Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140604

March 6, 2002

DR. RICO S. JACUTIN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
In an accusatory Information, dated 22 July 1996, petitioner, City
Health Officer Rico Jacutin of Cagayan de Oro City, was charged
before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, with the crime of
Sexual Harassment, thusly:
"That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro
City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court pursuant to
the provisions of RA 7975, the accused, a public officer, being then
the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City with salary grade
26 but a high ranking official by express provision of RA 7975,
committing the offense in relation to his official functions and
taking advantage of his position, did there and then, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit, request sexual favors
from Ms. Juliet Q. Yee, a young 22 year-old woman, single and
fresh graduate in Bachelor of Science in Nursing who was seeking
employment in the office of the accused, namely: by demanding
from Ms. Yee that she should, expose her body and allow her
private parts to be mashed and stimulated by the accused, which
sexual favor was made as a condition for the employment of Ms.

Yee in the Family Program of the Office of the accused, thus

constituting sexual harassment."1
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense
charged; hence, trial proceeded.
Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred
that on 28 November 1995 her father accompanied her to the office
of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. Juliets
father and petitioner were childhood friends. Juliet was informed by
the doctor that the City Health Office had just then filled up the
vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he might be
able to help her.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father
returned to the City Health Office, and they were informed by
petitioner that a medical group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to
town in December to look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro, where she might be considered. On 01 December
1995, around nine oclock in the morning, she and her father went
back to the office of petitioner. The latter informed her that there
was a vacancy in a family planning project for the city and that, if
she were interested, he could interview her for the job. Petitioner
then started putting up to her a number of questions. When asked at
one point whether or not she already had a boyfriend, she said "no."
Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her father were not around, she
could afford to be honest in her answers to the doctor. The father,
taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner then inquired whether
she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory on the various
aspects of virginity. He "hypothetically" asked whether she would
tell her family or friends if a male friend happened to intimately
touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she would be
the subject of a "research" program. She was requested to be back
after lunch.

Before proceeding to petitioners office that afternoon, Juliet

dropped by at the nearby church to seek divine guidance as she felt
so "confused." When she got to the office, petitioner made several
telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether there was any
available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered
her a job in the family planning research undertaking. She
expressed hesitation if a physical examination would include
"hugging" her but petitioner assured her that he was only kidding
about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told
her to meet him at Borja Street so that people would not see them
on board the same car together. Soon, at the designated place, a
white car driven by petitioner stopped. She got in. Petitioner held
her pulse and told her not to be scared. After dropping by at his
house to put on his bowling attire, petitioner got back to the car.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her
bath, and she said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time
for it. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and
she said "no." Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her
pants so that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part
of the research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees
and held her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he
reached her pubic hair. Surprised, she exclaimed "hala ka!" and
instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then touched her
abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and
letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her to raise
her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for
a while but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then
fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered her
shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that
she was through with the research. He begged her not to tell
anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted from
the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He
then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.

Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr.
Jacutin and the money he gave her but she did not give the rest of
the story. Her mother scolded her for accepting the money and
instructed her to return it. In the morning of 04 December 1994,
Juliet repaired to the clinic to return the money to petitioner but she
was not able to see him until about one oclock in the afternoon.
She tried to give back the money but petitioner refused to accept it.
A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16
December 1995, she attempted to slash her wrist with a fastener
right after relating the incident to her mother. Noticing that Juliet
was suffering from some psychological problem, the family
referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for counseling. Dr. Adaza would
later testify that Juliet, together with her sister, came to see her on
21 December 1995, and that Juliet appeared to be emotionally
disturbed, blaming herself for being so stupid as to allow Dr.
Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that Juliets frustration
was due to post trauma stress.
Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that
on 28 November 1995 he had a couple of people who went to see
him in his office, among them, Juliet and her father, Pat. Justin Yee,
who was a boyhood friend. When it was their turn to talk to
petitioner, Pat. Yee introduced his daughter Juliet who expressed
her wish to join the City Health Office. Petitioner replied that there
was no vacancy in his office, adding that only the City Mayor really
had the power to appoint city personnel. On 01 December 1995, the
afternoon when the alleged incident happened, he was in a meeting
with the Committee on Awards in the Office of the City Mayor. On
04 December 1995, when Juliet said she went to his office to return
the P300.00, he did not report to the office for he was scheduled to
leave for Davao at 2:35 p.m. to attend a hearing before the Office of
the Ombudsman for Mindanao. He submitted in evidence a
photocopy of his plane ticket. He asserted that the complaint for

sexual harassment, as well as all the other cases filed against him
by Vivian Yu, Iryn Salcedo, Mellie Villanueva and Pamela Rodis,
were but forms of political harassment directed at him.
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its
decision, dated 05 November 1999, penned by Mr. Justice Rodolfo
G. Palattao, finding the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the
crime of Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No. 7877. The
Sandiganbayan concluded:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, convicting the
accused RICO JACUTIN Y SALCEDO of the crime of Sexual
Harassment, defined and punished under R.A. No. 7877,
particularly Secs. 3 and 7 of the same Act, properly known as the
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a
fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Accused is further ordered to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos, by way of moral damages; Two
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, by way of Exemplary
damages and to pay the cost of suit."2
In the instant recourse, it is contended that "I. Petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment
in view of the inapplicability of Republic Act No. 7877 to the case
at bar.
"II. Petitioner [has been] denied x x x his constitutional right to due
process of law and presumption of innocence on account of the
insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his
conviction."3

The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3

of Republic Act 7877 provides:
"SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment
Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is
committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent
of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any
other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy
over another in a work or training or education environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the
other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
"(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual
harassment is committed when:
"(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant
the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or
diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
said employee."
Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a
position he held when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw
him to enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. He did try
to show an interest in her plight, her father being a boyhood friend,
but finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her
about accepting a job in a family planning research project. It all
started from there; the Sandiganbayan recited the rest of the story:

"x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical

examination would be a part of a research, accused asked
complainant if she would agree that her private parts (bolts) would
be seen. Accused assured her that with her cooperation in the
research, she would gain knowledge from it. As complainant looked
upon the accused with utmost reverence, respect, and paternal
guidance, she agreed to undergo the physical examination. At this
juncture, accused abruptly stopped the interview and told the
complainant to go home and be back at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon of the same day, December 1, 1995. Complainant
returned at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, but did not proceed
immediately to the office of the accused, as she dropped by a
nearby church to ask divine guidance, as she was confused and at a
loss on how to resolve her present predicament. At 3:00 oclock in
the afternoon, she went back to the office of the accused. And once
inside, accused called up a certain Madonna, inquiring if there was
a vacancy, but he was told that she would only accept a registered
nurse. Complainant was about to leave the office of the accused
when the latter prevailed upon her to stay because he would call
one more hospital. In her presence, a call was made. But again
accused told her that there was no vacancy. As all efforts to look for
a job in other hospitals failed, accused renewed the offer to the
complainant to be a part of the research in the Family Planning
Program where there would be physical examination. Thereafter,
accused motioned his two (2) secretaries to go out of the room.
Upon moving closer to the complainant, accused asked her if she
would agree to the offer. Complainant told him she would not agree
because the research included hugging. He then assured her that he
was just kidding and that a pre-schooler and high schooler have
already been subjected to such examination. With assurance given,
complainant changed her mind and agreed to the research, for she is
now convinced that she would be of help to the research and would
gain knowledge from it. At this point, accused asked her if she was
a tomboy, she answered in the negative. He then instructed her to

go with him but he would first play bowling, and later proceed with
the research (physical examination). On the understanding of the
complainant that they will proceed to the clinic where the research
will be conducted, she agreed to go with the accused. But accused
instructed her to proceed to Borja St. where she will just wait for
him, as it was not good for people to see them riding in a car
together. She walked from the office of the accused and proceeded
to Borja St. as instructed. And after a while, a white car arrived.
The door was opened to her and she was instructed by the accused
to come inside. Inside the car, he called her attention why she was
in a pensive mood. She retorted she was not. As they were seated
side by side, the accused held her pulse and told her not to be
scared. He informed her that he would go home for a while to put
on his bowling attire. After a short while, he came back inside the
car and asked her if she has taken a bath. She explained that she
was not able to do so because she left the house hurriedly. Still
while inside the car, accused directed her to raise her foot so he
could see whether she has varicose veins on her legs. Thinking that
it was part of the research, she did as instructed. He told her to raise
it higher, but she protested. He then instructed her to lower her
pants instead. She did lower her pants, exposing half of her legs.
But then the accused pushed it forward down to her knees and
grabbed her legs. He told her to raise her shirt. Feeling as if she had
lost control of the situation, she raised her shirt as instructed.
Shocked, she exclaimed, hala ka! because he tried to insert his
hand into her panty. Accused then held her abdomen, saying, you
are like my daughter, Day! (Visayan word of endearment), and
let the back of his palm touch her forehead, indicating the
traditional way of making the young respect their elders. He again
told her to raise her shirt. Feeling embarrassed and uncomfortable,
yet unsure whether she was entertaining malice, she raised her shirt
up to her breast. He then fondled her breast. Reacting, she
impulsively lower her shirt and embraced her bar while silently
asking God what was happening to her and asking the courage to

resist accuseds physical advances. After a short while, she asked

him if there could be a right place for physical examination where
there would be many doctors. He just exclaimed, so you like that
there are many doctors! Then he asked her if she has tooth decay.
Thinking that he was planning to kiss her, she answered that she
has lots of decayed teeth. He advised her then to have them treated.
Finally, she informed him that she would not continue with the
research. The accused retorted that complainant was entertaining
malice and reminded her of what she earlier agreed; that she would
not tell anybody about what happened. He then promised to give
her P15,000.00 so that she could take the examination. She was
about to open the door of the car when he suddenly grabbed her
thigh, but this time, complainant instantly parried his hand with her
bag."4
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing
city personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a
recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in
the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed,
petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words
and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets
employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take
undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high
position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The
findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of
Vivian Yu, petitioners secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn
Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y
Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise
been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered
by petitioner, i.e., that he was at a meeting of the Committee on
Awards; the court a quo said:

"There are some observations which the Court would like to point
out on the evidence adduced by the defense, particularly in the
Minutes of the meeting of the Awards Committee, as testified to by
witness Myrna Maagad on September 8, 1998.
"First, admitted, Teresita I. Rozabal was the immediate supervisor
of witness Myrna Maagad. The Notices to hold the meeting (Exh.
3-A and 3-B) were signed by Teresita Rozabal. But the Minutes
of the meeting, Exh. 5, was signed by Myrna Maagad and not by
Teresita Rozabal. The documents, Exhs. 3-A and 3-B certify that
the officially designated secretary of the Awards Committee was
Teresita Rozabal.
"Second, why was Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance
logbook and how was she able to personally bring the same in court
when she testified on September 8, 1998, when in fact, she
admitted during her testimony that she retired from the government
service on December 1, 1997? Surely, Myrna Maagad could not
still be the custodian of the logbook when she testified.
"And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, Others
Present, the attendance of those who attended was individually
handwritten by the persons concerned who wrote and signed their
names. But in the case of Dr. Tiro and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their names
were handwritten by clerk Sylvia Tan-Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and Dr.
Jacutin. However, Myrna Maagad testified that the logbook was
passed around to attending individuals inside the conference
room."5
Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not
indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal,6 no cogent reasons having
been sufficiently shown to now hold otherwise. The assessment on
the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court

because of its unique position of being able to observe that elusive

and incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at
the stand, an opportunity that is denied the appellate court.7
Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and
exemplary damages by the Sandiganbayan must be tempered to
reasonable levels. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a
complainant but are awarded only to enable an injured party obtain
some means that would help obviate the sufferings sustained on
account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must not
appear to be the result of passion or undue prejudice,8 and it must
always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be
proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be
recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a
psychological counseling expert, has found Juliet to be emotionally
and psychologically disturbed and suffering from post trauma stress
following her unpleasant experience with petitioner. The Court
finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral
damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00
exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against, or as a negative
incentive to curb, socially deleterious actions.9
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 23799, finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo
GUILTY of the crime of Sexual Harassment defined and punished
under Republic Act No. 7877, particularly Sections 3 and 7 thereof,
and penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay
a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED. The
Sandiganbayans award of moral and exemplary damages are
MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is ordered to indemnify the
offended party, Juliet Yee, in the amount of P30,000.00 and
P20,000.00 by way of, respectively, moral damages and exemplary
damages. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio,
JJ., concur.

Jacutin v. People
Facts:
City Health Officer Rico Jacutin of Cagayan de Oro City was
charged with the crime of Sexual Harassment by committing
the offense in relation to his official functions and taking
advantage of his position solicited sexual favors from Ms.
Juliet Q. Yee, a young 22 year-old woman, single and fresh
graduate in Bachelor of Science in Nursing who was seeking
employment in the office of the accused, namely: by
demanding from Ms. Yee that she should, expose her body
and allow her private parts to be mashed and stimulated by
the accused, which sexual favor was made as a condition for
the employment of Ms. Yee in the Family Program of the
Office of the accused, thus constituting sexual harassment

Specific acts of sexual harassment:

-

On the understanding that they will proceed to the

clinic where the research will be conducted, she
agreed to go with the accused. Jacutin invited her to
go bowling and when they were inside the car, he
asked whether she had varicose veins and he told her
to raised her foot and lower her pants.
He placed his hands insider her panty and Jacutin
touched her abdomen.
Jacutin also instructed her to raise her shirt to check
whether she had nodes or lumps then he fondled her
breast.

Jacutins Defense/Alibi:
-

When the alleged incident happened, he was in a

meeting in the Mayors office and he was scheduled to
leave for Davao even submitting a photocopy of his
plane ticket.
The cases filed against him are forms of political
harassment.

1. The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or

in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said invidual.

This is clearly applicable in this case since Jacutin was the

City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro city, a position he held
when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to
enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. He offered
her a job in a family planning research project where there
would be a physical examination. Even if the City Mayor had
the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, a
recommendation from Jacutin in the appointment of
personnel in the municipal health office could carry good
weight and he used this as leverage to take undue liberalities
on the person of Juliet.

Held: Jacutin is guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment

under RA 7877

Sandiganbayan decision: Jacutin is guilty of the crime of

sexual harassment under RA 7877
Issue: WON RA 7877 is applicable to this situation. YES
Ratio:
RA 7877, Section 3 provides: In a work-related or
employment environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to
death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence
imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the
penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us
whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In
compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he
wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses
Francisco Abarca of the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated
Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill and with
evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an

unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there

wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times
KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot
wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence
of which also caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and
ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would have
caused the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado,
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crimes of murders as a consequence, but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that
is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented their death.
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The
Solicitor General states accurately the facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca,
Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently
began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar
examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in
Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban,
Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to the bus station to go
to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he was
not able to catch the first trip (in the morning). He went back to the
station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had
engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985).
The accused, then proceeded to the residence of his father after
which he went home. He arrived at his residence at the V & G

Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in the

afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and
Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in
cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to
the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at
around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went
back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find his
wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it
was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh
playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his
rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado
who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was
playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp.
34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of
multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 2829, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was
hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp.
17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also exh. C). His wife, Lina
Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet
fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado who received a salary
of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not able to work for 1-1/2 months
because of his wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for medical expenses
while his wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn,
Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment,
the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with
double frustrated murder as charged in the amended information,
and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does not
consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48,
he is hereby sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley
Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000, complainant spouses Arnold and
Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh
and defendant's wife had illicit relationship while he was away in
Manila; that the accused had been deceived, betrayed, disgraced
and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his reasoning
faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts.
Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused
Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive clemency, not of full
pardon but of a substantial if not a radical reduction or
commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by
the court a quo:

I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS
CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional
circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article
247 reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances. Any legally married person who, having
surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he
shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to
parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age,
and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.

Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife

or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of
the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision
applies in the instant case. There is no question that the accused
surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the
act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the
deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the
following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case.
The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder,
therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between
the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual
intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot,
the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the
pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal
Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both
of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of
intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly
thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate
result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon
his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have
been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not
have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the
direct by-product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not
define an offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:

xxx xxx xxx

As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the
Code, the above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely
provides or grants a privilege or benefit amounting practically to
an exemption from an adequate punishment to a legally married
person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act
of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or
both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict
upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death or
serious physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and
his righteous indignation, the accused who would otherwise be
criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or
serious physical injury, as the case may be is punished only
withdestierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a
case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a
punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where
physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is
exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the
exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an
exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious physical
injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to
no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines
and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional
circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal
liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel the
prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the
information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd,
since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot
be an integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissons
. . . constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or
information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability
or exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential element of
the offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to

the satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106,

Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest
when we consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article
423) was found under the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of
Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There can, we think,
hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it could
not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
does not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a
privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the
infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances
therein mentioned.... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is
banished, but that is intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by
either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances,
We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for
the physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold
Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accusedappellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a
finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-appellant,

and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of

reclusion temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. This is where we disagree. The accusedappellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple.
Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the
consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done
amounts to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accusedappellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle
upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant
liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally
free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not
performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he
cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that
before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray
labot kagawas,") that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for
the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find
negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the
first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious
physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The
records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and
one-half months; there is no showing, with respect to Lina
Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries. We presume that she was
placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the
medical certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we
therefore impose upon the accused-appellantarresto mayor (in its

medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to

being the graver penalty (than destierro).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED.
The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to
six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been
in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties.
He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado
in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the
sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning
capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant,
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
153 SCRA 735

vs.

Facts:
That on or about 15th day of July 1984 in the city of Tacloban
Leyte Philippines, the accused Francisco Abarca went to the
bus station and travel to Dolores Eastern Samar to fetch his
daughter in the morning. Unfortunately, the trip was delayed
at 2 pm because of his failure to catch the trip plus the
engine trouble which causes him to proceed at his fathers
house, and then later went home. When he reaches home the
accused caught his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with
Khingsley Koh in the meantime his wife and Koh notice him,
that makes her wife push her paramour and got his revolver.
Abarca peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room
jumped and ran away to look for a firearm at the PC soldiers
house to where he got the M-16 rifle. The accused lost his
wife and Koh in vicinity at his house and immediately
proceeded to a mahjong house where he caught the victim
aimed and shoot Koh with several bullets on his different
parts of his body causing Mr. Khingsley Kohs instantaneous
death. By that time, Arnold and Lina Amparado had inflicted
multiple wounds due to stray bullets causing Mr. Amparados

one and one-half month loss of working capacity including his

serious hospitalization and the latters wife who had slighter
physical injuries from the incident. The RTC hereby sentenced
Abarca to death for Murder with double Frustrated Murder
and must indemnify the Amparado Spouses and Heirs of Kho.
Issue
Shall the accused suffer the penalty of arresto mayor subject
by his criminal liability?
Held:
The Supreme Court modified the appealed decision of
destierro to arresto mayor from the lower court sentencing
four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor
indemnifying Amparado spouses for expenses and damages.
Reasoning
The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the
Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing an
offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, the rule
presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. The
accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility
performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim but
he cannot be entirely without fault. It appears that before
firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words which is not
enough of a precaution to absolve him for the injuries
sustained by the Amparados. The acts of execution which
should have produced the crimes of murders as a
consequence, nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of his will; nonetheless, the Court finds
negligence on his part. He is liable under the first part,
second paragraph, of Article 365 that is less serious physical
injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. For the
separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses impose
upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum period to being the graver penalty.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46310

October 31, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARCIANO GONZALES, defendant-appellant.
Eduvigio E. Antona for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney
Zulueta for appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:
Marciano Gonzales appealed from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas which found him guilty of parricied and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with the accessories of the law,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Sixta Quilason, in the
amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
At the trial, the appellant testified that at midday on June 2, 1938,
on returning to his house from the woods, he surprised his wife,
Sixta Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act, told her that the
man was the very one who used to ask rice and food from them,
and counseled her not to repeat the same faithlessness. His wife,
promised him not to do the act again. Thereafter the accused
continued testifying he left the house and went towards the
South to see his carabaos. Upon returning to his house at above five
o'clock in the afternoon, and not finding his wife there, he looked
for her and found her with Isabelo near the toilet of his house in a
place covered with underbush, who was standing and buttoning his
drawers, immediately took to his heels. The accused went after him,
but unable to overtake him, he returned to where his wife was and,
completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife without intending
to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her dead body to
his house.
The appellant contends that, having surprised his wife, in the
afternoon of the date in question, under circumstances indicative
that she had carnal intercourse with Isabelo, he was entitled to the
privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised Penal code
providing: "Any legally married person who, having surprised his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill either of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious

physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. (Emphasis

ours.)
We do not believe that the accused can avail himself of the
aforesaid article, because the privilege there granted is conditioned
on the requirement that the spouse surprise the husband or the wife
in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; the
accused did not surprise his wife in the very act or carnal
intercourse, but after the act, if any such there was, because from
the fact that she was rising up and the man was buttoning his
drawers, it does not necessarily follow that a man and a woman had
committed the carnal act.
We cannot, therefore, entirely accept the defense sought to be
established by the accused, first, because his testimony is
improbable. It is not conceivable that the accused had only mildly
counseled his wife not to repeat committing adultery with Isabelo,
instead of taking harsher measures as is natural in such
circumstances, if the were true that he had surprised the two
offender in the act of adultery on returning to his house at midday
on the date in question. Neither is it likely that a woman thirty years
of age, like Sixta Quilason, and twenty-five-year old Isabelo
Evangelio, both of sound judgment as is to be supposed, had dared
to have carnal intercourse near the toilet of the offended party
house, a place which is naturally frequented by some persons. The
circumstance that the place was covered by weeds, does not
authorize the conclusion that the offenders could lay concealed
under the weeds because the latter do not usually grow to such
height as to conceal or cover two persons committing the guilt act.
It seems that under the circumstances it is unnatural that they would
execute the act in a place uncovered and open. We do not want to
suppose that the sexual passion of two persons would border on
madness. Secondly, because even assuming that the accused caught
his wife rising up and Isabelo cannot invoke the privilege of article

247 of the Revised Penal Code, because he did not surprise the
supposed offenders in the very act of committing adultery, but
thereafter, if the respective positions of the woman and the man
were sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they had committed
the carnal act. (3 Viada, Penal Code, p. 96; People vs. Marquez, 53
Phil., 260).
Taking into account the mitigating circumstances of lack of
intention on the part of the accused to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed upon the person of the deceased, and of his lack of
instruction, the appealed judgment is modified, and the accused is
sentenced to the penalty of twelve years and one day to twenty
years ofreclusion temporal and indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the amount of P1,000 with the costs. So ordered.
Villa-Real and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AVANCEA, C. J., concurring:
I agree with the majority decision as to the result. I do not believe
the testimony of the accused, the only evidence in his defense, that
at noon of that day he found his wife in his house having carnal
intercourse with Isabelo Evangelio, and that in the afternoon, some
hours thereafter, he saw them in the underbush near the toilet,
Isabelo buttoning his drawers and his wife rising up from the
ground. Isabelo denied these facts. The accused, immediately after
his wifes death, told his sister-in-law and the barrio lieutenant that
she had committed suicide. Subsequently, in the justice of the peace
court, he pointed to Isabelo as the killer of his wife.
MORAN, J., concurring:

I concur in the dispositive part.

The husband has no right to take the life of his wife. He has no
right to do so even on the ground of conjugal infidelity. The law
does not punish such infidelity by death. Much less, therefore, can
the husband punish it by that penalty. The law nevertheless
establishes one exception, whereby it justifies, the husband if the
latter kills his wife upon surprising her "in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person." (Article 247 Revised Penal
Code.) It is because the law, in such case, considers the husband as
acting in a justified burst of passion. But to avail himself of the
exception, the bounds, that is, that he has surprised his wife in the
carnal act with another, or under circumstances which unmistakably
evidence the execution of the carnal act.
I agree that for a husband to be justified, it is not necessary that he
sees the carnal act being committed by his wife with his own eyes.
It is enough that he surprises them under such circumstances as to
show reasonable that the carnal act is being committed or has just
been committed. Thus, for instance, if the offended husband, as in
the case of U.S. vs. Alano, 32 Phil., 381, had seen the supposed
adulterer on top of his wife, there would be sufficient ground to
justify him, although he had not seen the copulation with his own
eyes. If the husband surprises his wife with another in scant in a
hotel room and kills her, there would also sufficient ground to
justify him. (See U.S. vs. Feliciano, 36 Phil., 753.)
In the present case, the acts attributed to the deceased and Isabelo
Evangelio do not conclusively show that they had committed
adultery in the underbush. From the fact that, in an open filed, she
was rising up and pulling down her skirt while he was buttoning his
drawers nearby, it does not necessarily follow that they had carnal
intercourse. It does not appear in what position she was found
before she rose up, or how she stood up and pulled down her shirt.

She could have been in an ordinary sitting position before rising up

and, to avoid raising her skirt, she held it down when she stood up.
And as to him, the fact that he was buttoning his drawers only
means that they were unbuttoned, but anyone may be in such
circumstance without having carnal intercourse with any woman. It
may be that the woman, in the afternoon in question, was sitting
near the toilet of her house, and that while in this position, Isabelo
Evangelio, who answered the call of nature in another place,
approached her buttoning is entirely consistent with the
presumption of innocence in favor of both.
It is true, at non time, the deceased and Isabelo Evangelio
committed adultery in the conjugal house of the offended husband.
But this is no evidence that they committed adultery in the
afternoon of the same day. An accused cannot be found guilty of
one crime just because he committed the same crime before. One of
the rules covered by the principle res inter alios acta is to the rules
covered is to the effect that "evidence that one did or committed to
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did
or committed to do the same or a similar thing at another time."
(Elliott on Evidence, p. 216.) The adultery committed at noon time
only makes the acts executed by the deceased and Isabelo
Evangelio in the shrubbery highly suspicious. But mere suspicions
do not justify a husband in killing his wife.
IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:
At noon time on June 2, 1938, the appellant, on returning to his
conjugal house from the woods where he had been working,
surprised his wife Sixta Quilason, the deceased, and her paramour,
Isabelo Evangelio, in the act of adultery. Upon seeing him,
Evangelio escaped through the door of the house. The appellant
approached his wife and merely scolded her for the act she had
committed, making her understand that she would not get anything

from continuing her illicit relations with Evangelio because the

latter was without means of livelihood and used to ask rice and
food from them. The deceased promised the appellant not to fail
him again. After resting for a while, the appellant again left the
house towards the South to see and look after his carabaos. At five
not finding his wife therein, looked for her in the neighborhood,
finding her again with Isabelo Evangelio. On this occasion he found
his wife raising herself up in a shrubbery near her buttoning his
drawers. The latter took to his heels upon noticing the presence of
the appellant. The latter gave chase, but as he was unable to
overtake Evangelio, he returned to where his wife was and in a fit
of passion attacked and killed her with his knife, thereafter taking
her dead body home.
Upon the facts above set out, the majority decision finds the
appellants guilty of parricide, and considering in his favor the
mitigating circumstances of lack of intention to cause so grave a
wrong as that committed and of his lack of instruction, sentences
him to the indeterminated penalty of twelve years and one day to
twenty years ofreclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The
majority decision denies to the appellant the benefit afforded by
article 247 of the Revised Penal Code to this effect:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances. Any legally married person who having surprised
his spouse in the cat of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill either of them or both of them in the cat or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he
shall be exempt from punishmentlwphi1.nt

These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to

parents with respect to their daughters under eight years of age, and
their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his
wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity
of the other persons shall not be entitled to the benefits of this
article.
In my opinion the proven facts bring the appellant within the
purview of article 247 and make him deserving of the benefit
therein provided. The legal provision should not be interpreted so
literally and strictly as is done in the majority decision. The latter
declines to give the benefit because it finds that the appellant did
not surprise his wife and her paramour in adultery or in the very act
of committing it. It seems to me that the privilege or benefit extends
not only to the cat of adultery, but also to any plain and positive
facts which lead to no other reasonable conclusion than that which
lead to no other reasonable conclusion than that the adultery has
been committed. If the legal provision should be interpreted
literally and narrowly, a s has been done, then it would likewise not
be an act of adultery if a husband surprises his wife under another
man, both of them being naked, while the offended husband has not
seen the consummation of the carnal act. Thus viewed, the result is
a departure from the intention and purpose of the legal provision.
Taking into account the position of the deceased and her paramour,
what they were doing with their clothes, and the solitary place
covered with underbush, there could be no other conviction than
that they had just committed the carnal act, which is what warrants
the imposition of a lighter penalty under article 247.
The deduction made that the guilty parties could not have executed
the carnal act in that place finds no support in the reality of the facts
or in the lessons of experience gained through a reading of the

judicial annals. Adultery is not always committed in a ready and

luxurious room, or in a comfortable bed embellished with carvings.
The appellant, in my opinion, should be sentenced only to two
years, four months and one day of destierro, in the manner
provided by the Revised Penal Code, with costs..
LAUREL, J., dissenting:
I am unable to agree with the decision of the majority of my
brethren in this case and I find it my duty to express my dissent.
I am of the opinion that the benefit of article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code should be extended to the appellant who should
accordingly be sentenced to suffer the punishment of destierro in
the manner prescribed by law. It is true that this article of the Code
is limited in its application to cases where the offended spouse
surprises the other "in the act of committing sexual intercourse,"
but considering the purpose which the legislator must have had in
mind in extending the extraordinary or special attenuating
circumstance to the offended spouse, this requirement should not
invariably be given a literal interpretation, but each case should be
subjected to the rigid judicial scrutiny to prevent abuse but not to
frustrate the legislative rationale. To require performance of carnal
act before the offended spouse raise the chastising hands is to
require the impossible in the majority of my breathen, if a married
woman at the appointed hour, in response to a common purpose,
should meet her paramour at a designated place, both to enter a
room alone, then and thereafter to undress themselves, perform
actual acts of the character of abusos deshonestos, all in preludis to
the carnal act, the offended husband must look on in the mean time
and wait until the very physical act of coition takes place, if he
were to receive the benefit of the special attenuation provided in
section 247 of the Revised Penal Code. This interpretation is far

from being rational and certainly does violence to the reason and
purpose of the law. The circumstances are not for mature reflection
of for husband to engage in mathematical calculation. Precision
was not contemplated by the legislator and could not have been.
When, as expressed in the Explosicion de Motivos del Proyecto de
la Comision de Codifiaction, amendatory to the Spanish penal Code
of 1870, the offended spouse "en un triste momento vea
desmoronarse la felicidad de su hogar y obre a impulsos de
verdadero y sincero dolor", watchful waiting cannot be the rule. To
receive the benefit of section 247 of the Revised Penal Code it is
not necessary that the act be in ipsis rebus venereis, but it is
sufficient thatborrowing the expression of the Romanistsit be
in preludiis vel paulo post, provided that it is the lanuguage of
Pessina (Elementi, 2. p. 57) "el acto no pueda explicarse mas que
como efecto del lazo criminoso del adulterio" or in the language of
Groizard (Vol. 4, p. 673) "los complices se encuentren en situacion
y condiciones de los que DIRECTAMENTE se infiere que con aquel
proposito se han reunido". (Capitalizing and unitalicizing are
mine.) Upon the facts of the present case, it is uncontradicted that
the wife and her paramour were surprised near the toilet of the
house of the couple, amids growing shrubs, late in the afternoon
while "la mujer estaba abrochando sus pantalones" (s. n., pp. 25,
27) and they were hardly one foot apart from each other. Added to
this paramour was a prequent visitor of the house (s.n., p. 26), the
fact that a noon of the same day, June 2, 1938, both were surprised
"uno encima de la otra" (s.n., p. 23), and the further fact that the
husband had no other motive at least nothing was proved or
shown, on the contrary they lived happily for fifteen years for
killings his wife, and the only conclusion is unless we wish to
live in blissful ignorance of the frailties of human nature that the
deceased Sixta Quilason and her paramour Isabelo Evangelio met at
the place for one single and clear purpose, to commit adultery, and
that they committed it. Taking into consideration the acts of the
parties, their behavior and appearances, the surrounding

circumstances, the entire res gestae, it is clear to a rational mind

that they had committed the adulterios act. It is not necessary that
the husband should be actual and living witness to the act of
copulation to entitle him to the benefits of article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The laws of Solon, the Roman Law, the laws among the Goths and
other ancient laws not excluding our own native laws, view the
infidelity of the wife with severity; and there are modern codes
which justify the killing of the wife and her paramour who are
caught in the act adultery, such as the penal codes of Chile, Colobia
and Ecuador. In Argentina and Switzerland the same result is
reached by judicial determination, because the crime is deemed
committed in a state of mental desequilibrium. The theory of
exemption based on physical considerations has not been accepted
in the Anglo-American countries nor in the majority of the Latin
countries of Europe. Like the penal codes of Portugal, Italy, France
and Belgium, our Revised Penal Code considers the crime as a
special one, because of the extraordinary concurrent circumstances
of attenuation such as uncontrollable passion, absence of criminal
malice, and physical emotions. But whatever may be the case,
fundamentally and rationally, the codes and laws of all countries
express the same sentiment: the condemnation of the iniquity at
demolition of the fundamental unit of social order and the
destruction of the felicity of family and home. The responsibility of
the offended husband has been of varying degrees. Not to speak of
the influence of Christianity upon the institution of marriage, the
same development is observable in the field of criminal legislation
in the Spanish peninsula from the Fuero Juzgo, through the Fuero
Real, Las Siete Partidas, the Penal Codes of 1822, 1848, 1850 and
1870 down to the Spanish Penal Code of September 8, 1928.
In our case, I observe that the Spanish Penal Codes of 1848 (art.
339) and 1850 (art. 348) and 1870 (art. 438) require for purposes of

special attenuation that the husband surprise en adulterio a su

mujer and that the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 as reformed by the
Comision Codificadora de las Provincias de Ultramar which was
in force at the time of the revision of our penal laws in 1930 also
borrowed the same language which remained until the enactment of
Act No. 3195 of the Philippine Legislature. Perusal of this Act will
reveal that the changes consisted in extending the benefit of the
original article 423 of the Penal Code the both husband and wife,
and for this reason, the phrase "in the act of adultery" was changed
to "in the act of committing sexual intercourse", and the clause
"shall kill . . . in the act" was changed to "shall kill . . . in the act or
immediately thereafter," so that the law now as embodied in section
247 of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
Death of physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances. Any legally married person who, having
surprised his spoused in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he
shall be exempt for punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to
parents with respect to their daughters under eighteeen years of age,
and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote of facilitate the prostitution of his
wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity
of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this
article.

In United States vs. Alano the offended husband was charged with
the crime of homicide and sentenced by the lower court to the
penalty of fourteen years, eight months and one day of cadena
temporal, to the accessory penalties, and to pay the costs. The facts
in that case, as related in the decision of this court acquitting the
offended husband on appeal, are as follows:
"About 5 o'clock in the afternoon of July 27, 1914, Modesta
Carballo, a friend and comadre of Teresa Marcelo, who had a store
near a cinematograph on Calle Tennessee of the district of Malate,
went to Teresa's house on the same street to make her a present of
five tickets for admission to the said cinematograph. When Maria
Remigio, her husband F. R. Cleach, and Maria's sister, Antonina
Remigio, returned home and learned to the present, they got ready
to go the cinematograph; but Tomas Ramos and his wife, Ricarda
Garces, who also both lived in that house, did not do so, because
the former was in a billiard hall at the time, and the latter was lying
sick in a room of the house. In obedience to the suggestion of her
husband, the defendant Teresa Marcelo did not accompany the
party to the cinematograph, as one of her children was sick, but still
a little while afterwards Modesta Carballo approached the house
where the defendant was, to call Teresa, who then told Modesta that
she would not go to the cinematograph, for the reason mentioned.
Thereupon the defendant Eufrasio Alano and his wife Teresa
Marcelo amused themselves at the card game of "black jack."
About half past seven that evening the defendant, feeling tired,
went to bed, while his wife remained at the window looking out and
a little while afterward told her husband that she would go down for
a moment to the Chinese store near by, which she did.
As Teresa Marcelo was slow in returning and her sick child was
crying, Eufrasio Alano left the house to look for her in the Chinese
store situated on the corner of Calles Dakota and Tennessee, and,
finding her there, went to look for her in another Chinese store near

by, with the same result. He therefore started to return home

through an alley where he tripped on a wire lying across the way.
He then observed as he stopped that among some grass near a
clump of thick bamboo a man was lying upon a woman in a
position to hold sexual intercourse with her, but they both hurriedly
arose from the ground, startled by the noise made by the defendant
in stumbling. Alano at once recognized the woman as his wife, for
whom he was looking, and the man as Martin Gonzales who
immediately started to run. He was wearing an undershirt and a pair
of drawers, which lower garment he held and pulled up as he ran.
Enraged by what he had seen, the defendant drew a franknife he
had in his pocket and pursued Martin Gonzales. although he did not
succeed in overtaking him, and, not knowing where he had fled,
returned to the house, where he found his wife Teresa in the act
climbing the stairs. He then reprimanded her for her disgraceful
conduct and immediately stabbed her several times, although she
finally succeeded in entering the house, pursued by her husband
and fell face downwards on the floor near the place where the sick
woman Ricarda Garces was lying. The latter on seeing this
occurrence, began to scream and started to run, as did also Teresa
Marcelo who had arisen and gone down the stairs out of the house;
but her infuriated husband again assaulted her and when she
reached the ground she fell on one of the posts beside the stairs.
When the defendant saw her fall, he entered the house, took some
clothes and started out in the direction of the Fort McKinley.

sexual intercourse." Indeed, the act of the man placing himself upon
a woman is not necessarily the act of coition itself, but is a mere
preliminary to the act. There, this court did not give a literal
interpretation to the legal provision involved. (2) In the Alano case
it should be observed that the act of adultery occurred in the
neighborhood of Calles Dakota and Tennessee, in the district of
Malate, in the City of Manila, whereas the case at bar occurred no
less than in one of the remote barrios of the municipality of Sariaya,
Province of Tayabas. The majority in the case at bar finds it
incredible that the act of adultery could have been perpetuated
under the circumstances testified to by the defendant, and says:

There are three salient points in the Alonso case to which I direct
particular attention in support of the view that I entertain and in
refutation of the argument of the majority in the case at bar. (1) in
the Alano case the "man was lying upon a woman in a position to
hold sexual intercourse with her . . . near a clump of thick bamboo .
. . but they both hurriedly arose from the ground, stated by the noise
made by the defendant in stumbling." The parties there were not
surprised in the act of copulation but merely "in a position to hold

The occurrence in the Alano in the Alano case is not very different
from that of the case at bar. If in the former case it did take place
as found by this court in plain Malate, City of Manila, why
could it not have taken place in a sparely populated barrio of
Sariaya, Tayabas? The fact that Sixta Quilason was thirty years of
age and her paramour Isabelo Evangelio was but twenty-five years,
does not prove what the majority calls "discrecion suficiente" but
rather the youth of the actors and everything that youth implies.

Como tampoco es verosimil que una mujer, como Sixta Quilason,

de unos de 30 aos de edad, e Isabelo Evangelio, de unos 25 anos
de edad, ambos de discrecion suficiente, como es de suponer, se
hayan atrevido a tener un syuntanientocarnal, nada menos que cerca
del retrete de la case del ofendido, que es de suponer, es un lugar
frecuentado por algunas personas. La circunstancia de que el sitio
estaba cubierto de malezas, no autoriza la conclusion de que los
culpables podrian estar cubiertos por las malezas, porque las
malezas no suelen tener mucha altura para ocultar o cubrir a dos
personas que esten en posicion deshonesta. Parece que entales
casos, no es lo natural que ejecuten elacto en un sitio descubierto a
visible. No queremos suponerque pueda rayar en locura el impetu
pasional de dos personas.

(3)In the Alano case the offending wife was killed not in the place
where she was surprised with her paramour but in the conjugal
home after she had fled, pursued by her husband; whereas, in the
present case, the deceased Sixta Quilason was killed on the very
spot where she was found with her paramour Isabelo Evangelio.
The majority does not give credit to the testimony of the accused in
the present case. I do. I accept his testimony because (a) it is not
contradicted or disproved in its material details by the prosecution,
(b) I find nothing inherently improbable or incredible in that
testimony, (c) it was given under the solemnity of oath at a formal
trial, and (d) it is substantially a reiteration of his sworn statement
(Exhibit G June 3, 1938) and (s) the alleged report (Exhibit F)
concerning the suicide appears to have been made by the lieutenant
of barrio of Concepcion-Banahaw of that municipality.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

In view of the result reached by the majority in this case, I also

express the opinion that this is matter that may properly be brought
to the attention of His excellency, the President of the Philippines,
for such action as he may deem proper to take in the premises.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48768

December 4, 19471

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CIRILO CORICOR, defendant-appellant.
Crisanto Alba for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B.L. Reyes and Solicitor
Florencio Villamor for appellee.

PERFECTO, J.:

Appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the

heirs of the deceased Pedro Lego in the sum of P2,000, and to pay
the costs, having been found by the lower court guilty of murder
committed on September 15, 1941.
The evidence for the prosecution was presented on October 20 and
21, 1941, and the evidence for the defense on October 21 and 22,
1941. Six witnesses testified for the prosecution and their
testimonies are in substance as follows:
1. Dr. Gregorio Pealosa, 30, identified Exhibit A as written and
signed by him which is a certification of the post-mortem
examination he made on the body of Pedro Lego on September 12,
1941, 3 p.m. He presented Exhibit B, a diagram of a human body,
where the wounds mentioned in Exhibit A are indicated by circles
in red pencil. Wound No. 6 was fatal, while Nos. 10, 11 and 12
were serious. The wounds were caused by a sharp cutting
instrument, such as a pointed cutting bolo. Wounds Nos. 5, 6, and 9
could have been inflicted while the victim had his back turned
towards the aggressor. Death certificate Exhibit C was issued by the
witness. He performed the autopsy about 15 to 20 hours after the
death of Pedro Lego, which took place at 3 p.m. on September 16,
1941. Exhibit D is a certificate of the wounds of Catalina Regis
who suffered superficial wounds, none of which being serious.
2. Catalina Regis, 38 widow of Pedro Lego. On the morning of
September 15, 1941, she was with her husband in the house of
Severino Regis in barrio Lukay, municipality of Alangalang, to
attend a novena for the souls in purgatory. Pedro Lego "came later
at 11 a.m. of the same day which was the last day of the novena. On
Monday morning September 15, Cirilo Coricor went to the place."
The witness and her husband had been in the house of Severino
"since Friday yet, at 4 p.m." The accused is the aunt of my husband
Pedro Lego." Cirilo arrived at 7 a.m. "to invite us to his house to

give advice to his wife Isabel Regis." Cirilo said: "Tatay Pedro,
before you return to Jaro, please pass by our house to give advice to
my wife, because she does not mind me, does not obey me." At 11
o'clock of the same morning, Cirilo returned saying: "I return to
invite you again, because I feel impatient waiting for you at home."
After lunch, in which Cirilo partook, he said: "Tatay Pedro, I am
going ahead because you are to take rest for a while as I am afraid
that Isabel might go away and you may not reach her at home."
Cirilo went away with the corn which witness and Pedro Lego were
to take with them, to compel them to go to his house." At 3 in the
afternoon we went away in the direction of Jaro and we passed by
the house of Cirilo." Question as to their arrival at the house of
Cirilo, the witness answered: "About half past two, I believe , no, I
believe after three. Esperanza Coricor came along with us to the
house. When we arrive he offered us places to sit and I sat on a
bench near the door. Cirilo was sitting on the floor and my husband
Pedro Lego sat on a bench near the window, at the side of a post."
Cirilo "was cutting roast pig and placing the pieces in a plate. There
was a glass and one liter of tuba in a container of bamboo. At that
moment he offered me tuba and gave me part of the roast pig. I
drunk and Cirilo faced Pedro Lego, squatting, put the tuba in a
glass which he placed on a bench, and faced me and took the bolo
which was before me and then placed it in front of himself and then
said: "Tatay Pedro, take tuba,' and Cirilo took the bolo and with it
he cut a piece of roast pig. While Pedro Lego was drinking the tuba
from the glass which he lifted to his mouth, Cirilo gave him a thrust
with the bolo." He took the bolo from the floor. The bolo was big
and it had a horn handle. Pedro Lego was hit in the abdomen. "My
husband covered the wound with his hand and jumped from the
house, and Cirilo pursued him to the other side of the road, which
was an abaca plantation. I went down immediately after them,
going to the road to have a sight of them. They reached the abaca
plantation. I could not see them, because they were screened by
shubbery. I heard a noise of blows. My children were shouting and

crying. I was intending to go to the side of my husband, or else flee,

but I could not because of my children. When Cirilo Coricor came
out from the abaca plantation, after killing Pedro Lego, I heard him
saying: 'Where is Catalina I am going to kill her too.' I felt I was
held. When I moved my face I saw her sister holding him by the
hand which was carrying the bolo. When I disengaged myself from
him, I took my son and went running at full speed, but he reached
me and stabbed me in the head. I felt dizzy. I believe he did not stab
me with the sharp edge because I was not wounded. I fell down on
my back. He mounted me and attempted to give me a thrust in the
abdomen, but I was able to take hold of the bolo and pushed it up
while he was trying to push it down, and then my hands were
wounded, the same as my face. I felt bad due to my wounds and I
swooned and said to Cirilo: 'Ay, I am going to die.' He left me
unconscious. When I opened my eyes I tried to stand up. I felt very
weak and I went to the house of Severino Reyes, almost crawling.
As soon as I laid down in the room of Severino Regis I heard Cirilo
shouting: 'Where is that Catalina. So she is still alive. I will kill her.'
Cirilo was then in the road. The witness saw him through a cranny.
When Cirilo arrived at the house, he asked whether Catalina Regis
went there. Severino and Esperanza told him that Catalina was not
there, and Cirilo went away. The witness was treated by Dr.
Pealosa. Her wounds took thirty-three days to heal. The bolo
Exhibit E was the one used by Cirilo.lawphil.net

Isabel, because he was noticing that she had a paramour, which was
Saturnino Caaya. The witness suspected that Cirilo had a grudge
against Pedro Lego, because the latter "sent him away from our
land and he had to transfer to the land of Victorio Alcober" which
happened two years before the incident. Cirilo then said that "we
had preferences." At first "he did not talk with us, but later after our
frequent visits to the place we resumed our old friendly relations."
The witness saw the cadaver of her husband "at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon." After a few more questions, the witness said that she
saw the corpse saw her husband in the municipal building at seven.

At the time of the incident there were in the house of Cirilo, his
wife Isabel, Esperanza, and a son and a daughter of the witness.
Esperanza sat down in the same bench with Pedro. Esperanza did
not see when Pedro was attacked by Cirilo because at that moment
Esperanza had already gone down the stairs of the house of Cirilo
to return home. The floor of the house was less than one meter high
from the ground. The stairs had only two steps. There was a
sleeping room. When Cirilo requested Pedro Lego and his wife to
come to his house, he wanted his uncle to give advice to his wife

Q. What did you see? A. Nothing.

On August 14, "Isabel Regis arrived at our house in Jaro because

she has a quarrel with her husband." Isabel said that Cirilo was
jealous of Saturnino Caaya. Isabel remained in the house of the
witness for four days. Cirilo came to take her, but before going out
they quarrelled, Cirilo saying: "You are courageous because these
people are riding with you."
3. Dominga Lego, 7. Pedro Lego, her father, was interred in the
cemetery. He was killed by Cirilo. When requested to narrate the
incident of the killing the witness answered: "I cannot."
Q. But what did you see, did you not see how the accused killed
your father? A. I did not see.

Q. What did your father try to do in return? A. He sat down.

Q. After? A. They gave him some drink.
Q. Who gave him some drink? A. Cirilo.

Q. What did he give to drink? A. Tuba.

Q. Who was attacking her? A. Cirilo.

Q. After? A. He gave him a thrust.

4. Zacarias Ladera, 35. As Chief of Police of Alangalang, he

learned that Pedro Lego was killed about half past four on
September 15, 1941. He was notified by a chauffeur of a truck. He
went to the house of the accused. Nobody was there. I saw tuba in a
container. On the floor there was tuba and meat. The house was
open. On the floor there were stairs of blood. There was a bayong
of corn at the door of the house. On the way from the house to the
road there were also stains of blood. The cadaver was found in an
abaca plantation at the other side of the road. It was about twenty
meters from the road. The body was seen with face down. The
witness was acquainted with the accused and his wife and they
came to se him on September 10, when they asked for help in
preparing an affidavit to be signed by Isabel Regis. The spouses
came accompanied by Victorio Alcober. The day before, Alcober
came to the house of the witness with a pencil draft of an affidavit,
requesting that the affidavit be prepared to be signed by Isabel
Regis, because the spouses were quarrelling and without said
affidavit, Isabel Regis would be killed by her husband. The
affidavit stated that Isabel Regis had sexual intercourse with Pedro
Lego. A copy of said affidavit is marked as Exhibit "F." The
accused told the witness that he wanted an affidavit to be sure and
to have an evidence that his wife had been the paramour of Pedro
Lego. At the time the affidavit of Isabel Regis was made, the justice
of the peace was absent, for which reason it was not sworn to
before him. The witness told Cirilo: "I am afraid you may punish or
kill your wife for this affidavit", and Cirilo answered: "I love my
wife much; I only wanted to be sure that my uncle Pedro had sexual
intercourse with her and that is all."

Q. What was your father doing when he was given a thrust? A.

Drinking.
Q. Who gave him the thrust? A. Cirilo.
Q. Afterwards, what did your father do upon receiving the thrust?
A. He ran.
Q. Where to? A. To the abaca plantation.
Q. And Cirilo, what did he do? A. He pursued my father.
Q. And you, where did you remain? A. I remained with my
mother.
Q. Where was your mother when Cirilo pursued your father? A.
On the road, in the middle of the way.
Q. Afterwards, where did you and your mother go? A. We went
to the house of uncle Severino.
Q. How did you and your mother go to the house of Severino
Regis? A. I and my younger brother ran there.
Q. And your mother? A. She was wounded.
Q. When you ran, what did you mother do? A. She was lying on
her back; she was being attacked.

5. Ruperto Aguirre, 37. On October 14, 1941, he saw the

accused and his wife in the house of Cirilo's mother in Granja,
municipality of Jaro. The witness was invited by a younger sister of

the accused to apply a domestic medicine to cure the stomachache

of a son. Cirilo arrived after 2 o'clock, alone. Isabel, his wife, was
already there. At 3 o'clock, when the witness and his wife left,
Cirilo said to the witness: "Mano Perto, this is the last time that we
shall see each other." The witness asked him: "Why are you going
to Manila?" The accused answered: "I am going to Manila." "What
for?" "I am going to kill a man." "Who?" "I will not tell the name;
you will know it because he will be from here if he is here or he
will be from there if he is there." (On pp. 66 and 67, on crossexamination by the court, the contradictions of the witnesses were
put in evidence.)
6. Severino Regis, 30. Pedro Lego and Catalina Regis left the
house at 2 o'clock. They were accompanied by Esperanza Coricor,
wife of the witness. Esperanza wanted to ask money from Cirilo
Coricor. That same afternoon he saw again Catalina who was
wounded. Cirilo arrived at his house asking for Catalina, saying
that he was going to kill her. The witness told him to go away
because Catalina was not there. The accused, who was holding a
bolo, left at once.
Catalina Regis ands Pedro Lego remained in the house of the
witness "for just one night."
Ignacio Buales, 50, first witness for the defense testified that on
September 15, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Isabel Regis came
running to his house. She said: "Cirilo wounded somebody." The
witness saw the accused in front of the house of Victorio Alcober.
The witness asked him. "Why are you covered with blood?" The
accused answered: "I kill Pedro Lego" "Why?" "Because I caught
him and my wife flagrantly." The witness said: "Then you should
not remain here. Where is your bolo? "It is with Victorio." The bolo
was delivered by Sebastian Alcober to the witness who then invited

the accused to present himself to the chief of police. The witness

delivered the accused and the bolo to the chief of police.
Cirilo Coricor, 28, the accused, testified: "On September 15 at
about 2 o'clock in the afternoon I went to distilltuba. After distilling
in a distant place, I came to distill tuba from coconut tress near my
house. While I was near a coconut tree, before climbing it, I looked
at my house and I saw that the window of my room was being
closed, and I felt apprehensive and then I went there to see what
was happening, and when I was approaching the room I heard low
voices or persons. I looked through a hole into the room and at the
moment I saw Pedro Lego raising his body which was over that of
my wife and I saw his penis in erection. I say my wife naked from
the chest down. Upon seeing this I felt bad, as if my chest would
explode and I thought that the peace of my home had been violated.
Then I unsheated my bolo. Slowly I went up passing through the
kitchen door. My intention was to kill the two of them inside the
room. As I was approaching the door of my room, Pedro Lego
came out and I gave him a thrust, and my wife was able to escape
passing through the door of the kitchen. Upon being wounded,
Pedro Lego jumped out of the window, and I pursued him. After
passing the threshold of my house, he faced me and made an attack.
He was able to take hold of the blunt edge of the bolo while I was
strongly holding it by the handle. After a while Catalina Regis,
Pedro Lego's wife, arrived there and tried to help her husband,
taking hold of the bolo in order to wrest it from me. Then we were
three struggling for the possession of the bolo, and while they were
exerting force to take it, by pulling it towards them, I was in turn
pulling it towards me, and at that time the point of the bolo touched
the end of Catalina's nose. Sometimes we stumble down. After
stumbling for the fourth time, Catalina was placed beneath us and
the bolo, touched her face. After a while, as Catalina was hurt, she
lost hold of the bolo and ran away and the two of us, Pedro Lego
and myself, remained, and we continued struggling for the

possession of the bolo. And he lost hold it and I began stabbing

him. From that place he was able to run to the other side of the road
and I followed him and at that place I finished him, because I could
not endure any longer the outrage he did to my home. I love my
wife who I brought to the altar."
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon when the accused left his house, the
window of the room was open. He was the one who opened it in the
morning. He remembered seeing it open because he went inside the
room. The accused had been a distiller of tuba for more than two
years. He used to make his distillation at about half past two in the
afternoon, the time when he saw the window of the room being
closed. Of the twenty coconut trees from which he used to distill,
there still remained eight to be distilled. It was about four when he
approached the house to find out what was happening inside the
room. Two years before, the witness was residing in his land in
Jaro. He transferred to Lukay because of the wrong that Pedro Lego
was doing to his wife. One week after his marriage, Pedro Lego
started going to their house while the accused was away in his
work. The accused saw Pedro Lego once sitting on a bench beside
his wife. On another occasion he saw him near the door of the
room. The accused heard from neighbors that there was something
bad going on between Pedro Lego and his wife and that Pedro Lego
would go to their house when the accused was out. Once, at about
half past eleven, Pedro Lego arrived asking if they had any viand.
The accused answered that they had none. Lego said that he
brought viand but left it in the house of an uncle, surnamed Coricor,
and ordered Cirilo to fetch the viand because Pedro wanted to eat
with the spouses. The accused obeyed. When he returned, he saw
Pedro Lego and his wife coming out of the room. The wife went to
the kitchen, pretending to do something with the rice she was
cooking. Pedro Lego pretended to be occupied cleaning the altar,
and then said that he was looking for a chisel he placed in the
ceiling. The accused then sensed that there was something wrong,

as Pedro Lego had no business to be in the room. As the accused

lacked the courage to talk to them, he went to Pedro Lego's wife
and told her: "Inay Taling, please tell Tatay Pindoy that he is doing
wrong to my wife and that in case I should catch them in flagrant
copulation I would kill them and I would not recognize him as my
uncle." Catalina answered: "Leave it to me. I will tell him." One
week later, Pedro Lego returned. The accused thought that Lego
could not stop making love to his wife. So he again went to Lego's
wife and said; "Inay Taling, we are going away from Jaro to avoid
trouble. If I remained here and uncle Pedro continues his acts and I
catch him in the act I would not consider him as my uncle. I will
kill him." That is the reason why the accused and his wife
transferred to Alangalang to the land of Victorio Alcober.
The accused denies having gone to the house of Severino Regis, as
testified by Catalina Regis, to invite Pedro Lego and his wife to
come to his house to give advice to his wife in view of the latter's
relations with Saturnino Caaya. The accused remained in his house
waiting for the time to proceeds with the distillation. Regarding his
relations with Pedro Lego and his wife the accused said: "Since I
learned that they were doing something wrong to my wife I ceased
my friendly relations with them." The accused does not even know
Saturnino Caaya, and he never suspected any man having love
relations with his wife except Pedro Lego. The accused learned that
Pedro Lego and Catalina Regis were in the house of Severino,
because his sister Esperanza told him so, and was the one who
invited him to attend the novena. The accused and his wife refused
to attend the celebration, "because I knew that Catalina Regis was
the one leading the prayers and her husband Pedro Lego was there."
The accused avoided meeting Pedro Lego, "because I knew what he
was doing to my wife." It is not true that the accused offered roast
pig in his house to Pedro Lego and his wife. "We did not even roast
any pig that day." The accused denies having gone to Severino
Regis' home to look for Catalina with the intention of killing her.

The fact that Catalina Regis was wounded only accidentally when
she intervened to help her husband by trying to wrest the bolo from
the accused can be shown by the fact that "if the wounds had been
inflicted intentionally the wounds a would have been big."
Regarding the written admission of his wife, the accused had it
prepared "in order that my wife would not repeat what she did." On
September 3, the accused not consented to let his wife go to her
mother's house to have a massage, promising to return the next day.
Several days passed but she did not return. The accused went to
find out the reason for her failure to return. On September 8, the
accused went to her mother's house. He did not find her there and
the mother said that Isabel did not come to her house but to the
house of Pedro Lego. The accused requested his mother-in-law to
be the one to take his wife, "because if I would be the one to do it,
it is possible that Pedro Lego would be mad at me." After taking
Isabel, her mother told the accused that it took some time before
Pedro Lego consented to her leaving his house on the pretext that
the child became sick and should be cured. The accused brought his
wife to Lukay, where he reprimanded her for going to Pedro Lego's
house. The wife answered that she was brought to the house of
Pedro Lego in Jaro by her aunt Catalina. Then the accused said: "I
believe you have copulated with your uncle Pedro. Why should you
be there with him?" At first she refused to tell the truth, but upon
the insistence of the accused she could not conceal what happened.
Then on September 10, the accused brought his wife to the chief of
police of Alangalang "to be reprimanded and be advised not to do
again what she did." Since the accused and his wife transferred to
Lukay, the accused has not been on speaking terms with Pedro
Lego and his wife. The accused and his wife never visited Pedro
Lego's house again nor has the latter visited the former at Lukay.
After he killed Pedro Lego he went to the town to present himself
to the authorities. On the way he met Ignacio Buales who asked
him why he was covered with blood and the accused said: "I killed
somebody. I had a certainty that Pedro Lego and my wife were

doing something wrong." Since the accused transferred to Lukay,

he heard that once, in his absence, Pedro Lego came to his house.
Pedro Lego has a piece of land in Lukay and the accused heard that
Pedro Lego used to go to said place, but the accused never saw him.
At the time the accused peeped into the room of his house he was
already carrying the bolo Exhibit E which he was using for his
work. He was also carrying a sickle which had fallen from his waist
when he was pursuing Pedro Lego. The accused did not pay
attention as to whether Pedro Lego had his pants on. He saw his
sexual organ, the same as that of his wife, who had the skirts raised.
When the accused went to distill tuba, his wife knew that he had to
distill from coconut trees which were located far from their house.
Ever since, the accused was detained, he has not talked with his
wife, who failed to visit him even once. The reason was because
"she knows that I was also about to kill her. In fact I gave her a stab
but she was not hit." Neither Pedro Lego nor Catalina Regis knew
of Isabel's declaration Exhibit F. When Isabel left the house on
September 3, she brought with her eight-months-old daughter and
left her two-year-old son in the house of her compadre Francisco
Serrano.
A careful weighing of the evidence both of the prosecution and the
defense leads us to the conclusion that appellant's version as to the
circumstance under which Pedro Lego was killed is the more
credible. That appellant should have gone to the house of Severino
Regis to invite Pedro Lego and his wife to come to appellant's
house so as to advise Isabel, because she had a paramour, one
Saturnino Caaya, as testified to by Catalina Regis, appears not to
tally with the fact that, according to the testimony of the accused,
not contradicted by the same Catalina Regis, he went twice to her to
complain about the illicit relations between Pedro Lego and Isabel,
to the extent that appellant manifested to Catalina that if he should
surprise Lego in flagrant copulation with Isabel, he will kill them
and would forget that Lego is his uncle. If appellant was jealous of

nobody else but Pedro Lego, of whose illicit relations with his wife
he had ample evidence, including the written confession of Isabel,
there is no reason for him to recur precisely to Lego to give advice
to Isabel. The suggestion is too illogical to be entertained by a
person in his senses, and there is no evidence that appellant had lost
his. It is unbelievable that he should seek advice for his wife to
desist from continuing with an alleged paramour, Saturnino Caaya,
who is not even known to him. After appellant had twice
complained to her of the illicit relations between Lego and Isabel, it
is hard to believe that Catalina could have seriously entertained the
alleged invitation by appellant to his house to give advice to Isabel.
Catalina's story to the effect that her husband and herself were
regaled by the accused in his house with roast pig and tuba and
does not seem natural. It is a well-known custom among our people
in the barrios to prepare roast pig only on important celebrations of
gatherings. Roast pig is considered a delicacy only proper when
there are joyous motives. If Lego and his wife were invited just to
give advice to Isabel, on an unhappy domestic matter, it is
incredible that appellant should offer roast pig, which is only
prepared for merry occasions. The fact that Lego and his wife we
coming from the house of Severino Regis, where the novena which
took place must have been an occasion for preparing special dishes,
only serves to make more incredible Catalina's story.
We are of the opinion that the circumstances under which Pedro
Lego was killed by appellant were as narrated in the latter's
testimony and, accordingly, the appealed decision must be
modified, so as to reduce the penalty to that provided in the
following article of the Revised Penal Code.
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances. Any legally married person, who, having
surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse

with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he
shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall applicable, under the same circumstances, to
parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age,
and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his
wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity
of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this
article.
In applying the above article we feel that we are performing a duty
extremely distasteful, because, with all due respect to a contrary
opinion of the majority, the writer can not conscientiously agree
with the philosophy underlying said part of the Revised Penal
Code. That philosophy, acceptable during the immature stages of
human evolution, when blind and unreasonable impulses were the
law, when reason was swayed by obscurantism and absurd
prejudices, when the Christian and other humanitarian religions had
not yet set he tenets upon which modern civilization and culture
have developed, has absolutely no place in the present stage of
human society.
Under that un-Christian, barbarous, inhuman philosophy, the
offended spouse is given the tremendous power to summarily
execute two human beings, without the benefit of any hearing, trial,
or court proceeding. Under our laws, under the democratic system
of government established by our Constitution, the authors of the

most heinous and abhorrent offenses, such as treason, piracy,

parricide, murder, genocide, mass massacre, the criminals whose
misdeeds place them in the category of moral monsters, are
protected by a bill of rights, by an elaborate system of
administration of justice, by a number of fundamental guarantees
intended to insure that no the shall be deprived of the due process
of law and that the equal protection of the laws shall be effective to
everybody. Under the savage philosophy in question, those who
should happen to be surprised violating the conjugal fidelity can be
killed like vexatious insects or wild animals.
Conjugal fidelity committed by a married woman and her paramour
is punished, as adultery, by article 333 of the Revised Penal Code
with from 4 months to 6 years of imprisonment, and the one
committed by a husband and his mistress, as concubinage, by
article 334, with imprisonment from 6 months and 4 years and 2
months for the erring husband and banishment for the mistress.
Under article 334, not all cases of conjugal infidelity committed by
a husband is punishable. The great majority of them are left
unpunishable. No fiscal will think of prosecuting the husband who
should indulge in sexual intercourse with discreet mistresses or
with prostitutes. For such acts of conjugal infidelity, some
punishable with short terms of imprisonment, others with simple
banishment, and still others not punishable at all, article 247, in
effect, confers to the offended spouse the power to inflict the
supreme penalty of death. The banishment provided for the killer is
intended more for his protection than as a penalty. Such a twisted
logic seems possible only in a paranoiac mind. It is high time to
relegate article 247 to where it properly belongs, to the memory of
the sins that humanity promised to herself never to commit again.
The majority of the Court, however, opines otherwise.
For all the foregoing, setting aside the appealed decision, appellant
is found guilty of the offense of having killed Pedro Lego as

punished by article 247 of the Revised Penal Code and,

accordingly, is sentenced to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of
banishment, and to indemnify the heirs of Pedro Lego in the sum of
P2,000.
Paras, and Pablo, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C.J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Briones and Mr. Justice Padilla joined in
this decision.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J., concurring:
I agree to the application of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
But I can not assent to the commentary that it is old-fashioned and
unjust. Though it is not this Court's mission to vindicate legislative
measures, it should be observed that similar provisions are founds
in the codes of France, Italy, Belgium, Mexico, Peru, Chile and
other South American countries. 1 In some of these the offended
husband is even exempted from all criminal responsibility.
Article 247 was taken from the Spanish Penal Code; it does not
fully excuse the husband's misdeed, but it greatly reduces the
penalty, considering the enormous provocation and his righteous
indignation. As Groizard explains.
El marido que sorprende a su mujer en adulterio y la mata, o mata a
su complice, o mata a los dos, debe ser siempre justiciable. Todos
los elementos constitutivos del delito, en este hecho concurren. Hay
derecho herido: el derecho a la vida; hay ley violada; hayvoluntad

en la accion; hay dao immediato; hay dao mediato, y no concurre

ninguna de las circumstancias que hacen, con areglo a los
principios, de todo punto excusable el homicidio. Pero a su vez, hay
que convenir en que la voluntad criminal no se determina en tales
casos con aquella ausencia de exitaciones que constituye el tipo
ordinario del dolo, ni mucho menos con aquella otra calma y fria
reflexion que constituye el dolo perfecto; a su vez, hay que confesar
que la causa de la accion surge espontanea y conviolento impetu en
el animo del marido en presencia de la enorme ofensa, que se le
infiere, y por tanto, que la inmoralidad y la repugnancia del delito
decoro que la accion criminal le induce; a su vez, hay que
proclamar que la opinion publica, cuando ilega a su noticia la
catastrofe, se indigna mas contra los culpables del aduleterio que
contra el culpable del homicido; . . ..
TUASON, J., with whom concur MORAN, C.J., FERIA, and
HILADO, JJ., dissenting:
The decision of this Court not only disregards the sensible, realistic
rule which gives weight to the trial judge's findings on matters or
veracity; it gives credence to the highly improbable story of the
accused in preference to the prosecution witnesses' version of the
killing which is not only convincing in its natural details,
independently of the trial court's well-considered decision, but is
supported by indisputable facts.
Two accounts of the killing are pitted against each other, one given
by two eye-witnesses for the prosecution, the other by the accused
himself. They are condensed in the decision. A reading of the
unabridged statements, in the form of questions and answers will
convey a more vivid idea of, and, in their simplicity, inspire an
abiding confidence in, the witnesses' truthfulness.

According to the prosecutions' evidence the deceased had been

invited by the defendant to his house and there was suddenly
attacked while taking tuba offered by the defendant himself.
Contrasting this testimony, the accused said he caught the now
deceased having carnal knowledge of his (defendant's) wife.
The defendant's testimony is absolutely incredible. It is a fact which
no amount of argument can destroy, that the decedent's wife and
children were inside the house at the commencement of the assault.
This is undeniable from the other fact that the wife was seriously
wounded, sustaining five wounds, although there is variance in the
proofs as to the defendant's intention to inflict her injuries (which
have deformed her face). It is also a fact that the time of the attack
was from 3 to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. In the face of these facts,
the most beastly and daring of swains would not put in his head the
notion of committing the act attributed to the deceased. And it is
even more inconceivable that the defendant's wife had the temerity
to yield to Pedro Lego's lust with her husband just around, likely to
show up at any moment, and only five days after she had been
made to sign an affidavit in order, according to the accused, that she
should not renew her illicit relations with Lego, or that he might
have proof of her infidelity. When I say that the defendant was just
around I am referring to his own testimony, that before the
deceased came to his house he went out to gather coconut saps,
testimony which is beyond doubt a perjury but is granted for the
sake of argument.
The lower court's finding that the deceased, his wife and his
children were together in the house of the accused is established by
the testimony of the widow, of her seven-year old daughter,
Dominga Lego, and that of Severino Regis. The first of these three
witnesses declared that the accused twice came to the house of
Severino Regis and implored Pedro Lego to drop in at his
(defendant's) house and give counsel to his (defendant's) wife, who,

the defendant told Lego, paid no attention to and would not only
obey him. The first time the accused came was in the morning and
the second time was shortly after meal. Catalina the accused came
was meal. Catalina Regis stated that in the afternoon the accused
reminded the deceased of the necessity that he come right over lest
Isabel Regis would go away. To make sure that the deceased did not
fail to come, Catalina Regis further testified, the accused took upon
himself the trouble of carrying some corn which Pedro Lego had
put in a sack to take home to Jaro. This corn with its container was
found by the chief of police, after the killing, on the ground near the
steps of the defendant's house. On her part, Dominga Lego testified
that from the house of Severino Regis' wife, and she came to the
house of the accused, and that in that house her father was stabbed
by the defendant while she, the witness, was seated on a bench. A
complaint does not build up fabricated story by the testimony of a
timid and untutored young tot. Lastly, Severino Regis stated that
Pedro Lego, Catalina Regis, their children and the witness's wife,
Esperanza Coricor, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon went from
his house to the house of the defendant. He added that his wife
went along because she wanted to get money from the defendant
who is her brother.
Neither at the time of nor after his arrest did the defendant say to
the chief of police that he and surprised his wife and Pedro Lego.
What he told the officer, according to the latter, was "su Corazon
estaba muy apenado, resentido por este affidavit (Exhibit F) y que
desde algunos dias antes, estando todavia en Jaro y estaba el muy
resentido."
Ignacio Baales, barrio lieutenant, was notified by the defendant's
wife of the tragedy, and soon as saw the accused in the street.
Baales tried to make the court believe that he asked Coricor why
he was splashed with blood and that the accused answered he had
killed Pedro Lego "because I am caught him and my wife in

flagrante." But Baales said later that the defendant's statement that
he had surprised his wife with Lego was made to him only in the
courthouse on the day of the trial. On cross-examination the barrio
lieutenant said that Coricor's only expression was "nakafijo". The
defendant stated that when Baales asked him why his clothes were
spattered with blood he answered, "I had the certainty that Pedro
Lego and my wife were executing illicit acts."
It is apparent that the statement which the accused is said to have
uttered when he and Baales met was the result of an effort to put
up something after the barrio lieutenant had stated unwittingly or in
unguarded moment that it was in the courtroom he heard from the
defendant's lips of his wife's unfaithfulness. It looks as if the
defense had intended to have this statement taken as having been
made by the accused when he was questioned by the barrio
lieutenant shortly or immediately after the commission of the
crime. In any event that the statement stopped short of conveying
the idea that the accused has, as he expressly said at the trial, seen
Lego on top of Isabel with Lego's trousers down and Isabel's skirt
up to the waist or chest. The accused went to so far as to say, on the
witness stand, that he had seen Pedro Lego's sexual organ and to
describe it. The point is that the defendant is not a man whom we
could except to relate Lego's and Isabel's conduct with subtly and
refinement of words if he had found them in sexual intercourse.
Blunt and crude in his speech to the point of vulgarity, the
defendant would have said in unrestrained language what he had
seen instead of indulging in innuendos or expressing what would
sound to be a belief or conviction. In truth it is to be gathered from
the tenor of the provincial fiscal's questions to Baales that the
latter had not said to the prosecuting officer "nakafijo" or anything
suggesting coitus between Lego and Isabel.
The chief of police testified that in the defendant's house he found,
at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, tuba, in a bamboo container,

traces of spilled tuba and blood stains on the floor, and small
remnants of meat. This testimony, the veracity of which can not be
successfully questioned, corroborates the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution that the deceased and his family
had been invited by the defendant and entertained withtuba and
pork meat. The decision refuses to give credence to the presence of
meat saying that the day was not an occasion for roasting a pig.
What Catalina Regis did say was that the accused had a piece of
roast pork in a plate which he could have gotten from his sister
or bought elsewhere. It must be recalled that at Severino's house
there had been a feast on the occasion of a prayer said for the soul
of a departed relative and that at the luncheon the accused,
according to the evidence, had taken part.
The fact that the chief of police found blood stains only at the
entrance of then house is a clear refutation of the defendant's
testimony that he caught the deceased and his wife in the room
(which was on the opposite side of the sala from the entrance of
them house) and that there was a struggle for the possession of his
bolo inside the house between him and the deceased. At the same
time, this fact confirms the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution that upon receiving the first stab in the abdomen the
now deceased fled from the house and was pursued by the accused.
It is significant that the defendant's wife and Severino Regis wife,
Esperanza Coricor, who is the defendant's own sister, were not
presented as witnesses by the defense. These women made sworn
statements before the justice of the peace on the same day of the
crime corroborating Catalina Regis. Their affidavits were excluded
from the record on the objection of defense counsel based on
technical grounds. The exclusion was proper and the statements
may not be used as basis of defendant's conviction, but they should
not keep us from pausing before we take the defendant's grotesque
tale without question.

There are other things that point to the killing as a premeditated,

cold-blooded affair. Isabel Regis stated in her affidavit that her
husband told her to leave the house as soon as she should see Pedro
Lego and Catalina Regis come. The circumstances under which the
affidavit, Exhibit F, was made, lead one to believe that the accused,
in contemplation of his ghastly plan, used pressure on his wife to
confess an alleged adultery. Isabel in another affidavit declared that
she was forced by her husband to admit she had been abused by the
deceased and that she consented to sign Exhibit F to stop him from
scolding her. The chief of police thus narrated how the affidavit
happened to be executed:
On September 10, the accused and his wife appeared in his office
accompanied by Victor Alcober, the defendant's landlord. The day
before that, Alcober had come with a draft, saying?: "Do the favor
of preparing an affidavit for Isabel Regis, one of my tenants,
otherwise she will be killed by Cirilo Coricor, her husband, as they
have been quarrelling (peleando)." It was then that he told Alcober
to fetch Coricor and Isabel Regis. The next day Alcober came back
with Isabel and Coricor. The latter asked him to draw an affidavit.
He asked the accused the reason why he wanted an affidavit and
Coricor answered that it was to find out the truth and to have on
hand proof that his wife had been Pedro Lego's mistress. He
expressed concern lest the accused would make use of the affidavit
to harm his wife, but the accused assured him: "I love my wife and
I am not going to punish her." Upon this assurance he consented to
write down the affidavit on a typewriter. As soon as the affidavit
was written Coricor wanted to take it but the refused to hand it to
him. Then he went out to answer the call of nature and left the
paper on his table. When he returned, Coricor, Coricor's wife and
Alcober were gone with the paper.
That the accused conceived the idea of arming himself with this
affidavit only five days before he killed Lego and months after the

alleged adultery mentioned therein took place, in Jaro, gives added

reason for the belief that the defendant had long nurtured the idea
of doing away with his wife's uncle.
Even the charge that Lego disrupted the defendant's marriage in
Jaro, before the defendant and his wife moved to Lucay, is not by
any means clearly convincing. The dead man's widow branded this
imputation on her husband as a falsehood. She said she had not
heard any rumor or gossips to that effect, and she ought to have
known or heard of it if anything like that had happened. The fact is,
it can be seen between the lines that the defendant is a man of
nervous and violent temperament. Conceivably he may have been a
victim of an obsession or hallucination about his wife's faithfulness.
No small amount of tragedy has been the result of unfounded
jealousy. Not infrequently is jealousy a disease of the should
haunting the imagination. Pedro Lego was not the only object of
defendant's jealousy. He also accused one Calaya of breaking his
home though he denied this at the trial and said he did not know
any one by that name.
Whether the defendant's jealousy was founded or imaginary and
whether or not jealousy had anything to do with the murder in
question, it can be affirmed with absolute certainty that the
deceased was not guilty of any improper conduct towards the
defendant's wife on the day he was murdered. Indeed, jealousy may
just have been a pretext. Note the frenzy with which the affidavit
was made, its proximity to the date of the crime, and the
remoteness from that date of the supposed amorous episode that
was the subject of the sworn statement. Did the defendant know
that Lego and his family were coming to attend the prayer five days
hence in Severino's house? And was that the reason why he wanted
to have "on hand proof of his wife's infidelity?" That is not
implausible.

The defendant's real motive has to be looked for somewhere else.

Catalina Regis stated what I believe was the dominating cause of
the defendant's ire. Substantially, she testified that Pedro Lego had
bought a piece of land in Lucay, the scene of the present crime. She
said that the accused and his wife moved from Jaro to Lucay to
work on that land. Later the property was given to Severino Regis,
Isabel's brother, and the defendant was dismissed from it by Lego.
It was then that Coricor and his wife moved to Victor Alcober's
farm. This incident, according to Catalina Regis, was resented by
the accused and his wife, both of whom charged that Pedro Lego
and his wife "had preferences." For sometime thereafter Coricor
and his wife refused to talk with the deceased and the witness,
although in the course of their visits to Lucay the former good
relations were restored, at least on the surface.
The following circumstances bear out the theory that the killing
was motivated not by jealousy, much less defendant's having
surprised the accused and Isabel Regis, but by something else.
Isabel came out unscathed. It does not appear, aside from the
defendant's gratuituous testimony given in court, that he went after
his wife after he killed Lego to chastise her as he looked for
Catalina Regis. On the other hand, he slashed Catalina Regis
several times with his bolo until Catalina was knocked down and
was believed dead. After Catalina, upon regaining consciousness,
crawled away to hide, the accused, still carrying his bolo, upon
finding her gone, looked for her apparently intent on finishing the
woman. The defendant's determination to kill not only Lego but
also Lego's wife could not have been due to jealousy or to Lego's
having been caught by the accused with the latter's wife. The charge
that Catalina Regis was a party to her niece's fall for Catalina's
husband sounds too ridiculous to deserve attention.
The attitude of the accused in connection with his appeal is all
significant as indication of consciousness of guilt. He was

prosecuted for two crimes, that of murder in connection with the

death of Pedro Lego and frustrated murder in relation with his
attack against Catalina Regis. He was convicted of both accusations
although the court qualified the latter offense as serious physical
injuries. The accused appealed only from the sentence convicting
him of murder and abided by the decision as to the other crime.
This belies defendant's statement that Catalina Regis was wounded
unintentionally on his part when she allegedly intervened to wrest
his bolo while he had and Pedro Lego were grappling with each
other. Again, the accused filed a formal motion to withdraw his
appeal from the sentence for murder, although that motion to
withdraw the appeal was allowed to be withdrawn upon insistence
of the appellant who got an inkling from a dissenting opinion that
his case might have been decided with modification of the sentence
by this court in his favor.