ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee
on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three
weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second
impeachment
complaint
was
accompanied
by
a
"Resolution
of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable

officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is
clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended
to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are
two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by
virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not
truly political in nature.
---------Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs Pres. Aquino G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986
FACTS: 1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power. 2. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing
the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines."
ISSUE: WON the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate?
HELD: Yes
RATIO: The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that: 1. the people have accepted the Aquino
government which is in effective control of the entire country; 2. it is not merely a
de facto
government but in fact and law a
de jure
government; and 3. the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government

De Leon vs Esguerra
Facts:
Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen of barangay
dolores, taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon received memo antedated december 1, 1986 signed
by OIC Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, february 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno, as new captain by
authority of minister of local government and similar memo signed february 8, 1987, designated new
councilmen.
Issue:
Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held:
No, memoranda has no legal effect.
1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So, February 8, 1987 and
not December 1, 1986.
2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer in
efffect then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec.
27 states that all previous constitution were suspended.
3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect. Petitioners now
acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has been fixed. Barangay
election act is not inconsistent with constitution.
In Re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno
Facts:
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14,
1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It appears
from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but
took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary
Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." He was then appointed as appellate justice and
later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa
Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary.
A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an
exercise of her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from
being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no. 11, he
now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the
provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. A motion
for consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking.
They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously
been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
Issue:
Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC that would negate
any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33.
Held:
The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of
the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A
revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or
political system, usually effected with violence. A government as a result of people's revolution is considered de
jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and
others. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power.
Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
x -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG,
and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July
30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to
create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws

are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress
to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any
official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public
right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public.
He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in
the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds

reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of
the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create
ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have
been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it
can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights)
of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which

the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

DECISION
(En Banc)
LAUREL, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member
of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the
National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been
subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election
protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The
following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution
providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before
December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner
sought the dismissal of respondents protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his
motion.
II.

THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of
the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that
power by the National Assembly. xxx.
[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should
be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such
rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Mercantile Law Corporation Code Capital What Capital means

In 1928, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) was granted a franchise to engage
in the business of telecommunications. Telecommunications is a nationalized area of activity where a
corporation engaged therein must have 60% of its capital be owned by Filipinos as provided for by
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized
under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens; xxx
In 1999, First Pacific, a foreign corporation, acquired 37% of PLDT common shares. Wilson Gamboa
opposed said acquisition because at that time, 44.47% of PLDT common shares already belong to
various other foreign corporations. Hence, if First Pacifics share is added, foreign shares will amount
to 81.47% or more than the 40% threshold prescribed by the Constitution.

Margarito Teves, as Secretary of Finance, and the other respondents argued that this is okay because in
totality, most of the capital stocks of PLDT is Filipino owned. It was explained that all PLDT
subscribers, pursuant to a law passed by Marcos, are considered shareholders (they hold serial preferred
shares). Broken down, preferred shares consist of 77.85% while common shares consist of 22.15%.
Gamboa argued that the term capital should only pertain to the common shares because that is the
share which is entitled to vote and thus have effective control over the corporation.
ISSUE: What does the term capital pertain to? Does the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refer to common shares or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of
common and non-voting preferred shares)?
HELD: Gamboa is correct. Capital only pertains to common shares. It will be absurd for capital to
pertain as inclusive of non-voting shares. This is because a corporation consisting of 1,000,000 capital
stocks, 100 of which are common shares which are foreign owned and the rest (999,900 shares) are
preferred shares which are non-voting shares and are Filipino owned, would seem compliant to the
constitutional requirement here 99.999% is Filipino owned. But if scrutinized, the controlling stock
the voting stock or that miniscule .001% is foreign owned. That is absurd.
In this case, it is true that at least 77.85% of the capital is owned by Filipinos (the PLDT subscribers).
But these subscribers, who hold non-voting preferred shares, have no control over the corporation.
Hence, capital should only pertain to common shares.
Thus, to be compliant with the constitution, 60% of the common shares of PLDT should be Filipino
owned. That is not so in this case as it appears that 81.47% of the common shares are already foreign
owned (split between First Pacific (37%) and a Japanese corporation).
When may preferred shares be considered part of the capital share?
If the preferred shares are allowed to vote like common shares.