RULE 110

ZALDIVIA V REYES G.R. NO. 102342, JULY 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277
Facts: A complaint was filed before the fiscals office constituting an offense in violation of a city
ordinance. The fiscal did not file the complaint before the court immediately but instead filed it 3 months
later. The defendants counsel filed a motion to quash on ground that the action to file the complaint has
prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of the complaint before his office already interrupts the
prescription period.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a violation
against a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.
Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscals office does not interrupt the running of prescription on
offenses punishable by a special law. The complaint should have been filed within a reasonable time
before the court. It is only then that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted.
**Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which states that
prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

MARIO FL. CRESPO vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
FACTS: On April 18, 1977 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo.
When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that
there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. In an order, the presiding
judge, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the
accused in the CA which was eventually granted while perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing
his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have
finally resolved the petition for review.
The Undersecretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed
the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. But the
respondent judge denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse
to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
HELD: YES. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. And it is through the conduct
of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would
warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of
the criminal prosecution.

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or
a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in
the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits
proceed for the proper determination of the case.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to
secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the
contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the
Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be
convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of
the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case
leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The
least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

RULE 111
ELCANO VS. HILL G.R. NO. L-24803
Facts: Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. At the time of the occurrence,
Reginald Hill is still a minor and is already legally married. Reginald is still living and gets subsistence
with his father, Marvin Hill. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his acts were not criminal because
of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistakes.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the present civil action for damages is already barred by the acquittal of Reginald.
(2) Whether or not Atty. Marvin Hill has a vicarious liability being the father of a minor child who
committed a delict.
Held: No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasidelicts, hence the acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. To find the accused guilty in a
criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required unlike in civil cases, preponderance of evidence
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is sufficient. The concept of culpa acquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation
of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Also, Art 2177 CC provides that Responsibility for
fault or negligence is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. However, plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (ART 327CC), and
under Art 397, emancipation takes place by marriage of the minor, such emancipation is not absolute and
full. Reginald although married, was living with his father and still dependent from the latter. ART 2180
applies to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.

PLACER VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA [126 SCRA 463; G.R. NOS. L-60349-62; 29 DEC 1983]
Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and
Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of said
informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of
warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the
court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations
to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners.
Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They
contended that the fiscals certification in the informations of the existence of probable cause constitutes
sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel
the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation.
Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with the
warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge
must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of
the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of
probable cause.
Petition dismissed.

RULE 113
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew
Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan
Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission
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of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The Operation
Report read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found
with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the after Mission Report read that two
children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime
now.
Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child
prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other
literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after
close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for selfdeportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO
VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings
were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code.
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of
Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III
commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the
Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The
court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of existence of probable cause.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of
petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles
were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126,
Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule.
There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving
vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to
the arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and
estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas

corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was
illegal at the beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code.
Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a
ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never
construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with
assistance of a counsel if desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign
power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.

RULE 114
OKABE VS GUTIERREZ G.R. No. 150185
FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal
Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted
Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of
"door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver
the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only
US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other
documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor
Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner
w/c was subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with
a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The
petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial courts permission, and returned
to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July
12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the
hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only
documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent
Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the
affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence
adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent
Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to
Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying on her for support. Petitioner
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also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief
estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea
and w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the
hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of probable
cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latters documentary
evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner.
HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure which provides that:
SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint
filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses,
together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case. The respondent judge is
hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure.

LAVIDES VS. COURT OF APPEALS [GR 129670, 1 FEBRUARY 2000]

Facts: On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then
16 years old, had been contacted by Manolet Lavides for an assignation that night at Lavides' room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received
reports of Lavides' activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of
the same date, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where Lavides was
staying. When Lavides opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt
and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of Lorelie and the
affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of
Article III, 5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and other Purposes)
was filed on 7 April 1997 against Lavides in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-9770550). On 10 April 1997, Lavides filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless
Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to
Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged." On 29 April 1997, 9 more
informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor
children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to
Q-97-70874). In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides
had sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and given money as
payment for the said acts of sexual intercourse." No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed
separate applications for bail in the 9 cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving
Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal Case Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the
6

accused under detention, his arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules, and thus he must
therefore remain under detention until further order of the Court; and that the accused is entitled to bail in
all the case, and that he is granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a
total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under certain conditions. On 20 May 1997, Lavides filed a motion to
quash the informations against him, except those filed in Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866.
Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on 23
May 1997. Then on 22 May 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be
reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment. On 23 May 1997,
the trial court, in separate orders, denied Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations,
and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to
the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of
P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the 16 May 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of 10
April 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on 7 June 1997. On 2 June 1997, Lavides filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's order, dated 16 May 1997, and its two orders,
dated 23 May 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of
16 May 1997, respectively. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations
were filed against Lavides, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all
consolidated. On 30 June 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, invalidating the first two
conditions under 16 May 1997 order -- i.e. that (1) the accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of
appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these
cases; and (2) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to
trial in absentia -- and maintained the orders in all other respects. Lavides filed the petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure his presence during
the trial of these cases before the bail can be granted.
Held: In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused
may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is
dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial court could
ensure Lavides' presence at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any
stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so
required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place
him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release
on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2)
foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on
bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except
upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The court's
strategy to ensure the Lavides' presence at the arraignment violates the latter's constitutional rights.

People vs. Sola G.R. No. 56158-64

7

The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be
resolved in favor of a change of venue.
The prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it
may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.
Facts:
CFI Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of 7
persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental. On September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, the 332nd PC/INP Company
proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the
7 bodies. Seven (7) separate complaints for murder were thus filed against Pablo Sola and 18 other
persons. The municipal court found probable cause against the accused and ordered their arrest.
However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Pablo Sola and two
others have since been released from detention. The witnesses in the murder cases informed the
prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the CFI Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from
Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least 2 of the accused are official with power and
influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at
large. There have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses.
Issues:
1. Whether or not change of venue is proper
2. Whether or not the bail bond should be cancelled for failure to abide by the basic requirement that the
prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being
granted.
Held:
Change of venue
Change of venue has become moot and academic with the transfer of the case to Bacolod City. However,
the case proceeds with this discussion: To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its
witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and
to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. The witnesses in the case are fearful of
their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the
days of trial. Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.
Right of bail
The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio
for such hearing.
Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
8

present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process,
and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.
Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained
till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. This norm which is of the very essence of
due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove
that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the
municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an
infirmity of a jurisdictional character. (People vs. Sola, G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981)

COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991]
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear
in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on
December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration.
Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by
GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional
liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However
he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial
proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding
after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their
arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the
pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial
of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counteraffidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again
asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit
counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting
evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of
G/SCM)
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It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the
Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with
the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP
Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year
because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of
peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions
are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are
hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.

Leviste v. Alamedo
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, presided by Judge Alameda. Respondent Judge private complainants-heirs of De las Alas
filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public
prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the
proper offense.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the
deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record
or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. RTC issued the order deferring
arraignment and Order denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner assailed these orders
via certiorari and prohibition before the CA.
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to grant him time to
comment on the prosecutor's recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial
determination of probable cause. Trial court nonetheless admitted the Amended Information for
murderand directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; set the arraignment. Petitioner questioned
these two orders. The appellate court dismissed petitioner's petition, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Won there is a need for new evidences in reinvestigation by the prosecutor
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2. Won a hearing is a pre-requisite of hearing in judicial determination of probable cause in

issuance of warrant of arrest
HELD: petition is DENIED; Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
RD:
1. New pieces of evidence are not prerequisites for a valid conduct of reinvestigation. As the
word itself implies, it is merely a repeat investigation of the case, which is simply a
chance for the prosecutor to review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already
submitted.
2. The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a
hearing for judicial determination of probable cause.
The periods provided are mandatory the judge must determine the presence or absence of
probable cause within such periods; should not be stymied and distracted by needless motions for
determination of probable cause filed by the accused.

11