FIGUEROA V. PEOPLE, G.R.

NO 147406 (2008)
FACTS: Petitioner Figueroa was convicted for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide by RTC Bulacan
1. On appeal before the CA, he questioned, for the first,
the trial courts jurisdiction
2. It appears that at the time of the filing of the
Information, the MTC had exclusive original
jurisdiction over the case (penalty was below 6 years)
3. CA held that considering the petitioner had actively
participated in the trial and had belated attacked the
jurisdiction of the RTC, he was already estopped by
laches from asserting the trial courts lack of
jurisdiction
4. Figueroas argument: the lack of jurisdiction of a court
over the subject matter may be raised at any time, even
for the first time in appeal
ISSUE: WON Figueroa is estopped by laches from assailing
the jurisdiction of the RTC
HELD: No. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court
over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may
not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal.
The ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, on the matter of
jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule.
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to par the issue of lack of
jurisdiction only in cases which the factual milieu is analogous
to the Sibonghanoy case.

In applying the principle of estoppel y laches in the exceptional

case of Sibonghanoy, the Court considered the patent and
revolting equity and unfairness of having the judgment
creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15
years. This is not the case here.
CAB: The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC. At that time, no
considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. The
principle in Sibonghanoy case does not apply
DOCTRINE: The issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to
bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases which the
factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

PNB V. HEIRS OF ESTANISLAO MILITAR, 467 SCRA

377 (2005)
FACTS: Deogracias, Glicerio, Tomas, and Caridad (Militar)
were the heirs of Estanislao Militar and the registered coowners of 2 parcels of land.
1. In August 1941, Deogracias sold his aliquot share to
Pedro Golez, and to spouses Lumagbas
2. Despite the sale, Deogracias continued the occupy the
lot until his death in 1964.
3. In a Deed of Sale dated April 1975, it appears that
Deogracias, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad sold the
properties to spouses Jalbuna
4. Jalbuna mortgaged one of the lots to PNB as security
for a loan. When they defaulted, PNB extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage and sold the same in a public
auction with the bank as the highest bidder
5. Thereafter, PNB sold the same to spouses Lucero. As
new owners, they filed an ejectment case against the
heirs of Militar
6. As such, the heirs of Militar filed an action against
Jalbuna, PNB and Lucero for reconveyance of title,
annulment of sale, cancellation of titles and damages
7. Jalbuna invoked prescription, non-inclusion of
indispensable parties and lack of cause of action since
Deogracias no longer had interest over the properties
having sold them to third parties
8. PNB claimed it was a mortgagee in good faith and for
value
9. Spouses Lucero alleged the complaint was commenced
without the real party in interest; that the action had
already prescribed; and that they were innocent
purchasers in good faith

10. The trial court dismissed the case, citing that the case
was not brought in the name of all indispensable
parties. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC decision
ISSUE: WON the case was brought by all indispensable
parties
HELD: No. An indispensable party is one whose interest will
be affected by the courts action in the litigation, and without
whom no final determination of the case can be had. The
partys interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief
sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties
that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution
of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable.
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can
relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the other
party; and, (2) can the case be decided on the merits without
prejudicing the rights of the other party. There is, however, no
fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party;
this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of
the particular suit or litigation.
CAB: The ultimate relief sought by the action is the
reconveyance of titles to their rightful owners. The records
reveal that prior to the forgery, the disputed properties were
registered in the names of the co-owners, Glicerio, Tomas and
Caridad, whose interests remained undivided. Thus, if
reconveyance of the titles is granted, the titles will revert back
to the estates of the deceased co-owners and not to their
individual heirs, whose interests are divisible and may properly

be ventilated in another proceeding. Therefore, a co-heir may

bring such action without necessarily joining all the other coheirs as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted
for the benefit of all.
DOCTRINE: An indispensable party is one whose interest
will be affected by the courts action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
The partys interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the
relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other
parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution
of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable. There is, however, no fixed formula for
determining who is an indispensable party; this can only be
determined in the context and by the facts of the particular suit
or litigation.

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORP V. COURT OF

APPEALS, 149 SCRA 562 (1987)
FACTS: The instant case is originally an action for torts and
damages and specific performance with a prayer for temporary
restraining order
1. The damages were not specifically stated in the prayer
but the body of the complaint assessed a P78.75 million
damages suffered by petitioner Manchester Devt.
2. The docket fees paid was only P410. The said docket
fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that
their action is primarily for specific performance;
hence, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
3. The trial court ruled that there was an under-assessment
of docket fees, hence it ordered Manchester to amend
its complaint.
4. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the
amount of claim for damages to P10 million. Said
amount, however, was not stated in the prayer.
ISSUE: When does a court acquire jurisdiction?
HELD: The rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed
only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court." Thus, in the present case the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of
only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the
complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal
purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed
which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting
the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and
actions taken by the trial court are null and void. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the

prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or

similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading.
DOCTRINE: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of
the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading.

NEGROS SLASHERS V. TENG, 666 SCRA 629 (2012)

FACTS: Alvin Teng, a professional basketball player, signed a
3-year contract with the Laguna Lakers. Before the expiration
of his contract, the Lakers traded him to Negros Slashers, on
the condition that Negros the latter was to assume the
obligation of Laguna Lakers.
1. However, Teng played poorly during the national
championship. on Game 5, Tend called-in sick and did
not play
2. After notice and hearing, Negros Slashers informed
Teng of its decision to terminate Teng from the team
3. As such, Teng filed a complaint before the Office of the
Commissioner of the MBA. Subsequently, Teng filed an
illegal dismissal case with Regional Arbitration Branch
of NLRC
4. The Labor Arbtier found Tengs dismissal invalid citing
that Tengs below-par performance did not constitute
serious misconduct or willful disobedience that would
merit the penalty of dismissal. On appeal, NLRC
reversed the LAs decision for being premature since
the arbitration proceedings before the Commissioner of
MBA were still pending when he filed his labor case
5. Teng filed an MR but the same was denied for being
filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period
6. As such, Teng filed a petition for certiorari with CA
assailing the NLRC decision. CA reinstated the LAs
findings
7. Negros Slashers argument: Teng violated the rule on
forum shopping when it filed a complaint before MBA
and during the pendency of the arbitration, Teng filed
another complaint for illegal dismissal with the LA

8. Tengs contention: There is no forum shopping since it

was only after the MBA failed to come up with a
resolution on the matter that he opted to seek legal
redress with the LA
ISSUE: WON Teng violated the rule on forum shopping
HELD: No. For forum shopping to exist, it is necessary that
(a) there be identity of parties or at least such parties that
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) there be
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in one
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the other action.
CAB: Petitioners are correct as to the first two requisites of
forum shopping. First, there is identity of parties involved:
Negros Slashers Inc. and respondent Teng. Second, there is
identity of rights asserted i.e., the right of management to
terminate employment and the right of an employee against
illegal termination. However, the third requisite of forum
shopping is missing in this case. Any judgment or ruling of the
Office of the Commissioner of the MBA will not amount to res
judicata.
According to the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.
Res judicata is defined in jurisprudence as to have four basic
elements: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must
be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court

having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Although contractually authorized to settle disputes, the Office
of the Commissioner of the MBA is not a court of competent
jurisdiction as contemplated by law with respect to the
application of the doctrine of res judicata.
DOCTRINE: For forum shopping to exist, it is necessary that
(a) there be identity of parties or at least such parties that
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) there be
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in one
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the other action
A requirement of res judicata is that the decision must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties. Although contractually authorized to
settle disputes, the Office of the Commissioner of the MBA is
not a court of competent jurisdiction as contemplated by law
with respect to the application of the doctrine of res judicata.

MEDIAN CONTAINER CORP V. METROPOLITAN

BANK & TRUST CO, 561 SCRA 622 (2008)
FACTS: Metrobank filed a complaint for sum of money before
Makati RTC against petitioner Median Container Corp (MMC)
and spouses Ley as officers of the petitioner corporation
1. The process server served the Service of Summons
which was received by Danilo Ong, who indicated in
the receipt was the General Manager of MMC
2. MCC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of defective Service of Summons and defective
verification and certification against forum shopping
3. MMC questioned the authority of Atty. Alexander
Mendoza, who had verified and signed the certificate
against forum shopping
4. It appears that Atty. Mendoza verified the complaint
and signed the certification against forum shopping on
May 28, 2003. However, it was only on June 3, 2003
that Metrobank authorized Atty. Mendozas actions. In
effect, there is no valid and effective verification and
certification by the bank in its complaint
5. The trial court denied MMCs motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: WON there was defective verification and certification
against non-forum shopping on the part of Metrobank
HELD: No.
Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement. It is
simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in
the pleading are true and correct, and that the pleading is filed
in good faith. That explains why a court may order the
correction of the pleading if verification is lacking, or on the

pleading although it is not verified, if the attending

circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules
may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.
As for the required certification of non-forum shopping, failure
to comply therewith is generally not curable by its submission
subsequent to the filing of the petition nor by amendment, and
is cause for its dismissal. A certification against forum
shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which
is unaccompanied by prof that the signatory is authorized to
file the petition is generally likewise cause for dismissal.
However, the Court has relaxed the application of these
requirements upon appreciation of attendant special
circumstances (e.g. the certificate of non-forum shopping was
filed 1 day after the filing of election protest).
CAB: The passing on June 3, 2004 of a Board Resolution of
authorization before the actual filing on June 23, 2004 of the
complaint is deemed a ratification of Atty. Mendoza's prior
execution on May 28, 2004 of the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping, thus curing any defects thereof.
DOCTRINE: Verification distinguished from Certification
against forum shopping
Verification
Formal requirement; Not necessary except
when required by law
Purpose: to assure that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct
Court ay order the correct of pleading if
verification is lacking

Certification against foru

Jurisdictional requirement (ma

Purpose: to prevent multiplicit

The lack of certification agains

shopping is
not curable by mere amendmen

complaint, but shall be a cause for the

dismissal of the case without prejudice

BUNGCAYAO SR. V. FORT ILOCANDIA, 618 SCRA 381

(2010)
FACTS: Bungcayao claimed to be one of the entpreneurs who
introduced improvements on the Calayab beach when Fort
Ilocandia started its construction.

1. Bungcayao (and other DSierto) was granted a

provision permit from DENR-CENRO
2. Fort Ilocandia filed a foreshore application over its 14hectare property, including the portion applied for by
DSierto members
3. DENR denied the DSierto application on the ground
that the subject area applied for fell within the titled
property or the foreshore applied by Fort Ilocandia
4. During a mediation, the members of DSierto accepted
the settlement of P400,000 to vacate the property
5. Petitioner alleged his son attended the meeting and was
persuaded to sign the document
6. Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity
of contract
7. As counter-claim Fort Ilocandia prayed that petitioner
be required to return the P400,00 from respondent, and
vacate the portion they had occupied
8. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, CA
ruled that the claims made by respondent were
compulsory in nature, as they arose out of the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter
of the opposing partys claim and did not require for its
adjudication in the presence of third parties of whom
the court could not acquire jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON the respondents counter-claim is compulsory
HELD: No.
A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any
relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing
party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily
connected, with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the

subject matter of the plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in

the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred
in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the
same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive.
The Court has ruled that the compelling test of compulsoriness
characterizes a counterclaim as compulsory if there should
exist a logical relationship between the main claim and the
counterclaim. The criteria to determine whether the
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive are as follows:
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the
claim and by the counterclaim largely the
same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants claim, absent the compulsory
rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support
or refute plaintiffs claim as well as
defendants counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relations between the
claim and the counterclaim?
A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
counterclaim is compulsory.
CAB: Respondent filed three counterclaims. The first was for
recovery of the P400,000 given to Manuel, Jr.; the second was
for recovery of possession of the subject property; and the third
was for damages. The first counterclaim was rendered moot
with the issuance of the 6 November 2003 Order confirming
the agreement of the parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment,

Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and to return the P400,000 to

respondent. Respondent waived and renounced the third
counterclaim for damages. The only counterclaim that
remained was for the recovery of possession of the subject
property. While this counterclaim was an offshoot of the
same basic controversy between the parties, it is very clear that
it will not be barred if not set up in the answer to the complaint
in the same case. Respondents second counter-claim is only
a permissive counterclaim.
It is not a compulsory
counterclaim. It is capable of proceeding independently of
the main case.
The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees. Any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any
time, even on appeal before this Court

CAB: Respondent did not dispute the non-payment of docket

fees. Respondent only insisted that its claims were all
compulsory counterclaims. As such, the judgment by the trial
court in relation to the second counterclaim is considered null
and void without prejudice to a separate action which
respondent may file against petitioner
DOCTRINE: The compelling test of compulsoriness
characterizes a counterclaim as compulsory if there should
exist a logical relationship between the main claim and the
counterclaim. There exists such a relationship when conducting
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would
entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties
and the court; when the multiple claims involve the same
factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the
same basic controversy between the parties