PCGG v.

Sandiganbayan
GR. 151809-12
RULE 111
FACTS:
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development
Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central
Bank. It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to
directors, officers, stockholders and related interests which reached a total of P310 million.
On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business. A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held wherein the
Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government which one of the
first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against
respondents wherein the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among
others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG which was represented by their
counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private
practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan alleging that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and
counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza.
ISSUE:
WON Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza.
RULING:
No. It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. It
further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713
since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a
former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation,
retirement or separation from public office.

Adasa v. Abalos
GR. 168617
RULE 112
FACTS:
Respondent alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner, through deceit, received
and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without respondents
knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed
and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks.
On 23 March 2001, petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting that she received and
encashed the two checks issued in favor of respondent alleging that it was a certain Bebie
Correa who received the two checks which are the subject matter of the complaints and
encashed the same; and that said Bebie Correa left the country after misappropriating the
proceeds of the checks.
On 25 April 2001, a resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City
finding probable cause against petitioner and ordering the filing of two separate
Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual,
under Article 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
Consequently, two separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner raffled to Branches
4 and 5, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City.
On 8 June 2001, upon motion of the petitioner, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 8782
issued an order directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to conduct a
reinvestigation to which the OCP of Iligan City affirms the finding of probable cause against
petitioner.
Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner
filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ on 15 October 2001 which the DOJ reversed and
set aside the 30 August 2001 resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City
and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner.
Respondent Abalos filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the DOJ should have
dismissed the petition for review outright contending that Sec 7 of DOJ Circular no 70
mandates that If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed
resolution the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been
arraigned the aggrieved party cannot file a petition for review as the secretary of Justice
shall deny it outright.
The trial court has granted the petitioners motion to withdraw information and
dismissed the criminal case, on February 2003. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA on the DOJ resolution and it reversed the sad resolution. The appellate court
emphasized that DOJ Circular 70 Sec 7 used the phrase shall not.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari contending that section 12 of the same DOJ
Circular used the word may that would give discretion to the Secretary of Justice to
entertain an appeal, thus this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the overall language and the intent of DOJ Circular no 70 is directory that it would
give discretion to the Secretary of Justice to entertain an appeal even if the accused has
been arraigned.
RULING:

No. the court held that CA is correct, the DOJ cannot give an appeal/petition for review due
course and must dismiss such actions if the accused has already been arraigned.
Therefore in Sec 12 if the ground for the dismissal is the arraignment of the accused, it
must go back and act upon through Section 7. If Sec 12 is given a directory application it
would render earlier mandatory provisions invalid/negligible and would undermine the
main objectives of the said circular which is for the expeditious and efficient
administration of justice.

ISAGANI YAMBOT AND LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC VS. RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT AND

HON. FRANCISCO R. RANCHES (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH 21 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF VIGAN, IIOCOS SUR)
FACTS:
Philippine Daily Inquirer published in their May 2 and 3, 1996 issues news reports which
allegedly imputed to private respondent Armovit, the harboring or concealment of a convicted
murderer: Rolito Go, his client.
For this reason, Private Respondent Armovit filed on May 1996 with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of IIocos Sur a complaint-affidavit for libel against petitioners:
Yambot (publisher) Jimenez-Magsanoc (editor-in-chief) and two other correspondents, Teddy
Molina and Juliet Pascual, of the said broadsheet.
A Resolution was issued by Assistant Provincial Presecutor Nonatus Rojas on October
1996; finding probable cause to indict the petitioners and the reporters for libel.
Two criminal informations for libel were consequently filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of IIocos Sur, Branch 21.
Petitioners sought the review of the OPP's resolution by the Regional State Prosecutor
(RSP). Eventually, RSP Constante Caridad reversed the findings of the OPP.
The reversal of the findings of the OPP prompted the petitioners to file a motion for the
withdrawal of the aforesaid informations on February 12, 1997.
The trial court denied the motion on the ground that it found probable cause for the filing
of the charge. It has also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The CA also denied petitioners request for certiorari, hence the latter elevated the matter
for review by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, when it refused to rule
that Respondent Trial Court gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Provincial Public
Prosecutors motion to withdraw the two informations for Libel against petitioners. Thus,
depriving the petitioners of their right to PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
Whether or not there is abuse of discretion committed by CA, when it refused to rule that
the Respondent Trial Court has, indeed, abused its discretion, when it ruled: Probable Cause to
charge petitioners with Libel.
HELD/RULING:
NO to both issues.
The Supreme Court, in perusal of the Motion for Reconsideration which has been filed by
petitioner on February 23, 2009, discovered that it contains a mere rehash of the arguments
already passed upon by the RTC.
As the RTC has stated in its decision: Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of that court. It may, therefore, grant or
deny at its option a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information based on its own

assessment of the records of the preliminary investigation submitted to it, in the faithful
exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative, and not out of subservience to the prosecutor.

To reiterate, The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.

The Supreme Court also said Only in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion will this
Court interfere and reverse the trial court's findings and conclusions. Here, as stated in our
decision, the trial court made its own assessment of the records submitted to it; thus, it
complied with its bounden duty to determine by itself the merits of the motion. Its ruling,
therefore, cannot be categorized as tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The other arguments given by petitioners, pertaining to evidentiary matters which will be
presented, heard, and resolved during the trial.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED WITH FINALITY.

ALFREDO C. MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC. (RULE
112 and 113)
FACTS:
Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007 it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor.
On November 2007 Rolando Garcia (its dealer/operator) conducted a partial audit of the
used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without
Rolandos or the finance managers permission.
The partial audit showed the following:
o that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the payments
totaling P886,000.00.
o that while there were 20 cars under Alfredos custody, only 18 were accounted for.
o that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5.
o that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda
City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of P1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage
Petitioner Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars supposed failure to prove ownership
over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the unremitted payments. Hence, it
could not have suffered damage.
THE FILING OF INFORMATION:
The Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution, finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.
He then filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice.
The City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong filed Two Informations for Qualified Theft and Estafa
against petitioner before the RTC of Mandaluyong, while his motion for consideration was still
pending.
Alfredo filed a motion for Determination of Probable Cause before the trial court and he
also filed a motion to Defer Arraignment.
Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted.
The parties agreed to submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for
resolution.
THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION:
The Trial Court through Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali issued an order dismissing the
complaint for the reason that it did not find probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft
and estafa, even after having conducted an independent assessment of the evidence on
record.
The trial court also denied Juno Cars motion for reconsideration and did not allow the
issuance of warrant of arrest to petitioner.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION:

 Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial
court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the complaint. It argued that "the determination of probable cause and the decision
whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and reinstated the case. It ruled that the trial
court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public prosecutors
findings of probable cause with her own findings of insufficiency of evidence and lack of
probable cause.
Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 and argued that the trial court was correct
in finding that there is no probable cause. He argued that "judicial determination of probable
cause is broader than the executive determination of probable cause" and that it is not
correct to say that the determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on the
prosecutor.
ISSUES:
Whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of
its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.

HELD/RULING:
Yes.
The SC stated in People v. Castillo and Mejia that there are two kinds of determination of
probable cause: executive and judicial.
o The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be FILED in court.
o The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge
to ascertain whether a WARRANT OF ARREST should be issued against the accused. The judge
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
In this PRESENT CASE, Judge Capco-Umali of the RTC made an independent assessment of
the evidence on record and concluded that "the evidence adduced does not support a finding
of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa." Specifically, she found the
following:
o that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent evidence" that the vehicles alleged to have
been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them;
o or that these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of
qualified theft;
o that the complaint did not particularly state the exact value of the alleged office files or
their valuation appears to have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the accused,"
which she found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth
paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code.
Judge Capco also noted the she has ordered the court to set a clarifactory hearing to clear
out essential matters pertinent to the offense charged and even directed the private
complainant (JUNO CARS) to bring documents relative to the same/payment as well as
affidavit of witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying itself that indeed probable cause
exists to commit the present case which private complainant failed to do.
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali
correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo.

 The Constitution under Article III, Section 2 prohibits the issuance of search warrants or
warrants of arrest where the judge has not personally determined the existence of probable
cause. The phrase "upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce"
allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte. For this reason, Section 6,
paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates the judge to
"immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause."
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with
caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature
of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely
fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other
hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with
arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza are
DISMISSED.
--------------------------------------------------END----------------------------------------------------------------------ADDITIONAL INFO FROM THE RULING OF MENDOZA VS PEOPLE (MIGHT AS WELL READ IT):
It is the trial courts discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on
hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to
review the prosecutors determination of probable cause.
The judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutors
finding.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo: Jonathan Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda
Dy in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. An information for murder was filed against
Jonathan Cerbo.
o As general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest
error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts
should not dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary matters should be presented
and heard during the trial.
The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the proper
scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.
When there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of
a public prosecutors duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and
judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public
prosecutors finding of probable cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice
secretary and move for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until such appeal is
resolved.
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that
the facts and evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner].
There was nothing in his resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion
granted to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had
the discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest
of the accused and proceed with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this,
the court cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.
In People v. Hon. Yadao
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing
of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as
to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory.

 The courts first option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause."
That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause
against the respondents.
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of
the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in
the sound discretion of the court."
TERESITA OKABE, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO DE LEON GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of RTC PASAY
FACTS:
Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela
Okabe, with estafa.
Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of
P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the
Philippines.
It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the
said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other
documentary evidence.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a
resolution, finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner which was subsequently approved by the city
prosecutor.
The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a
personal bail bond in the said amount.
The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial courts permission, and returned
to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000.
On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure
order. Trial court approved the same.
Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the
investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and
the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto.
On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July
17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there
relying on her for support.
Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped
the petitioner from questioning the same.
Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and with leave of court left the court ROOM. Petitioner
filed with CA a petition for Certiorari.

CA set aside the hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of probable
cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latters documentary evidence,
as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner.- YES
2. Whether or not posting of bail bars the accused from questioning the legality of the arrest or the conduct of
a preliminary investigation. -NO
RULING:
1. Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides that an Information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and
counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence of the resolution:
SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed in court
shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the
other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case.
If the judge is able to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause on the basis of the records
submitted by the investigating prosecutor, there would no longer be a need to order the elevation of the rest of the
records of the case. However, if the judge finds the records and/or evidence submitted by the investigating
prosecutor to be insufficient, he may order the dismissal of the case, or direct the investigating prosecutor either
to submit more evidence or to submit the entire records of the preliminary investigation, to enable him to
discharge his duty. The judge may even call the complainant and his witness to themselves answer the courts

probing questions to determine the existence of probable cause. The rulings of this Court in Soliven v. Makasiar
and Lim v. Felix[58] are now embodied in Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, with
modifications, viz:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already
been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
In this case, the investigating prosecutor submitted to the respondent judge only his resolution after his
preliminary investigation of the case and the affidavit-complaint of the private complainant, and failed to include
the affidavits of the witnesses of the private complainant, and the latters reply affidavit, the counter-affidavit of the
petitioner, as well as the evidence adduced by the private complainant as required by case law, and now by
Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
2. No. SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. An
application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the
legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall
resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended
to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be
considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities
thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature
because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing
curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides,
procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases
pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was
already in effect. It behooved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioners petition for
certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
LEVISTE vs. ALAMEDA
FACTS:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with homicide for the
death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati.
After petitioner posted a P40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved, he was released from detention,
and his arraignment was set on January 24, 2007.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent
Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to reexamine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 2007 deferring petitioners arraignment and allowing the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30
days from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January 31, 2007 denying reconsideration of the first order.
Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer acting on the public
prosecutors recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his application for
injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the prosecutors recommendation and
thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause. Petitioner also separately moved for the
inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the Amended Information.
The appellate court dismissed petitioners petition.
Reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the information. Due process of law
demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be admitted without conducting another or a new
preliminary investigation.
In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an
information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended information contains a
charge related to or is included in the original Information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial
amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary
investigation.
RULING:
The Court answers in the affirmative.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be mere formal

amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the
event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as
to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which
does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds
specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely
states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the
essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
The amendment involved in the present case consists of additional averments of the circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify the offense charged from homicide to murder. It being
a new and material element of the offense, petitioner should be given the chance to adduce evidence on the
matter. Not being merely clarificatory, the amendment essentially varies the prosecutions original theory of the
case and certainly affects not just the form but the weight of defense to be mustered by petitioner.
DOJ vs. Jimenez G.R. 148571 September 24, 2002
Facts:
Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr.
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice,
it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with
the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec.
6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez.
Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion
praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an
alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in
cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order
for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court
deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
Issues:
1. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail?
2. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process?
Held:
1. Yes.
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition,
the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds application only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for
the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against
him, not before the extradition court.
2.

NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right
to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the

answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary
nature of extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings
had already been conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead
of taking it, he ran away.
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, 269 SCRA 402 , March 12, 1997
Facts:
Enrique Manarang noticed the accused appellants car running fast. After a while, a screech of tires was heard
and thus, made the officer run out and investigate.
Not so long, the car continued to run, so a hot-pursuit took place. Manarang then radioed the incident to the
Police.
When the car was put to a stop, the driver rolled down the windows with his hands raised.
The officers then noticed that it was the famous actor, Robin Padilla. While apprehended, because of the hitand-run incident, the police saw the revolver tucked in the left waist of Robin.
The police insisted that the gun be shown in the office if it was legal. The crowd had formed and Robin was
shaking their hands and pointing to the police while saying iyan kinuha ang baril ko, as if it was in the movies.
The gesture then revealed a magazine clip of a rifle which made the police suspect that there is a rifle inside
the vehicle. Then the rifle was seen. The other firearms were voluntarily surrendered by Robin.
Robins defense was that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the
course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule.
Robin Padilla was arrested, tried, and convicted for illegal possession of firearms. He was in possession of a .
357 caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson with 6 live ammunitions, One M-16 baby Armalite Rifle with ammunitions,
One .380 Pietro Barreta with 8 live ammunitions, and six live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.
Issue:
Whether the arrest was unlawful?
Held:
- The Bill of rights purpose is to put limit to the governments power. A peace officer or a private person may
arrest a person: (a) when the person has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit and
offense, (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
- The instances above clearly explain the legality of the arrest. Robin Padilla, had first sideswept a balut vendor and
the incident was heard by Manarang and he saw Robin fled away from the scene, thus, committing a hit-and-run.
Enrique Manarang was a peace officer.
-When he was halted, the firearms were revealed to the police officers without their act of searching. The firearms
were in plain view. And the firearms were found by the police in their pursuit of their official duties. And the
police have the right as to where they are because they were in pursuit of Robin when they found the firearms.
4. GO ET AL VS BONGOLAN
FACTS:
Information was filed charging the several accused with kidnapping Samuel Go
The case was assigned to Branch 2 RTC of Bangued Abra presided by Judge Bongolan
Prosecution recommended no bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, since kidnapping with ransom is
punishable with reclusion perpetua to death
Prosecution panel presented its witnesses consisting of Samuel Go, the kidnap victim, Alfredo Go, an alleged
previous victim who was released after paying a P500,000.00 ransom money, the Chief of Police of San Esteban,
Ilocos Sur, the Senior Inspector of the PNP Provincial Command in Abra, and a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
After their testimonies, accused Jaime Balmores filed a Motion for the Amendment of the Information and for
the Fixing of the Bail alleging that the evidence presented did not show that the kidnapping was for ransom. He
asked the prosecution to amend the information from kidnapping with ransom to simple kidnapping to bring it
within the ambit of bailable offenses and enable him to post bail as a matter of right.
Judge Bongolan issued an Order with the following:
(1) Denying the Motion to Amend the Information holding that It is the State that determines the contents of the
information and it is the States responsibility to prove its allegation contained in the information under the
principle of allegata et probate
(2) Allowing accused Balmores to substantiate his Motion to Fix Bail
(3) Allowing accused Edgardo Cacal and Rolando Molina to submit their own motion for admission to bail with
accompanying memorandum
Molina and Cacal filed their motion
Prosecution filed Opposition to Motion to Bail
Judge Bongolan issued his Order granting the two applications for bail in the amount of P50,000 each
Prosecution submitted its Motion for Reconsideration accompanied by a request to set the motion for hearing
However, before the prosecution could submit said motion, the accused were already released
The bondsmen, failed to find Judge Bongolan, proceeded to see Judge Benesa, who was then Acting Presiding
Judge of Branch 1 and designated pairing Judge of Branch 2

 Judge Benesa, upon being presented with a copy of Judge Bongolans Order granting bail, issued his order
releasing the accused
On the date set for the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Bongolan, upon being informed that
the accused had already been released by Judge Benesa, issued his Order denying the prosecutions Motion for
Reconsideration
Administrative case filed against Judge Bongolan and Judge Benesa for usurpation and abuse of authority,
rendition of unjust order and ignorance of the law in granting bail to several accused charged with kidnapping for
ransom
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State, in opposing the motions for bail was able to show that the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong with the presentation of its four witnesses in the trial proper so as to deny the said accused
of their right to bail under the provisions of Section 13, Article III of the Constitution as implemented by the
pertinent provisions of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
RULING:
The rule simply stated that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to bail EXCEPT in capital
offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. The only determinant factor as to whether the offense charged is
capital or not is the information itself. And in any event it is now up to the State to show that the evidence of guilt
is strong. An analysis of the evidence thus far adduced and relied upon by the State when it opposed these
motions is the key to the resolution of the issue as to whether the accused-movant are entitled to bail or not.
The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum.
A bail hearing is mandatory to give the prosecution reasonable opportunity to oppose the application by
showing that evidence of guilt is strong.
If the prosecution is denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process. The
records show that the prosecution was supposed to present its 6th and 7th witnesses when Judge Bongolan
prematurely resolved the motion.
A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of
the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. These two rights must
be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice, hence the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of
discretion.
The records, however, show that the release of the accused was done in haste by Judge Benesa. If he
examined the records of the case, he would have discovered that the prosecution was given by Judge Bongolan, 10
days within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration from his Order granting bail to the accused. Without the 10day period having lapsed, Judge Benesa ordered the release of the accused. Again, the prosecution was denied its
day in court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF:
(a) Judge Bongolan is ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for granting bail in a capital offense without conducting
a hearing
(b) Judge Benesa is ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for neglect in the performance of duty.
People vs. Fitzgerald
GR 149723 Oct. 27, 2006
Facts:
Victor Keith Fitzgerald was charged of rape with the regional trial court..
He was later convicted of the said crime by the RTC..
During Appeal, He petitioned for bail to be posted due to his old age and poor health condition.
RTC denied such petition however CA granted it because of the modification of the penalty imposed which
became reclusion temporal (remember the old age as mitigating)
Petition for certiorari was filed in SC
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent (Fitzgerald) should be granted bail.
Held:
The Supreme court Held that respondent is not entitled to post bail
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.
A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail.
SC Annulled CAs decision and issued a warrant of arrest against respondent..
Esteban Vs. Judge Alhambra
FACTS:
In this present petition for certiorari Anita Esteban seeks to annul the Orders dated July 9, 1998 and August 20,
1998 issued by Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose City,

in Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-88(95), SJC-27(97), SJC-30(97) and SJC-31(97).The Orders denied petitioners application
for cancellation of the cash bail posted in each case.
Gerardo Esteban is the accused in these criminal cases. His sister-in-law, Anita Esteban, petitioner herein,
posted cash bail of P20,000.00 in each case for his temporary liberty.
While out on bail and during the pendency of the four criminal cases, Gerardo was again charged with another
crime for which he was arrested and detained.
Fed up with Gerardos actuation, petitioner refused to post another bail. Instead, on June 18, 1998, she filed
with the trial court an application for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the four criminal cases. She
alleged therein that she is terminating the cash bail by surrendering the accused who is now in jail as certified to
by the City Jail Warden.
Anita now pleas that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of
jurisdiction, and that the issue is one of "first impression". She cites that under Sec 19,now Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused.
ISSUE: WON Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
refused to cancel the bail upon petition of the petitioner.
HELD:
No ,Anita misapplied the provision; the cash bail cannot be cancelled because Gerardo was not surrendered for the
four criminal cases he was originally charged with, he was acquired because of the subsequent case filed against
him
2. The court also cites section 14 which states:
Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail.
The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue
or provincial, cityor municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor
who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificateof deposit and a written undertaking
showing compliance with the requirements of Section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody.
The moneydeposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs,while the excess, if
any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit.
A cash bond is treated as the money of the accused (even if it was supplied by another person in his behalf). The
money of the accused shall than be applied as payment for any fine or cost imposed by the court. It is treated in
the nature of a lien.
(Yap vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001) Rule 114 Sec 9
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to
P5,500,000.00. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail
pending appeal.

The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000 on condition that he will
secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and
that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior
notice to the court and private complainant.
He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC.
He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail.

He also contests the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming that the
same violates his liberty of abode and travel.
Issue:
1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against excessive bail.
2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.
Held:
1. The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of
petitioners right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent
to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the
amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail
is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment
of the appellate court.
2. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights.
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the
above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function
of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented
from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.