping operations reduce conflict empirically

Hegre, Havard. Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations.
University of Oslo. 2013 June 11.
http://havardhegre.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/pko_prediction_2012.pdf
A conflict country where a peace-keeping operation with an annual budget of USD 15 million
per year is in place, has a 50% lower risk of major conflict than a conflict country without any
PKO. A mission with an annual budget of 500 million has more than 80% lower risk than the
no-PKO country.
Analysis: This series of answers functions extremely well for the negative because it paints the picture in the
judges mind that not only are peacekeeping operations the most peaceful form of conflict resolution, they are
actually empirically successful with what they do. While the affirmative will likely have many responses to this
argument, the judge is going to be inclined to believe the negative if they have never heard of peacekeepers
before. Additionally, one of the few general studies on the topic looking at peacekeeping operations and conflict
holistically concludes that the status quo peaceful solution works.
A2: Offensive Strikes are More Effective in Restoring Peace

Answer: UN offensive troops hurt civilians.
The DRC force has been accused of murder.

"Do Peacekeepers Have a Right to Fight?" BBC News. BBC, 03 Mar. 2005. Web. 02
Dec. 2014. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4315895.stm>.
The killings come just days after the deaths of nine Bangladeshi soldiers serving with the UN mission
in Congo (Monuc) in the north-eastern Ituri region. Ethnic Lendu villagers have accused UN
soldiers of massacring people, including women and children, at the height of a two-day counteroffensive in the area.
THIS IS IN THE CASE
Analysis: If they are hurting civilians, then clearly it is not beneficial to the local community for them
to be acting in an offensive manner.
A2: Offensive Peacekeeping will Benefit Developing Countries

Answer: Giving developing world soldiers more power will increase violence
These soldiers are often untrained, inexperienced and incapable of communicating with
the local people
Mendez, Juan. Standing for Change in Peacekeeping Operations. Project for a UN
Emergency Peace Service. May 2009.
http://www.globalactionpw.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/standing-for-change-final-may-09.pdf
Even if countries are willing to offer forces, the troops they contribute will almost certainly be
untrained for this type of mission; they will be operating in unfamiliar terrain; and by and
large will have no language ability to be applied in the region in question and no experience or
sensitivity to operate in vastly different cultural settings. Unfortunately, this excuse is given
credence by the behavior of some troops in recent peace-keeping operations, notably the participation
of international troops in sexual enslavement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (while successful
and exemplary conduct by most troops in other situations is not given due credit).
Answer: Peacekeepers commit violence against women
UN Peacekeepers have committed sexual violence against women in Haiti
Novick, Natalie. When those meant to keep peace commit sexualized violence. Women
Under Siege. 2012 May 25.
http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/when-those-meant-to-keepthe- peace-commitsexualized-violence
A young girl walks a short distance to visit her relatives in Haiti. But she doesnt get far before
men start harassing her, asking her to come with them. Their intentions are not even thinly
disguised, and this girl is just one of their many targets. But what may be surprising is exactly who
these men are. The unnamed girls quote is from a 2008 report by the U.K.-based nonprofit
organization Save the Children on sexualized violence toward children in conflict zones. The men she
mentions are from an international peacekeeping force more than 10,000-strong that has been in
her country since 2004: the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Perhaps not surprising
is that Haiti is not the only place where such propositions and sexual assaults are taking place. The
misconduct of peacekeeping forces in conflict zones has dogged the UN since the inception of the
peacekeeping program more than 50 years ago.
UN Peacekeepers have committed violence against women since the programs inception
http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/when-those-meant-to-keepthe-peace-commitsexualized-violence
The unnamed girls quote is from a 2008 report by the U.K.-based nonprofit organization Save the
Children on sexualized violence toward children in conflict zones.
The men she mentions are from an international peacekeeping force more than 10,000 strong that has
been in her country since 2004: the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Perhaps not
surprising is that Haiti is not the only place where such propositions and sexual assaults are
taking place. The misconduct of peacekeeping forces in conflict zones has dogged the UN since
the inception of the peacekeeping program more than 50 years ago.
Impact: UN Peacekeepers have raped and even fathered children in countries where
sexual violence is occurring
Save the Children found evidence that UN peacekeepers had raped young girls in the Ivory Coast,
southern Sudan, and Haiti. Cornell constitutional law scholar Muna
Ndulo recounted cases of UN peacekeepers fathering and subsequently abandoning children at the end
of their deployment. Ndulo quotes staggering numbers in his report: that UN peacekeepers have
fathered an estimated 24,500 babies in Cambodia and
6,600 in Liberia.
Analysis: While affirmative teams will likely focus on conventional conflict and violence, this gives
the negative team a unique way of generating offense in the rebuttal. Not only does this show that
peacekeepers are responsible for violence, it shows that they are responsible for an arguably more
horrific form of violence than the conventional conflict they are meant to prevent.
A2: The UN is obligated to save civilians with offense

Answer: This will increase risk of harm to civilians.
Offensive troops pose a greater ability to harm civilians.

Schilmoeller, Janessa. "DRC Awaits First-Ever Offensive UN Peacekeeping
Mission." MintPress News. N.p., 3 Apr. 2013. Web. 07 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.mintpressnews.com/drc-awaits-first-ever-offensive-unpeacekeepingmission/56747/>.
Yet, despite Ntagandas surrender and the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation
Framework, fighting continues to plague the DRC. The day after the U.N. authorized its offensive
mission, MONUSCO reported fighting in Kitchanga, North Kivu, which left 11 rebel combatants dead
and one Congolese Army soldier injured. Souhayr Belhassen, president of the International Federation
for Human Rights (FIDH), believes much more needs to be done to ensure human rights are protected
with the implementation of the U.N. intervention brigade. The incorporation of such an offensive
military force into a U.N. mission would mark an unprecedented change to the traditional
United Nations peacekeeping model and require stronger human rights protections mechanisms
to avoid increased harm to civilians, said Belhassen.
Analysis: If the top goal of the UN is to protect civilians, then this goal is clearly not being attained
when the actions taken net hurt them.
Answer: Intervening with force threatens the UNs reputation.
Harms to the local population would hurt the UNs reputation.

"UN Peace Operations and All Necessary Means." Journal of Managerial Issues 19.1
(2007): 7-10. Asian Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. 2013. Web. 7
Dec. 2014. <http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/docs/R2P%20Ideas%20in%20Brief/UN_Peace_O
perations_and_All_Necessary_Means.pdf>.
Firstly, proactive enforcement action may increase the risk of damage to the UNs fragile
reputation. Increased military activity brings heightened risk to populations in the areas of
operation. If the use of force by UN-mandated troops results in significant civilian casualties, the UN
and its peacekeeping apparatus will be adding to the insecurity of populations and would rightly be
subject to vilification. Even if force is employed responsibly and collateral damage is avoided,
there are often indirect albeit unintended consequences of action that may affect local
populations adversely and impact negatively on the UNs reputation.
If the UN doesnt succeed, then it looks extremely bad.

Dec. 2014. <http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/docs/R2P%20Ideas%20in%20Brief/UN_Peace_O
Furthermore, whilst operations might be effective in meeting short-term stabilisation
objectives, the repercussions could still produce a negative net effect for the overall endeavour.
For instance, if enforcement efforts come under sustained and/or revengeful attack or suffer
military defeats, the reputation of the UN as a whole will suffer. Likewise, conflict parties
temporarily degraded militarily may recover and return to attack civilian populations or humanitarian
actors perceived to be complicit in the politico-military efforts of UN-authourised entities. These
effects have the potential to undermine efforts to create a protective environment to the detriment of
the credibility of the UN and broader international community.
Analysis: If the reputation of the UN suffers, then its operational capacity as a whole will suffer,
making it less useful in future endeavors.
Answer: This action sets a very bad precedent for future peacekeeping.
Offensive operations justify future, more reckless, offense.
Dec. 2014.
<http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/docs/R2P%20Ideas%20in%20Brief/UN_Peace_O
Secondly, these qualitative shifts to mission postures and approaches to securing peace may set
a significant precedent that is difficult to replicate or sustain. If such robust postures register
military successes that lead to stabilisation in Mali and/or DRC, the UN will likely come under
increasing pressure to adopt a similar posture elsewhere. On-going challenges in Sudan/South
Sudan would make various missions there prime candidates, and future involvement in Syria and
adjustments in Lebanon may be influenced by such developments. Whilst resolution 2098 explicitly
states that the MONUSCO intervention brigade does not set a precedent,11 this caveat is unlikely to
hinder changing political realities or safeguard the traditional principles of peacekeeping if it is proven
or at least deemed to be an effective approach. Any groundswell of opinion in this regard could
overwhelm the need to focus on political processes and context-sensitive, case-by-case
approaches to specific conflicts. Furthermore, this would raise the spectre of further stretching
limited resources and unrealistic, if not reckless, calls to do more with less.
Analysis: A negative precedent could lead to harms in the future. As long term harms can very easily
to be proven to outweigh short term benefits, its clear that even if offense has a small success now, it
will backfire.
A2: Peacekeepers are of high quality

Answer: Peacekeepers are lacking in resources, clear goals, and discipline.
The quality of the troops depends on the member nations.

Cutillo, Alberto. Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for United Nations
Peacekeepers. N.p.: n.p., n.d. International Peace Institute, Aug. 2013. Web. 5
Dec. 2014.
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi_epub_deploying_the_be
st.pdf>.
While the importance of training was recognized in the Brahimi Report (2000), which
contained a number of recommendations in this area, only in 2008 did the UN draft its first
comprehensive strategy for training, and this is still in the process of being implemented. This
study discusses the main elements of that training strategy and evaluates the extent of its progress.
Training peacekeepers for service with the UN is not, however, the exclusive responsibility of the UN
Secretariat. Member states also have a crucial role to play. The UNs strategy will succeed only if
member states play their part. This study therefore also examines the role of UN member states,
focusing on a case study of one prominent international training center: the Center of Excellence for
Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Italy.
The training strategy needs to be improved, there is no way to evaluate peacekeepers.

Cutillo, Alberto. Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for United Nations
Peacekeepers. N.p.: n.p., n.d. International Peace Institute, Aug. 2013. Web. 5
Dec. 2014.
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi_epub_deploying_the_be
st.pdf>.
The UNs training strategy remains at an embryonic stage and needs to evolve on the basis of
current and future evaluations. Assessing the quality of training provided to UN peacekeepers
should be done in the broader context of measuring the effectiveness of individuals and units.
To date, however, no systematic performance indicators exist to evaluate UN peacekeepers.
Proposals have recently been circulated to address this issue but their implementation will require
time, considerable effort, and the overcoming of political opposition.
Peacekeeping operations are lacking in resources and have grandiose, unclear goals.
Zenko, Micah. "The Case for UN Peacekeeping." Council on Foreign Relations. Council
on Foreign Relations, 02 Mar. 2011. Web. 05 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/case-un-peacekeeping/p24277>.
The UN has entered an unprecedented era of demands and challenges. More troops than ever are
deployed in fifteen peacekeeping missions: The number of peacekeepers deployed has risen in the past
decade from twenty thousand to nearly one hundred thousand. Yet despite growing demand, the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) lacks adequate resources and well-trained
personnel to carry out complex, often-unrealistic mandates, and has struggled to work with
other UN agencies and regional partners. UN peacekeeping's shortcomings center on the tension
between the unrealistic expectations of the UN Security Council when it authorizes peacekeeping
and DPKO's insufficient resources to implement them UNSC mandates typically feature a
bloated list of wishful tasks, created without reference to field capacity, and have limited
guidelines for prioritization and termination.
Often peacekeepers are as bad as the militaries in the countries in terms of human rights
violations
Jordan, Michael J. "Sex Charges Haunt UN Forces." The Christian Science Monitor. The
Christian Science Monitor, 26 Nov. 2004. Web. 09 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1126/p06s02-wogi.html>.
It's their presence, human rights activists say, that underscores a troubling pattern:
While humanitarian interventions bring money, goodwill, and thousands of relief workers, they
also tend to fuel the practice of sex abuse, as in other foreign military operations from Congo to
Cambodia. It's a disturbing reminder, they say, of the darker side of peacekeeping and nationbuilding. "The issues with the UN is that peacekeeping operations unfortunately seem to be
doing the same thing that other militaries do," says Gita Sahgal, head of Amnesty
International's gender unit. "Even the guardians have to be guarded."
The United Nations needs to review its resource needs for peacekeepers
Zenko, Micah. "The Case for UN Peacekeeping." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign
Relations, 02 Mar. 2011. Web. 05 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/case-un-peacekeeping/p24277>.
Second, the United States should initiate a consultative review of DPKO's capability gaps involving
UN officials and representatives from major troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and policecontributing countries (PCCs). The first phase would identify and prioritize UN needs; the second
would match those needs with capabilities of the United States, TCCs, PCCs, and major donor
countries; the third would generate new countries' commitments to filling remaining peacekeeping
gaps. Based on the review, the United States should identify the most important gaps and
allocate resources accordingly. Particular attention should be paid to logistics (particularly
heavy lift), training (best practices and metrics), lessons learned from stability operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and intelligence sharing.
A2: Offensive Force is Best Done Multilaterally

Answer: Multilateral action is inefficient
It is difficult for countries to coordinate on the use of force

Poneman, Daniel. Multilateralism: Lessons from Iraq. The Henry L. Stimson Center.
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/27579/9/Chapter%208.%
20%20Multilateralism%20-%20Lessons%20from%20Iraq.pdf?1
Multilateralism is a hassle. It takes a lot of time and energy for a government to coordinate its
objectives, strategies, and tactics with other governments, each seeking to advance its own
sometimes widely divergentinterests and objectives. Resort to multilateralism can dilute a
governments central goals, divert efforts to secondary or tertiary fronts in a military or diplomatic
campaign, and create vested interests in third parties who seek to exploit the outcomes from any
success and duck those from any failure. Claims of credit and shifting of blame follow similar
patterns.
Impact: The slow process of multilateral action runs the risk of decreasing effectiveness
in stopping genocide.
Merely fulfilling an obligation to give a multilateral organization the right of first refusal before
seeking out a smaller coalition or acting unilaterally can be costly if the process of multilateral
deliberation slows down the deployment of military forces into a rapidly progressing conflict. If the
multilateral organization after due deliberation finally refuses to authorize or conduct the intervention,
both legitimacy and efficiency suffer.
Even if the multilateral imprimatur ultimately is obtained, postponing the intervention may mean a
much larger and costly operation has to be mounted in order to counter gains effectively that the
adversary meanwhile has achieved. Indeed, such mounting costs of delay finally may reduce the
willingness to mount a military action even on the part of those who earlier were ready to
intervene. This can be a serious problem in humanitarian crises as, for example, where
intercommunal conflict is escalating into ethnic cleansing on the way to genocide.
Analysis: The negative team can say that offensive force will expand the occupational power of the
UN, a multilateral organization, which is bad, because it will increase inefficiencies in responding to
conflict. Ultimately, this response is a critique of peacekeeping operations in general, which would
likely require a framework of some sort that says giving offensive capabilities to peacekeeping forces
increases their role, which is bad because they are bad for reasons including the fact that they are often
inefficient and responsible for being incapable of stopping conflict like genocide as a result.
Answer: Peacekeeping forces are hated by many countries and spread a negative image
Offensive forces by UN Peacekeepers have killed thousands in South Sudan

Rice, Xan. UN backed Congo military offensive a humanitarian disaster. The
Guardian. 13 October 2009.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/13/democratic-republic-of-congocivilian-deaths
A UN-backed offensive to destroy a Hutu rebel group in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
has had disastrous humanitarian consequences, with more than 1,000 civilians killed, 7,000
raped, and 900,000 forced from their homes.
Local people were upset with UN offensive actions

Rice, Xan. UN backed Congo military offensive a humanitarian disaster. The
Guardian. 13 October 2009.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/13/democratic-republic-of-congocivilian-deaths
A group of 84 local and international organisations today described the human
cost of the attempt to defeat the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda(FDLR) as
"unacceptable and disproportionate to the results it has achieved.
Peacekeepers commit sexual violence against women.

The unnamed girls quote is from a 2008 report by the U.K.-based nonprofit organization Save the
Children on sexualized violence toward children in conflict zones. The men she mentions are from an
international peacekeeping force more than 10,000 strong that has been in her country since 2004: the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Perhaps not surprising is that Haiti is not the only
place where such propositions and sexual assaults are taking place. The misconduct of
peacekeeping forces in conflict zones has dogged the UN since the inception of the peacekeeping
program more than 50 years ago.
Peacekeepers have raped and even fathered children of local women

http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/when-those-meant-to-keepthe- peace-commitsexualized-violence
Save the Children found evidence that UN peacekeepers had raped young girls in the Ivory Coast,
southern Sudan, and Haiti. Cornell constitutional law scholar Muna Ndulo recounted cases of UN
peacekeepers fathering and subsequently abandoning children at the end of their deployment. Ndulo
quotes staggering numbers in his report: that UN peacekeepers have fathered an estimated 24,500
babies in Cambodia and
6,600 in Liberia.
Analysis: This response criticizes offensive actions by the UN specifically, showing that when taken,
they have created more problems diplomatically and even delegitimized UN action as a whole. It also
discusses inherent problems that peacekeepers create in general through accusations of sexual assault.
This once again would work best with a framework that explains offensive capabilities just mean
giving more power to an organization that is bad in the first place.
A2: Offensive missions inspire new capabilities

Answer: New technology doesnt mean better fighting.
There are other factors that are more important to army success.
Kessler, Alex. "Do Better Weapons Win Wars? The Role of Technology in
Warfare." Triple Helix Online RSS. The Triple Helix Online, 2 Feb. 2011. Web.
02 Dec. 2014. <http://triplehelixblog.com/2011/02/do-better-weapons-win-warsthe-role-oftechnology-in-warfare/>.
How significant of a role does technological superiority assume in the determination of victory?
Though the study of Russia provides an interesting case in military history, it is no anomaly. War is a
chaotic system, infinitely complex in its variables and conditions, but analysis of recent and historical
conflicts suggest that some factors play larger roles than others in the decisiveness of war. The
advancement of weapons changes how wars are fought, but leadership, training, moral, and
most importantly, political strategy dictate how wars are won.
Analysis: If the new technology does not actually affect an armys success rate, then it is simply a
waste of new expenditures.
Answer: Most UN peacekeepers wouldnt be able to use new tech.
Most UN peacekeepers arent tech savvy so they might have trouble with new tech.
Piesing, Mark. "Smartphones, Drones and Social Media: Peacekeeping's Technological
Armoury (Wired UK)." Wired UK. N.p., 01 Aug. 2012. Web. 03 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-08/01/21st-century-peacekeeping>.
Walter Dorn, author of Keeping Watch: Monitoring, Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping
Operations, and a professor at the Royal Canadian Military College, is a regular consultant to the UN's
Department for Peacekeeping Operations. For him, it was "a bit of a shock", when he first saw the
footage at the UN's New York headquarters, as the organisation "usually kept this kind of thing to
themselves". According to Dorn, the average UN peacekeeper has "a technological capability
closer to a soldier from the 1950s than the 21st century". This is increasingly at odds with the techsavvy populations they are trying to protect.
Analysis: If soldiers couldnt use the new technology, then it being there wouldnt be very helpful to
their peacekeeping and wouldnt lead to benefits.
Answer: Much of the new tech would be restricted by where the UN acts.
There are several conditions and restrictions put in place by where the UN executes
missions, so its difficult to use new technology.
"Thematic Series on Building More Effective UN Peace Operations Technological
Innovations and Peace Operations." Center For International Cooperation. New
York University, 2011. Web. 3 Dec. 2014.
<http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/tech_innovations_june2012_en.pdf>.
DPKO has recently developed new policy guidelines and standard operating procedures,
however there are still a number of operational challenges for the use of monitoring and
surveillance technology in peacekeeping. The UN must lease expensive equipment from TCCs, but
contingentowned equipment (COE) standards are currently ill-defined, and the COE manual and Table
of Organization and Equipment (TOE), the standard list of components of a peacekeeping mission, do
not cover a number of important technologies. The UN lacks the requisite equipment to meet the
technological demands of many missions, and for the most expensive items, the use of contingent
capacities is essential. Many monitoring technologies, however, have become much cheaper in recent
years, and would fall within normal discretionary budgets. In addition to these challenges, because
many missions operate in remote locations, they must contend with intermittent power, poor
Internet access, and unreliable telecommunications, presenting further obstacles to the adoption
of sophisticated technology.
Analysis: New technology not being used refers back to the idea that its a waste of money and isnt
something worth attempting to attain through offensive operations.
Answer: New technology is expensive
The cost of the new technology is quite high and requires the UN to commit to several
steps to attain.
"Thematic Series on Building More Effective UN Peace Operations
Technological Innovations and Peace Operations." Center For
International Cooperation. New York University, 2011. Web. 3 Dec. 2014.
<http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/tech_innovations_june2012_en.pdf>.
DPKO has recently developed new policy guidelines and standard operating procedures, however
there are still a number of operational challenges for the use of monitoring and surveillance
technology in peacekeeping. The UN must lease expensive equipment from TCCs, but
contingentowned equipment (COE) standards are currently ill-defined, and the COE manual
and Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), the standard list of components of a
peacekeeping mission, do not cover a number of important technologies. The UN lacks the
requisite equipment to meet the technological demands of many missions, and for the most
expensive items, the use of contingent capacities is essential. Many monitoring technologies,
however, have become much cheaper in recent years, and would fall within normal discretionary
budgets. In addition to these challenges, because many missions operate in remote locations, they
must
contend with intermittent power, poor Internet access, and unreliable telecommunications, presenting
further obstacles to the adoption of sophisticated technology.
Analysis: Technology being expensive when it has already been proven to be unusable is clearly not
an investment that should be made.
A2: Multilateral Interventions Are More Effective

Answer: UN impartiality is not the only solution.
Non-United Nations operations have been seen as impartial

Sambanis, Nicholas. "Evaluating Multilateral Interventions in Civil Wars: A Comparison
of UN and Non-UN Peace Operations." (n.d.): n. pag. Yale University, 15 Dec.
2005. Web. 8 Dec. 2014.
There are other candidate explanations that our data do not allow us to fully evaluate.
One common conjecture is that non-UN missions do not benefit from the UNs
legitimacy premium and suffer because they are not perceived as impartial and thus fail
reassure the parties at critical junctures of the peace process. The key question remains,
however, what the effect of controlling for perceived impartiality would be in our
models. There have been non-UN missions that have been perceived at least as
impartial as some UN missions, so if we were able to measure and control for this in
our analysis, it is possible that the significance and magnitude of the effects of nonUN operations could increase. Controlling for perceived impartiality could also affect
the significance and magnitude of the coefficients for UN operations. However, measuring perceived
impartiality of a UN mission may be too difficult if not impossible.
Non-United Nations operations have had success

Sambanis, Nicholas. "Evaluating Multilateral Interventions in Civil Wars: A Comparison of UN and
Non-UN Peace Operations." (n.d.): n. pag. Yale University, 15 Dec.
2005. Web. 8 Dec. 2014.
We find some evidence that non-UN peace operations complement UN operations in
peacebuilding efforts and that non-UN operations undertaken by militarily advanced
countries may be more successful at preventing the recurrence of war. We discuss candidate
explanations of these results in light of the ecological model and propose an agenda for further
research on the design of peacekeeping operations.
In some cases unilateral force is the only option

Hilpold, Peter. "From Humanitarian Intervention To Responsibility To Protect: Making
Utopia True?" (N.D.): N. Pag. 7 Dec. 2010. Web. 8 Dec. 2014.
<Http://Www.Peterhilpold.Com/Wp-Content/Uploads/2014/03/Hilpold19.Pdf>.
As is known, the prohibition of the use of force according to Article 2(4) UN Charter worked quite
well. The number of international wars diminished visibly. At the same time, however, armed internal
conflicts augmented in number and intensity. The Security Council was severely blocked by the Cold
War and it was not even clear whether it was authorized to intervene in such cases in the first place.
Given this legal framework and political reality, in the face of massive human rights violations
third States were faced with the following dilemma: it was very likely that the State community
would not intervene, but a unilateral intervention was tantamount to a violation of international
law. The intervener could only hope that in view of the ever growing network of international
human rights its international responsibility would be mitigated in view of the valuable goals
pursued. This mitigation would, most probably, not go so far as to wipe out responsibility altogether
as it was clear that the State community wanted to attribute primary importance to Article 2(4) UN
Charter.
In many cases due to conflicts of interest, the United Nations is unable to act in a crisis
Staff, CNN. "Russia, China Block Syria from Facing International Criminal Court."
CNN. Cable News Network, 23 May 2014. Web. 08 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/22/world/syria-un/index.html>.
Russia and China vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution Thursday that would have asked
the International Criminal Court to investigate war crimes in Syria. They were the only two of
15 countries to vote against the resolution. The move came as no surprise. Throughout the conflict
in Syria, Russia and China -- both permanent council members -- have repeatedly used their
veto power to block resolutions tough on the Syrian regime.The United States and other
countries slammed the action Thursday. "Because of the decision of the Russian Federation to
back the Syrian regime no matter what it does, the Syrian people will not see justice today. They
will see crime but not punishment," Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations,
told the council after the vote.
In many cases due to conflicts of interest, the United Nations is unable to act in a crisis
Staff, CNN. "Russia, China Block Syria from Facing International Criminal Court."
CNN. Cable News Network, 23 May 2014. Web. 08 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/22/world/syria-un/index.html>.
Russia and China vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution Thursday that would have asked
the International Criminal Court to investigate war crimes in Syria. They were the only two of
15 countries to vote against the resolution. The move came as no surprise. Throughout the conflict
in Syria, Russia and China -- both permanent council members -- have repeatedly used their
veto power to block resolutions tough on the Syrian regime.The United States and other
countries slammed the action Thursday. "Because of the decision of the Russian Federation to
back the Syrian regime no matter what it does, the Syrian people will not see justice today. They
will see crime but not punishment," Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations,
told the council after the vote.
A2: United Nations operations cause less internal backlash

Answer: The United Nations is not always perceived to be as impartial as it would like to be in a
conflict
Some countries see United Nations interventions as pushing western political goals
"To Protect Sovereignty, or to Protect Lives?" The Economist. The Economist
Newspaper, 17 May 2008. Web. 08 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.economist.com/node/11376531>.
Taken up by a High-Level Panel on UN reform in 2004 and adopted by Kofi Annan, then UN
secretary-general, the principle survived the haggling in the run-up to the 2005 World Summit
to squeeze its way into the final Outcome Document, though shorn of criteria. But it was never
intended to cope with the aftermath of natural disasters or even ordinary human-rights
violations. It was to be invoked only for genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against
humanity. From the start, the idea was viewed by the developing world as a trick by the West to
impose its values. Cuba, Egypt, Russia, Algeria and Myanmar have been vocal opponents. They
have been leading a determined effort to obstruct the formal appointment of Edward Luck, a professor
at Columbia University, as a special UN adviser on the issue. He still has no salary, no real title and no
UN office.
State sovereignty trumps all

"To Protect Sovereignty, or to Protect Lives?" The Economist. The Economist
Newspaper, 17 May 2008. Web. 08 Dec. 2014.<http://www.economist.com/node/11376531>.
Tension between those two principlessovereignty versus interventionhas been palpable for
decades. Some countries stress the enforcement powers laid down by Chapter VII. Others
(mostly in the poor world) insist that state sovereignty always trumps, even in humanitarian
emergencies. In practice, since the end of the cold war the UN has been intervening more often in
conflicts within (as opposed to between) states. Sometimes it has happened with, and sometimes
without, the consent of the governments concerned.
United Nation peacekeeping operations are not seen as neutral when they act offensively
Bernard, Vincent. "NSAs-IHL-IRRC." Scribd. International Review of the Red Cross,
June 2011. Web. 09 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.scribd.com/doc/91861749/NSAs-IHL-IRRC>.
Following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s UN peacekeepers began to be deployed in new and
more challenging places, such as Somalia in 1992 and Liberia in 1993. The nature of conflict was
changing, and intra-state conflicts, often with multiple internal armed groups, usually meant that one
or more of the armed actors did not consent to the involvement of peacekeepers. The potential for
peacekeepers to become targets of violence dramatically increased. Their neutrality was also
increasingly compromised by calls from concerned governments and humanitarian actors for them to
engage in the protection of civilians, which often demands that peacekeepers take action that will put
them at odds with armed groups involved in the conflict.
United Nations Peacekeepers have been targeted in countries they operate in, they are
obviously not seen as impartial mediators.
Alfred, Charlotte. "Syria Rebels Attack UN Peacekeepers In Golan Heights." The
Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 30 Aug. 2014. Web. 09 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/30/syria-un-peacekeepersattacked_
n_5740840.html>.
Clashes erupted between al-Qaida-linked Syrian rebels and U.N. peacekeepers in the Golan
Heights on Saturday after the militants surrounded their encampment, activists and officials
said, as the international organization risked being sucked further into the conflict. Other U.N.
peacekeepers were able to flee from a different encampment that that was also surrounded by rebels of
the Nusra Front, al-Qaida's Syrian affiliate, they said.Late Saturday, the U.N. spokesperson's office
reported that "the situation on the ground is calm but tense' in the Golan. The clashes came after
Syrian rebel groups, including the Nusra Front, overran the Quneitra crossing located on the
frontier between Syrian and Israeli controlled parts of the Golan Heights on Wednesday,
seizing at least 44 Fijian peacekeepers.
Analysis: In the status quo, the United Nations does not always seek the consent of all parties
involved in a conflict (like it used to) before sending peacekeepers. At the point where United Nations
peacekeeping forces are being targeted in the areas they go into it is obvious that the parties who do
not give consent see them as hindrances to victory. This idea would only be reenforced if these
peacekeepers began to take offensive actions.
A2: Genocide Prevention

Answer: Peacekeepers arent effective enough.
Peacekeepers currently work, they just need better equipment.
Heaton, Laura. "The UN Standard to Prevent Genocide, 10 Years Later." The Christian
Science Monitor. The Christian Science Monitor, 23 Jan. 2012. Web. 05 Dec.
2014.
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2012/0123/The-UNstandardto-prevent-genocide-10-years-later>.
The UNs strategy for protecting civilians in the case of Jonglei consisted primarily of instructing
civilians to flee. The UN mission sent 500 combat-ready peacekeepers and around 300
supporting peacekeepers to the area, under the missions Chapter VII mandate that enables
them to fire on would-be aggressors in defense of civilians. But up against approximately 6,000
Lou Nuer militia men with the stated aim to wipe Murle out,** and without the adequate
equipment for transportation, urging people to fleeeffectively encouraging a humanitarian
emergency that has now left an estimated 120,000 people in need of assistancebecame the least
bad option. In the end, because of the UNs action, the Lou Nuer offensive proved far less deadly
than initially anticipated. But urging civilians to hide in the bush, where they become vulnerable
to other threats, hardly seems like a sustainable long-term approach to protection.
Resources were what was needed the most to act and prevent genocide, not offense
2014.
We saw [the violence] coming weeks before. Yet we were not able to stop it - unfortunately. Nor
was the government, which like others has primary responsibility for protecting its citizens. The
reason was painfully simple: we were denied the use of necessary resources ... in particular
helicopters that would have given us mobility to bring all the UN peacekeepers where there are
no roads except by air mobility. At the critical moment, I was reduced to begging for
replacements from neighboring countries and missions. With limited resources, we tried our
best. So, a key challenge in putting the Responsibility to Protect into practice is this: how do we do
our job, how do we deliver on Security Council mandates, when the very members of the Council do
not give us the support we need.
Many viable nonviolent solutions exist to stop genocide

2014. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2012/0123/The-UNstandard-toprevent-genocide-10-years-later>.
In hindsight, far more needed to be done in Jonglei to mediate between the rival Lou Nuer and Murle,
such as engaging the young men who would become implicated in the violence in reconciliation
efforts. The South Sudan government should have gotten more deeply involved in addressing past
grievances between the communities. In other words, key preventative efforts could have been
attempted to potentially avert the explosive attacks and counter-attacks that are still ongoing.
In Rawanda the peacekeepers were pulled out much too quickly and could have saved
hundreds of thousands of lives.
Stanton, Gregory H. "Genocide Watch." Genocide Watch. N.p., 2003. Web. 05 Dec.
2014. <http://www.genocidewatch.org/howpreventgenocideic.html>.
Then when the genocide actually began in April, General Dallaire desperately asked for a Chapter
Seven mandate and reinforcements to protect the thousands of Tutsis who had taken refuge in
churches and stadiums. Led by the U.S., the Security Council instead voted to pull out all 2500
UNAMIR troops. General Dallaire has since said that even those troops could have saved
hundreds of thousands of lives.
In the status quo peacekeepers are doing what they did not do in the past to prevent
genocide.
"Rwanda, Genocide, Hutu, Tutsi, Mass Execution, Ethnic Cleansing, Massacre, Human
Rights, Victim Remembrance, Education, Africa." UN News Center. UN, n.d.
Web. 03 Dec. 2014. <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgpreventgenocide.shtml>.
When efforts to prevent conflict fail, one of the highest priorities must be to protect civilians.
Wherever civilians are deliberately targeted because they belong to a particular community, there is a
risk of genocide. Over the last decade, the UN Security Council has frequently expanded the
mandate of UN peacekeepers so that they can physically protect civilians who are threatened
with violence. Today, UN peacekeeping missions regularly help national authorities to establish
effective arrangements for investigating and prosecuting serious violations of the law; disarm
and demobilize fighters and help to reintegrate them into the community; enforce special
measures to protect women and girls from sexual violence; and report on any "hate media"
inciting people to genocide, crimes against humanity or other violations of international
humanitarian law.
Analysis: Preemptive violence is not the answer to prevent genocide. In the past peacekeepers were
under equipped, removed too quickly, and not given enough leeway to defend citizens from
aggressors. Thankfully, all of those issues are being fixed which makes granting offensive power to
peacekeepers necessary.
A2: Enforcement of International Law

Answer: It is not necessarily the duty of the United Nations to enforce international law
Using force is a slippery slope which could overall decrease the support the United
Nations has
"Principles of UN Peacekeeping. United Nations Peacekeeping." UN News Center. UN,
n.d. Web. 03 Dec. 2014. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml>.
A UN peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort. It should always be
calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum
force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate.
The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often give
rise to unforeseen circumstances.
UN peacekeepers could be defended by other forces.

Nichols, Michelle. "U.N. Security Council Approves Creation of Mali Peacekeeping
Force." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 25 Apr. 2013. Web. 05 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/25/us-mali-crisis-unidUSBRE93O0R420130425>.
France has started withdrawing its 4,000-strong force and plans to have just 1,000 by the end of the
year. Paris had said Mali's North was in danger of becoming a springboard for extremist attacks on the
region and the West. "France is committed to standing by the
Malian people," said French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius in a statement. French forces would be
able to intervene to support MINUSMA when peacekeepers are "under imminent and serious
threat and upon the request of the secretary-general," according to the resolution.
Currently it is unclear how international law enforcement impacts peacekeeping

missions
Shareen, Scott P. "Contemporary Issues in UN Peacekeeping and International Law.
Hamilton, N.Z.: Population Studies Centre, U of Waikato, 1997. Institute for
Democracy & Conflict Resolution, Feb. 2011. Web. 5 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/02_11.pdf>.
Much is needed in the way of analysing the applicability of international human rights law to
UNPKOs. The plethora of instances in which UN Peacekeepers arealleged to have committed
human rights violations, from involvement in human trafficking to allegations of illegal
detention and mistreatment in UNPKOs, makes this an urgent imperative. While some
flexibility in the policy framework has been necessary as UN Peacekeeping has evolved, the lack
of a foundational legal framework has led to the policybased principles of human rights being
treated as almost irrelevant in some cases. The lack of a legal framework and understanding of
how IHRL applies to UNPKOs has resulted in ad-hoc approaches which have led to violations
and inconsistent implementation of IHRL by UNPKOs.
More research needs to be done to apply international law to these missions.

Shareen, Scott P. "Contemporary Issues in UN Peacekeeping and International Law.
Hamilton, N.Z.: Population Studies Centre, U of Waikato, 1997. Institute for
Democracy & Conflict Resolution, Feb. 2011. Web. 5 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/02_11.pdf>.
Accordingly, research in this field is required, particularly detailed analysis of how and to what
extent, IHRL binds the UN, and being carried out by the UN Peacekeeping Law Reform Project at the
University of Essex. Research on the functions carried out by UNPKOs, together with the specific
application of particular rights in a UN Peacekeeping context (such as the right not to be
arbitrarily detained), would be useful to help piece together a universal application of IHRL to
the UN. Further to this research, detailed work is also needed on both the policy and legal sides
to understand better which mechanisms would be most sensible to operationalise the application
of IHRL to the UN.
Analysis: It is important to remember that UNPOK stands for United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations and IHRL stands for International Human Rights Laws
There are many documented cases of human rights violations done by peacekeepers
Jordan, Michael J. "Sex Charges Haunt UN Forces." The Christian Science Monitor. The
Christian Science Monitor, 26 Nov. 2004. Web. 05 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1126/p06s02-wogi.html>.
In Kosovo, some of these women "are threatened, beaten, raped, and effectively imprisoned by their
owners," Amnesty International reported in May. "With clients including international police and
troops, the girls and women are often too afraid to escape, and the authorities are failing to help them.
It is outrageous that the very same people who are there to protect these women and girls are
using their position and exploiting them instead - and they are getting away with it." But the
problem goes beyond Kosovo and sex trafficking. Wherever the UN has established operations in
recent years, various violations of women seem to follow: A prostitution ring in Bosnia involved
peacekeepers, while Canadian troops there were accused of beatings, rape, and sexually abusing
a handicapped girl. Local UN staff in West Africa reportedly withheld aid, such as bags of
flour, from refugees in exchange for sexual favors. Jordanian peacekeepers in East Timor were
accused of rape. Italian troops in Somalia and Bulgarian troops in Cambodia were accused of
sexual abuses. In May, Moroccan and Uruguayan peacekeepers in Congo were accused of
luring teenage girls into their camp with offers of food for sex. The girls then fed the banana and
cake remuneration to their infants, whom media reported had been born as a result of multiple
rapes by militiamen.
A2: Offensive Operations allow for Cyber-peacekeeping

Answer: The UN peacekeepers dont have digital capabilities
They dont currently have the digital knowhow.

Mathisen, Georg. "Peacekeeping from Cyberspace." Sciencenordic.com. N.p., 20 Jan.
2014. Web. 02 Dec. 2014. <http://sciencenordic.com/peacekeeping-cyberspace>.
Now the duties of multinational forces range from the traditional protection of civilians and attempts
to keep the peace, with force if necessary, to efforts at starting up new states with all the institutional
trimmings a society needs, both during and after a conflict. But NUPIs John Karlsrud says that
todays peacekeepers are not fully equipped to make use of our current digital reality. Karlsrud
has written a chapter addressing these ideas in the recent book Cyber Space and International
Relations (Springer, Berlin 2013).
Analysis: This is simply pointing out the Pros impacts are not feasible as the peacekeepers currently
do not have the capabilities to carry out the actions. This does not respond to cyber capabilities good
claims, it simply responds to feasibility.
Answer: This is premature because the definitions for such attacks havent even been designed.
A definition for Cyber Attacks and force in the area of cyber warfare doesnt exist.
Phneah, Ellyne. "Idea of Cyber Peacekeepers Premature, 'redundant' | ZDNet." ZDNet. N.p., 06 Feb.
2012. Web. 02 Dec. 2014. <http://www.zdnet.com/idea-of-cyberpeacekeepers-premature-redundant2062303742/>.
"While the idea is interesting and useful, [but practically speaking], it's hard to envision the
deployment as there is no physical or visible battlefield for cyber warfare and hence cyber troops,
peacekeepers or otherwise," he said. Another security watcher, Kurt Baumgartner, also noted
there is no existing military doctrine or legal framework that defines what cyber incidents can
be considered as acts of war, which makes the proposed concept of cyber peacekeepers
premature. "It's the wrong solution for a completely different set of problems," the senior security
researcher at Kaspersky Labs told ZDNet Asia in an e-mail. The three were replying to the comments
made by John Burngarner, who is from the U.S. cyber consequences unit in Washington, in a BBC
report last month, in which he said there is a need for a virtual peacekeeping force.
Analysis: If it is premature and outlines havent been set up, then setting up the cyber peacekeepers
wouldnt and shouldnt be a priority for the UN.
Answer: This is redundant because there are already other organizations designed for the same
process.
This is a waste of expenditures.
Phneah, Ellyne. "Idea of Cyber Peacekeepers Premature, 'redundant' | ZDNet." ZDNet.
N.p., 06 Feb. 2012. Web. 02 Dec. 2014. <http://www.zdnet.com/idea-of-cyberpeacekeeperspremature-redundant-2062303742/>.
John Ong, regional director of South Asia at Check Point Software, described the concept of cyber
peacekeepers as similar to a governmental employee working for the Internet regulatory authority.
Their job scope would be to define, observe and legislate to maximum compliance, and provide
regulatory recommendations to improve existing laws to curb and minimize breaches, he added in his
e-mail. However, he felt that deploying such peacekeepers would be "redundant". This is
because there are already peacekeeping efforts in the form of inter-government cooperation to
curb Web breaches, as well as those from educational and non-profit advocacy organizations, he
explained. "Therefore, creating yet another redundant hierarchy or organization would not
enhance peace, [but] merely adds to expenditure," Ong stated. Anthony Lim, regional director of
SecureAge, agreed with Ong's definition of cyber peacekeepers and their job scopes, but added that it
would be difficult for such a force to patrol the cyber arena or prevent any offensive action by
cybercriminals or governmental agencies.
Analysis: There is no point in making an action if it is a waste of expenditures and will lead to no
benefit. In fact, if it is wasting money that is offense for the neg because its taking away from the
UNs ability to act in other arenas.
A2: R2P Expands Sovereignty

Defense of r2p misdefine sovereignty the redefinition still erodes it
Gay 7/23/13
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-deceptive-appeal-the-responsibility-protect-8764
John Allen Gay is an assistant managing editor at The National Interest. His book (co-authored with Geoffrey Kemp) War
with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences was released by Rowman and Littlefield in early 2013, The
National Interest, July 23, The Deceptive Appeal of the Responsibility to Protect, DOA: 12-7-14
The third pillar is where the rub is. The notion that the international community has an obligation to become
involved in a country under certain circumstances, regardless of what its government says, appears to erode national
sovereignty. Albright and Williamson charge that this is a misperceptionin fact, they say, R2P is designed
to reinforce, not undermine, national sovereignty. It places primary emphasis on the duty of states to protect their own
people and its complementary focus on helping governments improve their capacities to fulfill their commitments. In
other words, R2P expands the concept of sovereignty sovereignty includes not only rights, but also responsibilities,
responsibilities which states should help each other fulfill. Sovereignty here is so sacrosanct that states failing to exercise it
fully lose their title to itOnly when a government fails or refuses to live up to the responsibility of sovereignty does it
run the risk of outside intervention. Yet this is a curious way to construe sovereignty . Sovereignty becomes not
merely an empirical fact about states that is prudently respected, but a right entrusted from on high; given that the
right passes to the international community when abused, it would seem this sovereignty sees the world as a federation.
International institutionstreated in the report as the final authorities on third-pillar actionsgraciously devolve their
responsibilities to local viceroys and governors-general, whom it may relieve of their duties if their failures are severe
enough. Its not really sovereignty, thenits mere administrative convenience.
A2: R2P Doesnt kill Sovereignty - its Preventive

Even if its prevention, the doctrine still kills sovereignty
Gay 7/23/13
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-deceptive-appeal-the-responsibility-protect-8764
John Allen Gay is an assistant managing editor at The National Interest. His book (co-authored with Geoffrey Kemp) War
with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences was released by Rowman and Littlefield in early 2013, The
National Interest, July 23, The Deceptive Appeal of the Responsibility to Protect, DOA: 12-7-14
Albright and Williamson might reply that all these worries repeat the error of assuming that R2P is mainly about its
third pillar, when in fact R2P is at its core an instrument of prevention. It does not mandate military action by the
United States or others. The idea is to generate preventive diplomacy, increased development aid, sanctions, and other tools
to avoid the military options that might be necessary when prevention fails and atrocities commence. The second pillar,
for them, bears the most weight. et the way Albright and Williamson envision this pillar working is also a threat to
sovereignty. They imply this in the Politico op-ed they released to plug the report, as they note that Syria today presents
us with a stark reminder of the high human costs of equivocation. As Assad began to turn state organs into his own tool of
repression, R2Ps preventive underpinnings were rightfully called into question ... Indeed. No preventive
action could have kept Assad from turning the states institutions into tools of repression while also
respecting Syrian sovereignty, because Assads rule was already repressive. As in most autocracies, the government
could not become less repressive without endangering its continued hold on power. Assad was thus likely to regard the
second-pillar efforts that would have been necessary to stabilize prewar Syria as a threat, and to refuse them. (Indeed, other
autocracies, such as Russia and Egypt, have similarly refused such help.) So should these second-pillar measures be
conducted over a governments objections? If not, theyll often be insufficient; if so, sovereignty is further
eroded. Yet Albright and Williamson pass over this problem in silence.
A2: Safeguards Protect Sovereignty

R2P safeguards AUGMENT erosion of sovereignty
Menon 6/12/13
http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/06/12/its-fatally-flawed/
Rajan Menon is Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science, City College of New York/City University of
New York, and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
R2Ps originators anticipated that any prescription perceived as proposing lax criteria for the use of force would be dead
on arrival, so the ICISS report and follow-on publications of its ilk have bowed before the shrine of sovereignty.
They affirm that the obligation to protect people rests in the first instance with the governments that have jurisdiction over
them, but they add that when a state cannot or will not protect human rights, the responsibility shifts to the international
community, which means, ideally, the UN girded with Security Council authorization, or in a pinch regional organizations
if they promise subsequently to seek UNSCR approval. R2P proponents take pains to explain that the concept is not a
pretext for military intervention. Force, Gareth Evans tirelessly reiterates, should be used only during human rights
emergencies and only following the failure of diplomacy, mediation, naming and shaming, and sanctions. Even then, he
stresses, feasibility, risks, proportionality and the prospects for success must be weighed. (There is more than a dollop of
just war theory in R2P; Augustine and Aquinas would be proud.) R2Ps expositors also recommend various
preventive measures: early-warning mechanisms, pre-crisis mediation, peacekeeping, economic assistance and postconflict reconstruction.2 Yet the reassurances that force would be a rare, last-ditch response have not placated
critics, for several reasons. R2Ps pre-intervention prescriptions merely repeat existing remedies and add
nothing to diplomacys toolkit. Whats new is the casuistry of reframing and diminishing sovereignty in order to
legitimize altruistic armed intervention in defense of the abstract rights that most political communities agree upon
in theory. Given R2Ps emphasis on feasibility and the chances for success, weak states are its most likely proving
grounds; powerful ones need not fear, no matter the magnitude of their misdeeds. Because idealism and power are
inextricably intertwined, with the latter frequently corrupting the former, R2P provides powerful states one script for
playing the Good Samaritan when intervention promotes their interests, and another for eschewing or opposing aid when it
doesnt.
A2: N/U Sovereignty is Down Now

Aff is unique sovereignty is strong HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION is the ONLY
cause
Chirstensen 3/2/12
http://notesonliberty.com/2012/03/02/bizarre-love-triangle-towards-a-new-internationalism/
Brandon Christensen (follow him on Twitter) received his B.A. in cultural anthropology from UCLA in 2013, where he
also minored in Middle Eastern and African studies. His writings have been featured in the Freeman and at
RealClearHistory. He was born in the middle of Utah, raised in a small Northern California town, and spent two years
attending a community college in Santa Cruz before moving to Los Angeles. He is interested in pre-colonial polities,
property rights, ethnicity, and international trade.
Perhaps, but I strongly disagree with Dr. Larisons observations here. Not with the notion that weaker states have
selfish interests too, but rather with the argument that state sovereignty has been eroding precipitously over the
past twenty years. To the isolationist, free trade and international governance (including military alliances) are necessarily
bad things for a state and its sovereignty, because these concepts are perceived to be taking away from the ability of a state
to make decisions in its own interests. Yet the major powers and, to a lesser extent, the regional powers of the world
are largely able to do what they want in terms of formulating domestic and foreign policies. Just think of the recent
attempt by Brazil and Turkey to get Iran to play nice with its nuclear technology. With the exception of the United States in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the weak states of the world and their predation by major powers seems only to be
occurring along peripheries of the major powers territories, specifically in the region of the world traditionally under
Russian influence. And even these predatory practices of the Russian state are largely aimed at defending Moscows
peripheries from the incursions into region by the American state. So I would look at the situation of weak states outside
the peripheries of great powers not as a steady erosion of state sovereignty, but as the last stage of colonization by
Europeans a century ago. The weakness in these states was inherent from the beginning, as they were largely constructed
to extract resources for shipment to European industry and to ensure that recently conquered non-Western rivals, whether
monarchies, confederations, city-states, or empires, remained conquered once and for all. In order for a state to have
sovereignty, it needs to be recognized by its own people as legitimate, and not by major powers (though it certainly helps!),
and the structure of weak states, at least outside the peripheries of major powers, is illegitimate in the eyes of most the
people living within these states. Dr. Larison continues: If there is one thing more misguided than organizing foreign
policy around humanitarian and democratist meddling in the affairs of other nations, it has to be the revival of the liberal
nationalist conceit that there should be an independent nation-state for every group that wants one. Hardly. The
Wilsonian notions of humanitarian intervention and democratic nation-building are easily the most
misguided ideals being espoused throughout Washington today, and the fact that some of the idealists over at Foreign
Policy have latched onto liberal nationalism as a way to promote their misguided policies should not deter us from the fact
that the United States has not pursued nor promoted liberal nationalism in its foreign policy since Wilsons
disastrous meddling in Europe over (nearly) a century ago. Let us be clear: the NATO excursions into the Balkans had
nothing to do with promoting liberal nationalism, and everything to do with humanitarian intervention, democratic statebuilding, and geostrategic maneuvering. The military excursions into Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, and God
knows where else over the past twenty years have nothing to do with the concept of liberal nationalism and everything
to do with humanitarian intervention, democratic state-building, and/or geostrategic maneuvering. Liberal
nationalism, as it is promoted by the idealists, is extremely new on the scene in D.C. and is probably just one
of the many, many fads that swing through the capital and are used to apply humanitarian intervention and
democratic state-building to foreign policy proposals.
All Con Cards
Offensive PKOs Bad
Militarism/Colonialism
Offensive peacekeeping embraces militarism and colonialism
East African, April 26, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UN
intervention missions
Since then, the UN has swung like a pendulum in both theory and praxis from its traditional noncombative and "neutral" peacekeeping model to a new militaristic approach that has seen its forces
embroiled in combat in African theatres of war. This follows a new tendency by major global powers at the
helm of the United Nations Security Council to pursue a more militaristic approach, which is turning UN
missions into "combative peacekeeping." This has fuelled scepticism about the neutrality of UN missions
and the behind-the-scenes role of former European colonial powers in these missions.
Dont Solve Violence

Offensive peacekeeping cant resolve the structural causes of violence
East African, April 26, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UN
intervention missions
But the new UN interventionism has its fierce critics. Jean-Marie Guehenno, the United Nations
peacekeeping chief from 2000 to 2008, has cautioned against the thinking that a combative mission will
resolve conflicts in Africa, particularly Congo's quagmire. Offensive peacekeeping cannot be relied upon to
resolve the structural causes of the conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan or eastern DRC, which often have
regional dimensions and linkages in neighbouring countries. These pundits want the UN to pursue a solution
that will involve willing heads of
state from the region. They say that it is "not a SWAT team that's going to clean up a bad
neighbourhood That requires politics."
An offensive force could encourage the involvement of more groups

News Record, July 30, 2013, United Nations Authorizes Offensive Operations in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, http://www.newsrecord.co/united-nations- authorizes-offensive-operations-in-thedemocratic-republic-of-the-congo/
Pieter Vanholder, the DRC country director for the Life and Peace
Institute, believes that attempting to accomplish these goals may result in
unintended consequences. Speaking to Al-Jazeera, Vanholder explained,
The brigade may be seen as a kind of occupation force. As a consequence
it could become a push factor for some to join armed groups, adding to
local resistance.
Undermine Impartiality
Offensive peacekeeping kills the UNs role as a mediator
Africa Policy Brief, April 1, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UN intervention missions,
http://www.africapi.org/wp- content/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No1-April2014.pdf DOA: 12-7-14
Also worrying experts is that the new militarism is radically changing the way the UN has been perceived in
conflict situations. "The bigger danger is that when the UN becomes a combatant on the ground it loses
what has been its unique role of having been a potential mediator of being the impartial outsider," said Mr
Laurenti. Others feel that the shift to a combative style can compromise the image of the UN peacekeeping
forces as neutral actors in conflicts. "It may compromise the neutrality and impartiality which we find
essential to the organisation's peacekeeping. Its presence should be perceived by all parties as that of an
honest broker, and not a potential party to the conflict," said Gert Rosenthal, the envoy of Guatemala, a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council.
Lack of impartiality has undermined peacekeeping in the Sudan
The impartiality dilemma Beyond Congo, UN interventionism is facing an "impartiality" dilemma. The role
of the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has caused friction with the leaders in Juba, who are trying to
quell an insurgency led by the former vice-president Riek Machar. Following the outbreak of violence in
December 2013, the UN Security Council approved with unprecedented speed a request by SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon to boost the strength of the UNMISS to 12,500 troops and 1,323 police, up from 7,000
troops and 900 police. The perception of the lack of impartiality of the UN force by Juba has created
acrimony. In January, South Sudan president Salva Kiir accused the UN peacekeeping mission of acting like
a "parallel government" in his country. It did not help matters that in March, UN trucks that were
supposedly carrying food were found to be carrying weapons and blankets that Juba suspected to be
destined for the rebels.
Offensive peacekeeping operations undermine UN credibility needed to resolve future

crises
Austin Bay, 12-13-13, Sun Journal (Lewiston, Maine), December 13, 2013
Austin Bay: U.N. trying peacekeeping with fangs
But as for the U.N. ordering its well-equipped military units to destroy specific combatant factions?
Critics of offensive mandates authorizing the
"neutralization" of specific factions contend, with good reason, that, when this occurs, the Security Council
has overtly chosen sides. When its peacekeepers enter a sovereign country with the mandate to attack a rebel
faction, the U.N. loses more than credibility as a mediator. Come the next dirty war, the critics argue,
peacekeeping forces will be met as invaders.
Impartiality Impact
Lack of impartiality prevents peacekeeping solvency
Dr. Jeni Whalan, 2014, Partial Peace: The Politics of Taking Sides in UN
Peacekeeping, Paper prepared for International Studies Association Annual Convention, Toronto, 26-29,
https://www.academia.edu/6474185/Partial_Peace_The_Politics_of_Taking_Sides_in_UN_Peacekeeping DOA: 12-6-14 Lecturer
in International Security and Development BA (UNSW), M.Phil (Oxon), D.Phil (Oxon)
Similarly, Shashi Tharoor recognized that UN peacekeeping could not go back to basics if it was
to respond to the new security threats it faced, but nevertheless declared impartiality to be the
oxygen of peacekeeping: the only way peacekeeping can work is by being trusted by both sides,
being clear and transparent in their dealings, and keeping the lines of communication open. The
moment they lose this trust, the moment they are seen by one side as the enemy, they become
part of the problem they were sent to solve.
Impartiality critical to consent and sustaining peacekeeping

At the local level, similar diversity among the purposes of impartiality exists, as do tensions among
them. First, traditional impartiality has served to make peacekeeping acceptable to relatively strong
host states, sufficient that they would consent to the deployment of peacekeepers. Ensuring the
consent of the host state in one operation also had implications for the viability of future
peacekeeping; as Alan James noted, considerations of precedent were crucial: if a peacekeeping
force gets permission to enter a state to engage in impartial and non-violent activity and then moves
in the direction of partiality and violence, other prospective hosts are going to be extremely cautious
about issuing invitations.71
Impartiality critical to mediation

in
International Security and Development BA (UNSW), M.Phil (Oxon), D.Phil (Oxon)
The final purpose of impartiality identified at the local level is the procedural
legitimation expected to come from a peacekeeping operation that can mediate
between warring factions as an honest broker, fairly and without bias to any side. For
example, the Force Commander of the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC), General John Sanderson, credits this type of impartiality with
the missions ability to win confidence among senior members of the various
Cambodian factions, which provided UNTAC with a new means of influence to
influence their actions.76 This impartiality purpose is most often seen in conflicts among parties who
are relatively evenly matched, where there is not a strong international interest in the
victory of one side over another, and once the conflict has reached some form of
stalemate.77 Effective mediation can, in turn, be expected to produce better outcomes,
such as a negotiated ceasefire with which armed groups comply, which means this
approach may also have a substantive legitimation function.
Undermines Humanitarianism
UN taking on a combat role undermines humanitarianism
Criticism of UN interventionism has also come from the humanitarian aid agencies who fear that a
combative UN force risks blurring the line between aid workers providing care and soldiers. "You can have
a helicopter one day used to deliver the Force Intervention Brigade troops to attack a village and next day to
deliver aid to that same village," said Michiel Hofman, a senior humanitarian
specialist with Medicins sans Frontieres in Brussels. The UN bureaucracy can only take lightly the
critics of interventionism at its own peril. In war situations, perception is everything. Interventionism
hugely impacts the perception of the UN peacekeeping operations not just in Africa but globally.
Offensive missions could turn aid workers into targets

Sudarsan Raghavan, November 2, 2013, Washington Post, Raghavan has been The Post's Kabul bureau
chief since 2014. He was previously based in Nairobi and Baghdad for the Post, In Volatile Congo, A
New UN Force with Teeth, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-unforcewith-teeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html DOA: 12-514
But the force is also an unparalleled gamble for the United Nations that challenges the basic principles of
peacekeeping. It has orders to react offensively to enforce peace, essentially transforming peacekeepers into
combatants. And it is openly supporting Congolese government forces, a move away from the principle of
neutrality that has guided other U.N. missions. That could affect the United Nations ability to negotiate
peace deals with the militias and risks deepening conflicts. Humanitarian agencies are worried that Congos
brutal militias could see the entire U.N. mission, which also includes aid workers, monitors and civilian
experts, as non-neutral potential targets.
Nationalism
UN militarism in Africa triggers nationalism
Although Africa is unlikely to resist external players in situations like the CAR, growing perceptions of
increased UN militarism on the continent are likely to stir residual nationalism against external
intervention. In recent decades, the continent, through the AU, has grown increasingly assertive of its
independence vis-a-vis former colonial powers and the West.
Inconsistent With Peacekeeping Values

Offensive PKOs inconsistent with the core principles of peacekeeping
Courtney Brooks, March 28, 2013, Explainer: UN Move to Give Peacekeepers First Ever Combat
Mandate, http://www.rferl.org/content/un-peacekeepers-combat- resolution/24941095.html DOA: 12-514
Even though peacekeeping is nowhere to be found in the Charter of the United Nations, the UN has
performed almost 70 peacekeeping operations to date. Thought of as existing between Chapter VI and
VII, or Chapter VI ., peacekeeping was envisioned as a method to stave off wars and conflict in the
hopes of pacific settlement of disputes in order to maintain international peace and security. All
peacekeeping operations (PKOs) operate under three principles: (1) State parties consent to the PKO, (2)
Peacekeepers are impartial observers, and (3) Use of force is prohibited except in self-defense and or if
permitted under the mandate provided by the Security Council. UN Peacekeeping operations are only
approved by the Security Council and may sometimes work in tandem with PKOs authorized by
Regional Organizations.
Undermines Support for Peacekeeping

It is difficult to get commitments to peacekeeping involving offensive PKOs
in
Substantively, robust peacekeepers operating under new impartiality are intended to deliver on
the expectations and promises implicit in peacekeeping: that they will protect populations, keep the
peace, and deter conflict. But the procedural legitimacy of new impartiality is more contested.
First, it has been less acceptable to loose coalition of the UNs most significant troop contributing
countries. UN peacekeepers today are supplied overwhelmingly by developing countries; in recent
years, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India have collectively contributed the lions share.55 These troop
contributing countries have broadly resisted calls to accept the greater risks involved in using force
in peacekeeping operations, and have regularly invoked the principle of impartiality to question
such practice of taking sides.
in
Third, the traditional notion of impartiality is attractive to those countries that contribute the vast
majority of UN peacekeepers, because it minimizes the risk to their security; becoming a belligerent
party also means that peacekeepers become targets for retaliation.65 Since the Security Councils
peacekeeping decisions rely entirely for their implementation on the willingness of UN member
states to contribute forces to a mission, it must also take into account the perceptions of troop
contributing countries regarding the acceptability and appropriateness of the peacekeeping
enterprise. For their part, member states derive a number of benefits from their contribution of
troops to UN peacekeeping, but remain highly sensitive to the character of these operations:
Naturally, all contributing countries want to avoid casualties and hence exhibit greater reluctance to
contribute troops to missions that are thought overly dangerous. Contributing states thus typically
assess the degree of host government consent for a mission and might be deterred from participating
in operations where this is questionable... National publics are also frequently intolerant of
casualties sustained on peacekeeping operations. This poses a particular challenge to the emerging
concept of robust peacekeeping.66
Offensive PKOs reduce support for peacekeeping

News Record, July 30, 2013, United Nations Authorizes Offensive Operations in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, http://www.newsrecord.co/united-nations- authorizes-offensive-operations-in-thedemocratic-republic-of-the-congo/
Furthermore, most countries that supply troops for peacekeeping missions

do so with the expectation of limiting casualties. Placing peacekeepers in
a
fighting role may make supplying troops less attractive for U.N. member
states
Snowball
One offensive intervention sets a precedent for another
Brett D. Schaefer, is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the Margaret Thatch, April
10, 2013, Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation and editor of ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations
and the Search for Alternatives (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), U.S.
Should Oppose a Return to U.N. Peace Enforcement,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-to-un- peaceenforcement DOA: 12-6-14

The UNSC has authorized missions in the gray area between traditional missions and peace enforcement,
including the MONUSCO operation before creation of the intervention brigade, but Resolutions 2098 and
2100 go further toward peace enforcement than the U.N. has ventured since the 1990s. The U.N. is aware of
the significance of this shift and has taken pains to disguise it. Resolution 2098 explicitly establishes the
intervention brigade on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed
principles of peacekeeping. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations told journalists that
MINUSMA is not an enforcement mission. Yet the very act of creating the intervention brigade establishes
a precedent for future action, and asserting that MINUSMA is not an enforcement operation cannot
overcome the facts that there is no peace to keep and that peacekeepers are mandated to impose authority on
behalf of the Malian government where it is either weak or absent.
Alternatives
Parallel mission alternative
Since the mid-1990s, states willing to deploy military forces with coercive mandates to conflict
zones have overwhelmingly done so through parallel missions, often with UNa uthorization but not
under UN command nor operating within the UNs own conception of peacekeepers. It is notable
that the southern African states who contributed forces to MONUSCOs intervention brigade sought
initially to deploy as a parallel mission of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
UN authorized intervention forces are superior
Brett D. Schaefer, is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the

Margaret Thatch, April 10, 2013, Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation and
editor of ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the Search for Alternatives
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), U.S. Should Oppose a Return to U.N. Peace
Enforcement, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us- should-oppose-returnto-un-peace-enforcement DOA: 12-6-14
With Srebrenica and Rwanda in mind, the U.N. since 1999 has instructed its peacekeepers to protect
civilians from the imminent threat of violence. These debacles also led to a reexamination of U.N. peace
enforcement culminating in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi
report),
which acknowledged the need for robust peacekeeping operations at times but also
unequivocally stated: [T]he United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has
consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council,
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. This report has guided peacekeeping policy for over a decade.
Even as U.N. peacekeeping has been assigned broader responsibilities and
expanded to historic highs in personnel and expense in the 2000s,[2] the U.N. has observed the principle that
it should not engage in peace enforcement operations. Indeed, the U.N. reiterated the conclusions of the
Brahimi report in the 2009 A New Partnership Agenda Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping:
The single most important finding of the Brahimi report was that UN peacekeeping
can only succeed as part of a wider political strategy to end a conflict and with the will of the parties to
implement that strategy. Peacekeeping is not always the right answer. In situations of high political
tension, or in contexts where regional or national support is lacking, prevention, mediation, peacebuilding
and conflict-sensitive development activities may be more effective. In active conflict, multinational
coalitions of forces or regional actors operating under UN Security Council mandates may be more suitable.
Successful crisis management rests on choosing the right tools and bringing them together in ways that
maximize their respective strengths.
Alternative in the Congo

Brett D. Schaefer, is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the
Margaret Thatch, April 10, 2013, Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation and
editor of ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the Search for Alternatives
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), U.S. Should Oppose a Return to U.N. Peace
Enforcement, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us- should-oppose-returnto-un-peace-enforcement DOA: 12-6-14
Neither the DRC nor Mali is ripe for U.N. peacekeeping. The positive environment from
a decade ago has been squandered by DRC President Joseph Kabila with ample help from
spoilers inside and outside the country.[7] There is little prospect for peace in Mali until a
new government is elected that incorporates adequate representation from long-ostracized
groups.[8] While elections are scheduled for July, significant challenges persist that could
derail them.
The Obama Administration has a responsibility not to support the most convenient options
but rather to support efforts that are most likely to result in international peace and
security. Instead of peace enforcement through U.N. operations, the U.S. should explore
and advocate alternatives that address these situations and
support a U.N. mission only when the basic principles of peacekeeping are in place.
Specifically, the U.S. should shift gears and demand that the MONUSCO intervention
brigade be independently commanded in a manner similar to the
French force in Mali or the African Union force in Somalia. International efforts should
concentrate on addressing lack of governance in the DRC, and MONUSCO should be
downsized and focused on less ambitious goals of protecting and providing security for
humanitarian efforts until conditions are again ripe for a more traditional U.N.
peacekeeping operation. In Mali, the U.S. should delay standing up MINUSMA until
conditions improve while supporting the current French and African interventions.
Although the Administration makes decisions in the Security Council, those decisions have
financial implications. The U.N. charges the U.S. 28.38 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping
budget, including the $1.4 billion annual budget for MONUSCO (now with an additional
$140 million for the intervention brigade).[9] MINUSMA is projected to cost $800 million
annually which is not currently factored into fiscal year 2014 budget proposals.[10]
Congress should challenge the Administration over whether the U.N. should be entrusted
with these situations and ask which alternatives were explored.
Bad to Support Congo Government

Government is corrupt and its forces are accused of mass rapes
There are also concerns that the U.N. force is propping up a corrupt government and aiding an
undisciplined military that has a history of human-rights abuses, including mass rapes. Many Congolese
remain skeptical of the new brigades potential to eradicate the militias. Others have lofty expectations that
could bring disappointment and further antagonism toward the U.N. mission.
A2: Offensive PKOs Necessary to Stop Rebel Groups

Defeat of M23 hasnt deterred other groups
Dr Robert Besseling, January 1, 2014, Besseling is a Senior Political Adviser to the IHS Country Risk and
Forecasting Sub-Saharan Africa team, Janes
Intelligence Review, Elusive riches - Continued threats to the DRC's minerals
trade
The defeat of the M23 has not succeeded in motivating many members of other rebel groups and
community-based Ma-Ma self-defence militias that operate within the region to surrender and disarm. On 3
December, UN under-secretary- general for peacekeeping operations Herv Ladsous said that the FIB would
engage these other armed groups. The FIB is most likely to be deployed against collaborators of the M23,
including some Ma Ma groups in North and South Kivu, and other groups that operate in areas now
effectively under FARDC control, such as the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain
(APCLS), based in the town of Masisi, North Kivu, and the Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la
Paix/Forces Populaires Congolaises (UPCP/FPC) in Lubero, also in North Kivu. According to the UN Group
of Experts, both of these groups are involved in the mining of columbite-tantalum and gold.
A2: Necessary to Defeat Rebels

Cant defeat all of the rebel groups in the Congo
U.N. officials say a political solution is still the best path forward, but in a phone interview last week, Amani
Kabasha, the rebels political spokesman, said his group had lost trust in the U.N. mission because it was
supporting Congolese forces. Even if they kill all of the M23, another group will rise in our
place, he warned. The intervention brigade is expected to go after more than 40 other militias who are
committing atrocities, stealing Congos mineral wealth
and preventing the government from functioning a task that seems virtually impossible. There is also
the problem of perception. The Enough Project, a human-rights group, said in a report last week that the
brigade risks being seen, or being used, as a pawn of Kinshasa, the capital. Both Kobler and Cruz said
the brigade would not work with any Congolese army units that have
committed human-rights abuses. They also said the brigade would work at times on its own.
Militarized Approaches Fail

Militarized peacekeeping fails
James Sloan, June 3, 2014 is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Glasgow, School of
Law, and a former adviser to a UN peace mission. His book The Militarisation of
Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century was published in 2011 by Hart Publishing,
Oxford, UN Peacekeeping in Darfur: A Quagmare That We Cannot Accept,
http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/03/un-peacekeeping-in-darfur-a-quagmire-that-we-cannotaccept/
As the author of a 2011 book lamenting the change in direction in UN

peacekeeping since the turn of the century and warning that such operations
would almost certainly fail, I was not surprised to read the articles. Deeply
disturbed, of course, but not surprised. UNAMID is an example of a
militarized peacekeeping operationalso known as Chapter VII
peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, or muscular peacekeepinga type of
operation that has routinely been authorized by the Security Council since the
late 1990s. The operations represent an attempt by the Security Council to
prevent the recurrence of a Rwanda-type situation, where mass atrocities
occurred in the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation, by moving away
from the traditional policy that force may only be used by peacekeepers in selfdefense (or, sometimes, in defense of the mandate of the force), in favour of a
policy authorizing the use of offensive force to protect civilians and others. As I
argued in 2011, this type of operation is unlikely to be successful.
Why Isnt It Working?
The argument put forward in my book is, in a nutshell, that UN peacekeeping
operations are ill-suited to operations requiring the use of offensive force: they
lack the personnel, the equipment, and the effective leadership required.
Moreover, the tradition that peacekeeping operations may only operate with the
consent and cooperation of the government of the host state means that it is
extremely difficult for a militarized peacekeeping force to be even-handed in its
resort to force: if it were to use force against the host stateeven if the
government of the host state was acting contrary to the interests of its civilian
populationit would lose that governments good will and its continued
operation in the state would be extremely difficult.
It is generally agreed that the handful of peacekeeping operations in the 20th

century that were vested with enforcement powers were disastrous; they were
unable to achieve their mandated tasks and brought the Organization into
disrepute. Examples here include ONUC (a peacekeeping operation in the
Congo in the early 1960s) and two ill-fated operations in the 1990s:
UNPROFOR, a peacekeeping operation charged with protecting civilians in
safe areas in the former Yugoslavia (including, tragically, the safe area of
Srebrenica where some 8,000 thousand men and boys were murdered while
peacekeepers were pushed to one side), and UNOSOM II, a peacekeeping
operation charged with using force to prevent the resumption of violence in
Somalia (which withdrew in ignominy following the deaths of 18 US soldiers
and over 25 UN peacekeepers).
Of course, the UN did not use force in its peacekeeping operation in Rwanda
despite it being advocated by its ground commander, Canadian General Romeo
Dallaire, in the months before the genocide broke out. Permission to use force
was denied by the UN Secretariat on the basis that it was not provided for in the
operations Security Council mandate. The stain left on the reputation of the
UN by the Rwandan genocide was deep. With a view to ensuring that nothing
in the nature of the Rwandan genocide occurred under the noses of UN
peacekeepers, the idea that peacekeeping operations should routinely be
mandated to use offensive force in certain circumstances gained favour
despite the problems with earlier militarized peacekeeping operations. In 2000,
the influential Brahimi Report on peacekeeping was published. On the question
of the use of force by peacekeeping operations, it argued along the following
lines: 1) the UN must never again stand by while civilians are killed, as had
been the case with the Rwandan genocide; 2) peacekeepers must be made
robust and charged with taking sidesthey must never again be mere
appeasers; and 3) only once a sufficient number of well-trained and wellequipped peacekeepers have been contributed by states should the Security
Council establish and deploy an operation.
The first element of the argument is laudable: the UN must certainly not stand
idly by in the face of mass atrocities. However, matters fall apart when one gets
to the second and third elements. Simply adding a line or two to the mandates
of peacekeeping operations, requiring peacekeepers to take on the unimaginably
difficult task of preventing genocide or civilian harm is wildly unrealistic. The
nature of UN peacekeeping does not lend itself to the use of force:

peacekeeping forces must be donated by states (and may be withdrawn by them
at any time), peacekeeping forces tend to have little in the way of sophisticated
equipment (that, again, in many cases, must be donated), and the command
structure of peacekeeping forces is frequently problematic. For example, an
order from a commander from State A may be ignored by a subordinate from
State Bif that subordinate is able to have the order overruled by a government
official from State B. A version of this scenario is outlined in the Foreign
Policy investigation of UNAMID.
The third element of the argument that emerged from the Brahimi Report, i.e.,
that the Security Council should wait until peacekeeping forces are sufficiently
well-configured to be successful before establishing them or placing them in
situ, is also problematic. It presumes a Security Council that is sufficiently
circumspect to put political considerations to one side, as well as UN member
states that are willing to contribute sufficient financial resources and personnel
to the endeavordespite the risk of the loss of life. It ignores the reality that
many states may consider the contribution of personnel to operations where the
forces will be in harms way to be politically damaging (the US contributes no
personnel to UNAMID) and may even be begrudging when it comes to
donating equipment. Moreover, it ignores the possibility that some members of
the Security Council might consider it to be preferable to put in place an
operation that is ill-suited to the task, rather than risk waiting until the time is
right, lest they be seen to be doing nothing in the face of mass atrocity. Former
Secretary-General Kofi Anan described the establishment of a militarized
peacekeeping operation with a robust mandate, but little chance of fulfilling it,
as creating an alibi for the Security Council. Presumably, the idea is that if the
UN is criticized for allowing another mass atrocity to occur, the Security
Council can point to the fact that it did act: it established a militarized
peacekeeping operation to prevent such an atrocity. In this regard, the title of
the third article in the Foreign Policy investigation may be recalled: A Mission
That Was Set Up to Fail.
Even if we lived in a world where the leaders deciding what direction the
Security Council would take were circumspect and uninfluenced by politics,
and member statesincluding, of course, the Security Councils permanent
memberswere willing to donate sufficient funding, equipment, and troops to
ensure the success of such operations, I am not convinced that assigning

peacekeepers forceful tasks is a good idea. Imagine a mayor of a city with
serious crime problems and an inadequate police force deciding that the way to
protect the citizenry was to arm traffic wardens or ambulance attendants. While
these newly robust city employees might very well prevent a number of crimes,
it would not be long before they were no longer seen by the criminal population
as unthreateninginstead, becoming the targets of the criminals. Militarized
peacekeepers are in something of a no-win situation: where they use force,
they become the target of various forces; where they do not use force (because
they are vastly outnumbered and to do so would be the equivalent of
committing suicide), there is a substantial risk that the local populationwhich,
for better or worse, has come to think of the peacekeeping force as their
protectorwill see them as failures or cowards. Recall the title of the first
article in the Foreign Policy investigation: They Just Stood Watching.
Solvency Answers
No secondary support for offensive PKOs, failure collapses them
David Bosco, April 1, 2013, Foreign Policy, When Peacekeepers Go to War,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/01/when-peacekeeper s-go-to-war/ DOA 12-6-14
Part of the problem with offensive U.N. operations is that the training and resources of the forces doing the
fighting often doesnt match the mandate. Its one thing for the Security Council to authorize offensive
operations from New York; its quite another thing for peacekeeping commanders to manage them
successfully on the ground. During the U.N.s Bosnia operation in the 1990s,
that gap between the Councils proclamations and the actual work of peacekeepers
grew to tragic proportions. If peacekeepers get bogged down while on the offense
or, worse, commit abuses of their own political will for the operation will
likely melt away. The countries contributing the troops for the enforcement brigade may think twice. Its
doubtful that either the United States or cash- strapped European states will send their own forces to
bolster peacekeepers in need of assistance.
Right to Protect (R2P) Bad
Right to Protect Bad Link

Offensive peacekeeping operation exist to protect civilians
Midwest Model United Nations, 2013, http://mmun.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/ga4-a.pdf DOA: 12-6-14
The UN for the first time has authorized peacekeepers to conduct targeted offensive operations
within the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUSCO). Security Council Resolution 2098 established a
Force Intervention Brigade to assist the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in neutralizing
armed groups that have been accused of sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment of child
soldiers, violence against civilians, and other human rights abuses.6 These offensive operations are
meant to provide protection of civilians until the DRC has created a Rapid Reaction Force that is able
to take over duties from the Force Intervention Brigade. There are many critics that view the UNs
offensive operations as peace
enforcement and that the UN may not be seen as an impartial party to
the conflict in the DRC.
Offensive PKOs based on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Midwest Model United Nations, 2013, http://mmun.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/ga4-a.pdf DOA: 12-6-14
The new mandate for offensive operations in MONUSCO has been part of a recent trend in
strengthening peacekeepings ability to protect civilians. Protection of civilians is viewed as a key
factor in the success of any peacekeeping mission. This recent trend stems from the
20045 World Summit Outcomes endorsement of the Responsibility to
Protect. The international community made a commitment to protect their own populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity. In places where civilians are subject to such atrocities, the international
community agreed that the UN
should act to protect civilians.
Right to Protect Undermines American Leadership

An unconditional R2P obligation destroys US sovereignty, draining the military
R2p kill us sovereignty, causes overstretch
Groves 8
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/the-us-should-rejec t-the-un- responsibility-to-protectdoctrine
Steven Groves works to protect and preserve American sovereignty, selfgovernance and independence as leader of The Heritage Foundation's Freedom Project. Groves, who is the
Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in Heritages Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom,
also advocates American leadership on issues involving international political and religious freedom, human
rights and democratic institutions. He has testified before Congress on international law, human rights, the
United Nations and controversial treaties such as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women. In 2013, Groves was awarded the Dr. W. Glenn
and Rita Campbell Award for his work. The award is given annually to the
Heritage employee who delivered an outstanding contribution to the analysis and promotion of a free
society. Before joining Heritage in 2007, Groves was senior counsel to then-Sen. Norm Coleman (R-Minn.)
on the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. He played a lead role in the subcommittee's
investigation of the U.N. "oil-for-food" scandal, the most extensive congressional probe ever conducted of
the United Nations. Groves previously was an associate at Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, specializing in
commercial litigation. Before that he served as assistant attorney general for the State of Florida, where he
litigated civil rights cases, constitutional law issues and criminal appeals, among other matters, in state and
federal court. Groves is a frequent guest commentator on domestic and international television and radio.
He has appeared on ABC, BBC, CNBC, CNN and CNN International, Fox News Channel,
National Public Radio, Voice of America, NHK, Al Jazeera, Alhurra and the Canadian Broadcasting
Corp. His commentary and opinion pieces have been published by journals such as National Review,
The Weekly Standard and Human Events, as well as by The Washington Times and other major
newspapers across America. Groves holds a law degree from Ohio Northern University's College of Law
and a bachelor of arts degree in history from Florida State University.
If wholly accepted as official U.S. policy, the R2P doctrine would greatly expand U.S. obligations to
prevent acts of genocide around the world. More important, adoption of R2P would effectively cede U.S.
national sovereignty and decision-making power over key components of national security and foreign
policy and subject them to the whims of the international community. The U.S. government, as a party to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention), is
currently obligated to prevent acts of genocide that occur within U.S. territory.[29] The Genocide
Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), the legislation implementing the Genocide
Convention, was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan in 1988.[30] The Proxmire Act defined the
crime of genocide as an act committed "with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group." The new law even criminalized the act of inciting another
person to commit an act of
genocide.[31] Importantly, U.S. enforcement of these criminal offenses was limited to acts committed in the
United States.[32] However, adoption of the R2P norm would obligate the United States to prevent all
acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes even if they occur outside of the U.S. Such an
obligation would impose unique responsibilities. As the world's preeminent military force, the United
States would have to bear a disproportionate share of the R2P international commitment. In the event that
acts of genocide
and ethnic cleansing occur, the vast majority of nations in the international community could reasonably
plead military inferiority on each such occasion, leaving the United States to bear the brunt of any
intervention. Most members of the international community could also plead poverty, again leaving the
United States to fund the intervention. Even if the intervention is funded through the United Nations system,
the United States would still pay an unequal share of the cost.[33]
The doctrinal dominance of r2p wrecks Americas global leadership BOTH structurally
AND perceptually. Foreign policy must shift back to SELF-INTEREST
Kaplan 8/1/13
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-tragedy-us-foreign-policy-8810
Robert D. Kaplan is a foreign correspondent for The Atlantic, a senior fellow at the Center for a New
American Security in Washington and a member of the Pentagons Defense Policy Board. His most recent
book is Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (Random House, 2010).
The 1990s were full of calls for humanitarian intervention: in Rwanda, which tragically went unheeded;
and in Bosnia and Kosovo where interventions, while belated, were by and large successful. Free from the
realpolitik necessities of the Cold War, humanitarians have in the past two decades tried to reduce foreign
policy to an aspect of genocide prevention. Indeed, the Nazi Holocaust is only one lifetime removed from
our owna nanosecond in human historyand so postCold War foreign policy now rightly exists in the
shadow of it. The codified upshot has been R2P: the Responsibility to Protect, the mantra of
humanitarians. But American foreign policy cannot merely be defined by R2P and Never Again!
Statesmen can only rarely be concerned with humanitarian interventions and protecting human rights to the
exclusion of other considerations. The United States, like any nationbut especially because it is
a great powersimply has interests that do not always cohere with its values. That is tragic, but it is a
tragedy that has to be embraced and accepted. What are those overriding interests? The United States, as the
dominant power in the Western Hemisphere, must always prevent any other power from becoming
equally dominant in the Eastern Hemisphere. Moreover, as a
liberal maritime power, the United States must seek to protect the sea lines of communication that enable
world trade. It must also seek to protect both treaty and de facto allies, and especially their access to
hydrocarbons. These are all interests that, while not necessarily contradictory to human rights, simply do not
operate in the same category. Because the United States is a liberal power, its interestseven when they are
not directly concerned with human rightsare generally moral. But they are only secondarily moral. For
seeking to adjust the balance of power in ones favor has been throughout history an amoral enterprise
pursued by both liberal and illiberal powers.
Nevertheless, when a liberal power like the United States pursues such a goal in the
service of preventing war among major states , it is acting morally in the highest sense . A telling
example of this tensionone that gets to the heart of why Never Again! and R2P cannot always be the
operative words in statesmanshipwas recently provided by
the foreign-affairs expert Leslie H. Gelb. Gelb noted that after Saddam Hussein
had gassed close to seven thousand Kurds to death in northern Iraq in 1988, even
a truly ethical secretary of state, George Shultz, committed a moral
outrage. For Shultz basically ignored the incident and continued supporting
Saddam in his war against Iran, because weakening Irannot protecting the citizens of Iraqwas the
primary American interest at the time. So was Shultz acting immorally? Not completely, I believe. Shultz
was operating under a different morality than the one normally applied by humanitarians. His was a public
morality; not a private one. He and the rest of the Reagan administration had a responsibility to the hundreds
of millions of Americans under their
charge. And while these millions were fellow countrymen, they were more
crucially voters and citizens, essentially strangers who did not know Shultz or Reagan personally, but who
had entrusted the two men with their interests. And the American publics interest clearly dictated that of the
two states, Iran and Iraq, Iran at the time constituted the greater threat. In protecting the public interest of
even a liberal power, a statesman cannot always be nice; or humane. I am talking here of a morality of
public outcomes, rather than one of private intentions. By supporting Iraq, the Reagan administration
succeeded in preventing Iran in the last years of the Cold War from becoming a regional hegemon. That was
an outcome convenient to U.S. interests, even if the morality of the affair was ambiguous, given that Iraqs
regime was at the time the more brutal of the two. In seeking good outcomes, policymakers are usually
guided by constraints: a realistic awareness of what, for instance, the United States should and should not do,
given its finite resources. After all, the United States had hundreds of thousands of troops tied down in
Europe and Northeast
Asia during the Cold War, and thus had to contain Iran through the use of a proxy, Saddams Iraq. That was
not entirely cynical: it was an intelligent use of limited assets in the context of a worldwide geopolitical
struggle. The problem with a foreign policy driven foremost by Never Again! is that it ignores limits and
the availability of resources. World War II had the secondary, moral effect of saving what was left of
European Jewry. Its primary goal and effect was to restore the European and Asian balance of power in a
manner tolerable to the United Statessomething that the Nazis and the Japanese fascists had overturned.
Of course, the Soviet Union wrested control of Eastern
Europe for nearly half a century following the war. But again, limited resources
necessitated an American alliance with the mass-murderer Stalin against the mass-murderer Hitler. It is
because of such awful choices and attendant compromisesin which morality intertwines with amorality
that humanitarians will frequently be disappointed with the foreign policy of even the most heroic
administrations. World War II certainly involved many hideous compromises and even mistakes on President
Franklin D. Roosevelts part. He got into the war in Europe very late, he did not bomb the rail tracks leading
to the concentration camps, he might have been more aggressive with the Soviets on the question of Eastern
Europe. But as someone representing the interests of the millions of strangers who had and had not voted for
him, his aim was to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in a manner that cost the fewest American
soldiers lives,
and utilized the least amount of national resources. Saving the remnants of
European Jewry was a moral consequence of his actions, but his methods contained
tactical concessions that had fundamental amoral elements. Abraham Lincoln, for his part, brought mass
suffering upon southern civilians in the last phase of the Civil War in order to decisively defeat the South.
The total war waged by generals William Tecumseh Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant was evidence of that.
Simply put, there are actions of state that are the right things to do, even if they cannot be defined in terms
of conventional morality. Amoral goals, properly applied, do have moral effects. Indeed, in more recent
times,
President Richard Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, rushed arms to Israel following a
surprise attack by Arab armies in the fall of 1973. The
two men essentially told the American defense establishment that supporting Israel in its hour of need was
the right thing to do, because it was necessary to send an unambiguous message of resolve to the Soviets
and their Arab allies at a critical stage in the Cold War. Had they justified the arms transfers purely in terms
of helping embattled post-Holocaust Jewryrather than in terms of power politics as they didit would
have made for a much weaker argument in Washington, where officials rightly had American interests at
heart more than Israeli ones. George McGovern was possibly a more ethical man than either Nixon or
Kissinger. But had he been elected president in 1972, would he have acted so wisely and so decisively
during the 1973 Middle East war? The fact is, individual perfection, as Machiavelli knew, is not necessarily
synonymous with
public virtue. Then there is the case of Deng Xiaoping. Deng approved the brutal
suppression of students at Beijings Tiananmen Square in 1989. For that he is not respected among
humanitarians in the West. But the consolidation of Communist Party control that followed the clampdown
allowed for Dengs methodical, market-oriented reforms to continue for a generation in China. Perhaps
never before in recorded economic history have so many people seen such a dramatic rise in living
standards, with an attendant rise in personal (if not political) freedoms in so short a time frame. Thus, Deng
might be considered both a brutal Communist and the greatest man of the twentieth century. The
morality of his life is complex. The Bosnia and Kosovo interventions of 1995 and
1999 are frequently held out as evidence that the United States is most
effective when it acts according to its humanitarian valuesnever mind its amoral interests. But those who
make that argument neglect to mention that the two successful interventions were eased by the fact that
America operated in the Balkans with the balance-of-power strongly in its favor. Russia in the 1990s was
weak and chaotic under Boris Yeltsins incompetent rule, and thus temporarily less able to challenge the
United States in a region where historically the
czars and commissars had exerted considerable sway. However, Russia, even in the
1990s, still exerted considerable sway in the Caucasus, and thus a Western response to halt ethnic cleansing
there during the same decade was not even considered. More broadly, the 1990s allowed for ground
interventions in the Balkans because the international climate was relatively benign: China was only just
beginning its naval expansion (endangering our Pacific allies) and
September 11 still lay in the future. Truly, beyond many a moral response lies a question of power that
cannot be explained wholly in terms of morality. Thus , to raise morality as a sole arbiter is ultimately not
to be serious about foreign policy. R2P must play as
large a role as realistically possible in the affairs of state. But it cannot ultimately dominate . Syria is the
current and best example of this. U.S. power is capable of many things, yet putting a complex and wartorn Islamic societys
house in order is not one of them. In this respect, our tragic experience in
Iraq is indeed relevant. Quick fixes like a no-fly zone and arming the rebels
may topple Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but that might only make President Barack Obama culpable
in midwifing to power a Sunni-Jihadist regime, even as ethnic cleansing of al-Assads Alawites
commences. At least at this late juncture, without significant numbers of Western boots on the ground for
a significant periodsomething for which there is little public supportthe likelihood of a better, more
stable regime emerging in Damascus is highly questionable. Frankly, there are just no easy answers here,
especially as the
pro-Western regime in Jordan is threatened by continued Syrian violence. R2P applied in 2011 in Syria might
actually have yielded a better strategic result: it will remain an unknowable. Because moralists in these
matters are always driven by righteous passion, whenever you disagree with them, you are by definition
immoral and deserve no quarter; whereas realists, precisely because they are used to conflict, are less likely
to overreact to it. Realists know that passion and wise policy rarely flow together. (The late diplomat
Richard Holbrooke was a stunning exception to this rule.) Realists adhere to the belief of the mid-twentiethcentury University of Chicago political scientist,
Hans Morgenthau, who wrote that one must work with the base forces of human nature, not against
them . Thus, realists accept the human material at hand in any given place, however imperfect that
material may be. To wit, you cant go around
toppling regimes just because you dont like them. Realism, adds Morgenthau,
appeals to historical precedent rather than to abstract principles [of justice]
and aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good. No group of people
internalized such tragic realizations better than Republican presidents during the Cold War. Dwight
Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush all practiced amorality, realism,
restraint and humility in foreign affairs (if not all the time). It is their sensibility that should guide us now.
Eisenhower represented a pragmatic compromise within the Republican Party between isolationists and rabid
anti-Communists. All of these men supported repressive, undemocratic regimes in the third world in support
of a favorable balance of power against the Soviet Union. Nixon accepted the altogether brutal regimes in the
Soviet Union and Red China as legitimate, even as he balanced one against the other. Reagan spoke the
Wilsonian language
of moral rearmament, even as he awarded the key levers of bureaucratic power to
realists like Caspar Weinberger, George Shultz and Frank Carlucci, whose effect regarding policy was to
temper Reagans rhetoric. The elder Bush did not break relations with China after the Tiananmen uprising;
nor did he immediately pledge support for Lithuania, after that brave little country declared its independence
for fear of antagonizing the Soviet military. It was caution and restraint on Bushs part that helped bring
the Cold War to a largely peaceful and, therefore, moralconclusion. In some of these policies, the
difference between amorality and morality was, to paraphrase Joseph Conrad in Lord Jim, no more than the
thickness of a sheet of paper. And that is precisely the point: foreign policy at its best is subtle, innovative,
contradictory, and truly bold only on occasion, aware as its most disciplined practitioners are of the limits
of American power. That is heartrending, simply because calls to alleviate suffering will in too many
instances go unanswered. For the essence of tragedy is not the triumph of evil over good, so much as the
triumph of one good over another that causes suffering.
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/the-us-should-reject-the-un- responsibility-to-protectdoctrine
Steven Groves works to protect and preserve American sovereignty, selfgovernance and independence as leader of The Heritage Foundation's Freedom Project. Groves, who is the
Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in Heritages Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom,
also advocates American leadership on issues involving international political and religious freedom, human
rights and democratic institutions. He has testified before Congress on international law, human rights, the
United Nations and controversial treaties such as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women. In 2013, Groves was awarded the Dr. W. Glenn
Heritage employee who delivered an outstanding contribution to the analysis and
promotion of a free society. Before joining Heritage in 2007, Groves was senior counsel to then-Sen. Norm
Coleman (R-Minn.) on the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. He played a lead role in
the subcommittee's investigation of the U.N. "oil-for-food" scandal, the most extensive congressional probe
ever conducted of the United Nations. Groves previously was an associate at Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP,
specializing in commercial litigation. Before that he served as assistant attorney general for the State of
Florida, where he litigated civil rights cases, constitutional law issues and criminal appeals, among other
matters, in state and federal court. Groves is a frequent guest commentator on domestic and international
television and radio.
He has appeared on ABC, BBC, CNBC, CNN and CNN International, Fox News Channel, National Public
Radio, Voice of America, NHK, Al Jazeera, Alhurra and the Canadian Broadcasting Corp. His commentary
and opinion pieces have been published by journals such as National Review, The Weekly Standard and
Human Events, as well as by The Washington Times and other major newspapers across America. Groves
holds a law degree from Ohio Northern University's College of Law and a bachelor of arts degree in history
from Florida State University.
Operational Flexibility vs. Precautionary Principles. Even if surrendering control of America's armed
forces to the will of the world community were acceptable, the U.S. military could not operate
effectively under the R2P doctrine.
Once committed to a military operation with all of its attendant risks, U.S. armed forces must be allowed the
operational freedom to create the conditions to succeed. However, the R2P doctrine espouses a
"proportional means" limitation to the rules of engagement that would likely hinder the success of a
military intervention. Specifically, the ICISS report suggests that the "scale, duration and intensity of the
planned military intervention should be
the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question."[51] In
other words, any intervening armed force may act only to end genocidal acts and ethnic cleansing -- and go
no further. However, a combat environment is rarely so predictable. Some situations would require the
total destruction of
the forces perpetrating the genocide or the overthrow of the government
providing command and control. Yet the ICISS report states that "[t]he effect on the political system of the
country targeted should be limited...to what is strictly necessary to accomplish the purpose of the
intervention."[52] Several instances of genocide and ethnic cleansing in recent history have occurred with
the complicity and active involvement of a national government and its armed forces. It is unrealistic to
mandate that a military intervention limit its effect on the political system and its leadership while stopping
genocidal crimes. It is likewise nave to believe that government forces that are
complicit in genocidal acts would cease and desist from committing atrocities
after a military intervention has ended and the intervening troops are withdrawn. In addition, the R2P
doctrine demands that "all the rules of international humanitarian law should be strictly observed"
in the event of a military intervention.[53] There is, however, widespread debate over certain crucial
aspects of that law. For example, there are major differences
of opinion regarding the classification, treatment, confinement, and trial of certain classes of enemy
combatants. The use of certain weapons, such as cluster bombs and land mines, is also disputed. The
R2P's requirement of
strict observance of the law of armed conflict is therefore unachievable because there is broad
disagreement on what "strict observance" would entail.
Adoption of r2p crushes US hegemony without improving security

Holmes 11
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/04/whose-responsibilit y-toprotect
Kim R. Holmes, a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, oversaw the
think tanks defense and foreign policy team for more than two decades. Holmes was Heritages vice
president for foreign and defense policy studies and
director of the Davis Institute for International Studies from 1991 through 2012
except for his service, during most of the first term of President George W. Bush, as assistant secretary of
state for international organization affairs. Holmes priority is writing a book, due in fall 2013, in which he
hopes to lay out a compelling vision for Americas future by uniting Heritages domestic and foreign policy
ideas. Few people bring greater clarity and historical wisdom to thorny issues than Kim Holmes, Heritage
President Edwin J. Feulner said in announcing the new role on Dec. 5, 2012. Holmes previously directed
Heritage's team of foreign and defense policy experts in four centers on the front lines of international
affairs: the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, the Asian Studies Center, the
Center for International Trade and Economics and the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. Davis also
includes the Washington Roundtable for the Asia-Pacific Press (WRAPP). Holmes joined Heritage in 1985
and rose to vice president in 1991. He was a founding editor of the annual Index of Economic Freedom,
which has become a signature Heritage publication. He led the think tanks efforts to convince the United
States to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He launched Heritages widely respected
homeland security program after September 11, as well as its program
on international trade, and expanded the missile defense program to what it is today. Holmes left Heritage
in late 2001 to serve as an assistant secretary of state. After rejoining the think tank in 2005, he authored
the book Liberty's Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st Century. Recognized around the
globe as one of Washingtons foremost foreign and defense policy experts, Holmes
is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, where he formerly served on the Washington Advisory
Committee. Previous appointments include the Defense Policy Board, which is the U.S. defense secretarys
primary resource for expert outside advice; the Board of Directors of the Center for International Private
Enterprise; and public member of the U.S. delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe. While at the State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing policy and coordinating U.S.
engagement at the United Nations and 46 other international organizations. Important goals achieved at that
time included the U.N. mandates enabling Iraq to make the transition to democracy; the Security Council's
first binding nonproliferation resolution; the U.N.'s first mandate requiring the Office of Internal Oversight
Services to release reports to member states; an international outcry over Libya's assuming chairmanship of
the Commission on Human Rights, which culminated in that body's refashioning; and establishment of the
U.N. Democracy Caucus and U.N. Democracy Fund. Holmes earned his doctoral and masters degrees in
history from Georgetown University. He received a bachelors degree in history from the University of
Central Florida in Orlando. He was a research fellow at the Institute for European History in Germany and
adjunct professor of European security and history at Georgetown University
What are these objectives?
First, to undermine the idea that force should be used only to protect national security. Advocates argue
that protecting civilians is the only just
cause for using force. Defending our allies from attack or even launching military interventions overseas
to take out terrorist bases would, under this definition, be illegitimate. The second objective is to
elevate the Security Council as the only body that can legitimately authorize the use of force by any nation,
including the U.S. This has obvious implications for
the U.S. Constitution, which recognizes the war-making powers only of the President and the Congress.
Our nation has the bulk of the worlds military forces. This doctrine would constrain us from using force
for our own protection (except for very obvious invasions). Worse, it leaves our forces on the hook to
intervene overseas at the behest of the Security Council, at our expense. It relegates our military to the
status of U.N.-mandated world police force.
This makes no sense in terms of U.S. national security or in terms of the
U.N. Charter. Article 51 of the Charter affirms that nations can use military force for self-defense. The
Charter also says that when force is used for other purposes, it must do so to counter international threats
and restore international peace. And it says nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. In
other words, internal abuses by states are no excuse to intervene. Advocates of the responsibility to protect
may find this provision inconvenient, heartless or even illegitimate. But thats what the Charter says. As
envisioned by many of its supporters, this doctrine violates the U.N. Charter. The Security Council has
pecked away at national sovereignty for years, justifying arms embargoes, no-fly zones and sanctions. But it
has recently become far more willing to ignore this Charter restriction in response to perceived threats to
civilian security. Before dismissing the slippery slope argument that the Security Council will someday
claim exclusive jurisdiction over the use of force, remember how far we have drifted away from the original
purposes of the U.N. Charter. Responsibility
to protect is pure sophistry, riddled with contradictions. In reality, it is a cynical attempt to assert
external decision-making powers over the use of U.S. military force. By trying to change the rules,
advocates hope to delegitimize Americas traditional use of force to defend itself and its allies and to put
that decision in the hands of an international body
that includes
Franc, Russia and China. Its easy to see why Russia

e
China would want the U.N. to control U.S. decisions to use military force. Its not at all clear
why a U.S. president would want that.
R2P Bad: Sovereignty

Accepting r2p destroys US sovereignty
Groves 8
Steven Groves works to protect and preserve American sovereignty, selfgovernance and independence as
leader of The Heritage Foundation's Freedom Project. Groves, who is the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior
Research Fellow in Heritages Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, also advocates American leadership
on issues involving international political and religious freedom, human rights and democratic institutions.
He has testified before Congress on international law, human rights, the United Nations and controversial
treaties such as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In 2013,
Groves was awarded the Dr. W. Glenn
While genocide, war crimes, and other atrocities will always be incompatible with American values, the
McCain and Clinton statements raise the issue of whether preventing genocide and ethnic cleansing would
necessarily constitute a vital U.S. national interest. In some situations, acts of large-scale ethnic cleansing in
some remote nation may indeed affect U.S. national interests. However, the real question is whether or not
the United States should obligate itself through an international compact to use its military forces as
the rest of the world sees fit in cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Accepting such an obligation
would arguably empower other nations to judge whether U.S. national interests or national values are
at
stake. That begs the question of who will decide whether the United States must commit its limited
resources -- including its military forces -- to prevent atrocities occurring in a foreign land. The R2P
doctrine is designed to take decision making on these crucial issues out of the hands of the United States
and place it in the hands of the international community, operating through the United Nations. If the
United States consented to such a doctrine,
it would effectively surrender its authority to exercise an essential , sovereign power. First Principles
and National Sovereignty The United States must not surrender its independence and sovereignty
cavalierly. The Founding
Fathers and subsequent generations of Americans paid a high price to achieve
America's sovereignty and secure the unalienable rights of U.S. citizens. The
government formed by the Founders to safeguard American independence and protect
individual rights derives its powers from the consent of the governed, not from any other nation or group of
nations.[42] Having achieved its independence by fighting a costly war, America's Founders approached
permanent alliances and foreign entanglements with a fair degree of skepticism. President George
Washington, in his 1796 farewell address, favored extending America's commercial relations with other
nations but warned against extensive political connections.[43] Washington well understood that legitimate
governments are formed only through gaining the consent of the people. He therefore placed a
high value on the independence that the United States had achieved and was rightfully dubious about
involvement in European intrigues. Integral to national sovereignty is the right to make authoritative
decisions on foreign policy and national resources, particularly the use of the nation's military forces.
Many of the reasons why America fought the War of
Independence against Great Britain revolved around Britain's taxation of the American people without their
consent and its practice of "declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases
whatsoever."[44] Once America gained control of its revenue, natural resources, and industry and had
formed a government separate and apart from any other, the Founders would not have compromised or
delegated its prerogatives to any other nation or group of nations. Washington rightly warned his
countrymen to "steer clear" of such foreign influence and instead to rely on "temporary alliances for
extraordinary
emergencies."[45] The R2P doctrine strikes at the heart of the Founders' notion of national
sovereignty. The Founders would have deplored the idea that the United States would cede control -any control -- of its armed forces to the caprice
of the world community without the consent of the American people. Washington
stated that the decision to go to war is a key element of national sovereignty that should be exercised at the
discretion of the American government: Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a
different course. If we remain one people under an efficient government, the period is not far off...when we
may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.[46] The U.S. interest, guided by
justice and exercised with the consent of the American people, must remain the standard for making
decisions of war and peace. The interest of the international community, which is guided by its own
collective notion of justice and without the consent of the American people, should not serve as America's
barometer, especially when placing the lives of U.S. military men and women in jeopardy.[47] The United
States cannot rely on world opinion, as expressed through an emerging international norm such as R2P, to set
the proper criteria for the use of U.S. military force. The commitment to use force must be made exclusively
by the U.S. government acting
as an independent, sovereign nation based on its own criteria for military intervention.[48] In sum, the
R2P doctrine does not harmonize with the first principles of the United States. Adopting a doctrine
that binds the
United States to scores of other nations and dictates how it must act to prevent atrocities is the very sort of
foreign entanglement against which Washington warned us. The United States would betray the Founding
Fathers' achievement of independence and sovereignty if it wholly acceded to the R2P doctrine.
Actively rejecting r2p crucial to maintain sovereignty

Groves 8
Steven Groves works to protect and preserve American sovereignty, selfgovernance and independence as leader of The Heritage Foundation's Freedom
Project. Groves, who is the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in Heritages Margaret
Thatcher Center for Freedom, also advocates American leadership on issues involving international political
and religious freedom, human rights and democratic institutions. He has testified before Congress on
international law, human rights, the United Nations and controversial treaties such as the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In 2013, Groves was awarded the Dr. W. Glenn
Protecting American Sovereignty
Given the recognition of the responsibility to protect doctrine in the 2005

World Summit Outcome Document, as well as the continuing efforts by certain
actors in the international community to promote and operationalize R2P, the United States should
clarify its position on its national sovereignty and the criteria for the use of its armed forces.
To that end, the United States should:
Maintain its current official position, as set forth in Ambassador Bolton's letter regarding the 2005
World Summit Outcome Document, that the R2P doctrine does not create a binding legal obligation on the
United States to intervene in another nation for any purpose.
Affirm that the United States need not seek authorization from the U.N. Security Council, the U.N.
General Assembly, the international community, or any other international organization to use its military
forces to prevent acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other atrocities occurring in another country.
Base its decisions to intervene in the affairs of other nations -- including
punitive economic, diplomatic, political, and military measures -- on U.S. national interests, not on criteria
set forth by the R2P doctrine or any other
international "test."
Scrutinize ongoing efforts by certain actors within the international
community to operationalize and otherwise promote the R2P doctrine in the United States, the United
Nations, the international NGO community, and other international forums.
Reject the notion thatthe R2P doctrine is an established international norm.
Conclusion
The United States should take no comfort from the fact that, as a party to the
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, it has committed itself only to being
"prepared to take collective action" to end atrocities or that the ICISS report
represents the obligation to prevent atrocities as a mere "responsibility." R2P advocates are attempting to
achieve worldwide consensus that the international community has an obligation to intervene, with military
force if necessary, in another country to prevent acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities. R2P
proponents may not be satisfied with anything less than a multilateral treaty -- a United Nations Convention
on the Responsibility to Protect -- that creates binding legal obligations on its signatories.
The United States should therefore continue to treat the responsibility to protect doctrine with grave
skepticism. The independence won by the Founders and defended by subsequent generations of Americans
should not be squandered, but rather should be safeguarded from furtive encroachments by the international
community.
Only by maintaining a monopoly on the deployment of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, political
coercion, and military forces will the United States preserve its national sovereignty. Acceding to a set of
criteria such as those set forth by the R2P doctrine would be a dangerous and unnecessary step toward
bolstering the authority of the United Nations and the international community and would compromise the
consent of the American people.
A2: R2P Expands Sovereignty

Defense of r2p misdefine sovereignty the redefinition still erodes it
Gay 7/23/13
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-deceptive-appeal-the- responsibility-protect8764
John Allen Gay is an assistant managing editor at The National Interest. His book (co-authored with
Geoffrey Kemp) War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences was released by Rowman
and Littlefield in early 2013, The National Interest, July 23, The Deceptive Appeal of the Responsibility to
Protect, DOA: 12-7-14
The third pillar is where the rub is. The notion that the international community has an obligation to
become involved in a country under certain circumstances, regardless of what its government says,
appears to erode national sovereignty. Albright and Williamson charge that this is a misperception
in fact, they say, R2P is designed to reinforce, not undermine, national sovereignty. It places primary
emphasis on the duty of states to protect their own people and its complementary focus on helping
governments improve their capacities to fulfill their commitments. In other words, R2P expands the
concept of sovereigntysovereignty includes not only rights, but also responsibilities, responsibilities
which states should help each other fulfill. Sovereignty here is so sacrosanct that states failing to exercise it
fully lose their title to itOnly when a government fails or refuses to live up to the responsibility of
sovereignty does it run the risk of outside intervention. Yet this is a curious way to construe sovereignty.
Sovereignty becomes not merely an empirical fact about states that is
prudently respected, but a right entrusted from on high; given that the right passes to the international
community when abused, it would seem this
sovereignty sees the world as a federation. International institutionstreated
in the report as the final authorities on third-pillar actionsgraciously devolve their responsibilities to local
viceroys and governors-general, whom it may relieve of their duties if their failures are severe enough. Its
not really
sovereignty, thenits mere administrative convenience.
A2: R2P Doesnt kill Sovereignty - its Preventive

Even if its prevention, the doctrine still kills sovereignty
Gay 7/23/13
Albright and Williamson might reply that all these worries repeat the error of assuming that R2P is
mainly about its third pillar, when in fact R2P is at its core an instrument of prevention. It does not
mandate military action by the United States or others. The idea is to generate preventive diplomacy,
increased development aid, sanctions, and other tools to avoid the military options that might be necessary
when prevention fails and atrocities commence. The second pillar, for them, bears the most weight. et the
way Albright and
Williamson envision this pillar working is also a threat to sovereignty . They imply this in the Politico
op-ed they released to plug the report, as they note that Syria today presents us with a stark reminder of the
high human costs of equivocation.
As Assad began to turn state organs into his own tool of repression, R2Ps
preventive underpinnings were rightfully called into question... Indeed. No preventive action could
have kept Assad from turning the states institutions into tools of repression while also respecting
Syrian sovereignty, because Assads rule was already repressive. As in most autocracies, the government
could not become less repressive without endangering its continued hold on power. Assad was thus likely to
regard the second-pillar efforts that would have been necessary to stabilize prewar Syria as a threat,
and to refuse them. (Indeed, other autocracies, such as Russia and Egypt, have similarly refused such
help.) So should these second-pillar measures be conducted over a governments objections? If not,
theyll often be
insufficient; if so, sovereignty is further eroded. Yet Albright and
Williamson pass over this problem in silence.
A2: Safeguards Protect Sovereignty

R2P safeguards AUGMENT erosion of sovereignty
Menon 6/12/13
http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/06/12/its-fatall y-flawed/ Rajan Menon is Anne and
Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science, City College of New York/City University of New York,
and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
R2Ps originators anticipated that any prescription perceived as proposing lax criteria for the use of force
would be dead on arrival, so the ICISS report and follow-on publications of its ilk have bowed before the
shrine of sovereignty. They affirm that the obligation to protect people rests in the first instance with the
governments that have jurisdiction over them, but they add that when a state cannot or will not protect
human rights, the
responsibility shifts to the international community, which means, ideally, the UN girded with Security
Council authorization, or in a pinch regional organizations if they promise subsequently to seek UNSCR
approval. R2P proponents take pains to explain that the concept is not a pretext for military intervention.
Force, Gareth Evans tirelessly reiterates, should be used only during human rights emergencies and only
following the failure of diplomacy, mediation, naming and shaming, and sanctions. Even then, he stresses,
feasibility, risks, proportionality and the prospects for success must be weighed. (There is more than a
dollop of just war theory in R2P; Augustine and
Aquinas would be proud.) R2Ps expositors also recommend various preventive
measures: early-warning mechanisms, pre-crisis mediation, peacekeeping, economic assistance and postconflict reconstruction.2 Yet the reassurances that force would be a rare, last-ditch response have not
placated critics, for several reasons. R2Ps pre-intervention prescriptions merely repeat existing
remedies and add nothing to diplomacys toolkit. Whats new is the
casuistry of reframing and diminishing sovereignty in order to legitimize altruistic armed
intervention in defense of the abstract rights that most political communities agree upon in theory. Given
R2Ps emphasis on feasibility and the chances for success, weak states are its most likely proving
grounds; powerful ones need not fear, no matter the magnitude of their
misdeeds. Because idealism and power are inextricably intertwined, with the latter frequently corrupting the
former, R2P provides powerful states one script for playing the Good Samaritan when intervention promotes
their interests, and another for eschewing or opposing aid when it doesnt.
A2: N/U Sovereignty is Down Now

is unique sovereignty is strong HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION is the ONLY
cause
Chirstensen 3/2/12
http://notesonliberty.com/2012/03/02/bizarre-love-triangle-towards-a-new- internationalism/
Brandon Christensen (follow him on Twitter) received his B.A. in cultural anthropology from UCLA in
2013, where he also minored in Middle Eastern and African studies. His writings have been featured in the
Freeman and at RealClearHistory. He was born in the middle of Utah, raised in a small Northern California
town, and spent two years attending a community college in Santa Cruz before moving to Los Angeles. He is
interested in pre-colonial polities,
property rights, ethnicity, and international trade.
Perhaps, but I strongly disagree with Dr. Larisons observations here. Not with the notion that weaker states
have selfish interests too, but rather with the argument that state sovereignty has been eroding
precipitously over the past twenty years. To the isolationist, free trade and international governance
(including military alliances) are necessarily bad things for a state and its sovereignty, because these concepts
are perceived to be taking away from the ability of a state to make decisions in its own interests. Yet the
major powers and, to a lesser extent, the regional powers of the world are largely able
to do what they want in terms of formulating domestic and foreign policies. Just think of the recent attempt
by Brazil and Turkey to get Iran to play nice with its nuclear technology. With the exception of the United
States in Iraq and Afghanistan, the weak states of the world and their predation by major powers seems
only to be occurring along peripheries of the major powers territories, specifically in the region of the
world traditionally under Russian influence. And even these predatory practices of the Russian state are
largely aimed at defending Moscows peripheries from the incursions into region by the American state. So I
would look at the situation of weak states outside the peripheries of great powers not as a steady erosion of
state sovereignty, but as the last stage of colonization by Europeans a century ago. The weakness in these
states was inherent from the beginning, as they were largely constructed to extract resources for shipment to
European industry and to ensure that recently conquered non-Western rivals, whether monarchies,
confederations, city-states,
or empires, remained conquered once and for all. In order for a state to have
sovereignty, it needs to be recognized by its own people as legitimate, and not
by major powers (though it certainly helps!), and the structure of weak states, at least outside the peripheries
of major powers, is illegitimate in the eyes of most the people living within these states. Dr. Larison
continues: If there is one thing more misguided than organizing foreign policy around humanitarian
and democratist meddling in the affairs of other nations, it has to be the
revival of the liberal nationalist conceit that there should be an independent nation-state for every group
that wants one. Hardly. The Wilsonian notions of humanitarian intervention and democratic nationbuilding are easily the most misguided
ideals being espoused throughout Washington today, and the fact that some of
the idealists over at Foreign Policy have latched onto liberal nationalism as a way to promote their misguided
policies should not deter us from the fact that the United States has not pursued nor promoted liberal
nationalism in its foreign policy since Wilsons disastrous meddling in Europe over (nearly) a
century ago. Let us be clear: the NATO excursions into the Balkans had nothing
to do with promoting liberal nationalism, and everything to do with humanitarian
intervention, democratic state-building, and geostrategic maneuvering. The military excursions into Iraq,
Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, and God knows where else over the past twenty years have nothing to do
with the concept of liberal nationalism and everything to do with humanitarian intervention,
democratic state-building, and/or geostrategic maneuvering. Liberal nationalism, as it is promoted by
the idealists, is extremely new on the scene in D.C. and is probably just one of the many, many fads
that swing through the capital and are used to apply humanitarian intervention and democratic statebuilding to foreign policy proposals.
Sovereignty Impact
Global adoption of R2P causes great power wars denial of sovereignty.

Trombly 11
Dan Trombly, GWU IR Grad Student, 8-27-2011 The upending of sovereignty
http://slouchingcolumbia.wordpress.com/2011/08/27/the-upending-of-sovereignty/
The second dangerous

on the international scale, the potential
element
is
that
for
creating
serious enmity among the
. The
importance of consensus belies the
great
powers
reality
how consensus is
, not by automaticofrecognition but by a careful
formed
negotiation
of more we ,
in
terests and calculation
of Yet the
to view R2P as
threatwhich
s.
falsely simply
choose a series of actions
a itself,
norm
automatically initiates
to enforce
the
more
tension
we
are likely to provoke when this imagined process hits against the
friction
. Whilepolitics
I have predicted that military limitations by US allies in power projection
as
they of world
and the
increasingarability
of countries to deny the US ability to unilaterally project power itself will
actually
e
make the implementation of R2P unlikely beyond Africa or certain parts of the Middle East, even the
it in
the backyard of China or Russia could seriously destabilize the the US
attempts
to apply
to
seek to implement a norm which in theory only a UNSC veto
prevents
from
being
employed against China in that countrys backyard would be a
serious and
escalation
tensio
in utter of
denial of the type of sovereign, qualifed space
ns
China is seeking toR2P
create in its own neighborhood.
is not a plot by great powers. But it is a radical denial of the
historic purpose of sovereignty, which was not to protect societies from foreign states, but to
protect society from itself. But rather than empowering a global society, it will empower the
great powers of the international system, along with those societies whose appeals
suit their perceived interests. It is built on a fundamentally untenable illusion of
consensus among great powers which will not endure a crisis in a more strategically
meaningful area of the world. Should activists succeed in convincing great powers that societies
of affected states can legitimize the actions of intervening states, and jus ad bello trump the need
for the impossible-to-enforce consensus, the results will seriously challenge the basis of
amicable great power relations in the first place.
R2P Increase War Moral Hazard (Syria/Iran)

R2P incentivizes war deal-making it rules out compromise. Specifically drives Assad
and militias
Gay 7/23/13
John Allen Gay is an assistant managing editor at The National Interest. His
book (co-authored with Geoffrey Kemp) War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences
was released by Rowman and Littlefield in early 2013, The National Interest, July 23, The Deceptive
Appeal of the Responsibility to Protect, DOA: 12-7-14
The R2P concept of sovereignty can also give bad actors like Assad perverse incentives . A case in
point is threats to bring those behind atrocities before international courtsthreats made in Albright and
Williamsons report. Assad is
hardly more likely to seek peace and step down if he thinks that might see
him brought before the International Criminal Court and thrown in prison for decades. Such a risk is
all the more reason to hang on desperately and to keep inflicting horrors on his people. Secondpillar actions, too, could make him more troublesome. If the international community insists that states
accept outside efforts to change their politics, autocracies will have
incentives to resist the international community; those within autocratic regimes who benefit from their
positions have incentives to spoil the deal. And the resistance can be quite destructive, endangering
international stability and even causing atrocities. Irans support for terrorist groups and
sectarian militias throughout the Middle East may be driven in part by this dynamic .
R2P Increases War Moral Hazard

Moral hazard blocks negotiated solutions
Beaumont 5/4/13
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/04/un-syria-duty-to-intervene
Peter Beaumont writes on foreign affairs for the Guardian and Observer. He has
reported extensively from conflict zones including Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East, and has
reported widely on human rights issues and the impact of conflict on civilians. The winner of the George
Orwell Prize for his reports from Iraq he is the author of The Secret Life of War: Journeys Through
Modern Conflict
Jennifer Walsh, professor of international relations at Oxford University who has studied the development of
R2P, agrees with Evans's analysis. But she also identifies a "moral hazard" inherent in R2P that it can
create a perception
in conflicts that a rebel force may be only a regime-sponsored atrocity away from international
interveners coming to its aid. The incentive for rebels to find a negotiated solution is thus reduced.
Serbia proves moral hazard

Menon 6/12/13
Those who start wars are often confident that they know how they will end. They are just as often proved
wrong. Idealistic humanitarian interveners, a sub- species of such hubristic planners, congratulate
themselves on their high- mindedness, which leads most of them to assume that if no self-interested
motives attach to their intentions, then no self-interested consequences can emerge from them. Of course
this is absurd. One result of NATOs (eventual) decision to strike Bosnian Serb forces in 1995, very
popular among the
soon-to-be-hatched R2P brood, was to alter the political balance within the Kosovar Albanian
opposition. The Dayton deal skirted Kosovo, confirming most Kosovars belief that the world couldnt care
less about their plight. The new context helped the KLA but, as already noted, shaped the ferocity of its
tactics. In response, Serb forces mounted a major counterinsurgency campaign. Indeed, the multiplication of
Western calls to do something had the perverse effect of inducing Slobodan Milosevic to ramp up the
killings and
expulsions. Once NATO started bombing, Milosevic moved even faster and more ruthlessly to quash the
KLA, but NATO still limited itself to airpower and restricted pilots to safe altitudes. The result? In less than
three months after NATO began bombing, Serbian troops killed some 10,000 people in Kosovo and drove
another 1.4 million from their homes. The shallowness of the alliances commitment to humanitarian
principles was revealed when it chose to conduct a campaign that would produce minimal, ideally zero,
casualties for its own soldiers, no matter the horrendous consequences for the people it had intervened to
protect. NATOs defenders say that it did not do the killing and expelling,
that Milosevic was responsible and that he would have done what he did anyway. Yes, the Serbian leadership
unquestionably bears responsibility; yes, atrocities occurred before NATO acted; but there can be no doubt
that the scale and
duration of Serbian atrocities owed much to NATOs intervention. The selfexculpatory claim that what happened would have happened is unpersuasive. It is also worth noting in
passing what the Kosovar victory enableda set of concerns almost universally ignored in Western
accounts of the war. NATO defended the intervention as a response to killings and ethnic cleansing, but
after the war Albanians killed many Serb civilians and forced thousands of Serbs and Roma from
their homes even as NATO troops (organized as KFOR) were moving in to secure Kosovo. The KLA
maintained detention centers in Albania where several hundreds of Serbs and other minorities, plus
Albanians suspected of complicity with the Serb authorities, were held. Some were tortured, others killed
in some cases after their organs were removed for sale by Albanian criminal networks.6
High-ranking KLA officials participated in some of these activities. Before the war, in those parts of
Kosovo not controlled by Serb forces, criminal clans,
again involving KLA leaders, seized industries, natural resources and property, foreshadowing the massive
corruption and criminality that mark Kosovo today. None of this ever excited much passion in Brussels or
Washington; nor were European governments welcoming toward refugees fleeing Kosovo. Their focus was
on Serb atrocities. The KLA, which had gained in stature partly because the United States and Europe
embraced it as a war partner and as the legitimate representative of Kosovar resistance, got a pass. In
humanitarian
interventions Manichean world of artificial passion plays, there are no shades of gray. Unintended
consequences are either ignored or blamed on others.
Stefan Bauschard
Offensive PKOs release
10
01
Stefan Bauschard
10
11
Moral Hazard: Secessionism
R2P sparks global secessionism through moral hazard

Janik 13
Janik, Ralph R. A., The Responsibility to Protect as an Impetus for Secessionist
Movements: On the Necessity to Re-Think Territorial Integrity (December 6,
2013). Matthias Kettemann (ed), Grenzen im Vlkerrecht (Jan Sramek Verlag,
2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364478
Ralph Janik is research assistant of Prof. August Reinisch and lecturer at the University of Vienna. After
completing his studies in law and political science at the University of Vienna and the Universidad Alcala de
Henares (Madrid) , he has worked inter alia as a research assistant in the project International Law through
the National Prism: The Impact of Judicial Dialogue at the University
of Vienna, Section for International Law and International Relations , as well
as at the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam, where he also obtained his
postgraduate LL.M. degree in international law
The historical and political roots of such secessionist struggles will be briefly outlined in the next section,
which is followed by a short overview on the legal framework regarding secessionist claims. After having
discussed the extent to which law has a say in this subject matter and the possibility of secession as a
remedial , ultima ratio right under extraordinary circumstances, the following part will then proceed to
demonstrate that secession is increasingly gaining factual and legal importance in light of the increasing
tendency to deal with intra-state conflicts on the international plane instead of treating these as
essentially domestic matters. The last step in this development has been the emergence of the concept of the
Reponsibility to Protect which essentially enshrines the duty of states to protect their respective
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and also de lege
ferenda obligations upon the international community to act once a state is unable or unwilling to
protect its population from such acts or even carrying out these serious human
rights violations itself. As will be shown however, this concept does not only
have positive effects but may also constitute an incentive for secessionist movements to actively
provoke the government they are fighting to react in a manner that might force the international
community to step up with at least some kind of international support on their behalf. Here, one needs to
bear in mind that such support might decisively shift the balance of power towards the otherwise clearly
disadvantaged secessionist group. This incentive is further fostered by the fact that massive state retaliation
may also provide the basis for the
above-mentioned right to remedial secession , thereby also influencing the
international community in its subsequent assessment of the pressing issue of recognition. Assuming that
such a nexus of the Responsibility to Protect and the right to remedial secession indeed exists, the
international community could thus often unknowingly and unintentionally become the midwife of
new states. That would call for a fundamental re-conceptualization either of the attitude towards
secessionism or that towards intervention on humanitarian grounds; this point will be addressed in the last
part, which will be followed
Stefan Bauschard
by a conclusion.
10
21
Secession: A2: Alternative Causality

R2P is the CRUCIAL determinant of global secessionism
Janik 13
Janik, Ralph R. A., The Responsibility to Protect as an Impetus for Secessionist
Movements: On the Necessity to Re-Think Territorial Integrity (December 6,
2013). Matthias Kettemann (ed), Grenzen im Vlkerrecht (Jan Sramek Verlag,
2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364478
Ralph Janik is research assistant of Prof. August Reinisch and lecturer at the University of Vienna. After
completing his studies in law and political science at the University of Vienna and the Universidad Alcala de
Henares (Madrid) , he has worked inter alia as a research assistant in the project International Law through
the National Prism: The Impact of Judicial Dialogue at the University
of Vienna, Section for International Law and International Relations , as well
as at the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam, where he also obtained his
postgraduate LL.M. degree in international law
It is all too likely that, due to the change in attitude towards intervention in civil wars, often fought
over secessionist demands, as well as regarding recognition of thereby possibly emerging states, such
conflicts are here to
stay and may well increase in the future. This would particularly but not exclusively affect
countries composed by many ( easily ) separable groups living in more or less distinct territories
without sharing any sense of
community or even solidarity. The possibility of a doubled moral hazard
caused by the interplay of remedial secession and the prospect of outside intervention is thus of
crucial significance for the future of the international legal order. Yet, this effect in general and
regarding secession in particular has largely
remained ignored both by practitioners and theorists. Rather, scholars
usually seem reluctant to voice fundamental criticism in connection with
the advances in connection with the use of force on humanitarian grounds, especially upon authorization by
the Security Council, in fear of being seen as advocates of oppressive regimes. At the same time, states
seem to avoid or simply not consider the possibility of this very issue in their shortterm pursuance of
strategic goals, while they are keen on avoiding the creation of any precedence at all costs and regardless of
the facts. In the case of Kosovo for instance, the intervening countries simply emphasized that the conflict
was not an issue of an attempt to secession but a humanitarian catastrophe that had made the use of force
necessary to stop and prevent a regime from gross human rights abuses. 107 Nanda, Self-Determination,
279. 108
Secession Spills Over

Secession linked globally spills over
Larison 11
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-wages-of-kosov o-and-south- sudan/
Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published in the New
York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American
Scene, and Culture11, and is a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of
Chicago, and resides in Dallas.
This is always very easy for others with nothing at stake to say. Sudans break-up doesnt threaten the
rest of Africa until it provides the precedent in other countries for similar independence movements.
Kosovo was supposed to be exceptional, too, until recognition of its independence more or less directly
led to the effective partition of Georgia. When the U.S. and other states recognized Kosovo, few believed
that it could have an effect on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but it did. How many countries will suffer from
greater instability because self-determination prevailed in Sudan? Once
major powers start re-drawing borders to satisfy the demands of self- determination or other
concerns, there is no obvious place to stop . Kosovos example isnt supposed to have any effect on the
situation in Karabakh, either, but why
are the people in Karabakh and Armenia bound by this Western assumption?
Supporters of the secession of South Sudan have to take into account the possibility that the success of the
southern Sudanese in achieving independence will encourage other separatist and automomist
movements in Africa and elsewhere. In many ways, African nation-states are among the most arbitrary,
artificial creations in the entire world, but that doesnt mean that splitting them up into equally artificial,
less viable statelets will make things any better. Kosovos separation from Serbia and eventual
independence empowered a gang of criminals.
Secession creates a domino effect

Byman and Pollock 12
Byman, Daniel, and Kenneth Pollack. "The Syrian Spillover." Foreign Policy
(2012).
Kenneth Michael Pollack, PhD, is a noted former CIA intelligence analyst and expert on Middle East
politics and military affairs.
Dr. Daniel L. Byman is a professor at Georgetown University's Walsh School of
Foreign Service in the Security Studies Program and Department of Government
Secessionism: As the Balkan countries demonstrated in the 1990s, seemingly triumphant secessionist bids
can set off a domino effect . Slovenia's declaration of independence inspired Croatia, which prompted
Bosnia to do the same, which encouraged Macedonia, and then Kosovo. Strife and conflict
followed all of these declarations. Sometimes it is the desire of one subgroup

within a state to break away that triggers the civil war in the first place. In other cases, different groups vie
for control of the state, but as the
fighting drags on, one or more groups may decide that their only recourse is to secede. At times, a
minority comfortable under the old regime may fear discrimination from a new government. The South
Ossetians, for example, accepted Russian rule but rebelled when Georgia broke off from the Soviet Union, as
they feared they would face discrimination in the new Georgian state. After Russia helped South Ossetia
defeat the Georgian forces that tried to re-conquer the area in 1991-1992, the next domino fell when ethnic
Abkhaz also rebelled and created their own independent area in 1991-1992. The frozen conflict that resulted
from this civil war finally burst into an international shooting war between Georgia and Russia in August
2008.
R2P Fails: A2 Good

Self-interest and UN charter structurally precludes effective R2P
Holmes 1/7/14
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/1/the-weakness -of-the- responsibility-toprotect-as-an-international-norm
Kim R. Holmes, a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, oversaw the think tanks defense and
foreign policy team for more than two decades. Holmes was Heritages vice president for foreign and
defense policy studies and
except for his service, during most of the first term of President George W.
Bush, as assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs. Holmes priority is writing a book,
due in fall 2013, in which he hopes to lay out a compelling vision for Americas future by uniting Heritages
domestic and foreign policy ideas. Few people bring greater clarity and historical wisdom to thorny issues
than Kim Holmes, Heritage President Edwin J. Feulner said in announcing the new role on Dec. 5, 2012.
Holmes previously directed Heritage's team of foreign and defense policy experts in four centers on the front
lines of international affairs: the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, the Asian
Studies Center, the Center for International Trade and Economics and the Margaret Thatcher Center for
Freedom. Davis also includes the Washington Roundtable for the Asia-Pacific Press (WRAPP). Holmes
joined Heritage in 1985 and rose to vice president in 1991. He was a founding editor of the annual Index of
Economic Freedom, which has become a signature Heritage publication. He led the think tanks efforts to
convince the United States to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He launched Heritages
widely respected homeland security program after September 11, as well as its program
on international trade, and expanded the missile defense program to what it is
today. Holmes left Heritage in late 2001 to serve as an assistant secretary of state. After rejoining the think
tank in 2005, he authored the book Liberty's Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st Century.
Recognized around the
globe as one of Washingtons foremost foreign and defense policy experts, Holmes is a member of the
Council on Foreign Relations, where he formerly served on the Washington Advisory Committee. Previous
appointments include the Defense Policy Board, which is the U.S. defense secretarys primary resource for
expert outside advice; the Board of Directors of the Center for International Private Enterprise; and public
member of the U.S. delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. While at the
State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing policy and coordinating U.S. engagement at the
United Nations and 46 other international organizations. Important goals achieved at that time included the
U.N. mandates enabling Iraq to make the transition to democracy; the Security Council's first binding
nonproliferation resolution; the U.N.'s first mandate requiring the Office of Internal Oversight Services to
release reports to member states; an international outcry over Libya's assuming chairmanship of the
Commission on Human Rights, which culminated in that body's refashioning; and establishment of the U.N.
Democracy Caucus and U.N. Democracy Fund. Holmes earned his doctoral and masters degrees in history
from Georgetown University. He received a bachelors degree in history from the University of Central
Florida in Orlando. He was a research fellow at the Institute for European History in Germany and adjunct
professor of European security and history at Georgetown University.
Over the last 60 years, additional international conventions and United Nations
resolutions have also established norms and standards of international humanitarian law. These include the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its subsequent Protocols. Although not sidestepping the respect for
national sovereignty still embedded in the U.N. Charter (and thus the right of the Security Council to decide
ultimately questions of international peace), these conventions and resolutions did quite consciously stretch
the boundaries of old definitions of sovereignty. They not only diminished the legitimacy of national
sovereignty but also broadened the scope of action that international bodies could take in defense of human
rights and to protect against genocide and mass murder. It was always a balancing act, but there was
inherent tension between the rights of national sovereigntywhich the U.N. General Assembly and
Security Council jealously protected and the rights of individuals to protectionwhich were championed
in such bodies as the Human Rights Council, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and
the human rights treaty bodies.
The resolutions on R2P ratified by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005 tried to overcome these tensions,
but it still recognized the ultimate authority of the Security Council. Each state had a responsibility to
protect its population, the resolution said, but collective action was to be taken through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis. In other words,
only the Security Council could decide whether an intervention of the international community should be
undertaken, which implied not only the rights of the veto of the Permanent Five (P-5) members (including
the United States), but also that the universal humanitarian legal principles supposedly established by the
R2P resolution were still subordinate to the principles of national sovereignty--to rights of the P-5 members
in particular.
Why does this matter? Because it points to the fact that R2P is a mere aspiration, as opposed to a real
principle of international norms or even law. R2P sometimes not only runs against the practices of
Realpolitik (where national
sovereignty still reigns supreme), but more importantly, it is at odds with a
fundamental principle of the United Nations itselfnamely, the ultimate legal deference to national
sovereignty as decided by the national members of the Security Council. The Council may approve of the
concept with respect to Libya but does
not do so in Syria because certain members of the P-5 (namely Russia) object. In
that difference is the ultimate weakness of R2P as a principle . The opposition of Russia to a Syria
intervention, for example, reveals that no matter what Moscow may think about R2P as a principle, it will
not adhere to it if it violates its
national interests. Frankly, as a matter of principle, the United States as a P5 member more or less does the same thing. Regardless of what the General
Assembly may say, it is the actions of the Security Council that count in international peace and
stability. If there is no consensus among the P-5 on how R2P should be followed, or subsequent
observance of any agreement on it in practice, then it will never survive as a viable legal or normative
principle of international order.
R2p fails humanitarian intervention without the pretext solves better

Holmes 1/7/14
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/1/the-weakness -of-the- responsibility-toprotect-as-an-international-norm
Kim R. Holmes, a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, oversaw the think tanks defense and
foreign policy team for more than two decades. Holmes was Heritages vice president for foreign and
defense policy studies and
Center for International Trade and Economics and the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. Davis also
includes the Washington Roundtable for the Asia-Pacific Press (WRAPP). Holmes joined Heritage in 1985
and rose to vice president in 1991. He was a founding editor of the annual Index of Economic Freedom,
which has become a signature Heritage publication. He led the think tanks efforts to convince the United
States to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He launched Heritages widely respected
homeland security program after September 11, as well as its program
on international trade, and expanded the missile defense program to what it is
today. Holmes left Heritage in late 2001 to serve as an assistant secretary of state. After rejoining the think
tank in 2005, he authored the book Liberty's Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st Century.
Recognized around the
is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, where he formerly served on the
Washington Advisory Committee. Previous appointments include the Defense Policy Board, which is the
U.S. defense secretarys primary resource for expert outside advice; the Board of Directors of the Center for
International Private Enterprise; and public member of the U.S. delegation to the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe. While at the State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing policy
and coordinating U.S. engagement at the United Nations and 46 other international organizations. Important
goals achieved at that time included the U.N. mandates enabling Iraq to make the transition to democracy;
the Security Council's first binding nonproliferation resolution; the U.N.'s first mandate requiring the Office
of Internal Oversight Services to release reports to member states; an international outcry over Libya's
assuming chairmanship of the Commission on Human Rights, which culminated in that body's refashioning;
and establishment of the U.N. Democracy Caucus and U.N. Democracy Fund. Holmes earned his doctoral
and masters degrees in history from Georgetown University. He received a bachelors degree in history from
the University of Central Florida in Orlando. He was a research fellow at the Institute for European History
in Germany and adjunct professor of European security and history at Georgetown University.
Finally, there is the question of how R2P affects the United States. Since the U.S. has a veto on the U.N.
Security Council, it will never be forced to send an armed force in defense of the R2P principle against its
will. But that is not
the real concern. Rather, it is that, over time, the norm will be established that the only proper use of
American military force is for the kinds of humanitarian operations implied by the R2P principle.
Woodward and Morrison imply such a norm when they say R2P is arguably the most radical adjustment to
sovereignty since the Peace of Westphalia was signed in 1648. The authors see this as a positive
development, rather than as a concern for the use of force.
They envision it as a revolutionary advance, a victory for democracy because it
pledges to support sovereign rule only when it protects the populace it

governs. Undermining national sovereignty as a principle is a double-edged
sword for the United States. As any U.S. diplomat with U.N. experience will tell you, many nations around
the world are all too happy to downplay national sovereignty if it means criticizing the internal practices of
the United States or Israel. And yet they jealously defend that sovereignty when it comes to their own acts.
More fundamentally, however, the purposes of U.S. armed forces are still, first and foremost, to defend the
sovereignty, security and freedom of
the American people. They are not primarily mercenary forces to be deployed at
the behest of a U.N. body, no matter how well intended that mission may be. Therefore, significantly
altering U.S. military missions or planning to accommodate the R2P doctrine would be misguided.
After all is said and
, and a rather weak
done, R2P is not really a principle but an
aspiration
one
at that. Its defenders often say, The fact that we cannot protect people everywhere is no reason for doing
nothing when we can. In other words, they argue that intervening in the face of mass murder is an
option that cannot be
relinquished. That is true. But we dont need R2P to have that option. Whether the U.N. Security
Council authorizes such an intervention will always be a practical judgment, at the discretion of
sovereign members of the UNSC, and depending on all sorts of circumstances. And it is these exceptions
that
illuminate the weakness of R2P as a principle. The problem with R2P is
that its reality never lives up to its high-sounding principles. If it wanted to, the Security Council could
have intervened to stop genocide in Rwanda and elsewhere. The reason it didnt are the same ones that
will likely keep it from doing so elsewhere in the future. Ultimately R2P is riddled with too many
contradictions and practical problems to make it a serious doctrine for implementation by U.S.
strategy. It mainly comes down to an argument of moral suasion to intervene against mass murder and
genocide, which one can make without resorting to tortured arguments about supposed international
principles or even the proper purposes of warfare, and certainly
without damaging the vital notion of national sovereignty.
Scattershot application means fail

Holmes 11
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/04/whose-responsibilit y-toprotect
Kim R. Holmes, a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, oversaw the
think tanks defense and foreign policy team for more than two decades. Holmes
was Heritages vice president for foreign and defense policy studies and
Center for International Trade and
Economics and the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. Davis also includes the Washington Roundtable
for the Asia-Pacific Press (WRAPP). Holmes joined Heritage in 1985 and rose to vice president in 1991. He
was a founding editor of the annual Index of Economic Freedom, which has become a signature Heritage
publication. He led the think tanks efforts to convince the United States to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. He launched Heritages widely respected homeland security program after September 11, as
well as its program
on international trade, and expanded the missile defense program to what it is today. Holmes left Heritage
in late 2001 to serve as an assistant secretary of state. After rejoining the think tank in 2005, he authored
the book Liberty's Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st Century. Recognized around the
is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, where he formerly served on the Washington Advisory
Committee. Previous appointments include the Defense Policy Board, which is the U.S. defense secretarys
primary resource for expert outside advice; the Board of Directors of the Center for International Private
Enterprise; and public member of the U.S. delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe. While at the State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing policy and coordinating U.S.
engagement at the United Nations and 46 other international organizations. Important goals achieved at that
time included the U.N. mandates enabling Iraq to make the transition to democracy; the Security Council's
first binding nonproliferation resolution; the U.N.'s first mandate requiring the Office of Internal Oversight
Services to release reports to member states; an international outcry over Libya's assuming chairmanship of
the Commission on Human Rights, which culminated in that body's refashioning; and establishment of the
U.N. Democracy Caucus and U.N. Democracy Fund. Holmes earned his doctoral and masters degrees in
history from Georgetown University. He received a bachelors degree in history from the University of
Central Florida in Orlando. He was a research fellow at the Institute for European History in Germany and
adjunct professor of European security and history at Georgetown University.
The 1990s genocides in Srebrenica and Rwanda sparked U.N. debate on how to prevent such massacres. This
led to a 2001 U.N.-commissioned study, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. That report laid out the doctrines main ideas: All
nations have a responsibility to protect their citizens from large- scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, and if a
nation failed to do this, the international community working through the U.N. had a responsibility
to protect the aggrieved population. The U.N. General Assembly enshrined this idea in the 2005 Millennium
Summit Outcome Document. The U.S. accepted, but
stipulated that the document did not obligate nations to intervene. The
Security Council subsequently reaffirmed the responsibility lines on several occasions, most recently in
this years first Libyan resolution. It referenced the authorities responsibility to protect its population.
There are many problems with this idea. First is the hypocrisy of protecting one population while
ignoring others. Why intervene with force to stop a potential massacre in Libya and ignore real genocide
in Sudans Darfur region? Why were some of the same people who advocate a responsibility to protect in
Libya so fiercely opposed to intervening in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein killed
about 300,000 civilians? Given its scattershot application, responsibility to protect fails as a
principle .
Stefan Bauschard
11
01
Stefan Bauschard
R2P Bad: Bias
11
11
Prefer our evidence r2p good cards tainted by promilitary bias

Mahoney 10/22/13
http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/liam-mahony/myth-of-military- might-in-r2pchoices
Liam Mahony has been working in the field of civilian protection and human rights since the 1980s. Author
of Proactive Presence: Field Strategies for Civilian Protection, he has done extensive fieldwork in many
countries, and is a pioneer in the theory and practice of international protection. A former
lecturer in Human Rights at Princeton University, he co-founded Fieldview
Solutions and through it has led analysis and training for hundreds of UN and
NGO protection staff deployed in conflict zones.
debat over Responsibility-to- , assumptions, cultural myths and
e
Protect
language conspire to promote unwise military action. The effectiveness of military responses to conflict
has become unconsciously and widely assumed. Are military responses so popular because objective
scientific study has proven their efficacy? Or does this debate mostly reflect the daily teaching in many
In the
cultures throughout the world, that the bigger stick always wins? The promotion of violent force as the
problem-solving option of last resort pervades popular culture from Hollywood to school history
curricula. And it pervades this debate .
R2P proponents insist that their doctrine prefers non-military approaches. But
the language of the debate suggests otherwise: robust by definition means strong
and healthy, but in the international communitys debate over approaches to conflict it is usually a
synonym for military and violent. The double-edged phrase last resort implies both that the military
option has great risks but
also that if all other means fail, this is the one that will work. Gareth Evans
piece in this debate, for instance, refers to the military option as something
to be considered when no lesser measure is available. With thousands of lives at stake, why would we
settle for lesser measures? Such language, so frequently used even by those who are honestly committed
to civilian protection, inevitably supports calls for military action, even if it is unwise. The implicit
message is that the only really serious action is military
action. Everything else is weak and half-hearted. This language also invites world powers like the US
to clothe their military aspirations in humanitarian rhetoric, regardless of whether their intent or final
impact helps civilians on the ground. Syria, with its consistent support to Hezbollah, has been considered an
enemy by the US for decades. Can we seriously be considering that the US is all of a sudden engaging now
out of concern for Syrians civilians? The US is already engaged militarily supporting one side in
this war, and the civilian death toll has only increased as a result. If
anything, the debate regarding how best to protect civilians in Syria is much
too late the balance of consequences for civilians should have been assessed
before the first military or political support was offered to the rebels, back in 2011. I have had the
opportunity to spend some time in the Democratic Republic of Congo in recent years, assessing strategies
Stefan Bauschard
11
for
the protectionPKOs
of civilians,
in a situation where the international community and the UN have put all 21
Offensive
release
their eggs in the military basket. Many Congolese themselves are also
Stefan Bauschard
11
11
desperately hoping for military salvation. Yet after a decade of blue berets and billions of dollars spent,
civilians remain totally vulnerable to privations
from armed groups as well as from the (UN-supported) Congolese military. This year the UN was faced with
broad-based pressure to do something more. Despite there being no objective assessment of the real
protective impact on the Congolese people of the current militarized approach, the only new strategy they
could come up with was to strengthen the military approach and approve a UN force with an explicit
offensive mandate: more military, more robustly offensive. Interestingly, a recent study looking at a
different type of conflict resistance movements against repressive regimes suggests that in the last
hundred years, unarmed resistance movements were more successful
at achieving their objectives than armed ones. (Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. Why Civil
Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.) With adequate research, the hypothesis of
a correlation in international interventions between military force and protective impact
might be shown to be valid, or it might not. But in the meantime it is largely a myth , a heuristic
simplification that gives us a too-readily-available and simple answer to complex situations. It is also a
myth that gives many people
hope, because we deeply wish that there were a quick solution to the human
suffering we are witnessing in the conflicts that prompt these debates. Decision-makers truly
concerned with protecting civilians need to recognize this unconscious assumption that privileges
the military option . Rather than
reacting to knee-jerk pressures to do something, or to do more, policy decisions should be based on a careful
context-based analysis of each particular case, and an extremely cautious assessment of reasonable
expectations of consequences.
This kind of assessment is necessary before military action, before economic sanctions, or any other
pressure. Those in power who order atrocities - whether President Assad or an armed group leader in the
Congo - are most often
interested in sustaining or increasing their own power. Such power is political, economic, and military and it
depends on their relationships with others. A strategy to protect civilians must examine the real interests of
these people, identifying all the political, economic and military relationships they have
that present opportunities for leverage. From that analysis, a nuanced and more
complex strategy would combine the range of tools of leverage available. These in turn would be tailored to
maximize their combined impact, and the strategy would assess the projected balance of consequences with
an emphasis on minimizing negative impacts on civilians. Those in power who order violence against
civilians are usually linked to a range of powerful economic interests, and may be even more sensitive to
economic pressures than to military ones. (In fact, external military threats can sometimes serve to
strengthen domestic support for a targeted group consider how Hezbollah has benefitted from Israeli
attacks on Lebanon.) Economic sanctions are not a panacea, either, and may well in some cases hurt
civilians far more than can be justified by their impact. Further, just as military decisions tend to be based
on geo-politics
divorced from the interests of civilians, decisions about economic measures tend
to be skewed in the interests of economic power brokers for whom sacrificing profits for humanitarian gain
is unacceptable. It should not be surprising that we cannot control the arms trade, for instance, when huge
multinational interests in the US and Europe make so much money from it; or that we have difficulty fully
implementing other kinds of smart sanctions even when they have UN Security Council backing. The
fact that sanctions so seldom effectively
Stefan Bauschard
Offensive
PKOs
release
target the wealthy,
but instead
too often inflict greater suffering on the poor,
is no accident. The point here is not that economic measures are better or worse
than military ones, but rather that there is no self-evident hierarchy among
11
21
them. If wise decisions are to be made, the costs and benefits of different measures must be carefully
assessed, based on past experiences and on the real dynamics of each current context. But this is not
what is happening.
Instead, the debate
is dominated by myths, bias and rhetoric . The crucial assessment of the expected
balance of consequences has become a phrase for s oundbite s, rather than an analytical prerequisite to
action . As long as the military option is perceived as
more potentially effective than it is in reality, and economic and political
pressures considered less effective than they might be, unwise decisions result.
That is the f undamental nature of bias.
R2P = Genocide (Sudan/Syria)

R2p derails effective genocide prevention abandoning it is key to Syria and Sudan
De Waal 12
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/opinion/how-to-end-mass-atrocities.html?_r=0
Alex de Waal is executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher
School, Tufts University., How to End Mass Atrocities, New York Times, March 10, DOA: 12-7-14
High from last years interventions in Libya and Ivory Coast, Evans wrote triumphantly in Foreign Policy
last December that those missions brought an end to most of the confused debates about humanitarian
intervention. The vision he, Power and fellow idealists share is to send the cavalry over the hill not only
to stop any massacres but also to herald justice and democracy. If only it were that simple. In the face of
evil, the idealists tend to turn righteous and forget to ask important questions about what they want
to achieve and how. The result is a misrepresentation of history and a misunderstanding of
the measures that can most effectively halt atrocities today. One major problem is that the idealists
tend to misconstrue or overlook the fundamental motivations of perpetrators. They typically see the
killers as insatiable. This is understandable because they are driven by the memory of the Holocaust and the
Rwandan genocide. But the Nazis and Hutus were exceptional for making the
extermination of a people essential to their politics. Most mass killers have
other goals. In many cases, the perpetrators simply stop killing when they have reached their goals, become
exhausted, fallen out among themselves or been defeated. Take the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70. Despite a
blockade of the secessionist province of Biafra and the genocidal rhetoric of some Nigerian leaders, the
killing ended when the Biafran rebels finally fell to Nigerian forces. Having achieved their military aim, the
Nigerians then began a process of reconciliation and reconstruction under the banner no victor, no
vanquished. In Guatemala, the perpetrators of the 1980-83 massacres of Mayan communities suspected of
supporting Communist insurgents called an end to the atrocities after defeating the rebels. In Indonesia, the
generals stopped killing the Communists in 1966 once the group no longer posed a threat. The soldiers of
President Milton Obote massacred tens of thousands of people in Ugandas Luwero Triangle in 1983-4
until they were defeated on the
battlefield. Likewise, the killings in East Pakistan ended with Indias invasion
in 1971 and the Khmer Rouges atrocities in Cambodia with Vietnams intervention in 1978-79. In other
words, even once they are under way, mass atrocities do not lead inexorably to bottomless massacres.
The killers usually have
political goals: They are determined to kill until they have achieved their
objectives, not until theres no one else left standing. Their use of violence
can be excessive, but more important, it is often instrumental. This creates an opportunity for
negotiating an end to mass atrocities, through peace talks and with financial and diplomatic incentives and
pressure. In recent history such deal- making has brought to an end, albeit often an imperfect one,
massacres in Burundi, East Timor, Kenya, Macedonia and South Sudan. Yet the idealists insist on
pursuing a more ambitious agenda: nothing short of democracy and justice,
imposed by military intervention. And this can undermine simply getting the killing to
stop. For perpetrators, the prospect of foreign intervention and prosecution rules out the possibility for
compromise. For rebels, it creates a perverse incentive to escalate ethnic violence so as to provoke an
international military response. The idealists blind spot about nonideal endings also means they cannot
decide what do to when the killings do subside. In September 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell
announced that a genocide had occurred, and
might be continuing, in Darfur. But by then the level of violence had already
begun to drop, and it continued to diminish over the next few years. U.S. policy
stayed stuck on trying to stop massacres that were no longer happening. In 2009, Scott Gration, the U.S.
special envoy to Sudan, was saying there were remnants of genocide. But in 2010, Susan Rice, the U.S.
ambassador to the United
Nations, was still insisting there was an ongoing genocide. Unable to commit itself to either aggressive
regime change or a program of reconstruction and reconciliation, the U.S. government hasnt made any
progress on either approach. And its indecision has delayed finding a workable political solution for Darfur.
Western policy makers interested in stopping mass crimes should not overlook tools that can work.
Where violence is used as an instrument for political gain, it is negotiable. Some perpetrators can be
moderated through diplomacy. Others will stop killing if they defeat a rebellion or realize they
cannot. The main aim should be to stop genocidal killing . Holding elections and prosecuting
the perpetrators of crimes, however laudable those goals, arent the priority. Today, with civilians in
Sudans Nuba Mountains threatened by mass hunger and violence, U.S. campaigners are calling for
humanitarian intervention. They should remember to keep the political solution firmly in focus. The root of
the crisis is a war between evenly matched adversaries who must recognize that they need to live with the
other. The peace talks that stalled last July should
be revived. This would require Khartoum to lift the ban against the Sudan
Peoples Liberation Movement in the northern sector and begin an inclusive constitutional reform process.
The rebels and their South Sudanese backers, for their part, would have to repudiate the goal of regime
change. Politics are also all-important in Syria. The crisis has evolved from a civilian uprising
to a fully fledged civil war, with each side fearing annihilation if it loses.
The regime of Bashar al-Assad needs a soft landing, and so the model for
solving this crisis is the kind of patient mediation effort that was deployed in Yemen, not aggressive
intervention as in Libya. Responding to mass atrocities, whether ongoing or imminent, is difficult
enough, but the idealism of Evans
and Power makes it that much more so. They have composed a story, based on
ethics rather than evidence, that incorrectly assumes all perpetrators of mass political violence are
insatiable killers and that dictates who should respond (Western nations), how (with military intervention)
and why (for justice and
democracy). It is a morality tale that undermines the best ways to deal with the worst crimes.
R2p Bad: Drone Strikes

R2P legitimacy key to escalating globe drone strikes
Brooks 1/14/13
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52290-hate-obamas-drone- war.html?
itemid=id#26087
Rosa Brooks is a law professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, a columnist and contributing
editor for Foreign Policy and a Bernard L. Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation. From
April 2009 to July 2011, she served as Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele
Flournoy, and in May 2010 she also became [1] Special Coordinator for Rule of Law and Humanitarian
Policy, running a new Pentagon office dedicated to those issues. Brooks wrote a weekly column for the
Los Angeles Times from 2005 to
2009, and is an expert on national security, international law and human rights issues. At the Pentagon her
portfolio included both rule of law and human rights issues and global engagement, strategic communication,
and she received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service for her work.
This notion of a " responsibility to protect" was embraced by the international community -- including
the United States -- with surprising rapidity. In every
way, it represents a radical assault on traditional legal concepts of
sovereignty. The "responsibility to protect" doctrine -- often now referred to as R2P -- suggests that when a
state fails to protect its own population, it can no longer claim any right to be free of external intervention
(including, in extreme cases, military intervention) if intervention is needed to secure the safety of a
threatened population. And by implication, that intervention need
not necessarily be authorized by the U.N. Security Council. If the Security Council "fails to discharge its
responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action...concerned states may not
rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation," observed the 2001 ICISS report. The
logic is clear enough: If failure to protect its population delegitimizes a state's legal claim to sovereignty,
then the failure of collective security structures (such as the UNSC) to take appropriate corrective action
would similarly delegitimize those collective institutions. Put a little differently, the Responsibility to Protect
logically implies that both "the international community" and individual states have a right and a duty to
intervene -- militarily, if necessary -- when another state is "unwilling or unable" to protect its own
population. If the language justifying drone strikes in sovereign states appears to directly parallel the
language of the Responsibility to Protect, it's no accident. Although the R2P doctrine
was developed in response to genocide and other mass atrocities, the language of R2P was easily turned
to other purposes . That's not entirely inappropriate, either: R2P's underlying logic is equally applicable
to terrorism, which is itself
a form of human rights abuse (and one that can have devastating consequences for
civilian populations). As I have argued elsewhere, you "might even say that the R2P coin ought logically
to be seen as having two sides . On one side lies a state's duty to take action inside its own territory to
protect itsown population from violence
and atrocities. On the other side lies a state's duty to take action inside its
own territory to protect other states' populations from violence. Either way, a
state that fails in these duties faces the prospect that other states will intervene in its internal' affairs
without its consent." In a sense, then, it was the human rights community's critique of sovereignty
that helped pave the way for drone strikes.
R2P = Imperialism
R2p is a fig leaf for imperialism
Global Policy Forum 14 http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianqintervention.html
Global Policy Forum is an independent policy watchdog that monitors the work of
the United Nations and scrutinizes global policymaking. We promote accountability and citizen
participation in decisions on peace and security, social justice and international law.
What is to be done in a crisis like the genocide in Rwanda, when the international community seeks to stop
the killing? Can nations, acting through the UN Security Council, fulfill a "responsibility to protect" innocent
civilians? Or is such a doctrine just a Trojan horse for great power abuse? When nations send their military
forces into other nations' territory, it is rarely (if ever) for "humanitarian" purposes. They are typically
pursuing their narrow national interest - grabbing territory, gaining geo-strategic advantage, or seizing
control of precious natural resources. Leaders hope to win public support by describing such actions in
terms of high moral purposes - bringing peace, justice, democracy and civilization to the affected area. In the
era of colonialism, European governments all cynically insisted that they acted to promote such higher
commitments - the "white man's burden," "la mission civilisatrice," and so on and so forth. The appeal to
higher moral purposes continues to infect the political discourse of the great powers.
Today's " humanitarian intervention" is only the latest in this long tradition of political obfuscation .
In 2003, the US-UK invasion and occupation of Iraq was labeled "humanitarian intervention" by UK
Prime Minister Tony Blair
R2P = imperialism: Africa

Indeterminacy of R2p allows repeated interventions against Africa
Branch 11/6/12
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52035-the- responsibility-toprotect-what-is-the-basis-for-the-emerging-norm-of- r2p.html?itemid=id#26087
Assistant Professor of Political Science, San Diego
State University, 2008Research Associate, Makerere Institute of Social Re
search, 2011EDUCATION
Ph.D. (Political Science) Columbia University, 2007
A.B. (Social Studies) Harvard University, 1998
Africa has a long history of being 'protected' by the West. And today, with the precipitous rise of the socalled Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it appears that intervention in the name of protecting Africa has
returned to the centre of Western concern or
regained its utility. Three-quarters of the crises in which R2P has been invoked or applied have been in
Africa and the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on R2P announced that the responsibility to protect
really came from Africa and the African experience" Africa also provided the military testing ground
for R2P and following foreign military intervention in Libya in 2011, according to Ramesh Thakur, R2P is
closer to being solidified as an actionable norm". R2Ps privileged application in Africa bears comparison to
the continent's experience with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Critics have argued that the Court
targets Africa because it can operate there in an accountability-free zone, able to intervene in ongoing
conflicts, take sides in civil wars, scuttle amnesties and peace processes, or align itself with US military
forces all without being held responsible for the consequences of its actions. But at least with the ICC,
there is a concrete institution prosecutors and judges who make statements and decisions that can be
critiqued on legal, political, or moral grounds. With R2P, however, even this modicum of publicity and
formalisation is absent. And this makes its expanding use in Africa all the more dangerous. The first
problem is that no-one seems sure of what R2P even is. Its proponents have celebrated it as a norm, a
doctrine, a concept, an idea, a principle, a framework, or a lens, while its critics have dismissed or
condemned it as an excuse, an ideology, a fad, or an empty slogan. Illustrating this uncertainty is the fact
that, while most agree that R2P enjoys no legal status
of its own, others seem to give it an almost super-legal status. Take the
statement by Susan Rice, current US Ambassador to the UN, for example, who in
2007 invoked R2P to justify a threatened US ground and air attack against Sudan
without Security Council approval. Rice cited R2P to dismiss the possible legal
problems of invading a sovereign state, asserting: Still others insist that, without the consent of the UN or
a relevant regional body, we would be breaking international law. Perhaps, but the Security Council last
year codified a new international norm prescribing the responsibility to protect. It commits UN members
to decisive action, including enforcement, when peaceful measures fail to halt genocide or crimes against
humanity. Not surprisingly, there is also
no consensus on what actions R2P actually legitimates, nor by whom or when. The problem is
compounded by the multiplicity of statements on R2P, from the
2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report to the United Nations
2004 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, to
the Secretary- Generals 2009 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. The original statement of R2P in
the ICISS report explains: State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the
protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of
internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or
avert it, the principle of non- intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. Of course,
the statement poses more questions than it answers. What is the threshold at which responsibility is
legitimately taken up by the international community? Who makes that decision? And who is the
international community? The precise
sequence of actions necessary to fulfil R2P is also left undefined. According to
ICISS, R2P comprises three specific responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, by addressing both
the root causes and direct causes of crises; the responsibility to react to situations of compelling human
need by employing appropriate measures, up to military intervention; and the responsibility to rebuild,
which will help address the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert. Given the
increasingly expansive formulations of R2P, according to which R2P action is to help prevent, react, and
rebuild countries, work with, pressure, and coerce states, and address root causes and prevent the
recurrence of conflict, there seems to be little that is not
included among the instruments that may be legitimately used in the name of R2P.
This could span from development aid to diplomatic pressure, from direct budgetary assistance to invasion
and occupation, from traditional reconciliation to international criminal prosecution. Even one of R2Ps most
vocal academic supporters, Alex Bellamy, admits that, it is seldom if ever clear what R2P requires in a
given situation. The result is a situation in which some analysts can condemn the AU-UN intervention in
Darfur as a dismal failure of R2P while others can laud it as a success; some blame R2P as an excuse used to
prevent effective intervention there while others credit it with enabling international involvement. The same
ambiguity characterises discussions of the R2P in Kenya during the post-election violence in 2008. Some
would agree with Kofi Annan that Kenya is a successful example of R2P at work but others deny that R2P
played a role in the unfolding of international involvement, explaining that the situation was only labelled a
R2P situation retrospectively. This fundamental indeterminacy of R2P was made even clearer, as was
its danger, in the Libya intervention. The doctrines first full-scale deployment led to the bombing of
civilian infrastructure, the deposing and killing of Muammar Gaddafi, the installing of a rebel government,
and the arming of civilians all in the name of protection. The last was justified by a senior French
diplomatic source as: an operational decision taken at the time to help civilians who were in imminent
danger. A group of civilians were about to be massacred so we took the decision to provide self-defensive
weapons to protect those civilian populations under threatIt was entirely justifiable legally, resolution 1970
and 1973 were followed to the letter." R2P is not only dangerous because it is flexible enough to be used to
justify overthrowing governments and arming civilians, but also because it allows those using it to refuse
accountability. States can engage in political and military intervention without having to justify those
interventions on political or military grounds, only on protection grounds. And
they can refuse responsibility for the consequences of their actions all is fair when civilian protection is at
stake. R2P can be used to justify military intervention or non-intervention, invasion or withdrawal. Thus, it
is precisely R2Ps indeterminacy that makes it so popular today. This may suggest something about the
Wests current approach to Africa: occasional violent engagement in
Stefan Bauschard
12
01
the name of protection when a state has been declared to have failed in its own protection role,
complemented by military assistance to client states in the
name of promoting their capacity to protect. This is combined with disengagement when convenient in the
name of allowing states to fulfil the protection mandate themselves, all with no objective standards and no
accountability. Mahmood
Mamdani has argued that one consequence of R2P is to institute a divided international system that
distinguishes African states , whose legitimacy and sovereignty are to be judged by the international
community, from Western states, whose sovereignty is beyond question and that judge and intervene
in Africa. R2P institutes a divided international system in
another way as well: one within Africa that distinguishes those African states
that are favoured by the West and tend to be labelled human rights protectors,
responsible, and thus deserving support, from those that are out of favour with
the West and are labelled human rights violators, failed or criminal, and meriting international coercion. This
is not to say that every Western ally will be termed a human rights protector and every adversary a human
rights violator. But, by grounding the judgment as to state legitimacy in the flexible, informal language
of R2P, giving that judgment to those who have the power to claim to speak in the name of the international
community, and stripping away
the need for the state or interveners to be accountable to African citizenries, this division remains an everpresent and dangerous possibility.
R2P =Imperialism Kills International Law

R2P is a pretext for interventionism crushes collective security and ilaw
Herman 11/9/13
http://www.voltairenet.org/article180927.html
Edward S. Herman is professor emeritus of finance at the Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania and has written extensively on economics, political economy, and the media.
Among his books are Corporate Control, Corporate Power (Cambridge University Press, 1981), The Real
Terror Network (South End Press,
1982), and, with Noam Chomsky, The Political Economy of Human Rights (South End
Press, 1979), and Manufacturing Consent (Pantheon, 2002).
Both the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Intervention (HI) came into existence in
the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, which ended any obstruction that that contesting Great Power
had placed on the ongoing power projection of the United States. In Western ideology, of course, the
United States was containing the Soviets in the post-World War II years, but that was ideology. In reality
the Soviet Union was always far less powerful than the United States, had weaker and less reliable allies,
and was essentially on the defensive from 1945 till its demise in 1991. The United States was aggressively
on the march outward from 1945, with the steady spread of military bases across the globe, numerous
interventions, large and small, on all continents, engaged in building the first truly global empire. The
Soviet Union was an obstruction to U.S. expansion, with sufficient military power to constitute a modest
containing force, but it also served U.S. propaganda as an
alleged expansionist threat. With the death of the Soviet Union new threats were needed to justify the
continuing and even accelerating U.S. projection of power, and they were forthcoming, from narco-terrorism
to Al Qaeda to Saddams weapons of mass destruction to the terrorist threat that encompassed the entire
planet earth and its outer space. There was also a global security menace alleged,
based on internal ethnic struggles and human rights violations, that supposedly threatened wider conflicts, as
well as presenting the global community (and its policeman) with a moral dilemma and demand for
intervention in the interests of humanity and justice. As noted, this morality surge occurred at a moment in
history when the Soviet constraint was ended and the United States and its close allies were celebrating their
triumph, when the socialist option had lost vitality, and when the West was thus freer to intervene. This
required overriding the several hundred year old Westphalian core principle of international relations that
national sovereignty should be respected which if adhered to would protect smaller and weaker countries
from Great Power cross-border
attacks. This rule was embodied in the UN Charter, and could be said to be the fundamental feature of that
document, described by international law scholar Michael Mandel as the worlds constitution. Overriding this rule and Charter fundamental would clear the ground for R2P and HI, but it would also clear
the ground for classic and straightforward aggression in pursuit of
geopolitical interests, for which R2P and HI might supply a useful cover. It is obvious that only the
Great Powers can cross borders in the alleged interest of R2P and HI, a point that is recognized and
taken as an entirely acceptable premise in every case in which they have been applied in recent
years. The Great Powers are the only ones with the knowledge and material
resources to do this benevolent global social work. As NATO public relations
official Jamie Shea explained in May 1999, when the question came up as to
whether NATO personnel might be indicted for war crimes during NATOs bombing war against Serbia,
which seemed to follow from the letter of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) charter: NATO countries organized the ICTY and International Court of Justice, and NATO
countries fund these tribunals and support on a daily basis their activities. We are the upholders, not the
violators, of international law. This last is a contestable assertion, but Sheas other points are clearly valid.
It is enlightening that when a group of independent lawyers submitted an extensive dossier in 1999
showing probable NATO violations of ICTY rules, after a long delay and following
open pressure from NATO authorities, the anti-NATO claims were disallowed by the ICTY prosecutor on the
ground that with only 496 documented killings of Serbs by NATO bombs there is simply no evidence of a
crime base for indicting NATO, although the original May 1999 indictment of Milosevic involved a crime
base of only 344 deaths. It is of similar interest that International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo declined to prosecute NATO officials for their attack on Iraq in 2003, despite over 249
requests for ICC action, on the ground that here also the situation did not appear to meet the required
threshold of the Statute. These two cases illustrate the fact that the structures and laws that underlie the
application of R2P (and HI) exempt the Great Power enforcers from the laws and rules that they
enforce on
the lesser powers. It also exempts their friends and clients. This means that in the real world there is
nobody responsible for protecting Iraqis or Afghanis from the United States or Palestinians from Israel.
When U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright acknowledged on national TV in 1996 that 500,000
Iraqi children may have died as a result of UN (but really U.S.) -imposed
sanctions on Iraq, declaring that U.S. officials felt these deaths were worth it, there was no domestic or
global reaction demanding the end of these sanctions and the application of R2P or HI on behalf of the
victimized Iraqi population. Similarly there was no call for any R2P intervention on behalf of the Iraqis
when the United States and Britain invaded Iraq in March 2003, with
direct and induced civil war killings of perhaps a million more Iraqis. When the Canadian-sponsored
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect considered the Iraq war in relation to R2P, its authors
concluded that abuses by Saddam Hussein within Iraq were not of a scope in 2003 to justify an invasion, but
the coalition never even raised the question of whether the Iraqi people didnt need protection from the
invaders responsible for the death of vast numbers. They worked from the imperial premise that the Great
Power enforcers, even when aggressing in violation of the UN Charter and killing hundreds of thousands, are
exempt from R2P as well as the rule of law. This works from the top of the global power structure on down;
Bush, Cheney, Obama, John Kerry,
Susan Rice, Samantha Power at the top, then on the way down we have Merkel, Cameron, and Hollande,
then further down Ban Ki-Moon and Luis Moreno-Ocampo, and with their power base to be found in the
corporate leadership and media. Ban Ki- Moon and his predecessor Kofi Annan have been open servants of
the Great NATO Powers, to whom they owe their status and authority. Kofi Annan was an enthusiastic
supporter of the NATO attack on Yugoslavia, a believer in the enforcement responsibility of the NATO
powers, and keen on the institutionalization of R2P; and Ban Ki-Moon works in the same mode. This same
global power structure also means that ad hoc Tribunals will be formed and used against villains of choice,
as well as international courts. Thus when the
United States and its allies wanted to dismantle Yugoslavia and weaken Serbia, they were able to use the
Security Council in 1993 to establish a tribunal, the ICTY, precisely for this service, which the ICTY
carried out effectively. When they wanted to help their client Paul Kagame consolidate his dictatorship in
Rwanda, they created a similar tribunal for this service, the ICTR. If these powers want to attack and bring
about regime change in Libya, they can get the
ICC to accuse Gaddaffi of war crimes speedily and without independent investigation of any charges, and
based mainly on anticipations of civilian killings. But as noted, the ICC couldnt find any basis for action
against the invaders of Iraq whose killings of civilians were large-scale and realized, not merely anticipated.
There was, in fact, a major World Tribunal on Iraq organized to hear charges against the United States and its
allies for their actions in Iraq, but it was privately organized and had a critical anti-war bent, so that although
it held hearings in many countries and heard many prestigious
witnesses, this tribunal was given negligible attention in the media. (Its final
sessions and report in June 2005 were unmentioned in the major U.S, and British media.) R2P fits snugly
into this picture of service to an escalating imperial violence, with the United States and its enormous
military- industrial complex engaged in a Global War on Terror and multiple wars, and its NATO arm
steadily enlarging and embarked on out of area service, despite the ending of its supposed role of
containing the Soviet Union. It conveniently premises that the threats that the world needs to address come
from within countries, not from cross-border aggression in the traditional mode that the makers of the UN
Charter considered of first importance. They are wrong: William Blum lists 35 cases where the United States
overthrew governments
between 1945 and 2001 (thus not even counting the war-making of George W. Bush
and Barak Obama; Blum, Freeing the World to Death [Common Courage, 2005], chaps.
11 and 15) In the real world, while R2P has a wonderful aura of
benevolence, it will be put in play only at the instigation of the Great NATO Powers and it will
therefore never be used in the interest of unworthy victims, defined as victims of the Great Powers or their
clients (see Manufacturing Consent, chap 2, Worthy and Unworthy Victims). For example, it was never
invoked to constrain Indonesian violence in its invasion and occupation of East Timor from 1975 onward,
although this invasion-occupation accounted for an estimated 200,000 deaths on a population base of
800,000, thus
exceeding the proportionate deaths under Pol Pot. In this case the United States
gave the invasion a green light, gave further arms to the invaders, and protected them from any UN
response. This is a case where the UN Charter was being violated and East Timorese desperately needed
protection, but as the United States supported the invader no international response transpired. It is
enlightening and amusing to see that Gareth Evans has been perhaps the leading spokesperson in support of
R2P.as an instrument of justice. Evans is a former Foreign Minister of Australia, author of a book on R2P,
past president of the International Crisis Group, a co-founder of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, and a participant in several reports and debates on R2P. Evans was the
Foreign Minister of Australia during the years of Indonesias genocidal occupation of East Timor, and in
that role Evans honored and feted Indonesian leaders and worked with them in sharing the stolen oil
rights of East Timor. (See John Pilger, East Timor: a lesson in why the poorest
threaten the powerful, April 5, 2012, pilger.com.) So Evans was really a collaborator in a major genocide.
Can you imagine the medias response to a non- NATO human rights campaign that used as spokesperson a
Chinese official who had maintained friendly relations with Pol Pot during his most deadly years? It is
enlightening to see how Gareth Evans deals with the criteria for enforcing R2P. In answering questions on
this subject at a UN General Assembly session on R2P, Evans appealed to common sense: R2P defines
itself, and the crimes, including ethnic cleansing, are all inherently conscience-shocking, and by their
very nature of a scale that demands a responseIt is really impossible to be precise about numbers here.
Evans notes that sometimes modest numbers will suffice: We remember starkly the horror of Srebrenica
[with only 8,000 deaths]. Was Racak with its 45 victims in Kosovo in 99 sufficient to trigger the response
that was
triggered by the international community? It was sufficient to trigger a response for the simple reason that
it helped advance NATOs ongoing program of dismantlement of Yugoslavia. But Evans dodges answering
his own question. You may be sure that Evans does not ask or attempt to explain why there was no
triggering of a response to East Timor with its 200,000 or Iraqs 500,000 plus a million. The politicization of
choices here is total, but Evans has apparently internalized the imperial perspective so completely that this
huge double standard never reaches his consciousness. But the most interesting fact is that
a man with such a record and such blatant bias can be accepted as an authority
and his biased perspective is treated with respect. It is interesting, also, to see how Evans never mentions
Israel and Neither Palestine, where ethnic cleansing has been in active process for decades, works openly
and is deeply
resented by vast numbers across the globe. do other members of the power pyramid suggest Israel-Palestine
as an area where consciences are shocked and the nature and scale of abuse demands a response from the
international community. In order to obtain her U.N. Ambassadorship, Samantha Power thought it was
necessary to go before a group of pro-Israel U.S. citizens and assure them, with tears flowing, that she
regretted any past suggestions that AIPAC was powerful and
that its influence had to be over-ridden for developing a U.S.-interest policy
toward Israel and Palestine. She pledged a devotion to Israels national security. The world will wait a
long time for Power and her bosses to support R2Ps application to ethnic cleansing in Palestine In sum,
the international power
structure in the post-Soviet world has worsened global inequality and at the same time increased
Great Power interventionism and literal aggression . The increased militarism may have contributed to
the growing inequality, but it is also designed and serves to facilitate pacification at home as well as abroad.
In this context, R2P and HI are understandable developments, providing a moral cover for actions
that would repel many people and constitute a violation of international law if viewed in a cold light.
R2P puts aggression in a
benevolent light and thus serves as its useful instrument. In short, it is a cynical fraud
constitution ( UN Charter)-buster
and a
R2P Hypocritical
R2P is necessarily a hypocritical fiction only used against weak states
Menon 6/12/13
The world has not obliged revolutionary liberals. Raison dtat is resilient: Practical interests shape what
states do, not abstract ideals. The United States and its democratic allies are not exceptions to this rule.
When it comes to R2P, they, just as China and Russia have, will block punitive measures against
friendly governments. Imagine that the so-called Arab
Spring makes a delayed appearance in Saudi Arabia. Would the Saudis ever face a Security Council
resolution with R2P in it? Would the United States, Britain or France back an R2P resolution occasioned
by Israels use of force in the West Bank or Gaza? No and no. Those who doubt this might ponder recent
events in Bahrain, where a Sunni-run state lords over its Shia majority. The Obama Administration
deemed Qaddafis violence against the Libyan opposition R2P- worthy but has been unmoved by the
Bahraini regimes repression of unarmed protestors. Nor is Washingtons stance likely to change so long as
the U.S.
Fifth Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia played a decisive role in
mobilizing Arab support for UNSCR 1973, which authorized the intervention against Qaddafi; but it sent
troops into Bahrain to crush the Shia rebellion three days before NATOs intervention in Libya. Qatar, too,
mustered Arab League support for the move against Qaddafi and provided combat aircraft to supplement
NATOs Libya intervention, but its troops joined the Saudi gendarmes march into Manama. What mattered
for the Gulf monarchies was preventing the rise of a
Shia-dominated state in Bahrain aligned with Iran. Self-determination and
liberty could waitindefinitely. Egyptian security forces killed 840 unarmed
civilians and injured some 6,000 during the uprising against Mubarak; no major government invoked
R2P.Had Mubarak survived and unleashed his army in full, would he have shared Qaddafis R2P-tinged
fate? Not likely. Strong horses dont attract R2P attention; only weak or vulnerable ones do. Powerful
democracies have long been willing to countenance the killing and expulsions of people and to arm
governments that commit such acts. Consider some examples. Turkeys war against the PKK has
killed thousands of civilians since 1984 and displaced another 386,000. In 198889, Saddam Hussein
gassed and deported thousands of Kurds, killing as many as 100,000 of them, and
systematically razed their towns and villages. But Washington turned a blind eye
because the Iraqi dictator was then providing a useful service by fighting Khomeinis Iran. Consider, too,
that between Indonesias annexation of East Timor in 1975 and the 1999 UN-sanctioned, Australianled intervention, 18,600
East Timorese civilians were killed, and another 102,800 died from war-related hunger and disease, with
the vast majority of the fatalities occurring before
1999. Australia was rightly complimented for leading the multilateral force that helped bring stability, and
eventually independence, to East Timor. But the Australian government, its own documents have since
revealed, knew that
Indonesia was preparing to conquer East Timor in 1975, may have provided tacit
approval, and certainly was willing to arm Suhartos government in the years
preceding the annexation.Not only was Australia the only major Western democracy to officially recognize
the annexation; Gareth Evans, then its Foreign Minister, signed a deal in 1989 with his Indonesian
counterpart, Ali Alatas, giving Australian energy companies access to the seabed off East Timor. As for the
United States, it armed the Indonesian army for years, even though between
500,000 and one million people perished following the 1965 coup that brought
Suharto to power. It is now clear that Indonesias conquest of East Timor
occurred with the Ford Administrations foreknowledgeand acquiescence. American arms sales to
Indonesia rose substantially after its occupation of East Timor. Britains dealings with Suharto followed a
similar pattern.
R2P = White Supremacy

R2p is a cover for global white supremacy
Barake 9/9/13
http://www.fairobserver.com/article/humanitarian-intervention-u s-imperialism Ajamu Baraka was the
Founding Executive Director of the US Human Rights Network (USHRN) from July 2004 until June 2011.
The USHRN became the first domestic human rights formation in the United States explicitly committed to
the
application of international human rights standards to the US. Under Baraka, the Network grew
exponentially from a core membership base of 60 organizations to more than 300 US-based member
organizations and 1,500 individual members who
work on the full spectrum of human rights issues in the United States. Baraka
has also served on the boards of various national and international human rights
organizations, including Amnesty International (USA) and the National Center for Human Rights Education.
He is currently on the boards of the Center for Constitutional Rights; Africa Action; Latin American
Caribbean Community Center; Diaspora Afrique; and the Mississippi Workers Center for Human Rights.
Baraka has taught political science at various universities, including Clark Atlanta University and Spelman
College. He has been a guest lecturer at academic institutions throughout the US, and has authored several
articles on international human rights.
How is it that the administration can announce to the world its intentions to circumvent, and by doing so,
subvert international prohibitions on war? By wrapping itself in the false flag of humanitarian
concerns f or the suffering masses in Syria.
President Barack Obama, the corporate and financial elites most effective propaganda weapon since Ronald
Reagan, explains to the world that it is only the plight of people in Syria that drives the US decision to attack
the country. No one asks the president to explain to the innocent human beings who are walking around
today alive, but who will be the dead and maimed collateral damage of this pending attack, why their
sacrifice is for the greater good of humanity. This justification for the latest breech of international law is
yet another example of the sham that is humanitarian intervention. If mass killings of its own
people constitutes a crime against humanity and mass in Syria means over a thousand people killed,
surely the killing of over a thousand in Egypt must also constitute a serious crime against humanity. But that
kind of rational calculation could only occur if there were one ethical standard for all states and an equal
value placed on human life. Two Moral Standards The reality, however, is that there are two mutually
exclusive moral standards: one for the vast majority of nations, and another for those comprising the
dying
but dangerous collection of European colonial capitalist nations. It is the naked pursuit of US geo-political
interests like the gas off the coast of Syria, oil, and the desire to isolate Iran that drive policy and not some
concern for the people in Syria. That is the context that shapes and informs US foreign policies globally. In
the current context of relative US decline, international law related to non-economic functions and
relationships the Geneva accords and the law of war, human rights and the Charter of the United Nations
are now constraints on the ability of the US to pursue its interests. And with no domestic checks on executive
power with the capitulation and collaboration of Congress (despite this feint toward democratic
accountability represented in seeking congressional approval from Congress before attacking Syria), a
corporate media that serves as cheerleaders for the administration, and peace
and anti-imperialist movements that are marginal and in political disarray, US criminality is completely out
of control with the result that the United States has become the quintessential Rogue State. Why has it
been so easy for the State to obfuscate its interests and to create a bipartisan coalition united in its
support for the essentials of US foreign policies, even while there may
be disagreements on some of the tactical issues? This can be partially explained by the innovative
discourses produced by Western propagandists during the
last two decades, the most innovative being the concept of humanitarian intervention and its
dubious corollary, the right to protect. Humanitarian intervention and the right to protect
evoke the unacknowledged white supremacist assumption that the international
community read as the
governments of the capitalist/colonialist West has a duty and a right to
arrest, bomb, invade, prosecute, sanction, murder and violate international law anywhere on the
planet to save people based on its own determinations and values. That is precisely why the question of
what entitles the US to inflict punishments on the Syrian government is not even raised as part of a public
discussion. That question and its answer are obvious to the victims of Western colonial and imperialist
brutality: The US and its European allies have that right because they have always had the right over
the last 500 years to universalize and impose their assumptions, world
views and values. Normalization of White Supremacist Domination The normalization of white
supremacist domination and its prerogatives are so completely inculcated in US and Western
consciousness that not only is the question as to what right the US and the West have to attack Syria outside
the framework of
consideration, but alternative ways of viewing the world are beyond
cognitive comprehension . This is the cultural and ideological foundation of American
exceptionalism and the intellectual framework and assumptions that informed Western-based human
rights organizations and their theoreticians in the construction of the notion of humanitarian
intervention. De-contextualized from the reality of globalized Euro-American domination, the idea that
there is a
collective responsibility on the part of states to protect people from gross and
systemic human rights violations associated with war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic
cleansing, could be viewed as a progressive development for international relations and global morality
even if that protection if offered selectively. But in the hands of an arrogant minority that still dominates the
international system and sees its civilizational project as
representing the apex of human development, the right to protect has become a convenient cover for
rationalizing and justifying continued Euro-American global hegemony through the use of armed
interventions to refashion local realities in line with Western geopolitical interests.
R2P = Syria Intervention
R2P crucial to selling Syrian intervention

Thrall 2/22/12
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/responsibility-protec t-6559
A. Trevor Thrall is an associate professor of government and politics at George Mason University and
director of the Biodefense Program. He is the coeditor of American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear:
Threat Inflation since 9/11 and coeditor of the forthcoming book Why Did the United States Invade Iraq?
Intervention in Syria is either a dangerous idea, an opportunity to further the cause of democracy promotion
or nothing less than the moral duty of the international community. The Obama administration continues
to act cagey about the prospects of a successful intervention and the potential for geopolitical fallout from
Russia, China and Iran. But given European pressure
and the recent Libyan precedent, it seems more than possible that the United
States will come to embrace some sort of military intervention in Syria as the love child of regimechanging neoconservatives and genocide-preventing idealists . The real question then will be: Can
Obama sell a Syrian intervention to the public? And if so, how? The likeliest pitch for Obama to
use is some form of the
responsibility-to-protect (R2P) ethic . Articulated after the international communitys tepid response
to the Bosnian meltdown, R2P has become the liberal interventionists best friend, offering a
justification for violating national sovereignty and taking foreign governments to task for failing to
protect their people from violence. Obama used this line with Libya, arguing
that: To brush aside America's responsibility as a leader andmore profoundly our responsibilities to
our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are. . . . Some
nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is
different. And as president, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and
mass graves before taking action. And indeed, the loudest voices so far urging intervention in Syria
belong to the R2P crowd (Washington Post editorial here, for example), thanks in part to confidence
engendered by what they viewed as success in Libya. But
the question remains: Will the public buy this argument? Certainly, such
responsible rhetoric resonatesat least on the surfacewith the public. Though
precise poll data are scanty, a couple of polls from the Pew Research Center illustrate that the public
generally agrees that the United States has a responsibility to prevent genocide.
Stefan Bauschard
13
01
Stefan Bauschard
13
11
Ditching R2P Solves
R2P is the worst path in Syria moderate internationalism solves

Chimini 9/11/13 http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/bschimni/r2p-and-syri aimperialism-with-human-face
B.S. Chimini is Professor of International Law at the School of International
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Second, states have become wiser after the intervention in Libya. States that did not oppose the invocation
of R2P in Libya are now unwilling to support it because the UNSC resolution 1973 was misinterpreted and
used by NATO powers to bring about regime change. Third, there is the valid concern that military
action will lead to an escalation of violence in Syria and the region, leading to a greater humanitarian
crisis. Millions more will be displaced outside and inside Syria. Thousands more will lose their lives. It is
believed that even the departure of Assad will bring little relief to the people of Syria. This has been the
experience of the Libyan people, who have in the post- Gaddafi era been subjected to unceasing violence
by armed militias holding sway in large parts of the country. Fourth, it is felt that military action will
undermine the Geneva 2 process, which holds out the best possibility of bringing to an end the
conflict in Syria. It could mean a long period of political uncertainty in which the Syrian people will be
unable to take control of their political destiny. Fifth, it is pointed out that the support for
democratic forces in Syria comes from many Arab regimes that are anything but
democratic. It strengthens the suspicion that what drives support for military action is a geopolitical agenda.
Sixth, there is the genuine fear that arms supplied to rebels may end up with extremist groups who are a part
of the rebel forces. And seventh, it is believed that there are no innocent parties in this conflict. Both the
government and the rebel forces are contributing to the escalating violence and violating international
humanitarian laws. Even in global civil society, there is resistance to the idea that the choice before the
international community is between supporting military action or a brutal regime. This resistance
emanates from a certain reading of history. It is believed that the false choice is a function of the
geopolitics of imperialism with deep roots in colonialism. The roots of violence in post-colonial states
goes back to the construction of the colonial
state that saw the economy, bureaucracy, police and the army positioned to serve
the state rather than the people. The structures of colonial state were never fully dismantled in the postcolonial era. However, where the post-colonial states are democracies, social and human rights
movements are able to prevent gross violations of human rights (or, when it takes place, to use the legal
system to bring the perpetrators to justice). But in cases where the post- colonial state transfigured into
an authoritarian state, as in the case of Syria, this is not possible. These authoritarian states have often
received support from hegemonic powers pursuing geopolitical ambitions. But when such
regimes become a liability, the same states manipulate the politics of the post- colonial state by relying on
the genuine grievances of the people to oppose the incumbent regime. The outcome often is increased
violence by the state against its own people. It is against this backdrop that the lifting of the embargo by the
EU to supply arms to rebels, and earlier to allow the use of oil revenues to fund the insurgency, together with
the possibility of President Obama ordering
military action, are to be viewed. It is felt that despite denials, forces of imperialism are using the acute
distress of the Syrian people to pursue the agenda of regime change. What we need today is not military
intervention but prudent internationalism. It is an internationalism that refrains from undermining
the normative consensus in the international community on when military action is permissible.
Prudent internationalism also acknowledges
that democracy and democratic practices cannot be exported to societies and that military action can
undermine the future of democracy by sharpening sectarian
and social divides. Prudent internationalism also takes cognizance of the
past outcomes of military action, especially the continuing violence in societies that have been the subject
of military action (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya). Prudent internationalism also does not accept the view
that nonsupport of military action is support for the brutal Assad regime. Prudent internationalism sees a third
way , that of diplomatic and political action to resolve
the conflict. It requires that states and civil society forces opposed to
military action ensure that the Geneva 2 process gets under way. Indeed, there is a moral obligation on
all those opposed to military action not to
remain passive spectators to the unfolding tragedy in Syria. In this respect, it
is particularly important that key developing countries such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa act
immediately to garner support for the diplomatic process. The decision on convening the Geneva 2 process
cannot be left to a few states, in particular the US. Egypt has shown how the same hegemonic power that
speaks of the need to institute a democratic regime in Syria is a mute witness to its destruction in Egypt.
Meanwhile, as efforts are being made to start the Geneva 2 process, the Syrian people must be offered
increased humanitarian assistance to relieve their sufferings.
Syria Crisis Impact: Middle East War

Continued Syrian crisis destabilizes Middle East, respawns al Qaeda
Hashemi 2/20/14
Nader Hashemi is director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the Josef Korbel School of
International Studies at the University of Denver. His latest book is The Syria Dilemma. The views
expressed are his own. http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/20/why-u-s-shoul d-care-aboutsyria-crisis/
The moral case for why Syria matters is easy to make. The killing fields of
Syria are now reminiscent of those in Bosnia. Over the past three years, we have witnessed state-sanctioned
war crimes and crimes against humanity replete with chemical weapons, barrel bombs, the targeting of
children, mass rape, a refugee crisis and according to a new report industrial-scale torture and killings.
Indeed, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has described Syria as a disgraceful humanitarian
calamity with suffering and displacement unparalleled
in recent history. But a new dimension to this conflict has emerged: Syria is
now a global security problem. The Syrian conflict is destabilizing the Middle East . Lebanon has
been convulsed, Iraq has been shaken and Jordans fourth largest city today is a Syrian refugee camp.
To a lesser extent, Turkey has
also been adversely affected some 600,000 refugees are said to be currently
living on the Turkish-Syrian border, and Turkeys role in the conflict has become a major bone of contention
in domestic Turkish politics. Meanwhile, the conflict has heightened sectarian tensions across the ArabIslamic world, fueled in part by the regional maneuverings of Saudi Arabia and Iran and their respective
allies. Both are fighting to expand their regional influence, and Syria today is the key battleground for the
contest. Finally, al Qaeda has re- emerged from the ashes of the Syrian conflict. Al Qaeda now controls
territory that stretches more than 400 miles across the heart of the Middle East, CNN analyst Peter Bergen
recently observed. This deeply troubling development has obvious implications for global security,
especially for Europe and the United States.
Al Qaeda makes conflict spread regionally

Karam 1/8/14
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-news/20140108-jihadist-gains-in-syria-iraq- raise-stakes-inmideast.ece
Zeina Karam,
The Associated Press

Al-Qaeda is positioning itself as a vanguard defending Sunni Muslims against persecution by Shiitedominated governments in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. As a result, a Syrian rebellion against President
Bashar Assad is evolving into something bigger and more ambiguous: a fight increasingly led by Sunni
jihadists determined to create an Islamic state. Battling these extremists
is a coalition that includes Syrian moderates who are horrified that their cause has been discredited, with
parts of the nation falling under strict religious
law. For moderates in the Middle East, the renewed assertiveness of the extremists is increasingly
taking on the aspect of a regional calamity. The war in Syria has poured gasoline on a raging fire
in Iraq, and conflicts in
both countries are feeding upon one another and complicating an already
complex struggle, said Fawaz Gergez, director of the Middle East Center at the
London School of Economics. Now the reverberations of the Syria war are
being felt on Arab streets, particularly Iraq and Lebanon, and are aggravating Sunni-Shiite tensions
across the Arab Middle East. Why now? Experts see al- Qaeda characteristically taking advantage
of social, religious and
ideological divisions of the kind that have been exposed by the Sunni-Shiite
battle in Syria.
Longer conflict causes Mideast explosion

Kaplan 8/27/13
http://www.globaldashboard.org/2013/08/27/seven-scenarios-for-the-future-of- syria/
Seth Kaplan is a Professorial Lecturer in the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
(SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. He teaches, writes, and consults on issues related to fragile states,
governance, and development. He is the author of Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for
Development (Praeger Security International, 2008) and Betrayed: Politics, Power, and Prosperity
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). A Wharton MBA and Palmer scholar, Seth has worked for several large
multinationals and founded four companies. He speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese and Japanese.
6) Regional conflict. The likelihood of this also increases the longer the war goes on. Lebanon and Iraq
have already suffered from spillover : bombs have gone off in South Beirut and Tripoli in the past week
and Sunni extremists
have been strengthened in Iraq in recent months. It is not out of the realm of
possibility that these trends will continue and a broad Sunni-Shiite
conflict will engulf the whole Levant. This is the worst result, and would have even greater
consequences for the region. Over 50 million people would be directly affected.
Right to Protect Causes War Escalation

R2P interventionism is uniquely destabilizing BECAUSE its ineffective
Menon 6/12/13
Yet the reassurances that force would be a rare, last-ditch response have not placated critics, for several
reasons. R2Ps pre-intervention prescriptions merely repeat existing remedies and add nothing to
diplomacys toolkit.
Whats is the casuistry of reframing diminishing
in order to legitimize
sovereignty
new
altruistic armed intervention in defense of the abstract rights that most political communities agree upon in
theory. Given R2Ps emphasis on feasibility and the chances for success, weak states are its most likely
proving grounds; powerful ones need not fear, no matter the magnitude of their
misdeeds. Because idealism and power are inextricably intertwined, with the latter frequently corrupting the
former, R2P provides powerful states one script for playing the Good Samaritan when intervention
promotes their interests, and another for eschewing or opposing aid when it doesnt. R2Ps defenders see
this indictment as reflecting hyperbole or misunderstanding, or as the artifice of dictators who declaim about
sovereignty and legality but in
truth seek to avoid accountability. Yes, dictators have every reason to avoid accountability, but it doesnt
really matter which side is right. What matters is that in a world of diverse polities and cultures, such
objections and anxieties have sufficient appeal to prevent the doctrine from acquiring the
universal pragmatic applicability its supporters seek. Many states have signed
on to R2P, but it does not follow that they will stand behind its sovereignty-eroding features when it is
proposed as a plan for military action.
Disrupting sovereignty destroying the basis for collective security

Brooks 1/14/13
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52290-hate-obamas-drone- war.html?
itemid=id#26087
Rosa Brooks is a law professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, a
columnist and contributing editor for Foreign Policy and a Bernard L. Schwartz
senior fellow at the New America Foundation. From April 2009 to July 2011, she served as Counselor to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy, and in May 2010 she also became [1]
Special Coordinator for Rule of Law and Humanitarian Policy, running a new Pentagon office dedicated
to those issues. Brooks wrote a weekly column for the Los Angeles Times from 2005 to
2009, and is an expert on national security, international law and human rights
issues. At the Pentagon her portfolio included both rule of law and human rights
issues and global engagement, strategic communication, and she received the
Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service for her work.
Second, arguments premised on the Responsibility to Protect are transparent: Evidence that a
state is unwilling or unable to protect its population from egregious harm can be examined by all,
and R2P-based
interventions are publicly proclaimed, making it possible to hold interveners accountable for errors or abuses.
Nonetheless, the parallels between R2P and the understanding of sovereignty that undergirds U.S. drone
policy are troubling. I'm no fan of the traditional legal conception of sovereignty, which has been used to
mask many abuses. But in a world with no meaningful
international governance structures, sovereignty -- even a weak and hypocritical conception of
sovereignty -- is one of the few bulwarks against unilateral overreaching by great powers. Our fragile
international order rests less on "law" than on implicit bargains between states , and insofar as U.S.
drone policy further undermines traditional norms relating to
sovereignty and the use of force, it risks undermining those tenuous bargains.
It risks sending the message -- to friends and foes alike -- that we will no longer even offer much
pretence of respecting sovereignty. As a result, it risks undermining the fragile order we so
desperately need.
Sovereignty erosion = international wars

Gay 7/23/13
Why is R2Ps gutting of national sovereignty a problem? Respect for sovereignty is generally a
stabilizing force in the international community. It narrows the scope of acceptable disagreement
between statesthere are fewer things to fight about. This can lead, in turn, to fewer international
armed
conflictsand fewer of their attendant atrocities. R2Ps disregard for sovereignty might empower the
international community to, from time to time, actually stop a genocide by intervention. Yet all too often, no
international community
exists. Interventions can become proxy conflicts (this would happen in a
Syria intervention, and was a danger in the Balkans). And these proxy conflicts can readily yield
atrocities of their own, perhaps far worse than those the intervention was launched to prevent.
WW III
Johnstone 1/25/13
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52236-responsibility-toprotect-is-a-powerplay.html?itemid=id#26087
Johnstone gained a BA in Russian Area Studies and a Ph.D. in French Literature from the University of
Minnesota.[1] She was active in the movement against the Vietnam War, organizing the first international
contacts between American citizens and Vietnamese representatives. Most of Johnstone's adult life has been
spent in France, Germany, and Italy. Johnstone was European editor of the U.S. weekly In These Times from
1979 to 1990. She was press officer of the Green
group in the European Parliament from 1990 to 1996. Johnstone also regularly
contributes to the online magazine CounterPunch.[further explanation needed].
Opposing genocide has become a cottage industry in the United States. An example is a program called
"World Without Genocide" at William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul. The recent commentary by its
executive director, Ellen Kennedy ("Never again, its been said of genocide. Do we finally grasp it?" Jan.
19), employs all the usual clichs of that well-meaning but misguided campaign. Misguided, and, above all,
misguiding. The antigenocide movement is directing people of good intention away from the essential
cause of our
time -- to reverse the drift toward worldwide war . The Bible of this campaign is Samantha Power's
book, "A Problem from Hell." Power's thesis is that the United States is too slow to intervene to "stop
genocide." It is a suggestion the U.S.
government embraces, to the point of taking on Power as a White House adviser.
The reason is clear. Since the Holocaust has become the most omnipresent historical reference in Western
societies, the concept of "genocide" is widely accepted as the greatest evil to afflict the planet. It is felt to
be
worse than war. Therein lies its immense value to the U.S. military-industrial complex , and to a
foreign-policy elite seeking an acceptable pretext for military intervention. The obsession with "genocide"
as the primary humanitarian issue in the world
today relativizes war. It reverses the final judgment of the Nuremberg Trials
that: "War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone, but
affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the
supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the
accumulated evil of the whole." Instead, war is transformed into a chivalrous action to rescue whole
populations from "genocide." At
the same time, national sovereignty , erected as the barrier to prevent strong nations from invading
weaker ones -- that is, to prevent aggression and "the
scourge of war" -- is derided as nothing but a protection for evil rulers
("dictators") whose only ambition is to "massacre their own people." This ideological construct is the
basis for the Western-sponsored doctrine, forced on a more or less reluctant United Nations, of " R2P, " the
ambiguous shorthand
for both the "right" and the "responsibility" to protect people from their own governments. In practice,
this can give the dominant powers carte blanche
to intervene militarily in weaker countries in order to support whatever armed rebellions they favor. Once
this doctrine seems to be accepted, it can even serve as an incitement to opposition groups to provoke
government repression in order to call for "protection." Kennedy blames "genocide" on the legal barrier set
up to try to prevent aggressive war: national sovereignty. For more than 350 years," she writes, "the concept
of 'national sovereignty' held primacy over the idea of 'individual sovereignty' ... The result has been an
'over and over again' phenomenon of genocide since the Holocaust, with millions
of innocent lives lost in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Congo, Guatemala, Argentina, East Timor ..." Yet
Hitler initiated World War II precisely in violation of the national sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and
Poland -- partly, he claimed, to stop alleged human-rights violations against ethnic Germans who lived
there. It was to invalidate this pretext, and "save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war," that the United Nations was founded on the basis of respect
for national sovereignty. Of course, there is no chance that the United States will abandon itsnational
sovereignty. Rather, other countries are called upon to abandon their national sovereignty to the United
States. Kennedy's list includes events that do not remotely fit the term "genocide" and leaves out others that
do -- all according to the official U.S. narrative of contemporary
conflicts. But the significant fact is that the worst of these slaughters -- Cambodia, Rwanda and the
Holocaust itself -- occurred during warsand as a result of wars. The systematic killing of European Jews
took place during
World War II. In Rwanda, the horrific slaughter was a response to an invasion by Tutsi forces from
neighboring Uganda. The Cambodian slaughter was not the fault of "national sovereignty" but the direct
result of the U.S. violation of Cambodia's national sovereignty. Years of secret U.S. bombing of the
Cambodian countryside, followed by a U.S.-engineered overthrow of the Cambodian
government, opened the way for takeover of that country by embittered Khmer Rouge fighters who took out
their resentment against the devastation of rural areas on the hapless urban population, considered
accomplices of their enemies. Some of the bloodiest events do not make Kennedy's genocide list. Missing is
the killing of more than half a million members of the Indonesian Communist Party in
1965 and 1966. But the dictator responsible, Suharto, was "a friend of the United States," and the victims
were communists. A principal danger of the R2P doctrine is that it encourages rebel factions to provoke
repression, or to claim persecution, solely to bring in foreign forces on their behalf. It is certain that
opposition militants exaggerated Moammar Gadhafi's threat to Benghazi to provoke the 2011 French-led
NATO war against Libya. The war in Mali is a direct result of the brutal overthrow of Gadhafi, who was a
major force for African stability. The sole purpose of R2P is to create a public opinion willing to accept
U.S. and NATO intervention in other countries. It is not meant to allow the Russians or the Chinese, say, to
intervene to protect housemaids in Saudi Arabia from being beheaded -- much less to allow Cuban
forces to shut down Guantanamo and end U.S. violations of human rights (on Cuban territory). Intervention
means war; war causes massacres and more wars . The sense of
being threatened by U.S. power incites other countries to build up their own military defenses and to repress
opposition militants who might serve as excuses for outside intervention. Today, the greatest threat to the
peoples of the
world is not "evil dictators," but the militarization of international relations which, unless
reversed, is leading toward the unimaginable catastrophe of World War III.
R2P incentivizes escalation to provoke an intervention

Menon 6/12/13
The point here is not to condemn particular states for their selective moral outrages or for putting
interests before ethics. This is what states of all stripes tend to do. Its not that they never act in defense
of principles or altruistically; its that they dont do so when important interests point another way, or
when the costs and hazards of defending them are deemed prohibitive. R2P boosters and revolutionary
liberals will reply that the
inability to defend basic values everywhere does not mean they cant be defended
when possible. Examples of supposedly successful action (Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Libya) are
trotted out, perhaps supplemented by Emersons quip about consistencys allure for little minds. But
given the realities of power, what this riposte concedes is that if a weak and ally-bereft state kills its
citizens, it risks falling into the R2P file and facing armed intervention. If
not, then notwhich brings us to the problem of moral hazard inherent in R2P. The prospect of an
external humanitarian intervention, as noted earlier, led the KLA to adopt tactics that bordered on
terrorism , and Serbia in turn to adopt tactics that resembled migratory genocide . In Libya, once the
UNsanctioned machinery of intervention began to move, anti-Qaddafi insurgents
had no reason to compromise and Qaddafi had no motivation to hold back. R2P presents a theoretical
continuum of measures with armed intervention at one end, but engaged antagonists know that the various
intermediate steps can easily and rapidly be skipped, the continuum collapsed, and the concept applied
expansively. That encourages opposition forces to magnify violence to attract and suborn outside help,
and it encourages embattled regimes to accelerate efforts at repression before external intervention can
be
agreed upon and implemented. In short, the prospect of R2P interventions can easily make bad
situations worse. onsider Syria in this light. The Assad government has certainly slaughtered enough of its
own citizens to attract R2P attention. But no major power has proposed armed intervention or even arming
the insurgents in a dramatic or open way. Why? Because, unlike Qaddafi, Assad has
the equipment to make the establishment of a no-fly zone, let alone use of
ground troops, a very hazardous venture. Syria also has reliable supporters and
arms suppliers in Russia and Iran, and Beijing has joined Moscow in scuttling successive Security Council
resolutions aimed at the Assad regime. Russia and China had not forgotten that in Libya what began as an
R2P intervention to protect civilians turned quickly into one aimed at regime change. Its impossible to
prove, being a counterfactual, but had an R2P intervention in Syria ever seemed possible to the
combatants, it might well have made the carnage worse by quickening the tempo of killing.
Right to Protect Triggers Nuclear Proliferation

Strengthened R2P norm causes prolif.
Bolfrass 9/12/11
Alexander K. Bollfrass is a visiting scholar at the Stimson Center 9-12-2011
Explaining Libya to Iran
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9970/explaining-libya-to-iran
Eight years after Moammar Gadhafi gave up his mail-order nuclear weapons program and
chemical munitions in exchange for dtente with the West, he has been chased from power by a
ragtag rebel army backed by Western airpower. Chances are that Gadhafi regrets his decision to
forgo his WMD programs. If he had been armed with nuclear or chemical weapons, NATO might
not have intervened when he threatened to massacre his own people. While Gadhafi's fall is good
news, the end of the eccentric colonel's dictatorship now heightens the challenge of getting the
Irans and North Koreas of the world to give up their nuclear ambitions in exchange for better
relations with the West. Before the bombs started falling on Tripoli, the intellectual and legal
momentum behind such an intervention had been building for years. Through the work of
academics and humanitarian advocates, the idea known as the "responsibility to protect," or R2P,
has emerged as an increasingly mainstream norm among Western policymakers. R2P emphasizes
the responsibility of states to protect their populations and permits international intervention if a
government is unable or unwilling to prevent mass atrocities against its people. In March, the
international community did not dither when Gadhafi appeared to be preparing a massacre in
Benghazi. R2P was used to justify the first U.N.-sanctioned humanitarian intervention in a
sovereign country against the wishes of its government. The architects of the intervention were
some of the very same countries that had convinced Gadhafi to give up his weapons of mass
destruction eight years earlier: France, Britain and the United States.
Parallel to the
humanitarian community's development of the R2P doctrine, another community of

foreign policy thinkers, those worried about the spread of nuclear weapons, had worked to
promote an idea with very different implications for sovereignty. They reached the
conclusion that fear of outside intervention was among the many factors driving
governments to build weapons of mass destruction. For this reason, they argued, it was
necessary to assuage that fear with the offer of a security guarantee once the government could
prove it had abandoned its WMD ambitions. In Libya, this security-assurance principle
successfully brought the archpariah of the
1980s back into the international fold in 2003.
developments in
The contradictory doctrinal
humanitarian and security circles are not abstract intellectual exercises; they have practical
implications. In light of the Islamic Republic's crushing of the Green Movement in 2009, it takes
little imagination to see a Libya-like situation emerge in Iran. Iranian leaders weighing the pros and
cons of coming clean over their country's nuclear program might look closely at what happened to
Gadhafi after he surrendered his weapons program. They might also consider Saddam Hussein and his
nonexistent weapons of mass destruction, while contrasting both these dictators with Kim Jong Il and his
unpunished nuclear roguery and human rights violations. They might come to the conclusion
that nu
clear w
eapons arAli
e use
ful. In fact,said
we need
notstart
speculate
about
a scenario,
this is
Thesuch
Iranians
arefor
not
Leader
Ayatollah
Khamenei
at the
of the
essentially
Iranian Supreme
onlyin which
ar
oneswhat
learning
this one that sets the stage for athe
future
prized a counterweight to the

as
threat of
e
internatio interventi represented by an
nal
on
R2P
d
its inherent challenge to state sovereignty. Instead of greater openness and West-friendly
behavior, the response of the rogue states would be deeper retrenchment under the cover of
asymmetric WMD capabilities.
Stefan Bauschard
14
01
Proliferation snowballs and puts everyone on hair trigger every small crisis will go
nuclear.
Soloski 9
Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, serves on the U.S.
congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism,
9 (Henry, Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd, Policy Review June & July,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)
At a minimum, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed
during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or
another of the two superpowers strong alliance systems the U.S.-led free world and the
Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small,
nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now
have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally
with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system ( nato) that
includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk). nato is increasingly integrating its
nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan,
Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or
nuclear- weapon-armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent
nuclear powers by making them strategic partners (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies
(France and the uk), non-nato allies (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders
(China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North
Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world,
every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel,
India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but
none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as
important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure
3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance
system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the
international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914,
there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the
globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states,
this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states
or groups
that might
disruptperfect
or overthrow
a nuclear
weapons
state couldnucle
check
one
could
easilythreaten
createto the
nuclear
storm:
Small
U.S. influence
ignite aput
warall
Washington
could
havean
difficulty
containing.
amount
differences
between
arcoulof
competit
thaor
would
actors on
edge;
overhang
of No tha
military
science
or
tacticsmaterials
could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize
ors
t nuclear
t dsuch
be
called
break
upon
to or unstable
out nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be
threatening
relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a
crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and
or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of

potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the
military
and
befor
nuclear
rivalries
between
states
could easily be much more

intense than
Stefan Bauschard
14
11
Certainly each nuclear states military would place an even higher premium than before on
being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable,
and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The
advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile
defenses and long- range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and
key figures
the Middle
East
oree
South
nuclear
preemptive war options . of
Certainly,
in such in
a world,
relations
betw
n states cocould
uld beceasily
ome farprompt
less
West Asia, etc.
strategic consequences
weapons
eve
deployme
with
(arms
races,
strategic
stable. Relatively small developments e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces;
n
nts
miscues,
and
).
Pakistani-inspired terroristnuclear
strikes in India,
such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian
war
flanking activities in Iran near
Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination

attempts
As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world every quarrel or difference of opinion may
lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.23 In short, we may
soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.
Right to Protect Destroys US-Brazil Relations

Unchecked humanitarian intervention tanks US Brazilian relations overwhelms alt
cause
Spektor 12
http://www.americasquarterly.org/humanitarian-interventionism-brazilian-style Matias Spektor is
assistant professor of international relations at Fundao Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
While Washington saw the Libya episode as a successful model for future humanitarian
aw it as a dangerous
interventions, Braslia s
precedent
Brazils foreign policy elite believed the resolution was too broad,
giving NATO free rein over the terms and conditions of the intervention. For
Brazilian leadership, the thin rules governing the use of force on the
represent a great
to international s
part of the major powers
tability.
threat
The idea stems from a belief that intrusive norms of humanitarian intervention will corrode the
principles of sovereignty and national autonomy and threaten international stabilityrepresenting
potentially even a greater risk than the
rise of new powers, radical Islam and even nuclear terror.
Brazil wants LIMITED and RESTRAINED r2p syncing with the Brazilian position
boosts relations and Brazilian soft power
Spektor 12
http://www.americasquarterly.org/humanitarian-interventionism-brazilian-style Matias Spektor is
assistant professor of international relations at Fundao Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Brazilian officials were sensitive to the criticism. By November 2011, they began to circulate a concept
paper at the UN entitled Responsibility While Protecting, or RWP. The paper argued that without limits
on what the powerful may do, the emerging ideology of humanitarian intervention could easily become a
tool for foreign manipulation. It then went on to suggest that the international community ought to codify
standards and procedures to govern humanitarian intervention in the future. In practice, RWP proposed the
introduction of criteriasuch as last resort, proportionality, and balance of consequences before the
Security Council authorized the use of force. The paper called for
the creation of a system for monitoring and reviewing the intervention as it evolves. The RWP concept was
not open- ended and it stopped short of specifying how to roll out the criteria it proposed. Braslia conceived
it less as a finished doctrine and more as a broad message to the international community: if humanitarian
interventions in the future are loosely regulated and big power coalitions intervene as they please, then R2P
will divide the international community between north and south, rich and poor, strong and weak. There was
nothing new here. Brazils core message that interventions need to be carefully regulated can in fact be found
in the 2005 R2P initiative. The fact that the Brazilian government dusted off its old proposal and presented it
to the public
demonstrated its willingness to engage constructively in the global debate over the rules that govern the use
of force in the next decades. The reception of Brazils RWP in the U.S. and parts of Europe was negative
at first. With the partial exception of Germany, Europe quickly dismissed the initiative as an attempt to
block action and let tyrannical leaders hide behind the legal shield of sovereignty. So far, Brazil has done a
poor job of explaining what RWP
entails and answering suspicions that it is an attempt to paralyze global action
against mass atrocities instead of what it claims it is: a tool to ensure interventions cause less damage than
they set out to prevent. China, Russia and India did not show much sympathy for RWP either. They were
unhappy to see Brazil go further than they were ready to go in criticizing the Assad regime in Syria, and in
their eyes RWP only confirms Brazils unpredictability when it comes to defending the primacy of
sovereignty. This is, of course, problematic for Brazil. Without the military or financial resources to be a
major player in the business of intervention and peacekeeping operations, its ability to speak up
in global councils rests on the tacit support of others. If it wants its new ideas to stick, then Brazil first
needs to convince and influence powerful countries. RWP has yet to achieve this. Equally complicated is
the reception of
RWP at home. Brazils commitment to sovereignty is deeply rooted in and around
the state apparatus, and talk of humanitarian intervention is bound to clash with embedded understandings of
how the world works. It is among networks of activists and private foundations, however, that RWP seems to
have found its closest friends. Anecdotal evidence suggests that networks of human rights NGOs active in
Brazil and in and around the UN system welcomed the initiative and are keen to learn more about it. Among
these activists, there is a sense that if
R2P is ever going to become a key organizing principle of global order that is embraced by all, then
part of the bargain will have to involve some form of criteria for intervention. On this view, weaker
nations around the globe will only grant legitimacy to humanitarian intervention if the use of force on
behalf of strangers is strictly regulated to ensure that the interests
of the people come before those of powerful nations. Stepping Up or Stepping Out
of Line? Future disagreement between the U.S. and Brazil over humanitarian intervention is not
inevitable. Brazilian leaders have been sensitive to the accusation that they just want to be recognized as a
major power without paying
any of the costs. Instead, Braslia believes it has gone out of its way to
demonstrate its burden-sharing credentials. To further the debate, though,
Brazilian leaders will need to remain involved in the shaping of humanitarian
intervention norms and avoid alienating the United States. As part of this process, Brazil is aiming to
demonstrate that it is entitled to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, based not only on its
willingness to deploy military missions abroad to enforce peace and stability, but on the argument that it can
bring to international and multilateral debates and decisions a new, modern perspective on security that is
more in tune with the demands of a changing world. Along these lines, Braslia believes that it can add
legitimacy to global order because it seeks to preserve humanitarian intervention while defending the weak
from the selective geostrategic predations of the most powerful. This is a message that strikes a chord with
large swaths of people around the globe. What is the implication for the United States? Since Brazil is more
interested in adapting existing conceptions of intervention than in offering alternative ones, the U.S. would
be wise to invest in greater dialogue and practical cooperation on the ground. A good example is the work
currently conducted by
the two countries in Haiti or in bilateral military cooperation in partner countries throughout Africa. Along
these lines, Washington should not discard
RWP too quickly. If notions of civilian protection are going to become fixtures in the emerging
normative landscape, then they will have to be embraced by major rising powers, first among them
the members of the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Among those countries Brazil
has been the one most willing to engage on this topic. Rather than see RWP as an attempt to block progress
toward better and more efficient humanitarian interventions, the U.S. should take it as an attempt to
return to the initial spirit of R2P in the mid-2000s. At inception, the principle did not
focus on the use of military force as the sole or primary instrument to cease violations of rights.
Instead, it gave equal attention to building state
capacity to address structural causes of violence, such as poverty. Brazil wants
to emphasize that side of humanitarian intervention because it will not and
cannot take active part in it through military force. But it is keen to make
contributions in the fields where it has the ability to deliver, such as poverty alleviation, sustainable
agriculture, public service reform, and international aid and cooperation. These may not be integral to current
understandings of humanitarian intervention, but are likely to become so if R2P is to become a dominant
norm in twenty-first century international society. The best response by the U.S. would be to take Brazils
proposals seriously and engage Braslia in further specifying how the concept would work in practice.
Dialogue
with Brazil is a low-cost initiative to try bridging the gap between the Western industrial countries and
the major developing states that now threatens the future survival of a global shared responsibility to
protect.
Constrained r2p boosts Brazilian prestige as global middleman

Stuenkl 11/28/11
Oliver Stuenkel is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getlio Vargas Foundation (FGV)
in So Paulo, where he coordinates the So Paulo branch of the School of History and Social Science
(CPDOC) and the executive program in International Relations. He is also a non-resident Fellow at the
Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin and a member of the Carnegie Rising Democracies Network.
His research focuses on rising powers; specifically on Brazils, Indias and China's foreign policy and on
their impact on global governance. He is the author of the forthcoming IBSA: The rise of the Global South?
(2014, Routledge Global Institutions) and BRICS and the Future of Global Order (2014, Lexington).
In this context, Brazils President Dilma Rousseff has offered an interesting concept that may bring
the two sides together. During her opening speech at the UN General Assembly earlier this year,
Rousseff argued that better mechanisms were needed to assure that in an intervention
unwanted damage would be kept at a minimum, calling it the responsibility while protecting
(responsabilidade ao proteger). Since then, Brazil has been low-key about the idea, and it has attempted to
integrate the concept into last months
IBSA declaration. Brazilian Presidents Rousseff argument during her speech that
while there was been a lot of talk () of the right to protect, there is little
said about the responsibility while protecting may seem insignificant, but in essence means that if carried
out in a responsible manner, Brazil could, in principle, support intervention in the UN Security Council
in the future
and India and South Africa are not fundamentally opposed to this idea. In an op-
ed in todays Folha de So Paulo, Matias Spektor, professor at Fundao Getulio Vargas who coordinates the
Center for International Relations, argues that the concept has the potential to turn into one of the
Rousseff
administrations important
to the international e
. If accepted by
contributions
debat
the P5, the Brazilian initiative would impose constraints on interventions that could help reluctant
actors such as China and Russia support them, mitigating worries that interventions cause more
damage than necessary or support a hidden agenda. In order to successfully launch the concept, Spektor
argues, Brazil needs to promote it on many levels such as the G20 and during
the BRICS summit, which takes place in India next year. Whatever happens, the
case shows Brazil is eager to turn into an international agenda-setter : It is not only willing to
participate in international negotiations, but it also increasingly seeks to frame the debate and decide which
issues should be discussed in the first place.
Con Positive Peace Kritik
*** Links ***
Link War
Understanding war as a discrete event obscures the structural roots of violence
Cuomo 96 (Chris J. Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and Director of the Institute for
Women's Studies at the University of Georgia, War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of
Everyday Violence, Published in Hypatia 11.4 nb, pp. 31-48)
Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifications for entering into
war,
and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate,
hounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed
from norma l life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday
events in peaceful times . Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and ethical
dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event an occurrence, or collection of occurrences,
having clear beginnings and endings that are typically marked by formal, institutional declarations.
As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex,
intentions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of
states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists
including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other
oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gendered, raced, and nationalistic political
realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is
related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemoniescannot be adequately
pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions
and identifiable decisions.
Risk of w ar rh eto ric pri v ileg es se curit y ov er pea cema king , tu rn ing t h e c a se
Waever 4 (Ole, Ph.D. in Political Science and Professor of International Relations at COPRI, Peace and Security, Contemporary Security Analysis and
Copenhagen Peace Research, pg 62-63, http://books.google.com/books?id=L2GKw5JcmYQC&pg=PA53&lpg=PA53&dq=%E2%80%9CPeace+and+Security
%E2%80%9D,+%22Contemp orary+Security+Analysis+and+Copenhagen+Peace+Research
%22&source=bl&ots=7g5DLhB5ZY&sig=ujOh2GZXFvCSlxUWfsvrgOZyWWs&
hl=en&ei=OMZXSo2ZN5GiswOqoanaBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3, 2004, AD: 7-10-9)
President B ush senio r

Rasmussen 2001:341). The
decla re d in 1 9 8 9 , O nce a ga in, it is a t i me f o r pea ce
(quoted by
f a mo us New Wo rld O rder speec h a t t he end o f t he Gul f Wa r (March 6, 1991) was

phrased mostly in terms of peace- enduring peace must be our mission. Nato enlargement is so hard for Russia and others
to oppose because it is presented apolitically as the mere expansion of the democratic peace community (Williams 2001). The war
on terror after 11 September
2001 has surprisingly few references to either peace or security- o pera t io n Enduring F re edo
m - but
President George W. Bushs a ddre ss o n 7 O ct o ber 2 0 01 ended w it h P ea ce a nd f re
edom w ill prev a il, a nd
t he ( in)f a mo us a xi s o f ev il w a s presente d (29 January, 2002) in t er ms o f a t hreat t
o pea ce . Peace has become the overarching concept of the two examined in this chapter. Security in turn,
is gradually swallowed up into a
g ener a lized co ncer n a bo ut ris k . So ciet y s re f lect io ns o n it self a re increa sing
ly in t er ms o f risk (risk society). More and more dangers are the product of our own actions,
and fewer and fewer attributabl e to forces completely external to ourselves- thus threats
become risks (Luhmann 1990). This goes for forms of
production and their effects on the environment, and
the
it goes for
internal affairs, where it is hard to see
war on terrorism as a pure reaction to something coming to the West from elsewhere.
Western
actions in relation to Middle East peace processes, religion, migration and global economic policy are part of what might produce future
terrorism. The
short-term reaction to the 11 September attacks on the USA in 2001 might be reassertion of single- minded aspirations for absolute security with little concern for liberty and
and for boomerang effects on future security (Bigo 2002), but in general debates, the risk way of thinking about
international affairs is making itself increasingly felt. We have seen during the last twenty years a spread of the
originally specifically international concept of
sec urit y in it s sec ur it iza t io n f unct io n t o mo re a nd mo re s pher es o f do me st ic
life , a nd no w so ciety takes its revenge by transforming the concept of security along lines of
risk thinking (Waever 2002). Politically, the concepts of peace and security are changing places in these
years. Security studies and peace research werer shaped
in important ways by the particular Cold War context, though not the way it is often implied in fast politicians statements about the postCold War irrelevance of peace research. Peace research and security studies I(or rather strategic studies) meant, resp ectibley to oppose
P ea ce re sea rc h mig ht be
da t ed because peace is so apologetic to be intellectually uninteresting, while security is
potentially the name of a radical, subversive agenda.
or to accept the official Western policy problematique. Today, it is the othe way round.
Link War
They dehistoricize war making complex solutions to the structural roots impossible
Gur-Z eev 1 (Ilan, Head of the Department of Education at the University of Haifa, Summer,
http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/peace23.html)
Pacifist writers as diverse as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Barbara Deming have emphasized the fact that pacifism entails a critique
of pervasive, systematic human violence. Despite its reductionist tendencies, there is much to learn from the ways in which pacifists
conceive of war as a presence, as well as the pacifist refusal to let go of the ideal of peace. Characterizing pacifism as motivated by the desire
to avoid specific events disregards the extent to which pacifism aims to criticize the preconditions underlying events of war. Following
several initial moves in feminist philosophy, Peach rejects just war abstraction--of the realities, or "horrors," of war; dimensional evil,
killable Others; and I the ethical responses needed to address the morality of war, such as a privileging of justice mil rights over love and
caring. Following Elsluain, she believes that feminist just-war principles should be more particularized, contextualized, and individualized.
But the abstraction of the particularities of war depends on an abstraction of war itself. The distance of such abstraction is created in part by
Wars becomes conceptual entities

objects for considerationrather than diverse, historically loaded exemplifications of the
contexts in which they occur. In order to notice the particular and individual realities of war,
attention must be given to the particular, individual, and contextualized causes and eff ects of
pervasive militarism, as well as the
willingness to think of war without considering the presence of war in "peaceful" times.
patterns and connections among them
A crisis-driven approach to war focused on timeframe and risk assessment obscures the
omnipresence of militarism at the root of violence
Everyday Violence, Published in Hypatia 11.4 nb, pp. 31-48) CH
Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven
into
the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and
analyses.
For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options,
crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need
for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression
that so often function as giv ens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of
militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar
opposite of war . It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege,
and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this
false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed
conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercis es in crisis control.
Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of
privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make
resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might
actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global
militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to
the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and
that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.
Stefan Bauschard
15
01
Stefan Bauschard
15
11
Link War
Their reduction of war to the entities and particularities of the aff abstracts war,
preventing contextualized responses to structural violence
But the abstraction of the particularities of war depends on an abstraction of
war itself. The distance of such abstraction is created in part by willingness to think of war without
considering the presence of war in "peaceful" times. Wars becomes conceptual entitiesobjects for
considerationrather than diverse, historically loaded exemplifications of the contexts in which they
occur. In order to notice the particular and individual realities of war, attention must
be given to the particular, individual, and contextualized causes and effects of pervasive militarism, as
well as the patterns and connections among them. Like other feminists, Peach criticizes the dualisms and
dichotomies that underlie war and the other evils of patriarchy, including dichotomies between male and
female, combatant and non-combatant, soldier and citizen, ally and enemy and state and individual which
have dominated just-war thinking. Rather than relying
on traditional dichotomies, a feminist application of just-war criteria should emphasize the effects of
going to war on the lives of particular individuals who would be involved, whether soldier or civilian,
enemy or ally, male or female. (Peach 1994. 166)
Hegemony causes
negative peace
Link Hegemony
Tavares 8 (Rodrigo l, June, Understanding regional peace and security: a framework for analysis., Vol.
14
Issue 2, p107-127, 21p, Contemporary Politics)
The first instrument, armed violence, can be seen as a mechanism of state policy to shape
the international system. In a paradoxical perspective, realist scholars and conservative
policy makers tend to consider war as a rational tool to carve international order and
stability (Waltz
1959; see also Howard 1970). The second instrument, balance of power, is an instrument (or
a set of instruments) that states use to band together and pool their capabilities
whenever one state or group of states appears to become a threat as it gathers a
disproportionate amount of power. Although balance of power could be interpreted
as a concept or a strategic doctrine,
here t he e mpha si s is o n t he mec ha nis ms u sed by po litic a l a g ent s t o ba la nce ea ch o
t her s ca pa bilit ies .
In conjugation with this, hegemony is the dominance of one state over other states,
with or without the threat of force, to the extent that , for instance, the dominant
party can dictate the terms of relationship to its advantage. In the same line,
alliances are military collective defence arrangements of states formed as a
response to a common threat and as a way of maximizing security and
minimizing the eventuality of an external attack. Modern military alliances are
the subject of a significant body of literature (Osgood 1968, Walt 1987, 1997).
Negative peace trades-off with a focus on the structural roots of violence

Von Heinegg 4 (Wolff Heintschel, * Prof. Dr. iur., Europa-Universitat Frankfurt (Oder); Charles H.
Stockton Professor of International Law, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., SummerThe Rule of
Law in conflict and Post-Conflict Situations: Factors in war to peace transitions, Harvard Society for
Law & Public Policy)
Before dealing with the different forms of terminating (and of suspending) an international armed conflict, it needs to be stressed that
the
end of a war merely means a return to peace insofar as the situation thus created is
characterized by the absence of military operations, including occupation. This situation, often
referred to as "negative peace," of course does not mean a return to normal or amicable
relations between the former belligerents, often referred to as "positive peace." n17 The latter
condition, while not apt for an abstract and comprehensive definition, n18 may be achieved through the exchange of diplomats and by the
reestablishment of economic and cultural relations. There is, however, another aspect of this issue that is of importance in that context.
A
situation of "positive peace," which is, inter alia, based upon the principle of sovereign equality of
States, regularly presupposes the reestablishment of the full sovereignty of all belligerents.
While the termination of an international armed conflict implies that any further use of armed
force not justified by the right of self-defense will be contrary to the fundamental prohibition of
the use of force, n19 the existence of negative peace does not necessarily imply t he return of the
vanquished state to full sovereignty. While there may be an exchange of diplomats as well as other forms of
establishing diplomatic relations, the situation may not be characterized as a return to, or the
establishment of, positive peace s o long as the State concerned has not regained its full
sovereignty . This was the case with Germany until its reunification
because all questions relating to "Germany as a whole" had been made subject to the so called "Allied reservations," which meant that neither
the Federal Republic of Germany nor the German Democratic Republic were allowed to autonomously decide on that core question of
their respective sovereignty. Moreover, Berlin remained under an [*848] occupational regime. n21 Only with the end of the Allied rights
concerning Germany as a whole, including Berlin, did Germany and the Allies return to a situation of positive peace proper
***Impacts***
Stefan Bauschard
15
41
Stefan Bauschard
15
51
Impact No Solvency War
Militarism is the root cause The Pro doesn t solve

Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or
address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people
living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment.
These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help
construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural
nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of
the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world
results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of
militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic
glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions
for social problems.
Their solutions backfire, turning the case

Felice 98 (William F., Professor of International Relations and Human Rights at Eckerd College,
Militarism and Human Rights, International Affairs, Vol. 74 No. 1, Blackwell Publishing,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2624664, A.D.: 7/10/09) JH
The attitudes that sustain large and deadly military machines did not fall with the Berlin Wall .
The logic is mesmerizing. The world is a dangerous place divided into sovereign nation-states, each seeking to improve its position in an
There are few opportunities for cooperation. Each state maintains the right to be free
Each nation is surrounded by danger and
must protect itself to survive, which gives rise to a preoccupation with power, particularly military power.
Internalizing this acute sense of danger makes it easier to accept high taxation to pay for the
militarization at the expense of social development. Yet such militarization in the name of
security and peace often backfires and creates conditions of insecurity and conflict. Further, such
expenditures consistently undermine the ability of nations to fulfil other international human rights, in
particular economic and social rights. Security defined solely as the heavily armed defence of ones borders. How does a nation
anarchic international system.
from the scrutiny and intervention of other states in its internal affairs.
provide a basic right to physical security without compromising other human rights? What types of military and other expenses should be
budgeted to attain physical security?
Impact No Solvency Poverty

Structural violence outweighs the aff and a failure to address human security makes
their harms inevitable They treat the effect, not the cause
Gilman 0 (Robert, President of Context Institute, Structural Violence, The Foundation of Peace IC #4,
http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC04/Gilman1.htm, 2000, AD: 7-9-9)
How legitimate is it to ascribe these deaths to the structural violence of human institutions, and
not just to the variability of nature? Perhaps the best in-depth study of structural violence comes
from the Institute for Food and Development Policy (1885 Mission St, San Francisco, CA 94103).
What they find throughout the Third World is that the problems of poverty and hunger often
date back hundreds of years to some conquest - by colonial forces or otherwise. The victors
became the ruling class and the landholders, pushing the vast majority either on to poor ground
or into being landless laborers . Taxes, rentals, and the
legal system were all structured to make sure that the poor stayed poor . The same patterns
continue today. Additional support is provided by the evidence in the above figure, which speaks for
itself. Also, according to Sivard, 97% of the people in the Third World live under repressive
governments, with almost half of all Third World countries run by military dominated governments.
Finally, as a point of comparison, Ehrlich and Ehrlich (Population, Environment, and Resources, 1972,
p72) estimate between 10 and 20 million deaths per year due to starvation and malnutrition. If
their estimates are correct, our estimates may even be too low. Some comparisons will help to put
these figures in perspective. The total number of deaths from all causes in 1965 was
62 million, so these estimates indicate that 23% of all deaths were due to structural violence.
By 1979 the fraction had dropped to 15%. While it is heartening to see this improvement, the
number of deaths is staggeringly large, dwarfing any other form of violence other than
nuclear war. For example, the level of structural violence is 60 times greater than the average
number of battle related deaths pe r year since
1965 (Sivard 1982). It is 1.5 times as great as the yearly average number of civilian and battle field
deaths during the 6 years of World War II. Every 4 days, it is the equivalent of another Hiroshima .
Perhaps the most
hopeful aspect of this whole tragic situation is that essentially everyone in the present system has
become a
loser. The plight of the starving is obvious, but the exploiters don't have much to show for their
efforts either - not compared to the quality of life they could have in a society without the tensions
generated by this exploitation. Especially at a national level, what the rich countries need now is
not so much more material wealth, but the opportunity to live in a world at peace. The rich
and the poor, with the help of modern technology and weaponry, have become each others'
prisoners. Today's industrialized societies did not invent this structural violence, but it could not
continue without our permission. This suggests that to the list of human tendencies that are
obstacles to peace we need to add the ease with which we acquiesce in injustice the way we all too easily look in the other direction and disclaim "response ability." In terms of the
suffering it supports, it is by far our most serious flaw .
Militarism is the root cause
Felice 98 (William F., Professor of International Relations and Human Rights at Eckerd College, Militarism
and
Human Rights, International Affairs, Vol. 74 No. 1, Blackwell Publishing,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2624664, A.D.: 7/10/09) JH
This human rights agenda can also only be implemented within a framework of peace. Militarism has neither created a world of peace and
Overemphasis on military superiority undermines the

ability to build regimes of trust and harmony. The arsenals of the war system are symptoms of deep conflict. Arms
stability, nor protected the human right to physical security.
control and disarmament and the demobilization of armed forces are prerequisites to providing the institutional framework within which
nations may pursue implementation of the corpus of international human rights law. International security and stability are dependent on
domestic
The roots of conflict within domestic societies are often the result of economic,
social and environmental pressures which cause poverty and unemployment and pit one community, class, sex or
security and stability.
ethnic group against another. Human rights as the core of domestic and foreign public policy can provide a route for the achievement of
peace and stability.
P re o cc upa t io ns w it h ba la nce o f pow er a nd milita ry pro w ess ca n o nly co ntinue t

o pro duce a w o rld of
insecurity and war. Policies based on outmoded notions of realpolitik exacerbate insecurities. The irony
is
t ha t hu ma n r ig hts po licies p ro v ide t he clea re st ro a d to achiev e t he re a list

o bje ct iv es o f sec urit y a nd stability. Long-term interests in international stability should compel governments to
explore human security and positive peace. It is commonly accepted that totalitarianism and human rights are incompatible. The negative
impact of militarism on basic human rights must also be understood. A
militarized society exists in contradiction to

basic human rights and negates the opportunities for human freedom.
Impact War
Their conception of peace prescribes military solutions as violence control
Sandy & Perkins 1 (Leo R and Ray, Co-Founder of Peace Studies at Plymouth State College and
teacher of philosophy at Plymouth State College, The Nature of Peace and its implication for peace
education, online journal of peace and conflict resolution 4.2,
http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/ENGSEMJ/v08/undervisningsmateriale/IL%20&%20HR/Topic
%202%20%20Reading.pdf, 2001, AD:7-10-9)
Peace as the mere absence o f w a r is w ha t Woo l ma n ( 1 9 8 5) re f er s t o a s neg a t iv
e pea ce . This definition is based on Johan Galtungs ideas of peace. For Galtung, negative peace
is defined as a state requiring a set of social structures that provide security and protection from
acts of direct physical violence committed by individuals, groups or nations. The emphasis is
...on control of violence. The main strategy is dissociation, whereby conflicting parties are
separated...In general, policies based on the idea of negative peace do not deal with the causes of
violence, only its manifestations. Therefore, these policies are thought to be insufficient to assure
lasting conditions of peace. Indeed, by suppressing the release of tensions resulting from social
conflict, negative peace efforts may actually lead to future violence of greater magnitude .
(Woolman, 1985, p.8) The recent wars in the former Yugoslavia are testimony to this. The
massive military machine previously provided by the U.S.S.R. put a lid on ethnic hostilities yet
did nothing to resolve them thus allowing them to fester and erupt later.
Defining war as an event implies that war can be justifies, guaranteeing militarized solutions
to problems
Women's Studies at the Univerity of Georgia, War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of
Just-war theory is a prominent example of a philosophical approach that real-rim-the-assumption that
wars are isolated from everyday life and ethics. Such theory, as developed by St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius, and as articulated in
contemporary dialogues by many philosophers, including Michael Walzer (1977), Thomas Nagel (1974), and Sheldon Cohen (1989), take
the primary question concerning the ethics of warfare to be about when to enter into
military conflicts against other states. They therefore take as a given the
notion that war is an isolated, definable event with clear boundaries. These boundaries are
significant because they distinguish the circumstances in which standard moral rules and
constraints, such as rules against murder and unprovoked violence, no longer apply. Just-war
theory assumes that war is a separate sphere of human activity having its own ethical constraints
and
criteria and in doing so it begs the question of whether or not war is a special kind of event, or part of
a pervasive presence in nearly all contemporary life. Because the application of just-war principles is a
matter of proper decision- making on the part of agents of the state, before wars occur, and before
military strikes are made, they assume that military initiatives are distinct
events. In fact, declarations of war are generally overdetermined escalations of preexisting conditions.
Just-war criteria cannot help evaluate military and related institutions, including their peacetime
practices and how these relate
to wartime activities, so they cannot address the ways in which armed conflicts between and among
states emerge from omnipresent, often violent, state
militarism. The remarkable resemblances in some sectors between states of peace and states of war
remain completely untouched by theories that are only able to discuss the ethics of starting and
ending direct military conflicts between and among states
Impact War
Understanding war as an event necessitates militarism which forecloses vital
interrogation to determine true peace
Richmond 7 (Oliver P., lecturer in the Department of International Relations, University of St. Andrews,
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Critical Research Agendas for Peace: The Missing Link in the Study
of International Relations, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/5023019836?title=Critical%20Research
%20Agendas
%20for%20Peace%3a%20The%20Missing%20Link%20in%20the%20Study%20of%20International
%20Relations, AD: 7/10/09)
As a consequence what has emerged has been an orthodox assumption that first the management of
war
must be achieved before the institutions of peace can operate, at a global, regional, state, and local
level.
Peace has, in Western political thought in particular, been enshrined first in the belief that only a
limited peace is possible, even despite more utopian leanings, and recently that peace can now be
built according to a certain epistemology. Militarization, force, or coercion have normally been
the key mechanisms for its attainment, and it has been imbued with a hegemonic understanding
of universal norms, now increasingly instilled through institutions of governance. It is generally
assumed by most theorists, most policymakers,
and practitioners, that peace has an ontological stability enabling it to be understood, defined,
and thus created. Indeed, the implication of the void of debate about peace indicates that it is
generally thought that peace as a concept is so ontologically solid that no debate is required.
There is clearly a resistance to examining the concept of peace as a subjective ontology, as
well as a subjective political and ideological framework. Indeed, this might be said to be
indicative of "orientalism," in impeding a discussion of a positive peace or of alternative
concepts and contexts of peace. (18) Indeed, Said's humanism indicates the
dangers of assuming that peace is universal, a Platonic ideal form, or extremely limited. An emerging
critical
conceptualization of peace rests upon a genealogy that illustrates its contested discourses and
multiple concepts. This allows for an understanding of the many actors, contexts, and dynamics
of peace, and enables a reprioritization of what, for whom, and why, peace is valued. Peace from
this perspective is a rich, varied, and fluid tapestry, which can be contextualized, rather than a
sterile, extremely limited, and probably unobtainable product of a secular or nonsecular imagination.
It represents a discursive framework in which the many problems that are replicated by the
linear and rational project of a universal peace (effectively camouflaged by a lack of attention
within IR) can be properly interrogated in order to prevent the discursive replication of
violence. (19) This allows for an understanding of how the multiple and competing versions of
peace may even give rise to conflict, and also how this might be overcome. One area of consensus
from within this more radical literature appears to be that peace is discussed, interpreted, and
referred to in a way that nearly always disguises the fact that it is essentially contested. This is
often an act of hegemony thinly
disguised as benevolence, assertiveness, or wisdom. Indeed, many assertions about peace depend
upon actors who know peace then creating it for those that do not , either through their acts or
through the implicit peace discourses that are employed to describe conflict and war in opposition to
peace. Where there should be research agendas there are often silences. Even contemporary
approaches in conflict analysis and peace studies rarely stop to imagine the kind of peace they
may actually create. IR has reproduced a science of peace based upon political, social, economic,
cultural, and legal governance frameworks, by which conflict in
the world is judged. This has led to the liberal peace framework, which masks a hegemonic
collusion over the discourses of, and creation of, peace. (20) A critical interrogation of peace
indicates it should be qualified as a specific type among many.
Impact Structural Violence Outweighs

Structural violence outweighs nuclear war
Gilman 83 (Robert, President of Context Institute, Founding Editor of IN CONTEXT, A Quarterly of
Humane Sustainable Culture, Can we find genuine peace in a world with inequitable distribution of
wealth
among nations?, The Foundations of Peace, p. 8, AD: 7-11-09)MT
How legitimate is it to ascribe these deaths to the structural violence of human institutions, and not
just to the variability of nature? Perhaps the best in-depth study of structural violence comes from the
Institute for Food and Development Policy (1885 Mission St, San Francisco, CA 94103). What they
find throughout the Third
World is that the problems of poverty and hunger often date back hundreds of years to some
conquest - by colonial forces or otherwise. The victors became the ruling class and the
landholders, pushing the vast majority either on to poor ground or into being landless laborers.
Taxes, rentals, and the legal system were all structured to make sure that the poor stayed poor. The
same patterns continue today.
Some comparisons will help to put these figures in perspective. The total number of deaths from all causes
in
1965 was 62 million, so these estimates indicate that 23% of all deaths were due to structural violence.
By
1979 the fraction had dropped to 15%. While it is heartening to see this improvement, the number
of deaths is staggeringly large, dwarfing any other form of violence other than nuclear war. For
example, the level of structural violence is 60 times greater than the average number of battle
related deaths per year since
1965 (Sivard 1982). It is 1.5 times as great as the yearly average number of civilian and battle field deaths
during
the 6 years of World War II. Every 4 days, it is the equivalent of another Hiroshima.
Structural violence kills more people than have died in all acts of direct violence
Pilisuk 1 (Marc, GLOBALISM AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE Peace, Conflict, and
Violence:
Peace Psychology for the 21st Century. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice- Hall.) CH
Limited material resources are not the only plight of poor people. Poverty inflicts psychological scars as
well;
it is an experience of scarcity amidst affluence. For many reasons, such as those discussed by
Opotow (this volume), poverty produces the scorn of others and the internalized scorn of oneself.
Ind igence is not just about money, roads, or TVs, but also about the power to determine how
local resources will be used to give meaning to lives. The power of global corporations in local
communities forces people to depend on benefits from afar. Projected images of the good life help
reduce different cultural values to the one global value of money. Meanwhile, money becomes
concentrated in fewer hands. The world is dividing into a small group of haves and a growing
group of paupers. This division of wealth inflicts a level of structural violence that kills many
more persons than have died by all direct acts of violence and by war.
Structural violence outweighs NW

Evangelista 5 (Matthew, Professor of International and comparative politics, Harvard University,
Peace studies: Critical Concepts in Political Science,
2005, http://books.google.com/books?id=9IAfLDzySd4C&pg=PA41&lpg=PA41&dq=%22structural+
violence%22+%22nuclear+war%22&source=bl&ots=m9wAXnUQqH&sig=4MnhVGRGJJ_Z8aS5SSmTp
tgRqYM&hl=en&ei=YBJZSoSeKYuqswOQ9fjWBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6, AD:
7/11/9) TR
But equally important is to recall that it is hardly possible to arrive at any general judgment, independent
of time
and space, as to which type of violence is more important. In space, today, it may certainly be argued
that research in the Americas should focus on structural violence, between nations as well as
between individuals, and that peace research in Europe should have a similar focus on personal
violence. Latent personal violence in Europe may erupt into nuclear war, but the manifest
structural violence in the Americas (and not only there) already causes an annual toll of nuclear
magnitudes. In saying this, we are of course not neglecting the
structural components of the European situation, (such as the big power dominance and the
traditional exploitation of Eastern Europe by Western Europe) nor are we forgetful of the high level
of personal violence in the Americas even though it does not take the form of international warfare
(but sometimes the form of interventionist aggression).
Stefan Bauschard
16
01
Stefan Bauschard
16
11
Impact Structural Violence Outweighs
Structural violence outweighs direct violence on magnitude and probability

Pilisuk 97 (Marc, Fall, The hidden structure of violence, Fall97, Vol. 20 Issue
2, p25, 7phttp://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=8&hid=7&sid=9058ddcf-12214296-8d1b98c9d5856a77%40sessionmgr7&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=97120169
14)
Poverty, inequality, social marginality, and domination of resources all produce unneeded suffering and
death.
These structures are not acts of nature but products of social arrangements created by people in ways
not easily noticed. There are relationships among cultural, structural, and direct violence. Culture,
the normative beliefs and practices of a society, can be a source of violence by allowing a
dehumanization of certain persons or groups. Cultural violence leads to structural violence when it is
incorporated into formal legal and economic exchanges. While individual acts of direct violence
have many causes, their occurrence is frequently predicated upon a larger and often hidden
structure that induces violence (Galtung 1996). The three types
of violence differ temporally. Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ebbs
and flows; cultural violence remains more invariant, given the slow transformation of basic culture.
In most cases, there is a flow from cultural violence to institutionalized structural violence, and finally
to eruptions of direct violent acts. Direct violence is used by both underdogs and top dogs but
serves quite different purposes for the two groups. Underdogs use violence as a way to get out of
a "structural iron cage " of powerlessness and poverty or to get back at the society that put them
there . Top dogs, on the other hand, use violence as a way
to keep or gain power (Galtung 1996). Structural violence is harder to identify than direct
violence. One can recognize acts of rape or murder as violent and we abhor them. Examples of
structural violence, however, look normal on the surface. Therefore, more often than not,
structural violence is left unchanged and the cycle of violence continues.
Structural violence outweighs because its systemic

Parson 7 (Kenneth, Peace Review, April-June, Structural Violence and Power,
Peace Review; Apr-Jun2007, Vol. 19 Issue 2, p173-181,
9phttp://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=6&hid=7&sid=9058ddcf-1221-4296-8d1b98c9d5856a77%40sessionmgr7&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=25359940
) CH
Despit e a lo ng ce ntury o f v io lence rapid proliferation of the instruments of mass
violence, the
increasingly complex organization and accelerated deployment of the forces of violence,
and the widespread mediazation of violence over the last three decades aloneour
theoretical understanding
and articulation of violence itself has progressed much more slowly. Johan Galtung is one particular
theorist who takes seriously the project of clarifying how our discourses of violence perpetuate or
provide alternatives to
relations of violence. Given his longstanding attention to structural violence and the extensive thinking he has done on the relations between
violence and power within the context of militarization, poverty, and political repression, his notions of peace and violence are not without substantial content
and relevance to theorists of conflict and war
Stefan Bauschard
16
21
Structural Violence has a greater impact than Direct Violence

Maley 85 (William, The University of New South Wales at Duntroon, Peace, Needs and Utopia,
Political Studies, XXXIIl, 578-591, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=6&hid=7&sid=fbf7951efa9b-4ac2-ba3b2c07e8326bd2%40sessionmgr2) CH
However, Galtung's major theoretical innovation was to posit a distinction between direct violence,
where
there is an actor committing the violence, and structural violence, where there is no such actor,
On occasion he refers to this latter condition as 'social injustice', and he uses interchangeably
the labels 'social injustice' and 'positive peace' to describe the absence of structural violence, -'
However, he stressed that both the absence of direct violence and the absence of structural
violence are significant goals, and that 'it is probably disservice to man to try, in any abstract
way, to say that one is more important than the
other'.
Impact Sexism
Militarism allows for the justification of violence against women
To give one very clear example of the ways in which just-war evaluations of wars as events fail to address
feminist questions about militarism, consider the widespread influence of foreign military bases on
gendered national identities and interactions. In Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense
of International Politics (1990), Cynthia Enloe illustrates how, while decision- making and
economic power are held primarily by men, international relations and politics are inevitably
played out on women's bodies in myriad ways, propagating racist, nationalist, and colonialist
conceptions of femininity. One chapter, "Base Women," is devoted to a discussion of the ways in
which local and global sexual politics shape and are shaped through the constant presence of
thousands of military bases worldwide in the symbol of the soldier, the introduction of foreign
conceptions of mascul inity and femininity, the reproduction of family structures on military
bases, and through systems of prostitution that universally coexist alongside military bases
Enloe writes, "military politics, which occupy such a large part of international politics today,
require military bases. Bases are artificial societies created out of unequal relations between
men and women of different races and classes" and, one might add, different nations (Enloe 1990,
2). The constant, global presence of these bases is an example of the mundane givenness and
subtle omnipresence of military violence. Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of
the nearby community. A military base, even one controlled by soldiers of another country, can
become politically invisible if its ways of doing business and seeing the world insinuate
themselves into a community's schools, consumer tastes, housing patterns, children's games,
adults' friendships, jobs and gossip. . . . Most have draped themselves with the camouflage of
normalcy. . . . Rumors of a base closing can send shivers of economic alarm through a civilian
community that has come to depend on base jobs and soldiers' spending. (Enloe 1990, 66) Just-war
theoryeven feminist just-war theorycannot bring to light the ways ill which the politics of
military bases are related to the waging of war, how militarism constructs masculinity and
femininity, or how international politics are shaped by the microcosmic impacts of military
bases. It therefore cannot address some of the most pressing ways in which militarism and war
involve and affect women.
Impact Environment
Militarism justifies continual environmental destruction
Women's Studies at the University of Georgia, War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the
Significance of Everyday Violence, Published in Hypatia 11.4 nb, pp. 31-48)
If environmental destruction is a necessary aspect of war and the peacetime practices of
military institutions, an analysis of war which includes its embeddedness in peacetime
militarism is necessary to address the environmental effects of war. Such a perspective must pay adequate
attention to what is required to prepare for war in a technological age, and how women and other Others are affected by the realities of
practices Emphasizing the ways in which war is a presence, a

constant undertone, white noise in the background of social existence, moving sometimes closer
to the foreground of collective consciousness in the form of direct combat yet remaining mostly
as an unconsidered given, allows for several promising analyses . To conclude, I will summarize four distinct
contemporary military institutions and
benefits of feminist philosophical attention to the constancy of military presence in most everyday contemporary life.
Militarism Destroys the Environment

In Scorched Earth: The Military's Assault on the Environment, William Thomas, a U.S. Navy veteran,
illustrates the extent to which the peacetime practices of military institutions damage natural
environments and communities. Thomas argues that even "peace" entails a dramatic and
widespread war on nature, or as Joni Seager puts it, "The environmental costs of militarized
peace bear suspicious resemblance to the costs of war" (Thomas 1995, xi). All told, including
peacetime activities as well as the immense destruction caused by combat, military institutions
probably presen t the most dramatic threat to ecological well-being on the planet. The military is
the largest generator of hazardous waste in the United States, creating nearly a ton of toxic
pollution every minute, and military analyst Jillian Skeel claims that, "Global military activity may be
the largest worldwide polluter and consumer of precious resources" (quoted in Thomas 1995, 5). A
conventionally powered aircraft carrier consumes 150,000 gallons of fuel a day. In less than an hour's
flight, a single jet launched from its flight deck consumes as much fuel as a North American motorist
burns in two years. One F-16 jet engine requires nearly four and a half tons of scarce titanium, nickel,
chromium, cobalt, and energy-intensive aluminum (Thomas 1995, 5), and nine percent of all the iron
and steel used by humans is consumed by the global military (Thomas 1995, 16). The United States
Department of Defense generates 500,000 tons of toxins annually, more than the world's top five
chemical companies combined. The military is the biggest single source of environmental
pollution in the United States. Of 338 citations issued by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency in 1989, three-quarters went to military installations (Thomas 1995, 17).
Impact Environment
Military practices destroy the environment both during war and peace time
There are many conceptual and practical connections between military practices in which humans
a i m to
kill and harm each other for some declared "greater good," and nonmilitar y practices in which
we displace, destroy, or seriously modify nonhuman communities, species, and ecosystems in the
name of human interests. An early illustration of these connections was made by Rachel Carson in
the first few pages of The Silent Spring (1962), in which she described insecticides as the inadvertent
offspring of World War II chemical weapons research. We can now also trace ways in which
insecticides were put of the Western-defined global corporatization of agriculture that helped kill off
the small family farm and made the worldwide system of food production dependent on the likes of
Dow Chemical and Monsanto. Military practices are no different from other human practices
that damage and irreparably modify nature. They are often a result of c ost- benefit analyses
that pretend to weigh all likely outcomes yet do not consider nonhuman entities except in terms
of their use value for humans and they nearly always create unforeseeable effects for humans
and nonhumans. In addition, everyday military peacetime practices are actually more destructive
than most other human activities, they are directly enacted by state power, and, because they
function as unquestioned "givens," they enjoy a unique near-immunity to enactments of moral
reproach. It is worth noting the extent to which everyday military activities remain largely
unscrutinized by environmentalists, especially American environmentalists, largely because fear
allows us to he fooled into thinking that "national security" is an adequate excuse for
"ecological military mayhem" (Thomas 1995, 16).
Impact Genocide
The ideology of militarism guarantees genocide and unlimited violence
The feminization, commodification, and devaluation of nature helps create a reality in which its destruct
ion
in warfare is easily justified. In imagining an ethic that addresses these realities, feminists cannot neglect
the extent to which military ecocide is connected, conceptually and practically, to transnational
capitalism and other forms of human oppression and exploitation. Virtually all of the world's thirty-five
nuclear bomb test sites, as well as most radioactive dumps and uranium mines, occupy Native lands (Thomas 1995, 6). Six nuiltinationals
control one-quarter of all United States defense contracts (Thomas 1995, 10), and two million dollars per minute is spent on the global
military (Thomas 1995, 7). One could go on for volumes about the elleci of chemical and nuclear testing, military-industrial development
There
are many conceptual and practical connections between military practices in which humans
aim to kill and harm each other for some declared "greater good," and nonmilitary practices in
which we displace, destroy, or seriously modify nonhuman communities, species, and
ecosystems in the name of human interests. An early illustration of these connections was made by Rachel Carson in the
and waste, and the disruption of wildlife, habitats, communities, and lifestyles that are inescapably linked to military practices.
first few pages of The Silent Spring (1962), in which she described insecticides as the inadvertent offspring of World War II chemical
weapons research. We can now also trace ways in which insecticides were put of the Western-defined global corporatization of agriculture
that helped k ill olf the small family farm and made the worldwide system of food production dependent on the likes of Dow Chemical and
Military practices are no different from other human practices that damage and
irreparably modify nature. They are often a result of cost-benefit analyses that pretend to weigh
all likely outcomes yet do not consider nonhuman entities except in terms of their use value for
humans and they nearly always create unforeseeable effects for humans and nonhumans . In
addition, everyday military peacetime practices are actually more destructive than most other
human activities, they are directly enacted by state power, and, because they function as
unquestioned "givens," they enjoy a unique near-immunity to enactments of moral reproach. It
Monsanto.
is worth noting the extent to which everyday military activities remain largely unscrutinized by environmentalists, especially American
environmentalists, largely because fear allows us to he fooled into thinking that "national security" is an adequate excuse for "ecological
military mayhem" (Thomas 1995, 16).
If
environmental destruction is a necessary aspect of war and the peacetime practices of military
institutions, an analysis of war which includes its embeddedness in peacetime militarism is
neces sary to address the environmental effects of war. Such a perspective must pay adequate attention to what is
required to prepare for war in a technological age, and how women and other Others are affected by the realities of contemporary military
institutions and practices.
Impact Morality OWs Extinction

We have a moral obligation to help others in the face of structural violence even if that
leads to extinction.
Watson 77 (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, World Hunger and
Moral Obligation, p. 118-119)
These arguments are morally spurious. That food sufficient for well-nourished survival is the equal right
of
every human individual or nation is a specification of the higher principle that everyone has equal
right to the necessities of life. The moral stress of the principle of equity is primarily on equal
sharing, and only secondarily on what is being shared. The higher moral principle is of human equity
per se. Consequently, the moral action
is to distribute all food equally, whatever the consequences. This is the hard line apparently drawn by
such moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam Chomskybut then, morality is hard. The conclusion
may be unreasonable (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously moral.
Nor should anyone purport surprise; it has always been understood that the claims of moralityif
taken seriouslysupersede those of conflicting reason. One may even have to sacrifice ones life or
ones nation to be moral in situations where practical behavior would preserve it. For example, if a
prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even when reason tells him that
collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, if one is to be moral, one distributes
available food in equal shares (even if everyone then dies). That an action is necessary to save ones
life is no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to be a patriot or moral. No
principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save ones life or nation. There is
a strict analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering
to Christian principles for the sake of being Christian. The moral world contains pits and lions, but
one looks always to the highest light. The ultimate test always harks to the highest principlerecant
or dieand it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets rough. I have put aside
many questions of detail such as the mechanical problems of distributing foodbecause detail
does not alter the stark conclusion. If
every human life is equal in value, then the equal distribution of the necessities of life is an extremely
high, if not the highest, moral duty. It is at least high enough to override the excuse that by doing it
one would lose ones
life. But many people cannot accept the view that one must distribute equally even in f the nation
collapses or all people die. If everyone dies, then there will be no realm of morality. Practically
speaking, sheer survival comes first. One can adhere to the principle of equity only if one exists.
So it is rational to suppose that the principle of survival is morally higher than the principle of
equity. And though one might not be able to argue for unequal distribution of food to save a nation
for nations can come and goone might well argue that
unequal distribution is necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large groupsay
one-third
of present world populationshould be at least well-nourished for human survival. However, from an
individual standpoint, the human specieslike the nationis of no moral relevance. From a
naturalistic standpoint, survival does come first; from a moralistic standpointas indicated above
survival may have to be sacrificed. In the milieu of morality, it is immaterial whether or not the
human species survives as a result of individual behavior.
***Alternative***
Alternative Discourse
Discourse is key to positive peace
Gay 98 (William, University of North Carolina, Charlotte, December, The Practice of Linguistic
nonviolence, Peace Review, 10402659, Dec98, Vol. 10, Issue 4, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?
vid=7&hid=7&sid=fbf 7951e-fa9b4ac2-ba3b-2c07e8326bd2%40sessionmgr2&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d %3d#db=ap
h&A N=1426690)
Many times the first step in reducing linguistic violence is to simply refrain from the use of offensive
and
oppressive terms. However, just because linguistic violence is not being used, a genuinely pacific discourse is not necessarily
present. Nonviolent discourse, like the condition of peace, can be negative or positive. "Negative
peace" refers to the temporary absence of actual war or the lull between wars, while "positive
peace" refers to the negation of war and the presence of justice. The pacific discourse that is
analogous to negative peace can
actually perpetuate injustice. Broadcasters in local and national news may altogether avoid using terms like "dyke" or "fag" or
even "homosexual," but they and their audiences can remain homophobic even when the language of lesbian and gay pride is used . A
government may cease referring to a particular nation as "a rogue state," but public and
private attitudes may continue to foster prejudice toward this nation and its inhabitants. When
prejudices remain unspoken, at least in public thrums, their detection and eradication are made
even more difficult . Of course, we need to find ways to restrain hate speech in order to at least stop linguistic attacks in the public
arena. Likewise, we need to find ways to restrain armed conflicts and hostile name calling directed against an adversary of the state.
However,
even if avoidance of linguistic violence is necessary, it is not sufficient. Those who bite
their tongues to comply with the demands of political correctness are often ready to lash out
vitriolic epithets when these constraints are removed. T hus, the practice of linguistic nonviolence
is more like negative peace when the absence of hurtful or harmful terminology merely marks a
lull in reliance on linguistic violence or a shift of its use from the public to the private sphere.
The merely public or merely formal repression of language and behavior that expresses these
attitudes builds up pressure that can erupt in subsequent outbursts of linguistic violence and
physical violence.
Linguistic violence causes structural violence Resistance solves

Gay 98 (William, University of North Carolina, Charlotte, December, The Practice of Linguistic
nonviolence, Peace Review, 10402659, Dec98, Vol. 10, Issue 4, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?
vid=7&hid=7&sid=fbf 7951e-fa9b4ac2-ba3b-2c07e8326bd2%40sessionmgr2&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d %3d#db=ap
h&A N=1426690) CH
The first step is breaking our silence concerning the many forms of violence. We need to recognize
that
often silence is violence; frequently, unless we break l he silence, we are being complicitous to the
violence of
the situation. However, in breaking the silence, our aim should be to avoid counter-violence, in
its physical forms and in its verbal forms. Efforts to advance peace and justice should occupy
the space between silence and violence. Linguistic violence can be overcome , but the care and
vigilance of the positive practice
of physical and linguistic nonviolence is needed if the gains are to be substantive, rather than merely
formal, and if the goals of nonviolence are to be equally operative in the means whereby we
overcome linguistic violence and social injustice.
Alternative Reject
Moving away from crisis-driven politics solves
Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also
enables
consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape
more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the
ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the
events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and
political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots
shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state- sponsored violence are a
sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the
fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of
excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships
among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions
with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more
powerful police state, one
cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among
phenomena like
the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.
Rejecting negative peace opens the space for positive peace

Salomon and Nevo 2 (Gavriel and Baruch, educational psychologists, University of Haifa, Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Peace Education: The Concept, Principles, and Practices around the World, 2002,
http://www.questiaschool.com/read/109637749?title=Peace%20Education%3a%20%20The%
20Concept%2c%20Principles%2c%20and%20Practices%20around%20the%20World, AD:
7/9/9) TR
It is obvious that peace education is not a single entity. A variety of distinctions can be offered. For one,
peace
has more than one meaning, and so does its absence violence. Galtung (1973) distinguished
between positive and negative peace, with the former denoting collaboration, integration, and
cooperation, and the latter denoting the absence of physical and direct violence between groups.
He also coined the construct of "structural violence," denoting societal built-in inequalities and
injustices. A second, possible distinction pertains to the sociopolitical context in which peace
education takes place: regions of intractable conflict (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998), regions of racial or
ethnic tension with no overt actions of hostility (e.g., Leman, chap. 14, this volume), or regions of
tranquility and cooperation. A third distinction can be made between
desired changes: changes on the local, microlevel, for example, learning to settle conflicts and to
cooperate on an interpersonal level, versus desired changes on a more global, macrolevel, for
example, changing perceptions, stereotypes, and prejudices pertaining to whole collectives. Although
in both cases individuals are the targets for change, the change itself pertains to two different
levels: more positive ways of handling other individuals versus handling other collectives. Still
another possible distinction is between the political, economic, and social status of peace education
participants: racial or ethnic majority versus minority, conqueror versus conquered, and perpetrator
versus victim. Clearly, peace education for the weak and dominated is not the same as for the strong
and dominating (for important distinctions, see chapter 3 by Bar-Tal, this volume). Whereas these and
other distinctions are of great importance, I think that the sociopolitical context in which
peace education takes place supersedes the rest. It is the context that determines to an important
extent (a) the challenges faced by peace education, (b) its goals, and (c) its ways of treating the
different subgroups of participants. Thus, for example, a rough examination of peace education
programs around the world suggests that whereas regions of relative tranquility emphasize
education for cooperation and harmony (positive peace), promoting the idea of a general culture
of peace, regions of conflict and tension emphasize education for violence prevention (negative
peace), greater equality, and practical coexistence with real adversaries, enemies, and minorities.
Whereas the former are likely to promote individual skills in handling
local, interpersonal conflicts, the latter are more likely to address perceptions of and tolerance toward
collectives.
Stefan Bauschard
17
01
Stefan Bauschard
Alternative Reject
17
11
The ontopolitical act of rejection calls into question the negative peace worldview,
prompting alternatives
Burke 2 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales,
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Aporias of Security, http://www.questia.com/read/5002461817?
title=Aporias%20of%20Security, AD:
7/10/9)
However, I believe that, more than ever, we do need to ask what it is to be secure. Surely we no longer
know
what security is--in that Platonic sense. Surely more than ten years after the end of the Gold War,
after the Clinton Doctrine and the destruction of the Twin Towers, after humanitarian and policy
disasters in Indochina, Africa, East Timor, the Middle East, and Central America, and after a
growing body of humanist and critical scholarship has questioned security's unity, discursive
structure, and political implications, security no longer possesses a credible wholeness. (1) This
article begins from the premise that security's claims to universality and wholeness founder on a
destructive series of aporias, which derive firstly from the growing sense that security no longer
has a stable referent object, nor names a common set of needs, means, or ways of being, and
secondly, from the moral relativism that lies at the center of dominant (realist)
discourses of security that pretend to universality but insist that "our" security always rests on the
insecurity and suffering of another. While this article argues strongly that security has no essential
ontological integrity, it also argues that if the power and sweep of security are to be understood
and challenged, its claims to universality must be taken seriously. They underpin and animate
sweeping forms of power, subjectivity, force, and economic circulation and cannot be dismissed
out of hand. Nor, in the hands of some humanist writers--who have sought to think human and gender
security in radical counterpoint to realist images of national and international security--are such claims
always pernicious. They have a valuable moral and political force that undermines, perhaps
unwittingly, the logocentric presuppositions of the realist discourses they question. Yet a common
assumption that security can be ontologically completed and se cured does present a hurdle for
the kind of "ontopolitical" critique that we really need. (2) The answer is not to seek to close out these
aporias; they call to us and their existence presents an important political opening. Rather than seek to
resecure security, to make it conform to a new humanist ideal--however laudable--we need to
challenge security as a claim to truth, to set its "meaning" aside. Instead, we should focus on
security as a pervasive and complex system of political, social, and economic power, which
reaches from the most private spaces of being to the vast flows and conflicts of geopolitics and global
economic circulation. It is to see security as an interlocking system of knowledges, representations,
practices, and institutional forms that imagine, direct, and act upon bodies, spaces, and flows in
certain ways-to see security not as an essential value but as a political technology. This is to move
from essence to genealogy: a genealogy that aims, in William Connolly's words, to "open us up to
the play of possibility in the present ... [to] incite critical responses to unnecessary violences and
injuries surreptitiously imposed upon life by the insistence that prevailing forms are natural,
rational, universal or necessary." (3)
Stefan Bauschard
17
11
Stefan Bauschard
17
21
Alternative Small Actions
Small acts of resistance are key to positive peace

Duncan 2 (Grace, Student of Peace and Conflict, School of Political Science and International Studies,
UQ, Winter, Peace, Action and Consequences, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?
vid=9&hid=7&sid=fbf7951e-fa9b-4ac2-ba3b2c07e8326bd2%40sessionmgr2)
So the causes of this violence are personal as well as societal. Aaron has problemshis unemployment
and
his family but his reaction to those problems is far from inevitable. It can be argued that Aarons
unhappiness has led to this violence as much as anything else. Any action that would reduce his
unhappiness, a simple act of genuine kindness or compassion, would thus address this problem
and contribute to positive peace. Such an act would be barely visible to the world at large, yet
its contribution would be more durable because it goes closer to the source of the conflict.
Clearly Aaron would not completely change his behaviour because one person was nice to him, but
such an action can feed into the psychological web of human society and have ripple like effects. In
this way, the action would be broad in its consequences and far less ambiguous than those mentioned
above. While its results would be difficult to see, they should not be ignored. Clearly, this
theory is a crude simplification of a complex situation, perhaps an oversimplification. It must be
acknowledged that not all levels of action are appropriate or possible in all circumstances, nor
are they available to all
peo ple. While s ma l ler a ct ions ca n be un dert a ke n by a lmo st a ny o ne, big g er a ct
s are re ser v ed f o r t ho se
with political power or influence. The ethical stance generated by this theory is not that an
individual
sho uld shu n big g er a ct s (if they are available to them), because of their ambiguity and short
shelf-life, in
f a v o ur of s ma ller inte rper s o na l a ct io ns. It is that smaller acts have ethical priority
because of the relative purity and durability of their consequences, and should not be compromised in
pursuit of big actions. They should not be forgotten or judged less important simply because
they are subtle and unspectacular and do not occur in the more glamorous public or
international spheres. People have different ideas about how best to pursue peace and these, at
times, seem irreconcilable. This paper has explained, through the device of the continuum of action
for peace, what I see as the connections and relationships between various types of acts that have this
aim. It has dealt with the fact that actions undertaken with purely altruistic motives can sometimes
have ambiguous results, particularly if they are big actions, and especially if they lose sight of these
connections and of the ultimate aim of positive peace. The hypothetical example used is intended only
as a thought- experiment. It would be the task of further study to show how such ideas are manifested
in the real world.
Alternative Solves Politicians/Elites

Gradualism is the only way to solve preparing for conflicts brings them into existence,
dragging the world into a nuclear holocaust politicians cannot solve, the alternative
must occur alone
Groten and Jansen 81 (Hubert and Juergen, Doctorate in International Studies and Peace Lobbyist,
Interpreters and Lobbies for Positive Peace, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 18, No. 2, Special Issue on
Theories of Peace 175-181, Sage Publications, http://www.jstor.org/stable/424209, A.D.: 7/9/09)
With regard to peace research as we know it, we may conclude that nothing can be done. This does not seem to worry peace researchers
unduly. As shown above, they have been allowed to settle down as a scholarly community, tolerated by the powers that be and by the
the impact that critical peace research can make is largely reduced by political
pressure that faces the peace researchers with the alternative of either refraining from publishing any radical conclusions
public. In addition,
from their research or of seeing public acceptance and public funds withdrawn. This dampens any enthusiasm, especially as there is no
rulers tolerate peace research, and the masses, the people

who should be interested in i t, know nothing about it. Not raising their voices too high to avoid
disturbing the peace is what peace re - searchers seem to have resigned themselves to. All this is
happening at a point of history when the world is poised on the brink of a holocaust; when the behaviour of
man, under the influence of what Osgood calls 'psycho-logic',8 must be qualified as par- anoid; when the spiralling arms race
has been allowed to take on a frightening reality of its own. This is happening when one of the leading German
scholars and scientists, Carl F. von Weizsacker, who among other things has a well-earned reputation as a peace researcher, is setting
energetically about the task of propagating the need for nuclear shelters for the people.9 He, too, seems to have resigned
himself this time to yet another war taking its natural course - it cannot be helped, it is all so
human. After that war is over, we must sit down and seriously think about preventing war. Now
there is nothing we can do but construct shelters. Von Weizsacker surely knows that the speeding up of civilian defence
adds momentum to the spiralling conflict as it makes war a working proposition again in the
minds of many. How can this suicidal folly be stopped? Our answer is gradualism. It makes suggestions that do not strain the social and political system or the individual too much. Its basic
positive feedback to cheer one up. This is because the
assumption, that symbolic unilateral steps can prepare the way to qualitative disarmament, ought to be taken up again. New thinking,
though, has to be added to gradualist theory where the addressees are concerned. So far the proponents of gradualism have been addressing
most of the politicians in responsible positions have many

conflicting interests to take care of and conflicting pressures to respond to. What is more important,
they are not so personally involved since they are the ones who are least affected by the effects of
structural violence, and they are well-cushioned against the absence of positive peace. However, there is a small band of
themselves mainly to politicians. But
politicians who would be prepared to take up the cause of positive peace provided they are given encouragement and continuous support
There is no support for a positive peace policy from the dominant strata of society
because they are not aware of the necessity of such a policy.
by their voters.
A2: Positive Peace Vagueness

We must move forward toward positive peace attempts to define the goal are only
constructions of a flawed mindset
'Peace is not merely the absence of war,
collective violence or threats to use violence; the idea of peace must be rendered
using terms like 'justice', 'freedom', 'development', and 'solidarity'.'5 Expanding the concept of peace in this way does not make it any more
workable than does reducing it to a normative formula such as: peace is meeting man's basic needs or providing the minimum for
'All the
attempts at pro- ducing a comprehensive definition of what positive peace is must be seen in
the light of the quest for an all-embracing political system which as a minimum guarantees the
survival of mankind and as its
subsistence.6 The difficulties that arise when one tries to define peace are aptly summarized in the following words:
maximum creates a social order in which the welfare and happiness of man are achieved.'7 Is it at
all possible to find a useful and practicable definition of positive peace? As it embraces both the road and the goal, both
the method or process and the aim, it would have to incorporate an analysis of present - day society and, at the
same time, would have to trace the picture of a new, just society. Perhaps we are asking the wrong questions. What
we ought to be concerned
with cannot be a comprehensive definition but, rather, an analysis of the existing situation that would pro vide
us with the tools to start changing society. Another idea becomes essential here. This is democratization which, like
positive peace, is
both the goal, i. e., a democratic society free from structural violence, and the road leading to it, i.e., a procedure that takes in the masses and
The goal can be named but it need not be defined. What matters is the process,
the road leading to it, the key to it, positive peace being the guideline. The idea then is not to use up one's
energy trying to present people with a picture of what may be in store for them but to prepare the way, advancing by small
steps, taking first things first. Of course providing a clear analysis of the existing situation is more than many peace researchers
ever do; but this is not sufficient in itself. It is, however, equally insufficient to point to a utopia. Doing first things first
also implies that critical peace research cannot be 'neutral' or 'objective' in the sense that it appeals to all and sundry in bland
scientific terms. It has to take sides. It has to prepare action. This means first of all realizing that there is nobody eagerly
waiting for recipes or in- structions from peace research. Critical peace researchers have to understand that
their aims are not the aims of the people dominating society. What critical peace research has to offer can
only be put into practice with the help of those people who are most seriously affected by the absence
of positive peace. Only they can initiate and implement any policy that com- bats structural
violence. It is not to the rulers of society that positive peace appeals; it is to the dispossessed and
oppressed that the value and the chances of positive peace must be proved. However, they are not aware of the
terms' structural violence' and 'positive peace' that have so far been re - served to academic
circles, as jargon, and to a few privileged people, as esoteric knowledge
is supported by them.
Stefan Bauschard
17
51
Stefan Bauschard
17
61
A2: Aff Alone Doesnt Solve
A movement towards positive peace is a prerequisite to solving all harms even a small
transition solves the most intense impacts of structural violence
Barash 0 (David P., Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington, Approaches to peace: a
leader in peace studies, Oxford University Press, 2000, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/111756263?
title=Approaches%20to%20Peace%3a%20%
20A%20Reader%20in%20Peace%20Studies, AD: 7-10-9)
It is important to be against war. But it is not enough. We also need to be in favor of somethingsomething positive and affirming: namely, peace. Peace studies is unique not only because it is
multidisciplinary and forthrightly proclaims its adherence to values, but also because it identifies
positive visions of peace as being greater than the absence of war. The positive peace toward
which peace studies strives may be, if anything,even more challenging than the prevention of war. It
is a variation on what has been called the dog-car problem. Imagine a dog that has spent yars barking
and running after cars. Then, one day, it catches one. What does it do with it? What would devotees
of peace do with the world if they had the opportunity? This is not a useless exercise, as before any
future can be established, it must first be imagined. And moreover, unlike our hypothetical carchasing dog, the establishment of positive peace is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. The
movement toward positive peace is likely to be halting and fragmentary, with substantial success
along certain dimensions, likely failures along others. On balance, the project is formidable,
nothing less than a fundamental effort to rethink the relationship of human beings to each other
and to their shared planet .
If war and its causes are difficult to define- and this is assuredly the case- the positive peace is even more
elusive. (It can even be dangerous, since disagreements over what constitutes a desirable peace can
lead to war.) Earlier, we briefly considered just war doctrine. The conditions for a just peace are no
less strenuous or important. The relevant issues include- but are not limited to- aspirations for
human rights, economic fairness and opportunity, democratization, and what, specifically, is
desire, or how much emphasis to place on each goal. The pursuit of positive peace nonetheless
leads to certain agreed principles, one of which is a minimization of violence, not only the over
violence of war, but also what has been called structural
violence a condition that is typically built into many social and cultural institutions. A slaveholding society may be at peace in that it is not literally at war, but it is also rife with
structural violence . Structural violence has the effect of denying people important rights
such as economic opportunity, s ocial and political equality, a sense of fulfillment and self worth, and access to a healthy natural environment .
When people starve to death, or even go hungry, a kind of violence is taking place . Similarly,
when human beings suffer from diseases that are preventable when, they are denied a decent
education, housing, an
opportunity to play, to grow, to work, to raise a family, to express themselves freely, to organize
peacefully, or to participate in their own governance, a kind of violence is occurring, even if
bullets or clubs are not being used. Society visits violence on human rights and dignity when it
forcibly stunts the optimum development of each human being, whether because of race,
religion, sex, sexual preference, age, ideology, and so on. In short, structural violence is another
way of identifying oppression, and positive peace would be a situation in which structural
violence and oppression are minimized. In addition, social injustice is important not only in its
contribution to structural violence, but also as a major contributor to war, often in unexpected
ways. For many citizens of the United States and Europe, as well as privileged people worldwide,
current lifestyles are fundamentally acceptable. Hence, peace for them has come to meant the
continuation of things as they are, with the additional hope that overt violence will be
Stefan Bauschard
prevented. For others- perhaps the majority of our planet- change of one sort or another is
desired. And for a small minority, peace is something to fight for! A Central American peasant
was quoted in the New York Times saying I am for peace, but not peace with hunger.
17
71
A2: Aff Alone Doesnt Solve

Positive peace is a process Were the necessary first step
Bilgin 5 (Pinar, Assistant Professor, Ph.D, International Politics and Security, University of Wales,
Regional Security in the middle East: A Critical Perspective, 2005,
http://www.questia.com/read/108556832?title=Regional%20Security%20in%20the%20Mid dle%20East%3a
%20%20A%20Critical%20Perspective, AD: 7/10/9)
As an analytical move,
War
broadening security entails questioning the military-focused security agendas of Cold
Security Studies and calling for opening up the agenda to include other non -military threats. In making
this move, students of critical approaches to security have followed in the footsteps of Peace Researchers who, from the 1960s onwards,
had gradually widened their conceptions of peace and violence. Distinguishing between 'negative' and 'positive' peace, John Galtung
argued that peace defined as here by the absence of armed conflict is 'negative peace'.
'Positive peace', maintained
Galtung, means the absence of not only direct physical violence but also indirect (and sometimes unintentional)
'structural violence' - that is, those socio-economic institutions and relations that oppress human
beings by preventing them from realising their potential. Galtung (1969, 1996) also emphasised that to
attain 'positive peace', it is not enough to seek to eliminate violence; existing institutions and
relations should be geared towards the enhancement of dialogue, cooperation and solidarity
among peoples coupled with a respect for the environment. It is also worth noting here that for Galtung (1996:265) peace is not a
static concept; it is rather a process (as with security and emancipation for students of critical approaches to security; see
Booth 1991b; Wyn Jones 1999). Building upon Peace Researchers' broadening of the concepts of violence and peace that took human
critical approaches to security broadened security to include - in Ken

those physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what
beings as the referent, students of

Booth's words - 'all
they
would freely choose to do' (Booth 1991b: 319; Booth 1999b: 40). Such constraints may include human rights
abuses, water shortage, illiteracy, lack of access to health care and birth control, militarisation of
society, environmental degradation and economic deprivation as well as armed conflic t at the stateand sub-state level. Accordingly, the purpose behind broadening security, from a critical perspective, is to
become aware of threats to security faced by referents in all walks of life and approach them within a comprehensive and
dynamic framework cognisant of the interrelationships in between. Understood as such, broadening security does not simply
mean putting more issues on governments' security agendas, but opening up security to provide a
richer picture that includes all issues
that engender insecurity. In other words, although the broadening of governmental security agendas is an offshoot of
broadening security, it is not its main purpose. After all, the US Central Intelligence Agency also broadened its agenda in the 1990s
(Johnson 1993), but sought to address them through its traditional practices.
A2: Positive Peace = Violence/Revolt

Positive peace precludes the possibility of violence or revolution
Peace research is called upon to break this doubly vicious circle. It can do this
if it takes its central concept, peace, more
seriously. Only then will it take itself seriously. And only then will it accept its responsibilities
to the people. To do this, it has to come down from its academic pulpit . It is here that the concept of 'positive
peace' comes in.3
'Positive peace' is central to a peace research that claims to be a critical social science. When peace research started some twenty years ago
there were the 'armers', who aimed at controlling military conflicts by calling for arms, and new arms at that; and there vere the 'disarmers'.
This distinction was not sufficient. Only when Johan Galtung broke down the narrow concept of violence as personal, direct violence by
introducing the concept of 'structural violence' could peace research develop into a critical social science. Those social scientists that have
structural violence is present wherever man is deprived of his

potentiality by the working of the very structure of society itself . So this kind of violence is
produced by the structure of society and it, in turn, supports this structure. According to this concept,
any social injustice is structural violence. Direct, personal violence is but one aspect of this violence. Starting from this
opted for critical peace research believe that
concept, Dieter Senghaas
peace research is more radically critical of society and

considers a 'peace' policy that advocates deterrence as not only too limited but also as preserving the
social status quo characterized by structural violence. This does not mean, however, that critical peace
research, on a continuum of possible policies, is placed firmly at the end advocating revolution. On the contrary, it rules
out revolution as this implies the use of direct violence. So on this continuum peace research stops short of
revolution; it equally rejects the policy of deterrence as a means not capable of bringing about
positive peace. This does not mean, however, that it does not take into account short and medium-term approaches as well. It has to in
developed his concept of 'organized peacelessness'. Critical
order to reach its addressees. At this point a somewhat closer inspection
Positive peace can only be achieved in the

absence of structural violence and the violent structures that go with it. Positive peace is social
justice.
of the category central to peace research, positive peace, is called for.
A2: Positive Peace = Authoritarianism

Positive peace resists authoritarianism
Potter 4 (Nancy Nyquist, PhD in Rhetoric from the University of Minnesota, Putting Peace into practice,
pg. 14-15, http://books.google.com/books?id=uQ4Ab7drluQC&pg=PA5&lpg=PA5&dq=%22negative+peace%22+%22
positive+peace%22+%22inseparable%22&source=bl&ots=JyUFsQfWT3&sig=LtO877TxxXq2bEOC_aGIbd7_
kU0&hl=en&ei=WRRZSpChF4XcsgOZ5OCZCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4, A.D.:
7/11/09)
The language of positive peace is quite compatible with the democratic spirit and is diametrically
opposed
to authoritarian traditions. Since the language of positive peace resists monologue and
encourages dialogue, it fosters an approach to public policy debate that is receptive rather than
aggressive and meditative rather than calculative. The language of positive peace is not passive in the
sense of avoiding engagement; it is pacific in the sense of seeking to actively build lasting peace
and justice. In this sense, while the language and practice of positive peace facilitates the
continuation of politics rather than its abandonment, it also elevates diplomacy to an aim for
cooperation and consensus rather than competition and compromise. The language
of positive peace provides a way of perceiving and communicating that frees us to the diversity
and open - endedness of life rather than the sameness and finality of death that results when
diplomacy fails and war
ensues. The language of positive peace, by providing an alternative to the language of war and the
language
of negative peace, can introduce into public policy discourse shared social values that express
the goals of a fully politicized and enfranchised humanity.
Positive Peace Good Solves Root Cause

(1/2)
Positive peace resolves the underlying causes of conflicts and violence- facilitates the
development of relationships which restore and preserve community values and needs.
We should be encouraging the government to pass policies of peace and justice
Sandy and Perkins 1 (Leo R and Ray, Co-Founder of Peace Studies at Plymouth State College and
teacher of philosophy at Plymouth State College, The Nature of Peace and its implication for peace
education, online journal of peace and conflict resolution 4.2,
http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/ENGSEMJ/v08/undervisningsmateriale/IL%20&%20HR/Topic
%202%20%20Reading.pdf, 2001, AD:7-10-9)
Positive peace, in contrast, is a pa t t er n of coo pera t io n a nd inte g ra t io n bet w ee n
ma j o r hu ma n g ro ups ....[It] is about people interacting in cooperative ways; it is about
social organizations of diverse peoples who willingly choose to cooperate for the benefit of all
humankind; it calls for a system in which there are no winners and losers--all are winners; it is a
state so highly valued that institutions are built around it to
pro t ec t a nd pro mo t e it (OKane, 1991-92). It also involves the search for positive conditions
which can
resolve the underlying causes of conflict that produce violence (Woolman, 1985, p.8). The
strategies used for this purpose are called associative, and t hey a re cha ra ct er ized by a hig
h lev el of social interaction [which] enables more rapid resolution of conflict by providing
maximum contacts through which solutions
ma y a rise (Woolman, 1985, p.8). Woolman also describes the sort of social reorganization that
would provide
the best opportunity for real peace. Essentially, he espouses Galtungs idea of smallness and
decentralization of power and authority. Thus, small scale social organization offers a better
environment for
encouragement of local autonomy, participation, and high levels of inter -group interaction. Big
countries, corporations, and institutions are generally regarded as negative structures because
they are prone to depersonalization, excessive centralization of decision-making, and patterns
of center-periphery exploitation. Gene Sharp (1980) in his Social Power and Political Freedom
adroitly elaborates these points.
The condition of smallness does much to reduce feelings of anonymity and powerlessness. It also
facilitates the development of relationships which can restore and preserve community values
and spiritual needs
w hich sho uld t a ke prec ede nce o v er t he ma t er ia lis m t ha t is so ce ntr a l t o Weste rn
cult ure. (Woolman,
1985, p.12). Consistent with these approaches, Reardon (1988) places global justice as the central
concept of positiv e pea ce a nd a sser t s t h a t j ust ice, in t he sense o f t he f ull enj o y
ment o f t he ent ire ra ng e o f hu ma n rights by all people, is what constitutes positive
peace (p.26). In a similar vain, Trostles (1992) comprehensive definition of peace clearly places it within a positive context: [Peace
is] a state of well-being that is characterized by trust, compassion, and justice. In this state, we can be encouraged to explore as well as
celebrate our diversity, and search for the good in each other without the concern for personal pain and sacrifice. ... It provides us a chance
to look at ourselves and others as part of the human family, part of one world. The
role of the individual peacemaker from this perspective would involve people who, . . . work toward promoting a world in which nonviolent
a nd so cia l e qua lity a re t he no r m. . . . Indiv idua l s o f co nscience sho ul d w o rk

t o cr ea t e a t rickle
interaction
up t heo ry . . . . by st a rt ing at t he g ra ssro o t s lev el t o enco ura g e co rpo ra t e

lea ders, po litica l f ig ures, a nd government officials to establish policies promoting peace
and justice . This includes not only participating in government by voting, etc., but also standing
against a government that does not operate in the best interest of global harmony. (Trostle,
1992) A pea ce ma ki ng g o v er n ment w o uld re quir e a sy st e m o f no n military national service (to). . . include the Peace Corps and exchange student or exchange citizen
programs.
. .as well as the duty of largely developed nations to share technology and surpluses of an y kind with
those
co unt ries in nee d a nd les s de v elo ped (Trostle, 1992). Offering another broad positive
view of peace is MacLeod (1992) who defines it as, an awareness that all humans should have the
right to a full and satisfying life. For an individual this means developing his own and his loved
ones potential growth, and for reaching out to his neighbors to help assure that they have the same
chance. For communities, this means developing fair regulations for living together, and encouraging
programs that will enhance fellowship among its many diverse elements. For nations, this means
encouraging its citizens to strive for enhancement of a benign attitude toward all elements of their
own society and toward all other nations. Towards an adequate definition It is difficult
no t t o see in t hese po sit iv e a ppro a ches t o t he def init io n o f pea ce ra dica l
i mplica t io ns f o r a reorganization of our society and, indeed, our entire world. There is no
denying that a positive conception of peace along the lines suggested by Galtung, Sharp, Reardon,
et al. would involve fundamental changes on the level of the individual psyche and the nationstate as well. At both levels genuine peace requires the advent of a new self-lessness, a
willingness to see our fellow humans as our brothers and sisters, and--as the traditional
religions have always counciled-- to love them as we love ourselves. But besides this
Stefan Bauschard
18
01
subjective component of each individuals altruistic love, there must be justice which depends on the
right sort of social organization. This is Reardons point. It is also implied by Trostles state of wellbeing ... of global harmony ... part of one world. The suggestion here is that, at the very least, a state
of (genuine) peace is something beyond what can be achieved by the traditional system of
sovereign nation-states. The problem, of course, is that this system lacks a system of workable
law, each state being the ultimate arbiter of
whether it will wield force in its pursuit of national interest or not . Without workable world law its
hard to
see how there can be justice, and so, peace, in its true sense. The world federalists have expressed this
point
succinct ly but po w er f ully : There ca n be no w o rld pea ce w it ho ut inte rna t io na l j ust
ice; no inte rna t io na l
justice without world law; and no effective world law without institutions to make, interpret and
enforce
it . 3 And the world federalists may be right when they make this requirement of enforceable world law a sine qua non for the
abolition of the age-old institution of war itself. Certainly Albert Einstein thought so when he declared that Peace is not merely the
absence of war but
the presence of justice, of law, of order--in short, of government (Einstein, 1968). In conclusion, we believe that a proper definition of
peace must include positive characteristics over and above the mere absence of belligerence. Rather, it must include those positive factors
that foster cooperation among human groups with ostensibly different cultural patterns so that social justice can be done and human
potential can freely develop within democratic political structures. And this--promoting social justice/freedom by democratic means--will
almost certainly require more selfless concern at all levels: at the personal level, more brotherly love; and at the international level, less
narrow national self-interest-- a goal which we believe will require a diminution of the current system of nation states and the gradual
emergence of
a world community self-governed by world law. In this way, a truly peaceful world will be a world where war has been made impossible-or, at least much less likely--by a new community where people not only see themselves in their hearts as part of one human family, but
where, in (political-legal-moral) reality, they really are part of such a family. Lessons for peace education Finally, what do these insights
about the definition of peace mean for peace makers, and peace educators generally, in the 21st Century? We think they mean first that
peace makers must stress that the long range goal of peace education should be the elimination
of war as a method of resolving disputes. Reardon (1988) anticipated this when she said that
peace education must confront the need to abolish the institution of war (p.24). To date there has not
been a widespread perceived need to do so. Establishing the need is a challenge that lies ahead. But, secondly and at least equally important,
our reflections about the nature of peace
also suggests that the abolition of war will require more than the mere cessation of hostilities among peoples--not that that would be bad if
ca nt g et it w it ho ut a ra dica l r ec onst
ruct io n o f interpersonal and international relations along the lines suggested by our earlier
examination. And paramount among these relations are the ideas of social justice and world law. The
importance of these ideas in successfully pursuing the quest of abolishing war is, we think, an
equally important implication for the future of peace education. Of course, the quest for peace
and the abolition of war will be a long one requiring us to dig
we could get it. The problem is, as we saw earlier, that we probably
deeper into t he v er y depths o f t he hu ma n a n d inst it utio n a l psy ches w hich lea d

civ ili ze d peo ples t o re so rt to force and, ho pef ully , t o f ind a nd bu ild t he elu siv e
pea ce . This quest re q uires t ha t w e t ea ch f o r pea ce and not just about peace.
Positive Peace Good Solves Militarism

Pursuit of positive peace minimizes structural violence, an inherent condition of in
justice that is a major contributor to oppression and war
Barash 00 (David P., Professor of Psychology, University of Washington, Approaches to Peace: A Reader
in Peace Studies, 2000, http://www.questia.com/read/111756263?title=Approaches%20to%20Peace%3a
%20%20A%20
Reader%20in%20Peace%20Studies, AD: 7/9/9)
The pursuit of positive peace nonetheless leads to certain agreed principles, one of which is a
minimization of
violence, not only the ov er t vio lence o f wa r, but a lso w ha t ha s been ca lled st ruct
ura l v io lence , a condition that is typically built into many social and cultural institutions. A
slave-holding society may be at peace in that it is not literally at war, but it is also rife with
structural violence. Structural violence has the effects of denying people important rights such as
economic opportunity, social and political equality, a sense of fulfillment and self-worth, and
access to a healthy natural environment. When people starve to death, or even go hungry, a kind of
violence is taking place. Similarly, when human beings suffer from diseases that are preventable,
when they are denied a decent education, housing, an opportunity to play, to grow, to work, to raise a
family, to express themselves freely, to organize peacefully, or to participate in their own
governance,
a kind of violence is occurring, even if bullets or clubs are not being used. Society visits violence on
human rights and dignity when it forcibly stunts the optimum development of each human being,
whether because of race, religion, sex, sexual preference, age, ideology, and so on. In short,
structural violence is another way of identifying oppression, and positive peace would be a
situation in which structural violence and oppression are minimized. In addition, social injustice
is important not only in its contribution to structural violence, but also as a major contributor to
war, often in unexpected ways. For many citizens of the United States and Europe, as well as
privileged people worldwide, current lifestyles are fundamentally acceptable. Hence, peace for them
has come to mean the continuation of things as they are, with the additional hope that overt violence
will be prevented. For others perhaps the majority of our planet change of one sort or another is
desired. And for a small minority, peace is something to fight for! A Central American peasant was
quoted in the New York Times as saying I am for peace, but not peace with hunger. There is a
long tradition suggesting that injustice is a primary cause of war. The French philosopher Denis
Diderot, for example, was convinced that a world of justice and plenty would mean a world free of
tyranny and war. Hence, in his 18 th- century treatise, the Encyclopedia, Diderot sought to establish
peace by disseminating all the worlds technical information, from bee-keeping to iron forging. And,
of course, similar efforts continue today, although few advocates of economic and social
development claim that the problem of violence can be solved simply by spreading knowledge or
even by keeping everyones belly full.
Imperialism Bad
Racism
Imperialism is grounded in racism and strips countries of their culture
Narobi 86.[James, Professor of NHU, Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African
th
Literature. July 6 , 2013 London:Heinemann Kenya, New Hampshire

http://www.swaraj.org/ngugi.htm ]
For these patriotic defenders of the fighting cultures of African people, imperialism is not a slogan. It is real;
it is palpable in content and form and in its methods and effects. Imperialism is the rule of consolidated
finance capital and since 1884 this monopolistic parasitic capital has affected and continues to aff ect
the lives even of the peasants in the remotest corners of our countries. If you are in doubt, just count
how many African countries have now been mortgaged to IMF the new International Ministry of
Finance as Julius Nyerere once called it. Who pays for the mortgage? Every single producer of real wealth
(use-value) in the country so mortgaged, which means every single worker and peasant. Imperialism is
total: it has economic, political, military, cultural and psychological consequences for the people of the
world today. It could even lead to holocaust. The freedom for western finance capital and for the vast
transnational monopolies under its umbrella to continue stealing from the countries and people of
Latin America, Africa, Asia and Polynesia is today protected by conventional and nuclear weapons.
Imperialism, led by the USA, presents the struggling peoples of the earth and all those calling for
peace, democracy .and socialism with the ultimatum: accept theft or death. The oppressed and the
exploited of the earth maintain their defiance: liberty from theft. But the biggest weapon wielded and
actually daily unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is the cultural bomb. The
effect of a cultural bomb is to
a nnihila t e a peo ple s belief i n t heir names, in their languages, in their environment, in their
heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see
their past as one wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance thems elves from
that wasteland. It makes them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves;
for instance, with other peoples languages rather than their own. It makes them identify with that which
is decadent and reactionary, all those forces which would stop their own springs of life. It even plants
serious doubts about the moral rightness of struggle. Possibilities of triumph or victory are seen as
remote, ridiculous dreams. The intended results are despair, despondency and a collective death-wish.
Amidst this wasteland which it has created, imperialism presents itself as the cure and demands that the
dependant sing hymns of praise with the constant refrain: Theft is holy. Indeed, this refrain sums up the
new creed of the neo-colonial bourgeoisie in many independent African states. The classes fighting
against imperialism even in its neo-colonial stage and form, have to confront this threat with the
higher and more
creative culture of resolute struggle. These classes have to wield ev en more firmly the weapons of the
struggle
contained in their cultures. They have to speak the united language of struggle contained in
each of their languages. They must discover their various tongues to sing the song: A people
united can never be defeatedColonialism dehumanizes individuals of all races
Hardt and Negri 2k

[Michael and Antonio, Political Philosopher and Literary Theorist at Duke University, Political
Philosopher, Empire, page 129]
The work of numerous authors, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and
Franz Fanon, who have recognized that colonial representations and colonial sovereignty are dialectical in form has proven useful in
several respects. First of all, the dialectical
construction demonstrates that there is nothing essential about the identities in struggle.
The
White and the Black, the European and the Oriental, the colonizer and the colonized are
all representations that function only in relation to each other and (despite appearances)
have noreal necessary basis in nature, biology, or rationality. Colonialism is an abstract
machine that produces alterity and identity. And yet in the colonial situation these
differences and identities are made to function as if they were absolute, essential, and
natural. The rst result of the dialectical reading is thus the denaturalization of racial and
cultural difference. This does not
mean that once recognized as articial constructions, colonial identities evaporate into thin air;
they are real illusions and continue to function as if they were essential. This recognition is not a politics in itself, but merely the sign that an anti
colonial politics is possible. In the second
the dialectical interpretation makes clear that colonialism and colonialist

representations are grounded in a violent struggle that must be continually renewed.
place,
The
European
Selfneeds violence and needs to confront its Other to feel and maintain its power, to remake itself continually. The generalized state of war that
continuously subtends colonial representations is not accidental or even unwantedviolence is the necessary foundation of colonialism itself. Third,
posing colonialism as a negative dialectic of recognition makes clear the potential for subversion
inherent in the situation. For a thinker like Fanon, the reference to Hegel suggests that the Master can only achieve a hollow form of recognition; it is
the Slave, through life-and-death struggle, who has the potential to move forward toward full consciousness. The dialectic ought to imply movement,
but this dialectic of European sovereign identity has fallen back into stasis. The failed dialectic suggests the possibility
of a proper dialectic that through negativity will move history forward.
Ethics
Imperialism destroys ethics by valuing security risks over collateral damage
McNally 6 (David, Professor of political science at York University The new
imperialists Ideologies of Empire Ch 5 Pg 92) JL
Yet, even on Ignatieff s narrow definition, in which human rights are about
stopping unmerited cruelty and suffering, the crucial question is how we are to do so. What if some means
to this ostensible end say, a military invasion can reasonably be expected to produce tens of thousands of
civilian casualties and an almost certain breakdown in social order? Ignatieff s doctrine of human rights
provides absolutely no ethico-philosophical criteria in that regard. Instead, he offers a pragmatic judgement
and a highly dubious one that only U.S. military power can be expected to advance human rights in
the zones where barbarians rule. But note: this is an utterly ad hoc addition to his theory. In no respect
can it be said to flow from any of his reflections on human rights per se. Moreover, others proceeding from
the same principle of limiting cruelty and suffering have arrived at entirely opposite conclusions with
respect to imperial war. Ignatieff s myriad proclamations for human rights thus lack any
demonstrable tie to his
support of empire and imperial war. This is convenient, of course, since the chasm between moralizing
rhetoric and imperial advocacy allows Ignatieff to pump out empty platitudes as if these contained real
ethical guidance. Concrete moral choices, involving historical study and calibrations of real human
risk, never enter the equation. So, Ignatieff can drone on about the world being a better place without
Saddam, never so much as acknowledging the cost of this result: some 25,000 Iraqis killed as a
result of armed conflict since the start of the U.S. invasion, and probably more than 100,000 dead as a
result of all the consequences of the U.S. war.24
Nowhere does he offer any kind of calculus for determining if these tens
of thousands of deaths are ethically justified. Instead, banalities about being rid of Saddam are offered up
without even countenancing the scale of human suffering that Ignatieff s preferred course of action war
and occupation
has entailed. But then, Ignatieff shows little regard for ordinary people in the
zones of military conflict. His concern is for the security of the West and of the U.S.A. in particular.
Ruminating about Americas new vulnerability in the world, for instance, he writes, When American
naval planners looked south from the Suez Canal, they had only bad options. All the potential refuelling
stops Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Yemen are dangerous places for American warships. As the
attack on the U.S.S. Cole made clear, none of the governments in these strategically vital refuelling stops
can actually guarantee the safety of their imperial visitors.25
Indigenous Rights
Imperialism deteriorates the culture of indigenous people
Galeota 2004 [Julia, The Humanist, Article Cultural Imperialism: An American Tradition
http://www.thehumanist.org/humanist/articles/essay3mayjune04.pdf]
In his 1976 work Communication and Cultural Domination, Herbert Chiller defines cultural
imperialism as: the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world
system, and how its dominating
stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to
correspond to, or even to promote, the values and structures of the dominant center of the system.
Thus, cultural imperialism
involves much more than simple consumer goods; it involves the disseminatio n of ostensibly American
principles, such as freedom and democracy. Though this process might sound appealing on the
surface, it masks a frightening truth: many cultures around the world are gradually disappearing due
to the overwhelming influence of corporate and cultural America. The motivations behind American
cultural imperialism parallel the justifications for U.S. imperialism throughout history: the desire for
access to foreign markets and the belief in the superiority of American culture. Though the Un it ed
Sta t es do es bo a st t he wo rld s la rg est, mo st po w er f ul economy, no business is completely
satisfied with controlling only the American market; American corporations
w a nt to co ntro l t he o t her 95 perc ent o f t he wo rld s co nsu mer s a s w ell. However, one
must question whether this
projected society is truly beneficial for all involved. Is it worth sacrificing countless indigenous cultures
for the unlikely promise of a world without conflict? Around the world, t he a nsw er is a n o v erwhel
ming No ! Disre g a rdi ng the fact that a world of homogenized culture would not necessarily
guarantee a world without conflict, the complex fabric of diverse cultures around the world is a
fundamental and indispensable basis of humanity. Throughout the course of human existence,
millions have died to preserve their indigenous culture. It is a fundamental right of humanity to be
allowed to preserve the mental, physical, intellectual, and creative aspects
o f o ne s so ciet y . A single global culture would be nothing more than a shallow, artificial culture of
materialism
reliant on technology. Thankfully, it would be nearly impossible to create one bland culture in a world of over
six
billion people. And nor should we want to. Contrary to Rothkopf s (and George W. Bushs) belief that,
Good and evil, better and worse coexist in this world, there are no such absolutes in this world. The United
States should not be able
to relentlessly force other nations to accept its definition of what is good and just or even modern.
Fortunately,
many victims of American cultural imperialism arent blind to the subversion of their cultures.
Terrorism
Imperialism encourages fundamentalism which leads to terrorist organizations.
Gagnon 12
[Jean, Honorary Research Fellow, Centre for Greater China Studies, Journal of South Asian
Development, The Taliban Did Not Create the Taliban, Imperialism Did, vol. 7 no. 1] Sir Karl Poppers (2002) method of historicism has
been neglected in the analysis of the radicalization of Afghanistans society in the form of the Taliban. Poppers historicism is the idea that the
past may allow the forecasting of the future by understanding the state of the present in one specific line of historical inquiry. It is argued
by analyzing periods of imperialismthose eras of social injustice, violence and

oppressionit is seen that such imperialism led to radical fundamentalism, as many
had no choice but to lash out. The push to strenuous religious identity, heavily laden
with violent tactics, was the natural response of peoples trying
herein that
to maintain their identities and collective destiny from

imperial domination. Furthermore, as evidence continues to show, most often those
individuals that are first to radicalize are the poorest of the poor, the dispossessed, or
those who have experienced violent injustices. Using Poppers method, it is possible to explain
how imperialism breeds radicalism (using Afghanistan as an example) and as such provide
some general recommendations to swing the pendulum in reverse so as to minimize radical behavior. This article has implications for
international relations, foreign policies and aid.
Nuclear technology is easily accessible to terrorist groups, enabling them to inflict

maximum damage.
O'Neill 97 from the Institute for Science and International Security
[Kevn, Editor at the Institute for Science and International Security, The Nuclear Terrorist
Threat http://www.isisonline.org/publications/terrorism/threat.pdf]
The proliferation of nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices to terrorist

groups is perhaps one of the most frightening threats to U.S. security. Nuclear
materials, technologies and know-how are more widely available today
than ever before. Small quantities of both fissile materials and highly radioactive
materials, sufficient to manufacture a radiological dispersal device, are actively traded
on the black market. A nuclear detonation by a terrorist group would likely result in an
unprecedented number of casualties. In contrast, a radiological dispersal attack would
probably be less violent, but could significantly contaminate an urban center, causing
economic and social disruption. Both types of attacks would have significant
psychological impacts on the entire population.
Pro
We affirm Resolved: United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive
operations.
Contention 1: Peacekeepers Need

Offensive Capabilities
Record numbers of UN peacekeepers have been dispatched in Africa in recent years yet they
have been unable to prevent fresh spasms of violence. U.N. forces have been limited by
mandates that only allow them to fight in self-defense. Shortly before genocidal attacks erupted
in Rwanda in 1994, for example, U.N. peacekeepers learned that arms were being imported
illegally by an ethnic Hutu militia. But senior U.N. officials ordered the peacekeepers not to
seize the weapons because it was outside the scope of their mandate. Offensive force does work.
The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) defeated the M23 rebel. That
victory was thanks to the 3,000-strong first-ever U.N. Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) created
by the Security Council. According to The Global Regime for Armed Conflict The UN's growing
willingness to deploy combat-ready troops for peace enforcement is a welcome shift and has
proven more successful in quelling violence and instability.
Contention 2: Offensive PKO has the Ability to

Stop Genocide
A peacekeeping force that can actually go after rebels and guerrillas that attack civilians and
destabilize regions is a very positive step forward for UN Peacekeeping. Past UN operations
have been heavily criticized for be unable to stop events and groups that were killing innocent
civilians. The most damning example of a UN Peacekeeping failure is the Rwandan Genocide.
Peacekeepers were not allowed to combat machete wielding Hutus as they massacred Tutsis and
even when several Peacekeepers were killed the force was withdrawn rather than being
reinforced and allowed to counterattack. Being able to stop and combat the groups that led to a
need for a UN mission will make for a more lasting peace than when the groups were ignored or
government forces had to be relied on to stop them. Being able to actually stop violence directed
at civilians and peacekeepers alike will go a long way in ensuring that a tragedy like the
Rwandan Genocide will not happen again just because peacekeeping forces' hands are tied by red
tape. As we said in our previous contention they knew when attacks were going to happen but
they were unable to take a preventative strike. There is a current offensive peacekeeping mission
taking place in the DRC right now. The intervention brigade is better equipped than either the
local rebel groups or the Congolese military, with tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and
night vision goggles. The brigade is comprised of three infantry battalions, one artillery unit and
one Special Forces and Reconnaissance Company, and is authorized to shoot first unlike any
peacekeeping mission before it. The brigade was authorized to use all necessary means to protect
civilians and "neutralize armed groups". Shortly after these troops were brought in described
what was described as a wave of surrenders among rebels occurred and peace talks resumed.
These Offensive PKOs can and are being used to stop killing and genocide. No one knows how
many people in total died from genocide in the twentieth, century, but the number of dead be
near 360,000,000 people. This is more than than the number of people killed in all 20th century
wars combined. By allowing offensive PKOs we allow the UN power to prevent these deaths.
Contention 3: Offensive Operations allow for

Cyber-peacekeeping
Cyber peacekeeping is classified as offense so it is topical. Kleffner 14 When more destructive
offensive cyber measures are envisaged, such as those causing physical damage to equipment of
the opposing party in non-self-defense circumstances, authorization must derive from the
mandate. As noted above physical destruction by cyber means is a use of armed force and must,
therefore, be authorized by the Security Council. Since traditional peacekeeping missions are
authorized only to use force in self-defense as defined above, offensive cyber operations are not
permitted. Since the Cold War, peacekeeping has evolved from first- generation peacekeeping
that focused on monitoring peace agreements, to third-generation multidimensional
peacekeeping operations tasked with rebuilding states and their institutions during and after
conflict. However, peacekeeping today is lagging behind the changes marking our time. Big
Data, including social media, and the many actors in the field may provide peacekeeping and
peacebuilding operations with information and tools to enable them to respond better, faster and
more effectively, saving lives and building states. These tools are already well known in the areas
of humanitarian action, social activism, and development. Also the United Nations, through the
Global Pulse initiative, has begun to discover the potential of Big Data for Development,
which may in time help prevent violent conflict. However, less has been done in the area of
peacekeeping. Cyber operations are a critical advancement in keeping peace. Cyber operations
provide the ability to remotely shut down the networks of opposing actors, allowing for a
significant advantage to a mission seeking to disrupt the activities of those threatening a peace
process. Cyber-attacks are much less destructive so theyre better for a countrys stability For a
peace operation constrained in its use of armed force and likely to be involved in a subsequent
transition to reconstruction and development efforts, the ability remotely turn off a network
rather than destroying it means that cyber operations will prove a useful tool in the toolbox of
peace operations. UN Peacekeepers could also help regulate cyberwar and cyber terrorism. On
the CBS program 60 Minutes tonight, National Security Agency (NSA) director Gen. Keith
Alexander admitted that a foreign national could impact and destroy a major portion of our
financial system by placing a virus in our computer systems and literally take down the U.S.
economy if the virus was spread around. My partner will read the devastating impacts of US
collapse in his speech.
For these reasons my partner and I urge you to vote pro.
Case Cards
Need Offensive Capabilities

Peacekeepers have failed to stop violence in Africa
Raghavan, Sudarson. Record Number of UN Peacekeepers Fails to Stop African Wars.
Washington Post. 2014 Jan 3. http://www.news-herald.com/generalnews/
20140106/record-numbers-of-un-peacekeepers-cant-stop-africa-violence/1
The United Nations has dispatched a record number of peacekeepers in Africa in recent
years, deploying soldiers to trouble spots such as the Central African Republic and South Sudan.
Yet the blue helmets and thousands of other soldiers sent by
African regional groups have failed to prevent fresh spasms of violence.
Peacekeepers are limited by their inability to act offensively

U.N. forces have often been limited by mandates that only allow them to fight in
self-defense. Shortly before genocidal attacks erupted in Rwanda in 1994, for example, U.N.
peacekeepers learned that arms were being imported illegally by an ethnic Hutu militia. But
senior U.N. officials ordered the peacekeepers not to seize the weapons because it was outside
the scope of their mandate, their commander, Brig. Romeo Dallaire, later recounted in a book.
Unable to prevent genocidal attacks in Rwanda as a result of only having defensive

capabilities
U.N. forces have often been limited by mandates that only allow them to fight in self-defense.
Shortly before genocidal attacks erupted in Rwanda in 1994, for example, U.N.
peacekeepers learned that arms were being imported illegally by an ethnic
Hutu militia. But senior U.N. officials ordered the peacekeepers not to seize the weapons
because it was outside the scope of their mandate, their commander, Brig. Romeo Dallaire,
later recounted in a book.
Peacekeepers could not prevent mass violence in South Sudan because they lacked
offensive capabilities
More than two years ago, the U.N. mission in South Sudan was authorized to have up to
7,500 military personnel and police. But it was unable to stop the ethnic andpolitical
bloodletting that had been occurring since the country won independence
from Sudan in 2011. In January 2012, the U.N. mission was heavily criticized by
victims and community leaders for doing little to stop a wave of tribal killings in Jonglei
State, the same region that is now a battle zone.
Able to stop conflict in the DRC once granted offensive capabilities

Deen, Thalif, U.N. Peacekeeping goes on the offensive Inter Press Service. 2013 Nov 13.
http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/11/u-n-peacekeeping-goes-on-the-offensive/
As U.N. peacekeeping operations assume a more agressive role in conflict zones, the first
concrete results came last week when the armed forces of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) defeated the M23 rebel group after a 20-month-long insurgency.
That victory was thanks in part to the support provided by the 25,240- strong U.N.
Stabilisation Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), but more importantly, the 3,000-strong first-ever
U.N. Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) created by the Security Council last March.
Overall the use of offensive force has been effective

The Global Regime for Armed Conflict. Council on Foreign Relations. 2013 June 19.
http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/global-regime-armed-conflict/p24180
The UN's growing willingness to deploy combat-ready troops for peace
enforcement is a welcome shift and has proven more successful in quelling violence and
instability. At the same time, it carries inherent risks. The use of force can have unpredictable
consequences, threatening the safety of UN personnel. In addition, more assertive mandates,
such as those adopted in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, may involve the UN
directly in the conflict, jeopardizing its reputation as an impartial, honest broker. To mitigate the
potential harm to its reputation and to avoid undermining its objectives, the UN should reframe
the concept of "impartiality" to mean equal treatment to all parties working for peace, combined
with resolute opposition to spoilers bent on violence. At the same time, the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should prioritize inclusive dialogue and seek to reach out to
representatives from all sides of the conflict.
Ability to Stop Genocide

UN peacekeepers have intervened in the Congo
Raghavan, Sudarsan. "In Volatile Congo, a New U.N. Force with Teeth." Washington
Post. The Washington Post, 2 Nov. 2013. Web. 04 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-un-forcewithteeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html>.
The U.N. soldiers are in Congo with an ambitious goal: to reverse the trajectory of
one of the worlds most horrific and complex conflicts, one that has killed more than 5
million people since 1998, the deadliest war since World War II. They are also here to rescue
the image of the troubled U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Congo. To be a peacekeeper doesnt
mean you need to be passive, their top commander, Gen. Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, said
hours before the offensive began. To be a peacekeeper, you need to take action. The way to
protect the civilians is to take action. If you see the history of atrocities here, it justifies action.
Inaction is precisely what the U.N. mission here has been criticized for in the 14 years since
the United Nations dispatched soldiers to Congo, the first members of what has become the
largest peacekeeping force in U.N. history. Now, the U.N. Security Council has launched the
Forward Intervention Brigade in a bold attempt to defeat the dozens of militias that pillage
this mineral-rich central African country, which is roughly the size of Western Europe. The
brigade, composed of 3,000 soldiers, is the United Nations first offensive combat force and
is seen as a possible model for defusing crises in other chaotic parts of the world.
The intervention could lead to long lasting peace and has already had success
Raghavan, Sudarsan. "In Volatile Congo, a New U.N. Force with Teeth." Washington
Post. The Washington Post, 25 Oct. 2013. Web. 04 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-un-forcewithteeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html>.
But senior U.N. civilian and military officials, as well as some analysts, say the
brigade could be the United Nations best chance to help bring meaningful change, and
perhaps even a sustainable peace, to Congo. This week, the Congolese and U.N. forces
pushed the rebels of the M23 movement out of major towns, including their last primary
stronghold of Bunagana, near the Ugandan border. The remarkably swift military defeat of
the rebels, who only last year briefly seized the eastern city of Goma, represented the first
significant victory for the force. Everybody is impatient, said Martin Kobler, the special U.N.
envoy to Congo. The atrocities going on, the rapes of women and the use of child soldiers,
this is just unacceptable. Thats why its a good development to have the intervention
brigade here. This is teeth.
The issue in Rwanda was the peacekeepers were not allowed to take action
"Rwanda: 100 Days of Slaughter." BBC News. N.p., 6 Apr. 2014. Web. 04 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506>.
The UN and Belgium had forces in Rwanda but the UN mission was not given a
mandate to stop the killing. A year after US troops were killed in Somalia, the US
was determined not to get involved in another African conflict. The Belgians and
most UN peacekeepers pulled out after 10 Belgian soldiers were killed. The French, who
were allies of the Hutu government, sent a force to set up a supposedly safe zone but were
accused of not doing enough to stop the slaughter in that area. Rwanda's current president has
accused France of taking part in the massacres - a charge denied by Paris.
The Rwandan genocide involved brutal killings and a litany of other man rights
violations.
With meticulous organisation. Lists of government opponents were handed out to
militias who went and killed them, along with all of their families. Neighbours killed
neighbours and some husbands even killed their Tutsi wives, saying they would be killed if
they refused. At the time, ID cards had people's ethnic group on them, so militias set up
roadblocks where Tutsis were slaughtered, often with machetes which most Rwandans kept
around the house. Thousands of Tutsi women were taken away and kept as sex slaves.
Some 800,000 people died in this genocide

In just 100 days in 1994, some 800,000 people were slaughtered in Rwanda by ethnic
Hutu extremists. They were targeting members of the minority Tutsi community, as well
as their political opponents, irrespective of their ethnic origin.
The United Nations should hunt down those who are violating human rights
Totten, Samuel. "Not on Our Watch: The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond
(review)." Genocide Studies and Prevention 4.1 (2009): 139-44. 2012. Web. 5
Dec. 2014.
<http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Countries_at_Risk_Report_2012.pdf>.
There are currently genocidal massacres taking place in the North and South Kivu
provinces of the DRC. Eastern DRC is at Stage 7. Genocide Watch advocates that the United
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(MONUSCO) should increase its efforts to hunt down perpetrators of
genocide in both the FDLR and Raia Mutomboki with robust funding and training
from European and other African governments, culminating in a cease-fire
monitored by MONUSCO.
Wave of Surrenders
Kobler, Martin. DR Congo: UN peacekeeping on offensive after defeat of M23, says senior UN
official 11 December 2013
1 December 2013 With peace efforts under way with the M23, the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC) is shifting its focus to other rebel groups and working with the Government to maintain the fragile
gains in the eastern part of the country, the Security Council was told today.
We will go on with this fight against all armed groups, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the
country, Martin Kobler said, referring to the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC (MONUSCO) which he heads.
I brought a message of hope to the Security Council. I think the situation is different now in the DRC after the end
of the fight against the M23, he told journalists after the briefing, but cautioned that military successes much be
backed by civilian determination and access to services such as health care and education otherwise we will go
back to square one.
The M23 composed of soldiers who mutinied from the DRC national army in April along with other armed
groups, has clashed repeatedly with the FARDC. At various times, UN officials have also deplored the activities of
other armed groups in the region, including Mayi Mayi, the FDLR, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
(NALU) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).
In March, the Security Council authorized the deployment of an intervention brigade within MONUSCO to carry
out targeted offensive operations, with or without the Congolese national army, against armed groups that threaten
peace in eastern DRC.
Around 1,500 to 1,800 combatants are estimated to be members of the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation
of Rwanda), one of the groups MONUSCO is focusing on, along with ADF in the north.
Mr. Kobler described a wave of surrenders among rebels, 70 per cent of whom are below the age of 30, and who
are eager to return to civilian life.
He noted, however, that unlike the M23, the FDLR is a smaller group that continues to live among civilian
populations making the offensive more difficult.
The operation started on 27 November, and yesterday and the day before, progress was made to clear areas and
streets of FDLR positions, Mr. Kobler said.
Among recent successes, he said for the first time in years, MONUSCO forces were able to reopen a street from
Pinga in the North Kivu towards the provincial capital of Goma: From yesterday on, people can bring their
vegetables to the Goma market, they can visit their families outside the area after a two-year paralysis.
After a failure last month between the M23 and the Government to sign an official political agreement, the
Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson, said it is hoped that the document
will be cosigned tomorrow by Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Malawi's Joyce Banda, who is also the
chairperson for the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
The agreement is part of ongoing talks between the M23 and the Government, held in Kampala, Uganda, under the
auspices of Mr. Museveni as mediator and Chairperson of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region
(ICGLR), as well as Ugandan Defence Minister and Facilitator, Crispus Kiyonga.
The Special Envoy also stressed the importance of the 11-nation Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the
DRC and the Region, which she has dubbed a framework of hope.
It's time for the people of the region to feel that the framework is making a difference in their lives through a peace
dividend, Mrs. Robinson told journalists in New York.
Cyber Warfare
Cyber peacekeeping is classified as offense so it is pro ground.
Kleffner, Jann. "Keeping the Cyber Peace: International Legal Aspects of Cyber
Activities in Peace Operations." International Law Studies. US Naval War
College, 2013. Web. 01 Dec. 2014.
<https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=
rja&uact=8&ved=0CC8QFjAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.usnwc.edu%2Fget
attachment%2F992607f1-9dbd-4762-b93c-079809f3b9d6%2FKeeping-theCyber-Peace--International-LegalAspec.aspx&ei=GjF9VO2xBcj2yQT1i4CYBw&usg=AFQjCNH0d8tmdXzRFkS
W4uB0ipMKqseNFg&sig2=5QtgX9kT1h5wE6ZiUIID9Q>.
When more destructive offensive cyber measures are envisaged, such as those causing
physical damage to equipment of the opposing party in non-self-defense circumstances,
authorization must derive from the mandate. As noted above, physical destruction by cyber
means is a use of armed force and must, therefore, be authorized by the Security Council.
Since traditional peacekeeping missions are authorized only to use force in self-defense as
defined above, offensive cyber operations are not permitted. Peace enforcement operations
endowed with a Chapter VII authorization to use all necessary means, may, on the other hand,
use force to enforce the mandate. Thus, offensive cyber operations causing damage, destruction
or personal injury are authorized in any situation that kinetic force would be permissible,
provided they are necessary to fulfill mission objectives. Likewise, when members of the peace
operation find themselves actively engaged in hostilities under the laws of armed conflict,
destructive offensive cyber operations may be used against military objectives in accordance
with that body of law.
Cyber attacks can shut down enemy operations, helping peace operations greatly.
College, 2013. Web. 01 Dec. 2014.
Cyber operations may also allow the mission to project their mandate into regions beyond its
area of deployment, which it could not otherwise reach with current capabilities. In addition to
their utility for intelligence and monitoring activities, cyber operations provide the ability to
remotely shut down the networks of opposing actors, allowing for a significant advantage
to a mission seeking to disrupt the activities of those threatening a peace process.
Cyber attacks are much less destructive so theyre better for a countrys stability.
College, 2013. Web. 01 Dec. 2014.
To date there is no public record of cyber operations being used by a UN peace operation. The
United States has stated that it used cyber operations successfully in
Afghanistan. 51 However, given the dual nature of the U.S. presence in the country and the
double-hatted command of the troops involved, it is not possible to determine whether the cyber
operations were conducted under the auspices of the UN-mandated, NATO led International
Security Assistance Force or the independent U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom. Cyber attacks
to disrupt or disable the Libyan air defense networks prior to strikes by coalition aircraft
were also contemplated by the United States in that UN-mandated operation, but the idea
was discarded in the early stages of operational planning and conventional strikes were
ultimately used to achieve the same results.52 For a peace operation constrained in its use
of armed force and likely to be involved in a subsequent transition to reconstruction and
development efforts, the ability tomerely turn off a network rather than destroying it
means that cyber operations will prove a useful tool in the toolbox of peace operations.
UN Peacekeepers could help regulate cyberwar between countries

Watts, Susan. "Call for Cyberwar 'peacekeepers' Force." BBC News. BBC, 26 Jan. 2012. Web.
02 Dec. 2014. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/9687338.stm>.
"We've seen cyber incidents between Russia and Georgia, and that's ongoing. We've seen
incidents between Pakistan and India and that's ongoing. We've seen stuff between China and
India... between Israel and other Middle Eastern states. The UN needs to figure out how they
can deploy peace keepers in the digital borders of a nation, virtual peacekeepers that would
protect the peace."
The UN is lagging behind and could be benefitted through the use of cyberspace.
Karlsrud, John. "Peacekeeping 4.0: Harnessing the Potential of Big Data, Social Media, and
Cyber-technology." Academia.edu. Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs, 12 Oct. 2013. Web. 02 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.academia.edu/5652020/Peacekeeping_4.0_Harnessing_the_Potential
_of_Big_Data_Social_Media_and_Cyber-technology>.
Since the Cold War, peacekeeping has evolved from first- generation peacekeeping that
focused on monitoring peace agreements, to third-generation multidimensional
peacekeeping operations tasked with rebuilding states and their institutions during and
after conflict. However, peacekeeping today is lagging behind the changes marking our
time. Big Data, including social media, and the many actors in the field may provide
peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations with information and tools to enable them to
respond better, faster and more effectively, saving lives and building states. These tools are
already well known in the areas of humanitarian action, social activism, and development.
Also the United Nations, through the Global Pulse initiative, has begun to discover the
potential of Big Data for Development , which may in time help prevent violent conflict.
However, less has been done in the area of peacekeeping. UN member states should push for
change so that the world organization and other multilateral actors can get their act together,
mounting a fourth generation of peacekeeping operations that can utilize the potentials of Big
Data, social media and modern technology Peacekeeping 4.0.
Block Cards
A2: Hypocritical
UN CHARTER ALREADY ALLOWS FOR "OFFENSIVE" FORCE IN
PEACEKEEPING-Blyth '13
[Fiona; Research Assistant at the International Peace Institute; Too Risk-Averse, UN
Peacekeepers in the DRC Get New Mandate and More Challenges; IPI Global
Observatory; 10 April 2013; retrieved 12 December 2014]
The announcement of the intervention brigade in the DRC in Resolution 2098 was
framed as the frst ever offensive combat force; however, offensive operations
are already authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII
mandates typically permit the use of force beyond self-defense to ensure
the freedom of movement of the mission, protect civilians, and for the
protection of UN personnel and property. Previous feld commanders have
interpreted their mandates as such to allow UN forces to actively pursue rebel
groups and to preempt and disrupt rebel movement ahead of time. Examples of this
include the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (UNSTAMIH) and the United Nations Mission in Somalia
II (UNISOM II).
A2: UN Wrong Actor for Interventions

Answer: Because the UN is not a nation, it lacks biases and special interests that would limit its
success in bringing about peace through force.
A third party neutral actor is necessary to reinforce cooperative action in bridging

peace.
Gerardo L. Munck and Chetan Kumar. Civil Conflicts and the Conditions for Successful
International Intervention: A Comparative Study of Cambodia and El Salvador. Cambridge
University Press, April 1995. < http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097404>
In other words, a mutually harmful military confrontation always remains on the
cards. Thus, while a stalemated military conflict, by embodying a lose-lose situation,
represents a necessary condition for the beginning of negotiations, it does not in
itself represent a sufficient condition. For it does not guarantee an equilibrium that
could foster a stable peace process. In this situation it is possible that a third, or
bridging, domestic actor may provide the necessary assurances that will reinforce
the cooperative option. In the bargaining process between authoritarian rulers and the societal
opposition, such a role was played by King Juan Carlos I in the Spanish
democratic transition and President Karamanlis in the Greek transition. The problem
remains that in most cases such actors are simply not to be found. But, in those cases, as
Laurence Whitehead writes, In the absence of adequate internal bridging
institutions or actors, there are international agencies, such as the UN, the OAS, the
European Community and the Contadora Group, which could act as a "functional equivalent"
for the missing domestic actor.
Analysis: This response highlights the differences between the UN and nations in their ability to
intervene militarily to bring about peace. This piece of evidence somewhat creates a hierarchy of
ideal interveners, with local actors being preferred but rare, then the United Nations, and then
any more self-interested national actor. Debaters should be able to expand upon why the UNs
ability to bridge conflict as a peaceful third party makes it the best actor to intervene.
Answer: Humanitarian intervention is often not directly related to national interest, so states will
not want to embroil themselves in the conflict.
Because of the American political system and current United States global military
hegemony, interventions by states to stop genocide or solve humanitarian crises are
unlikely.
Kaufmann, Chaim. See No Evil: Why America Doesn't Stop Genocide. Foreign
Affairs, July/August 2002. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58061/chaimkaufmann/
see-no-evil-why-america-doesn-t-stop-genocide>
The causal chain, though frustrating, is reasonably straightforward. The rest of the
world does not act because the United States does not. The United States does not act, in
turn, because public support for humanitarian intervention is diffuse and rarely mobilized.
Absent clear demonstrations that the public supports intervention, the military is
unwilling. Partly because of the military's position, the political right is opposed. Because
the political right is opposed, presidents are cautious and believe that pushing for action
cannot benefit them politically but can only cost them. Because presidents do not favor
humanitarian action, finally, career foreign policy and national security officials learn that
strong advocacy of it is both unlikely to succeed and bad for their job prospects. The result
is that humanitarian disasters have a hard time even getting on an administration's agenda,
let alone generating momentum for action.
When nations will not take action, relatively small forces of UN peacekeepers with
the use of force could be incredibly successful.
Blair, David. To prevent another Rwanda, all it takes is a few well-trained troops. The
Telegraph, April 3 2014.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/rwanda/1074
2690/To-prevent-another-Rwanda-all-it-takes-is-a-few-well-trained-troops.html>
What followed is best conveyed in the terse words of General Romo Dallaire, then
commander of a United Nations peacekeeping force in Rwanda. In just 100 days, over 800,000
innocent Rwandan men, women and children were brutally murdered while the developed
world, impassive and apparently unperturbed, sat back and watched the unfolding
apocalypse, he wrote. Gen Dallaires searing memoir of those 100 blood-soaked days, Shake
Hands with the Devil, contains a lesson of eternal relevance. This distinguished Canadian soldier
offers his professional assessment that a mere 4,000 trained troops, entrusted with a
mandate allowing the use of force to protect civilians, could have stopped the genocide in its
tracks. For want of a handful of soldiers, 800,000 people died. Why would such a modest force
have been enough? The answer is twofold. First, Rwanda has no vast or uninhabited tracts of
territory for killers to find refuge. Instead, the densely populated country is only slightly
bigger than Wales; for good measure, Rwanda also possesses a good network of tarred roads.
Second, the Interahamwe militiamen whose hands were steeped in blood the name
means those who kill together often carried out their massacres armed with nothing
more advanced than machetes. They could not have resisted proper soldiers, able and
willing to stop mass murder by using force. How many encounters with, say, a battalion of US
or British infantry would these thugs have been able to withstand?
Analysis: This is a relatively intuitive response that will be easy to make clear to judges of any
level of debate experience. The lack of political will to get involved in other countries problems
is an easy concept to understand, so debaters can couple that idea with analysis from an expert
from the Rwandan military saying that just a few thousand soldiers with offensive capabilities
could have stopped the Rwandan Genocide. Then, the idea that only a UN peacekeeping force
with offensive capabilities can stop genocides is set up, with evidence to back it up.
A2 - Offensive Operations undermines UN impartiality

Answer: Trying to remain impartial and achieve negotiations just strengthens insurgency groups.
Trying to achieve negotiations is a bad goal; it provides legitimacy to insurgent

groups, and may motivate other insurgencies.
Byman, Daniel. Talking with Insurgents: A Guide for the Perplexed. Brookings
Institute. April 2009. Web. 3 Dec 2014.
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2009/3/04%20engagin
g%20insurgents%20byman/04_engaging_insurgents_byman.pdf>
The most commonly cited objection to talks with insurgents is that talking actually
formally recognizes the insurgency, and may lead to the misconception that there are
rewards for using violent methods. Many insurgents crave legitimacy, and even if talks
involve no concessions on the part of a government, recognizing insurgents as worthy
interlocutors can be seen as a victory by potential followers and other states. Other
insurgents and would-be insurgents may believe that continued or even increased violence
may lead to eventual recognition. Paying the price of recognition might be worthwhile if
there was a guarantee of success in the end. Alas, most talks are likely to end in failure, or
at least the initial rounds do. The conditions for ending long-standing conflicts are often
difficult or impossible to meet, and terrorism in particular needs only a small group of
people to continue. Putting a governments credibility on the line, both at home and overseas, is
thus risky while those advocating talks on both the government and insurgent side risk looking
foolish.
Keeping the peace by trying to achieve negotiations gives insurgencies the ability
to regroup, and may give them access to political power.
Some groups may enter talks and even proclaim a ceasefire with no intention of
permanently renouncing violence. Because insurgent groups often win by
demonstrating their staying power, simply buying time in the face of an aggressive
government counterinsurgency campaign can be immensely valuable to them. The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam repeatedly used ceasefires to rearm and regroup for the
next offensive in northern Sri Lanka. The entry of insurgents into talks can also transform
the political scene. If insurgents are allowed to participate in politics, they will be able to
challenge moderate but weak political leaders and thus may radicalize peaceful opposition
or even take control of the government. In Lebanon today, Hizballahs successful entry into
politics has not led it completely away from anti-Israeli violence. Its political successes,
however, have given veto power over Lebanese government decisions and control over such
key facilities as the Beirut airport. Moreover, they can use their peaceful political
organizations to feed money and recruits into their radical wing, a process that can prove
particularly devastating should the group go underground again.
Even successful negotiations of peace often fail to prevent the most radical elements
of insurgencies.
Even success, when it comes, often is incremental rather than complete. Success is a
challenge that increases the political price of talks. Some groups may accept a ceasefire or
other conditions for talks, but engage in activities that suggest a change of heart remains
far off. Hamas has repeatedly declared ceasefires. Some it has broken, and others were broken
by Palestinian groups that Hamas claimed it did not control. Government efforts to split a
movement and wean the moderates away
sometimes succeed, but enough hardcore members remain that at least some
violence will continue, and there may be a shift to more terrorism. Many members of
M-19 in Columbia turned away from bloodshed, but a violent fringe remained.8
This partial success, while far from ideal, can still reduce the scale of violence and make it easier
to gather intelligence on the perpetrators. Nevertheless, while insurgency presents more of a
political threat than terrorism, many citizens find the possibility of terrorism in previously safe
cities more daunting than the reality of a bloodier guerrilla war near a remote border or faraway
province. An engaged movement itself may reject violence, but new groups may form from
rejectionist remnants. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, the dominant fighting
organization when the insurgency in Kashmir first broke out, has been willing to embrace
peaceful methods over time. More radical groups, mostly Islamists who usually worked
with Pakistan, rejected peaceful methods, and so the fighting continues. Such new players
may actually increase their use of violence in order to derail promising peace talks.
Answer: Even if achieving political talks is the goal, offensive operations do it better because it
weakens insurgent groups, forcing them into talks.
For decades prior to offensive operations, the UN failed to resolve the conflict.
Vogel, Christopher. Congo: Why UN peacekeepers have a credibility problem. The
Guardian. 30 Aug 2013. Web. 7 Dec 2014.
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/30/congo-un-peacekeepersproblem>.
After 14 years, with a budget of $1.5bn a year, and employing 20,000 uniformed staff, the
UN peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the
largest mission in the organisation's history. Yet the force, currently known as Monusco, is
struggling for credibility. On Twitter, critics have given it the hashtag
#MONUSELESS. Peacekeepers have been blamed for standing by when rebels from the
allegedly Rwanda-backed March 23 movement (M23) conquered the city of Goma for 10
days last November. It has also been accused of blurring the lines
between military and humanitarian activity, and for having an appalling record in
protecting the civilian population one of its two major aims. The second is to help
restoring state authority, which requires engaging with politicians and public servants
with sometimes dubious motives and propping up an army notorious for human rights
abuses.
UN offensive operations in the DRC shows that offensive operations, can force peace
talks by weakening insurgencies.
Jones, Pete. U.N. envoy says military success an opportunity for Congo talks. Reuters. 2 Sept
2013. Web. 4 Dec 2014. < http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/02/uscongo-democraticenvoy-idUSBRE9810MB20130902>.
(Reuters) - The U.N. special envoy for Africa's Great Lakes region said on Monday
recent military successes by Congo's army against eastern rebels should be used to
relaunch peace talks. Democratic Republic of Congo's army drove M23 rebels from
positions overlooking the eastern city of Goma on Friday, scoring its biggest victory since
the uprising began 18 months ago. "When there is a military victory like this, it is a chance
to advance with a political solution, and that is better for a durable peace," said envoy Mary
Robinson, a former Irish prime minister, without going into further details. The military
breakthrough came after a new U.N. intervention brigade, with a tough mandate to crush
armed groups, entered combat for the first time. U.N. artillery and helicopters pounded
M23 positions in Kabati, 11 km north of Goma, until rebels withdrew.
Analysis: The argument here is that trying to achieve things like peace and negotiations wont be
effective because they just allow insurgent groups to become more powerful. This functions as a
turn on the argument, and it shows that its necessary in some instances to engage in offensive
operations to substantially weaken insurgent groups. This especially important in noting that
many of the conflicts that the UN engages in peacekeeping operations in are conflicts where
there are multiple parties that have the ability to continue conflict. The last evidence gives you a
different option that lets you argue instead that the affirmative is correct, that negotiations are a
good impacts, but that the most effective way to achieve them is through offensive operations.
You can argue that the Congo rapidly turned its situation around, while most other peacekeeping
missions have been going on for years without significant progress.
A2 Peacekeeping missions are fiscally irresponsible

Answer: Military missions will always be expensive, but that is simply the cost of protecting
human rights. UN Peacekeeping is less expensive than comparative military operations. Most
importantly, issues of human rights should be prioritized over monetary concerns.
UN Peacekeeping is fiscally negligible compared to the worlds military

expenditures
Financing Peacekeeping. The United Nations Peacekeeping. Web. Accessed 4
December 2014. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml
The approved budget for UN Peacekeeping operations for the fiscal year 1 July
2014-30 June 2015 is about $7.06 billion [A/C.5/68/26 PDF Document]. By way of
comparison, this is less than half of one per cent of world military expenditures
(estimated at $1,747 billion in 2013).
Offensive/ preventative missions are integral to the responsibility to protect

Bellamy, Alex J. Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. Global
Governance. 2008. Web. Accessed 4 Dec. 2014.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800699
According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS), the Responsibility to Protect concept comprises three responsibilities
relating to deadly conflict and other human-made catastrophes: to prevent, to react, and to
rebuild.1 The responsibility to react has received significant political and scholarly
attention and has dominated debates about the adoption of the responsibility-to-protect
principle by the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World
Summit.2 Likewise, the responsibility to rebuild has been accompanied by renewed interest in
questions of justice after war (the so-called jus post bellum) and was institutionalized by the
World Summit through the creation of the UN's Peace building
Commission. Despite being described as the "single most important dimension of the
responsibility to protect," the responsibility to prevent has been relatively neglected.3 In the
World Summit's Outcome Document, the UN's commitment to conflict prevention was kept
separate from its commitment to the Responsibility to
Protect, and states committed only to help establish an "early warning" capability for the UN and
to support the secretary-general's Special Advisor on the Prevention of
Genocide.4 The call of the ICISS for measures to centralize preventive efforts, tackle the root
causes of conflict, and enhance direct prevention capabilities was over looked in favor of this
focus on early warning.
Answer: The UN is the best agency to intervene because they handle finances and logistics
better than other nations or multilateral coalitions that typically take unilateral action.
The UN handles money as well as or better than other international actors

Dobbins, James. A Comparative Evaluation of United Nations Peacekeeping. The
RAND Corporation. June 2007. Web. Accessed 2 December 2014.
http://www.prgs.edu/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT284.pdf
The UN is a comparatively efficient and cost effective force provider. In its specialized
agencies, it possesses a broad panoply of civil as well as military capabilities needed for to
nation-building. All UN-led operations, of which up to two dozen are routinely underway at
any one time, are planned, controlled, and sustained by a few hundred military and civilian
staffers at UN headquarters in New York. Most UN troops come from Third World countries
whose costs per deployed soldier are a small fraction of any Western army. As of this
writing, the United Nation deploys over 80,000 soldiers and police in nineteen different countries
for a cost of some $5 billion per year. This makes the United Nations the second largest
provider of expeditionary forces in the world, after the United States but ahead of NATO,
the EU or the AU. The UN spends 3 in one year on all nineteen of these missions about what it
costs the United States for one months operation in Iraq.
In other international coalitions or non-UN peacebuilding efforts, member states are

not required to contribute money, but UN members are held to contribution
requirements, indicating that the UN has steadier means of obtaining funding
Gaibulloev, Khusrav, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu. Demands for UN and NonUN Peacekeeping: Nonvoluntary versus Voluntary Contributions to a Public
Good. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Dec. 2009. Web. Accessed 3
December 2014. http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20684619?
uid=2&uid=4&sid=211047417
13901
The presence of these two types of missions after 1993 raises some interesting demand issues
because of the different ways that missions are supported. UN peace keeping is primarily
financed by assessments, imposed by the United Nations on its member nations based on
income, status, and other considerations. Although nations have some discretion as to when
they pay their assessments, there is little overall volition. In contrast, nations' contributions
to non-UN peacekeeping operations are essentially voluntary. Even for NATO-led
peacekeeping, allies can decide not to participate in an "out-of-area" mission, since votes
must be unanimous. A NATO ally can withhold its veto in return for not having to send
troops on an operation. Both kinds of peacekeeping missions provide donor-specific (e.g.,
stable trade flows and protection to foreign direct investment [FDI]) and global purely public
benefits (e.g., world stability) in different proportions. Peacekeeping missions with a greater
share of donor specific benefits are more apt to rely on voluntary contributions, while those
missions with a greater share of global public benefits are more apt to rely on mandated
(assessed) contributions. This suggests that non-UN peacekeeping operations are apt to
provide more contributor-specific benefits than UN peacekeeping operations. Moreover,
voluntary non-UN peacekeeping can support more complex and expensive actions, because the
contributing nations are more highly motivated to participate.
A2 Harms to Humanitarian Aid

Response: The argument is non-unique to offensive operations, as even defensive peacekeepers
and humanitarian workers have conflicts and blurring of lines.
A study from before the first offensive peacekeeping operation ever came to be finds
a similar blurring of lines between civilian and military relief providers, but urges
that more extensive training can help solve the problem.
Franke, Volker. THE PEACEBUILDING DILEMMA: CIVIL-MILITARY
COOPERATION IN STABILITY OPERATIONS. George Mason University,
International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 11, Number 2, Autumn/Winter
2006. <https://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf>
Effective CIMIC in stability operations must take into account the political context of the
mission and aim at creating acceptable, legitimate, representative, just, and stable institutions that
bring about and can sustain a peaceful political transition.
Contemporary peacebuilding is inherently political, often rendering a clear demarcation
between humanitarian and political activities neither possible nor fruitful. While
separating military and civilian elements in stability operations may be impossible, careful
training sensitizing civilian and military relief providers to the cultural, organizational,
operational, and normative differences will be an important step in enhancing interagency
coordination to achieve the shared mission objectives that inform peacebuilding and postconflict reconstruction.
In a post-9/11 world, military and humanitarian efforts have begun to blend

together, a trend that is not affected by UN offensive operations.
Ferreiro, Marcos. Blurring of Lines in Complex Emergencies: Consequences for the
Humanitarian Community. The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, December
24 2012. http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1625
Militant movements have good reasons to be suspicious of Western humanitarian
agencies, even if they may be wrong on their allegations. USAID administrator Rajiv
Shah has recently reaffirmed the strong links between aid and national security:
[Former Defense] Secretary Gates was right when he said development is a lot cheaper
than sending soldiers,[4] and official reports to the US Congress bluntly include USAID
expenses in Iraq and Afghanistan on the costs of the Global War on
Terror.[5]The question is, what is the price of linking aid efforts with military goals?
This is not a new concern, nor are Shahs declarations especially striking. Since the wave of
humanitarian interventions in the 90s and ever more so since 9/11, roles between
humanitarian workers and other actors have become increasingly blurred. In the last
decade, we have heard NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen suggesting that NGOs
should be the soft power component to military strategy in Afghanistan, and describing this
country as the prototype for engagement between NATO and NGOs;[6] we have also heard
then-U.S. Special Representative for
Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, remarking the importance of aid organizations on intelligence
gathering;[7] and, at the beginning of the Afghan campaign, then-US
Secretary of State Colin Powell referring to INGOs as force multipliers and an important part
of our combat team.[8] In sum, the military seems to be increasingly aiming to co-opt the
NGO community under a discourse based on the need to break cultural barriers and
misunderstandings, and the assumption of sharing common goals. Military relief operations
within counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies and the mushrooming of militarized contractors

have contributed to greater confusion.
Analysis: This argument essentially says that regardless of whether or not peacekeepers have
offensive operation capabilities, there will be a struggle and an unclear distinction between UN
workers keeping the peace and UN workers providing aid to civilians. Debaters can set up this
response in crossfire by asking why these harms would only exist if peacekeepers had the power
to fire when not just in self-defense, or whether general anger at peacekeepers and confusion
about their role in comparison to humanitarian workers has existed since the beginning of the
organization.
Response: Security provided by actors like UN Peacekeepers are necessary for humanitarian aid
to even be successful in the first place.
Development cannot occur and aid cannot be distributed without stability.

Bouchat, Clarence. Security And Stability In Africa: A Development Approach.
Strategic Studies Institute, January 2010.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub964.pdf
However, security and stability also require internal rule of law, order, and justice to form
a safe, secure, and stable environment in which to gain the local populaces support.44
From the 19th century Philippines to modern Afghanistan U.S. military operations show that
state security and internal stability factors must be addressed to establish the prerequisites
for building viable nations.45 Simply stated, instability, violence, and war are major
constraints to economic development anywhere in the world, as is especially demonstrated in
Sub-Saharan Africa.46 In part, this is because
secure and stable conditions lay the foundation to sustain the good governance and
economic development that make a state viable.47 The commander of the U.S. Armys
Combined Arms Center (CAC) calls such actions in places like Sub-Saharan Africa preemptive
stability operations, attaining security and stability before, and not after, violence starts.48 The
foundational need for stability and security is equally recognized by Africans, as when leaders of
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) realized that a combination of
poverty and bad governance is no doubt a great part of the causes of the conflicts in West
Africa. Accordingly, there can be no economic advancement without a peaceful, stable and
secure environment.
Actors like the UN are uniquely positioned to provide this stability.

Taylor, Margaret. Civilian-Military Cooperation in Achieving Aid Effectiveness:
Lessons From Recent Stabilization Contexts. Council on Foreign Relations,
2009. <cfr.org/content/publications/.../09_development_aid_taylor.pdf>
Security is currently the major issue inhibiting the implementation of aid projects in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Insurgents, terrorists and other armed groups will continue to be a reality
in fragile states and regions for donors looking to provide assistance. In very insecure
environments, a foreign military presence may be indispensable. UN-led and other peacekeeping missions staffed by military contingents from UN member nations will continue to
be called upon to provide breathing space for civilian aid efforts. To be successful,
peacekeeping missions need adequate resources and achievable mandates. Donors must bear
in mind that in some circumstances, a peacekeeping mission may be the easiest political
solution but not the most practical one, particularly if the mission is not given the resources and
authority to actually succeed, or if there is no peace to keep.
Analysis: This response is similar to an argument made on many topics, the idea that stability is
a prerequisite to successful aid or development. However, debaters arguing this topic to a lay
audience should be sure to remember that not all judges are familiar with this theory, so they
should give it the time and evidence it deserves to make it clear. However, once debaters have
established that the humanitarian aid so emphasized by the Con in this argument is null and void
without stability, something that can best be brought by offensive UN peacekeeper operations,
they can successfully turn this argument to the Pro.
Answer: More human rights abuses would be prevented in the Pro world.
The genocide in Bosnia killed almost 100,000 people; a human rights abuse
singlehandedly outweighs any harm from the Con side.
Past Genocides and Mass Atrocities. <http://endgenocide.org/learn/past-genocides/>
In 1992, the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) also declared independence and the
region quickly became the central theater of fighting between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks
(Bosnian Muslims). During the wars in the former Yugoslavia, all belligerents committed
abuses against the civilians. Soldiers and paramilitaries used rape, torture, forcible
displacement, and summary executions to ethnically cleanse areas under their control.
The actions of Serbian units, including the Bosnian Serb army and paramilitaries, were
particularly notorious for committing atrocities, including the massacres at Foca, Tuzla,
Visegrad, and Srebrenica. At Srebrenica, Bosnian Serb forces under General Radko Mladic
overran a U.N. safe-area and executed at least 7,500 Bosniak men and boys who were sheltering
with Dutch peacekeeping troops. Due to the nature of the attacks on civilians during the Bosnian
and Croatian wars, the United Nations created the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
in 1993. This tribunal is tasked with prosecuting offenders who contributed to the deaths of at
least 96,000 people.
The genocide in Rwanda, killing nearly one million, also outweighs any harms from
peacekeeper human rights abuse.
Past Genocides and Mass Atrocities. <http://endgenocide.org/learn/past-genocides/>
Civil war broke out in Rwanda in 1990, further exacerbating tensions between the Tutsi
minority and Hutu majority. Although a peace agreement was reached in 1992, political
negotiations continued. In 1994, as he returned from the latest round of talks in neighboring
Tanzania, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down
outside of the countrys capital, Kigali. Habyarimanas death provided the spark for an organized
campaign of violence against Tutsi and moderate
Hutu civilians across the country. Despite the efforts of United Nations peacekeepers, extremist
Hutu groups killed between 800,000 and 1 million people across the country in only 100
days. In 1994, the United Nations created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), dedicated to bringing those responsible for the genocide to justice. While slow-moving,
the ICTR has determined that the widespread rapes committed during the Rwandan genocide
may also be considered an act of torture and Genocide on their own.
The UN itself admits that it failed to prevent these genocides due to weak mandates.
Winfield, Nicole. UN Failed Rwanda. Global Policy Forum, December 16 1999.
<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/201/39240.html>
The independent report, commissioned by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, showed a UN
peacekeeping mission in Rwanda doomed from the start by an insufficient mandate and
later destroyed by the Security Council's refusal to strengthen it once the killings began. And it
showed UN officials - Annan and then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali among them -
unable or unwilling to act on information from the field that a massive slaughter was
occurring and that they needed to do something to stop it. Coupled with another selfcritical analysis of the UN role in the fall of Srebrenica during the Bosnian war, the report
is sure to fuel the growing international debate about the imperative of the United Nations
and its member governments to stop grave violations of human rights. In a statement, Annan
acknowledged the systematic failure of the United Nations and expressed his "deep remorse" on
behalf of the organization. Annan, who was head of UN peacekeeping operations during the
genocide, commissioned the report to find out the truth about the UN role in the massacre and to
learn from the mistakes. He appointed a three-man team to conduct the 6-month-long analysis,
and turned over UN files, cables and archives as well as UN personnel for testimony.
Analysis: Pro teams should do basic comparative analysis between the human rights abuses
perpetrated by peacekeepers and the human rights abuses that could have been stopped by
peacekeepers if they had a mandate for an offensive operation. This type of response can be set
up in crossfire by asking the Con team if peacekeepers have ever committed a genocide, or if
peacekeepers have ever killed 1.1m people. However, debaters should be wary of minimizing the
harms of peacekeepers. Debaters should instead say that while the ideal is to have no human
rights abuses, neither team can prevent all human rights abuse. However, one team can prevent
the deaths of millions, where the deaths and abuses preventable by the other team are
significantly more minor.
Response: If peacekeepers are committing human rights abuses in the status quo, they do not
need an offensive mandate to commit them and the argument is non-unique.
The UN offensive peacekeeping mission in Congo in 2009, before there was any
offensive operation, still committed abuse.
Charbonneau, Louis. Criticized U.N.-backed Congo operation to shut down. Reuters.
Dec 16, 2009. Web. Accessed 5 December 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/16/uscongo-democratic unidUSTRE5BF4UH20091216
A U.N.-backed military operation in eastern Congo in which government soldiers are
accused of massacring hundreds of civilians will end this month, the top U.N. official in
Congo said on Wednesday. "Kimia II will be completed on December 31,"
U.N. special envoy to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Alan Doss, told the
Security Council during a meeting on the U.N. peacekeeping mission there, known as
MONUC. However, he made clear to reporters that MONUC was keeping open the option of
continuing to engage in future "targeted operations" with the Congolese army against rebel
enclaves. The United Nations has backed Congolese government forces in a nine-month
operation called Kimia II against Rwandan Hutu rebels in Congo's east. The United
Nations says it bolstered stability by supporting the operation but aid agencies had argued
against U.N. support due to heavy civilian casualties. Doss said the operation's main goal -to disperse the rebels and weaken their ability to exploit Congo's mineral wealth -- "has
been largely achieved although we do recognize that there have been very serious
humanitarian consequences."
Analysis: This response is relatively simple as well. Any piece of evidence read by your
opponents that peacekeepers are committing abuse can be turned against them, because that
abuse was committed without an offensive mandate. Peacekeepers do not have a mandate to kill
civilians in either world, Pro or Con, but they seem to still be doing so. Debaters should argue
that this issue is not one that either side can prevent, so it cannot be an offensive argument for the
Con.
A2 - Military intervention will result in backlash

Answer: Foreign occupation is not the main cause of blowback.
Issues such as economic inequality and lack of economic opportunity are major
factors in terrorism.
Ehrlich, Paul R. and Liu, Jianguo. Some Roots of Terrorism. Stanford. Nov 2002. Web. 3 Dec
2014. <http://web.stanford.edu/group/CCB/Pubs/paulpdfs/2002_Liu_somerootsofterrori
sm.pdf>.
Although various hypotheses about the causes of terrorism have been proposed, a number
of important factors have been largely ignored. Geopolitics, especially richworld attempts to
control oil, help incite terrorist attacks on the rich by people from developing countries. But
demographic and socioeconomic factors, especially poverty, inequality and large numbers
of young men facing dim economic prospects, also are likely contributors to such terrorism.
We show that those factors will not ameliorate soon without determined effort. Developed
nations, particularly the United States, could help reduce terrorism by controlling overconsumption and increasing carefully targeted aid to developing nations.
Terrorism has multiple causes; offensive operations, even if perceived as occupation,

wont cause terrorism because its not the root cause.
Taspnar, mer. Fighting Radicalism, not Terrorism: Root Causes of an International
Actor Redefined. Brookings Institution. 2009. Web. 3 Dec 2014.
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2009/9/summer%20fall
%20radicalism%20taspinar/summer_fall_radicalism_taspinar.pdf>.
Terrorism has multiple causes. Attempts to create a single typology of terrorism or generic
profiles for terrorists are often misleading. An ideal breeding ground for recruitment
emerges when various social, cultural, economic, political, and psychological factors come
together. And even when such negative dynamics converge, different terrorist networks
have different political objectives. Despite such complexities and diversity, all terrorist groups
share one common objective: the willingness to kill or harm civilians for their cause. This is why
terrorism is ultimately a major security concern. Therefore, there is no point in denying that
counter-terrorism is primarily about securing the homeland and protecting civilians with utmost
vigilance in safety measures, intelligence gathering, law enforcement, interagency coordination,
and, when necessary, the use of force.
Answer: The types of operations that UN peacekeepers enter into means that terrorism isnt
likely.
UN peacekeepers only enter operations with consent, meaning that the perception of
occupation is unlikely.
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines. United Nations.
2008. Web. 3 March 2014.
<http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf>.
Consent of the parties. United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed with the
consent of the main parties to the conflict.20 This requires a commitment by the
parties to a political process and their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation mandated to
support that process. The consent of the main parties provides a United Nations
peacekeeping operation with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to
carry out its mandated tasks. In the absence of such consent, a United Nations peacekeeping
operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action,
and away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace. In the implementation of its mandate, a
United Nations peacekeeping operation must work continuously to ensure that it does not
lose the consent of the main parties, while ensuring that the peace process moves forward. This
requires that all peacekeeping personnel have a thorough understanding of the history and
prevailing customs and culture in the mission area, as well as the capacity to assess the evolving
interests and motivation of the parties.
Answer: The UN is unlikely to perceived as a occupying force.
The UN is unlikely to be seen as an occupying force; its globally respected.

UN Retains Strong Global Image. Pew Research.17 Sept 2013. Web. 3 Nov 2014.
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/17/united-nations-retains-strong-globalimage/>.
As the United Nations opens its 68th General Assembly session, publics around the world
continue to have a positive impression of the international organization. Clear majorities in
22 of the 39 countries surveyed say they have a favorable view of the UN, including thumbsup from Security Council permanent members Britain, France and the U.S. Ratings for the UN
are on balance favorable in Russia. But the Chinese are divided in their opinion. However, views
trend negatively in key Middle Eastern publics, including Israel, the Palestinian territories,
Jordan and Turkey. Overall, a median of 58% across the 39 countries surveyed express
favorable views of the UN, with just 27% holding an unfavorable opinion. South Koreans
express the highest support (84%). Ban Ki-moon, who heads the UN, is South Korean.
Meanwhile, roughly eight-in-ten Indonesians and Filipinos approve of the international body.
Support is also high in Africa, and most of Europe and Latin America. Nearly six-in-ten
Americans have a favorable opinion of the UN, headquartered in New York City, and support is
up since the 2008 election of Barack Obama. However, there is a partisan divide in views of the
multilateral institution, with stronger support from Democrats and independents than from
Republicans. Across many of the countries surveyed, young people are more positive toward
the international body than older people. And in roughly half of the countries, those with a
college degree or higher incomes tend to have a rosier view of the UN.
Analysis: The arguments here take out the causal assumptions that the negative arguments rest
on. It shows that terrorism does not have a simple root cause, and that the UN is not seen as an
occupier like the US because it is multilateral. The way to use this argument in round is to force
your opponent to beat back all four of your warrants, because each of them takes out an
important link. This puts a high amount of pressure on them to spend a lot of time defending
their argument at the cost of defending other arguments.
A2: Degradation of Vital UN Principles

Response: The argument is nonunique, as impartial and less consent-based
peacekeeping exists even outside of offensive operations.
Impartial peacekeeping, and drifting towards greater offensive

capabilities, is not a new phenomenon that will destroy United
Nations credibility.
Whalan, Jeni. Partial Peace: The Politics of Taking Sides in UN Peacekeeping.
International Studies Association Annual Convention, March 2014.
<https://www.academia.edu/6474185/Partial_Peace_The_Politics_of_Taking_Si
d
es_in_UN_Peacekeeping>
The ideal of impartial peacekeepersby which I mean the unbiased,
evenhanded treatment of conflict parties, without advancing the interests of
one party against those of anotheris rarely found in reality. Instead,
since the first articulation of a peacekeeping doctrine in 1958, the
practice of impartiality has been accompanied by near-continuous
debate about what impartiality really means, what it should mean,
and whether peacekeeping has crossed its own definitional line. In
1958, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld summarized the experiences
of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), a unique experiment by the
United Nations in a type of operation which previously it had not been called
upon to conduct: peacekeeping. Hammarskjlds intent was to identify the
principles and conclusions which emerge from the operation in order to
provide guidance for future peacekeeping practice. From this report emerged
the three principles that have been used to defne peacekeeping ever since:
the consent of host states, the non-use of force by peacekeepers, and
impartiality. The meaning of impartiality is not clearly articulated by
Hammarskjld, but it can be discerned from two number of key paragraphs.
Even within the DR Congo specifically, peacekeepers have bent

the rules of impartiality and consent.
Gowan, Richard. No Peace to Keep: U.N. Peacekeeping's Year of Living
Dangerously.
World Politics Review, December 17 2013.
<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13449/no-peace-to-keep-unpeacekeepings-year-of-living-dangerously#>
To defenders of these new operational concepts, such complaints seemed
overblown. U.N. forces may have declared their fealty to concepts like
impartiality, but they have always bent the rules. In the DRC in
particular, peacekeepers have used significant force in the past. The
U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) circulated talking
points explaining that the new brigade was a matter of evolution not
revolution, although some big troop contributors like India remained
unhappy. And while the Islamist presence in Mali was a genuine
concern, the French intervention had done enough damage to
hardcore insurgents for the U.N. to begin operations without facing

widespread challenges. One DPKO official was even heard to predict that
Mali would be as relaxed a peacekeeping billet as Cyprus.
Analysis: Debaters should phrase this response as proving that no matter
what the judge believes about impartiality and consent, it is irrelevant
because it will exist in either world. A vote for the Con does not take the UN
in a different direction than it has been going for decades, and debaters
should press their opponents to show what unique line has been crossed with
this newest UN operation that had not been crossed earlier.
Response: Consent from both parties in intervention is not inherently
benefcial to the success of UN operations.
Dependence on host-state consent actually decreased

cooperation in Yugoslavia because the government saw
peacekeepers as an inferior solution to an offensive operation.
Christine Gray. Host-State Consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in
Yugoslavia.
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law. 1996.
<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1379&context=djcil>
Such references to Chapter VII, of course, do not alter the fact that the
presence of the peacekeeping force still depends on host-state
consent. Moreover, efforts to obtain consent, and even references to
Chapter VII, were not enough to ensure cooperation by the parties in
the former Yugoslavia with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),
since the parties saw UNPROFOR as an obstacle in the way of a
favorable military solution rather than as an impartial force. This
failure to ensure cooperation and reach agreement with respect to
the mandate and status of U.N. forces led to the activation of a
Rapid Reaction Force, discussed in Part VI, and ultimately to the
withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia and to the establishment of the
United Nations Confdence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), discussed in Part
VII. As the world community witnessed in the case of the former
Yugoslavia, sometimes the inherent limitations on a peacekeeping
force, including the legal requirement of host-state consent and the
practical requirement of cooperation from all significant parties
involved, are at odds with expectations for what the U.N. force
might achieve. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, well aware of
the resulting political difficulties, reaffirmed the appropriate role of a
peacekeeping force when he welcomed Croatian President Tudjman's
announcement that he would accept the establishment of UNCRO in
Croatia.
Limited intervention by the UN cannot be impartial if it wants

to be successful.
Richard K. Betts. The Delusion of Impartial Intervention. Foreign Affairs.
November/December 1994.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50545/richard-k-betts/the-delusionofmpartial-intervention>
How does this happen? By following a principle that sounds like common
sense: [The idea] that intervention should be both limited and
impartial, because weighing in on one side of a local struggle undermines
the legitimacy and effectiveness of outside involvement. This Olympian
presumption resonates with respect for law and international cooperation. It
has the ring of prudence, fairness, and restraint. It makes sense in oldfashioned U.N. peacekeeping operations, where the outsiders' role
is not to make peace, but to bless and monitor a cease-fire that all
parties have decided to accept. But it becomes a destructive
misconception when carried over to the messier realm of "peace
enforcement," where the belligerents have yet to decide that they
have nothing more to gain by fighting. Limited intervention may end
a war if the intervenor takes sides, tilts the local balance of power,
and helps one of the rivals to win - that is, if it is not impartial.
Impartial intervention may end a war if the outsiders take complete
command of the situation, overawe all the local competitors, and
impose a peace settlement - that is, if it is not limited. Trying to
have it both ways usually blocks peace by doing enough to keep
either belligerent from defeating the other, but not enough to make
them stop trying. And the attempt to have it both ways has brought the
United Nations and the United States - and those whom they sought to help to varying degrees of grief in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.
Analysis: This argument turns the Cons offense by saying that impartiality
and reliance on consent are not benefcial. Debaters can depict these statues
as outdated traditions that do not necessarily apply to the combat of today.
While they might sound like good, lofty goals, Pro teams can argue that they
actually diminish an operations likelihood of succeeding. When making both
this response and the response above, debaters should say the principles of
impartiality and reliance on consent have been waning for decades, but even
if offensive operations stray even more from them, that is nothing but a
beneft.
Answer: The UN is the best equipped international agency to take offensive
actions because it is intrinsically democratic.
Because the UN is multilateral and largely egalitarian they are

the proper international agency to intervene
Dobbins, James. A Comparative Evaluation of United Nations Peacekeeping.
The
RAND Corporation. June 2007. Web. Accessed 2 December 2014.
http://www.prgs.edu/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT284.
pdf Among international organizations, the United Nations has the
most widely accepted legitimacy and the greatest formal authority.
Its actions, by definition, enjoy international sanction. Alone among
organizations, it can compel its member governments to fund such
operations, even requiring contributions from those opposed to the

intervention in question. The United Nations has the most
straightforward decision making apparatus, and the most unified
command and control arrangements. The UN Security Council is
smaller than the equivalent NATO, EU, or AU bodies. It takes all
decisions by qualified majority; only five of its members have the
capacity to block decisions unilaterally. Once the Security Council
determines the purpose of a mission and decides to launch it, further
operational decisions are largely left to the Secretary General and his staff,
at least until the next Security Council review, generally six months hence.
In UN operations, the civilian and military chains of command are
unified and integrated, with unequivocal civilian primacy and a clear
line of authority from the UN Secretary General through his local
civilian representative to the local force commander.
Answer: While the politics within the Security Council may be hard to
navigate, this is easier to deal with than the political turmoil created by
unilateral action
Because member states are obligated to follow the UN Charter,

action through the UN is the most legitimate political option
Gupta, Sanjay. The Doctrine of Pre-Emptive Strike: Application and
Implications during the Administration of President George W. Bush.
International Political Science
Review. Mar. 2008. Web. Accessed 4 December 2014.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445135
Pre-emptive strikes by individual nations or groups of nations
without the authorization of the Security Council are prohibited by
the United Nations. In its preamble, the UN Charter states that the
UN was established "to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war," and its substantive provisions obligate its members
to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means" (Article 2
[3]) and to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations" (Article 2 [4]). In place of the traditional
right of states to use force against another member, the charter creates a
system of collective security in which the Security Council is
authorized to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to "decide what
measures shall be taken ... to maintain international peace and
security" (Article 39). Although the UN Charter seeks to deny the use of
force by states against their adversaries, it does recognize the right of
nations to use force for the purpose of self-defense (Article 51).
Unilateral action is not a preferable mode of offensive

intervention because it is inconsistent with international law
and norms
Reisman, W. Michael. Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World
Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention. The
European Journal of International Law. 2000. Web. Accessed 4 Dec 2014.
http://ejil.org/pdfs/11/1/517.pdf
The professional ambivalence toward unilateral action arises from
the fact that jurists, above all, appreciate that at the heart of
procedural law is the notion that orderly decision, preceded by due
deliberation and followed by authorized and inclusive application, is
vital to minimum order and human dignity. Lawyers know that,
however noble the impulse, action that purports to be in common
interest, but that is taken without formal authority, may have
incalculable public and private costs. Actions inconsistent with the
procedures prescribed for them may erode the authority of the law
and increase the probability of abuse. Hence the laws ceaseless quest
for organization and institutionalization and its discomfort with and inherent
resistance to legally unauthorized actions, no matter how urgent the
circumstance or morally imperative the impulse. Laws insistence on orderly
decision is not a professional pathology or sub-cultural quirk, but central to
the legal enterprise.
Humanitarian Stuff
Action in the DRC forced negotiations
Courtney Brooks, September 6, 2013, Al Jazeera America, UN Tests Combat Brigade in Democratic
Republic of Congo, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/5/un-tests-combatbrigadeindemocraticrepublicofcongo.html DOA: 12-6-14
While the world's attention has been fixed on Syria over the past few weeks, the landscape of diplomacy
quietly but radically evolved amid the dense green hills of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
A flock of attack helicopters descended there on Aug. 28, in a town north of Goma, in the eastern region
of the beleaguered Central African nation. The aircraft were filled with armed United Nations
peacekeepers, along with Congolese military forces. The first-ever U.N. peacekeeping force with an
offensive combat mandate tasked with "neutralizing" and disarming rebel forces in one of the world's
most intractable conflicts was in action. Within two days, the peacekeepers and army had forced rebel
militias threatening Goma to withdraw from the front lines. On Thursday, a rebel group known as M23
agreed to resume peace talks with the Congolese government.
Rebels were committing human rights violations

Courtney Brooks, September 6, 2013, Al Jazeera America, UN Tests Combat Brigade in Democratic Republic of
Congo, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/5/un-tests-combat-brigadeindemocraticrepublicofcongo.html
DOA: 12-6-14
About 800,000 people have reportedly fled their homes in eastern DRC since the M23 captured Goma in November
2012. The U.N. Stabilization Mission in the DRC, known by its French initials, MONUSCO, was criticized for
standing by as the city was overrun. U.N. officials later said the troops lacked the authority to combat the rebel
advance. M23 withdrew under international pressure after briefly holding the city. Since mid-July, de facto truces
between the army and rebels have been repeatedly broken as fighting erupted, with human rights atrocities
accompanying the violence. In July, Human Rights Watch reported that M23 rebels had summarily executed at least
44 people and raped at least 61 women and girls since March.
UN militarism has forced parties to return to the negotiating table

East African, April 26, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UN intervention missions
Unlike typical peacekeepers, the brigade was not only sanctioned to engage in combat but it was also equipped for
war with tanks, night vision goggles, artillery and armoured personnel carriers.
The new combat style has been praised for resolving longstanding security stalemates and protecting civilians in
conflicts. As Jeffrey Laurenti, a UN expert at the Century Foundation argues, it was the frustration with Monusco's
failure to protect civilians and create a conducive environment for lasting peace after being on the ground for nearly
two decades that led to the authorisation of the interventionist brigade by the Security Council. There is every reason
to rejoice at the success of new UN militarism. In its aftermath, the UN combative mission has forced the M23
rebels to return to the negotiation table and resume the previously stalled peace talks with the DRC government in
Kampala. Predictably, within the UN corridors of power, interventionism is the new norm. Speaking in Goma on
September 2 2013, Mary Robinson, Special Envoy of the UN to the Great Lakes Region, said, "The recent military
engagement [in the DRC] did not at all complicate it, it was necessary." In the same vein, the United States
ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, said the brigade was invigorating both the Congolese National Army and
the UN peacekeeping mission. And the US special envoy to the Great Lakes Region, Russ Feingold, echoed Powers'
view, describing the brigade as "a stronger approach that can give peacekeeping operations more strength in the
future and help resolve knotty problems."
Offensive peacekeeping in the Congo forcing the rebels to the table

Dr Robert Besseling, January 1, 2014, Besseling is a Senior Political Adviser to the IHS Country Risk and
Forecasting Sub-Saharan Africa team, Janes Intelligence Review, Elusive riches - Continued threats to the DRC's
minerals trade
The Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) government is likely to sign a conclusive peace agreement with the
defeated M23 rebel group before the end of 2014. Rwandan and Ugandan pressure on the M23 to disarm, as well as
a stronger, United Nations-backed DRC military, will deter the M23 from launching a fresh insurgency. Despite the
demise of the M23, the group's former combatants are likely to join new or existing rebel groups in 2014, posing
increased risks to the region's valuable extractive sector. Rwanda's motivations for seeking an end to the M23's
insurgency in eastern DRC lie in economics. Specifically, President Paul Kagame and senior members of the RDF
are seeking the removal of restrictions on foreign budgetary support imposed by several states including the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which were introduced in 2011 following UN accusations of Rwandan
support for the M23. Moreover, Rwanda is likely to seek a renewed FARDC offensive against the ethnic Hutu armed
group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces dmocratiques de libration du Rwanda:
FDLR), which threatens Rwandan security.
Offensive operations forced the rebels into peace talks

Sudarsan Raghavan, November 2, 2013, Washington Post, Raghavan has been The Post's Kabul bureau chief since
2014. He was previously based in Nairobi and Baghdad for the Post, In Volatile Congo, A New UN Force with
Teeth, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-un-force-withteeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html DOA: 12-5-14
The capture of Goma prompted the U.N. Security Council to approve the intervention brigade this year, giving it a
mandate to neutralize all of Congos militias. The force, made up of troops from South Africa, Malawi and
Tanzania, became operational this summer. In late August, the brigade went into action for the first time, backing
Congolese government forces by firing artillery shells at M23 rebel positions a few miles north of Goma in the town
of Kibati. The fighting drove the rebels back a few miles, preventing them from shelling Goma and convincing them
to enter peace talks in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, in September.
Offensive operations forced rebels to the table

Daniel Donovan, April 11, 2013, Foreign Policy Association, UN Offensive Operation in DRC a long time
coming, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/04/11/un-offensive-operation-in-drc-a-long-time-coming/
The second and maybe most important facet this new force brings to the table is
the threat of interference against the M23. While talks between the DRC
government and M23 began in December, they stalled as of mid-February as
divisions within the rebel ranks forced them to abandon the negotiation table until
they could once again unify. Now talks have again resumed. The rebels have taken
steps to give the impression that they would not back down from a UN force, such
as labelling this move an act of war, as well as spreading anti-U.N. propaganda to
the populace. The bottom line remains that this organized brigade represents a
threat to the rebel position, and one that cannot be ignored. This may force the
hand of M23 leadership to consent to a peace deal before facing the possibility of
fighting enemies on multiple fronts. If this move brings about a peace deal, then it
will have already been successful.
Human rights key to stop global war
Burke-White 4 William W., Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean at
the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge,
"Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation", The Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring, 17
Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, Lexis
For most of the past fifty years, U.S. foreign policymakers have largely viewed the promotion of human rights anti
the protection of national security as in inherent tension. Almost without exception, each administration has treated
the two goals as mutually exclusive: promote human rights at the expense of national security or protect national
security while overlooking international human rights. While U.S. |*)licymakers have been motivated at times by
human rights concerns, such concerns have generally been subordinate to national security. For example, President
Bushs 2(X)2 U.S. National Security Strategy speaks of a commitment to protecting basic human rights. In the
same document, President Bush makes it clear that defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and
fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.1 This subordination of human rights to national
security is both unnecessary and strategically questionable. A more effective U.S. foreign policy would
view human rights and national security as correlated and complementary goals. Better protection of
human rights around the world would make the United States safer and more secure. The United States
needs to restructure its foreign policy accordingly. This Article presents a strategicas opposed to ideological or
normativeargument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign
policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and
their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national
security arc acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United
States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 19dl, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in
Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-G)ld War period indicates that states that systematically abuse
their own citizens human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that
improvements in various states human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign
policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a states
domestic human ri ghts policy appears to be a telling indicator of that states propensity to engage in
international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and
the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U. S.
policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A
strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important
policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as
presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers
states a mean s of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights
records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from
aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it
addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.
Definitions
Principles of Peacekeeping
United Nations. Principles of UN Peacekeeping. 2014.

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml The United
Nations peacekeeping website maintains updates on current United Nations operations
and the organizations overall goals.
Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate UN peacekeeping operations
are not an enforcement tool. However, they may use force at the tactical level, with the
authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate. In
certain volatile situations, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping operations robust
mandates authorizing them to use all necessary means to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the
political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the
national authorities in maintaining law and order. Although on the ground they may sometimes
appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as
envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
Robust
peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization
of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the
conflict.
By
contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may
involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally
prohibited for
Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.
Cyber Attack
cyber attack refers to the use of deliberate actions and operations perhaps over an extended
period of time to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary computer systems or
networks or the information and (or) programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks
Offensive Operations
Combat operations designed primarily to destroy the enemy, Offensive operations may be
undertaken to secure key or decisive terrain, deprive the enemy of resources or decisive terrain,
to deceive or divert the enemy, to develop intelligence, and to hold the enemy in position. (US
Marine Field Manuel
Preemptive Strike
A preemptive strike is a military action which is designed to neutralize a potential threat, or to gain a
distinct advantage against an enemy. The legality of preemptive strikes is questionable, as they are
generally considered offensive actions.
Self-Defense
The act of defending one's person when physically attacked, as by countering blows or
overcoming an assailant

Lay Judge January

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originalbeschreibung:

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Lay Judge January

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Con

Contention 1: Harms Humanitarian Aid

Contention 2: External Military Powers Cannot

Contention 3: Military Intervention Will Result in

Humanitarian workers may provide less information or be less successful in delivering

RISKS HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS IN WAR-TORN REGIONS-Reghavan '13

RISKS HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS ON THE GROUND-Ker '13

RISKS THE MANDATE OF PEACEKEEPERS TO PROTECT CIVILIANS-Ker '13

UN AIR AND HEALTH WORKERS ARE AT RISK WHEN INCREASING

EXPANDING PEACEKEEPING TO OFFENSIVE ACTION RISKS ALL THOSE

USE OF OFFENSIVE PEACEKEEPING RISKS CIVILIANS WORKING ON THE

The DRC force has been accused of murder.

and Matson's treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn[s]: "its

When we calculate the actual losses

External Cant Create Peace

A lack of external involvement directly led to peace and development in Somaliland

actors in the post-intervention peace-building process. We argue that local participation is a

This increase in violence occurs overall, as well.

Military intervention will result in blowback

UN Peacekeeping forces intervene in areas to try and prevent terrorism.

Peacekeepers, in UN seen as military occupation

The major cause of terrorism is foreign occupation.

USE OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES OFFENSIVELY MAY CREATE UNINTENDED

A2: Offensive PKOs Necessary to Stop Rebel Groups

Cant defeat all of the rebel groups in the Congo

Answer: Peacekeepers Facilitate Peaceful Resolution to Conflict

The fundamental role of peacekeepers is to keep peace

Peacekeepers stopped violence by disarming rebels peacefully

eSierra Leone demonstrates success in peaceful conflict resolution

Impact: Peacekeeping operations are effective at preventing major conflict

Impact: Peacekeeping operations reduce conflict empirically

A2: Offensive Strikes are More Effective in Restoring Peace

The DRC force has been accused of murder.

A2: Offensive Peacekeeping will Benefit Developing Countries

A2: The UN is obligated to save civilians with offense

Offensive troops pose a greater ability to harm civilians.

Harms to the local population would hurt the UNs reputation.

If the UN doesnt succeed, then it looks extremely bad.

A2: Peacekeepers are of high quality

The quality of the troops depends on the member nations.

The training strategy needs to be improved, there is no way to evaluate peacekeepers.

A2: Offensive Force is Best Done Multilaterally

It is difficult for countries to coordinate on the use of force

Offensive forces by UN Peacekeepers have killed thousands in South Sudan

Local people were upset with UN offensive actions

Under Siege. 2012 May 25.

Peacekeepers have raped and even fathered children of local women

A2: Offensive missions inspire new capabilities

A2: Multilateral Interventions Are More Effective

Non-United Nations operations have been seen as impartial

Non-United Nations operations have had success

In some cases unilateral force is the only option

A2: United Nations operations cause less internal backlash

State sovereignty trumps all

A2: Genocide Prevention

Many viable nonviolent solutions exist to stop genocide

A2: Enforcement of International Law

UN peacekeepers could be defended by other forces.

Currently it is unclear how international law enforcement impacts peacekeeping

More research needs to be done to apply international law to these missions.

A2: Offensive Operations allow for Cyber-peacekeeping

They dont currently have the digital knowhow.

A2: R2P Expands Sovereignty