PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

Section 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution

includes within the mantle of its protection tangible, as well intangible, objects
RA 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Act)
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, [G.R. No. 93833 (Sept. 28, 1995)]
Even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A.
4200.
The Supreme Court held further that the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute.
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, [145 SCRA 112 (1986)]
The Supreme Court held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of
overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a
telephone extension devise was neither among those device(s) or arrangement(s)
enumerated therein, following the principle that penal statutes must be construed strictly in
favor of the accused.
WHEN IS WIRETAPPING ALLOWED?
See Section 3 of R.A. 4200
INADMISSIBILITY OF WIRETAPPED EVIDENCE
See Section 4 of R.A. 4200
Chavez vs. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008
The right may be invoked against the wife who went to the clinic of her husband and there
took documents consisting of private communications between her husband and his alleged
paramour. (Zulueta v. CA, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996, 253 SCRA 699)
Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC, GR No. 113271, 16 October 1997
The Supreme Court said that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures made by private individuals. Despite the lack of consent on the part of
the private respondent, the check was deemed admissible in evidence.
Republic Act 53 as amended by RA 1477
Section 1 provides protection for non-disclosure of sources of information:
Without prejudice to his liability under civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor,
columnist or duly accredited reporter of a newspaper, magazine or periodical of general
circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any information or news report
appearing in said application which was released in confidence to such publisher, editor or
reporter unless the court or a Committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded
by the security of the state.

 EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382
Letters addressed by a lawyer (one of the parties to a case) addressed to individual Justices
of the Supreme Court in connection with the performance of their judicial functions, become
part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court --- and thus are not
covered by the constitutional guarantee.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Section 4, Article III, 1987 Constitution
Scope
Any and all modes of expression are embraced in the guaranty.
Reinforced by Section 18(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution
Two Aspects
Freedom from Censorship or Prior Restraint
There need not be total suppression; even restriction of circulation constitutes censorship.
Movie Censorship
The power of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) can be
exercised only for purposes of classification, not censorship.
The Supreme Court upheld the primacy of freedom of expression over Enriles right to
privacy, because Enrile was a public figure, and a public figures right to privacy is
narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Besides, the movie A Dangerous Life would not
have been historically faithful without including therein the participation of Enrile in the EDSA
Revolution. Thus, the intrusion into Enriles right to privacy is not unreasonable. (Ayer
Productions v. Judge Capulong, G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988)
The Supreme Court noted that the order of the trial court specifically failed to lay down any
factual basis constituting a clear and present danger which will justify prior restraint of the
constitutionally protected freedom of speech and expression save its plea for time to hear and
resolve the issues raised in the petition for contempt, thereby invalidating the orders issued
by the lower courts restraining the public showing of the The Jessica Alfaro Story. (Viva
Productions vs. CA)
The Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) was created by Marcos as a body under the Office
of the President of the Philippines.
It has the power to regulate the importation and export, as well as the production, copying,
distribution, exhibition, showing, sale or disposition of videograms or any of their technical
variations.
3

 Freedom from Subsequent Punishment

Without this assurance, the individual would hesitate to speak for fear that he might be
held to account for his speech, or that he might be provoking the vengeance of the officials he
may have criticized. However, this freedom is not absolute, and may be properly regulated in
the interest of the public. Accordingly, the State may validly impose penal and/or
administrative sanctions, such as:
Libel
libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or
cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or
condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed;
and, (d) existence of malice.
Art. 354 of the RPC provides that "every DEFAMATORY imputation is PRESUMED to be
malicious, EVEN IF it be true, IF no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, EXCEPT in the following cases: 1. A PRIVATE communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any LEGAL, MORAL OR SOCIAL DUTY; and 2. A FAIR AND TRUE
REPORT, made in GOOD FAITH, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report
or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions."
BRILLANTE vs. CA, ET. AL., G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004: the Supreme
Court reiterated the doctrine of PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION under Article 354, No. 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the case of OCAMPO, supra, and it clarified that the
interest sought to be protected by the person making the communication need not be his
own, but may refer to an interest shared by the other members of society. According to the
Supreme Court, indeed, the purpose of affording protection to privileged communication is to
permit all interested persons or citizens with grievances to freely communicate, with
immunity, to the persons who could furnish the protection asked for. (Id.).
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, et. al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., G. R. NO. 107566,
November 25, 2004: the Supreme Court held that the rule on PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
applies to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being that which is true,
or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon reasonable degree of
care and on reasonable grounds. The Supreme Court further held that the remedy of the
person allegedly libeled is to show proof that an article was written with the authors
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. While
the law itself creates the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious,
nevertheless, the privileged character of a communication destroys said presumption. The
burden of proving actual malice shall then rest on the plaintiff. (Id.).
FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. vs. AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTERBICOL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE (AMEC-BCCM), GR. 141994, January 17, 2005, citing
the case of BORJAL: the Supreme held that fair commentaries on matters of public interest
are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of
fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
4

imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his
guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when
the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. The Supreme Court further held therein, thus: In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression
of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, inter alia, provides that in every criminal
prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives
and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
Under Article 362 of the Revised Penal Code, ACTUAL MALICE, not merely presumptive
malice, is required to remove a respondent from the legal protection of the privileged
communication rule under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of Vasquez v. CA, et. al., GR 118971, September 15, 1999, the Supreme Court,
in discussing the rule on ACTUAL MALICE, held that the prosecution must prove not only that
the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge
of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. Thus: For that
matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official
conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual
malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times vs. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decisions. (Lopez
v. CA, 145 Phil. 219 [1970]; Mercado v. CFI, 201 Phil. 565 [1982]; Babst v. NIB, 132 SCRA 316
[1984]). This is the rule of actual malice. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not
only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that in Adm. Circular No. 08-2008, dated January
25, 2008 of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, pursuant to the resolution of the Supreme
Court En Banc in A.M. No. 08-1-17 SC at its session of 22 January 2008, entitled GUIDELINES
IN THE OBSERVANCE OF A RULE OF PREFERENCE IN THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES
IN LIBEL CASES, the Supreme Court reminded all trial judges that in recent cases cited in
the administrative circular, it opted to impose ONLY A FINE on the person convicted of the
crime of libel, particularly in those cases:
5

1. where the accused wrote the libelous article merely to defend his honor against the
malicious messages, where the accused committed the offense in the heat of anger and in
reaction to a perceived provocation, 2. where the intensely feverish passions evoked during
an election period must have agitated petitioner into writing his open letter and that
incomplete privileged communication should be appreciated in favor of petitioner, especially
considering the wide latitude traditionally given to defamatory utterances against public
officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties or against public
figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them, and 3. where the crime of libel
was the first offense of the accused and he was motivated purely by his belief that he was
merely exercising a civic or moral duty to his client when he wrote the defamatory letter to
private complainant.
The Supreme Court stated therein that in the foregoing cases, the emergent rule of
preference for the imposition of fine only rather than imprisonment in libel cases under the
circumstances therein specified.
Obscenity
The accused was convicted for exhibiting nude paintings and pictures, notwithstanding his
claim that he had done so in the interest of art. (People vs. Go Pin, G.R. No. L-7491, August 8,
1955)
The Supreme Court declared that the determination of what is obscene is a judicial
function. (Pita vs. CA, G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989)
Criticism of Official Conduct
The individual is given the widest latitude in criticism of official conduct. The Court
compared criticism to a scalpel that relieves the abscesses of officialdom. (US vs. Bustos,
37 Phil 731)
The Court held that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes
criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. (People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil
265)
The Court said that a publication that tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence
the court, and constitutes a clear and present danger to the administration of justice is not
protected by the guarantee of press freedom and is punishable by contempt. It is not
necessary to show that the publication actually obstructs the administration of justice; it is
enough that it tends to do so. (In Re: Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr.)
Freedom of the press is subordinate to the decision, authority, integrity and independence
of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice. While there is no law to restrain or
punish the freest expression of disapprobation of what is done in or by the courts, free
expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean,
ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and their members. (In Re: Column of Ramon
Tulfo,
6

Tulfos Sangkatutak na Bobo column [on the SC decision in Valmonte vs. de Villa])
Right of Students to Free Speech in School Premises NOT ABSOLUTE
This right must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment. While the Campus Journalism Act provides that a student shall not be expelled
or suspended solely on the basis of articles he or she has written, the same should not
infringe on the schools right to discipline its students. Thus, this Section of the Campus
Journalism Act should be read to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student
solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such article materially
disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of rights of others. (Miriam
College Foundation vs. CA, G.R. No. 127930, 15 December 2000)
Tests of governmental interference
Clear and Present Danger Rule
Whether the words are used in such circumstances and of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the State has
the right to prevent (Schenck vs. US, 249 US 97). The substantive evil must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.
The rule is that the danger must not only be clear and present but also traceable to the
ideas expressed.
The Court said that the term clear seems to point to a causal connection with the danger
of the substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned; while the present refers to the
time element, identified with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be
probable, but very likely inevitable. (Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835)
Dangerous Tendency Rule
If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which the State has the right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and the
probable effect of the utterance were to bring about the substantive evil that the legislative
body seeks to prevent. (Cabansag vs. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152)
Balancing of Interests Test
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation
results in an indirect, conditional, or partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to
determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the
particular circumstances presented. (American Communications Association vs. Douds, 339
US 282)
The Supreme Court said that the clear and present danger rule is not only the test which
has been recognized and applied by the courts. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedoms of speech and of the press is the balancing of interests test, which requires a
court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a
given situation. (Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan)
7

RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN

Section 7, Article III, 1987 Constitution
SCOPE
Chavez v. PEA and AMARI, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
It was held that the right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to
the consummation of the transaction. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no
contract is consummated, or if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to
expose its defects. However, the right only affords access to records, documents and papers,
which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them at his expense. The exercise is also
subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of public records and to minimize
disruption of government operations.
EXCEPTION
The right does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information rooted in
separation of powers, nor to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information
affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement
agencies before the prosecution of the accused.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Board of Investments in denying the
petitioner access to trade and industrial secrets. (Garcia v. Board of Investments, 177 SCRA
374)
NEED FOR PUBLICATION OF LAWS REINFORCES THIS RIGHT
Taada v. Tuvera
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot
be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14
The Supreme Court sustained the right of a municipal mayor to examine judicial records,
subject to reasonable rules and conditions.
Except perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful or sheer,
idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern
themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the person seeking access to the
records. (Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil 383)
Legaspi v. CSC, 71 SCRA 14
The right to information enshrined in the Bill of Rights is self-executing. They supply the
rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right
and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental
right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
constitution without need for any ancillary act of the legislature. What may be provided by the
legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which
must, of necessity be consistent with the declared state policy of full disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.
8

 While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by
the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public
concern, and to afford access to public records, cannot be discretionary on the part of said
agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by
any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary,
its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern, there is no rigid
test which can be applied. It a term that eludes exact definition.
Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, 09 December 1998
The Supreme Court upheld the right of the petitioner, a former Solicitor General, to the
disclosure of any agreement which may have been arrived at concerning the purported illgotten wealth of the Marcoses.
Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 203 SCRA 515
The Supreme Court held that the voting slips constituting the decision of the members of
the MRTCB are not private nor confidential, because they are made in the exercise of official
functions.
Valmonte v. Belmonte
Right to information is not absolute, it is limited to matters of public concern and interest,
and is further subject to limitations as may be imposed by law.
Public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought clearly a manner of public interest and concern.
The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity and cannot be invoked
by juridical entities like the GSIS.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, 12 October 1998
The Supreme Court held that Section 19 of the rules and regulations implementing RA
8177, which provides that the manual setting forth the procedure for administering the lethal
injection shall be confidential, was unduly suppressive, because the contents of the manual
are matters of public concern affecting the lives of the people and such matters naturally
arouse the interest of the individual citizen.
In Re: Request for Live Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder
Cases against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez v.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC, 29 June 2001
The Supreme Court said that when the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press
and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the
accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial race against another, jurisprudence tells us
that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. With the possibility of losing not only
the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely
certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate
judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified
to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in
proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract
9

from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed by a
judge with an unprejudiced mind unbridled by running emotions or passions.
Resolution on the motion for reconsideration (September 13, 2001), the Court
ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, not for live or real
time broadcast. Only later will they be made available for public showing.
BA-RA 7941 v. COMELEC
names of party-list representatives are a matter of public concern
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or
the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is
the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. ( Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
G. R. No. L-72119, May 19, 1987, 150 SCRA 530, citing Cooley.) Without a governments acceptance
of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an
acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens,
the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise
of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. ( Tanada v. Tuvera, G. R.
No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27) And since every citizen by the simple fact of his
citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are
ordinarily unavailing. (Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 334 )
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right
of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the peoples
right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation
as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions
involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there
is also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military,
trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security. ( Chavez v. PCGG, G.R.
No. 130716, December 9, 1998, 299 SCRA 744)
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both
terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to
determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the
public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons
employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the
identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public
concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of
10

the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective
petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the
Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec
under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the
certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election
day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law
something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the
"Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the
limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before
the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid
to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which
comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a
fundamental right to information. (Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. No. L- 82380, April
29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861) While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such
vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would
eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons behind
the Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed,
however, that the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and
applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes,
at the first instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of government
officials and offices.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be
informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a
system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The
Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo, (G. R. No. L-8921, January 9, 1914, 26 Phil. 521)
has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. ( Rodriquez
v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. L-61545, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 465 ) So it must be
here for still other reasons articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein
petitions.
Read Akbayan v. Aquino JPEPA
diplomatic communication; negotiation is privileged information