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28th

Christie Cruz
of October 2014
AB 4ELS
Case statement: Why does Immanuel Kant oppose Consequentialism?

1. Kants definition of happiness. Kant defines happiness simply as getting what is


desired complete satisfaction with ones condition 1. While it does play a part in his
ethics, Kant does not give much time for an elaboration of his concept of happiness
because it is not central to his deontological, or duty-based, system of ethics.
Because Kant defines happiness this way, reasons why he thinks it is powerless to
function as a basis for morality become evident.
First, getting what one wants may result in preventing someone else from
getting what they want, which clearly illustrates that not everyone can be
realistically happy all at the same time, because personal happiness does not
supply a single determining basis that is valid for every single person. Therefore, if
morality is equal to happiness, and not everyone can be happy, then not everyone
can be moral.
Second, Kant writes, The concept of happiness is such an indeterminate concept
that although every human wishes to attain it, he can still never say determinately
and consistently with himself what one wishes and wills.

Kant gives the example

of a man wanting and attaining wealth in the belief it would make him happy, only
to find out that it would cause him more unhappiness due to the envy of others and
the anxiety from losing it to thievery or bad business decisions.

He further states,

The problem of determining surely and universally which actions would promote
the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble because happiness is not
an ideal of reason, but of imagination.

Therefore, a man cannot absolutely

reasonably know exactly what actions can produce happiness, lasting or not, in any
1

Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Ibid., 70

Ibid.

Ibid., 71

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amount, either for himself only or for others, which Kant believes considerably
weakens the Consequentialist thesis of basing morality on the resulting happiness
of an act.
2. Kants concept of good will. Kant writes, It is impossible to think of anything at
all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without
limitation, except a good will.5 Intellect, power, wealth, wisdom, courage,
perseverance, faith all are considered good only when possessed by a person with
a good will, for in the hands of someone with bad will, none of these can be
instrumentally good.

The problem now lies in how to determine a good will.

Consequentialists will assume that a good will should aim to act in a manner that
produces the most happiness for the most people, but Kant thinks that this is a
backwards way of thinking. Kant writes, A good will is not good because of what it
effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but
only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to
be valued incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought about by it.

Kant believes that a will is considered good only when it chooses an action due to
its own volition or duty, rather than what that action can accomplish. Therefore,
since Consequentialists would prefer an action that can accomplish gaining the
most happiness, Consequentialism does not fit with Kants ethical viewpoint.
3. Kants Categorical Imperative. Kant calls rules that all of us ought to follow as
imperatives. There are hypothetical imperatives which base what we ought to
do on conditions, but Kant believes that the duty of the good will is not defined by
imperatives that are hypothetical, but rather by those that are categorical. The
categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as objectively

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary J. Gregor. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 7

Uleman, Jennifer. An Introduction to Kants Moral Philosophy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary J. Gregor. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 8

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necessary of itself, without reference to another end.

It states that people must

do what ought to be done, regardless of what ends it may accomplish.


The categorical imperative is an absolute, non-negotiable, universal moral
law that Kant believes should be enforced regardless of context or circumstance:
what is right is right, and what is wrong is wrong always. Therefore,
Consequentialisms belief that any action will be considered good as long as it
promotes or results in the most happiness for the most number of people is again
rejected by Kant here.
4.

Kants Three Principles or Formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Kant

formulates his categorical imperative in three ways: First, the Law of Nature Act
as though the maxim of your action were by your will, at the same time, to become
a universal law of nature

This means one must act if, and only if, the maxim, or

general rule to follow, can be universalized. If that act can be universalized, as in


everyone in the world can do it, then and only then can it be considered moral.
Second, Humanity as an end, never a means So act as to treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end and
never as merely a means.

10

This forbids us from manipulating or using other

humans for our own purposes.


Third, Autonomy So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as
making universal law through its maxims.

11

This means that this sense of moral

duty is one we should impose on ourselves, because it comes from within self-law
from our good will.
All three of these formulations are unfit for Consequentialism, and so oppose
it.
8

Ibid., 25

9 Pojman, Louis. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong. (Boston,Mass: Wadsworth), 129
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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5.

Kants notion of freedom. Because humans are rational beings, and every

rational being has their own individual will, we have the capacity to cause events
though free will. A will that is free must be a will that is autonomous, or gives itself
its own law. Thus, a will is free only when it follows moral laws from within itself.
Kant writes, What, then, can freedom of the will be other than autonomy,
that is, the will's property of being a law to itself?

12

Any being endowed with

reason and will must think of itself as free, for reason would not be reason if it were
subject to control by irrational forces from outside itself. He elaborates, The will is,
in all its actions, a law to itself, indicates only the principle, to act on no other
maxim than that which can also have as object itself as a universal law. This,
however, is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle
of morality; hence a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same.

13

Kants notion of freedom seems to be disciplinarian and contradictory. How


can we be free if we are bound by law? Kant tries to explain that we are only free
when we follow moral universal demands because absolute freedom or doing
whatever and anything we want is an illusion; It means we are chained and
enslaved by desires that come from the instinctive, irrational part of us or from
external factors, and not from the autonomy of our reason and will.
Conclusion: Kant argues that it is not the positive consequences or resulting
happiness of the act that make it moral, but rather its good motives -

deontological or duty-based approach that contrasts with Utilitarianism. He believes


that actions are good because they result from good will that comes from within us
and not from any outside force. As a basis for morality, he proposes the categorical
imperative which is a universal, absolutist, self-imposed rule that people ought to
follow regardless of consequences.

References

1212 Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary J. Gregor. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 52
13 Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary J. Gregor. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 52
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Kant, Immanuel. Practical Philosophy. Ed., Translated by Mary J. Gregor.


Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed., Translated by
Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Pojman, Louis. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 7th ed. Boston, Mass:
Wadsworth, 2012
Uleman, Jennifer. An Introduction to Kants Moral Philosophy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010.

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