JURISDICTION

Fukuzume vs People (2005) G.R. 143647

Facts:
Sometime in July 1991, Yu, a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires,
accompanied by Jovate, went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque. Jovate introduced
Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that
he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu
that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing
Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from
Fukuzume. This transaction later turned uneventful as Fukuzume failed to comply his
undertaking to return Yus money when Yu was refused by NAPOCOR, thus, prompting Yu to
file an estafa case.
Upon arraignment, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, finding the accused guilty as
charged. Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, he appealed to CA but CA affirmed the trial
courts decision modifying only the penalty, hence, the petition before the SC.
Issue: WON the trial court of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Held: SC answered on the negative. We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in
ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit
subscribed by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in
evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the amount
of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzumes
contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that he gave the amount of P50,000.00
to Fukuzume in the latters house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in
Paraaque.
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of
a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex
parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and
oftentimes inaccurate.
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he
gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject
aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or
anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction. Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals: However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside
from the sworn statement executed by Yu, the prosecution presented no other evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yus sworn statement or to prove that any of the
above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. From the
foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime
of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said
city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be
set aside for want of jurisdiction, without
prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.

Foz Vs People
(G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009)
Facts:
In an Information filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr., and Danny G.
Fajardo, columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News were charged with the crime of
libel. They wrote and publish in the reular issue of the Panay news a certain article maliciously injuring
and exposing one Dr. Edgar Portigo, a company physician of San Miguel Corporation office, SMC, as an
incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the poor.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty as charged. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed
an appeal with the CA which rendered its assailed Decision affirming in toto the RTC decision. Hence, this
present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as
charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.
Held:
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v.
People:
xxx the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. Xxx
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific
rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation: xxx The criminal action and civil action for damages
in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately
with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first

published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: xxx

Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the
publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where
the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at
the time of the commission of the offense.
The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region only showed that Iloilo was the place where
Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed
and first published in Iloilo City.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information
failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of
Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of
libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent
jurisdiction.
Decision:
Petition Granted.

Tijam Vs Sibonghanoy
()
Facts:
In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for collection of a
sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against defendants' properties. The attachment, however,
was subsequently discharged under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond
subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs
moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied on the
ground that there was "no showing that a demand had been made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding
company for payment of the amount due under the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p. 60).
Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of the judgment,
and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion dated October 31, 1957,

for issuance of writ of execution against the surety, with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On
October 31, 1957, the surety received copy of said motion and notice of hearing.
It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel asked that
he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so an order was issued in open court.
Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the period given him, the
court, on December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety;
and on December 12, 1957, the corresponding writ of execution was issued.
On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that
the same was "issued without the requirements of Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court having been
complied with," more specifically, that the same was issued without the required "summary hearing". This
motion was denied by order of February 10, 1958.
On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-stated order of
denial; which motion was likewise denied by order of March 26, 1958.
From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March 26, 1958 denying the surety's
motion to quash the writ of execution and motion for reconsideration, respectively the surety has
interposed the appeal to the Court of appeals, which was later on denied.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the the failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage barred the
party from questioning it later.
(2) Whether or not the lower court err in not granting its motion to quash the writ of execution
because the same was issued without the summary hearing.
Held:
I.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising
the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. It must be remembered that although the action,
originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since
July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court
of origin.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the
rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of
the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct
not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.
II.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become
persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by
the Court of Appeals.
The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of
execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing required by Section 17 of
Rule 59.
Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which
ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is
resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and
regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or
summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to
interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp.
793-794); and as to the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the
discretion of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the
incident up for consideration.
In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and
of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was
present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo
gave him a period of four days within motion was called, and it was upon his request that the
court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that
period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain
that it was deprived of its day in court.
Decision:
Orders appealed from are affirmed.

SECTION 2 RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE OF

ACCUSATION

PEOPLE VS LAGARDE
Facts:
This is an appeal seeking for the reverse of decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment of conviction for rape by RTC Leyte.
Lagarde was charged with rape in an information stating that: On December 27, 2001 in Leyte,
deliberate and of use of force and intimidation rape an 11 year-old. Upon arraignment, Lagarde
pleaded not guilty.
During trial, prosecution presented testimony of the minor and her the doctor who examined her
after the incident. Defense presented Lagarde denial contending that he didn't left the house of
Lolita during the fiesta celebration, that he had a drinking spree with the other visitors.
The RTC found AAAs testimony credible, noting that at her age, it is inconceivable for her to
concoct a tale of having been raped. Her accusation, according to the RTC, was supported by
medical findings that she was indeed sexually abused. The lower court dismissed accusedappellants denial and alibi. Lolitas testimony was likewise disbelieved not only because she
was related to accused-appellant but also because she herself was busy drinking tuba in another
part of the house. She could not categorically say, the RTC added, that accused-appellant did not
leave his seat and molest AAA.
The appellate court upheld the trial courts findings of fact and judgment of conviction. With
regard to the penalty, however, the CA ruled that the trial court erred when it imposed the death

sentence on the basis of the following aggravating circumstances: minority, use of bladed
weapon, and uninhabited place. Aside from the abolition of the death penalty, the CA held that:
It is basic in criminal procedure that the purpose of the information is to inform the accused of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him or the charge against him so as to enable him
to prepare a suitable defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of
the charges against him, and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple
rape and convicted of its qualified form punishable by death although the attendant
circumstances qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment were not set forth in the
indictment on which he was arraigned. More importantly, they are not the circumstances that
would call for the application of death penalty.
Issues: (1) the court gravely erred in finding the guilt of the accused (2) the court gravely erred in
imposing upon the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Ruling: Appeal has no merit.
In rape cases, courts are governed by the following principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of this crime,
only the complainant can testify against the assailant. Accordingly, conviction for rape may be
solely based on the complainants testimony provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
The trial court observed that AAAs testimony was credible, straightforward, clear, and
convincing. She ably identified accused-appellant as her attacker and described in detail how she
was sexually assaulted. There is no reason a child would fabricate such a serious accusation such
as rape and risk public humiliation if not to seek justice. It is for this reason that testimonies of
child-victims are normally given full weight and credence, since when minors say they were
raped, they say in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.
The victims credibility is further bolstered by the immediate reporting of the incident to her
mother and subsequently to the authorities. Moreover, the medical findings of Drs. Oyzon and
Palencia-Jadloc established the fact that complainant had sexual intercourse.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, could only offer denial and alibi as defenses. His alibi that
he spent the afternoon drinking with other visitors does not deserve merit since he was present in
the same house where the victim was.
It is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against them. It would be a denial of accused-appellants basic right to due process if
he is charged with simple rape and consequently convicted with certain qualifying circumstances
which were not alleged in the information.

The appellate court correctly ruled that the use of a bladed weapon and uninhabited place are not
circumstances that would call for the imposition of the death penalty.
The victims minority does not also qualify the offense to merit the death penalty. To warrant a
death sentence, the victim must be under seven (7) years of age.

Olivares VS. CA

GR 163866

FACTS:
Isidro Olivares was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching the breast and kissing the
lips of Cristina Elitiong, a 16-year old high school student employed by the former in making
sampaguita garlands during weekends. The trial court found him guilty; affirmed by the CA.
Petitioner now alleges that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was violated for failure to allege in the information the essential elements of the
offense for which he is being charged.
Issue: WON Olivares can be charged with violation of RA 7610.
Held:
Yes.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows:
1.

The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3.

The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
kissed Cristina and touched her breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances. The second element, i.e., that the act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise
present.
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused
because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct.
Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly

provided in Section 3 (b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed
that Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse because
Congress really intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or
intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only
child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse.
As to the contention that the minority of Cristina was not properly alleged in the information, the
SC ruled that: Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned in the
information, hence he was adequately informed of the age of the complainant.

ANDRES VS PEOPLE
Petitioners Antonio Andres (Antonio) and Rodolfo Duran (Rodolfo) were charged with
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539[4] before the RTC, Branch 18, MalolosCity, Bulacan,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of September, 2002, in the Municipality of
Sta. Maria, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping each other, with intent of gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away with them one Motorized Kawasaki Tricycle worth
P140,000.00 belonging to Catalino Eugenio to the damage and prejudice of the
said Catalino E. Eugenio in the amount of P140,000.00.
The petitioners also contend that assuming they were guilty of the crime charged, the penalty
imposed by the lower courts was erroneous. They argue that the information failed to allege any
circumstance that would warrant the imposition of a higher penalty.
We find the petition meritorious with respect to the penalty imposed and, thus, PARTIALLY
GRANT the petition. In all other respects, we AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the CA in
CA-G.R. CR No. 30243.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court limits this
Courts review to errors of law, not of fact, [5] unless the factual findings are devoid of evidentiary
support or unless the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. On factual
matters, the factual findings of the CA are conclusive and beyond our review, particularly when
the appellate court affirms the factual findings of the trial court, as we held in Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. CA.[6] We see no palpable error or any arbitrariness in the lower courts findings of
fact and, thus, do not have any basis to review these findings.

The appropriate question, a legal one, for our review is the third assigned error the
propriety of the penalty imposed. Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
[7]
provides:
SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective
of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less
than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four
months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen
years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force
upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
[Underscoring ours]

In the present case, the Information charging the petitioners with violation of R.A. No.
6539, as amended, did not allege that the carnapping was committed by means of violence
against, or intimidation of, any person, or force upon things. While these circumstances were
proven at the trial, they cannot be appreciated because they were not alleged in the
Information. Thus, the lower courts erred when they took these circumstances into account in
imposing the penalty which they pegged at seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty
(30) years imprisonment. In the absence of these circumstances, the charge against the petitioners
is confined to simple carnapping whose imposable penalty should have been imprisonment for
not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, and not more than seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months.
PEOPLE vs. JOSELITO NOQUE G.R.No. 175319 January
15, 2010 Del Castillo, J.:
Facts: Accused Joselito Noque was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted
by SPO4 Norberto Murillo on January 30, 2001. Two Informations were filed
before the RTC of Manila docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 01-189458 and 01189459 charging of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of a
regulated drug. The trial court convicted the accused on both charges. The
trial court held that while the Informations alleged methamphetamine
hydrochloride as the drug seized from the appellant, the drug actually
confiscated which was ephedrine, which by means of chemical reaction could
change into methamphetamine. Thus, the trial court ruled that the appellant
can be convicted of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes

proved. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision. The CA held that the
designations and allegations in the informations are for the crimes of illegal
sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs. Hence, the accused appealed
the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not appellants right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation was not violated.
Held: The appeal is bereft of merit.
As correctly observed by CA, the offenses designated in the Informations are
for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, which define and penalize
the crimes of illegal sale and possession of regulated drugs. The allegations
in the Informations for the unauthorized sale and possession of shabu or
methamphetamine hydrochloride are immediately followed by the qualifying
phrase which is a regulated drug. Thus, it is clear that the designations and
allegations in the Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of regulated drugs. Ephedrine has been classified as a regulated
drug by the Dangerous Drugs Board in Board Resolution No. 2, Series of
1988.
The CA correctly ruled that Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
can be applied by analogy in convicting the appellant of the offenses
charged, which are included in the crimes proved. Under these provisions, an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter. At any rate, a minor variance between the information
and the evidence does not alter the nature of the offense, nor does it
determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so that even if a discrepancy
exists, this cannot be pleaded as a ground for acquittal. In other words, his
right to be informed of the charges against him has not been violated
because where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly
informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses
included therein.

G.R. No. 147782, June 25, 2008]

JUANITA A. AQUINO, PETITIONER, TERESITA B. PAISTE, RESPONDENT.
FA C T S :

Respondent alleged that petitioner along with 3 others sold fake gold bars to
her

respondent brought petitioner to the NBI in the presence of a certain Atty.

Tolentino where the parties entered into an amicable settlement

in the amicable settlement, the accused waived her right to counsel despite
the recital of her constitutional rights made by NBI agent ElyTolentino in the
presence of a lawyer Gordon S. Uy

respondent filed a criminal complaint against Garganta, petitioner, and three

others for the crime of
estafa

prosecution presented as documentary evidence three (3) documents, one of

which is the amicable settlement signed in the NBI, while the defense relied
solely on its testimonial evidence

trial court rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of the crime charged

CA affirmed said conviction

Petitioner ascribes error to the CA when it gave due weight and

consideration to the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel that
she signed in the NBI during the custodial investigation

She claims she executed the agreement under threat and not freely
and voluntarily, in violation of Sec. 12(1)[9]
of the Constitution which guarantees her rights under the Miranda Rule
I SS U E :
whether or not petitioners right to counsel was violated
HELD: NO
when petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR on March
27, 1991 to be investigated, she was already under custodial investigation
and the constitutional guarantee for her rights under the Miranda Rule has
set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with one in
the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed

However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed

out by the CA, that the custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation
for the crime was either aborted or did not push through as the parties,
petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the amicable

settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with

both parties affixing their signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and
NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino
Petitioner's contention that her constitutional rights were breached and she
signed the document under duress falls flat for the following reasons:1)it is
undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the person of
Atty. Uy
2)petitioner could have asserted its right "to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses,"
[13]
for which she could have compelled Atty. Uy to testify but she did not. Basic
is the principle that consultation and information between counsel and client
is privileged communication and the counsel may not divulge these
without the consent of the client, petitioner never raised any objection
against Atty. Gordon Uy's appointment during the time she was in the NBI
and thereafter, when she signed the amicable settlement. She is deemed to
have engaged Atty. Uy when she conferred with him and thereafter signed
the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel in his presence. We
do not see how the answer of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon crossexamination about the petitioner's counsel in the NBI, could be evasive when
the NBI agent merely stated the fact that an independent counsel, Atty. Uy,
was provided petitioner.
4) when petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly
executed the amicable settlement. Verily, she was provided with an
independent counsel and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.
The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth."
Thus, the presenceof Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioner's rights even if the
custodial investigation did not push through and precluded any threat of
violence, coercion, or intimidation
5)even granting arguendo
that the amicable settlement is in the nature of an admission, the document
petitioner signed would still be admissible since none of her constitutional
rights were violated