G.R. No.

5246
September 16, 1910
MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee.
Ramon Salinas, for appellants.
Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba, are
the only heirs of Doa Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey, deceased. Remedio
s Grey y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, was married on the 21st day of March
, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of July, 1905, without leaving any
heirs except her husband. The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to have reg
istered the following-described property:
A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag, Pr
ovince of Bulacan, upon which are situated three houses and one camarin of light
material, having a superficial area of 52 hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares; b
ounded on the north by the highway (calzada) of Talampas and the lands of Rita R
uiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo, Hermenegildo Pr
ado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on the south by the
same stream and the lands of the capellania; and on the west by the stream calle
d Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de la Cruz, Jose Camacho and Domingo R
uiz Mateo.
This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane
and is assessed at $1,000 United States currency. The petition, which was filed
on the 18th of December, 1906, was accompanied by a plan and technical descripti
on of the above-described parcel of land.
After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of February,
1908, a decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of
Act No. 926, directing that the land described in the petitioner be registered
in the names of the four petitioners, as coowners, subject to the usufructuary r
ight of Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios Grey.
On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Cou
rt of Land Registration asking for a revision of the case, including the decisio
n, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of land whic
h are described in said motion, and which, according to his allegations, are inc
luded in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged that the decree of Feb
ruary 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, th
ereby depriving him of said two parcels of land. He further alleged that he was
the absolute owner of the two parcels of land, having inherited them from his fa
ther, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same. He therefore
asked, under the provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496)
, a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude
the two parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motio
n reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both
parties, rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its decision modifying the fo
rmer decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacle
to Ratilla de la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed
and now insist, first, that the trial court erred in reopening the case and modi
fying its decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the reason that said decr
ee was not obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the court erred in hold
ing that the two parcels of land described in the appellee's motion are not thei
r property.
It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma part of
the land described in the petition and were included in the decree of February
12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the owners of the remainder of the land d
escribed in the said decree.
The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the same, i
ncluding the two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a pu
blic document dated the 26th of November, 1864, duly executed before Francisco I
riarte, alcalde mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province o

f Bulacan.
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a stat
e grant for several parcels of land, including the two parcels in question. This
grant was duly inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on the 6th
of April of the same year.
It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this
case the appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is a
lso admitted that the name of the appellee does not appear in the said petition
as an occupant of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that the appellee
was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason they did not in
clude his name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends th
at he was occupying the said parcels as the absolute owner under the estate gran
t by inheritance.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include
the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels
of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted
fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial
court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the publi
c document of purchase of 1864.
The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died prior
to that time. Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years of ag
e when their mother died. So these children were minors when the father of the a
ppellee obtained the estate grant.
On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the petitioner
s, who were then minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners' deceased pare
nts to one Irineo Jose for a period of three years. On the 23d of March, 1895, t
he said Jose Grey, as the representative of the petitioners, rented the same lan
d for a period of six years to Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee.
This rental contract was duly executed in writing. This land was cultivated duri
ng these six years by Baldomero R. de la Cruz and his children, one of whom is t
he appellee. On the 14th of December, 1905, Jose Grey, for himself and the other
petitioners, rented the same land to Estanislao R. de la Cruz for a period of t
wo years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering into this rental contract with Jose
Grey did so for himself and his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the
appellee admits that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts
and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners' land, nevertheless he insists that
the two small parcels in question were not included in these contracts. In the
rental contract between the uncle of the petitioners and he father of the appell
ee the land is not described. In the rental contract between Jose Grey, one of t
he petitioners, and Estanislao R. de la Cruz, brother of the appellee, the two s
mall parcels of land in question are included, according to the description give
n therein. This was found to be true by the court below, but the said court held
that as this contract was made by Estanislao R. de la Cruz it was not binding u
pon Anacleto R. de la Cruz, the appellee.
The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of the p
etitioners in 1864, as is evidenced by the public document of purchase and sale
of that year. The same two parcels of land are included in the state grant issue
d in favor of Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was obtained afte
r the death of the petitioners' parents and while they were minors. So it is cle
ar that the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the sa
id parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their application for regi
stration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when th
ey omitted to include in their application the name of the appellee as one of th
e occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required th
at they include in their application the names of their tenants. Under these cir
cumstances, did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June,
1908, after its decree had been entered in February of the same year?
The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by
the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contai
n an accurate description of the land. It shall contain the name in full and the

address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of
land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state wh
at search has been made to find them. In the form of notice given by statute, wh
ich shall be sworn to, the applicant is required to state and set forth clearly
all mortgages or encumbrances affecting said land, if any, the rights and intere
sts, legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder, reversion, or expectancy
of all persons, with their names in full, together with their place of residence
and post office addresses. Upon receipt of the application the clerk shall caus
e notice of the filling to be published twice in the Official Gazette. This publ
ished notice shall be directed to all persons appearing to have an interest in t
he land sought to be registered and to the adjoining owners, and also "to all wh
om it may concern." In addition to the notice in the Official Gazette the Land C
ourt shall, within seven days after said publication, cause a copy of the notice
, in Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk to every person named in the application
whose address is known; to cause a duly attested copy of the notice, in Spanish
, to be posted in a conspicuous place on every parcel of land included in the ap
plication, and in a conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of the tow
n in which the land is situated. The court may also cause other or further notic
e of the application to be given in such manner and to such persons as it may de
em proper. The certificate of the clerk that he has served the notice as directe
d by the court by publication or mailing shall be conclusive proof of such servi
ce. Within the time allowed in the notices, if no person appears and answers, th
e court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary app
earing, order a general default. By the description in the published notice "to
all whom it may concern," and by express provisions of law "all the word are mad
e parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default an order." If the cour
t, after hearing, finds that the applicant has title, as stated in his applicati
on, a decree or registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subjec
t only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the bra
nches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation
, or included in the general description "to all whom it may concern." Such decr
ee shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of
any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of l
and or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by f
raud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one
year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)
The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 referr
ed to above.
It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the outstandi
ng interest which he admits but also all claims of interest, though denied by hi
m. By express provision of law the world are made parties defendant by the descr
iption in the notice "to all whom it may concern."
Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question under
the circumstances as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he was made
a party defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree on the 12th of F
ebruary, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all persons, including the
appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is mentioned in the application, notice,
or citation.
The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of
the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and co
uld have been opened only on the ground that the said decree had been obtained b
y fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, in
asmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee was occupying these two small
parcels of land as their tenant. One of the petitioner went upon the premises w
ith the surveyor when the original plan was made.
Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Reg
istration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to

deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be a
lleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as distinguis
hed from constructive fraud.
The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian statutes ha
s been frequently raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the Australian cou
rts; the first is the distinction between the meaning of the word "fraud" in the
sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, and its me
aning in the sections relating to the protection of bona fide purchasers from re
gistered proprietors. The second is the distinction between "legal," "equitable,
" or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or "moral" fraud. In none of the groups
of the sections of the Australian statutes relating to the conclusive effect of
certificates of title, and in which fraud is referred to, is there any express i
ndication of the meaning of "fraud," with the sole exception of that of the Sout
h Australian group. (Hogg on Australian Torrens System, p. 834.)
With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive effect of ce
rtificates of title, it has been held in some cases that the "fraud" there menti
oned means actual or moral fraud, not merely constructive or legal fraud. In oth
er cases "fraud" has been said to include constructive, legal, and every kind of
fraud. In other cases, against, knowledge of other persons' right, and the deli
berate acquisition of registered title in the face of such knowledge, has been h
eld to be "fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of title so obtained;
and voluntary ignorance is, for this purpose, the same as knowledge. But in non
e of these three classes of cases was there absent the element of intention to d
eprive another of just rights, which constitutes the essential characteristics o
as distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in not
f actual
es Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.)
By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of Privy Cou
ncil in Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi, decided in
March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his Supplementary Addendum to his work on Austral
ian Torrens System, supra.) The same meaning should be given to the word "fraud"
used in section 38 of our statutes (Act No. 496).
The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within the me
aning of the word as used in our statutes, will in each case be a question of fa
ct. We will not attempt to say what acts would constitutes this kind of fraud in
other cases. This must be determined from the fact an circumstances in each par
ticular case. The only question we are called upon to determine, and have determ
ined, is whether or not, under the facts and circumstances in this case, the pet
itioners did obtain the decree of February 12, 1908, by means of fraud.
It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without du
e process of law, in violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 19
02, known as the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no law shall be enacted
in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."
The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition a
nd given notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee any good, as he
was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means
of the publication "to all whom it may concern." If this section of the Act is t
o be upheld this must be declared to be due process of law.
Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note t
he history and purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System
." This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857 a
nd was there worked out in its practicable form.
The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As
we have said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an app
lication for the registration of the title to lands, under this system, the theo
ry of the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and ot
her interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have have a right to
appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the proceeding is aga
inst the whole word. This system was evidently considered by the Legislature to
be a public project when it passed Act No. 496. The interest of the community at

large was considered to be preferred to that of private individuals.

At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to reg
istration of title to land, because immovable property is becoming more and more
a matter of commercial dealing, and there can be no trade without security. (Du
mas's Lectures, p. 23.)
The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he may evicte
d because his vendor had, unknown to him, already sold the and to a third person
. . . The registered proprietor may feel himself protected against any defect in
his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.)
The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of titles, made
by Sir Robert Torrens, has been fully justified in its use:
First. It has substituted security for insecurity.
Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and th
e time occupied from months to days.
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage.
Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the "thr
ee R's" can transact his own conveyancing.
Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.
Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding
titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has
barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, p
p. 75, 76.)
The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to lan
d was made by Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South Australia
in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title by registrationtakes the place of "ti
tle by deeds" of the system under the "general" law. A sale of land, for example
, is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is iss
ued. The certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, con
stitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein. Under the old system
the same sale would be effected by a conveyance, depending for its validity, apa
rt from intrinsic flaws, on the correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wil
ls, etc. . . . The object of the Torrens system, them, is to do away with the de
lay, uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing system. (Duffy & Eagleson
on The Transfer of Land Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)
By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of transac
tions with interest in land whose declared object . . . is, under governmental a
uthority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasi
ble title to realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on Australian Torrens s
ystem,supra, pp. 1, 2.)
Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in whi
ch the Torrens system has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will always occu
r. The percentage of errors, as compared with the number of registered dealings
in Australia, is very small. In New South Wales there were, in 1889, 209, 894 re
gistered dealings, the average risk of error being only 2 cents for each dealing
. In Queensland the risk of error was only 1 cents, the number of registered dea
lings being 233,309. In Tasmania and in Western Australia not a cent was paid fo
r compensation for errors during the whole time of operation, (Dumas's Lectures,
supra, p. 96.) This system has been adopted in various countries of the civiliz
ed world, including some of the States of the American Union, and practical expe
rience has demonstrated that it has been successful as a public project.
The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens syst
em has been the subject of judicial decision in the courts of the United States.
(People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575; People
vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration Act,"
was copied substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898.
The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts of tho
se States.
It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we never
heard of it before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110 U. S.

, 516.)
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requireme
nts of justice, a proceedingin rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted
and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the Stat
e or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of e
ither constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the r
es. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, fo
r it hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of
claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the
proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The Mary
(9 Cranch, 126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee Commissio
n (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 606, 611.
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particu
lar person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body,
or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are
entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may conc
ern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the o
bject is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of an
y sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world ha
s a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an
inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was hel
d conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. I
n this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 1
90, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody, although the only n
otice of the proceedings given is by general notice to all persons interested.
The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did no
t rest its judgment as to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground th
at the State has absolute power to determine the persons to whom a man's propert
y shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in rem. So
we conclude that the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the facts an
d circumstances, especially the absolute lack on the part of the petitioners of
any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure
him, constitute due process of law.
As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the p
rovisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366
, Compilation) we do not decide.
For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment appealed
from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor o
f the petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 1
2, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner, vs. LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHAL
F AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN
BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF SIMEON AYING, AND WENCESLAO SUMALINOG
, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF ROBERTA AYING, responden
ts.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking the modification of
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 7, 2000 which affirmed
with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu Ci
ty, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 2930-L; and the Resolution dated August 2, 2000
denying petitioner s motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters locat

ed at Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance o

f a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of land. After her death in
1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree i
n the name of Crisanta Maloloy-on s eight children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emili
ano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The ce
rtificate of title was, however, lost during the war.
Subsequently, all the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Par
tition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1964, conveying
the subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Company.
Said deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on March 6
, 1964 under Act No. 3344 (the law governing registration for unregistered land)
, and since then, petitioner had been religiously paying real property taxes on
said property.
In 1988, herein petitioner filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original T
itle as the original title over the subject property had been lost during the wa
r. On April 12, 1988, the court granted said petition, thereby directing the Re
gister of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to issue a reconstituted title in the name of
the abovementioned Aying siblings. Thus, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No
. RO-2856 was issued.
In 1991, petitioner, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject property,
sent out notices to vacate, addressed to persons occupying the property. Unhee
ded, petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants befor
e the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Lapu-Lapu City.
On February 1, 1994, the MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the property. The
case eventually reached this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 128102, entitled Aznar
Brothers Realty Company vs. Court of Appeals, Luis Aying, Demetrio Sida, Felomin
o Augusto, Federico Abing, and Romeo Augusto.[2] On March 7, 2000, a Decision wa
s promulgated in favor of herein petitioner, declaring it as the rightful posses
sor of the parcel of land in question.
Meanwhile, herein respondents, along with other persons claiming to be descendan
ts of the eight Aying siblings, all in all numbering around 220 persons, had fil
ed a complaint for cancellation of the Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sa
le, recovery of ownership, injunction and damages with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City
. The complaint was dismissed twice without prejudice. Said complaint was re-f
iled on August 19, 1993, docketed as Civil Case No. 2930-L.
In their amended complaint, herein respondents (plaintiffs before the RTC) alleg
ed that: they are co-owners of subject property, being descendants of the regist
ered owners thereof under OCT No. RO-2856; they had been in actual, peaceful, ph
ysical, open, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession in concept of own
er of subject parcel of land since time immemorial; their possession was disturb
ed only in the last quarter of 1991 when some of them received notices to vacate
from petitioner and several weeks thereafter, earthmoving equipment entered the
disputed land, bulldozing the same and destroying plants, trees and concrete mo
numents ( mohon ); respondents discovered that such activities were being undertaken
by petitioner together with Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.; petitioner
claimed to be the owner of subject property by virtue of an extra-judicial part
ition of real estate with deed of absolute sale executed in petitioner s favor by
the alleged heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on; the aforementioned extra-judicial part
ition of real estate with deed of absolute sale is a fraud and is null and void
ab initio because not all the co-owners of subject property affixed their signat
ure on said document and some of the co-owners who supposedly signed said docume
nt had been dead at the time of the execution thereof; petitioner entered subjec
t land in bad faith, knowing fully well that it did not have any right to the la
nd and used force, threat and intimidation against respondents; and they suffere
d moral damages.[3]
Petitioner (defendant before the RTC) filed its Answer, denying that respondents
are the lawful owners of subject parcel of land by virtue of their being descen
dants or heirs of the registered owners of subject property. Instead, petitione
r alleged that it had been in actual possession of subject land as owner thereof
by virtue of the extra-judicial partition of real property and deed of absolute

sale executed in its favor; that in fact, it had been paying taxes thereon reli
giously; that it tolerated about 6 persons to live on said land but said persons
were eventually ejected by court order. Petitioner then raised the affirmative
defenses of failure to state cause of action and prescription, as it took respo
ndents 27 years, 10 months and 27 days to file the action to recover subject pro
perty, when an action to recover property based on an implied trust should be in
stituted within 4 years from discovery of the fraud.[4]
In the Pre-Trial Order dated January 30, 1995 of the RTC, the issues were narrow
ed down to the following:
1.
Whether or not the plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the heirs o
f the registered owners of Lot No. 4399.
2.
Whether or not plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 4399.
3.
Whether or not the defendant Aznar [herein petitioner] is estopped
to make any claim on Lot No. 4399.
4.
Whether or not the defendant Aznar is a builder in bad faith.
5.
Whether or not the defendants are liable for damages and attorney s
fees in favor of the plaintiffs.
6.
Whether or not the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with De
ed of Absolute Sale is valid and had, in effect, validly conveyed to defendant A
znar Lot No. 4399.
7.
Whether or not the plaintiffs action has prescribed.[5]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated July 4, 1997, ruling that respond
ents evidence failed to prove that the extra-judicial partition with deed of abso
lute sale was a totally simulated or fictitious contract and concluded that said
document is valid, thus, effectively conveying to petitioner the property in qu
estion. It further held that respondents action had prescribed in that the actio
n is considered as one for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust,
it prescribed in 10 years from the registration of the deed on March 6, 1964; an
d if the action is considered as one for annulment of contract on the ground of
fraud, it should have been filed within 4 years from discovery of the fraud. Th
e trial court also ruled that respondents failed to present any admissible proof
of filiation, hence, they were not able to prove that they are indeed heirs of
the eight Aying siblings who appear as the registered owners under OCT No. RO-28
56.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the amended complaint on the g
round of prescription, and declaring the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate
with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1964 as valid and binding, adjudging
that Lot 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at Dapdap, Mactan, La
pu-Lapu City had been validly conveyed to and in favor of Aznar Brothers Realty
Company, and directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to register the a
bove-mentioned deed in accordance with law and to cancel Original Certificate of
Title No. RO-2856, and to issue a transfer certificate of title in the name o
f Aznar Brothers Realty Company upon payment of the necessary registration fees
pursuant thereto.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued in this case is hereby ordered dissolv
ed.
The Motion for Contempt filed by the plaintiffs against defendants is dismissed
for want of factual and legal basis.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Herein respondents appealed the foregoing decision to the CA and on March 7, 200
0, said court promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which is repr
oduced hereunder:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested Decision while AFFIRMED is hereby MODIFI
ED. The heirs of Emiliano Aying, Simeon Aying and Roberta Aying are hereby decl
ared as the lawful owners of the contested property but equivalent only to 3/8.
SO ORDERED.
In modifying the RTC judgment, the CA ratiocinated that an action for recovery of
possession of registered land never prescribes in view of the provision of Sect

ion 44, Act No. 496 (now Sec. 47, PD 1520), to the effect that no title to regis
tered land in derogation to that of a registered owner shall be acquired by pres
cription.
The CA further ruled that even if the action is deemed to be based on
implied trust, prescription did not begin to run since there is no evidence that
positive acts of repudiation were made known to the heirs who did not participa
te in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale. Thus, striking down the RTC s ruling that the respondents complaint
is dismissible on the ground of prescription, the CA held instead that herein r
espondents action had not prescribed but upheld the validity of the Extra-Judicia
l Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale, except as to the shares o
f the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta, who did not participate in the exec
ution of said document.
Herein petitioner s motion for reconsideration of the CA decision was denied per R
esolution dated August 2, 2000.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision o
n the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT AN HEIR OF THE ORIG
INAL REGISTERED OWNER MAY LOSE HIS RIGHT TO RECOVER A TITLED PROPERTY BY REASON
OF LACHES;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT THE ACT OF REGISTRA
TION OF THE DEED OF PARTITION WITH SALE MAY BE CONSIDERED AN UNEQUIVOCAL REPUDIA
TION OF THE TRUST GIVING RISE TO PRESCRIPTION;
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1104 OF
THE CIVIL CODE TO THE EFFECT THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF BAD FAITH OR FRAUD, THE PAR
TITION WITH PRETERITION OF ANY COMPULSORY HEIR SHALL NOT BE RESCINDED.[7]
In their Comment, respondents argue that this case is an action to declare as nu
ll and void the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sa
le, hence, under Article 1410 of the Civil Code, an action for declaration of an
inexistent contract does not prescribe. Respondents further posit that the pri
nciple of laches should be applied against petitioner and not against them, as t
hey (respondents) had been in actual possession of the subject property, while p
etitioner merely brought action to eject them more than 29 years after the alleg
ed execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolut
e Sale. They also refuted petitioner s arguments regarding the application of the
principles of implied and constructive trusts in this case.
At the outset, it should be stressed that not all the plaintiffs who filed the a
mended complaint before the trial court had been impleaded as respondents in the
present petition. The only parties impleaded are the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon
and Roberta Aying, whom the CA adjudged as owners of a 3/8 portion of the land
in dispute for not having participated in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Pa
rtition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.
It is significant to note that herein petitioner does not question the CA conclu
sion that respondents are heirs of the aforementioned three Aying siblings. Hen
ce, the trial court and appellate court s findings that the Extra- Judicial Partit
ion of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was not forged nor simulated and t
hat the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying did not participate in the e
xecution thereof, are now beyond cavil.
The issues raised by petitioner for the Court s resolution are (1) whether or not
respondents cause of action is imprescriptible; and (2) if their right to bring a
ction is indeed imprescriptible, may the principle of laches apply.
Respondents alleged in their amended complaint that not all the co-owners of the
land in question signed or executed the document conveying ownership thereof to
petitioner and made the conclusion that said document is null and void. We agr
ee with the ruling of the RTC and the CA that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Re
al Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and binding only as to the heirs w
ho participated in the execution thereof, hence, the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon a
nd Roberta Aying, who undisputedly did not participate therein, cannot be bound

by said document.
However, the facts on record show that petitioner acquired the entire parcel of
land with the mistaken belief that all the heirs have executed the subject docum
ent. Thus, the trial court is correct that the provision of law applicable to
this case is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaini
ng it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the bene
fit of the person from whom the property comes.
In Vda. De Esconde vs. Court of Appeals,[8] the Court expounded thus:
Construing this provision of the Civil Code, in Philippine National Bank v. Cour
t of Appeals, the Court stated:
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technica
l sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named
a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust, respec
ting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que tru
st. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or ge
nerate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a tru
stee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust,
there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-ca
lled trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the
beneficiary.[9]
The concept of constructive trusts was further elucidated in the same case, as f
ollows:
. . . implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible
from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduce
d on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of
the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either res
ulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from each other as
follows:
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration
and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed
always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature of
circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person
thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold hi
s legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trust
s are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of j
ustice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against
one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal rig
ht to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.[10] (
Emphasis supplied)
Based on such concept of constructive trusts, the Court ruled in said case that:
The rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property e
ntrusted to him until and unless he repudiates the trust, applies to express tru
sts and resulting implied trusts. However, in constructive implied trusts, pres
cription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship.
Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a condition precedent to the runn
ing of the prescriptive period.[11]
The next question is, what is the applicable prescriptive period?
In Amerol vs. Bagumbaran,[12] the Court expounded on the prescriptive period wit
hin which to bring an action for reconveyance of property based on implied or co
nstructive trust, to wit:
. . . under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constr
uctive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corre
sponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of t
he true owner. In this context, and vis--vis prescription, Article 1144 of the C
ivil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the t
ime the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment.

xxx
xxx
xxx
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perfor
ce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this C
ourt, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, i
t is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or con
structive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title o
ver the property.[13]
It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from
the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certific
ate of title over the property, but if the person claiming to be the owner there
of is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, whic
h in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.[14]
In the present case, respondents Wenceslao Sumalinog, an heir of Roberta Aying;
Laurencio Aying, an heir of Emiliano Aying; and Paulino Aying, an heir of Simeon
Aying, all testified that they had never occupied or been in possession of the
land in dispute.[15] Hence, the prescriptive period of ten years would apply to
herein respondents.
The question then arises as to the date from which the ten-year period should be
reckoned, considering that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Dee
d of Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496 (
Land Registration Act), despite the fact the land in dispute was already titled
under Act No. 496 in the names of the Aying siblings at the time the subject doc
ument was executed.
In Spouses Abrigo vs. De Vera,[16] it was held that registration of instruments
must be done in the proper registry, in order to affect and bind the land and, t
hus, operate as constructive notice to the world.[17] Therein, the Court ruled:
x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefo
re a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent sale is registered not un
der the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not c
onsidered REGISTERED x x x .[18]
In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Abs
olute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496, said doc
ument is deemed not registered. Accordingly, the ten-year prescriptive period c
annot be reckoned from March 6, 1964, the date of registration of the subject do
cument under Act No. 3344. The prescriptive period only began to run from the t
ime respondents had actual notice of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate
with Deed of Absolute Sale.
The only evidence on record as to when such prescriptive period commenced as to
each of the respondents are Wenceslao Sumalinog s (heir of Roberta Aying) testimon
y that about three years after 1964, they already learned of the existence of th
e Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale;[19] and La
urencio Aying s (heir of Emiliano Aying) admission that he found out about the sal
e of the land in dispute a long time ago and can only estimate that it must be a
fter martial law.[20] Paulino Aying (heir of Simeon Aying) gave no testimony wha
tsoever as to when the children of Simeon Aying actually learned of the existenc
e of the document of sale. On the other hand, petitioner did not present any ot
her evidence to prove the date when respondents were notified of the execution o
f the subject document.
In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying
and Simeon Aying discovered the existence of the document of sale, it must be de
termined which party had the burden of proof to establish such fact.
The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to
an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the fact
s averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain.[21] Moreover, one alle
ging a fact that is denied has the burden of proving it and unless the party ass
erting the affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof of that issue by
a preponderance of the evidence, his cause will not succeed.[22] Thus, the defe
ndant bears the burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses which he sets up
in answer to the plaintiff s claim or cause of action; he being the party who asse

rts the truth of the matter he has alleged, the burden is upon him to establish
the facts on which that matter is predicated and if he fails to do so, the plain
tiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor.[23]
In the case at bar, it was petitioner, as the defendant before the RTC, which se
t up in its Answer the affirmative defense of prescription. It was, therefore,
incumbent upon petitioner to prove the date from which the prescriptive period b
egan to run. Evidence as to the date when the ten-year prescriptive period bega
n exists only as to the heirs of Roberta Aying, as Wenceslao Sumalinog admitted
that they learned of the existence of the document of sale in the year 1967. As
to the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, there is no clear evidence of
the date when they discovered the document conveying the subject land to petitio
ner. Petitioner miserably failed to adduce proof of when the heirs of Emiliano
Aying and Simeon Aying were notified of the subject document. Hence, with regar
d to said heirs, the Court may consider the admission in the amended complaint t
hat they learned of the conveyance of the disputed land only in 1991 when petiti
oner sent notices to vacate to the occupants of the subject land, as the date fr
om which the ten-year prescriptive period should be reckoned.
Respondents filed their Amended Complaint on December 6, 1993.[24] Thus, with re
gard to respondent heirs of Roberta Aying who had knowledge of the conveyance as
far back as 1967, their cause of action is already barred by prescription when
said amended complaint was filed as they only had until 1977 within which to bri
ng action. As to the respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, they were a
ble to initiate their action for reconveyance of property based on implied or co
nstructive trust well within the ten-year prescriptive period reckoned from 1991
when they were sent by petitioner a notice to vacate the subject property.
Evidently, laches cannot be applied against respondent heirs of Emiliano and Sim
eon Aying, as they took action to protect their interest well within the period
accorded them by law.
With regard to petitioner s argument that the provision of Article 1104 of the Civ
il Code, stating that a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory
heirs shall not be rescinded, should be applied, suffice it to say that the Ext
ra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is not being res
cinded. In fact, its validity had been upheld but only as to the parties who pa
rticipated in the execution of the same. As discussed above, what was conveyed
to petitioner was ownership over the shares of the heirs who executed the subjec
t document. Thus, the law, particularly, Article 1456 of the Civil Code, impose
d the obligation upon petitioner to act as a trustee for the benefit of responde
nt heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying who, having brought their action within th
e prescriptive period, are now entitled to the reconveyance of their share in th
e land in dispute.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2000 is MODIFIED, as follows: The amended c
omplaint of the heirs of Roberta Aying is DISMISSED on the ground of prescriptio
n. However, the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, having instituted the
action for reconveyance within the prescriptive period, are hereby DECLARED as
the LAWFUL OWNERS of a 2/8 portion of the parcel of land covered by Original Cer
tificate of Title No. RO-2856.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

ANDREA M. MOSCOSO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMINA L. MORON, Respo
ndents.
GUERRERO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the defunct Court of Appeal
s 1 (now the Intermediate Appellate Court) in CAGR No. 52187-B entitled "Applica
tion for Land Registration Under Act No. 496-Andrea M. Moscoso, applicant-appell
ant versus Maximina L. Moron, et al., oppositors-appellees" which affirmed the j
udgment of the Court of First Instance of Tacloban City in Land Registration Cas
e No. N 134.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
Sometime on March 22, 1966, petitioner applied for land registration of a 1,147
square meters residential lot situated in the poblacion of the municipality of P
alo, province of Leyte, bounded and described in Survey Plan Psu-54699 of the th
en General Land Registration Office as verified and approved under date June 16,
1927. Her application substantially stated that petitioner is the owner in fee
simple of the land and improvements thereon as her acquisition by inheritance fr
om her father, the late Pascual Monge y Vigera who died on June 9, 1950, and tha
t the same parcel of land is her share in a partial partition of estate she and
her brothers and sisters executed on May 22, 1964 at Palo, Leyte (Exhibit "K");
that she and her predecessors in interest have been in continuous, public, actua
l and adverse possession of the land applied for since time immemorial until the
present; that at the last assessment for taxation, said lot was assessed in her
name under Tax Declaration No. 28260 dated May 24, 1964 (Exhibit H and that the
taxes are fully paid up to the current year; that to the best of her knowledge
and belief, there is no incumbrance or any kind whatsoever affecting said land n
or any other person having interest therein, legal or equitable, in posession, r
emainder, reversion or expectancy; and that the land is now being rented by less
ees of the applicant, namely, Angel Encenares, Olanda Bribe, Timoteo Noblejas, F
elisa Adre, Celestina Solana, Baltazar Collado, all of Palo, Leyte.virtualawlibr
ary virtual law library
After due publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing of the petition in the Of
ficial Gazette, Vol. 62, Nos. 46 and 47, issues dated November 14 and 21, 1966 (
Exhibit "C"), only the Highway District Engineer of Leyte as public oppositors,
and Concordia Lanuncia, Flaviano L. Marchadesch, Jr., and herein private respond
ent Maximina L. Moron as private oppositors appeared for the initial hearing bef
ore the trial court.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
The trial court summarily dismissed the opposition of the Highway District Engin
eer who merely sought to secure a reservation for a road right-of-way in favor o

f the national government in view of petitioner's willingness to annotate the sa

me on the certificate of title which might issue. The opposition of the private
parties thus remained.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
The written opposition substantially allege that they, including one Mrs. Apolon
ia L. Marchadesch who died in 1963 and survived by her only issue, oppositor Fla
viano L. Marchadesch, are the illegitimate children of the late Zenona Lanuncia
and the recognized natural children of the late Pascual Monge who died in 1950 a
nd father of applicant Andrea M. Moscoso; that the late Zenona Lanuncia, from th
e age of three, became a protegee of the late spouses, Saturnino Monge and Isidr
a Vigera Monge, letigimate parents of Pascual Monge and Juan Monge, now deceased
; that Isidra Vigera Monge was the original owner of the parcel of land applied
for; that Isidra Monge, long before she died on April 15, 1915, and after Pascua
l Monge legally got married to the mother of the applicant and brother and siste
rs, and in order to provide a home and subsistence to the oppositors, their sist
er and mother, all of which are girls, effected a verbal partition of her lands
with her sons, Pascual, Juan and with the herein oppositor, who were already at
their teens, which, by virtue of said partition, the land herein applied for reg
istration passed to the hands of the oppositors for their home; that the opposit
ors have no knowledge that this parcel of land forms part of the inheritance of
the applicant and of a partial partition among the applicant and her brother and
sisters; that the oppositors have, if not legal, an equitable title to the land
as judged from the circumstances surrounding the oppositors' case; they deny th
e allegation that applicant and her predecessors in interest have been in contin
uous, public, actual and adverse possession of the land from time immemorial, th
e truth being that the oppositors exercised exclusive dominion over the land and
are in actual and continuous possession over it from time immemorial to the pre
sent and that should the verbal partition effected before the death of Isidra Vi
gera Monge in 1915 being insufficient to pass title to the oppositor, then by vi
rtue of acquisitive prescription caused by the open, continuous, uninterrupted,
peaceful and adverse possession in favor of oppositors, they are entitled to the
land invoking the benefits of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141. 2 virtu
al law library
Upon the termination of the hearing on the merits, the Hon. Jesus N. Borromeo, t
hen Presiding Judge of the CFI, Tacloban City, rendered his decision dated Decem
ber 22, 1971, directing that the title over the land should not be registered ex
clusively in the name of the applicant since "it has been overwhelmingly establi
shed by them (the private oppositors) that they and their sister Apolonia, who d
ied in 1963, are the children of Zenona Lanuncia and Pascual Monge resulting fro
m the relations between the two prior to the marriage of the latter with Guadalu
pe Oliver, mother of herein petitioner and her brothers, Elpidio, Salvador, Reme
dios, Ruperto, and Abelardo (deceased), all surnamed Monge. 3 Hence, the judgmen
t decreed:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the registrat
ion of title over the parcel of land situated in the poblacion of the municipali
ty of Palo, Province of Leyte, as described in the Plan Psu-54699, Exhibit "E",
and the technical description Exhibit "F", in the name of the co-ownership of: (
1) Andrea M. Moscoso, Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Salvador Moscos
o, with postal address at Bupsong, Antique for three-fourth (3/4) share; (2) Con
cordia Lanuncia, Filipino citizen, of legal age, single, and a resident of Palo,
Leyte, for one-twelfth (1/12) share; (3) Maximina L. Moron, Filipino citizen, o
f legal age, married, and a resident of Palo, Leyte, for (1/12) share; and, (4)
Flaviano L. Marchadesch, Jr., son of the late Apolonia L. Marchadesch, for one-t
welfth (1/12) share, subject to a reservation of a road right-of-way in favor of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.virtualawlibrary virtual law
library
After this judgment shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of reg
istration be issued.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
SO ORDERED. 4 virtual law library
The trial court ruled that the verbal donation made by Isidra Vigera Vda, de Mon
ge in favor of Zenona Lanuncia and the latter's daughters by Pascual Monge becau

se they are of weaker sex, was ineffectual to transmit title of ownership over t
he land in question and that their adverse claim of ownership even under extraor
dinary prescription of over thirty years could not favor them because such claim
is disputable due to their failure to declare the property for tax purposes in
their name after the death of Isidra Monge. The trial court, however, gave signi
ficant weight to the carbon copy of a power of attorney executed and signed by t
he late Pascual Monge on February 11, 1945 (Exhibit "2", "2-A" to "2-C" in favor
of Maximina L. Moron, wherein he stated that Maximins is his daughter and appoi
nted her as his Attorney-in-Fact to transact with the United States Armed Forces
in the Philippines in his behalf for the collection of rentals and other war da
mage claims due and payable to him. The court ruled that the power of attorney w
as an authentic writing wherein Maximina Lanuncia was voluntarily recognized as
the daughter of Pascual Monge. As found by the trial court thus,
Precisely, it would appear that, in his power of attorney executed on February 1
1, 1945 in favor of Maximina L. Moron, Exhibit "2", Pascual Monge stated that Ma
ximina is his daughter. The contention of petitioner that said power of attorney
was fraudulently altered in order to inse therein the words "my daughter . . ."
does not seem to be well-taken because, from an examination of the document, th
e Court does not notice concrete indications of alteration having been made in o
rder to suit the ends of the herein oppositors.virtualawlibrary virtual law libr
ary
Thus, the Court is of the view that the late Pascual Monge, who had no impedimen
t to marry Zenona Lanuncia when Maximina was conceived (Art. 119, Old Civil Code
; Art, 269, New Civil Code) had voluntarily recognized Maximina Lanuncia Moron a
s his child when in his power of attorney executed on February 11, 1945, he ment
ioned her as his daughter. ... 5 virtual law library
Petitioner assailed the Court's decision in his motion for reconsideration, cont
ending that the disposition of the estate should be governed by the Old Civil Co
de (Spanish Civil Code of 1889) since he died on June 9, 1950 while the New Civi
l Code took effect only on August, 1950; that assuming that the New Civil Code a
pplies in the case at bar the power of attorney (Exhibit "2") is not an authenti
c document to support voluntary recognition because the words "my daughter" reve
als a clear sign of erasure and is a product of falsification as presented in th
e rebuttal testimony of her brother Elpidio Monge and that said document is not
even a public document because it was merely acknowledged by the Municipal Mayor
of Palo, Leyte who had no authority to authenticate writings as public document
s which could be done only by a notary public.virtualawlibrary virtual law libra
ry
Acting upon the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the Court modified its dec
ision in the Order dated May 25, 1972 with the following dispositive portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of December 22, 1971 is hereby amended in
the sense that the Court hereby orders the registration of title over the parce
l of land situated in the poblacion of the municipality of Palo, Province of Ley
te, as described in the Plan Psu-54699, Exhibit "E", and the technical descripti
on Exhibit "F" in the name of the co- ownership of (1) Andrea M. Moscoso, Filipi
no citizen, of legal age, married to Salvador Moscoso, with postal address at Bu
gasong, Antique, for 13/14 share; and (2) Maximina L. Moron for for share, subje
ct to the reservation of a road right-of-way in favor of the government of the P
hilippines.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
After this judgment shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of reg
istration be issued.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the amended judgment, petitioner elevated the case to the def
unct Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Hence, the
instant petition before Us.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
Petitioner assigns practically the same errors allegedly committed by the trial
court which were presented before the respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:
I. The lower court erred in holding that Pascual Monge voluntarily recognized Ma
ximina Lanuncia Moron as his natural child by virtue of the power of attorney (E
xhibit "2") executed by him in favor of the latter.virtualawlibrary virtual law

library
II. The lower court erred in holding that said power of attorney (Exhibit "2") i
s not materially altered when in fact it was erased to suit the ends of the oppo
sitors.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
III. The lower court erred in appreciating said power of attorney (Exhibit "2")
as a public document.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
IV. The lower court erred in making judicial pronouncements that Maximina Lanunc
ia Moron as the acknowledged natural child of Pascual Monge conferring upon her
legal right to inherit from the whole estate of the late Pascual Monge who died
on June 9, 1950 when her claim over the land subject of this land registration p
roceeding is that it was given to their mother Zenona Lanuncia by Isidra Vigera
and for their long continuous possession acquired the same by acquisitive prescr
iption.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
V. The lower court erred in making judicial pronouncement of recognition without
a formal complaint, hearing on the merit and neither has Maximina Lanuncia Moro
n the status of a continuous possession of a natural child.virtualawlibrary virt
ual law library
VI. The lower court erred in ordering the registration of the land applied for r
egistration in favor of the applicant, Andrea M. Moscoso, only 13/14 share and t
o oppositor Maximina Lanuncia Moron 1/14 share in co-ownership.
The principal or decisive issue to be resolved herein is whether or not opposito
r-appellee Maximina L. Moron had been acknowledged by her illegitimate father, P
ascual Monge (now deceased) in view of which, as held by the trial court and aff
irmed by the respondent appellate court, being an acknowledged natural daughter,
she would be entitled to 1/14 share in the land in question as her inheritance.
In resolving this issue, We are guided and must comply with the well-establishe
d rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals may not be reviewed by the
Supreme Court in an appeal by certiorari where such findings are ably supported
by substantial evidence on record, the same being binding, final and conclusive.
6 virtual law library
Hence, the finding of the appellate court that the power of attorney, Exhibit "2
", was not materially altered before the same was presented to the court below;
that it is "more likely that a mistake was committed in the preparation thereof;
that the person who typed the document had to make a slight erasure and correct
ion in typing correctly the word "daughter" and that t e power of attorney, as c
orrected, was then given to Pascual Monge and Maximina L. Moron for their signat
ure. As such, the correction cannot be considered a deliberate alteration or fal
sification as depicted by appellant", is a finding of fact which cannot be distu
rbed. We agree with the court that said power of attorney is an authentic writin
g wherein the father, Pascual Monge, voluntarily recognized Maximina L. Moron as
his daughter, and since Pascual Monge had the legal capacity to contract marria
ge at the time of the conception, Maximina is a natural child, entitled to share
in the inheritance of the property in question.virtualawlibrary virtual law lib
rary
It may be so as argued by the petitioner that where the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supr
eme Court is in order and resort to the duly proven evidence becomes necessary,
citing Gonlalez vs. CA, G.R. No. 37453, May 25, 1979, 90 SCRA 183 and cases cite
d therein. We have in fact noted that the trial court found no alteration in the
power of attorney, Exhibit "2", when it ruled that "from an examination of the
document, the court does not notice concrete indication of alteration having bee
n made therein in order to suit the ends of the herein oppositor." (Decision, pp
. 21-22, Record on Appeal), whereas respondent appellate court held that "(w)e f
ind it more likely that a mistake was committed in the preparation of the power
of attorney that the person who typed the document had to make a slight erasure
and correction in typing correctly the word "daughter" and that the power of att
orney, as corrected was then given to Pascual Monge and Maximina L. Moron for th
eir signature. As such, correction cannot be considered a deliberate falsificati
on, as depicted by appellant. "(CA Decision, p. 8) virtual law library
We have indeed scrutinized minutely the documentary evidence in question, Exhibi

t "2", as We have ordered the elevation of the original records before Us. We af
firm the holding of the appellate court that "What clearly appears to be the cas
e, upon clear examination, is that there is no erasure of the portion whereon "m
y" was typed. If, really, such 14-letter word was erased and in lieu thereof the
word "daughter" was typed or superimposed, the erasure would be very noticeable
and visible as the word "daughter", which is shorter by six letters, cannot ful
ly cover the space occupied by 1, administratrix". This could be easily seen by
the naked eye when the document, as in the instant case, was executed more than
25 years ago and has turned yellow with age. But this is not the case." There is
no inconsistency between the two findings of the trial and appellate courts. Bo
th support the authenticity of the document in ruling that there was no delibera
te falsification, which We uphold.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
Petitioner's contention that the Court of First Instance, acting as a land regis
tration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether the oppositor
is the acknowledged natural child of Pascual Monge, is untenable. We have a numb
er of cases that answer petitioner's position. Thus, in the case of Florentino v
s. Encarnacion, G.R. No. L-27697, Sept. 30,1977, 79 SCRA 193, 204-205, We ruled:
Petitioner-appellants' third assignment of error is not well taken. Firstly, the
otherwise rigid rule that the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, bein
g special and limited in character and proceedings thereon summary in nature, do
es not extend to cases involving issues properly litigable in other independent
suits or ordinary civil actions, has time and again been relaxed in special and
exceptional circumstances, (See Government of P.I. vs. Serafica, 61 Phil. 93 (19
34); Caoibes vs. Sison, 102 Phil. 19 (1957); Luna vs. Santos, 102 Phil. 588 (195
7); Cruz vs. Tan, 93 Phil. 348 (1953); Gurbax Singh Pabla and Co. vs. Reyes, 92
Phil. 117 (1952)). From these cases, it may be gleaned and gathered that the pec
uliarity of the exceptions is based not alone on the fact that the Land Registra
tion Courts are likewise the same Courts of First Instance, but also the followi
ng premises: (1) Mutual consent of the parties or their acquiescence in submitti
ng the aforesaid issues for the determination by the court in the registration p
roceedings; (2) Full opportunity given to the parties in the presentation of the
ir respective sides of the issues and of the evidence in support thereto; (3) Co
nsideration by the court that the evidence already of record is sufficient and a
dequate for rendering a decision upon these issues. (Aglipay vs. De Los Reyes, L
-12776, March 23, 1960) ...
Upon a scrutiny of the proceedings in the trial court, We find that petitioner f
iled a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration wherein she assailed the ruli
ng of the trial court that based upon Exhibit "2", the power of attorney, the op
positor was an acknowledged natural child of the late Pascual Monge and entitled
to a portion of the land subject of the land registration proceedings. She clai
med that the document was not authentic and not a public document. In effect, pe
titioner acquiesced in submitting the issue as to the status of the oppositor as
an acknowledged natural child entitled to successional rights and had the full
opportunity to dispute the authenticity of the document in question as in fact,
applicant's brother, Elpidio Monge, gave rebuttal testimony to support petitione
r's theory that the document was a product of a falsification, which the trial c
ourt did not believe. Moreover, the court considered and deemed the evidence alr
eady of record sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon the issue t
hus raised. In doing so, We find no abuse of discretion committed by the trial c
ourt.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
In addition, considerations of speedy justice and avoidance of multiplicity of s
uits impel Us to hold and rule that under the facts of the case at bar, the tria
l court, acting as a land registration court, may adjudicate the land sought to
be registered to either or both of the applicant and oppositor, in whole or in p
art, based on evidence submitted to the court showing that the party has proper
title for registration. (Section 37, Act 496.) virtual law library
In any event, as the Supreme Court said in Nicanor T. Santos vs. Rosa Ganayo, L31854, Sept. 9. 1972, 116 SCRA 431, "Whether a particular matter should be resol
ved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction o
r of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (Probate, Land Registration, et

c.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural q

uestion involving a mode of p- practice which may be waived." In meeting the iss
ue raised by the oppositor as to her status as an acknowledged natural child as
a result of her voluntary recognition appearing in Exhibit "2", the oppositor (n
ow the petitioner herein) had waived the procedural question and she may not be
allowed to raise the same in the present petition.virtualawlibrary virtual law l
ibrary
The proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens system i
s an action in rem not in personam hence, personal notice to all claimants of th
e res is not necessary to give the court jurisdiction to deal with and dispose o
f the res, and neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate th
e decree or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State, as soverei
gn over the land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title i
n a proceeding in rem or in the nature of a proceeding in rem which shall be bin
ding upon all persons, known or unknown. (City of Manila vs. Lack et al., 19 Phi
l. 324, 337; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of Lands vs. Roman Cathol
ic Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120; Aguilar vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661).virtu
alawlibrary virtual law library
Under the above doctrine, petitioner's assailment that "(t)he judicial pronounce
ment (referring to the holding that the oppositor Maximins L. Moron is the ackno
wledged natural child of Pascual Monge) which will become conclusive and far-rea
ching and in effect binds the other heirs of Pascual Monge consisting of the bro
thers and sisters as well as the nephews and nieces of the petitioner who are no
t parties in this prayer proceedings " is untenable.virtualawlibrary virtual law
library
Earlier, We have affirmed the ruling of the appellate court that Exhibit "2" whi
ch is the power of attorney is an authentic writing wherein the father, Pascual
Monge, voluntarily recognized Maximina L. Moron as his daughter, applying the pr
ovisions of Article 278, New Civil Code, which provides that recognition shall b
e made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or
in any authentic writing. We apply Article 278, New Civil Code retroactively to
the case of Maximina L. Moron although she was born before the effectivity of th
e New Civil Code in view of the provisions of Article 2260 of the New Civil Code
, which states:
Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place accordi
ng to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body
of laws.
The reason for giving retroactive effect to Article 2260 is indicated in the Rep
ort of the Code Commission, page 169, thus: "The liberalized mode of recognition
is in harmony with the aim of the proposed code to do justice to illegitimate c
hildren. Hence, its retroactive effect." (See Civil Code Annotated by Padilla, V
ol. VII, 1975 Ed., p. 709).virtualawlibrary virtual law library
In Caridad Cruz Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals and Jose Pedro Reynaldo SyQuia, G.R. No. 62283, Nov. 25, 1983, the Supreme Court squarely held:
... Article 2260 of (the Civil Code of the Philippines) provides that 'the volun
tary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, eve
n if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before A
ugust 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect (p. 169, Repo
rt of the Code Commission, 7 Padilla, Civil Code, 1975 Ed., p. 709).
Under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, an acknowledged natural child is entitled
to ... "3. To receive the hereditary portion determined by this Code." (Article
134). This hereditary portion is fixed under Article 840 which states:
Art. 840. When the testator leaves legitimate children or descendants, and also
natural children, legally acknowledged, each of the latter shall be entitled to
one-half of the portion pertaining to each of the legitimate children who have n
ot received any betterment, provided that it may be included within the freely d
isposable portion, from which it must be taken after the burial and funeral expe
nses have been paid.
The same share which is one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate child
ren or descendants is given to each of the acknowledged natural children under A

rticle 895 of the New Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 895. The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of
the natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime
of each of the legitimate children or descendants.
The final adjudication made by the trial court in its Order dated May 25, 1975 (
affirmed by the Court of Appeals) directed the registration of the land in quest
ion in the name of the co-ownership of petitioner Andrea M. Moscoso for 13/14 sh
are and Maximina L. Moron, the oppositor, for 1/14 share in view of the court's
realization that no documentary evidence was presented to prove that the other o
ppositors, Concordia Lanuncia and Apolonia Lanuncia (decease) and mother of oppo
sitor Flaviano Marchadesch, Jr. were acknowledged by Pascual Monge, In the inter
est of justice, We must modify the above sharing in order to give the legal shar
e of the oppositor as an acknowledged natural child.virtualawlibrary virtual law
library
Since there are six (6) legitimate children including the petitioner Andrea M. M
oscoso who had previously acquired the shares of her five (5) co-heirs, and one
(1) acknowledged natural child, the oppositor Maximina L. Moron, herein private
respondent who is entitled to one-half (1/2) the share of each of the legitimate
children (Article 840, Spanish Civil Code; Article 895, New Civil Code), the pr
oper sharing should be 12/13 to Andrea M. Moscoso and 1/13 to Maximina L. Moron.
virtualawlibrary virtual law library
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFI
ED in the sense that the adjudication of the land subject of the land registrati
on proceedings shall be in the co-ownership of petitioner-applicant Andrea M. Mo
scoso for 12/13 share and to oppositor-private respondent Maximina L. Moron for
1/13 share. In all other aspects, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.virtualawlibrary virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.virtua
lawlibrary virtual law library
Abad Santos J., took no part.virtualawlibrary virtual law library

AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,

vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
Vicente Llanes for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in
LRC Consulta No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of
Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT
No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the re
quest that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument
sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of l
and described in OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided t

wo-thirds (/) portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land
is 11.2225 hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legal
ly defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously ann
otated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate s
ales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in fa
vor of three different buyers. The pertinent entries read:
Entry No. 5658.
Sales.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveyin
g an undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of Floren
tino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled wit
h respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu thereof, the name of t
he vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in i
nterest of the vendor. ...
Date of Instrument:
January 25, 1955, ...
x x x
x x x
x x x
Entry No. 5659.
Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveyin
g an undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto Br
avo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect
to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is
hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the
vendor ...
Date of Instrument:
June 9, 1953. ...
Entry No. 5660.
Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveyin
g an undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana Gaba
yan, this Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said
undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby s
ubstituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ..
.
Date of Instrument:
February 12, 1952. ...
The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sale
s contains an additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate cer
tificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos
Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon ver
bal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in
the name of the vendees, this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly
because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548
had not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make th
e requested annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of La
nd Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in
a resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in contro
versy, the Commissioner observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property
described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold
undivided portions thereof on three different occasions in favor of three differ
ent buyers. Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Ba
lbin, there are now three co-owner's duplicates which are presumably in the poss
ession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to the owner's duplicate of
Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-owner's duplicates must lik
ewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees that the issuance of t
he three co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and
until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are
presumed to have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.et
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, peti
tioners would want to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in
their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the produc
tion of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instru

ment is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority from the regist
ered owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in acco
rdance with such instrument." Under this provision, according to petitioners, th
e presentation of the other copies of the title is not required, first, because
it speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in the pr
operty is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in
this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their f
avor was illegal or unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviou
sly assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, name
ly, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a vo
luntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for th
e register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the
case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably
issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land Registra
tion Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unau
thorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until other
wise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies o
f the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adve
rsely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one
copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to b
e issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain iden
tical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the la
nd covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted
to carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would
cease to be reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in
upholding the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since
the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of
the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina,
"there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving sp
ouse may make such a conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general a
nd sweeping in its implications, for without a previous settlement of the partne
su
rship a surviving spouse may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein
bject of course to the result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to
be denied that, if the conjugal character of the property is assumed, the deed o
f donation executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirm
ity which justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the tw
o-thirds portion of said property which he donated was more than his one-half sh
are, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions
of the same land to three other parties.
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Bal
bin and the character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the valid
ity of the different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of
the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantim
e the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper n
otices of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Il
ocos Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pron
ouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., c
oncur.
Capistrano, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., objectors-appellants.
Southworth and Faison for appellants.
D. R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petit
ioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition in the C
ourt of Land Registration for the purpose of having registered, under the Torren
s system, four parcels of land, known as Parcel A, Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parce
l D, all of which were located in the city of Manila. The only one of said parce
ls to which attention need be given in the present appeal is Parcel A.
From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described general
ly and technically.
I. General description.
It is a parcel of land with the buildings erected thereo
n, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94,
and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River; bounded on the no
rth by Calle Escolta for 31.08 meters, on the south by the Pasig River for 25.19
meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P. Roxas for 66.48 meters, and on th
e west by the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez for 62.10 meters; with an
area of 1,817.03 square meters as set forth in the attached plan.
II. Technical description. The undersigned on the 26th of the present month proc
eeded to survey and fix the boundaries for preparing the topographical plan of a
lot occupied by buildings of strong materials one and two stories high belongin
g to Maria del Consuelo Roxas y Chuidian, located in the district of Binondo of
this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern ban
k of the Pasig River. The point marked on the plan with the letter "X," located
at the vertex of the angle formed by the northeastern side of Calle Escolta and
the corner of the Pasaje de Perez was selected as the basic point, whence S. 49 4
0' W., 27.75 meters is located Point A, chosen as the point of beginning for the
topographical operations, the result whereof is as follows:1awphil.net
| Points or | Directions in | Distances | Boundaries |
| stations. | degrees. | in meters. | |
| A to B | S. 44 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. |
| B to C | S. 46 15' E | 16.15 | Heirs of Antonio |

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K

to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to
to

D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
A

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

S.
S.
N.
N.
N.
N.
N.
N.
N.

42
40
49
52
37
35
50
35
42

00'
50'
45'
00'
10'
45'
30'
00'
05'

E
E
E
E
W
W
E
W
W

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

32.75 | } Enriquez. |
13.20 | |
14.25 | } Pasig River. |
10.94 | |
24.90 | |
6.56 | |
1.92 | } Pedro P. Roxas. |
7.60 | |
25.50 | |

The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the points specifie
d are marked on the attached plan, the bearings are magnetic, and its boundaries
are: on the north, Calle Escolta; on the south, the Pasig River; on the east, t
he estate of Pedro P. Roxas; and on the west, the estate of the heirs of Antonio
Enriquez.
The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and which
accompanied the petition is as follows and is marked "Exhibit A."
{bmc 029035a.bmp}
By comparing the above technical description with the plan presented (Exhibit A)
, it will be noted that the line A-B in the technical description runs S. 44, 30'
W., and that the distance between A and B was 31.08 meters, while in the plan l
ine A-B runs S. 46, 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters. Attention is called to th
is difference between the technical description and the plan at this time, but i
ts importance to the questions presented will be discussed below.
Attached to said petition was a number of documents presented as exhibits, showi
ng the chain of title of the petitioner.
We find that said petition contains a statement of the names of the adjoining ow
ners of the land in question. The petition gives the names of said persons, as f
ollows:
The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of the owners of the parcels of l
and conterminous with this estate are, according to my information:
The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives are the attorneys Hartigan,
Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, 7 Anda, Intramuros, Manila, Pedro P. Roxas, 154 M
alacaang, San Miguel.
Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and the documents showing the
chain of title of the petitioner, the matter was referred to the examiner of tit
les of the Court of Land Registration, who made a very careful examination of th
e title of the petitioner to the land in question, and on the 5th day of March,
1906, presented a very carefully prepared report, in which he sets out in detail
the title of the petitioner to said Parcel A, as well as the other parcels, the
recommends the registration of said Parcel A, as well as the others, in the nam
e of the petitioner.
Upon the issue thus presented we find that the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario,
judge, on the 23d day of March, 1906, in accordance with the provisions of secti
on 31 of Act No. 496, issued the following notice:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
[Registration of title. Court of Land Registration.
Case No. 1895.]
To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the ci
ty of Manila; A. Sing, Nos. 84-88; A. Burke, No. 90; Messrs. Macke and Chandler
and F. M. Sousa, these two No. 90 interior; Ramon Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno
, No. 92; Rosendo Comas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No. 96; Luciano Cordoba, No. 28
; Messrs. Salgado, Gordillo and Martinez, No. 32; Messrs. Greilsammer Bros., No.
36; and Messrs. Williams & Chandler, No. 34, upstairs; these on Calle Escolta;
Antonio Vy Chuico, No. 226, and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario;
Ang Seng Queng, Calle Nueva No. 149; and Candido Lim, Calle Jaboneros No. 113; a
ll these of the district of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, attorn
eys of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez, Calle Santo Tomas, corner of Calle Cabildo

, district of Intramuros; Carmen Ayala de Roxas, No. 154; and Maximo Cortes and
Dolores Ochoa, these two No. 330, the three on Calle Malacaang, district of San M
iguel; Francisco Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso Tiaoqui, Calle Lacoste No.
122, and Gervasio Rosario Ventura, Calle Dulumbayan No. 111, these three of the
district of Santa Cruz; and Enrique Somes, Calle Alix No. 140, district of Samp
aloc; all of the city of Manila, P. I., and to all whom it may concern:
Whereas an application has been presented to said court by Maria del Consuelo Fe
lisa Roxas y Chuidian, through her attorney in fact Antonio Bonifas, Calle Padre
Herrera No. 59, district of Tondo, city of Manila, P. I., to register and confi
rm her title in the following described land: Four parcels of land with the impr
ovements of strong materials thereon, situated in the district of Binondo, Manil
a, P. I., more particularly bounded and described as follows:
Parcel A.
Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96, beginning at a pt. marked "A" on p
lan, being S. 49 40' W., 27.75 m. from the W. end of the chaflan at the S. inters
ection of the Escolta and Pasaje de Perez; thence S. 46 30' W., 31.08 m. along th
e SE. line of the Escolta, to pt. "B"; S. 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to pt. "C"; S. 42 E.
, 32.75 m. to pt. "D"; S. 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to pt. "E"; N. 49 45' E., 14.25 m. t
o pt. "F"; N. 52 E., 10.94 m. to pt. "G"; N. 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to pt. "H"; N. 38
40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. "I"; N. 52 35' E., 2.27 m. to pt. "J"; N. 38 50' W., 4.12
m. to pt. "K"; N. 53 30' E., 0.30 m. to pt. "L"; N. 40 05' W., 14 m. to pt. "M"; N
. 44 W., 15.35 m. to pt. "E" to "G" follow the NW. bank of the Pasig River.
Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; SE. by the Pasig River;
SW. by property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez and NW. by the Escolta.
Date of survey, December 26, 1905.
You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land Registration to be held at t
he City Hall, Calzada de las Aguadas, city of Manila, P. I., on the 25th day of
April, A. D. nineteen hundred and six, at 8 o'clock in the forenoon, to show cau
se, if any you have, why the prayer of said application shall not be granted; an
d unless you appear at such court at the time and place aforesaid your default w
ill be recorded and the said application will be taken as confessed, and you wil
l be forever barred from contesting said application or any decree entered there
on.
Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court, this 23d day of March in t
he year nineteen hundred and six.
Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of said Court.
In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of Land Reg
istration, on the 28th day of March, 1906, sent a copy of said order to each of
the persons mentioned therein, by registered mail. The record shows that each of
said persons received a copy of said notice, including the representative of th
e heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The record further sh
ows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of Manila, tha
t said notice was posted upon the land in question. The record further shows tha
t said notice had been published in two daily newspapers of the city of Manila.
The Manila Times and La Democracia.
On the 17th day of April, 1906, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registra
tion, made the following certificate relating to the notice and to the publicati
on of the notices required by section 31 of Act No. 496.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Case No. 1895.
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant.
I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Island
s, certify that, in compliance with the order issued by said court, a notice ref
erring to the application for registry No. 1895, presented by Antonio Bonifas, a
s representative of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, was published on
ce only in the daily newspapers of this city, The Manila Times on March 28, 1906
, and La Democracia on the 31st of the same month and year, in English and Spani
sh respectively, and notice was served upon the Attorney-General of the Philippi

ne Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke; Macke
& Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao S
ang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Willia
ms & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartig
an, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, F
rancisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes, a c
opy of said notice in Spanish having been sent to each one on March 28, 1906, by
registered mail. And for the purposes of the necessary procedure, I issue the p
resent in Manila on the 17th day of April, 1906.
A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.
On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that Modesto Reyes, attorney fo
r the city of Manila (p. 131, record) presented a written statement to the court
calling its attention to the fact that there existed an "error of closure" in t
he plan of said Parcel A, and asked the court to correct the error. The said att
orney also called the attention of the other plans of the other parcels of land,
included in the original petition. Our attention has not been called to any ord
er made by the lower court, relating to said request of the attorney of the city
of Manila.
In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on
the said petition was brought on for trial on the 25th day of April, 1906, at 9
o'clock a. m., at the place mentioned in said notice. At the hearing the petitio
ner was represented. No one appeared to represent the "heirs of Antonio Enriquez
."
On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the cause relating to said Par
cel A was brought on for trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas appeared for the petitioner
and My. Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila, appeared for the city of
Manila. Mr. Reyes called the attention of the court again to the fact that ther
e existed certain errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the plan pre
sented by the petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of errors) the cou
rt ordered that said errors be corrected. So far as the record shows no correcti
on whatever was made in the plan of said Parcel A.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been brought on for hearing, the
honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, distated the following order or judgmen
t in default against all persons:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
No. 1895.
Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian for registration of th
e real estate described herein,
vs.
The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city
of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke: Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Geneto; Tomas
Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Ma
rtinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco;
And Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas
; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa; Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Ros
ario Ventura; and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may concern, defendants.
The present case having been duly tried, and
Whereas, the clerk of this court caused to be published once only a notice in du
e from referring to the application mentioned, in two newspapers of general circ
ulation, one printed in the English language and another in the Spanish language
, to wit, The Manila Times of this city, and La Democracia of the same city; and
119 days have elapsed since publication of said notice was effected;
Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered mail, within seven days afte
r the publication of the said notice, a copy thereof in the Spanish language to
each one of the persons named in the application or who appeared to be concerned
therein;
Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a conspicuous place on each of the parc

els of land included in the application a certified copy of the notice in Spanis
h, and also in a conspicuous place in the principal municipal building of the ci
ty of Manila, before the fourteen days preceding that set for the termination of
the period fixed;
Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have failed to appear to impugn
the application, within the period fixed by the law;
This court orders a declaration of default against all the defendants and other
persons who may be concerned in opposing the application, which is granted.
Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registrat
ion, in Manila, this 21st day of July, 1906.
Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.
Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreein
g that said parcel of land, A, be registered as the absolute property of Maria d
el Consuelo Felisa Roxas Y Chuidian. Said decree was as follows:
Having tried case No. 1895, this court decrees that Maria del Consuelo Felisa Ro
xas y Chuidian, of Manila, Philippine Islands, applicant, spinster, is the absol
ute owner of the real property, which is adjudicated to her, located in the city
of Manila, the description whereof is hereinafter set forth:
A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo;
bounded on the NE. by the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; on the SE. by the P
asig River; on the SW. by the property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez; and on
the NW. by Calle Escolta.
Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which point is 27.75 m. S., 49 40' W.
from the extreme W. of the angle situated at the intersection S. of Calle Escolt
a and Passage de Perez; and from said point A., S., 46 30' W., 31.08 m. to point
B; thence S., 46 15' E., 16.15 m. to point C; thence S., 42 E., 32.75 m. to point
D; thence S., 40 50' E., 13.20 m. to point E.; thence N., 49 45' E., 14.25 m. to p
oint F; thence N., 52 E., 10.94 m. to point G; thence N., 36 20' W., 14.20 m. to p
oint H; thence N., 38 40' W., 17.16 m. to point I; thence N., 52 35' E., 2.27 m. t
o point J; thence N., 38 50' W., 4.12 m. to point K; thence N., 53 30' E., 0.30 m.
to point L; thence N., 40 05' W., 14 m. to point M; thence N., 44 W., 15.35 m. to
point of beginning; having an area of 1,817.03 square meters.
All the points named are marked on the plan; the bearings are magnetic; date of
survey, December 26, 1905.
Wherefore this court orders that the said real property be registered in accorda
nce with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of the aforesai
d Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, subject however to any of the encu
mbrances set forth in section 39 of said Act that may be in force and effect.
Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registrat
ion, in Manila, this twenty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and six, at eigh
t o'clock and ten minutes ante meridian.
Attest:
[SEAL.] (Sgd.) A. K. Jones,
Clerk of the Court.
A copy of this decree was sent to the register of deeds of Manila, September 25,
1906.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known a
s No. 742, and delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the proper
ty became registered under the Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner.
After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of the petitioner, on the 21
st day of July, 1906, nothing further seems to have been done in the Court of La
nd Registration until on or about the 19th day of December, 1911, nearly five ye
ars and a half after said land had been registered, when we find that the assist
ant attorney of the city of Manila filed the following petition:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.
Case No. 1895.
Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.

MOTION.
The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney, comes now into the court a
nd respectfully represents;
I. That the plan of the property with which the present case deals is affected b
y an error of closure greater than 1/1500;
II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error as it
has to expropriate a portion of said land for use as a public street;
Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a new survey of said property
described in the plan filed in this case.
Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911.
It is not clear whether said petition refers to the incorrections in the plan of
Parcel A or to the incorrections in the plans of the other parcels of land (B,
C, and D), which were included in the petition of the petitioner.
On the 23d date of December, 1911, the honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the
Court of Land Registration, referred the petition of the city of Manila to the c
hief surveyor of the court. On the 27th day of December, 1911, the said surveyor
reported to the court that there existed "errors of closure in said plans."
On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the Court of Land Registration ord
ered the chief surveyor to prepare new plans, in accordance with section 4 of Ac
t No. 1875, and directed that notice be given to the adjoining owners.
On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del Consuelo F
elisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of the certifica
te issued to her on the 21st day of July, 1906, so as to include the buildings u
pon the lands included in her petition. Said petition was as follows:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION:
Case No. 1895.
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant.
Comes now the applicant into the Honorable Court of Land Registration and repres
ents:
1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in the name and representation
of the applicant, sought the legalization of property title to four estates, am
ong them the following:
(a) A parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 84 to 9
6 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.
(b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon located at Nos. 28
to 36 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo.
(c) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at No. 14
9 Calle Nueva, corner of Callejon Carvajal, district of Binondo.
2. That the other estate mentioned in the said application refers to a parcel of
land, with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 222 to 230 Calle Rosa
rio, district of Binondo, which buildings were totally destroyed by the fire tha
t occurred on the 2d of November of the year just past, and it cannot therefore
be included in the purpose of the present application.
3. That in the said application it is stated that the land of the estate designa
ted by the letter (a) was assessed at 65,072 dollars and 50 cents United States
currency, and the buildings at 18,500 dollars United States currency; that the l
and of the estate designated by the letter (b) was assessed at 55,020 dollars an
d 50 cents, United States currency, and the buildings at 15,000 dollars, United
States currency; and the land of the estate designated by the letter (c) was ass
essed at 5,658 dollars Unites States currency, and the buildings at 5,000 dollar
s United States currency.
4. That both in the property titles to the said estates and in the plans and tec
hnical descriptions thereof which accompany said application and are annexed to
the above-entitled case, it appears that on the parcels of land which form part
of the estates under consideration there are erected buildings, consisting of tw
o houses of strong materials, one behind the other, in the estate designated by
the letter (a); a house of stone and masonry in that designated by the letter (b
); and another house of stone and masonry in that designated by the letter (c).

5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the registration entries refe
rring to the said estates, it appears that they consist of the parcels of land a
nd the buildings stated.
6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the Municipal Board, the tenants,
and owners conterminous with the estates referred to therein, the buildings ere
cted on them are likewise mentioned.
7. That by decree of June 21, 1906, adjudication and registration of the estates
were ordered in applicant's favor in the terms set forth in the application; bu
t in the certificate of the decree or resolution under consideration, issued by
the clerk of the court, the description of the parcel of land corresponding to e
ach estate was given, but the respective building on each was omitted, and in th
is form were issued the certificates of title, Nos. 472, 764, and 743, which acc
ompany this application.
8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and 22, 1906, the legal represent
ative of the applicant guaranteed by deposit, as assurance fund, the rights of i
ssuance of title and one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessed valuation, the sum
of P943.70 Philippine currency, the receipts and vouchers wherefore do not accom
pany this application because the applicant destroyed them in the belief that th
ere was no need to exhibit them, but averring that the amounts paid for those pu
rposes are credited in the accounting division of the Court of Land Registration
and the office of the register of deeds, as has been ascertained by a person de
legated therefor by the applicant.
9. That when applicant attempted to alienate one of the estates mentioned she ob
served the omission in the corresponding certificate of title of the building ex
isting thereon, the same as in the certificates of title corresponding to the ot
her two estates; and as it is to be supposed that said omission is due solely to
a simple clerical error, which nevertheless greatly affects the applicant's rig
ht, she appeals to your honorable court with the request that you order the corr
ection of said omission, especially as there at present exist on the said parcel
s of land, without modification or alteration, the same buildings that existed w
hen legalization of title thereto was applied for and which appear in the titles
of acquisition annexed to the above-entitled case, reference whereto has been m
ade in the third paragraph.
10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of proving that the said esta
tes consist not only in the parcel of land or lot but also in the building erect
ed on each, the applicant attaches hereto the assessment or property-tax receipt
s for each of the said estates, wherein are stated the two points mentioned.
11. That in view of what has been set forth and explained, the applicant prays t
he honorable court to decree, after the necessary legal proceedings, correction
of the omission referred to by ordering the free issuance of a new certificate o
f title to each of the said estates, wherein record be made of the building erec
ted on each, consisting of those enumerated in the third paragraph of this appli
cation.
Manila, February 28, 1912.
MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN.
On the 9th of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent a commu
nication to Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration,
accompanied by a contract, showing that on the 20th day of March, 1912, Maria d
el Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold all her rights, title, and interest
in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon, to the said Masonic Temple A
ssociation of Manila. Said Masonic Temple Association of Manila requested the ju
dge of the Land Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issu
e a new certificate to it.
On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B.
W. Hay, surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, was presented, in accordance with the o
rder of the court of the 23d of December, 1911. Said new plan was made for the p
urpose of correcting the errors in closure in the original plan presented by the
petitioner on the 10th day of January, 1906. Said new plan is as follows (see p
age 48):
After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions:

(a) That of
ginal plan;
(b) That of
certificate
ce with her
(c) That of
ed to it in
l Consuelo

the city of Manila to have corrected the error of closure in the ori
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, to have included in her
of title the buildings located upon the lands registered in accordan
original petition; and
the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, to have a certificate issu
accordance with its contract of purchase of said lands from Maria de

{bmc 029048.bmp}
Felisa Roxas y Chuidian
after notice had been given to all the interested partie
s, were set down for hearing. For one reason or another, the hearings on said mo
tion were transferred from one date to another from the 22d of April, 1912, unti
l the 24th of August, 1912. During said various hearings, in addition to the app
ointment of a commission to view the premises, certain proof was taken upon the
question of the correctness of the original plan presented by the petitioner, in
January, 1906. During said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez appeared
and apparently made some objection to the granting of said motions. They present
ed no written statement in which their specific objections appear. The nearest a
pproach to a definite and specific statement of their objections appears in the
argument of their counsel at the close of said several hearings, in which it app
ears that their objections to the correction of the original plan and certificat
e and the issuance of a new certificate to the Masonic Temple Association of Man
ila was based upon the ground that they claimed easements or servitudes in the l
and in the question.
After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the C
ourt of Land Registration, and his associates, the Honorable James A. Ostrand an
d the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, auxiliary judges of said court, sitting in b
anc, on the 24th day of August, 1912, by a unanimous decision, granted the motio
ns of the city of Manila, of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, and of
the Masonic Temple Association of Manila.
On the 10th day of September, 1912, the attorneys for the objectors presented a
motion for new trial, basing it upon the ground that the conclusions of the lowe
r court were manifestly contrary to the proof. After a due consideration of said
motion for a new trial and after hearing the respective parties, the Court of L
and Registration, sitting in banc, composed of Charles H. Smith, James A. Ostran
d, and Norberto Romualdez, denied said motion, and the case was appealed to this
court. In this court the respondents presented the following assignments of err
or:
1. That the court below erred in holding that the proceedings of the Court of La
nd Registration were valid in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and ap
pellee, confirming the title to lot 4, which is in controversy in this suit.
2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law.
3. That the judgment of the court below is against the manifest weight of the ev
idence.
After a careful examination of the argument of the appellants in support of each
of said assignments of error, we are of the opinion that they may be discussed
together.
In the argument of the appellants in support of their assignments of error, ther
e is but little argument against the decision of the court rendered on the 24th
of August, 1912. Practically the whole argument of the appellants is based upon
the ground that the original certificate (No. 742, issued July 21, 1906) is abso
lutely void, for the reason that "the appellants had no notice of the pendency o
f the original action to confirm the title of said property." Appellants now adm
it that a notice of the pendency of the original action was sent to attorneys Ha
rtigan, Rohde & (Marple?) Gutierrez. Appellants now allege that it affirmatively
appears that neither this firm nor any of its members represented the defendant
s and appellants in that action. The record shows, as we have pointed out above,
that the original petition showed that Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez were the rep

resentatives of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez, and that notice was duly sent
to them. We have searched the record now in vain to find the slightest denial o
f the fact that they were the representatives of said heirs, even though one of
said attorneys represented them, or at least some of them, in the present procee
dings. So far as the record shows there is not even a suggestion found in the va
rious hearings and proceedings taken and had under the above motions, that said
attorneys were not the representation of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez at th
e time of the original proceedings. Neither does the record show any attempt on
their part to deny the fact that they received the notices given in the original
action. The appellants assert in their argument that "personal notice was absol
utely necessary in order to justify the court below in rendering a decree in fav
or of the plaintiff and appellee, in the first instance" (the original proceedin
g). The appellants, by that argument, attempt to show, not that the judgment of
the 24th of August, 1912, was invalid, but that the original certificate (No. 74
2) was void, because they had not been served with personal notice. This brings
us to the question whether or not personal notice to all of the persons interest
ed in an action for the registration of real property under the Torrens system,
is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of said registration. It will be rem
embered that we noted above that personal notice of the pendency of the original
petition had been given and that a publication of the same had been made in acc
ordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496. After the expi
ration of the period during which notice must be given, the original cause was s
et down for hearing. The record also shows that the clerk of the Land Court made
a certificate showing that that notice had been issued and published in accorda
nce with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said "certificate of the cl
erk that he had served the notice as directed by the court, by publishing or mai
ling, shall be filed in the case before the return day, and shall be conclusive
proof of such service."
On the day set for the hearing of said original petition, no one appeared to opp
ose the granting of the prayer which it contained. Section 35 of Act No. 496 pro
vides: "If no person appears and answer within the time allowed, the court may a
t once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order
a general default to be recorded and the application ( petition) be taken for c
onfessed. By the description in the notice. "To all whom it may concern," all th
e world are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and ord
er. The court shall not be bound by the report of the examiner of titles, but ma
y require other and further proof."
The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the contention of t
he appellants. It seems to directly contradict the requirements of personal noti
ce as an absolute prerequisite to the granting of a valid title under the Torren
s system.
The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section 38 of said Act N
o. 496. Said section 38 provides that: "Every decree of registration shall bind
the land and quite the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in t
he following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, inclu
ding the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the application, notice or citations, or included in the general descrip
tion 'To all whom it may concern.'"
There is a further and very strong intimation in the law that personal notice is
not absolutely a prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens system
. Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that: "The court shall, so far as it deems i
t possible, require proof of actual notice to all the adjoining owners and to al
l persons who appear to have an interest in or claim to the land included in the
application." It will be noted also that the petitioner in registration cases i
s not by law required to give any notice to any person. The law requires the cle
rk of the court to give the notices. (Sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is
true that "the court may also cause other or further notice of the application t
o be given in such a manner and to such persons as it may deem proper." Thus it
is seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved from any obli
gation whatsoever to give motive to any person of the pendency of his applicatio

n to have his land registered under the Torrens system. That being true, upon wh
at theory may the applicant be subjected to harassment or delay or additional ex
pense, because some person claims that he did not receive actual personal notice
? Section 101 and 102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons who hav
e suffered damages for the failure on the part of court officials to comply with
the law. (Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to h
ave the registration and certificate annulled, unless he comes within the provis
ions of section 38, and even then he is without a remedy against the applicant u
nless he can show, within a period of one year after the decree of registration
and the granting of the certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any est
ate or interest therein," by fraud, and not even then, if an "innocent purchaser
for the value has acquired and interest." In the present case five years and a
half had transpired and negotiations for the sale of the land to an innocent pur
chaser had been terminated. There is not intimation that the petitioner is guilt
y of fraud, in the slightes degree.
While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times, is has been adopted in many
States and its provisions have been attacked at almost every point. The require
ments relating to notices has been a fruitful source of litigation. The constitu
tionality of the law has been attacked many times, because of the provision of s
aid law relating to notices. This is not the first time that the question has be
en presented to this court. The same question was presented to this court in the
case of Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz (17 Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the register
ed title was attacked upon the ground that fraud existed, simply because persona
l notice had not been given. The existence of fraud was predicated upon the fail
ure of actual personal notice. In passing upon that question, this court, speaki
ng through Mr. Justice Trent, said (quoting from the syllabus):
In original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the appe
llee herein was made a party- defendant by publication, but was not personally s
erved with notice: Held, That the decree of the Court of Land Registration is co
nclusive against his as well as all the world.
The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem and
not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instit
uted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within
the state or notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by t
he power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were t
his not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutio
nal rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plain
tiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
In the present case there is not the slightest intimation that the original appl
icant (Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidan) was guilty of fraud. The recor
d shows that she named all the persons who might have an interest in the registr
ation of her land, in her petition. The applicant is not charged even with negli
gence. The record shows that she did all the law required her to do.
In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary purpose
is the registration of the title which the applicant or petitioner has and to r
elieve his land of unknown liens or claims, just or unjust, against it. The Torr
ens system of land registration is a system for the registration of title to lan
d only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land. It is not inte
nded that lands may be acquired by said system of registration. It is intended o
nly that the title, which the petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cl
eared of all liens and burdens of whatsoever character, except those which shall
be noted in the order of registration and in the certificate issued.
If there exists known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gai
ns nothing in effect by his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent
transfer of his title. The registration either relieves the land of all known a
s well as unknown claims, absolutely, or it compels the claimants to come into c
ourt and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainly
concerning either the character or the extent of such claims.
The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of
registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for th

e reason that personal notice could never be given to "unknown claimants." The g
reat difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of possible unknown cla
imants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in
fact, to the transfer of titles.
Courts have held that in actions in rem personal notice to owners of a res is no
t necessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the r
es. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep., 49; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 7
1; American Land Company vs. Zeis, 219 U.S., 47.) This rule was first establishe
d in admiralty proceedings. It was established out of the very necessities of th
e case. The owner of a ship, for instance, lived in London. His ship was found i
n the most distant ports of the earth. Its operation necessarily required suppli
es, such as men, coal, and food. The very nature of its business necessitated th
e making of contracts. The continuance of its voyage depended upon its capacity
to make contracts and to get credit. It might also, perchance, cause damage to o
ther craft, in like conditions. To be able to secure all such necessities, to sa
tisfy all possible obligations, to continue its voyage and its business on the h
igh seas, merchants and courts came to regard the "ship" as a person, with whom
or with which they were dealing, and not its real owner. Consequently there came
into existence this action in rem. For the purpose of carrying into effect the
broader purposes of the Torrens land law, it has been universally considered tha
t the action should be considered as one in rem. Mr. Justice Holmes, then of the
Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts, and now a member of the Supreme Co
urt of the United State, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71), in dis
cussing this question, said:
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requireme
nts of justice, a proceedingin rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be institut
ed and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the St
ate or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of
either constitution (of the State of Massachusetts or the United States). Juris
diction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we have said, such
a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it hardly would dot to m
ake a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known
and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all
. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714, 727; The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144.)
There are many classes of cases where men may be deprived of their property and
of their rights, without personal notice of the proceedings in which that may oc
cur. For instance, in attachment cases, notice or service upon the defendant may
be had by publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S., 714, 727.) So also in divor
ce proceedings, as well as the rights of claimants against estates of deceased p
ersons, personal notice is not a prerequisite. Notice by publication may be had.
Also unknown claimants or owners may be brought into court without personal not
ice in an action for the condemnation of private property for public use. There
exists a multitude of cases in which personal service is not necessary and servi
ce by publication is sufficient.
The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to land migh
t be quited "by notice by publication to all persons." (Hamilton vs. Brown, 101
U.S., 256, 274; Huling vs. Kaw Valley, etc., Co., 130 U.S., 559, 564; Parker vs.
Overman, 18 Howard (N.Y.) 137; American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; A
rndt vs.Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; Perkins vs. Wakeman, 86 Cal., 580.)
Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states had the power and right to p
rovide a procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. The state had c
ontrol over real property within its limits. The conditions of ownership of real
estate in a state, whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen, are subject to
its rules, concerning the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private
or public, and the models of establishing title thereto; and for the purpose of
determining these question, it (the state) may provide any reasonable rules or p
rocedure. (Clark vs. Smith, 13 Peters, 195; Barker vs. Harvey, 181 U.S., 481; Mi
tchell vs. Furman, 180 U.S., 402; Botiller vs. Domingues, 130 U.S., 238; Moore v
s. Steinbach, 127 U.S., 70; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; American Land Compa
ny vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)

The state possesses not only the power to determine how title to real estate may
be acquired and proved, but it is also within its legislative competency to est
ablish the method of procedure. (American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Bert
rand vs. Taylor, 87 Ill., 235; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerrigan, 150
Cal., 208, 305; Perkinsvs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.)
The estate, as sovereign over the lands situated within it, may provide for the
adjudication of title in a proceedingin rem, or in the nature of a proceeding in
rem, which shall be binding upon all persons known and unknown. (State vs. McGl
ynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580; 21 Am.t.
Rep., 67; McLaughlin vs. McCrory, 55 Ark., 442; 29 Am. St. Rep., 56; People's N
ational Bank vs. Cleveland, 117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; 68 Am
. St. Rep., 175; Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662; Ruppin vs.Mc
Laughlin, 122 Iowa, 343; Young vs. Upshur, 42 La. An., 362; 21 Am. St. Rep., 381
; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; 51 L.R.A., 571; 57 L.R.A., 297; Rohrer vs. Ad
er, 124 Mo., 24; Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90 N.Y. Supp., 76, 79, 97; Arn
dt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316.)
If the state can provide for substituted service for the purpose of quieting tit
le to real estate against an unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable metho
d for securing substituted services against residents. The power of the state to
provide methods of quieting title should not be limited to known persons. In or
der to make such a law valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it is neces
sary that it be made to operate on all interest and persons known or unknown.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71) in discussin
g this question, said: "If it (the procedure) does not satisfy the Constitution,
a judicial proceeding to clear titles against all the world hardly is possible,
for the very meaning of such a proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well as k
indeed certainly against the unknown may be said to be its chief end
nown claims
and unknown claims cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant."
Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case o
f the American Land Company vs.Zeiss (219 U. S., 47) said: "To argue that the pr
ovisions of the statute are repugnant to the due process clause (of the Constitu
tion) because a case may be conceived where rights in and to property would be a
dversely affected without notice being actually conveyed by the proceedings is i
n effect to deny the power of the state to deal with the subject. The criterion
is not the possibility of conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable charac
ter of the requirements, having reference to the subject with which the statute
deals."
The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the case of In re Empire City
Bank (18 N.Y., 199, 215) in speaking of the right of the state to prescribe in s
uitable cases for substituted service, said: "Various prudential regulations are
made with respect to these remedies by it may possibly happen, notwithstanding
all these precautions, that a citizen who owes nothing, and has done none of the
acts mentioned in the statutes, may be deprived of his estate without any actua
l knowledge of the process by which it has been taken from him. If we hold, as w
e must, in order to sustain this legislation, that the Constitution does not pos
itively require personal notice in order to constitute a legal proceedings due p
rocess of law, it then belongs to the legislature to determine in the particular
instance whether the case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation, and w
hat manner of constructive notice shall be sufficient to reasonably apprise the
party proceeded against of the Legal steps which are taken against him. (America
n Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Title, Document, etc., Company vs. Kerri
gan, 150 Cal., 289.)"
The only case cited by the appellants in support of their argument, is the case
of the American Land Company vs.Zeiss (219 U.S., 47). In view of the facts and t
he decisions of the different courts which are cited in that case, it is difficu
lt to understand how it is authority in support of the contention of the appella
nts here. The facts in that case are as follows:
Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an action in the superior court of
the country San Francisco, alleging in substance that on the 18th and 19th days
of April, 1906, a material part of the public records contained in the office of

the county recorder of the city and county of San Francisco was destroyed by fi
re; that on the 18th day of April, 1906, and at the time of the filing of the co
mplaint, he was the owner and in the actual and peaceable possession of the parc
els of land in controversy: that his estate, title, interest in and to said parc
els of land, and each of them, was that of owner in fee simple, absolute, free f
rom all encumbrances, liens, defect, claims or demands of any kind or nature wha
tsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prayed that the be adjudged to
be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said parcels of land, and each
of them, was that of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrance,
liens, defects, claims or demands of any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these
facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prated that he be adjudged to be the owner of and en
titled to the possession of said described parcels of land in fee simple, and th
at no one else had any estate, rights, title, interest or claim in or to the sam
e, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present or future, vested or
contingent.
Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeisss, a summons was issued and notice
of the pendency of the action was published in certain newspaper, as was requir
ed by law. Notice was also posted upon the property, as required by the statute.
No one having appeared and opposed the granting of the petition of the complain
t, or claimed any interest in or lien upon the property described in the complai
nt, a default was ordered against all persons, and on the 19th days of December,
1906, a decree was entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he was the owner i
n fee simple, absolute, and entitled to the possession of the land described in
the complaint and that no other person had any right title, interest, or estate
in and to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present or f
uture, vested or contingent.
Nothing else seems to have transpired after said decree was issued in favor of Z
eiss, until the 26th day of May, 1908, or one year and five months after the ent
ry of the decree of the superior court, in the city and county of San Francisco.
On that date (the 26th of May, 1908) an action was brought in the United States
Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, in which the plaintiffs
claimed title to the parcels of land, as owners in fee simple, absolute, which h
ad theretofore been decreed to Zeiss. The plaintiff alleged that the decree issu
ed by the superior court of the city and county of San Francisco was void and of
no force and effect and was made and maintained without due process of law, and
that said superior court, in said action and proceedings never had any jurisdic
tion over the persons holding the title during such proceedings, and that said c
ourt did not have or obtain jurisdiction to divest the right, title, interest or
estate of plaintiff . The complaint alleged that "Zeiss had no right whatever i
n said parcels of land, other than his rights of possession and occupation." The
bill further alleged that the plaintiffs had been at all times citizens and res
idents of California, not seeking to evade, but ready to accept service of summo
ns and easily reached for that purpose; that, notwithstanding that fact, no serv
ice was made upon them nor did they in any way receive notice of the pendency of
the action (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the rea
l property herein described); nor did they gain any knowledge of existence of th
e decree until more than a year after its entry. To the complaint the defendant,
Zeiss, demurred.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Distri
ct certified the question involved to the Supreme Court of the United States. Th
e Supreme Court of the United States, after a careful analysis of the facts and
of the law, in a very lengthy and instructive opinion (219 U. S., 47), decided e
ach of the question submitted by the Circuit Court of Appeals against the conten
tion of the plaintiff and returned the cause to the court below.
The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the title to two parcels of la
nd for the purpose of registrating his title to the same under an act of the leg
islature of the State of California, entitled "An act to provide for the establi
shment and quieting of title to real property in case of loss or destruction of
public records." Said law is known as the McEnerney Law. It was intended by said
act to provide a method whereby owners in possession of real estate, where reco

rds had been destroyed to such an extent as to make it impossible to trace a rec
ord title, might secure a degree in the court which would furnish public, authen
ticated evidence of title. The special occasion for the law was the fact that pr
actically all of the public records of title in several counties in the State of
California had recently theretofore been destroyed as the result of an earthqua
ke and fire. Said law provided that whenever the public records in the office of
the county recorded had been, or shall hereafter be lost or destroyed, in whole
or in any material part, by flood, fire, or earthquake, any person who claims a
n estate of inheritance or have title in, and who had by himself or his tenants,
or other persons holding under him, in actual and peaceable possession any real
property in said county, may bring and maintain an action in rem, against all t
he world, in the superior court for the county in which said real property is si
tuate, to establish his title, and to determine all adverse claims thereto.
The law further provides that an action shall be commenced by the filing of a ve
rified complaint, in which he shall name the defendants as "all persons claiming
any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part th
ereof." He was required to give in his complaint a particular description of the
property. The law provided that upon the filing of the complaint, a summons or
notice was required to be issued, containing the names of the court and the coun
try in which the action was brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a particular
description of the property involved, which notice was directed to "all persons
claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or an
y part thereof," as defendants.
The law further provided that said summons or notice should be published in a ne
wspaper of general circulation in the county where the action was brought, at le
ast once a week for a period of two months.
The law further provided that personal notice should be given to any person clai
ming an interest in the property or a lien thereon adverse to the plaintiff.
The said law further provided that upon the publication and posting of the summo
ns and its service upon and mailing to the person, if any, upon whom it is herei
n directed to be specially served, the court shall have full and complete jurisd
iction over the plaintiff and said property and of the person and every one clai
ming any estate, right, title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property,
or any part thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the possession and con
trol of said property, for the purpose of the action, and shall have full and co
mplete jurisdiction to render judgment therein, which is provided for in the law
.
In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss, cited and relied upon by the
appellants, the validity of said law was attacked and the legality of the title
granted to Zeiss was impugned for the reason that the law was unconstitutional
and void, and because the plaintiff had not received actual notice of the applic
ation to Zeiss to have his title quieted, under said law. The Supreme Court of t
he United States (219 U.S., 47) held, as has been above indicated, that the law
was constitutional and that a compliance with the requirements of the notice pro
vided for in said law was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the res
and to enter a valid decree. There seems to be but little in the decision in th
e case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss to support the contention of the a
ppellants.
Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands had full power to ado
pt the procedure provided for in Act No. 496, for the registration of the title
of lands; and
Considering that the court in the original action followed strictly the procedur
e adopted by said law; and
Considering that there is no claim of fraud, actual or constructive, upon the pa
rt of any of the parties connected with said action, we are forced to the conclu
sion that the appellants here are not now entitled to have that judgment or decr
ee of registration and certificate amended or set aside.
There remains another question, however, which the appellants have not discussed
and which we deem of importance. It is the question of the right of the Land Co
urt to correct an error of closure in a plan or of a statement contained in a ce

rtificate. A plan is prepared and is presented with the petition for the registr
ation of a parcel of land. No opponents appear. No opposition is presented to th
e registration. All the steps in the procedure required by law have been taken.
The land is registered. It is then discovered for the first time that by reason
of a wrong direction given to one of the lines in the plan, said plan will not c
lose
that if a wall were built upon the lines of the plan, one of the four corne
rs of the wall would not meter. We believe that an error of the character may be
corrected by the court, provided that such correction does not include land not
included in the original petition. Upon the question whether the amended plan (
p.252, record) included more or different lands than were included in the origin
al petition, we find the following statements made by one of the judges who orde
red said plan amended. The statements is:
At this stage of the proceedings and on his particular point nothing further is
incumbent upon the court than to determine the property as it was adjudicated in
this case.
Therein no new portion was either added or subtracted, and this court finds that
such should be the holding on this particular point.
We have a further statement made by one of the judges, the Honorable Charles H.
Smith, relating to the same question, in an answer presented by him to a petitio
n for a writ of prohibition, presented by some the appellants herein, to the Sup
reme Court. That petition for a writ of prohibition involved practically the sam
e question presented by the appellants here now. Upon the question whether or no
t additional lands had been included in the new plan (p.252, record), Judge Smit
h, in answering for himself and his associates (Ostrand and Romualdez) said:
Respondents deny that a new dividing line between the premises in question (prem
ises of the plaintiff and appellant) was determined and established by an order
of the court issued at the conclusion of said proceedings, but, on the contrary,
respondents charge the truth to be that the dividing line between said properti
es was not changed but simply approved and so indicated upon the record title. F
or instance, the line between said properties beginning on the south side of the
Escolta is exactly at the same point indicated in the original description and
approved by the court; in other words, the premises in question of the said Mari
a del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian have not been enlarged; the boundary line
s thereof have not been changed; the real descriptions of the properties have be
en left undisturbed; the adjoining land owned by the petitioners is undiminished
, except possibly as to alleged easements claimed to have been created by the pr
ojection of some of the roots of the petitioners' building over the aforesaid re
gistered property of the said Roxas. That matter is settled clearly by the provi
sions of the last paragraph of section 39 of Act No. 496."
We called attention above to the fact that the petitioner alleged that the line
A-B of her property ran S., 44 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters, while the plan
accompanying said petition (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) made said line to run
S., 46 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters An examination of the certificate issu
ed to the petitioner (see page 39, ante) also states that the line A-B runs S.,
46 30' W., for a distance of 31.08 meters. The record contains no application wh
y the original plan (see Exhibit A, page 35, ante) did not conform to the descri
ption of the land given in the petition. That error, in our judgment, seems to h
ave constituted the real difficulty with the closure of the plan. Under said con
ditions we are of the opinion that the Land Court is entirely justified in order
ing the plan corrected for the purposes above indicated.
There is still another question involved in the case, which the appellants have
not discussed, and that is the right of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidi
an to have her original certificate of registration corrected, for the purpose o
f showing that she was the owner of the buildings located upon the parcel of lan
d in question. It will be remembered that in her petition presented January 12,
1906, she alleged that she was the owner of the parcel of land in question, toge
ther with the buildings thereon. No opposition was presented. No objection was m
ade to the registration of the land as described in her petition. The record sho
ws no reason why the buildings should have been omitted in the certificate of re
gistration. The omission must have been an errors. on the part of the clerk. We

find that Act No. 496 contains an express provision for the correction of such e
rrors. Section 112 provides that the registered owner may, at any time, apply by
petition to have corrected any "error, omission, or mistake made in entering a
certificate, or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate." We thi
nk the petition presented by Miss Roxas for the correction of such original cert
ificate was entirely within her right under the law. It might be claimed, and we
believe that the proposition is sustained by law, that the registration of a pa
rcel of land, unless the record contains something to the contrary, necessarily
includes the buildings and edifices located thereon, even though they are not me
ntioned. Without relying upon that proposition of law, however, and in view of t
he petition of the plaintiff, it is hereby ordered that the original certificate
be amended so as to include not only the land described in the original petitio
n, but the buildings located thereon as well.
With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, the
record contains no sufficient reasons for not granting the same.
Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the j
udgment of the court below should be and it is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

NAAWAN COMMUNITY RURAL BANK INC., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUS
ES ALFREDO AND ANNABELLE LUMO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
Under the established principles of land registration, a person dealing with reg
istered land may generally rely on the correctness of a certificate of title and
the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond it to determine the legal status
of the property.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the February 7, 199
7 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55149, which in turn aff
irmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs-spouses are adjudged the absolute owners and possessor
s of the properties in question (Lot 18583, under TCT No. T-50134, and all impro
vements thereon) and quieting title thereto as against any and all adverse claim
s of the defendant. Further, the sheriffs certificate of sale, Exhibit 4; 4-A; S
heriffs deed of final conveyance, Exhibit 5, 5-A; Tax Declarations No. 71211, Ex
hibit 7, and any and all instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding in
favor of the defendant, as against the plaintiffs, and their predecessor-in-int
erest, which may be extant in the office of the Register of Deeds of Province of
Misamis Oriental, and of Cagayan de Oro City, and in the City Assessors Office
of Cagayan de Oro City, are declared as invalid and ineffective as against the p
laintiffs title.
The counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On April 30, 1988, a certain Guillermo Comayas offered to sell to private respon
dent-spouses Alfredo and Annabelle Lumo, a house and lot measuring 340 square me
ters located at Pinikitan, Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City.
Wanting to buy said house and lot, private respondents made inquiries at the Off
ice of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City where the property is locate
d and the Bureau of Lands on the legal status of the vendors title. They found o
ut that the property was mortgaged for P8,000 to a certain Mrs. Galupo and that
the owners copy of the Certificate of Title to said property was in her possessi
on.
Private respondents directed Guillermo Comayas to redeem the property from Galup
o at their expense, giving the amount of P10,000 to Comayas for that purpose.

On May 30, 1988, a release of the adverse claim of Galupo was annotated on TCT N
o. T-41499 which covered the subject property.
In the meantime, on May 17, 1988, even before the release of Galupos adverse cla
im, private respondents and Guillermo Comayas, executed a deed of absolute sale.
The subject property was allegedly sold for P125,000 but the deed of sale refle
cted the amount of only P30,000 which was the amount private respondents were re
ady to pay at the time of the execution of said deed, the balance payable by ins
tallment.
On June 9, 1988, the deed of absolute sale was registered and inscribed on TCT N
o. T-41499 and, on even date, TCT No. T-50134 was issued in favor of private res
pondents.
After obtaining their TCT, private respondents requested the issuance of a new t
ax declaration certificate in their names. However, they were surprised to learn
from the City Assessors Office that the property was also declared for tax purp
oses in the name of petitioner Naawan Community Rural Bank Inc. Records in the C
ity Assessors Office revealed that, for the lot covered by TCT No. T-50134, Alfr
edo Lumos T/D # 83324 bore the note: This lot is also declared in the name of Na
awan Community Rural Bank Inc. under T/D # 71210.
Apparently, on February 7, 1983, Guillermo Comayas obtained a P15,000 loan from
petitioner Bank using the subject property as security. At the time said contrac
t of mortgage was entered into, the subject property was then an unregistered pa
rcel of residential land, tax-declared in the name of a certain Sergio A. Baliba
y while the residential one-storey house was tax-declared in the name of Comayas
.
Balibay executed a special power of attorney authorizing Comayas to borrow money
and use the subject lot as security. But the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and t
he Special Power of Attorney were recorded in the registration book of the Provi
nce of Misamis Oriental, not in the registration book of Cagayan de Oro City. It
appears that, when the registration was made, there was only one Register of De
eds for the entire province of Misamis Oriental, including Cagayan de Oro City.
It was only in 1985 when the Office of the Register of Deeds for Cagayan de Oro
City was established separately from the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Misamis Oriental.
For failure of Comayas to pay, the real estate mortgage was foreclosed and the s
ubject property sold at a public auction to the mortgagee Naawan Community Rural
Bank as the highest bidder in the amount of P16,031.35. Thereafter, the sheriff
s certificate of sale was issued and registered under Act 3344 in the Register o
f Deeds of the Province of Misamis Oriental.
On April 17, 1984, the subject property was registered in original proceedings u
nder the Land Registration Act. Title was entered in the registration book of th
e Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City as Original Certificate of Title No.
0-820, pursuant to Decree No. N-189413.
On July 23, 1984, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41499 in the name of Guill
ermo P. Comayas was entered in the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
Meanwhile, on September 5, 1986, the period for redemption of the foreclosed sub
ject property lapsed and the MTCC Deputy Sheriff of Cagayan de Oro City issued a
nd delivered to petitioner bank the sheriffs deed of final conveyance. This time
, the deed was registered under Act 3344 and recorded in the registration book o
f the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
By virtue of said deed, petitioner Bank obtained a tax declaration for the subje
ct house and lot.
Thereafter, petitioner Bank instituted an action for ejectment against Comayas b
efore the MTCC which decided in its favor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court a
ffirmed the decision of the MTCC in a decision dated April 13, 1988.
On January 27, 1989, the Regional Trial Court issued an order for the issuance o
f a writ of execution of its judgment. The MTCC, being the court of origin, prom
ptly issued said writ.
However, when the writ was served, the property was no longer occupied by Comaya
s but herein private respondents, the spouses Lumo who had, as earlier mentioned
, bought it from Comayas on May 17, 1988

Alarmed by the prospect of being ejected from their home, private respondents fi
led an action for quieting of title which was docketed as Civil Case No. 89-138.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring private res
pondents as purchasers for value and in good faith, and consequently declaring t
hem as the absolute owners and possessors of the subject house and lot.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn affirmed the trial cou
rts decision.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SHERIFFS DEED OF FINAL CONVEYANCE WAS DULY EXECUTED AND RE
GISTERED IN THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY ON DECEMBER 2, 1986;
II. WHETHER OR NOT REGISTRATION OF SHERIFFS DEED OF FINAL CONVEYANCE IN THE PROP
ER REGISTRY OF DEEDS COULD BE EFFECTIVE AS AGAINST SPOUSES LUMO.
Both parties cite Article 1544 of the Civil Code which governs the double sale o
f immovable property.
Article 1544 provides:
x x x. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Petitioner bank contends that the earlier registration of the sheriffs deed of f
inal conveyance in the day book under Act 3344 should prevail over the later reg
istration of private respondents deed of absolute sale under Act 496,[4] as amen
ded by the Property Registration Decree, PD 1529.
This contention has no leg to stand on. It has been held that, where a person cl
aims to have superior proprietary rights over another on the ground that he deri
ved his title from a sheriffs sale registered in the Registry of Property, Artic
le 1473 (now Article 1544) of the Civil Code will apply only if said execution s
ale of real estate is registered under Act 496.[5]
Unfortunately, the subject property was still untitled when it was acquired by p
etitioner bank by virtue of a final deed of conveyance. On the other hand, when
private respondents purchased the same property, it was already covered by the T
orrens System.
Petitioner also relies on the case of Bautista vs. Fule[6] where the Court ruled
that the registration of an instrument involving unregistered land in the Regis
try of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person who may subseque
ntly deal with the same property.
However, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that, at the time of the execut
ion and delivery of the sheriffs deed of final conveyance on September 5, 1986,
the disputed property was already covered by the Land Registration Act and Origi
nal Certificate of Title No. 0-820 pursuant to Decree No. N189413 was likewise a
lready entered in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan De O
ro City as of April 17, 1984.
Thus, from April 17, 1984, the subject property was already under the operation
of the Torrens System. Under the said system, registration is the operative act
that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
Moreover, the issuance of a certificate of title had the effect of relieving the
land of all claims except those noted thereon. Accordingly, private respondents
, in dealing with the subject registered land, were not required by law to go be
yond the register to determine the legal condition of the property. They were on
ly charged with notice of such burdens on the property as were noted on the regi
ster or the certificate of title. To have required them to do more would have be
en to defeat the primary object of the Torrens System which is to make the Torre
ns Title indefeasible and valid against the whole world.
Private respondents posit that, even assuming that the sheriffs deed of final co
nveyance in favor of petitioner bank was duly recorded in the day book of the Re
gister of Deeds under Act 3344, ownership of the subject real property would sti
ll be theirs as purchasers in good faith because they registered the sale first
under the Property Registration Decree.
The rights created by the above-stated statute of course do not and cannot accru
e under an inscription in bad faith. Mere registration of title in case of doubl
e sale is not enough; good faith must concur with the registration.[7]

Petitioner contends that the due and proper registration of the sheriffs deed of
final conveyance on December 2, 1986 amounted to constructive notice to private
respondents. Thus, when private respondents bought the subject property on May
17, 1988, they were deemed to have purchased the said property with the knowledg
e that it was already registered in the name of petitioner bank.
Thus, the only issue left to be resolved is whether or not private respondents c
ould be considered as buyers in good faith.
The priority in time principle being invoked by petitioner bank is misplaced bec
ause its registration referred to land not within the Torrens System but under A
ct 3344. On the other hand, when private respondents bought the subject property
, the same was already registered under the Torrens System. It is a well-known r
ule in this jurisdiction that persons dealing with registered land have the lega
l right to rely on the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense
with the need to inquire further, except when the party concerned has actual kno
wledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such inquiry.[8]
Did private respondents exercise the required diligence in ascertaining the lega
l condition of the title to the subject property so as to be considered as innoc
ent purchasers for value and in good faith?
We answer in the affirmative.
Before private respondents bought the subject property from Guillermo Comayas, i
nquiries were made with the Registry of Deeds and the Bureau of Lands regarding
the status of the vendors title. No liens or encumbrances were found to have bee
n annotated on the certificate of title. Neither were private respondents aware
of any adverse claim or lien on the property other than the adverse claim of a c
ertain Geneva Galupo to whom Guillermo Comayas had mortgaged the subject propert
y. But, as already mentioned, the claim of Galupo was eventually settled and the
adverse claim previously annotated on the title cancelled. Thus, having made th
e necessary inquiries, private respondents did not have to go beyond the certifi
cate of title. Otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certifi
cate of Title would be rendered futile and nugatory.
Considering therefore that private respondents exercised the diligence required
by law in ascertaining the legal status of the Torrens title of Guillermo Comaya
s over the subject property and found no flaws therein, they should be considere
d as innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
Accordingly, the appealed judgment of the appellate court upholding private resp
ondents Alfredo and Annabelle Lumo as the true and rightful owners of the disput
ed property is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO B.

MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA M. GALVEZ,
represented by CONCEPCION M. LAZARO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
To serve the ends of social justice, which is the heart of the 1987 Constitution
, the State promotes an equitable distribution of alienable agricultural lands o
f the public domain to deserving citizens, especially the underprivileged. A lan

d registration court must, therefore, exercise extreme caution and prudent care
in deciding an application for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over
such lands so that the public domain may not be raided by unscrupulous land spec
ulators.[1]
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure se
eking to set aside the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals of 26 August 2002 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64323, which affirmed the decision[3] of the Municipal Trial Cour
t (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna,[4] of 1 September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 orderi
ng the registration in favor of the respondents of parcels of land situated at B
arangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna, designated as Lot 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D,
and 2111-E.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 14 November 1996, the respondents filed before the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna, an
application[5] for registration of title over five parcels of land, each with a
n area of 5,220 square meters, situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. In t
heir application, they stated, among other things, that they are the sole heirs
of Spouses Melencio E. Melendez, Sr., and Luz Batallones Melendez, original owne
rs of Lot 2111 of CAD-455, with an area of 2.6 hectares. Their parents had been
in possession of the said property since 1949, more or less. After the death o
f their mother and father on 19 February 1967 and 5 May 1976, respectively, they
partitioned the property among themselves and subdivided it into five lots, nam
ely, Lots 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E. Since then they have been
in actual possession of the property in the concept of owners and in a public a
nd peaceful manner.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor Gene
ral (OSG), opposed the application on the following grounds: (a) neither the res
pondents nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to the prop
erty or have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and o
ccupation of the land in question since 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the muniments
of title, i.e., tax declaration and tax receipts, presented by the respondents
do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fideright to regis
tration of the land under Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise kno
wn as The Public Land Act,[6] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073; (c) th
e claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant can
no longer be availed of by the respondents; and (d) the land is part of the pub
lic domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.[7]
At the trial on the merits, respondents Mauricio B. Melendez, Jr., and Carmencit
a M. Alconaba testified to establish their claim over the subject lots. Maurici
o claimed that he and his co-respondents acquired by inheritance from their dece
ased parents Lot 2111 of Cad-455, which is an agricultural land. Their parents
had been in possession of the said land since 1949 and had been religiously payi
ng the taxes due thereon. When their parents died, he and his siblings immediat
ely took possession of said property in the concept of an owner, paid taxes, and
continued to plant rice thereon. On 24 June 1996, he and his co-heirs executed
an Extrajudicial Settlement with Partition over the said lot and subdivided it
into five lots.[8]
For her part, Carmencita testified that Lot 2111 of Cad-455 had been in the poss
ession of their parents since 1940 and that after the death of their parents she
and her siblings immediately took possession of it and religiously paid the tax
es thereon. The land is being cultivated by Julia Garal, their tenant. She adm
itted that no improvements have been introduced by their family on the lot. On
cross examination, she admitted that plans to sell the property were at hand.[9]
In its decision of 1 September 1998, the trial court found that the respondents
have sufficiently established their family s actual, continuous, adverse, and noto
rious possession of the subject property for more than fifty-seven years, commen
cing from the possession of their predecessors-in-interest in 1940, and that suc
h possession was in an adverse and public manner. Likewise, it found that the l
and in question is alienable and disposable and is not within any reservation or
forest zone. Thus, it confirmed the title of the respondents over the said lot
s; directed the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch, to cause the regist

ration of said parcels of land in the name of the respondents upon payment of fe
es; and ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration once the decision becom
es final and executory.
Upon appeal[10] by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Hence, this petition.
The OSG argues that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in (a) g
iving weight to the self-serving testimonies of Mauricio and Carmencita that the
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, an
d adverse possession of the lots in question in the concept of an owner for at l
east thirty years; and (b) holding that respondents tax declaration is sufficient
proof that they and their parents have been in possession of the property for a
t least thirty years, despite the fact that the said tax declaration was only fo
r the year 1994 and the property tax receipts presented by the respondents were
all of recent dates, i.e., 1990, 1991,1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Finally, the
OSG states that even granting for the sake of argument that the respondents have
been in possession of the property since 1940, their adverse possession should
be reckoned only from 28 September 1981 when the property was declared to be wit
hin alienable and disposable zone.
The petition is meritorious.
While the rule is well settled that the findings of fact of appellate courts are
conclusive upon us,[11] there are recognized exceptions thereto, among which is
where the findings of fact are not supported by the record or are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion.[12] This exception is
present in this case.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942,[13] reads as
follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying land
s of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court o
f First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of t
heir claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agric
ultural lands of the public domain, under abona fide claim of acquisition of own
ership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the applic
ation for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. T
hese shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essenti
al to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under t
he provisions of this chapter.
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073[14] by substituting the phra
se for at least thirty years with since June 12, 1945 ; thus:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall app
ly only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been i
n open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the app
licant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim o
f acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
The date 12 June 1945 was reiterated in Section 14(1) of P. D. No. 1529,[15] other
wise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court o
f First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized represent
atives:
(1)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide cla
im of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the follow

ing: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural l
ands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, excl
usive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide cla
im of ownership either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
There is no doubt that the subject property is part of the disposable and aliena
ble agricultural lands of the public domain. But it is not clear as to when it
was classified as alienable and disposable by proper authorities.
We do not find merit in OSG s claim that the subject property was classified as wi
thin the alienable and disposable zone only on 28 September 1981, and hence, pos
session by respondents predecessors-in-interest before that date cannot be consid
ered. In support of this claim, the OSG relies on a statement appearing in the
survey plan marked as Exhibit Q, which reads:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 23-A L.C.
Map No. 004 certified on September 28, 1981 and is outside any civil or militar
y reservation.
As postulated by the respondents, the phrase certified on September 28, 1981 could
not have meant that Lot 2111 became alienable and disposable only on 28 Septemb
er 1981. That date obviously refers to the time that Project No. 23-A L.C. Map N
o. 004 was certified.
Neither can we give weight to the contention of the respondents that since Proje
ct No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 of which Lot 2111 forms part was approved on 31 Dec
ember 1925 by the then Bureau of Forestry, Lot 2111 must have been disposable an
d alienable as early as of that date. There is nothing to support their claim t
hat 31 December 1925 is the date of the approval of such project or the date of
the classification of the subject property as disposable and alienable public la
nd. It is settled that a person who seeks registration of title to a piece of l
and must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence.[16] The respondents h
ave failed to discharge the burden of showing that Lot 2111 was classified as pa
rt of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of public domain as of 12
June 1945 or earlier.
Likewise, the respondent have miserably failed to prove that they and their pred
ecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious pos
session and occupation of the subject property under a bona fide claim of owners
hip either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals based the finding of fifty-seven years
of possession by the respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on the testi
monies of Carmencita and Mauricio. The two were aged 62[17] and 60,[18] respect
ively, when they testified in 1997. Thus, they must have been born in 1935 and
1937, respectively. If the asserted possession lasted for a period of fifty-sev
en years at the time they testified, the same must have commenced sometime in 19
40, or at the time that Carmencita was just 5 years old and Mauricio, about 3 ye
ars old. It is quite impossible that they could fully grasp, before coming to t
he age of reason, the concept of possession of such a big tract of land and test
ify thereon nearly six decades later. In short their testimonies could not be r
elied upon to prove the adverse possession of the subject parcel of land by thei
r parents.
In any case, respondents bare assertions of possession and occupation by their pr
edecessors-in-interest since 1940 (as testified to by Carmencita[19]) or since 1
949 (as testified to by Mauricio[20] and declared in respondents application for
registration) are hardly the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence required in cases
of this nature. Proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to subst
antiate their claim. They cannot just offer general statements which are mere c
onclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.[21] Even granting that th
e possession by the respondents parents commenced in 1940, still they failed to p
rove that their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by
the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymo
us with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes co

nstructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it se
eks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken to
gether with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupa
tion serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possessi
on must not be a mere fiction.[22] Actual possession of a land consists in the m
anifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would natur
ally exercise over his own property.[23]
No evidence on record shows that Spouses Mauricio and Luz Melendez cultivated, h
ad control over, or used the whole or even a greater portion of the tract of lan
d for agricultural purposes.[24] Moreover, only one tenant worked on the land, a
nd there is no evidence as to how big was the portion occupied by the tenant. M
oreover, there is no competent proof that the Melendez Spouses declared the land
in their name for taxation purposes or paid its taxes. While tax receipts and
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at
the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.[25] Th
e voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes not only ma
nifests one s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also
announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties wi
th an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act st
rengthens one s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[26]
The respondents claim that they immediately took possession of the subject land
upon the death of their parents, Mauricio and Luz Melendez, who died on 5 May 19
76 and 19 February 1967, respectively, and that they had been religiously paying
the taxes thereon. If that were so, why had they not themselves introduced any
improvement on the land?[27]We even find unsubstantiated the claim of Carmencit
a that they had a tenant on the land. They did not present any tenant. In any
case, we wonder how one tenant could have cultivated such a vast tract of land w
ith an area of 2.6 hectares.
The records also reveal that the subject property was declared for taxation purp
oses by the respondents only for the year 1994. They paid the taxes thereon onl
y for the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Being of recent dates,
we cannot trust the assertion of the respondents that they immediately took poss
ession of the property in the concept of an owner after the death of their paren
ts. While belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes does not nece
ssarily negate the fact of possession,[28] tax declarations or realty tax paymen
ts of property are, nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of a
n owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that
is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession.[29]
Likewise, it is noteworthy that none of the respondents reside on the subject pr
operty. Carmencita even admitted that plans of selling the property were at hand
. Thus, it would be rational to conclude that this move for registration is jus
t but a camouflage by smart land speculators who saw in the land applied for exp
ected profits from its existence.
In a nutshell, the respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title ov
er the land subject of the application at the time MTC LRC Case No. 06 was filed
with the trial court. They failed to prove that (1) Lot 2111 was classified as
part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of public domain as of 1
2 June 1945 or earlier; (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation thereof in the con
cept of owners from 12 June 1945 or earlier.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decisions of the Court of Appeals of
26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323 and of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabu
yao, Laguna, of 1 September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The land registration case MTC LRC Case No. 06 is hereby ordered DIS
MISSED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 107427

January 25, 2000
JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makat
i, Branch 58, in LRC Case No. M-77,1 which was reversed by respondent Court of A
ppeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26122.2 Petitioner'
s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent court on September 30, 199
2.3
The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657
) square meters of land located in Las Pias, Metro Manila. The facts show that so
metime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the sai
d parcels of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Pias; after which
corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles. On Jan
uary 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, the petit
ioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued i
n the name of petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Mar
ia Cailles.
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance
of Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 o
f Commonwealth Act No. 141.4 The case was docketed as L.R.C. Case No. 4328. On F
ebruary 21, 1964, the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, o
pposed petitioner's application on the grounds that neither he nor his predecess
ors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor have they bee
n in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subje
ct land is part of the public domain.5
The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an action fi
led by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before the then Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally disposed of by this Court in G.R.
No. 51263 where the rights of Maria Cailles were upheld over those of the oppos
itor Leonardo.6
On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were forwarded to
the Makati Regional Trial Court7where it was docketed as Land Registration Case
No. M-77. The Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition to the application o
n July 22, 1985,8 this time alleging the following additional grounds: (1) the f
ailure of petitioner to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;
and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute a
cquisition of the lands applied for.
On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of peti
tioner.9 The Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on J
une 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the lower court's Order.10 It also denied p
etitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of September 30, 1992.1
1
Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following grounds
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in finding that the commencement of thir
ty (30) year period mandated under Sec. 48 (b) shall commence only on March 27,
1972 in accordance with the classification made by the Bureau of Forestry in Fir
st (1st) Indorsement dated August 20, 1986.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an ERROR in DRAWING conclusion and
inference that prior to the declaration by the Bureau of Forestry in March 27, 1
972, the parcels of land sought to be registered by Applicant was part of the fo
rest land or forest reserves.
III. The Honorable Court of Appeal ERRED and failed to consider VESTED RIGHTS of
the applicant-appellant and his predecessors-in-interest land occupied from 190
8.12
The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to
the subject land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by hi

mself and through his predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous, exclusi

ve and notorious possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other hand, i
t is the respondents' position that since the subject parcels of land were only
classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972,13 petitioner did not ha
ve any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963. Neither was the r
equisite thirty years possession met.
We agree with respondents.
In Republic vs. Doldol,14 the requisites to acquire title to public land were la
id down, as follows
. . . . The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and o
ccupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded
by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The sa
me, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved
on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricu
ltural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or own
ership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force m
ajeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the condition
s essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of titl
e under the provisions of this chapter. (emphasis in the original).
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act
requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public la
nd and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occ
upation of the same must be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed i
n the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the pos
sessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a governme
nt grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the l
and is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents that peti
tioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are al
ienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the governm
ent that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1
972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had oc
cupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of suc
h possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at th
at time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may b
e the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers onl
y to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.15
A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,16 where a homestea
d patent issued to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the
ground that at the time it was issued, the subject land was still part of the p
ublic domain. In the said case, this Court ruled as follows
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states
that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership a
re presumed to belong to the State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 219 SCRA 340).
Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of l
ands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applic
ant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposabl
e. This petitioners failed to do.1wphi1.nt
We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued to petit
ioners' predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to the inalienable and
undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title issued in their name
by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the time the homestead pate

nt was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the original patent a

pplicant, the Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same b
ecause the area was not yet classified as disposable public land. Consequently,
the title issued to herein petitioners by the Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.
Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as ina
lienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of confir
mation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over
lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable.17 In the absence of such cl
assification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom
and open to disposition.18 Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the confi
rmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it ma
y form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.19
Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Orde
r recognizes private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We only fin
d on record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development20 from which no
indication of such exemption may be gleaned.
Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for confi
rmation of imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other errors raised in
this petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack o
f merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 123231. November 17, 1997]

HEIRS OF MARCIANO NAGAO, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES PONCIANO MAL
LARI and GLORIA BINUYA, SPOUSES ELENA MALLARI and MELENCIO TULABAN, and REGINA M
ALLARI, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners see
k the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 400171
which set aside the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Bra
nch 35 in Civil Case No. 8362 dismissing private respondents complaint3 which so
ught the declaration of nullity of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) issue
d pursuant to a Free Patent in the name of petitioners.
The factual antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals, are a
s follows:
Plaintiffs-appellants [private respondents] filed a complaint for the declaratio
n of nullity of Original Certificate of Title No. P-8265 issued in the name of t
he heirs of Marciano Nagao and covering Cad. Lot. No. 3275. Plaintiff-appellants
alleged that the issuance of the said title was on account of the fraud, deceit
, and misrepresentation committed by defendant Macario Valerio. An information f
or perjury was even filed on November 2, 1983 against defendant Valerio, who unl
awfully attested that Lot No. 3275 was not occupied or being claimed by other pe
rsons. Plaintiff-appellants alleged that part of the subject property was owned
by their predecessors-in-interest Rufino Mallari and Fermina Jamlig and that the
y were in possession of the said land since 1920. They recently discovered that
their entire Lot No. 3275 was registered by defendant Valerio under Free Patent
No. (III-2) 001953 and OCT No. P-8265 in the name of the heirs of Marciano Nagao
. They allegedly demanded from defendant Valerio to execute the necessary docume
nt in order that the 2,250 square meters owned by them be segregated from the pr
operty titled in the name of the defendants-appellees [petitioners herein]. Defe
ndants-appellees, however, refused to accede their demands.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants-appellees on the following grounds,

viz.:
1. The court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action;
2. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against the defendants, since suit for ann
ulment of title which actually is a reversion proceedings should be instituted b
y the Solicitor;
3. Plaintiffs cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, the lawsu
it having been instituted more than one year, or in fact almost fifteen years af
ter the issuance of the title.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Order of 21 September 1992,5 the trial court granted petitioners motion t
o dismiss on the ground that:
[The] action to annul the subject certificate of title, which is the plaintiffs
principal cause of action, should be instituted by the Solicitor General. (Lopez
v. Padilla, 45 SCRA 44; Maximo v. CFI of Capis (sic), 182 SCRA 420; and Sumali
v. Judge of CFI Cotabato, 96 Phil. 946, cited by the defendants).
Private respondents appealed the order of dismissal to respondent court raising
this lone assignment of error:
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND/OR ALL THE CAUSES OF ACTION OF THE PL
AINTIFF-APPELLANTS.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its decision7 of 20 September 1995, the Court of Appeals set aside the challe
nged order of the trial court and reinstated private respondents complaint. Appl
ying Agne v. Director of Lands,8 respondent court distinguished private responde
nts action from a review of the decree of title on the ground of fraud, and held
that the rule on the incontrovertibility of a certificate of title upon the exp
iration of one year after the entry of the decree did not apply as the action fo
r cancellation of the patent and certificate of title issued pursuant thereto wa
s instituted on the ground that they were null and void as the Bureau of Lands h
ad no jurisdiction to issue them, the land having been withdrawn from the public
domain prior to the award of the patent and grant of certificate of title to an
other person.
Petitioners motion to reconsider9 having been denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution of 20 December 1995,10petitioners filed the petition at bar alleg
ing that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL, CONSID
ERING THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DO NOT HAVE THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO CON
TEST THE FINAL AWARD MADE BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, AND CIVIL COURTS ARE DEVOID
OF JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY TO REVIEW OR CONTROL SUCH FINAL JUDGMENT.
II
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS CASE IS FOR THE AWARD IN T
HEIR FAVOR OF 2,250 SQUARE METERS PORTION OF THAT PARCEL OF LAND COVERED BY OCT
NO. P-8265 AND CIVIL COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER THE NATURE OF THE ACTION S
INCE IT IS THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, NOT THE CIVIL COURTS, WHO IS VESTED WITH JURIS
DICTION TO DECIDE [TO] WHOM TO AWARD DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
III
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PETITIONERS, SINCE [A] S
UIT FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE WHICH ACTUALLY IS A REVERSION PROCEEDINGS [sic], SHOU
LD BE INSTITUTED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL.
IV
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE
LAWSUIT HAVING BEEN INSTITUTED MORE THAN ONE YEAR, OR IN FACT ALMOST FIFTEEN YE
ARS, AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE TITLE.
The Court of appeals correctly set aside the challenged order of the trial court
, but not necessarily for the correct reasons. The trial court sustained the sec
ond ground of petitioners motion to dismiss, namely, that private respondents ha
d no cause of action since the suit for annulment of title amounted to a reversi
on proceeding which only the Office of the Solicitor general could initiate. The
propriety of that ruling was the primary issue before the Court of Appeals, as
the trial court did not deem it necessary to rule on the other grounds, viz., (a
) lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and (2) that private respo
ndents cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations since the action

was filed more than one year after issuance of the title.
The rule is settled that a motion to dismiss a complaint hypothetically admits t
he truth of the facts alleged therein.11 In their complaint,12 private responden
ts specifically alleged that: (a) they are the heirs of Rufino Mallari and Fermi
na Jamlig who are part owners of a parcel of land known as Cad. 324-D, Lot 3275,
situated at Mambangan, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija; (b) the portion belonging to
private respondents, with an area of 2,250 square meters, was covered by tax dec
larations in their names, occupied and possessed by their predecessors-in-intere
st since 1920 and continuously thereafter until the present; (c) their possessio
n has been peaceful, public, continuous, adverse and in the concept of an owner;
(d) on or about 18 February 1974, defendant Macario Valerio, in order to depriv
e private respondents of their rights over and ownership of the portion of the l
ot, committed perjury, for which he is now criminally charged in court, by causi
ng the entire Lot 3275 to be registered under Free Patent No. (III-2) 001953 and
the issuance of original certificate of Title No. P-8265, both in the name of M
arciano Nagao, represented by Macario Valerio; (e) on account of the fraud, dece
it and misrepresentation committed by Macario Valerio, the grant of the patent a
nd issuance of the title were null and void and the indefeasibility of a title i
ssued pursuant thereto one year after did not apply; (f) upon discovery, only re
cently, of the issuance of the title in the name of the Heirs of Marciano Nagao,
private respondents demanded from Macario Valerio the execution of the necessar
y documents segregating the 2,250 square meter portion and transferring the prop
erty to them, however Macario refused without justifiable cause or reason; and (
g) as a consequence of Macarios refusal, they suffered moral damages and were co
mpelled to incur expenses and secure the services of counsel. Private respondent
s then prayed, inter alia, that Original Certificate of Title No. P-8265 be decl
ared null and void, or that the 2,250 square meter portion be segregated and the
Register of Deeds ordered to issue a title over said portion in their names, an
d that petitioners be ordered to pay actual, moral and other damages, attorneys
fees and litigation expenses.
It is then clear from the allegations in the complaint that private respondents
claim ownership of the 2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the
concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely s
ince 1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even
assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acqu
ired imperfect title thereto under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, otherwise know
n as the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942. This section provides:
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of th
eir claims and issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Regis
tration Act, to wit:
x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricu
ltural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of own
ership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the applic
ation for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. T
hese shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essenti
al to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under t
he provisions of this chapter.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under Section 48, a subject lot is, for all legal intents and purposes, segregat
ed from the public domain, because the beneficiary is conclusively presumed to h
ave performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be en
titled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, the lot i
n question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau o
f Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence, dismissal of priva
te respondents complaint was premature and trial on the merits should have been

conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters.

It would have been entirely different if the action were clearly for reversion,
in which case, it would have to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant
to Section 101 of C.A. No. 141, which provides:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or
the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the [Repub
lic] of the Philippines.
In light of the above, and at this time, prescription is unavailing against priv
ate respondents action. It is settled that a Free Patent issued over private lan
d is null and void,14 and produces no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est,
nullum producit effectum.15 Moreover, private respondents claim of open, public
, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the 2,250 square meter portion
since 1920, and its illegal inclusion in the Free Patent of petitioners and in t
heir original certificate of title, gave private respondents a cause of action f
or quieting of title which is imprescriptible.16 The complaint of private respon
dents may thus likewise be considered an action for quieting of title.
The grounds then relied upon in petitioners motion to dismiss are not indubitabl
e and cannot be impressed with merit. We are not, however, foreclosing the prese
ntation of evidence during trial on the merits that the land in question is not
private property and that private respondents are not entitled to the benefits o
f Section 48 of C.A. No. 141.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the challenged j
udgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, but for the reasons stated above.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23265 January 28, 1980

MOISES HERICO, petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO DAR and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Pedro A. Venida for petitioner.
Ricardo S. Heraldo & F. H.Geris for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 reversing the d
ecision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte in favor of the plaint
iff, Moises Herico 2 the petitioner here and accordingly dismiss the latter's co
mplaint. 3
The complaint filed on October 26, 1956 in the Court of First instance of Camari
nes Norte, sought the cancellation of OCT No. P-506 of the Registry of Deeds of
Camarines Norte, issued on May 10, 1956 pursuant to Free Patent No. V-36970 cove
ring a parcel of land situated in Paracale, Camarines Norte, in the name of resp
ondent Cipriano Dar.
As recited in the appealed judgment the plaintiff-petitioner's evidence shows th
e following.
The plaintiff's evidence shows that the land in question is a part of the public
domain; that in 1914, when it was still within the forest zone, it was occupied
, together with the land adjoining it on the North (now in the possession of Ped
ro Lamadrid); that adjoining it on the East (now in possession of Maximins Anday
a); and that on the West, now in possession of the heirs of Adriano Lopez, by Em
ilio, Gregorio and Isidoro,, all surnamed Andaya; that the Andaya brothers gradu
ally cleared the entire area by making caingin and planting bananas, abaca and c
oconuts; that in 1918, when Isidoro, who was the youngest among the Andaya broth
ers, was ready and able to take care of and improve the land, it is ceded to him
by his two elder brothers, Emilio and Gregorio; that while in possession he imp
roved the land and incurred indebtedness from his aunt, Martina Herico, in the a
mount of P60.00, representing cash advices and cost of supplies given to him tha
t to guarantee payment of the said amount he executed on March 12, 1925, a priva
te document purpotedly mortgaging the land in question to Martina Herico (Exhibi
t A); that in 1938, Martina Herico demanded payment from him of the amount of in
debtedness which by this time laid amounted to P130.00 but Isidoro Andaya, inste
ad of paying, transferred and assigned his right to the land to plaintiff Moises
Herico, a brother of Martina, in consideration of the sum of P130.00 which was
paid by Moises Herico to Martina Herico; that Moises Herico took possession of t
he land in 1939 and planted it with abaca and coconuts, although there were coco
nut trees thereon previously planted by Isidro Andaya; that plaintiff declared t
he land for taxation purposes in 1940 and 1945; that in 1943, he placed Maximino
Andaya, a son of Emilio Andaya, as tenant on the land who planted some coconut
trees and remained as such tenant until 1953; that in 1949 plaintiff placed the
defendant as his tenant on said land with the privilege of gathering all the pro
duce thereof provided he planted some coconut trees for the plaintiff; that on D
ecember 12, 1955, while he was still plaintiff's tenant, defendant without the k
nowledge and consent of the plaintiff filed a Free Patent application for said l
and; that on April 7, 1956, the said application was approved and an order for t
he issuance of a parent was issued; that on May 10, 1956, the corresponding cert
ificate of title was issued in favor f the defendant; that the adjoining owners
of the land, including the plaintiff himself, who is also the owner of the adjoi
ning land on the South, were not notified of the Free Patent application; and th
at the defendant is a relative of the plaintiff's wife who went to reside in bar
rio Batobalane municipality of Paracale, only after the liberation, staying at f
irst in a house near that of the plaintiff, but out of charity plaintiff placed
him as tenant on said land with the privilege of harvesting for his benefit the
produce of the land. (pp. 2-4, Petitioner's Brief)
On the basis of the evidence of defendant-respondent which the Court of Appeals
recited as follows:
On the other hand, the defendant sought to show that he took possession of the l
and in question in 1922; that he cultivated the same and possession it continuou
sly to the exclusion of all other persons; that he declared the land for taxatio
n purposes and paid the taxes thereon; that on December 10, 1949, he entered int
o a contract with Mrs. Victorina Salen and Mrs. Eufemia Salen to do prospecting
work on the land in question and for them to sell the mining located thereon; th
at he also entered into a contract with Vicente Inocalla giving the latter the r

ight to prospect locate and carry out mining operations over said land-, that he
filed his Free Patent application after occupying and cultivating the land cont
inuously since 1922; that nobody objected or filed a protest against his applica
tion in spite of the fact that notices of the application were posted in the var
ious places required by law; that not being the owner of more than twenty-four h
ectares of land and having cultivated the land in question continuously since 19
22, a report to that effect was submitted by Junior Public Land Inspector Floren
cio Rosales who stated in his report that the land is claimed by nobody and that
the defendant had totally cultivated the total area of 8.6973 hectares and intr
oduced improvements thereon consisting of 700 coconuts ranging from twenty to th
irty years old, and banana plants smittered all over the land; that pursuant to
said report, Free Patent No. V-36970 was issued by authority of the President of
the Philippines and on the basis thereof Original Certificate of Title No. P-50
6 was issued to him by the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte. (pp. V-VI, Peti
tioner's Brief)
The Court awarded judgment in favor of defendant, Cipriano Dar.
The decision of the respondent Court failed utterly to pass on the question of w
hether respondent Dar was a tenant of petitioner Herico on the land in question.
It proceeded on the assumption that there was no landlord-tenant relationship b
etween them, and came to the conclusion that when respondent Dar applied for a f
ree patent over the land in question, he did so without committing any fraud aga
inst petitioner or his landlord, or to create a constructive trust in favor of t
he latter. Sole basis of the conclusion was the approval of his application for
free patent by the land authorities and the granting of the Torrens title therea
fter.
The allegation of respondent Dar that he has never been a tenant of the petition
er over the land in question is belied by his own statement which he signed on N
ovember 8, 1956 in which he admitted that he has been petitioner's tenant since
1945 (Exhibit D). On the witness stand he also admitted that he has been making
copra for the petitioner. 4 With these admissions, it is easier to believe the a
llegation of petitioner that his possession dates back to 1914, through that of
his predecessors-in-interest, as recited earlier, and declared the land for taxa
tion purposes earlier in 1940 than respondent Dar who declared it only in 1952 (
Exhibit 3), after he had been allegedly placed as tenant in the land in question
in 1949.
What led the Court of Appeals to find in favor of respondent Dar is the fact tha
t his application for a free patent was approved after the requisite official in
vestigation which enjoys the presumption of regularity. This presumption however
, may be said to have been seriously impaired by respondent Dar's admission of h
aving been a tenant to petitioner Herico, for by such relationship, respondent D
ar should not be heard to dispute his landlord's title, claim to which by the la
tter is strengthened by the prompt filing of the present action, just months aft
er the issuance of the certificate of title sought to be cancelled, precisely on
the ground of fraud. As held by this Court:
It is elementary that a tenant will not be heard to dispute his landlord's title
, hence, the proceedings whereby the defendants obtained free patents were fraud
ulent.
We cannot concur with the distinguished trial judge that it is necessary that th
e plaintiff 'presente pruebas concluyentes o titulos positives que justifiquen c
on la claridad de la Luz meridiana el derecho de propiedad o dorainio del demand
ante sobre los terrenos cuestionados.' By virtue of his possession since 1892, e
stablished by the preponderance of evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to a cert
ificate of title to the lands described in his petition, under the provisions of
section 45, paragraph (b), of Act No 2874, the Public Land Law, and he is concl
usively essential to a government grant. That being so, the original certificate
s of title of free patent issued to the various defendants, as recited in the ag
reed statement of facts, were unauthorized and void as against this plaintfff. (
Lizada vs. Oman Ari 59 Phil. 547, 555; See also Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, G.R.
No. 7745 November 18, 1955, 51 O.G. 5590; Bancadren vs. Diones, et al., G.R. No
. L-8013, December 20, 1955). (pp. 5-6, Petitioner's Brief).

Another obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year
from the issuance of the Torrens title, the same can no longer be reopened to be
declared null and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. In the first
place, the action to annul or cancel the certificate of title was brought within
one year as admitted by respondent in his brief. 5 Secondly, under the provisio
ns of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent-court held to be inapplicable
to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation fo
r more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest,
title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Lan
d Act as by free patent This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took
effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which
provides:
... (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of appl
ication for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essen
tial to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. (p. 8, Petitioner's Brief).
As interpreted in several cases 6 when the conditions as specified in the forego
ing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by op
eration of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of
a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the p
ublic domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. T
he application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent an
d the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
On the ground, therefore, that there is evidence of fraud in the filing of appli
cation for free patent over the land by respondent Dar, and that the land applie
d for had ceased to be part of the public domain by reason of the operation of R
epublic Act -No. 1942 in favor of petitioner, the decision appealed from has to
be reversed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals dismissing the compla
int is hereby reversed, and another one entered cancelling Original Certificate
of Title No. P-506 issued in favor of the defendant-respondent, for being null a
nd void, and declaring plaintiff-petitioner entitled to either judicial confirma
tion or administrative legalization of his incomplete or imperfect title under t
he provision of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. 7 Cos
ts against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Metencio-Herrera, JJ., c
oncur.