1. G.R. No.

L-28113

March 28, 1969

(b) because it offends against

section 10 (1) of article VII of the
Constitution, which limits the
President's power over local
governments to mere supervision ,
In short, said section 68, as part of
the Revised Administrative Code,
approved on March 10, 1917, must
be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the
Constitution, in 1935, which is
utterly incompatible and
inconsistent with said statutory
enactment."

THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO

DEL SUR, and AMER MACAORAO
BALINDONG, petitioners, vs. PANGANDAPUN
BENITO, HADJI NOPODIN MACAPUNUNG,
HADJI HASAN MACARAMPAD, FREDERICK V.
DUJERTE MONDACO ONTAL, MARONSONG
ANDOY, MACALABA INDAR LAO. respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the
mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while the
respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor,
and the rest of the respondents are the
councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of
the same province.
Balabagan was formerly a part of the
municipality of Malabang, having been created
on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of
the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios
and sitios1 of the latter municipality.
petitioners brought this action for prohibition to
nullify Executive Order 386 and to restrain the
respondent municipal officials from performing
the functions of their respective office relying on
the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor
General 2 and Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva
In Pelaez this Court, through Mr.
Justice (now Chief Justice)
Concepcion, ruled: (1) that section
23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio
Charter Act, approved January 1,
1960], by vesting the power to
create barrios in the provincial
board, is a "statutory denial of the
presidential authority to create a
new barrio [and] implies a
negation of the bigger power to
create municipalities," and (2) that
section 68 of the Administrative
Code, insofar as it gives the
President the power to create
municipalities, is unconstitutional
(a) because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and

the respondents argue that the rule announced

in Pelaez can have no application in this case
because unlike the municipalities involved
in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is at
least a de facto corporation, having been
organized under color of a statute before this
was declared unconstitutional, its officers
having been either elected or appointed, and the
municipality itself having discharged its
corporate functions for the past five years
preceding the institution of this action.
Thus, its existence cannot be collaterally
attacked, although it may be inquired into
directly in an action for quo warranto at the
instance of the State and not of an individual like
the petitioner Balindong.
Issue:
1. whether a statute can lend color of validity to
an attempted organization of a municipality
despite the fact that such statute is subsequently
declared unconstitutional
2. whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de
facto corporation
3. whether its existence can be collaterally attack
Ruling:

1. No. a statute cannot lend color of validity

to an attempted organization of a
municipality despite the fact that such
statute is subsequently declared
unconstitutional.
An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers
the following analysis:
It appears that the true basis for denying
to the corporation a de facto status lay in
the absence of any legislative act to give
vitality to its creation.
The principle that color of title under an
unconstitutional statute can exist only
where there is some other valid law
under which the organization may be
effected, or at least an authority in
potentia by the state constitution
As a result of this analysis of the cases the
following principles may be deduced which seem
to reconcile the apparently conflicting decisions:
I. The color of authority requisite
to the organization of a de
facto municipal corporation may
be:
1. A valid law enacted by
the legislature.
2. An unconstitutional law,
valid on its face, which has
either (a) been upheld for a
time by the courts or (b)
not yet been declared
void; provided that a
warrant for its creation can
be found in some other
valid law or in the
recognition of its potential
existence by the general
laws or constitution of the
state.
II. There can be no de
facto municipal corporation unless
either directly or potentially, such

a de jurecorporation is authorized
by some legislative fiat.
III. There can be no color of
authority in an unconstitutional
statute alone, the invalidity of
which is apparent on its face.
IV. There can be no de
facto corporation created to take the
place of an existing de jure corporation, as
such organization would clearly be a
usurper.10

In the cases where a de facto municipal

corporation was recognized as such despite the
fact that the statute creating it was later
invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to
rest on the consideration that there was some
other valid law giving corporate vitality to the
organization
2. whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de
facto corporation
NO. in the case at bar, the mere fact that
Balabagan was organized at a time when the
statute had not been invalidated cannot
conceivably make it a de factocorporation, as,
independently of the Administrative Code
provision in question, there is no other valid
statute to give color of authority to its
creation.
In Norton v. Shelby Count, 12 Mr. Justice Field
said: "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is,
in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed
Executive Order 386 "created no office." This
is not to say, however, that the acts done by
the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise
of its corporate powers are a nullity because
the executive order "is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it
had never been passed." For the existence of

Executive, Order 386 is "an operative fact

which cannot justly be ignored.
Operative fact Doctrine:
The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects
with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular
conduct, private and official

3. whether its existence can be

collaterally attack
, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence
of a municipality is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or other direct
proceeding.
4 But

the rule disallowing collateral attacks

applies only where the municipal corporation
is at least a de facto corporations. 5 For where
it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto,
but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may
be, questioned collaterally or directly in any
action or proceeding by any one whose rights
or interests ate affected thereby, including
the citizens of the territory incorporated
unless they are estopped by their conduct
from doing so.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring
I concur fully with the well-written opinion
of Justice Castro
At any rate, although the general rule is that
an unconstitutional statute 'confers no
right, creates no office, affords no protection
and justifies no acts performed under it.' ...

there are several instances wherein courts,

out of equity, have relaxed its operation ... or
qualified its effects 'since the actual existence
of a statute prior to such declaration is an
operative fact, and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored' ... and a
realistic approach is eroding the general
doctrine.
A judicial decision annulling a presidential
exercise of authority 4 is not without its effect
either. That much is evident from the holding
now reached. The act stricken down, whether
proceeding from the legislature or the Executive,
could in the language of the Chicot County case,
be considered, prior to the declaration of
invalidity, as "an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored."
The doctrine of co-equal or coordinate
departments would be meaningless if a
discrimination of the above sort were considered
permissible. The cognizance taken of the prior
existence of an enactment subsequently declared
unconstitutional applies as well as to a
Presidential act thereafter successfully assailed.
There was a time when it too did exist and, as
such, a fact to be reckoned with, though an infirm
source of a legal right, if, as subsequently held,
considered violative of a constitutional
command
To such a claim, it suffices to answer that while
the challenged Administrative Code provision
was in fact held as not containing within itself
the authority conferred on the President to
create municipal corporations.
The Congress may delegate to another branch of
the Government the power to fill in the details in
the execution, enforcement or administration of
a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.

"Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code

does not meet these well-settled requirements
for a valid delegation of the power to fix the
details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it
give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the
evil effects above referred to.

. For as originally formulated, it would merely

recognize that during its existence, prior to its
being declared violative of the constitute, the
statute must be deemed an operative fact. Today
we decide that such a doctrine extends to a
Presidential act held void not only on the ground
of unconstitutional infirmity but also because in
excess of the statutory power conferred. That to
me is the more significant aspect of this decision.
To repeat, to that point of view I yield full
concurrence.

2. Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez

G.R. No. 103702
December 6, 1994
Facts:

1959
President Carlos P. Garcia, issued EO No.
353, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and
2630 of the Revised Administrative Code,
creating the municipal district of San
Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the
municipality of San Narciso of the same
province certain barrios.
Take Note: Executive Order No. 353 was
issued upon the request of the municipal
council of San Narciso, Quezon. Waah ngon my own ang Muncipality of San Narciso.
Nagdrama.

1965
EO No. 174 issued by President Diosdado
Macapagal officially recognized the the
municipal district of San Andres to have
gained the status of a fifth class
municipality

1989
Municipality of San Narciso filed a
petition for quo warranto against the
officials of the Municipality of San Andres.
The petition sought the declaration of
nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and
prayed that the respondent local officials
of the Municipality of San Andres be
permanently ordered to refrain from
performing the duties and functions of
their respective offices.
Invoking Pelaez v. Auditor General, 4 the
petitioning municipality contended that
Executive Order No. 353, a presidential
act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent
powers of the legislature and in violation
of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. Hence, petitioner
municipality argued, the officials of the
Municipality or Municipal District of San
Andres had no right to exercise the duties
and functions of their respective offices
that
righfully
belonged
to
the
corresponding
officials
of
the
Municipality of San Narciso. Haha d diay
kaya ni San Narciso mg-on my own.

Municipality of San Andres Arguments:

since it was at the instance of petitioner

municipality that the Municipality of San
Andres was given life with the issuance of
Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner
municipality) should be deemed estopped
from questioning the creation of the new
municipality;
that because the Municipality of San
Andres had been in existence since 1959,
its corporate personality could no longer
be assailed;
Later on, Municipality of San Andres filed
anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the
case had become moot and academic with
the enactment of Republic Act No. 716
particuarly Section 442(d) of the law,
reading thusly:

Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. . . .

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date

of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
Municipality of San Narciso replied:

The above provision of law was

inapplicable to the Municipality of San
Andres since the enactment referred to
legally existing municipalities and not to
those whose mode of creation had been
void ab initio.
Since the petition for quo warranto had
been filed prior to the passage of said law,
petitioner municipality had acquired a
vested right to seek the nullification of
Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt
to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160
to the petition would perforce be violative
of due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

RTC ruled in favour of Municipality of San

Narciso and said that whatever defects (were)
present in the creation of municipal districts by
the President pursuant to presidential issuances
and executive orders, (were) cured by the
enactment of R.A. 7160

Issue:

What is the status of Municipality of San

Andres
Held:
De Jure

Petitioners' theory (katung naa daw cla

vested right kay petition was filed before
the enactment of LGC) might perhaps be a
point to consider had the case been
seasonably brought. Executive Order No.
353 creating the municipal district of San
Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but
it was only after almost thirty (30) years,
or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality
of San Narciso finally decided to challenge
the legality of the executive order. In the
meantime, the Municipal District, and
later the Municipality, of San Andres,
began and continued to exercise the
powers and authority of a duly created
local government unit. In the same
manner that the failure of a public officer
to question his ouster or the right of
another to hold a position within a oneyear period can abrogate an action
belatedly filed, 19 so also must a quo
warranto proceeding assailing the lawful
authority of a political subdivision be
timely
raised. 20 Public
interest
demands it.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was
a complete nullity for being the result of
an
unconstitutional
delegation
of
legislative
power,
the
peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case
hardly could offer a choice other than to
consider the Municipality of San Andres
to have at least attained a status uniquely
of its own closely approximating, if not in
fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal
corporation.
Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive
Order No. 353, the Municipality of San
Andres had been in existence for more
than six years when Pelaez v. Auditor
General was promulgated. The ruling
could have sounded the call for a similar
declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to

be the case. On the contrary, certain

governmental acts all pointed to the
State's recognition of the continued
existence of the Municipality of San
Andres.
After more than five years as a municipal
district, Executive Order No. 174
classified the Municipality of San Andres
as a fifth class municipality.
Under Administrative Order No. 33, the
Municipality of San Andres had been
covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit
Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the
province of Quezon.
Whatever doubt there night be as to the
de jure character of the municipality must
be deemed to have been put to rest by
Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code to the effect that municipal districts
"organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities."
The power to create political subdivisions
is a function of the legislature. Congress
did just that when it has incorporated
Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws,
which in essence are retrospective, 21 and
aimed at giving "validity to acts done that
would have been invalid under existing
laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with," are validly accepted in
this jurisdiction, subject to the usual
qualification against impairment of
vested rights.
Also, the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution which apportioned the seats
of the House of Representatives,
considered Municipality of San Andres to
be one of the twelve (12) municipalities

composing the Third District of

province of Quezon.
All considered, the de jure status of
Municipality of San Andres in
province of Quezon must now
conceded.

the
the
the
be

Add-on (in case mushagit si Sir ug: WHAAT IS

QUOOO
WARRANTOOO,
MAHILUUUUMM!!!???)
The special civil action of quo warranto is
a "prerogative writ by which the Government
can call upon any person to show by what
warrant he holds a public office or exercises a
public franchise." 13
It must be brought "in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines" 15 and commenced
by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when
directed by the President of the Philippines . . .
." 16 Such
officers
may,
under
certain
circumstances, bring such an action "at the
request and upon the relation of another person"
with the permission of the court. 17 The Rules of
Court also allows an individual to commence an
action for quo warranto in his own name but this
initiative can be done when he claims to be
"entitled to a public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another."

3. Municipality of Candijay, Bohol v. CA and

Municipality of Alicia, Bohol
G.R. No. 116702 December 28, 1995

CHARACTER:

Municipality of Candijay Bohol

municipality adjudged by RTC to have
ownership over Barrio/Barangay
Pagahat;
Municipality of Alicia Bohol
municipality adjudged by the CA to have
ownership over Barrio/Barangay Pagahat

SUBJECT MATTER:
When an Initially Defective Municipal
Corporation BECOMES a De Jure Municipal
Corporation by virtue of Sec. 442(d) of the LGC

FACTS:

This is a love-triangle story among

Candijay Badiday, Alicia Keys and Karl
Pagahat; Candijay and Alicia were fighting
over Pagahat
RTC
Tagbilaran
declared
"barrio/barangay Pagahat as within
the territorial jurisdiction of the
plaintiff municipality of Candijay,
Bohol, and further permanently
enjoined defendant municipality of
Alicia "to respect and NEVER MOLEST
Candijays control, possession and
political supervision of barangay
Pagahat
On appeal, the CA concluded that the
RTC committed an error
o CA rejected the boundary line
being claimed by petitioner
based on certain exhibits since
it would appear that Candijay
will eat up a big chunk of
territories FAR EXCEEDING her
territorial jurisdiction under the
law creating her
Example:
it
included
portions
of
Barrios
Putlongcam
and
La
Hacienda
when
said
barrios are undisputedly
part of Alicias territory
under Executive Order No.
265 creating Alicia
o Executive Order No. 265 (which
created Alicia from out of certain
barrios of the municipality of
Mabini), and Act No. 968 of the

Philippine Commission (which set

forth the respective component
territories of the municipalities of
Mabini and Candijay), show that
"Barrio Bulawan from where
barrio Pagahat originated is
NOT MENTIONED AS ONE OF
THE BARRIOS constituted as
part OF ALICIA. NEITHER do
they show that Barrio Pagahat
forms part of CANDIJAY.
o Thus,
CA
applied
the
Equiponderance of Evidence
Rule (Equipoise Rule), stating:
When the scale shall stand
upon an equipoise and
there is NOTHING in the
evidence which shall
incline it to one side or
the other, THE COURT
WILL FIND FOR THE
DEFENDANT (Alicia).
Candijay filed an MfR with the CA but was
DENIED
Thus, Candijay filed the instant petition
with the Supreme Court alleging, among
others, that Alicia LACKED juridical
personality, as a result of having been
CREATED UNDER A VOID EXECUTIVE
ORDER
in
reference
to
the
pronouncement in Pelaez v. Auditor
General
o Petitioner contended that Exec.
Order No. 265 issued by
President Quirino on September
16, 1949 creating Alicia is NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO, inasmuch
as Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, on which
said Executive Order was based,
CONSTITUTED
AN
UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWERS
(thus,

UNCONSTITUTIONAL) as Pelaez
vs. Auditor Genera.

continued existence
of the Municipality of
San Andres

ISSUE:
WON Alicia Keys lacked juridical
personality as being created under a void
Executive Order?

RULING:
NO, Alicia Keys did NOT lack juridical
personality despite being created under a void
Executive Order.
As its legal basis, the Supreme Court
recalled its ruling in Municipality of San
Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr. whereby it
upheld Municipality of San Andres as a de jure
municipal corporation. The Court said that the
instant case of Alicia IS STRIKINGLY SIMILAR
with the case of San Andres.
San Andres

Alicia

Created in 1959 by created by virtue of

virtue of Executive Executive Order No.
Order No. 353
265 in 1949
had been IN
EXISTENCE FOR
MORE THAN SIX
YEARS when Pelaez
vs. Auditor
General was
promulgated BUT the
case DID NOT
specifically declare
the
unconstitutionality of
EO No. 353 unlike the
other EOs therein

IN EXISTENCE for all

of SIXTEEN YEARS
when Pelaez
vs.Auditor
General was
promulgated

certain
GOVERNMENTAL
ACTS ALL POINTED to
the STATE'S
RECOGNITION of the

VARIOUS
GOVERNMENTAL
ACTS throughout the
years all INDICATE
THE STATE'S

Executive
Order No. 174
classified the
Municipality of
San Andres as
a fifth class
municipality
Administrative
Order No. 33
provides that
Municipality of
San Andres
had been
covered by the
10th Municipal
Circuit Court of
San FranciscoSan Andres for
the province of
Quezon
Under the
Ordinance
appended to
the 1987
Constitution,
the
Municipality of
San Andres has
been
considered to
be one of the
twelve (12)
municipalities
composing the
Third District
of the province
of Quezon

RECOGNITION and
acknowledgment of
the existence thereof

Administrative
Order No. 33
provides that
Municipality of
Alicia was
covered by the
7th Municipal
Circuit Court of
Alicia-Mabini
under the
Ordinance
appended to
the 1987
Constitution,
the
Municipality of
Alicia is one of
twenty
municipalities
comprising the
Third District
of Bohol

Inasmuch as Alicia is similarly situated

as the municipality of San Andres, IT SHOULD
LIKEWISE BENEFIT FROM the effects of
Section 442 (d) of the Local Government
Code, and should henceforth be considered as
a regular, de jure municipality.

Section 442 (d) of the Local

Government Code provides that municipal
districts "organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have
their RESPECTIVE SETS OF ELECTIVE
MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS HOLDING OFFICE at
the time of the EFFECTIVITY OF (THE) CODE
shall henceforth be considered as REGULAR
MUNICIPALITIES.
The power to create political subdivisions
is a function of the legislature. Congress did just
that when it has incorporated Section 442 (d) in
the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to
acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with," are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification
against impairment of vested rights.
Thus, as a de jure municipality, Alicia HAS
juridical capacity.

*************************************************
*

2. The challenged Decision "does not solve

the problem of both towns but throws
them back again to their controversy."
That the assailed Decision, in dismissing
the complaint in Civil Case No. 2402, may leave
the parties where they are or may not resolve
their problem one way or the other, IS OF NO
MOMENT. The fact remains that, as correctly
evaluated by the respondent Court, NEITHER
PARTY WAS ABLE TO MAKE OUT A CASE;
neither side could establish its cause of action
and prevail with the evidence it had. They are
thus no better off than before they proceeded to
litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the
courts can only leave them as they are. In such
cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the
complaints/petitions.

4. Municipality of Jimenez v Baz

G.R. No. 105746
December 2, 1996
De Jure and De Facto Corporations

OTHER ISSUES
1. improper
application
by
the
respondent Court of Appeals of the socalled principle of "equiponderance of
evidence", for having based its ruling on
documentary
evidence
which,
petitioner claims, are void
The issues of fact in this case had been
adequately passed upon by respondent Court in
its Decision, which is well-supported by the
evidence on record. The determination of
equiponderance of evidence by the
respondent Court INVOLVES THE
APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE by the latter
tribunal, WHICH WILL NOT BE REVIEWED BY
THIS COURT unless shown to be whimsical or
capricious.
Here, there has been no such showing.

Facts:

The

Municipality

of

Sinacaban

was

created by E.O. 258 by Pres. Elpidio

Quirino, pursuant to Sec. 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

Gist aning 2 bullets: on dispute ang

boundaries sa Sinacaban:
o Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of
Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios
Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja,
and Sinara Alto, based on the
technical description in E.O. No.
258. The claim was filed with the

Provincial

Board

of

Misamis

Occidental against the Municipality

of Jimenez.
o The Municipality of Jimenez, while
conceding that under E.O. No. 258
the disputed area is part of

Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted

jurisdiction on the basis of an
agreement

it

had

with

the

Municipality of Sinacaban. This

agreement was approved by the
Provincial

Board

of

Misamis

Occidental, in its Resolution No.

77, dated February 18, 1950,
which fixed the common boundary
of Sinacaban and Jimenez

The Provincial Board declared the

disputed area to be part of Sinacaban.
It held that the resolution approving the
agreement between the municipalities
was void because the Board had no power
to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as
fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being
vested in Congress pursuant to the
Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1983. The Provincial Board

Issues/Held:
1. whether

and

mandamus

in

the

Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City,

Branch 14.

has

legal

Yes. de facto status

Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari,

prohibition,

Sinacaban

personality to file a claim

denied the motion of Jimenez seeking

reconsideration.

the power to create municipalities is

essentially legislative and consequently
Sinacaban, which was created by an
executive order, had no legal
personality and no right to assert a
territorial claim vis--vis Jimenez, of
which it remains part.
The RTC, inter alia, held:
o that Sinacaban is a de facto
corporation
since
it
had
completely organized itself even
prior to the Pelaez case and
exercised corporate powers for
forty years before the existence
was questioned;
o that Jimenez did not have the legal
standing to question the existence
of Sinacaban, the same being
reserved to the State as
represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General in a quo warranto
proceeding;
o that Jimenez was estopped from
questioning the legal existence of
Sinacaban by entering into an
agreement with it concerning their
common boundary; and
o that any question as to the legal
existence of Sinacaban had been
rendered moot by 442 (d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160)

Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with

the decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General,

If Sinacaban legally exist, then it has standing to

bring a claim in the Provincial Board. Otherwise,
it cannot.
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban
was

not

validly

created

as

municipal

corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor

Above all, it was held that whatever doubt

General

municipal

there might be as to the de jure character of

corporations is essentially a legislative matter

the municipality must be deemed to have

and therefore the President was without power

been put to rest by the local Government

to create by executive order the Municipality of

Code of 1991 (R.A. no. 7160), 442 (d) of which

Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been

provides that municipal districts organized

reiterated in a number of cases[9] later decided.

pursuant

However, we have since held that where a

executive orders and which have their

municipality created as such by executive

respective sets of elective officials holding

order is later impliedly recognized and its

office at the time of the effectivity of this Code

acts are accorded legal validity, its creation

shall henceforth be considered as regular

can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of

municipalities.

that

the

creation

of

San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.,[10] this

Court considered the following factors as
having validated the creation of a municipal
corporation, which, like the Municipallity of
Sinacaban, was created by executive order of
the President before the ruling in Pelaez v.
Auditor general:
(1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the
validity of the creation of the municipality
had never been challenged;

to

presidential

issuances

or

The same factors are present so as to confer on

Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto
municipal corporation in the sense that its
legal existence has been recognized and
acquiesced publicly and officially.
1) Sinacaban had been in existence for
sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor
General was decided on December 24,
1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258
creating it had never been questioned.

(2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez

Created in 1949, it was only 40 years

no quo warranto suit was filed to question

later that its existence was questioned

the validity of the executive order creating

and only because it had laid claim to an

such municipality; and

area that apparently is desired for its

(3) the fact that the municipality was later

classified as a fifth class municipality,
organized as part of a municipal circuit court
and considered part of a legislative district in
the Constitution apportioning the seats in the
House of Representatives.

revenue. This fact must be underscored

because under Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of
Court, a quo warranto suit against a
corporation for forfeiture of its charter
must be commenced within five (5)
years from the time the act complained
of was done or committed. On the

contrary,

the

municipality
recognized

State
of

and

Jimenez

Sinacabans

even
itself

the

office at the time of the effectivity

have

of the Code shall henceforth be

corporate

considered

existence. Under Administrative order no.

as

regular

municipalities.

33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court,

Sinacaban is constituted part of municipal
circuit for purposes of the establishment

2. whether R.A. No. 7160, 442(d) is

of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the

invalid, since it does not conform to

country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier

the

recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by

requirements

entering into an agreement with it

plebiscites in the creation of new

regarding their common boundary.

municipalities

The

agreement

was

embodied

in

Resolution no. 77 of the Provincial Board

of Misamis Occidental.
2) Sinacaban has attained de jure status by
virtue of the Ordinance appended to the
1987

Constitution,

legislative

districts

apportioning
throughout

the

country, which considered Sinacaban

constitutional
for

and
the

statutory
holding

of

No.
Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the
time the 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 2, 1987, it is not subject to the
plebiscite

requirement.

This

requirement

applies only to new municipalities created for

the first time under the Constitution.

part of the Second District of Misamis

Occidental.

3. whether it is the boundary provided

3) 442(d) of the Local Government Code of

for in E.O. No. 258 or in resolution No.

1991 must be deemed to have cured any

77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis

defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This

Occidental which should be used as the

provision states:

basis

shall continue to exist and operate

as such. Existing municipal district
organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of
elective municipal officials holding

adjudicating

Sinacabans

territorial claim

Municipalities existing as of the

date of the effectivity of this Code

for

EO 258.
E.O. no. 258 does not say that Sinacaban
comprises

only

the

barrios

(now

called

Barangays) therein mentioned. What it say is

that

Sinacaban

contains

those

barrios,

without saying they are the only ones

comprising it. The reason for this is that the

Jimenezs contention that the RTC failed to decide

technical description, containing the metes

the case within one year form the start of

and bounds of its territory, is controlling. The

proceeding as required by 79 of the Local

trial court correctly ordered a relocation and

Government Code of 1983 and the 90-day period

consequently

provided for in the Constitution does not affect

the

question

to

which

the

municipality the barangays in question belong.

the validity of the decision rendered. For even

The power of provincial boards to settle

boundary disputes is of an administrative
nature involving as it does, the adoption of
means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities. It is a power to fix

granting that the court failed to decide within

the period prescribed by law, its failure did
not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the
case but only makes the judge thereof liable
for possible administrative sanction.

common boundary, in order to avoid or settle

conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities.

It

implementing

the

is

thus
law

limited

to

creating

5. SULTAN OSOP CAMID vs. OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT, et al GR No. 161414
January 17, 2005

municipality. It is obvious that any alteration of

boundaries that is not in accordance with the law
creating a municipality is not the carrying into

WARNING: Medyo samok ni siya nga case so I

hope masabtan ra ni nga digest.

effect of that law but its amendment.[13] If,

therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial

FACTS

Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to

the technical description of the territory of
Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as
basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.
In case no settlement of boundary disputes is
made the dispute should be elevated to the RTC
of the province. In 1989, when the action was
brought by Jimenez, this Code was the governing
law. Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for
review the Decision and Resolution of the

Preliminaries: Let us first go back sa ruling sa

Pelaez vs Auditor General (1965): katong EOs
nga gi-promulgate sa President creating 33
municipalities. As you can remember, gi-annul
man to sa Supreme Court ang 33 ka EOs because
the power to create LGUs is vested in Congress.

So in this case, it involves the MUNICIPALITY

OF ANDONG, in Lanao del Sur created by EO
No. 107, one of the 33 EOs nga gi-declare nga
null and void sa Supreme Court sa Pelaez case.

Provincial Board. The governing law is now the

Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
118-119.

Petitioner, Sultan Camid, representing

himself as the current resident of Andong
suing as private citizen & taxpayer,

alleged
that
Andong
has
metamorphosed into a full-blown
municipality with a complete set of
officials appointed to handle essential
services for the municipality - the
municipality of Andong has its own high
school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of
Education, Culture and Sports office, and
at least seventeen (17) barangay units
with their own respective chairmen; from
1964-1972 the public officials of Andong
have been serving their their constituents
through the minimal means and
resources with least (sic) honorarium and
recognition from the Office of the then
former President Diosdado Macapagal;
Since the time of Martial Law in 1972,
Andong has allegedly been getting by
despite the absence of public funds, with
the Interim Officials serving their
constituents in their own little ways and
means (caveat, mga claims ra nuon ni
niya kuno nga full-blown municipality na
ang Andong)

To support his claim that Andong remains

in existence, he presented a CENRODENR Certification certifying the total
land area of Muncipality of Andong. He
also submitted a Certification from the
Provincial Statistics Office concerning
the population of Andong 14,059
inhabitants.
He also assailed in this petition the DILG
Certification which enumerated 18
municipalities certified as existing per
DILG records: it turned out kana daw 18
municipalities nga gi-certify sa DILG as
existing municipalities were among the
original 33 municipalities voided by the
Supreme Court sa Pelaez case. According
to Camid, the said DILG Certification
was issued with grave abuse of
discretion because it DID NOT
CLASSIFY Andong AS A REGULAR
EXISTING MUNICIPALITY
Lastly, he insisted on the continuing
validity of EO 107 creating

municipality of Andong since the Pelaez

decision has already been modified by the
decision in Municipality of San Narciso
vs. Mendez which affirmed the unique
status of municipality of San Andres as a
DE FACTO CORPORATION citing Sec.
442(d) of the Local Government Code.
(Basta nga argument ra jud ni Camid is
that same ra man daw ug circumstances
ang municipality of San Andres (San
Narciso case) ug Andong mao nga dapat ideclare sad daw ang Andong as De Facto
Corporation)
RULING

When may municipal corporations exist by

prescription?

Community has claimed and exercised

corporate functions, with knowledge &
acquiescence of the legislature, and
without interruption or objection for a
period long enough to afford title by
prescription
So there must be: (a) factual
demonstration of the continuous exercise
by the municipal corporation of its
corporate existence; and (b) acquiescence
by other municipalities of the state

In this case, Camid does not have the

opportunity to make an initial factual
demonstration of those circumstances before
the Court. Camids seeming ignorance of the
principles of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the
concomitant prematurity of the present petition,
cannot be countenanced.

Is the DILG Certification valid? YES

Such certification does not bear the authority

to create or revalidate a municipality. The
annulment of the Certification will really do

nothing to serve Camids ultimate cause- the

recognition of Andong. Neither does the
Certification even expressly refute the claim that
Andong still exists, as there is nothing in the
document that comments on the present status
of Andong.

===================================
=
MAIN
RULING
===================================

1. Whether or not a municipality (in this case,

Municipality of Andong) whose creation by an
EO was previously voided by the Supreme Court
may attain recognition in the absence of any
curative or re-implementing statute?

NO. THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANDONG

REMAINED
INEXISTENT;
NOR
IS
IT
CONSIDERED A DE FACTO CORPORATION.

The Municipality of Andong NEVER EXISTED.

Executive Order No. 107, which established
Andong, was declared null and void ab initio
in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with
thirty-three (33) other executive orders.
The phrase void ab initio means from the
beginning, from the inception, Pelaez case
was never reversed by the Court rather it was
expressly affirmed in the subsequent cases:
Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality
of Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of
Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent legislation
has been passed since 1965 creating a
Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there
is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong
does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.

2. Is San Narciso case similarly applicable to the

case of Andong? NO, the San Narciso case is
not applicable

Municipality of
Andong (EO No. 107)

Municipality of San
Andres (EO No. 353)
Municipality of San
Narciso vs Mendez

EO No. 107 was

among the 33 EOs
annulled
in
the
Pelaez case in 1965

EO No. 353 was not

among the 33 EOs
annulled in the Pelaez
case in 1965

Not applicable in this San

Andress
was
case
existing for nearly 30
years before its legality
was challenged.
Still, acting on the
premise that the said
executive order was a
complete nullity, it
noted
peculiar
circumstances that San
Andres had attained the
status
DE
FACTO
CORPORATION

Pelaez
limited
its
nullificatory
effect
ONLY TO THOSE EOs
specifically challenged
in the said case despite
the fact that Court could
have very well extended
the
decision
to
invalidate San Andress

Such statement in the San Narciso case

contradicts Camids reading of the said case
that the creation of San Andres, just like
Andong, had been declared a complete nullity
on the same ground of invalid delegation of
legislative powers in Pelaez.

3. How about the applicability of Sec. 442(d) of

the LGC as was applied in the San Narciso
case?

SEC. 442(d) OF THE LGC IS NOT APPLICABLE

IN THE CASE AT BAR.

Sec. 442(d) - municipal districts

"organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities

No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of

Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is
preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext,
even if made, would succeed. The power to
create political subdivisions is a function of
the legislature. Congress did just that when it
has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code.
Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to
acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with," are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification
against impairment of vested rights. (Ang point
sa court is that Sec. 442(d) pf the LGC is deemed to
have cured the defect to such municipalities
created by virtue of Executive Orders before the
passage of the LGC but such curative effect is
LIMITED ONLY TO THOSE EXECUTIVE ORDERS
WHICH WERE NOT JUDICIALLY ANNULLED BY
THE COURT in the Pelaez case)

The Court has since held that where a

municipality created as such by an EO is later
impliedly recognized and its acts are
accorded legal validity, its creation can no
longer be questioned.

Based on the relevant jurisprudence, the

following are the applicable rules: (Summary sa
points gi-discuss sa Court)

1. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the

President has no power to create
municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory
effects to the particular municipalities
challenged in actual cases before this Court

2. However, with the promulgation of the

Local Government Code in 1991, the legal
cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly
created by executive order but not judicially
annulled. The de facto status of such
municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and
Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and
Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code
deemed curative whatever legal defects to
title these municipalities had labored under.

3.1. What should then be the correct

interpretation of Sec. 442(d) of the LGC?
It does not serve to affirm or reconstitute
the judicially dissolved municipalities
such as Andong, which had been
previously created by presidential
issuances or executive orders. The
provision
affirms
the
legal
personalities
only
of
those
municipalities such as San Narciso,
Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have
been created using the same infirm
legal basis, yet were fortunate enough
not to have been judicially annulled.

On the other hand, the municipalities

judicially dissolved in cases such as
Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang,

remain inexistent, unless recreated

through
specific
legislative
enactments, as done with the eighteen
(18) municipalities certified by the
DILG. mao ni ang reason why ni-ingon
ang Court nga valid rato ang DILG
Certification certifying the existence of
the 18 municipalities previously declared
void sa SC under Pelaez nga case. This is
different sa municipality of Andong
because wala man subsequent curative
or
re-implementing
statute
recognizing sa legal existence of
Andong

4. Is Andong entitled to recognition as a DE

FACTO CORPORATION?

ANDONG IS NOT A DE FACTO CORPORATION

Reasons why Andong is not a de facto

corporation:

A. EO 107 which created Andong was

EXPRESSLY ANNULLED by the Court in
the Pelaez decision (1965)

Most prominent is the fact that the executive

order creating Andong was expressly annulled
by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to
affirm Andongs de facto status by reason of its
alleged continued existence despite its
nullification, we would in effect be condoning
defiance of a valid order of this Court. Court
decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due
to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.

B. Sec. 442(d) of the LGC is

INAPPLICABLE in the case of Andong

because it did not have a set of

municipal officials holding office at the
time of effectivity of LGC in fact,
admitted by Camid Andong has never
elected its municipal officers

It bears noting that based on Camids own

admissions, Andong does not meet the
requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the
Local Government Code.

Section 442(d) requires that in order that the

municipality created by executive order may
receive recognition, they must have their
respective set of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the
Local Government] Code. Camid admits that
Andong has never elected its municipal
officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the
fact that Andong was judicially annulled in
1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in
Pelaez, the national government ceased to
recognize the existence of Andong, depriving
it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to
conduct municipal elections for the void
municipality.

C. There was no recognition by the

State as to the existence of the
municipality of Andong

The failure to appropriate funds for Andong

and the absence of elections in the
municipality in the last four decades are
eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the
State of the existence of the town.

But then, how about the

CENRO-DENR
Certification and the NSO
Certification presented by
Camid?

The certifications relied

upon by Camid, issued by
the DENR-CENRO and the
National Statistics Office,
can hardly serve the
purpose of attesting to
Andongs legal efficacy. In
fact,
both
these
certifications qualify that
they were issued upon the
request of Camid, to
support the restoration or
re-operation
of
the
Municipality of Andong,
Lanao
del
Sur,
thus
obviously conceding that
the municipality is at
present inoperative.

D. In the Ordinance appended to the 1987

Constitution (as relied upon in the San
Narciso case) Andong is not listed
among the municipalities of Lanao del
Sur or of any other province

We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance

appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had
also been relied upon in Jimenez and San
Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the
seats of the House of Representatives to the
different legislative districts in the Philippines,
enumerates the various municipalities that are
encompassed by the various legislative districts.
Andong is not listed therein as among the
municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other
province for that matter. On the other hand, the
municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and
Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as
part of Quezon, Bohol, and Misamis
Occidental respectively.

========================
Other
Relevant
Ruling
sa
Court
=================================

6. How about the other 18 municipalities

which were similarly nullified in Pelaez but
certified as existing by the DILG Certification?

As to the 18 municipalities certified by the

DILG certification - The petition fails to mention
that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez,
legislation was enacted to reconstitute these
municipalities. It is thus not surprising that the
DILG certified the existence of these eighteen
(18) municipalities, or that these towns are
among the municipalities enumerated in the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Andong has not been similarly re-established
through statute. Clearly then, the fact that there
are valid organic statutes passed by legislation
recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is
sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal
treatment to Andong as against these eighteen
(18) other municipalities.

7. Lastly, what is the legal effect of the

nullification of Andong in Pelaez?

The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in

Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of
the voided town back into their original
municipalities, namely the municipalities of
Lumbatan, Butig and Tubaran. These three
municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao
del Sur, and presumably continue to exercise
corporate powers over the barrios which once
belonged to Andong

5. G.R. No. L-38204 September 24, 1991

THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD, petitioner, vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of the Court
of First instance of Southern Leyte, Branch III,
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF SOUTHERN
LEYTE, HON. SALVACION O. YNIGUEZ, in her
capacity as Governor of Southern Leyte and
the MUNICIPALITY OF BONTOC, respondents.
G.R. No. 38205 September 24, 1991
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD, petitioner, vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch III
and the Municipality of Bontoc, respondents
This refers to two (2) petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the accused orders of
respondent judge which dismissed the
complaints filed with the trial court, as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and
to order the same respondent to assume
jurisdiction and proceed with the determination
of the cases on the merits.
Facts:
On June 15, 1950, Congress passed Republic Act
No. 522 creating the municipality of Bontoc,
formerly a barrio of the municipality of Sogod in
the province of Leyte, which shall be composed
of the barrios of Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion, Pacu,
Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz,
Mahayahay and their corresponding sitios
A boundary dispute however, later arose
between the municipality of Bontoc and the
municipality of Sogod with the latter claiming
that the former exercised jurisdiction not only
over the barrios above-mentioned but also over
other ten (10) barrios allegedly belonging to
Sogod.
On June 17, 1952, the Provincial Board of Leyte
issued Resolution No. 617 directing the holding
of a plebiscite among the barrios of Pangi, Taa
part of Sta. Cruz, Tuburan, Laogawan and their
corresponding sitios. The purpose of the

plebiscite is to determine whether the people in

these barrios would like to remain with the
municipality of Sogod or with Bontoc. more
votes were cast in favor of Sogod than those in
favor of Bontoc
, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution
No. 519 recommending to the President of the
Philippines and/or to the Congress of the
Philippines that Republic Act 522 be amended so
as to include in said Act creating the municipality
of Bontoc, the following barrios claimed by
Sogod which are in the heart of Bontoc but not
included in said law, namely: Baugo, Himakilo,
Esperanza, Hibagwan, Pamahawan, Mahayahay,
Bunga, Da-o and Maoylab
On December 28, 1959, Carlos P. Garcia, then
President of the Philippines, promulgated
Executive Order No. 368, which approved the
recommendation of the provincial board of
Leyte, and reconstituted the barrios and sitios
which shag compose the municipalities of Bontoc
and Sogod.
However, on July 14, 1960, the President of the
Philippines, thru then Executive Secretary
Castillo sent a telegram to the Provincial Board
of Southern Leyte to SUSPEND
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 368.
On July 18, 1960, the Provincial Board of
Southern Leyte passed Resolution No. 62
suspending the implementation of Executive
Order 368. The Board also created a committee
to conduct the holding of a plebiscite in the
barrios and sitios affected by Executive Order
368 and to finally settle the boundary dispute.
the municipality of Sogod filed Civil Case No. R1706 for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of First Instance to enjoin the provincial
board and provincial governor from taking
cognizance of the long pending boundary dispute
between the two municipalities and to enjoin the
municipality of Bontoc from exercising
territorial jurisdiction over the barrios of Pangi,
Taa Casao, Sta. Cruz, Tuburan and Laogawan all
allegedly belonging to the municipality of Sogod

On August 31, 1973, the trial court dismissed the

action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case
G.R. No. 38205
On December 7, 1970, the municipality of Sogod
filed Civil Case No. R-1707 with the Court of First
Instance of Southern Leyte for recovery of taxes
with receivership against the municipality of
Bontoc. The complaint alleged that the
municipality of Bontoc, without any legal basis,
exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios
enumerated in Republic Act No. 522 but also
over ten (10) barrios belonging to the
complainant municipality of Sogod
, the trial court issued an order dismissing Civil
Case No. R-1707 on the ground that the right to
collect taxes would ultimately depend on Civil
Case No. R-1706, which was already dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction and that the issue as to
boundary dispute have not yet been decided in a
plebiscite for that purpose
Issue:
whether or not the trial court gravely erred in
dismissing the two cases for lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling: NO
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution
or by law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the
parties nor can it be acquired or diminished by
any act of the parties.
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of
commencement of action
At the time the civil actions were filed with the
trial court by petitioner municipality in 1970, the
applicable laws necessary for the determination
of the question of whether the trial court has the
authority to decide on the municipal boundary
dispute are the following: 1) Republic Act No.
522, creating the municipality of Bontoc; 2)
Republic Act No. 3590, the Revised Barrio
Charter, revising Republic Act No. 2370; and 3)

Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative

Code of 1917.
Republic Act No. 522 defines the jurisdiction of
the municipality of Bontoc. It clearly enumerates
the barrios which shag compose the municipality
of Bontoc. This means that all the other barrios
in Southern Leyte which are not included in the
law creating the municipality of Bontoc are
deemed to remain under the jurisdiction of the
municipality of Sogod
Republic Act No. 3590 on June 22, 1963, known
as the Revised Barrio Charter, barrios may be
created and their boundaries altered only by Act
of Congress or by the corresponding provincial
board upon petition of the majority of the voters
in the area affected and the recommendation of
the municipality in which the proposed barrios
are situated. Thus, the provincial board was
empowered under the Id law to determine and
alter boundaries of municipalities and barrios
Further, the law then vested the right to settle
boundary disputes between municipalities on
the provincial board pursuant to Section 2167 of
the Revised Administrative Code
It is clear from the aforestated legal provision
that the authority to hear and resolve municipal
boundary disputes belongs to the provincial
boards and not to the trial courts. The decisions
of the boards are then appealable to the
Executive Secretary.
. Petitioner municipality should have elevated
the matter of delay to the then Secretary of
Interior (now Executive Secretary) for action
instead of bringing it to the trial court. Although
existing laws then vested on the provincial board
the power to determine or even alter municipal
boundaries, the Secretary of Interior or the
Executive Department for that matter, was not
precluded during that time from taking
necessary steps for the speedy settlement of the
boundary dispute
We find that the trial court acted correctly in
dismissing the cases for want of jurisdiction and
in allowing the provincial board to continue with

the pending investigation and proceedings on

the boundary dispute.

joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Ormoc City and Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga.

The 1987 Constitution now mandates that no

province, city, municipality or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected. Hence, any
alteration or modification of the boundaries of
the municipalities shall only be by a law to be
enacted by Congress subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
barrios affected (Section 134, Local Government
Code). Thus, under present laws, the function of
the provincial board to fix the municipal
boundaries are now strictly limited to the factual
determination of the boundary lines between
municipalities, to be specified by natural
boundaries or by metes and bounds in
accordance with the laws creating said
municipalities.

2. Since no amicable settlement was reached,

members of the joint session agreed to elevate
the case to the proper court for settlement which
was reflected in the Resolution No. 97-01

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are DISMISSED. The

assailed orders of the respondent judge dated
August 31, 1973 and December 17, 1973 in G.R.
No. L-38204 and orders dated August 31, 1973
and December 17, 1973 in G.R. No. L-38205 are
AFFIRMED

6. Municipality of Kananga vs. Madrona GR No.

141375 | April 30, 2003 | Panganiban Parties:
Petitioner: MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA,
Represented by its Mayor, Hon. GIOVANNI M.
NAPARI Respondent: Hon. FORTUNITO L.
MADRONA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Ormoc City (Branch 35), the CITY OF ORMOC,
Represented by its Mayor, Hon. EUFROCINO M.
CODILLA SR
Facts:
1. There was a boundary dispute between the
Municipality of Kananga and Ormoc City. Both
parties agreed to amicable settlement though a

3. The City of Ormoc filed a case before the RTC

of Ormoc City to settle the boundary dispute
The Petitioners Case
4. Municipality of Kananga filed a Motion to
Dismiss before the RTC based on the following
grounds:
a. RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the claim.
b. There is no cause of action
c. That a condition precedent for filing the
complaint has not been complied with
d. Ormoc is an independent chartered city
5. RTC Ruling: DENIED
Municipality of Kananga

the

motion

of

-Reason: Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code

has been complied with when both parties
decided to an amicable settlement through a
joint session. That being said, RTC has
jurisdiction over the case under BP Blg. 129
6. Hence this petition by the Municipality of
Kananga
Issue:
WON RTC of Ormoc City may exercise original
jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary
dispute between a municipality and an
independent component city.
Held: Yes
Ratio:
1. Under Sec. 118 of the 1991 Local Government
Code,

boundary disputes between and among local

government units shall, as much as possible, be
settled amicably.
This means that the parties concerned shall refer
the issue for settlement in the Sanggunians
concerned.
2. In other words, the settlement of a boundary
dispute between a component city or a
municipality on the one hand and a highly
urbanized city on the other -- or between two or
more highly urbanized cities -- shall be jointly
referred for settlement to the respective
Sanggunians of the local government units
involved.
3. Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in
which a component city or a municipality seeks
to settle a boundary dispute with a highly
urbanized city, not with an independent
component city. While Kananga is a municipality,
Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly
then, the procedure referred to in Section 118
does not apply to them
4.Even if the said provision is not applicable,
both parties still decided to enter into an
amicable settlement but to no avail. They also
issued a resolution agreeing to elevate the case
and bring the issue to the RTC for adjudication.
5.This means that the general rules governing
jurisdiction, which is vested by law and cannot
be conferred or waived by the parties, as
provided for by BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 will be applied.
6. Sec. 19 of BP Blg 129 states that RTC shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions.
7. Since there is no law providing for the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over
the settlement of boundary disputes between a
municipality and an independent component city
of the same province, RTC committed no grave

abuse of discretion in denying the municipalitys

Motion to Dismiss.
8. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate
all controversies except those expressly withheld
from their plenary powers. They have the power
not only to take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the first time, but
also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts
at that stage
As to whether Ormoc is an independent
component or highly urbanized city
9. Kananga is a municipality constituted under
Republic Act No. 542. Further, Ormoc is an
independent component, city created under
Republic Act No. 179
10. Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be
either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is
deemed an independent component city,
because its charter prohibits its voters from
voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city
independent of the province. There is neither a
declaration by the President of the Philippines
nor an allegation by the parties that it is highly
urbanized
Case Law / Doctrine
The territorial boundaries define the limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its
territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its
acts are ultra vires.
Dispositive Portion
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
challenged Order AFFIRMED.

7. Barangay Sangalang vs. Barangay

Maguihan
More credence should be given to the survey of
lands conducted by the LMB, than that of the tax
assessors.

Facts:

Issues:

This is a territorial dispute involving claims of

jurisdiction between the two Barangays, namely
Sangalang and Maguihan (both in Batangas) over
a parcel of land. Sangalang claims that the said
lot is within their territorial jurisdiction while
Maguihan claims that it is within their territorial
boundary.

(1) WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion

in dismissing the case by applying the rigid
technical procedure over substantial justice.

The dispute was then referred to the

Sangguniang Bayan for resolution. The hearing
committee, in its report found that the disputed
lot is within the jurisdiction of Sangalang. This
was affirmed by the Sangguniang Bayan (SB).
The decision was appealed by Maguihan to RTC
(Sec. 119 LGC) which overturned the decision of
the SB, and declared the disputed land to belong
to Maguihan.
Sec. 119 LGC: Appeal. - Within the time and
manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any
party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian
concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The
Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal
within one (1) year from the filing thereof.
Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior
to the dispute shall be maintained and continued
for all legal purposes.
Aggrieved, Sangalang filed a notice of appeal to
the CA. CA dismissed the appeal citing that the
petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. The
proper remedy was Rule 42 (Petition for
Review) because the decision of RTC was in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It further
said, that even if it could have filed an appeal
under Rule 41, it would still be dismissed
because the submitted appellants brief failed to
contain a subject index and page references to
the records requirement in its Statement of Facts
and Case and Argument. Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

(2) WON RTC has jurisdiction of the appeal made

by Maguihan considering there was no payment
of docket fee.
(2) WON the RTC erred in ruling that the
disputed lot belonged to the jurisdiction of
Maguihan.

Ruling:
Lets tackle the substantive issue first.
Third Issue: Disputes of the Barangay over a
certain lot.
What it basically involves is adjudication as to
which barangay the lots in dispute belong.
Petitioner
Documents:

submitted

the

following

1. Copy of a certification from the Office of the

Provincial Assessor stating that the disputed lots
are all within the territorial jurisdiction of
Barangay Sangalang.
2. Copies of Tax Declaration Nos. 038-00315,
038-00316 and 038-00317, and
3. Old Map of Barangay Sangalang.
Respondents Documents:
1. Certified copy of the cadastral map of the
Lemery Cadastre, which was approved on March
17, 1983 by the Director of Lands, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and
2. Certification of the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources dated
September 9, 1997.

Art. 17 of the IRR of LGC proscribes the

documents to be submitted for the settlement
of boundary disputes.
Art. 17: Documents attached to petition - The
petition shall be accompanied by:
1. Duly authenticated copy of the law or
statute creating the LGU or any other
document showing proof of creation of
the LGU;
2.
Provincial,
city,
municipal,
or barangay map, as the case may be, duly
certified by the LMB.
3. Technical description of the boundaries
of the LGUs concerned;
4. Written certification of the provincial,
city, or municipal assessor, as the case
may be, as to territorial jurisdiction over
the disputed area according to records in
custody;
5. Written declarations or sworn
statements of the people residing in the
disputed area; and
6. Such other documents or information
as
may
be
required
by
the sanggunian hearing the dispute.
The RTC observed that neither of the parties
satisfied the requirement that all the
enumerated documents must be attached to the
petition. Hence, like the RTC, this Court is left
with no other option but to select which between
the documents presented by the parties carries
greater weight in proving its claim.
The documents presented by petitioner were
sourced from the tax assessors office, whereas
the documents presented by respondent were
sourced from the land management bureau. The
answer is very apparent and needs little
discussion.
To this Courts mind, the presence of the
cadastral map, which was approved by the
Director of Lands, should be given more weight
than the documents sourced by petitioner from
the assessors office. Said map was approved on

March 17, 1986, which was approximately 10

years before the controversy in hand
developed. Hence, the same should be
controlling in the absence of proof that such
document is invalid or inaccurate. As a matter of
fact, notwithstanding the hearing committees
recommendation to rule in favor of petitioner,
the committee itself stated in its report that the
cadastral map submitted by respondent was
authentic.
It is undisputed that the Land Management
Bureau is the principal government agency
tasked with the survey of lands, and thus, more
weight should be given to the documents
relating to its official tasks which are presumed
to be done in the ordinary course of business.
Between a geodetic engineer (has sufficient
expertise) and a tax assessor (mainly
concerned with assessment of taxes), the
conclusion is inevitable that it is the formers
certification as to the location of properties in
dispute that is controlling, absent any finding of
abuse of discretion. As correctly observed by
respondent and the RTC, the duty of provincial
and municipal assessors is primarily the
assessment of taxes and not the survey of lands.
Lastly, petitioner alludes to a petition/resolution
allegedly of persons residing in the properties in
dispute to the effect they are under the
jurisdiction of petitioner. On this note, this Court
agrees with the observation of the RTC that the
determination as to whether the properties in
dispute are within a certain jurisdiction is not a
decision to be made by the populace, to wit:
x x x In simple language, the
population follows the territory
and not vice versa. It is the
determination of the ambit and
sphere of the land area as culled in
the approved barangay map that
determines the jurisdiction of the

barangay and not the decision of

the populace. To allow the latter
will open endless litigation
concerning
disputes
of
jurisdiction.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: (pwede na di basahon)
The court said that it is bewildered by the
petitioner to tailor-fit the rules to their own
convenience (kung asa ang pabor sa ilaha, mao
to ilaha gusto I apply). As to the first issue, it
questioned the rigid application of law, however
in the second issue, they questioned why the
rules was not strictly applied.

Docket Fees:
Yambao v. Court of Appeals declared:
Considering the importance and purpose of the
remedy of appeal, an essential part of our judicial
system, courts are well-advised to proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of the right
to appeal, but rather, ensure that every partylitigant has the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, freed
from constraints of technicalities. In line with
this policy, we have held that, in appealed cases,
the failure to pay the appellate docket fee does
not automatically result in the dismissal of the
appeal.
The court further said that the petitoners only
raised this issue in their Motion for
Reconsideration, and respondent had explained
that his failure to do so was because of
ignorance. The failure to pay docket fees does
not automatically result in the dismissal of an
appeal, it being discretionary on the part of the
appellate court to give it due course or not. This
Court will then not interfere with matters
addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC in
the absence of proof that the exercise of such
discretion was tainted with bias or prejudice, or

made without due circumspection of the

attendant circumstances of the case.

Issue on Appeal to CA: CA was correct, but

should have not dismissed the case.
After an examination of relevant laws pertinent
to herein petition, this Court finds that the CA
was correct in holding that petitioner had
availed itself of the wrong remedy.
As correctly observed by the CA, under Section
118 of the Local Government Code, the
jurisdictional responsibility for settlement of
boundary disputes between and among local
government units is to be lodged before the
proper Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan concerned, if it involves two or
more barangays in the same city or municipality.
Under Section 118(e) of the same Code, if there
is a failure of amicable settlement, the dispute
shall
be
formally
tried
by
the sanggunian concerned and shall decide the
same within (60) days from the date of the
certification referred to.[24]
Section 119 of the Local Government Code also
provides
that
the
decision
of
the sanggunian concerned may be appealed to
the RTC having jurisdiction over the area in
dispute, within the time and manner prescribed
by the Rules of Court.

In the case at bar, it is clear that when the case

was appealed to the RTC, the latter took
cognizance of the case in the exercise of its
appellate
jurisdiction,
not
its
original
jurisdiction. Hence, any further appeal from the
RTC Decision must conform to the provisions of
the Rules of Court dealing with said matter.

Based on Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, the

petitioner availed itself of the wrong remedy, but
the CA should have not so easily dismissed the
petition, because of the emerging trend towards
liberal construction of the Rules.

In a case, the court has said: Courts have the

prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the
most mandatory character, mindful of the duty
to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end
to litigation and the parties' right to due process.
In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal
construction of the rules when to do so would
serve the demands of substantial justice and
equity. This was further explained by SC in the
case of Aguam vs. CA.

8. Calanza vs. Paper Industries Corporation of

the Philippines (PICOP) (2009)
Facts:
Petitioners Leonora P. Calanza, et. al., filed with
the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development
Service, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region XI, of Davao City,
applications for small-scale mining permits for
the purpose of extracting gold. They stated that
the area where they will conduct mining
operations was in the Municipality of Boston,
Davao Oriental. Their application was approved
by the governor of Davao Oriental, Rosalind Y.
Lopez.

Since the mining areas applied for by petitioners

were within the respondent Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) logging
concession area under Timber License
Agreements (TLAs), petitioners negotiated with
PICOP for their entry into the mining site at
Barangay Catihan, Municipality of Boston, Davao
Oriental.

PICOP, through its officer Roberto A. Dormendo,

refused petitioners entry into the mining area
on the ground that petitioners mining permits
are defective since they were issued by the
governor of Davao Oriental when in fact the
mining area is situated in Barangay Pagtilaan,
Municipality of Lingig, Surigao del Sur.

Because of such refusal, petitioners filed a

Complaint against PICOP and its officers before
the RTC of Banganga, Davao Oriental, praying
that PICOP or its agent be enjoined from
preventing and prohibiting them from entering
into the mining site.

PICOP countered that the RTC of Davao Oriental

has no jurisdiction over the complaint of
petitioners since the disputed area is situated in
the Province of Surigao del Sur.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. The

RTC opined that Barangay Pagtilaan (as claimed
by PICOP) or Catihan (as claimed by petitioners)
is within the territory of the Province of Davao
Oriental.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision

and dismissed the complaint of respondents.
The Court of Appeals stated that the RTC erred in
passing upon the issue of the boundary dispute
between the provinces of Davao Oriental and
Surigao del Sur since the resolution of the
boundary dispute primarily resides with the
sangguniang panlalawigans of the two provinces
and the RTC has only appellate jurisdiction over
the case, pursuant to the Local Government Code
of 1991.

Issue: WON RTC has original jurisdiction over

the case? NO.
There is boundary dispute when a portion or the
whole of the territorial area of a Local
Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by two or
more LGUs. In settling boundary disputes,

Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code

provides:
Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for
Settlement of Boundary Dispute. Boundary
disputes between and among local government
units shall, as much as possible, be settled
amicably. To this end:
xxx
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more
municipalities within the same province shall be
referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned.
xxx

Section 119. Appeal. - Within the time and

manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any
party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian
concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction over the area in dispute x x x.

Article 17, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations

Implementing The Local Government Code of
1991 outlines the procedures governing
boundary disputes, which succinctly includes the
filing of the proper petition, and in case of failure
to amicably settle, a formal trial will be
conducted and a decision will be rendered
thereafter. An aggrieved party can appeal the
decision of the sanggunian to the appropriate
RTC.

The records of the case reveal that the instant

case was initiated by petitioners against
respondents predicated on the latters refusal to
allow the former entry into the disputed mining
areas. This is not a case where the sangguniang
panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del
Sur jointly rendered a decision resolving the
boundary dispute of the two provinces and the
same decision was elevated to the RTC. Clearly,
the
RTC
cannot
exercise
appellate
jurisdiction over the case since there was no
petition that was filed and decided by the
sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental
and Surigao del Sur. Neither can the RTC

assume original jurisdiction over the

boundary
dispute
since
the
Local
Government Code allocates such power to the
sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental
and Surigao del Sur. Since the RTC has no
original jurisdiction on the boundary dispute
between Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur, its
decision is a total nullity. A void judgment for
want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right nor the creator
of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to
it and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect.

---------------------------------------Article 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary

Disputes. The following procedures shall
govern the settlement of boundary disputes:
(a) Filing of petition - The sanggunian concerned
may initiate action by filing a petition, in the
form of a resolution, with the sanggunian having
jurisdiction over the dispute.
(b) Contents of petition - The petition shall state
the grounds, reasons or justifications therefore.
(c) Documents attached to petition - The petition
shall be accompanied by:
1. Duly authenticated copy of the law or statute
creating the LGU or any other document showing
proof of creation of the LGU;
2. Provincial, city, municipal, or barangay map, as
the case may be, duly certified by the LMB.
3. Technical description of the boundaries of the
LGUs concerned;
4. Written certification of the provincial, city, or
municipal assessor, as the case may be, as to
territorial jurisdiction over the disputed area
according to records in custody;
5. Written declarations or sworn statements of
the people residing in the disputed area; and
6. Such other documents or information as may
be required by the sanggunian hearing the
dispute.

(d) Answer of adverse party - Upon receipt by

the sanggunian concerned of the petition
together with the required documents, the LGU
or LGUs complained against shall be furnished
copies thereof and shall be given fifteen (15)
working days within which to file their answers.
(e) Hearing - Within five (5) working days after
receipt of the answer of the adverse party, the
sanggunianshall hear the case and allow the
parties concerned to present their respective
evidences.
(f) Joint hearing - When two or more
sanggunians jointly hear a case, they may sit en
banc
or
designate
their
respective
representatives. Where representatives are
designated, there shall be an equal number of
representatives from each sanggunian. They
shall elect from among themselves a presiding
officer and a secretary. In case of disagreement,
selection shall be by drawing lot.
(g) Failure to settle - In the event the sanggunian
fails to amicably settle the dispute within sixty
(60) days from the date such dispute was
referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to
the effect and copies thereof shall be furnished
the parties concerned.
(h) Decision - Within sixty (60) days from the
date the certification was issued, the dispute
shall be formally tried and decided by the
sanggunian concerned. Copies of the decision
shall, within fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation thereof, be furnished the parties
concerned, DILG, local assessor, COMELEC, NSO,
and other NGAs concerned.
(i) Appeal - Within the time and manner
prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may
elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned
to the proper Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the dispute by filing therewith
the appropriate pleading, stating among others,
the nature of the dispute, the decision of the
sanggunian concerned and the reasons for
appealing therefrom. The Regional Trial Court
shall decide the case within one (1) year from
the filing thereof. Decisions on boundary
disputes promulgated jointly by two (2) or more
sangguniang panlalawigans shall be heard by the

Regional Trial Court of the province which first

took cognizance of the dispute.