G.R. No.

111343 August 22, 1996

ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, and LOURDES DU, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:p
Petitioner Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. is accused of violating Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise
known as the Anti-Fencing Law, in an information which reads:
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of Violation of Anti-Fencing Law
of 1979 (Presidential Decree 1612), committed as follows:
That on or about a week prior to October 25, 1986, in the City of Davao, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused,
with intent to gain for himself, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously purchased and
received dismantled farrowing crates made of GI pipes, valued at P20,000.00,
knowing the same to be the subject of thievery, thereby committing an act of
"fencing," in violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, to the damage and prejudice
of the owner thereof Lourdes Farms, Inc., represented by Lourdes Du.
Contrary to law.
Davao City, Philippines, January 19, 1987.
(SGD.) ANTONINA B. ESCOVILLA
4th Asst. City Fiscal 1
Petitioner is a duly licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City using the business
name "Dunlao Enterprise."
On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. Fortunate Mariquit and Carlito Catog, both employees of
Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its proprietor, Mrs. Lourdes Du, to go to petitioner's premises
together with police officers Pfc. Epifanio Sesaldo and Pat. Alfredo Ancajas to verify information
received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen from Lourdes Farms were to be found
thereat.
Upon arrival at petitioner's compound, the group saw the farrowing crates and pipes inside the
compound. They also found assorted lengths of G.I. pipes inside a cabinet in petitioner's shop
and another pile outside the shop but within the compound.
After he was informed by the police operatives that said pipes were owned by Lourdes Farms and
had been stolen from it, petitioner voluntarily surrendered the items. These were then taken to
the police station.
On February 16, 1987, Criminal Case No. 14655 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 9, accusing petitioner of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
On March 13, 1987, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY. Trial ensued and on May
30, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED and the evidence being sufficient, this Court finds
ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO SR., GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of AntiFencing Law of 1979 and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Six (6) Years,

Eight (8) Months, One (1) Day as minimum to Seven (7) Years and Four (4) Months
as maximum of Prision Mayor with all the accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. On May 10, 1993, the appellate
court promulgated its decision 3 affirming the judgment of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner states that the appellate court erred:
(A) IN NOT FINDING THAT AT LEAST TWO (2) ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED,
NAMELY, THE ALLEGED PURCHASE BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE GI-PIPES
AND HIS ALLEGED KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR BEING STOLEN ITEMS, WERE NOT
PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE;
(B) IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT, A DULY LICENSED SCRAP METAL
BUSINESSMAN FOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15) YEARS, HAD ACTED IN GOOD
FAITH ANDWITHOUT ANY CRIMINAL INTENT IN POSSESSING AS TEMPORARY
CUSTODIAN OF SAID GI-PIPES BY BRINGING THEM INSIDE HIS BUSINESS
ESTABLISHMENT, WHOSE INSIDE PREMISES WERE OPEN TO PUBLIC VIEW, BEFORE
DARK SET IN ON THE DAY THEY WERE BROUGHT TO HIM BY WELL-DRESSED JEEPRIDING MEN WHO MERELY OFFERED SAID ITEMS TO HIM FOR SALE BUT WHO FAILED
TO RETURN TO HIS ESTABLISHMENT UNTIL POLICE OPERATIVES WENT TO HIS
BUSINESS PREMISES A FEW DAYS THEREAFTER. 4
In brief, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to establish the fact that, in receiving and
possessing the subject items, he was motivated by gain or that he purchased the said articles.
Further, he questions the alleged value of the stolen properties stating that they are worth a lot
less than what the trial court declared them to be.
Under Presidential Decree 1612, 5 "fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft."
There is no question that the farrowing crates and assorted lengths of G.I. pipes were found in
the premises of petitioner. The positive identification by Fortunato Mariquit, an employee of
Lourdes Farms, Inc., that these items were previously owned by it gave rise to a presumption of
fencing under the law:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item,
object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall
be prima facie evidence of fencing.
In the instant case, did petitioner Ernestino Dunlao succeed in rebutting this presumption?
We hold in the negative.
First of all, contrary to petitioner's contention, intent to gain need not be proved in crimes
punishable by a special law such as P.D. 1612.
The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called "acts mala in se," and acts
which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called "acts mala
prohibita." 6 This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is
done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala

prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? 7 When an act is illegal, the intent of the
offender is immaterial. 8
In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals

involving violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, we said:

On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this element was not
clearly established by the People's evidence and he, therefore, draws the conclusion
that respondent court seriously erred in presuming the existence of intent to gain.
Again, this supposition ignores the fact that intent to gain is a mental state, the
existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person (Soriano vs.
People, 88 Phil. 368 [1951]; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977,
p. 45; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the external
demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent court
inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in the body of
the judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which he remains
indifferent even at this crucial stage. Withal, the sinister mental state is presumed
from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his bodega
which were loaded on his pick-up (People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil, 52 [1929]; 1
Reyes,supra at P. 46; Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). At any
rate, dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special stature like the AntiFencing Law of 1979 (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil; 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58)
because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense
(U.S. vs. Siy Gong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 [1915]; 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59; 1
Aquino, supra at p. 52).
Secondly, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by petitioner, as mere
possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing. 10
It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this presumption by sufficient and convincing
evidence but he failed to do so. All petitioner could offer, by way of rebuttal, was a mere denial
and his incredible testimony that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his
establishment and left them there.
A There was a jeep loaded with G.I. pipes where he approached me
with the G.I. pipes but I refused to buy and instead requested me that
they will unload those G.I. pipes in front of my establishment.
Q Now, did you have a talk with that person whom you said arrived
aboard the jeep which was carrying G.I. pipes?
A We had a talk requesting me that they will just unload the G.I. pipes
but we have never talked that I am going to buy those G.I. pipes.
Q Can you recall what did the man tell you as he asked you to allow
him to unload those G.I. pipes?
A He told me that he would just leave them temporarily and he will
come back but it took a long time, he failed to come back.
Q What time, more or less, of the day was that when the unloading of
the G.I. pipes was made, was it in the morning or afternoon?
A I can remember it was in the afternoon but I am not certain as to the
time.
Q Can you estimate the time in the afternoon?
A May be around 2 or 3 o'clock but I am not certain, it was in the
afternoon.

Q You said that man who unloaded the G.I. pipes did not return
anymore and so, what did you do with the G.I. pipes that were
unloaded in front of your establishment?
A That was already late in the afternoon, around 5:30 up to 6:00
o'clock, we are about to close, so what I did I have it brought inside my
compound for safekeeping. 11
In the Lim

12

case, we held that:

. . . the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1612 . . .
must be upheld in the light of petitioner's shallow demurrer premised on a denial
and alibi, since a disputable presumption on this score is sufficient until overcome
by contrary evidence.

The Court notes that the stolen articles were found displayed 13 on petitioner's shelves inside his
compound. If petitioner were merely keeping the farrowing crates and G.I. pipes for the men
aboard the jeep, why did he display them? When a storeowner displays articles, it is assumed
that he is doing so with the intention of selling them.
Furthermore, the Court finds it strange that petitioner did not even bother to ascertain the
identity of the person or persons who deposited the articles with him. We quote with approval
the trial court's observation that:
The narration of how the items were simply dumped at the compound of the
accused; the fragile and vague statement that the unidentified party unloading the
items would bring more items at some indefinite date; . . . that accused caused the
pipes to be brought inside the compound of his own volition without any such
arrangement with the strangers; that the latter did not return thereafter; that some
of the items delivered by the strangers were distributed in and around the
compound and in cabinets inside the building already cut in short pieces; that
accused cannot produce any proof of ownership by the persons who simply
unloaded the items then left without coming back these are matters which
common sense and sound business practices would normally clarify in the face of
the express provisions of the Anti-fencing Law. . . . And when the accused took it
upon himself to protect and transfer inside his compound items unloaded by total
strangers without any agreement as to how the items would be sold or disposed of
nor how soon agreement would be compensated, a rather dubious aura of
illegitimacy envelopes and taints the entire transaction.
Lastly, petitioner questions the value of the stolen articles as found by the trial court and as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. He contends that the pipes were worth only P200.00, not the
P20,000.00 alleged in the Information.
Prosecution witness Carlito Catog testified on the value of the stolen pipes stating that, as he
worked as purchaser for Lourdes Farms, he was knowledgeable about their true worth. He also
explained the basis of the estimate of the said articles: 14
Q Now, those G.I. pipes which you said you saw in the premises of Mr.
Dumlao and which you earlier mentioned as having been identified by
you as coming from Lourdes Farms, can you tell the Honorable Court,
more or less, how much did you buy those pipes?
A I arrive at the amount of Fifty Nine Thousand (P59,000.00) as my
estimate.
Q Fifty Nine?
A Fifty Nine Thousand Pesos (P59,000.00).

Q And can you tell the Honorable Court what is your basis of making
this estimate?
A The G.I. pipes were made into piggery crates, we use the 3/4 inch by
20 feet G.I. pipes in fabricating. We use 6 lengths of those pipes at the
cost of P80.00 per crate. So, we arrive at the amount of P480.00 of the
materials, the G.I. pipes used in fabricating crates, plus the cost of
fabrication which we paid to the one making at P700.00 per crate, so
we arrive at P1,180.00 per crate and the number of crates per
estimate, which we recovered from the premises of Mr. Dumlao is
about more or less 50 crates. So, we arrive at Fifty Nine Thousand
Pesos (P59,000.00).
The trial court, however, based its decision on the amount of P20,000.00 as alleged in the
information, instead of the appraisal of P59,000.00 made by Mr. Catog. The Court believes that
P20,000.00 is a more realistic estimate of the value of the stolen pipes. Petitioners claim that the
pipes were worth only P200.00 is not credible considering that it took a truck to haul off the
entire load from petitioner's premises, as testified to by Fortunato Mariquit. 15
Q How did you bring the G.I. pipes from the place of Mr. Dumlao to the
police station?
A We loaded them in a dump truck owned by Federico Jaca.
Q Now, what was the quantity of the pipes that you were able to bring
from the place of Mr. Dumlao to the police station?
A Almost a truckload.
Q What did you say, it was a dump truck?
A Almost a load of a dump truck.
Q After reaching the police station, what happened?
A We unloaded it in the police station and we went home.
In line with our ruling in the Lim case, 16 petitioner should pay Lourdes Farms, Inc. represented by
its owner Mrs. Lourdes DU, the sum of P20.000.00 minus the value of the pipes and farrowing
crates recovered and in the custody of the police, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ordered to
pay Lourdes Farms, Inc., represented by Mrs. Lourdes Du, the sum of P20,000.00 minus the value
of the recovered pipes and farrowing crates, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111426 July 11, 1994
NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Puno and Puno for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The chief issue presented for our determination in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the correctness of the decision of 29 March 1993 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 11024 1 which affirmed the decision of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 2 finding the petitioner guilty of the violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law (P.D. No. 1612) but set aside the penalty imposed and ordered the trial court to receive
additional evidence on the "correct valuation" of the pieces of jewelry involved for the sole
purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed.
The information in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 charged the petitioner with the violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law in that
on or about and during the period from February 12, to February 24, 1988, inclusive,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent of gain for herself or
for another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly buy and keep in
her possession and/or sell or dispose of the following jewelries, to wit: one (1) set of
earrings, a ring studded with diamonds in a triangular style, one (1) set of earrings
(diamond studded) and one (1) diamond-studded crucifix, or all valued at
P105,000.00, which she knew or should have known to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery committed by Joselito Sacdalan Salinas against the
owner Teodoro and Luzviminda Encarnacion. 3
On the basis of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Teodoro Encarnacion (one of the
offended parties), Cpl. Ignacio Jao, Jr., and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez, both of the Western Police
District, the trial court promulgated on 16 November 1990 its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilty of the accused for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1612 beyond reasonable doubt, the accused Norma
Dizon-Pamintuan is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS ofprision mayor to NINETEEN (19) YEARS
of reclusion temporal.
No civil liability in view of the recovery of the items, subject-matter of this case.
With costs. 4
The evidence of the prosecution is summarized by the trial court as follows:
Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public Works and Highways
testified that he has just arrived at his residence located at Better Living
Subdivision, Paraaque at around 9:45 p.m. of February 12, 1988 coming from the
Airport and immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his driver and
two housemaids outside to pick-up his personal belongings from his case. It was at
this point that five unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy
portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his driver and two
helpers and dragged them inside his house. That the men pointed a gun at him and
was made to lie face down on the floor. The other occupants, namely his wife, the
maids and his driver were likewise made to lie on the floor. Thereafter, the robbers
ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal properties
including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter
immediately to the police. He was then interviewed by the Paraaque police and
was informed that an operation group would be assigned to the case.
He likewise reported the matter to the Western Police District on February 15, 1988.
Two days later, a group of WPD operatives came over to his house and he was asked
to prepare a list of items of jewelry and other valuables that were lost including a
sketch of distinctive items. He was later told that some of the lost items were in

Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police had dispatched. That an
entrapment would be made with their participation, on February 14, 1988. As such,
they went to Camp Crame at around 9:00 a.m. and arrived at the vicinity of 733
Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at about 10:00 a.m.; that he is with his
wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen
displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan; the pieces were: 1
earring and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000 bought from estimator
Nancy Bacud (Exh. "C-2"), 1 set of earring diamond worth P15,000 (Exh. "C-3") and
1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000 (Exh. "C-4").
Corporal Ignacio Jao, Jr. of the WPD testified that he was with the spouses Teodoro
Encarnacion, Jr. in the morning of February 24, 1988 and they proceeded to
Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at the stall of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan
together with Sgt. Perez. After the spouses Encarnacion recognized the items
subject matter of the robbery at the display window of the stall being tended by the
herein accused, they invited the latter to the precinct and investigated the same.
They likewise brought the said showcase to the WPD station. He further testified
that he has no prior knowledge of the stolen jewelries of the private complainant
from one store to another.
Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez of the WPD testified that he reported for duty on February
24, 1988; that he was with the group who accompanied the spouses Encarnacion in
Sta. Cruz, Manila and was around when the couple saw some of the lost jewelries in
the display stall of the accused. He was likewise present during the early part of the
investigation of the WPD station. 5
The recovery of the pieces of jewelry, on the basis of which the trial court ruled that no civil
liability should be adjudged against the petitioner, took place when, as testified to by Teodoro
Encarnacion, the petitioner "admitted that she got the items but she did not know they were
stolen [and that] she surrendered the items and gave them to [his] wife." 6
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as testified to by Rosito Dizon-Pamintuan, is
summarized by the trial court thus:
The defense presented only the testimony of Rosito Dizon-Pamintuan who testified
that he is the brother of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan and that sometime around 11:00
a.m. of February 24, 1985, he, together with the accused went infront of the
Carinderia along Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila waiting for a vacancy
therein to eat lunch. Suddenly, three persons arrived and he overheard that Cpl. Jao
told her sister to get the jewelry from inside the display window but her sister
requested to wait for Fredo, the owner of the stall. But ten minutes later when said
Fredo did not show up, the police officer opened the display window and got the
contents of the same. The display stall was hauled to a passenger jeepney and the
same, together with the accused were taken to the police headquarters. He likewise
testified that he accompanied his sister to the station and after investigation was
sent home. 7
In convicting the petitioner, the trial court made the following findings:
The prosecution was able to prove by evidence that the recovered
items were part of the loot and such recovered items belong to the
spouses Encarnacion, the herein private complainants. That such items
were recovered by the Police Officers from the stall being tended by
the accused at that time. Of importance, is that the law provides a
disputable presumption of fencing under Section 5 thereof, to wit:
Mere possession of any goods, article, item object, or anything of value
which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing.

There is no doubt that the recovered items were found in the possession of the
accused and she was not able to rebut the presumption though the evidence for the
defense alleged that the stall is owned by one Fredo. A distinction should likewise be
made between ownership and possession in relation to the act of fencing. Moreover,
as to the value of the jewelries recovered, the prosecution was able to show that the
same is Ninety Three Thousand Pesos (P93,000.00). 8
The petitioner then appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 11024)
where she raised two issues: (1) that the judgment was based on a mere presumption, and (2)
that the prosecution failed to show that the value of the jewelry recovered is P93,000.00.
In its challenged decision of 29 March 1993, the Court of Appeals disposed of the first issue in
this wise:
The guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. All the
elements of the crime of fencing in violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (P.D.
No. 1612), to wit:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. A person, not a participant in said crime, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells; or in any manner deals in
any article or item, object or anything of value;
3. With personal knowledge, or should be known to said person that said item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft;
4. With intent to gain for himself or for another;
have been established by positive and convincing evidence of the prosecution . . .
The fact that a crime of robbery has been committed on February 12, 1988 is established by the
testimony of private complainant Teodoro T. Encarnacion who immediately reported the same to
Paraaque Police Station of the Southern Police District (TSN, Hearings of October 3, 1988,
November 9, 1988 and January 11, 1989; Exh. A) and submitted a list and sketches of the
jewelries robbed, among other things, from their residence located at Better Living Subdivision,
Paraaque, Metro Manila (Exh. C,
C-1 to C-4 and D).
The second element is likewise established by convincing evidence. On February 24,
1988, accused-appellant was found selling the jewelries (Exhs. C-2, C-3 and C-4)
which was displayed in a showcase in a stall located at Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. [Testimonies of Teodoro Encarnacion (id. supra); Cpl. Ignacio Jao (TSN,
Hearing of February 13, 1989) and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez (TSN, Hearing of June 4,
1989)].
On the element of knowledge that the items are derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery and of intent to gain for herself or for another, the Anti-Fencing
Law provides:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good,
article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
Knowledge and intent to gain are proven by the fact that these jewelries were found
in possession of appellant and they were displayed for sale in a showcase being
tended by her in a stall along Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. 9

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that there was not enough evidence to
prove the value of the pieces of jewelry recovered, which is essential to the imposition of the
proper penalty under Section 3 of P.D.
No. 1612. It opined that the trial court erred in concluding that "the value of the recovered
jewelries is P93,000.00 based on the bare testimony of the private complainant and the selfserving list he submitted (Exhs. C, C-2 and C-4, TSN, Hearing of October 3, 1993)." 10
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not commit any reversible error, its
decision dated October 26, 1990 convincing accused appellant is hereby AFFIRMED
with the modification that the penalty imposed is SET ASIDE and the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 20) of Manila is ordered toreceive evidence with respect to the
correct valuation of the properties involved in this case, marked as Exhibits "C", "C2" and "C-4" for the sole purpose of determining the proper penalty to be meted out
against accused under Section 3, P.D. No. 1612. Let the original records be
remanded immediately. 11
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner contends that:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE CAEBA, IN BLATANT DISREGARD OF
APPLICABLE LAW AND WELL-ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN REMANDING THE
CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING THE CORRECT PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED. 12
On 23 February 1994, after the public respondents had filed their Comment and the petitioner
her Reply to the Comment, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
The first assigned error is without merit.
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person
who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object
or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as the
term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is
obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised Penal Code,
subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law
enforcement agencies that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private
properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the
lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen
properties," P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the
crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be
prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter
case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise
stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate
and distinct offenses. 13 The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised
Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable

considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of
fencing 14 and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. 15
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object
or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly
established. A robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private
complainants who afterwards reported the incident to the Paraaque Police, the Western Police
District, the NBI, and the CIS, and submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the jewelry
taken from them (Exhibits "C" and "D"). Three of these items stolen, viz., (a) a pair of earrings
and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000.00 (Exhibit "C-2"); (b) one set of earrings worth
P15,000.00 (Exhibit "C-3"); and (c) a chain with crucifix worth P3,000.00 (Exhibit "C-4"), were
displayed for sale at a stall tended to by the petitioner in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. The public display of the articles for sale clearly manifested an intent to gain on the part
of the petitioner.
The more crucial issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution proved the existence of the
third element: that the accused knew or should have known that the items recovered from her
were the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness
thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he
has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. 16 When knowledge of the
existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a
person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not
exist. 17 On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or
would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. 18 Knowledge refers to a mental
state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and
state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from
the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental
awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of
innocence. 19
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article,
item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall
be prima facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge
of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The
presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established
fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not
offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law. 20 In the early case
of United States vs.
Luling, 21 this Court held:

It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional

provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material
fact or facts shall constitute prima facieevidence of guilt, and that then the burden
is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are
innocent and are committed without unlawful intention. (Commonwealth vs. Minor,
88 Ky., 422.)
In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as common
law offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by
statute. The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain
well defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a
crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then
to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent
and are not committed with any criminal intent or intention.
In his book on constitutional law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz said:
Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption of innocence may be overcome by
contrary presumptions based on the experience of human conduct [People vs.
Labara, April 20, 1954]. Unexplained flight, for example, may lead to an inference of
guilt, as 'the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous is as bold as a
lion. Failure on the part of the accused to explain his possession of stolen property
may give rise to the reasonable presumption that it was he himself who had stolen
it [U.S. vs. Espia, 16 Phil. 506]. Under our Revised Penal Code, the inability of an
accountable officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him will be
considered prima facieevidence that he has appropriated them to his personal use
[Art. 217]. According to Cooley, the constitutional presumption will not apply as long
as there is "some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so
unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary mandate" [1 Cooley, 639].
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the
testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the
contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and
that she used to buy from a certain Fredo. 23
Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a licensed dealer or
supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 provides that "all stores, establishments or entitles
dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from
an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public,
secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National
Police in the town or city where such store, establishment or entity is located." Under the Rules
and Regulations 24 promulgated to carry out the provisions of Section 6, an unlicensed
dealer/supplier refers to any person, partnership, firm, corporation, association or any other
entity or establishment not licensed by the government to engage in the business of dealing in
or supplying "used secondhand articles," which refers to any good, article, item, object or
anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the
same has actually or in fact been used.
We do not, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that there is insufficient evidence to prove
the actual value of the recovered articles.
As found by the trial court, the recovered articles had a total value of P93,000.00, broken down
as follows:
a) one earring and ring studded with diamonds (Exh. "C-2") P75,000.00
b) one set of earring (Exh. "C-3") P15,000.00

c) one gold chain with crucifix (Exh. "C-4") P3,000.00

These findings are based on the testimony of Mr. Encarnacion 25 and on Exhibit "C," 26 a list
of the items which were taken by the robbers on 12 February 1988, together with the
corresponding valuation thereof. On cross-examination, Mr. Encarnacion re-affirmed his
testimony on direct examination that the value of the pieces of jewelry described in
Exhibit "C-2" is P75,000.00 27 and that the value of the items described in Exhibit "C-3" is
P15,000.00, although he admitted that only one earring and not the pair was
recovered. 28 The cross-examination withheld any question on the gold chain with crucifix
described in Exhibit "C-4." In view, however, of the admission that only one earring was
recovered of the jewelry described in Exhibit "C-3," it would be reasonable to reduce the
value from P15,000.00 to P7,500.00. Accordingly, the total value of the pieces of jewelry
displayed for sale by the petitioner and established to be part of the proceeds of the
robbery on 12 February 1988 would be P87,000.00.
Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 1612 provides that the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
the accused if the value of the property involved is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed
P22,000.00, and if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty of prision
mayor should be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00; the total penalty which may be imposed, however, shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining
thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed. The maximum penalty that
can be imposed in this case would then be eighteen (18) years and five (5) months, which is
within the range of reclusion temporalmaximum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law which
allows the imposition of an indeterminate penalty which, with respect to offenses penalized by a
special law, shall range from a minimum which shall not be lower than the minimum prescribed
by the special law to a maximum which should not exceed the maximum provided therein, the
petitioner can thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum to eighteen (18) years and five (5) months
of reclusion temporalmaximum as maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to the
latter.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the penalty imposed by
the trial court and in remanding the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence to
determine the actual value of the pieces of jewelry recovered from the petitioner and for the
imposition of the appropriate penalty.
We do not agree with the petitioner's contention, though, that a remand for further reception of
evidence would place her in double jeopardy. There is double jeopardy when the following
requisites concur: (1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2) the first
jeopardy must have validly been terminated, and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first. 29 Such a concurrence would not occur assuming that the case was
remanded to the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED by setting aside the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11024 insofar as it sets aside the penalty imposed by
Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 and orders the
remand of the case for the trial court to receive evidence with respect to the correct value of the
properties involved. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED subject to the
modification of the penalty which is hereby reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor maximum as minimum to Eighteen (18) years
and Five (5) months of Reclusion Temporal maximum as maximum, with the accessory penalties
of the latter.
SO ORDERED.