G.R. Nos.

L-13389-90
September 30, 1960
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., and MONTELIBANO SUBDIVISIONS, movants-appellees,
vs.
ALFREDO LOPEZ MONTELIBANO and CONCEPCION MONTELIBANO HOJILLA, oppositors-appella
nts.
These are appeals from two orders entered by the Court of First Instan
ce of Occidental Negros, acting as land registration court, in Cadastral Case No
. 9, LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 86.
G.R. No. L-13389
On 10 April 1957, the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. and Montelibano Subdiv
isions filed a motion in the above mentioned court and cadastral case alleging t
hat Lot No. 21 of subdivision plan No. Psd-12392, a part of Lot No. 77 of the Si
lay Cadastre, registered in the names of Alfredo Montelibano and Alejandro M. Mo
ntelibano, share and share alike, covered by TCT No. T-5979, was sold to Corazon
J. Lacson of Silay, Occidental Negros, payable by installment; that prior to th
e sale, sometime in August 1947, the vendors mortgaged the said parcel of land t
ogether with other properties of the petitioners to the Philippine National Bank
, Bacolod Branch, to secure the payment of an obligation, which mortgaged was du
ly noted at the back of TCT No. T-5979 under entry No. 4999; that on 24 Septembe
r 1954 the vendee paid in full the agreed price of the parcel of land and on the
same date the vendors executed the deed of sale in her favor; that on 29 Januar
y 1957 the mortgagee executed a deed of release of real estate mortgage on the p
arcel of land in question; that on 12 March 1957 Alfredo L. Montelibano and Conc
epcion Montelibano Hojilla brought an action against Alfredo Montelibano in the
Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros (civil case No. 4272) and, pursuant
to the provisions of section 79, Act No. 496, as amended, and section 24, Rule
7, of the Rule of Court, caused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated in the t
itle to all the realities of the defendant in the province of Occidental of Negr
os, including that sold to Corazon J. Lacson; and that the vendee was an innocen
t purchaser. They prayed that the Register of Deeds of the province of Occidenta
l Negros be directed to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the back o
f TCT No. T-5979, insofar as it affects Lot No. 21, and issue the corresponding
transfer certificate of title in favor of Corazon J. Lacson free from the annota
tion of the notice of lis pendens. On 10 May 1957 the Court, presided over by Ho
n. Jose F. Fernandez, entered an order dated 27 April 1957 granting the petition
ers' motion. On 22 may 1957 the oppositors Alfredo L. Montelibano and Concepcion
Montelibano Hojilla filed a motion for reconsideration. On 3 June 1957 the peti
tioners filed an objection thereto. On 11 November 1957 the Court denied their m
otion. Hence this appeal interposed by the oppositors.
G.R. No. L-13390
On 6 May 1957 the same petitioners filed a motion in the same court an
d cadastral case alleging that Lot No. 28 of the same subdivision plan, register
ed also in the names of Alfredo Montelibano and Alejandro M. Montelibano, share
and share alike, covered by TCT No. T-5986, was sold to Marcelino Lalantakan of
Silay, Occidental Negros, payable by installment; that on 29 of June 1936 the ve
ndee paid in full the agreed price of the parcel of land and on the same date th
e vendors executed the deed of sale in his favor; that the parcel of land togeth
er with other realities of the petitioners was among those mortgaged by the vend
ors to the Philippines National Bank to secure the payment of a loan of P81,900;
that on 17 January 1957 the mortgagee executed a deed of release of real estate
mortgage on the parcel of land in question; that on 12 March 1957 Alfredo L. Mo
ntelibano and Concepcion Montelibano Hojilla brought an action against Alfredo M
ontelibano in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros (civil case No. 4
274), and cause a similar notice of lis pendens mentioned in the first case to b
e annotated in the title to all the realities of the defendant in the province o
f Occidental Negros, including that sold to Marcelino Lalantakan; and that the v
endee was an innocent purchaser. The petitioners prayed the same relief as that
asked in the first case. On 24 May 1957 the same oppositors filed an objection t
o the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. On 30 May 1957 the petitioners
filed an answer thereto. On 14 November 1957 the Court, presided over by Hon. J

ose S. de la Cruz, entered an order granting the petitioners' motion. Hence this
appeal interposed by the oppositors.
In the first case, the deed of sale in favor of Corazon J. Lacson, exe
cuted by the vendors on 24 September 1954, was registered in the office of the R
egister of Deeds on 9 May 1957 (entry No. 48590), after the notice of lis penden
s had been noted on back of the title to the property on 12 March 1957. In the s
econd case, the deed of sale in favor of Marcelino Lalantakan executed by the ve
ndors on 29 June 1936 was not registered at all.
The parcels of land in question covered by transfer certificates of ti
tle Nos. 5979 and 5986 were registered in the name of Alfredo Montelibano and Al
ejandro Montelibano and Alejandro M. Montelibano, share and share alike.
In the brief filed jointly in these two cases, counsel for the appella
nts quoted the prayer of their complaint in civil case No. 4274, as follows:
a) Declaring null and void the Project of Partition, Annex "B", and the order ap
proving the same, Annex "C", hereof, and, ordering a new partition among the pla
intiffs Concepcion Montelibano and Alfredo L. Montelibano, and the properties le
ft by the deceased spouses Alejandro M. Montelibano, on the basis of each, of th
e properties left by the deceased spouses Alejandro Montelibano and Gliceria Mon
telibano, as listed and specified on pages 1 to 3 of the Project of Partition, A
nnex "B" hereof, minus the share already given to Alejandro M. Montelibano;
b) In the alternative, for the plaintiff Concepcion Montelibano, ordering the de
fendant to transfer to her (Concepcion Montelibano) in full ownership of one-fou
rth of the urban lots which he received as his share under the Project of Partit
ion, Annex "B" hereof;
c) In the alternative, also, ordering the herein defendant to transfer in full o
wnership one-half of all the properties which he received under the Project of P
artition, Annex "B" hereof, and specified on pages 3 to 6 thereof, to the plaint
iff Alfredo L. Montelibano;.
d) Sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiffs Concepcion Montelibano and Mat
ias Hojilla damages in the sum of not less than P100,000.00, and the plaintiff A
lfredo L. Montelibano damages in the sum of not less than P200,000.00, both with
the legal rate of interest from the time of the filing of this complaint until
full payment; and
e) Sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiffs as attorney's fees, the sum of
P50,000.00 (Pp. 2-3, appellants' brief.)1awphl.nt
Although an unrecorded sale of a parcel of land registered under the T
orrens System is binding upon the parties, yet "The act of registration shall be
the operative act to convey and affect the land . . . ." 1 Such being the law a
ny acquired right in a registered land is effective as between and binding upon
the parties and their privies but not as to third parties. The sale made of the
two lots by the registered owners to Corazon J. Lacson and Marcelino Lalantakan,
respectively, not having been registered, such sales do not affect third partie
s. The lots continue or remain the property of the registered owners. And when t
he latter are sued by a party concerning or involving or affecting the lots thus
sold by the registered owners and the suing party causes a notice of lis penden
s to be noted on the back of the certificates of title to the lots sold, such no
tice cannot be cancelled upon motion of the vendors or vendees predicated upon t
he fact that the vendees had acquired the lots prior to the noting of the notice
of lis pendens. If judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in the actio
n brought against the registered owners, the unrecorded right acquired by the ve
ndees in the lots sold to them is subject or subordinate to the right of the pla
intiffs in whose favor judgment is rendered. If judgment is rendered against the
plaintiffs in the action, the notice of lis pendens noted on the certificate of
title to the lots loses its efficacy or is ipso facto cancelled.
The orders appealed from are reversed, with costs against the petition
ers and appellees.
G.R. No. L-27594 February 27, 1976
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, and the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHI
LIPPINES,petitioners,

vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch III, PARANAQUE INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ROMAN C . TAMAYO, TH
E COMMISSIONER OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28144 February 27, 1976
ALIPIO ALINSUNURIN, now substituted by PARAAQUE INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORAT
ION,applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY and the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHIL
IPPINES,oppositors-appellants.
The infirmity of the grounds asserted by respondent-appellee, Paranaque Investme
nt and Development Corporation, in its Second Motion for Reconsideration would h
ave been easily discernible from a careful reading of the judgment of this Court
. For the guidance of the members of the bar and the information of the parties,
it may, however, be useful to explain further why the judgment, insofar as resp
ondent Tamayo is concerned, has not become final during the pendency of the appe
al, and therefore, the decree was issued arbitrarily and the Torrens Certificate
of Title based thereon a nullity.
It seems obvious that the interest of respondents Alipio Alinsunurin (now succee
ded by Paranaque Investment and Development Corporation) and Roman C. Tamayo ove
r the land are so interwoven and dependent upon each other, that if the judgment
were affirmed on appeal it would have benefited respondent Tamayo regardless of
whether said respondent has joined the appeal or not. Both respondents based th
eir claim of title as heirs of the deceased Maria Padilla, on the informacion po
sesoria of Maria's father, Melecio Padilla, and the alleged continuous, peaceful
and adverse possession over the land under concept of ownership since time imme
morial of their aforementioned predecessors-in-interest. Thus, in his answer in
LRC N-675, respondent Tamayo did not assert a claim adverse to that of the appel
lant Alinsunurin, but on the contrary, alleged that he and the afore-mentioned a
ppellant Alinsunurin and his wife, "have all been in actual, continuous, public
and peaceful possession as co-owners of the land subject herein since time immem
orial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest, namely, Maria Pa
dilla and before her, her late father Melecio Padilla, who obtained same from th
e Spanish government under possessory information title granted on February 5, 1
895 ..." and prayed that the title be registered in favor of the testate estate
of Maria Padilla", or in the alternative, "in favor of appellant Alipio Alinsunu
rin, together with respondent Roman C. Tamayo, with the first two to have 2/3 in
terest and the last 1/3 interest". This communality of interest was further show
n during the hearing, when the counsel for respondent Tamayo did not present any
evidence of his own but merely joined Paranaque Investment and Development Corp
oration, successor of Alinsunurin, in the presentation of its evidence. It is no
t disputed that the evidence in support of the claim of title of respondent Para
naque Investment and Development Corporation is the same as that and inseparable
from that of respondent Roman C Tamayo, and if such evidence of the former is c
onsidered untenable, it is inconceivable how the latter respondent's claim of ti
tle could stand by itself. It must be remembered that the appeal of the petition
ers is from the entire judgment in LRC N-675 and not merely from separate and di
stinct portions thereof. Consequently, the reversal of the judgment insofar V, P
aranaque Investment and Development Corporation's alleged ownership of 2/3 of th
e property pro indiviso is concerned would necessarily result in the reversal of
the judgment with regard to respondent Roman C. Tamayo's alleged title to 1/3 p
ro indiviso of the land. For whether or not an appeal by one or several parties
in the case will affect the liability of those who did not appeal must depend up
on the facts of each particular case. Ordinarily, a reversal of a judgment is bi
nding only on the parties in the suit but does not control the interest of the p
arties who did not join or were not made parties to the appeal; but where the ri
ghts and liabilities of those who did not appeal and those of the parties appeal
ing are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be inseparable, a revers
al of the judgment as to one would operate as a reversal as to all. Moreover, no

substantial right of respondent Tamayo appears to have impaired by the non-serv

ice of the notice of appeal to said party. It must be noted that respondent Tama
yo's formal entry as "oppositor"" in LRC N-675 was apparently done without the k
nowledge of petitioners. The copy of the motion of said respondent to lift parti
ally the Order of General Default and the copy of the order of the respondent co
urt granting said motion were not served upon petitioners. Petitioners, however,
upon their discovery of the existence of Roman C. Tamayo's pleading in the reco
rd's of LRC N-675 on January 3, 1967, immediately furnished a copy of their seco
nd motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal, as well as the cop
ies of the original and amended record on appeal, to said respondent. There is n
o question that the record on appeal and the amended record on appeal were filed
within the period granted by the court. We have held that filing of the record
on appeal on time necessarily implies the filing of a notice on appeal and is eq
uivalent thereto, the reason being that the filing of a record on appeal is more
expressive of the intention to appeal than the filing of notice to do so. Besid
es, there being no showing that it had adversely affected any substantial right
of said respondent, petitioners' failure to serve respondent Tamayo a copy of th
e notice of appeal within thirty (30) days after notice of judgment cannot consi
dered enough ground to dismiss the appeal with respect to said respondent, or to
consider the judgment final as to said party.
As to the claim of respondent Paranaque and Development Corporation that Honofre
Andrada, et al. were denied their day in court, it should be noted that such cl
aim is not asserted by the party directly involved. In any case, it may be recal
led that the notice of lis pendens was entered on the Day Book (Primary Entry Bo
ok) of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija on April 12, 1967. On June 5, 1967,
this Court issued a restraining order enjoining (a) the respondent judge from is
suing a writ of possession in LRC No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, of the court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija; (b) the respondents Paranaque Investment and D
evelopment Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo, all their agents or representatives,
from taking possession and/or exercising acts of ownership, occupancy or posses
sion over the property in question subject matter of LRC No. N-675; and (c) rest
raining the Register of Deeds from accepting for registration documents referrin
g to the subject land until petitioners shall have filed a notice of lis pendens
as to the title certificates of Roman C. Tamayo and Paranaque Investment and De
velopment Corporation. Accordingly, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds
of Nueva Ecija, a notice of lis pendens which is duly entered and annotated on
June 23, 1967 in the memorandum of encumbrances on Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-3151 under Entry No. 12032/0-3151, as follows:
Entry 12032/0-3151; Lis Pendens the property described in this title is the obje
ct of a pending petition for certiorari and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction
filed by the Dir. of Lands, the Dir. of Forestry and AFP, with the Supreme Cour
t involving the nullity of the Order of the Court dated March 11, 1967. Date of
Inst. June 23, 1967. Date of Inscript. June 23,1967 at 11:16 a.m.
(Sgd.) GAUDENCIO L. ATENDIDO
Register of Deeds
It is, therefore, manifest from the foregoing that the order of Judge Florencio
Aquino in Civil Case No. 4696 on September 23, 1968 for the issuance of "clean t
ransfer certificate of title to Honofre Andrada, et al." was made subsequent to
and entry. It is well-settled that "in involuntary registration such as an attac
hment, levy on execution and lis pendens entry thereof on the Day Book is a suff
icient notice to all persons of such adverse claim. It is not necessary that the
notice of lis pendens be annotated on the back of the corresponding original ce
rtificate of title. The notice should, of course, be annotated on the back of th
e corresponding original certificate of title, but this is an official duty of t
he Register of Deeds, which may be presumed to have been regularly performed." B
eing transferees pendente lite, said parties are bound by the judgment against t
he transferor.
ACCORDINGLY, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
G.R. No. L-45252 January 31, 1985

TIMOTEO LAROZA and CONCHITA URI, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
DONALDO GUIA, defendant-appellee.
Action to quiet title filed by appellants Timoteo Laroza and Conchita Uri in the
then Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City versus appellee Donal
do Guia over a parcel of land described as follows:
Isang (1) lagay na lupang tirikan at niyugan na natatayo sa Nayon ng San Francis
co, Lunsod ng San Pablo; may luwang na 200 metrong parisukat humigit kumulang an
g tirikan at 2210 na metrong parisukat, humigit kumulang ang niyugan. May tanim
na 46 puno ng niyog at 29 puno ng lanzones na pawang nabunga. Ang kabalantay sa
SE-Remedios Bautista; sa SW Provincial Road; sa SW at SE-Maria Umali at sa NW Bu
enaventura Guia Ito ay hinahalagahan ng Pamahalaan ng P730.00 para sa taong kasa
lukuyan at ito ay mayroong Katibayan sa pagmamay-ari Blg. 31068. Ang mga hanggan
an nito ay may palatandaang buhay na madre-cacao. (pp. 4-5, Record on Appeal)
Appellants, in their complaint, alleged that they bought the above-described pro
perty in good faith and for valuable considerations from Francisco Guia on June
30, 1973, after they had seen the documents of ownership of said Francisco Guia
which consisted of the following:
(a) Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition executed before Notary Public Alfonso Farco
n of San Pablo City dated August 5, 1961. Copy of which is hereto attached as An
nex "B;"
(b) Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Manuel Guia in favor of Francisco Guia, Bu
enaventura Guia and Felimon Guia, dated March 5, 1940 executed before Notary Pub
lic Enrique Estrellado of San Pablo City, and duly registered with the Register
of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna on March 8, 1940, copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex "C;"
(c) Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by Cayetana Garcia dated March 5, 1940
executed before Notary Public Enrique Estrellado of San Pablo City, copy of whi
ch is hereto attached as Annex "D" (P. 6, Record on Appeal);
that they were in continuous possession of the said property from the time they
acquired the same from Francisco Guia until appellee, "through the commissioners
appointed by this Honorable Court in Civil Case No. SP-488, namely: Aproniano M
ls. Magsino, Clerk of Court; Rogaciano Borja, Deputy Clerk of Court; Atty. Ricar
do Fabros, then represented by Mr. Armadilla; and, Engr. Danilo Dichoso, the sur
veyor, intruded upon the said peaceful possession by attempting to survey the ab
ove-described property and to partition the same by virtue of a decision of this
Honorable Court dated December 29, 1966 in Civil Case No. SP-488; that the atte
mpt of herein defendant to survey and partition the above-described property bec
louds the title of herein plaintiffs for which reason, they were constrained to
institute the present action with the assistance of counsel at the agreed amount
of P5,000.00 and were compelled to incur litigation expenses of not less than P
500.00." (p. 7, Record on Appeal)
Appellee, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging, amo
ng others, "that the land subject matter of the complaint has already been the s
ubject of a final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. SP-488, hence, plaint
iffs (appellants) have no cause of action, or if there be any, the same is barre
d by a prior judgment." (p. 39, Record on Appeal)
Appellants opposed the motion to dismiss maintaining that the complaint states a
sufficient cause of action and prayed that the motion to dismiss be denied.
The lower court, on October 30, 1974, issued an order dismissing appellants' com
plaint saying that:
The motion to dismiss is well taken. It is beyond debate or question that the la
nd over which plaintiffs seek herein to quiet title has already been declared th
e property of defendant by the final and executory judgment of this Court in SP488, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and a further attempt to challen
ge the adjudication by certiorari was thrown out perfunctorily by the Supreme Co
urt. There is no room for doubt or for controversy that all the requisite elemen
ts of res judicata or bar by prior judgment are present here. Plaintiffs are the
supposed purchasers of the property from Francisco Guia, defendant in SP-488. N
eedless to say, a judgment against a party binds his successors in interest. A s

ale or similar transmission of right does not disturb the Identity of party for
purposes of res judicata. In this regard, for further enlightenment on the issue
s generated by this dismissal motion, the Court hereby refers to its order of Ma
rch 22, 1971 in SP-488.
Contrary to plaintiffs contention, the ground of res judicata raised by defendan
t is indubitable and patent from paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint. (pp. 77-78
, Record on Appeal)
Appellants went to the then Court of Appeals alleging that the lower court erred
(1) in holding that the instant case is already barred by a previous judgment;
(2) in dismissing the complaint without a hearing which although preliminary sho
uld be conducted as ordinary hearings; and, (3) in holding that the ground of re
s judicata raised by appellee is indubitable and patent from paragraphs 4 and 5
of the complaint. (pp. 1-2, Brief for the Appellants)
The appellate court forwarded the records of the case to Us because "no factual
issue is involved" and "the issues raised in the instant case are purely legal q
uestions which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to determine." (p. 5, CA
Resolution)
There is no merit in this appeal.
Records show that long before appellants had acquired subject property, a notice
of lis pendens (Civil Case No. SP 488) had already been registered with the Off
ice of the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City affecting the property. Lis pende
ns is a notice of pending litigation; a warning to the whole world that one who
buys the property so annotated does so at his own risk (Rehabilitation Finance C
orporation vs. Morales, 101 Phil. 175). Notwithstanding, appellants bought the l
and from Francisco Guia, defendant in Civil Case No. SP 488. Having purchased th
e property with notice of lis pendens, appellants took the risk of losing it in
case the decision in the said civil case, as what actually happened, is adverse
to their predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Guia Time and again, We have decreed
that the filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a notice
of the particular litigation referred to therein and, therefore, any right they
may thereafter acquired on the property is subject to the eventuality of the sui
t. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and neces
sity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation withi
n the power of the Court until the judgment or decree shall have been entered; o
therwise, by successive alienation's pending the litigation, its judgment or dec
ree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. On this score alone,
appellants case would necessarily fall.
In their first assigned error appellants argue that there is no res judicata bec
ause there is no Identity of causes of action since the case at bar is an action
to quiet title, whereas, Civil Case No. SP-488 is one of filiation and partitio
n. In National Bank vs. Barreto, 52 Phil. 818, We held that "a judgment for the
plaintiff sweeps away every defense that should have been raised against the act
ion, and this for the purpose of every subsequent suit, whether founded upon the
same or a different cause." in Civil Case No. SP-488, appellee Donaldo Guia mai
ntained that he is a co-owner of that parcel of land, including the land in ques
tion, which was later adjudicated to him as his share in the inheritance from th
e late Cayetana Garcia; whereas, Francisco Guia, appellants' predecessor-in inte
rest, alleged that he is the sole owner of the property. Thus, both parties clai
m ownership over the same property appellee Donaldo Guia, by virtue of a final j
udgment rendered in Civil Case No. SP-488, and appellants Timoteo Laroza and Con
chita Uri, by virtue of the sale executed by Francisco Guia, who lost in said ci
vil case. In both cases, the question boils down to ownership of the land. Thus,
there is Identity of causes of action.
Anent the second assigned error, records reveal that a hearing on appellee's mot
ion to dismiss appellants' complaint was conducted on August 12, 1974. There is,
therefore, no basis for appellants to say that a hearing was never held in the
case.
Finally, appellants claim that the lower court erred in declaring that res judic
ata is indubitable and patent from the face of the complaint itself, without the
appellee pleading the same as an affirmative defense. From a cursory reading of

the pleadings, extant in the records of the case, We find that in his motion to
dismiss, appellee had thoroughly discussed the issue of res judicata and, coupl
ed by the fact that it was the same court which heard and decided Civil Case No.
SP 488, the trial court can rightfully rule on said issue.
ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest t
herein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proc
eeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and
in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may b
e prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or
to quiet the title.
G.R. No. L-39433
March 9, 1934
CLEMENTE A. LAZARO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELICIANA MARIANO, ET AL., defendants.
CARMEN JULIANA GARRICHO and FRANCISO AGUADO, appellees.
This is an appeal taken by the plaintiffs Clemente A. Lazaro and Maria Simon fro
m the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, with resp
ect to the defendants Carmen Juliana Garricho and Francisco Aguado, the disposit
ive part of which reads as follows:
The court is of the opinion that it should decide and it hereby decides this cas
e by declaring null and void, the deed Exhibit A, executed by the defendant Feli
ciana Mariano de Sarangaya and cancelling the original certificate of title No.
9303, in the name of the said defendant. The register of deeds of Nueva Ecija is
hereby ordered to issue a certificate of title in the name of the plaintiffs, n
oting thereon, however, the mortgage liens evidenced by the deeds Exhibits B and
C in favor of the defendants Carmen Juliana Garricho and Francisco Aguado, who
are hereby absolved from the complaint.
The indemnity prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaint is hereby denied,
with costs against the defendant Feliciana Mariano de Sarangaya. So ordered.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors a
s committed by the court a quo in its decision, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in not finding that the annotation on original certific
ate of title No. 9303 of the order dated July 2, 1929, dismissing civil case No.
5073 was illegal, null and void, and could not be considered a cancellation of
the notice of lis pendens for the reason that it was made on July 30, 1929, befo
re said order had become final.
2. The lower court likewise erred in not finding that the appellees acted in bad
faith in executing the deeds of mortgage Exhibits B and C.
3. The lower court also erred in not declaring said Exhibits B and C null and vo
id with respect to the appellants.
4. The lower court again erred in denying the motion for new trial filed by plai
ntiffs-appellants.
The following pertinent facts, which have been established at the trial by a pre
ponderance of evidence, are necessary for the determination of the questions rai
sed in this appeal, viz.:
On November 26, 1928, the herein plaintiffs-appellants Clemente A. Lazaro and Ma
ria Simon filed a complaint, docketed as civil case No. 5073 of the Court of Fir
st Instance of Nueva Ecija, against the herein defendant Feliciana Mariano (alia
s Feliciana Mariano Vda. de Sarangaya, and Feliciana Mariano Sarangaya), praying
upon the facts alleged therein, that the contract of sale Exhibit A be declared
rescinded and that an order be issued directing the cancellation of certificate
of title No. 9303 of the registry of deeds of Nueva Ecija and the issuance of a
nother in lieu thereof in the name of the said plaintiffs-appellants.
On the said date of November 26, 1928, at 11:03 a. m., a notice of lis pendens w
as filed in the office of the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija, which notice was
noted on the back of said certificate of title No. 9303.
On July 2, 1929, the aforementioned civil case No. 5073 was called for hearing.

Inasmuch as the plaintiffs failed to appear and their counsel was not ready for
trial, the court, upon petition of the defendant's counsel, dismissed the case (
Exhibit I-C).
On July 27, 1929, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reinstatement (Exhibit I-E),
which was denied in an order dated September 11, 1929 (Exhibit I-F).
On July 30, 1929, the order of dismissal dated July 2, 1929, was noted on the ba
ck of said certificate of title No. 9303.
On September 23, 1929, Feliciana Mariano, the defendant in the aforesaid civil c
ase No. 5073, constituted two mortgages on the parcel of land described in the a
forementioned certificate of title No. 9303, in favor of the herein defendants-a
ppellees Carmen Juliana Garricho and Francisco Aguado: the first mortgage for th
e sum of P10, 000 (Exhibit B) and the second for P6,500 (Exhibit C).
The first question to be decided in this appeal, which is raised in the first as
signment of error, is whether or not the notation of the order of dismissal of c
ivil case No. 5073 on the back of the certificate of title No. 9303 is legal and
valid and operated as a cancellation of the notation of the notice of lis pende
ns.
As will be seen from the statement of facts above given, the dismissal of the co
mplaint in civil case No. 5073 was due to the failure of the therein plaintiffs,
who are also the plaintiffs in this case, to appear before the court when the s
aid case was called for trial on the date set therefor, and to their counsel's s
tatement made in open court that he was not ready to proceed with the case. Sect
ion 127, case 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides that the court may dis
miss an action when the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial, and the
defendant appears and asks for the dismissal; in which case the said dismissal s
hall not be a bar to another action for the same cause (section 581, California
Code of Civil Procedure). By provision of law, such dismissal does not therefore
give to the subject matter so dismissed, the character of res judicata and cons
equently the order of dismissal does not finally determine the controversy and i
s not appealable, in accordance with the provisions of section 122 of the same C
ode. The order dismissing a case upon petition of the defendant by reason of the
plaintiff's failure to appear, not being appealable, the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure relative to the period for, and the steps to be followed in,
the filing and perfection of an appeal are not applicable, and the plaintiff ha
s no other remedy but to ask for the reinstatement of the case or to file anothe
r complaint upon the same cause. Upon failure to resort to either remedy, there
will be no pending case before the court, which may be noted in the registry of
deeds.
The notation of the order of dismissal issued in civil case No. 5073, which elim
inated it from the court's docket, operated as a cancellation of the notation of
the pendency thereof (38 Corpus Juris, p. 40, sec. 65). At any rate, due to the
delay in the filing of the new complaint, which was done on June 10, 1930, the
dismissal having taken place on July 2, 1929, the herein plaintiffs-appellants l
ost the benefit of the lis pendens (38 Corpus Juris, p. 40. sec. 66).
The other assignments of error, being mere corollaries of the first assignment,
need not be passed upon, inasmuch as the questions involved therein have already
been implicitly determined by the resolution of the legal question raised in th
e aforesaid first assignment of error.
In view of the foregoing, this court is of the opinion and so holds: (1) That th
e order dismissing a civil case, upon petition of the defendant by reason of the
plaintiff's failure to appear, is not final and does not constitute res judicat
a, and therefore, not appealable; and (2) that the dismissal of a civil case upo
n petition of the defendant by reason of the plaintiff's failure to appear, oper
ates as a cancellation of the notation of lis pendens.
Wherefore, not finding any error in the appealed judgment, it is hereby affirmed
in toto, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-58193 August 30, 1984
LEONORA A. PUNONGBAYAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ri

zal, Branch XXI, ANGEL L. BAUTISTA and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILIGAN CITY, respond
ents.
Petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction with prayer for a
restraining order to annul and set aside the order of the respondent judge direc
ting the cancellation of the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated a
t the back of TCT No. 19417 of the Register of Deeds of Iligan City, registered
in the name of Angel L. Bautista appearing thereon as Entry No. 434.
The pertinent facts as gathered from the pleadings are as follows:
Leonora Punongbayan and St. Peter's College, Inc. were the owners of two parcels
of land described in TCT No. 296 and TCT No. 7546, respectively. They mortgaged
the two properties to the Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Bank, for short) t
o guarantee a loan of P550,000.00. Subsequently, St. Peter's College, Inc. sold
the property with TCT No. 7546 to Angel Bautista, the latter to assume the oblig
ation of paying the outstanding balance of the mortgage to the Manila Bank. Ange
l Bautista, however, failed to pay the assumed obligation and as a result, the p
roperties were extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction to the Mani
la Bank as the highest bidder for the price of P131,467.58. Within the one year
redemption period, Leonora Punongbayan, represented by Danilo Punongbayan redeem
ed the property with TCT No. 296 for the amount of P28,327.09 and a certificate
of redemption was issued in her favor and the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
296 was likewise delivered to her by the Manila Bank. Within almost the same per
iod, Angel Bautista paid the amount of P148,316.05 to the Manila Bank as payment
of the redemption price of the two parcels of land. The Manila Bank issued a ce
rtificate of redemption in favor of Angel Bautista with respect to the land with
TCT No. 10937 (formerly TCT No. 7546) only, alleging that the redemption referr
ed to his property only as the other property with TCT No. 296 had been redeemed
by Leonora Punongbayan. The Manila Bank likewise returned to Angel Bautista the
amount of P28,327.09, which the latter refused to accept and instead made sever
al demands from the Manila Bank to issue a certificate of redemption in his favo
r with respect to the two parcels of land. The Manila Bank denied the request. T
hus a complaint was filed by Angel Bautista against the Manila Bank (Civil Case
No. 24992) for Specific Performance with Damages before the Court of First Insta
nce of Rizal, Branch XXI.
After trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Angel L. Bautista.
The Manila Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, Angel L. Bauti
sta filed an ex-parte petition before the lower court for the issuance of a cert
ificate of final conveyance (sale) over the two properties, which the trial cour
t granted. By virtue of such certificate of final conveyance, TCT No. 296 was ca
ncelled and a new TCT No. 19417 was issued in the name of Angel L. Bautista. Upo
n knowing this, Leonora Punongbayan caused the annotation of an adverse claim an
d notice of lis pendens (Entry No. 434) at the back of TCT No. 19417 and filed b
efore the lower court a motion to set aside the order of the respondent judge di
recting the issuance of a certificate of final conveyance (sale), which the tria
l court denied. Angel L. Bautista thereafter filed an ex-parte manifestation and
motion praying for the cancellation of Entry No. 434. The trial court issued an
order granting the motion without giving Leonora Punongbayan a chance to be hea
rd. Leonora Punongbayan then filed a motion to set aside such order, which the t
rial court denied. Thus, by virtue of such order, the Register of Deeds of Iliga
n City cancelled the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens. Hence, this petiti
on for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction with prayer for a restra
ining order to annul and set aside the order of respondent judge with respect to
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, to reannotate the notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 19417 and to restrain the private respondent from making a tr
ansfer of the land covered by TCT No. 19417. As prayed for, the Court issued a t
emporary restraining order.
The issue for resolution is whether or not the notice of lis pendens annotated a
t the back of TCT No. T-19417, under Entry No. 434, was properly and legally ord
ered cancelled.
The petitioner, Leonora Punongbayan claims that the cancellation was illegal sin
ce no notice was sent to her concerning the hearing of the motion for cancellati

on of said annotation and was consequently denied the right to be heard.

We find merit in the contention of the petitioner.
The rule for the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens provides that there sho
uld be notice to the party who caused it to be recorded so that he may be given
a chance to be heard and show to the court that the notice is not for the purpos
e of molesting the adverse party and that it is necessary to protect his right.
The last paragraph of Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that:
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order
of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molest
ing the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the
party who caused it to be recorded.
In the case of Sarmiento vs. Ortiz, et al., the Court ruled:
A trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in ordering the cancellation of
a notice of lis pendens on a certificate of title where there was no unnecessary
delay attributable to plaintiff and his counsel in the resolution of the main c
ase for annulment of said certificate; especially when such cancellation was ord
ered without notice to plaintiff's counsel.
And in the case of Natano vs. Esteban et al., the Court ruled
For three reasons, the order directing the cancellation of the notice of lis pen
dens should be set aside: First, it was granted ex-parte. Plaintiffs were thus d
eprived of their right to be heard on notice. Second, the order dismissing the c
omplaint had not yet become final. That order in effect had placed plaintiffs at
a disadvantage. It opened the floodgate to the commission of a fraud. What if,
after the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the office of the Registe
r of Deeds, defendants should thereafter sell the land to a purchaser in good fa
ith and for value ? Third, There is no showing that the notice of lis pendens "i
s for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded."
In view of the foregoing, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discreti
on in issuing the questioned order directing the cancellation of the notice of l
is pendens without notice to the party who caused its annotation.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby GRANTED and the questioned order direct
ing cancellation of the notice of lis pendens is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Register of Deeds of Iligan City is hereby ordered to reannotate the notice
of lis pendens on TCT No. 19417. The temporary restraining order issued by the c
ourt is hereby made permanent. With costs against the private respondent Angel L
. Bautista.
SO ORDERED.
At the comme
(RULE57 of ROC) Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue.
ncement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or an
y proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security f
or the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases
:
(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, oth
er than moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, qu
asi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a party who is about to depart from
the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors;
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or c
onverted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or
an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as
such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violatio
n of duty;
(c) In an action to recover the possession of property unjustly or fraudulently
taken, detained or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been c
oncealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the app
licant or an authorized person;
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting t
he debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the
performance thereof;
(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or

is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; or

(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Phi
lippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication.
G.R. No. L-69303
July 23, 1987
HEIRS OF MARIA MARASIGAN, namely, Teofilo, Isabel, Maximina, Anicia, and Francis
co, all surnamed Marasigan, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and MARIA MARRON, respondents.
Who has a better right to the property in question, the party who bought it with
a notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of her title or the party in whos
e favor the notice of lis pendens was made? The appellate court answered this qu
estion in favor of the party who had the notice annotated and who won the litiga
tion over the property. We affirm.
The disputed property in this case is a residential lot (Lot No. 2-A) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100612 issued by the Register of Deeds of the
City of Manila in the name of one Fe Springael-Bazar, married to Felicisimo Baz
ar.
The pertinent facts as disclosed by the record are as follows:
On April 24, 1975, Civil Case No. 97479 entitled "Maria Marron v. Felicisimo Baz
ar and Fe S. Bazaar" was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Manila
, Branch XIII. The action sought to compel defendants Bazar to execute a registr
able Deed of Absolute Sale of their lot covered by T.C.T. No. 100612 in favor of
Maria Marron.
On January 27, 1976, while Civil Case No. 97479 was still pending, the private r
espondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of T.C.T.
No. 100612.
On February 24, 1976, judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 97479. The disposi
tive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and again
st the defendants as follows:
a) Ordering the defendants Fe Springael Bazar and Felicisimo Bazar as vendors (1
) to execute in favor of the plaintiff Maria Marron as vendee a Deed of Absolute
Sale in a public instrument over the residential lot covered by Transfer Certif
icate of Title No. 100612 issued by the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila
to and in the name of Fe S. Bazar, married to Felicisimo Bazaar; and (2) to deli
ver to plaintiff sufficient copies of such deed of sale, together with the Owner
's copy of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100612, in order that the plai
ntiff can register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Registry of Deeds of the C
ity of Manila and secure a transfer certificate of title for the land in her nam
e.
b) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P500.00 Philippine
Currency, as and for attorney's fees; and
c) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. (Rollo, p. 15).
The above judgment became final and executory so Maria Marron filed a motion for
execution which was granted. A writ of execution was issued by the court on Jul
y 12, 1976. The spouses Bazar, however, refused to surrender their title to the
property in question and to execute the required deed of sale in Marron's favor.
On November 29, 1978, the lower court finally ordered the Clerk of Court to exe
cute the deed of sale in behalf of the erring spouses. When the said deed was pr
esented to the Register of Deeds of Manila for registration, the Deputy Clerk of
Court was advised to secure a court order in order that the new title issued in
the name of herein petitioner Maria Marasigan could be cancelled.
It appears that on December 18, 1974, a deed of absolute sale of Lot 2-A covered
by T.C.T. No. 100612 was executed by Fe S. Bazar in favor of Maria Marasigan fo
r and in consideration of the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). Howeve
r, it was only on July 5, 1977 that said deed was registered with the Registry o
f Deeds of Manila. Consequently, T.C.T. No. 100612 was cancelled and a new title
was issued in Maria Marasigan's name. When the Register of Deeds of Manila issu
ed Transfer Certificate of Title No. 126056 naming Maria Marasigan as the new ow

ner of Lot 2-A, the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by Marron on th
e Bazar's title was carried over on the said new title.
Meanwhile, on May 26, 1977, the Bazaars filed a petition for relief from the jud
gment dated February 24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. While their petition was
still pending, they moved to set aside the said judgment on June 22, 1979 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over their persons.
On the other hand, on February 24, 1979, Marron instituted L.R.C. Case No. 7680
captioned "Maria Marron v. Maria Marasigan" which prayed for a court order requi
ring the Register of Deeds of Manila to register the deed of sale executed by th
e Deputy Clerk of Court in behalf of the Bazaars pursuant to the order dated Nov
ember 29, 1978 of the Court of First Instance, Manila, Branch XIII. L.R.C. Case
No. 7680 was tried by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV acting as
a land registration court. Said case was dismissed for the following reason:
... This court acting as a Land Registration Court, with limited and special jur
isdiction cannot act on this petition under summary proceedings but (sic) should
be ventilated before a court of general jurisdiction Branch XIII, which issued
the aforesaid Order dated November 29, 1978, the said petition is hereby dismiss
ed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice on the part of the petitioner to i
nstitute the appropriate civil action before the proper court. ... (Annex "A," p
. 4, Rollo, p. 138)
On September 6, 1979, Marron filed another case docketed as Civil Case No. 12637
8 to have Marasigan's TCT 126056 cancelled conformably to the procedure outlined
in the decision of the above land registration court. On July 30, 1980, the par
ties submitted said case for decision.
On February 18, 1982, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV to which
Civil Case No. 126378 was assigned dismissed Marron's complaint for being premat
ure since the decision rendered by the CFI, Branch XIII in Civil Case No. 97479
had not yet become final and executory considering that it was still the subject
of a petition for relief from judgment.
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on August 7, 1984, ruled that Marro
n is entitled to the property under litigation by virtue of the notice of lis pe
ndens annotated at the back of Maria Marasigan's title. The appellate court furt
her ruled that the decision in Civil Case No. 97479 had become final and executo
ry because the petition for relief from judgment of the spouses Bazar was filed
out of time. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and another one entered
(a) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel T.C.T. No. 126056 in the
name of Maria Marasigan and issue another in the name of Maria Marron by virtue
of the Deed of Sale executed by the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch XIII;
(b) Ordering the said Register of Deeds, during the pendency of this case, to re
frain from registering any deed of sale pertaining to T.C.T. No. 126056 in the n
ame of Maria Marasigan other than that of the herein plaintiff; and
(c) Ordering the defendant Maria Marasigan to pay attorney's fees in the amount
of P10,000.00. (IAC, Decision. Rollo, pp. 17-18).
Maria Marasigan who died in the course of the proceedings is now represented by
her heirs in the instant petition which assigns the following errors:
I
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT THE RIGHT OF ACTI
ON OF RESPONDENT MARIA MARRON (AS PLAINTIFF) IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAD PRESCRI
BED AND SHE INCURRED IN LACHES.
II
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT RESPONDENT ABANDO
NED OR WAIVED HER PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EFFECTS TO/OF THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE N
O. 97479, WHEN SHE FILED CIVIL CASES NO. 7680 AND 126378, DURING ITS EFFECTIVITY
.
III
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DECISION IN C
IVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
IV
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THE LACK OF JURISDICTI

ON OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASES NO. 7680 AND 126378 OVER THE PERSONS OF PET
ITIONERS.
V
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97479 HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF DEFENDANTS SPOUSES
FELICISIMO BAZAAR AND FE S. BAZAAR.
VI
THAT THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT THE DEED OF ABSOL
UTE SALE EXECUTED BY THE DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT, WAS NOT LEGAL AND VALID AND WITH
OUT PROOF AND EFFECT. (Brief for the appellant, pp. 1 and 2)
We find no merit in the present petition.
There is a clear showing that although the late Maria Marasigan acquired the pro
perty in question from the Bazaars pursuant to a deed of absolute sale on Decemb
er 18, 1974 or a little over four months before the filing of Civil Case No. 974
79, the transaction became effective as against third persons only on July 5, 19
77 when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. It is the act of
registration which creates constructive notice to the whole world. Section 51 o
f Act 496, as amended by Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 15
29) provides:
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration.
Every conveyance ... affecting r
egistered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Regis
ter of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, b
e constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing o
r entering.
Moreover, there is no question that when the late Maria Marasigan was issued her
transfer certificate of title to the subject property (T.C.T. No. 126056), the
Registrar of Deeds of Manila then carried over to the new title the notice of li
s pendens which the private respondent had caused to be annotated at the back of
the Bazar's title. In case of subsequent sales or transfers, the Registrar of D
eeds is duty bound to carry over the notice of lis pendens on all titles to be i
ssued. Otherwise, if he cancels any notice of lis pendens in violation of his du
ty, he may be held civilly and even criminally liable for any prejudice caused t
o innocent third persons (The Director of Lands, et al. v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177).
A notice of lis pendens means that a certain property is involved in a litigatio
n and serves as notice to the whole world that one who buys the same does it at
his own risk (Rehabilitation Finance Corporation v. Morales, 101 Phil. 171). It
was also a clear notice to Maria Marasigan that there was a court case affecting
her rights to the property she had purchased.
As earlier stated it was only on July 5, 1977 that the sale between Maria Marasi
gan and the Bazaars became effective as against third persons. The registration
of the deed of sale over the subject property was definitely subsequent to the a
nnotation made on January 27, 1976. Consequently, Marasigan was bound by the out
come of the litigation against her vendors or transferors. (See Rivera v. Tirona
, et al., 109 Phil. 505).
We reiterate the established rule that:
... the filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a notice of
the particular litigation referred to therein and, therefore, any right they ma
y thereafter acquire on the property is subject to the eventuality of the suit.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessit
y, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within t
he power of the Court until the judgment or decree shall have been entered; othe
rwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree
shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. ... (Laroza v. Guia, 134
SCRA 34 1)
The late Marasigan's transferors did not interpose any appeal from the adverse j
udgment dated February 24, 1976 in Civil Case No. 97479. The 30-day period under
the old rule (Rule 41, section 3 of the Revised Rules of court now amended by B
atas Pambansa Bilang 129, section 39) within which the Bazaars may have taken an
appeal started to run from May 12, 1976 when they were served with a copy of th
e said decision. On June 11, 1976, the February 24, 1976 decision in Civil Case

No. 97479 became final and executory. At this point after the finality of the sa
id decision, the Bazaars no longer had the right to alienate the property subjec
t of the litigation. Any transaction effective during the period of litigation i
s subject to the risks implicit in the notice of lis pendens and to the eventual
outcome of the litigation.
Moreover, we agree with the finding of the appellate court that the petition for
relief from judgment by the Bazaars dated May 26, 1977 was filed beyond the two
periods provided in Section 3 Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court. There may
have been some errors in the computations but the petition itself was out of tim
e.
Rule 38, Section 3 of said Rules provides, in part, that:
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition. ...
A petition provided for in either of the p
receding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days af
ter the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set a
side, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered
or such proceeding was taken. ...
The 60-day period must be reckoned from May 12, 1976 when the Bazaars were serve
d with a copy of the assailed decision. Therefore, the 60-day period expired on
July 11, 1976. It was only after 379 days or more than 12 months after they lear
ned of the judgment that the Bazaars filed their petition for relief from said j
udgment. (See Domingo v. Dela Cruz, 23 SCRA 1121) The appellate court computed t
he 6-month period from the date of the judgment was rendered. Rule 38 states tha
t the counting should commence from the entry of the judgment or order. (See Dir
ige v. Biranya, 17 SCRA 840). A judgment is entered only after its finality and
Civil Case No. 97479 became final on June 11, 1976. Since the records do not bea
r the exact date the questioned judgment was entered, the 6-month period can be
counted for purposes of our decision from July 12, 1976 when the writ of executi
on of the final judgment was issued. The phrase "or other proceeding" in Section
3 of Rule 38 includes a writ of execution (Aquino v. Blanco, 79 Phil. 647). The
6-month period from July 12, 1976 lapsed on January 8, 1977. A period of ten (1
0) months had already lapsed when the Bazaars filed their petition for relief fr
om judgment on May 26, 1977. Obviously, the petitioners cannot now question the
effects of the final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 97479. In the word
s of Laroza v. Guia (supra) they cannot render the final judgment abortive and i
mpossible of execution. The deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court o
n behalf of the Bazar spouses pursuant to the court's judgment was valid and bin
ding.
The petitioners cannot also raise before us the issues of prescription or laches
and lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the Bazar spouses in Civil Case No
. 97479. This cannot be done in this petition which stems from Civil Case No. 12
6378 in the trial court and AC-G.R. No. 00183 in the appellate court. The Bazaar
s were the proper parties who ought to have raised them as defenses either in a
motion to dismiss or in their answer. Since they did not do so, the same were de
emed waived. (See Rule 9, section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court; MD Transit &
Taxi Co., Inc. v. Estrella, 113 SCRA 378; Torreda v. Boncaros, 69 SCRA 247; Visa
yan Electric Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 39 SCRA 43; Republic
v. Mambulao Lumber Company, 6 SCRA 858).
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for la
ck of merit. The appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
(RULE13 of ROC) Section 13. Proof of Service.
Proof of personal service shall co
nsist of a written admission of the party served, or the official return of the
server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of th
e date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof t
hereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing comp
liance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof
shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by
the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified
or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.

Section 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estat
e, or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for
partition, or other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the tit
le to land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no jud
gment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effec
t upon registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto, unless
a memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and
the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution t
hereof, together with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and
an adequate description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof,
shall have been filed and registered.
Section 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered lan
d adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the origina
l registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registerin
g the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or
interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the cert
ificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and
a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant
's residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This stat
ement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate o
f title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from t
he date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adver
se claim may be canceled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the part
y in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse cla
im based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a peti
tion in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellat
ion of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the qu
estion of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may b
e just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the regist
ration thereof shall be ordered canceled. If, in any case, the court, after noti
ce and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous,
it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more
than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, t
he claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds
a sworn petition to that effect.
Section 71. Surrender of certificate in involuntary dealings. If an attachment o
r other lien in the nature of involuntary dealing in registered land is register
ed, and the duplicate certificate is not presented at the time of registration,
the Register of Deeds shall, within thirty-six hours thereafter, send notice by
mail to the registered owner, stating that such paper has been registered, and r
equesting him to send or produce his duplicate certificate so that a memorandum
of the attachment or other lien may be made thereon. If the owner neglects or re
fuses to comply within a reasonable time, the Register of Deeds shall report the
matter to the court, and it shall, after notice, enter an order to the owner, t
o produce his certificate at a time and place named therein, and may enforce the
order by suitable process.
[G. R. No. 102377. July 5, 1996]
ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA SAJONAS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, DOM
INGO A. PILARES, SHERIFF ROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MARIKINA, respondents.
A word or group of words conveys intentions. When used truncatedly, its meaning
disappears and breeds conflict. Thus, it is written - By thy words shalt thou b
e justified, and by thy words shalt thou be condemned. (Matthew, 12:37)
Construing the new words of a statute separately is the raison d etre of this appe
al.
Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation of the inscription of a Noti
ce of Levy on Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real pr

operty. The inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent on Tran
sfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issu
ed in the name of the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde and Lucita Jarin, and was late
r carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of
the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchi
ta R. Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now
the petitioners in this case.
The facts are not disputed, and are hereby reproduced as follows:
On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to se
ll a parcel of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfred
o Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contrac
t to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The property was registered in the names of
the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina
, Rizal. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adv
erse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject proper
ty, which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase
price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question
in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale
was registered almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed Civil Cas
e No. Q-28850 for collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June
25, 1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said cas
e under which Ernesto Uychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation to Domingo P
ilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two years from June 25
, 1980. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in the compromise ag
reement, defendant-appellant Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of executi
on to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement, which the court gr
anted in its order dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was i
ssued on August 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City where the civil case was pend
ing. Pursuant to the order of execution dated August 3, 1982, a notice of levy o
n execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant she
riff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution be
fore the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of
TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.
When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4 1984 was registered on August 2
8, 1985, TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was
ssued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annot
ated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. On October 21, 198
5, the Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon City,
hence the auction sale of the subject property did not push through as schedule
d.
On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice
of levy on execution upon defendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter to thei
r lawyer, Atty. Melchor Flores. Despite said demand, defendant-appellant Pilare
s refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation. In view thereof, plaint
iffs-appellees filed this complaint dated January 11, 1986 on February 5, 1986. [1
]
The Sajonases filed their complaint[2] in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Bra
nch 71, against Domingo Pilares, the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The re
levant portion of the complaint alleges:
7. That at the time the notice of levy was annotated by the defendant, the Uychoc
de spouses, debtors of the defendant, have already transferred, conveyed and ass
igned all their title, rights and interests to the plaintiffs and there was no m
ore title, rights or interests therein which the defendant could levy upon;
8. That the annotation of the levy on execution which was carried over to the ti
tle of said plaintiffs is illegal and invalid and was made in utter bad faith, i
n view of the existence of the Adverse Claim annotated by the plaintiffs on the
corresponding title of the Uychocde spouses;
9. That a demand was made by the plaintiffs upon the defendant Domingo A. Pilare
s, to cause the cancellation of the said notice of levy but the latter, without

justifiable reason and with the sole purpose of harassing and embarrassing the p
laintiffs ignored and refused plaintiffs demand;
10. That in view of the neglect, failure and refusal of the defendant to cause t
he cancellation of the notice of levy on execution, the plaintiffs were compelle
d to litigate and engage the services of the undersigned counsel, to protect the
ir rights and interests, for which they agreed to pay attorney s fees in the amoun
t of P10,000 and appearance fees of P500 per day in court. [3]
Pilares filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim[4] on March 8, 1986, raisi
ng special and affirmative defenses, the relevant portions of which are as follo
ws:
10. Plaintiff has no cause of action against herein defendants;
11. Assuming, without however admitting that they filed an adverse claim against
the property covered by TCT No. 79073 registered under the name of spouses Erne
sto Uychocde on August 27, 1984, the same ceases to have any legal force and eff
ect (30) days thereafter pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529;
12. The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 being effected pur
suant to the Writ of Execution dated August 31, 1982, duly issued by the CFI (no
w RTC) of Quezon City proceeding from a decision rendered in Civil Case No. 2885
9 in favor of herein defendant against Ernesto Uychocde, is undoubtedly proper a
nd appropriate because the property is registered in the name of the judgment de
btor and is not among those exempted from execution;
13. Assuming without admitting that the property subject matter of this case was
in fact sold by the registered owner in favor of the herein plaintiffs, the sal
e is the null and void (sic) and without any legal force and effect because it w
as done in fraud of a judgment creditor, the defendant Pilares. [5]
Pilares likewise sought moral and exemplary damages in a counterclaim against th
e Sajonas spouses. The parties appeared at pre-trial proceedings on January 21,
1987,[6]after which, trial on the merits ensued.
The trial court rendered its decision on February 15, 1989.[7] It found in favor
of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.
The court a quo stated, thus:
After going over the evidence presented by the parties, the court finds that alth
ough the title of the subject matter of the Notice of Levy on Execution was stil
l in the name of the Spouses Uychocde when the same was annotated on the said ti
tle, an earlier Affidavit of Adverse Claim was annotated on the same title by th
e plaintiffs who earlier bought said property from the Uychocdes.
It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction (Guidote vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil.
442) that actual notice of an adverse claim is equivalent to registration and th
e subsequent registration of the Notice of Levy could not have any legal effect
in any respect on account of prior inscription of the adverse claim annotated on
the title of the Uychocdes.
xxx xxx
xxx
On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs are buyers in good faith of the proper
ty of the spouses Uychocde even notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that
said sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors, the Court find
s that the evidence in this instance is bare of any indication that said plainti
ffs as purchasers had notice beforehand of the claim of the defendant over said
property or that the same is involved in a litigation between said spouses and t
he defendant. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and bad faith, and the existe
nce of any bad faith must be established by competent proof.[8] (Cai vs. Henson,
51 Phil 606)
xxx
xxx
xxx
In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendant Pilares, as follows:
1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy on Execution annotated on Tra
nsfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.
2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000 as attorney s fees.
3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by said defendant.

Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs.

Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the Court of Appeals[9], assigning errors on t
he part of the lower court. The appellate court reversed the lower court s decisi
on, and upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of tit
le, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated February 15, 1989 is reversed an
d set aside and this complaint is dismissed.
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellees."[10]
The Sajonas couple are now before us, on a Petition for Review on Certiorari[11]
, praying inter alia to set aside the Court of Appeals decision, and to reinstate
that of the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondent filed his Comment[12] on March 5, 1992, after which, the part
ies were ordered to file their respective Memoranda. Private respondent complie
d thereto on April 27, 1994[13], while petitioners were able to submit their Mem
orandum on September 29, 1992.[14]
Petitioner assigns the following as errors of the appellate court, to wit:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULE ON THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR ADVERSE
CLAIM UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS IT FAILED TO REA
D OR CONSTRUE THE PROVISION IN ITS ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE THE APPARENT INCONS
ISTENCY WITHIN THE PROVISION IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT AS A WHOLE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IN SUCH WISE O
N THE GROUND THAT IT VIOLATES PETITIONERS SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
Primarily, we are being asked to ascertain who among the parties in suit has a b
etter right over the property in question. The petitioners derive their claim f
rom the right of ownership arising from a perfected contract of absolute sale be
tween them and the registered owners of the property, such right being attested
to by the notice of adverse claim[15]annotated on TCT No. N-79073 as early as Au
gust 27, 1984. Private respondent on the other hand, claims the right to levy o
n the property, and have it sold on execution to satisfy his judgment credit, ar
ising from Civil Case No. Q-28850[16] against the Uychocdes, from whose title, p
etitioners derived their own.
Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the
interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of suc
h interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act o
r Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves a warn
ing to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an inte
rest on the same or a better right than that of the registered owner thereof. S
uch notice is registered by filing a sworn statement with the Register of Deeds
of the province where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the cl
aimed right together with other dates pertinent thereto.[17]
The registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized under Section 70 of
P.D. No. 1529.*
Noting the changes made in the terminology of the provisions of the law, private
respondent interpreted this to mean that a Notice of Adverse Claim remains effe
ctive only for a period of 30 days from its annotation, and does not automatical
ly lose its force afterwards. Private respondent further maintains that the noti
ce of adverse claim was annotated on August 27, 1984, hence, it will be effectiv
e only up to September 26, 1984, after which it will no longer have any binding
force and effect pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the sale in favo
r of the petitioners by the Uychocdes was made in order to defraud their credito
r (Pilares), as the same was executed subsequent to their having defaulted in th
e payment of their obligation based on a compromise agreement.[18]
The respondent appellate court upheld private respondents theory when it ruled:
The above stated conclusion of the lower court is based on the premise that the a
dverse claim filed by plaintiffs-appellees is still effective despite the lapse
of 30 days from the date of registration. However, under the provisions of Sect
ion 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of 30
days from the date of its registration. The provision of this Decree is clear

and specific.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It should be noted that the adverse claim provision in Section 110 of the Land R
egistration Act (Act 496) does not provide for a period of effectivity of the an
notation of an adverse claim. P.D. No. 1529, however, now specifically provides
for only 30 days. If the intention of the law was for the adverse claim to rem
ain effective until cancelled by petition of the interested party, then the afor
ecited provision in P.D. No. 1529 stating the period of effectivity would not ha
ve been inserted in the law.
Since the adverse claim was annotated On August 27, 1984, it was effective only
until September 26, 1984. Hence, when the defendant sheriff annotated the notic
e of levy on execution on February 12, 1985, said adverse claim was already inef
fective. It cannot be said that actual or prior knowledge of the existence of t
he adverse claim on the Uychocdes title is equivalent to registration inasmuch as
the adverse claim was already ineffective when the notice of levy on execution
was annotated. Thus, the act of defendant sheriff in annotating the notice of l
evy on execution was proper and justified.
The appellate court relied on the rule of statutory construction that Section 70
is specific and unambiguous and hence, needs no interpretation nor construction
.[19] Perforce, the appellate court stated, the provision was clear enough to wa
rrant immediate enforcement, and no interpretation was needed to give it force a
nd effect. A fortiori, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of
thirty (30) days from the date of its registration, after which it shall be wit
hout force and effect. Continuing, the court further stated;
. . . clearly, the issue now has been reduced to one of preference- which should
be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sa
le. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was regist
ered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was annotate
d six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985.
In the case of Landig vs. U.S. Commercial Co., 89 Phil 638 it was held that wher
e a sale is recorded later than an attachment, although the former is of an earl
ier date, the sale must give way to the attachment on the ground that the act of
registration is the operative act to affect the land. A similar ruling was res
tated in Campillo vs. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 513).
xxx
xxx
xxx
The reason for these rulings may be found in Section 51 of P.D. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, which provides as follows:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by the registered owner.- An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the
same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgage
s, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed,
mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to conv
ey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land,
but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of aut
hority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
in so far as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under the Decree, the
registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the provi
nce or city where the land lies. (Italics supplied by the lower court.)
Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity
to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registe
red land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of
the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property wh
ich are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title.[20]
Although we have relied on the foregoing rule, in many cases coming before us, t
he same, however, does not fit in the case at bar. While it is the act of regis
tration which is the operative act which conveys or affects the land insofar as
third persons are concerned, it is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of pr

operty covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, d

uly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale.[21]
While it is true that under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree,
deeds of conveyance of property registered under the system, or any interest th
erein only take effect as a conveyance to bind the land upon its registration, a
nd that a purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens tit
le, upon its face, indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right th
at may subsequently defeat his right thereto, nonetheless, this rule is not abso
lute. Thus, one who buys from the registered owner need not have to look behind
the certificate of title, he is, nevertheless, bound by the liens and encumbran
ces annotated thereon. One who buys without checking the vendor s title takes all
the risks and losses consequent to such failure.[22]
In PNB vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the subsequent sale of the property to
the De Castro spouses cannot prevail over the adverse claim of Perez, which was
inscribed on the bank s certificate of title on October 6, 1958. That should have
put said spouses on notice, and they can claim no better legal right over and a
bove that of Perez. The TCT issued in the spouses names on July, 1959 also carri
ed the said annotation of adverse claim. Consequently, they are not entitled to
any interest on the price they paid for the property. [23]
Then again, in Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, we said that the statement of respon
dent court in its resolution of reversal that until the validity of an adverse cl
aim is determined judicially, it cannot be considered a flaw in the vendor s title
contradicts the very object of adverse claims. As stated earlier, the annotatio
n of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property, and serves as a notice and warning to third parti
es dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same o
r has a better right than the registered owner thereof. A subsequent sale canno
t prevail over the adverse claim which was previously annotated in the certifica
te of title over the property. [24]
The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed in the Transfer Certi
ficate of Title No. N-109417 still in force when private respondent caused the n
otice of levy on execution to be registered and annotated in the said title, con
sidering that more than thirty days had already lapsed since it was annotated?
This is a decisive factor in the resolution of this instant case.
If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents are charged with know
ledge of pre-existing interest over the subject property, and thus, petitioners
are entitled to the cancellation of the notice of levy attached to the certifica
te of title.
For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to the law itself. Section 110
of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act reads:
Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered lands adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, m
ay, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a s
tatement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how o
r under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate
of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the ri
ght or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant s
residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him.
The statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the cou
rt, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon
the question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree t
herein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invali
d, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case, the court after notice
and hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious,
it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble the costs in its discretion.
The validity of the above-mentioned rules on adverse claims has to be re-examine
d in the light of the changes introduced by P.D. 1529, which provides:
Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adv
erse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original reg

istration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering the
same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or inte
rest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate o
f title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a descrip
tion of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant s
residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This state
ment shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of
title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from t
he date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adver
se claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the par
ty in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse c
laim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a peti
tion in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellat
ion of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the qu
estion of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may b
e just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the regis
tration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after n
otice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolou
s, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor m
ore than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty day
s, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of De
eds a sworn petition to that effect. (Italics ours)
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be
given effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative shoul
d be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible
as parts of a harmonious whole.[25] For taken in solitude, a word or phrase mig
ht easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and ev
ident when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated
.[26] In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse cla
im, we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Sect
ion 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration.
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity
of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should
not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence follo
wing, which reads:
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled
upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force a
nd effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary
to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no
adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mer
e lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a u
seless act.
A statute s clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in its relation
to the statute s totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmoni
ze it with the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant, provisions
of statutes must be reconciled. The printed pages of the published Act, its his
tory, origin, and its purposes may be examined by the courts in their constructi
on.[27] An eminent authority on the subject matter states the rule candidly:
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections, and is animated by o
ne general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be con
strued in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmoni
ous whole. It is not proper to confine its intention to the one section constru
ed. It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide it
by a process of etymological dissection, into separate words, and then apply to
each, thus separated from the context, some particular meaning to be attached t

o any word or phrase usually to be ascertained from the context. [28]

Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency b
etween the portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of advers
e claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effecti
vity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the
adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscr
iption will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. Fo
r if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said
period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation
would be a useless ceremony.[29]
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase may be cancelled , which obvious
ly indicates, as inherent in its decision making power, that the court may or ma
y not order the cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision
limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of r
egistration. The court cannot be bound by such period as it would be inconsiste
nt with the very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the peri
od of effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an
adverse claim which is the principal issue to be decided in the court hearing.
It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the court to
determine whether it will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not.[30
]
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without
qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the sta
tute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotati
on of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right
is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third part
ies dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same
or a better right than the registered owner thereof.[31]
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse
claim is to be threshed out is to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to
be heard, providing a venue where the propriety of his claimed interest can be e
stablished or revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the existence
of any encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse claim. This is in lin
e with the provision immediately following:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim shall be regi
stered by the same claimant.
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the property, the ad
verse claimant will be precluded from registering a second adverse claim based o
n the same ground.
It was held that validity or efficaciousness of the claim may only be determined
by the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court sha
ll order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justi
ce and equity may warrant. And it is only when such claim is found unmeritoriou
s that the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protectin
g the interest of the adverse claimant and giving notice and warning to third pa
rties. [32]
In sum, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. N-79073 was still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City She
riff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto. Conseque
ntly, he is charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon on
execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the
registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing
adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners.
This can be deduced from the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, to wit
:
Section 16. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons- The levy on executio
n shall create a lien in favor of the judgment creditor over the right, title an
d interest of the judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy, subj

ect to liens or encumbrances then existing. (Italics supplied)

To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their property, who waited
a long time to complete payments on their property, convinced that their interes
t was amply protected by the inscribed adverse claim.
As lucidly observed by the trial court in the challenged decision:
True, the foregoing section provides that an adverse claim shall be effective for
a period of thirty days from the date of registration. Does this mean however,
that the plaintiffs thereby lost their right over the property in question? St
ated in another, did the lapse of the thirty day period automatically nullify th
e contract to sell between the plaintiffs and the Uychocdes thereby depriving th
e former of their vested right over the property?
It is respectfully submitted that it did not. [33]
As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith of the subject pro
perty, the same should be made to rest on the findings of the trial court. As p
ointedly observed by the appellate court, there is no question that plaintiffs-ap
pellees were not aware of the pending case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at
the time of the sale of the property by the latter in their favor. This was clea
rly elicited from the testimony of Conchita Sajonas, wife of plaintiff, during c
ross-examination on April 21, 1988 .[34]
ATTY. REYES
Q - Madam Witness, when Engr. Uychocde and his wife offered to you and your hus
band the property subject matter of this case, they showed you the owner s transfe
r certificate, is it not?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - That was shown to you the very first time that this lot was offered to you
for sale?
A - Yes.
Q - After you were shown a copy of the title and after you were informed that t
hey are desirous in selling the same, did you and your husband decide to buy the
same?
A - No, we did not decide right after seeing the title. Of course, we visited
...
Q - No, you just answer my question. You did not immediately decide?
A - Yes.
Q - When did you finally decide to buy the same?
A - After seeing the site and after verifying from the Register of Deeds in Ma
rikina that it is free from encumbrances, that was the time we decided.
Q - How soon after you were offered this lot did you verify the exact location
and the genuineness of the title, as soon after this was offered to you?
A - I think it s one week after they were offered.[35]
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another with
out notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property an
d pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or befo
re he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.
[36] Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any uncon
scientious advantage of another.[37] Thus, the claim of the private respondent t
hat the sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors has no basis
in fact, there being no evidence that the petitioners had any knowledge or noti
ce of the debt of the Uychocdes in favor of the private respondents, nor of any
claim by the latter over the Uychocdes properties or that the same was involved i
n any litigation between said spouses and the private respondent. While it may
be stated that good faith is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be established
by competent proof by the party alleging the same. Sans such proof, the petiti
oners are deemed to be purchasers in good faith, and their interest in the subje
ct property must not be disturbed.
At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree) guarantees
to every purchaser of registered land in good faith that they can take and hold
the same free from any and all prior claims, liens and encumbrances except thos
e set forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly mentioned in the ACT
as having been preserved against it. Otherwise, the efficacy of the conclusiven

ess of the Certificate of Title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would b
e futile and nugatory.[38]
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated Octo
ber 17, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Tri
al Court dated February 15, 1989 finding for the cancellation of the notice of l
evy on execution from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby REINS
TATED.
The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is hereby
CANCELLED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.